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A
COLLECTION

Of Several

Philosophical Writings

O F

D^r. HENRY MORE,

Fellow of *Christ's-College* in *Cambridge*.

As Namely,

His *Antidote against Atheism.*
Appendix to the said Antidote.
Enthusiasmus Triumphatus.
Letters to Des Cartes, &c.
Immortality of the Soul.
Conjectura Cabbalistica.

The Fourth Edition Corrected and much Enlarged.

Aristot. Ethic. Lib. 10.

Εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νόος ὡρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βίος, θεῖος ὡρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον· χρηὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ψευδίζοντάς ἀνθρώπων φρενὰς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, ἀπαθανάτίζειν καὶ ἅπαντα ποιεῖν ὡρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κρείτιστον ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν.

And again Chap. 8. and 7.

Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ ἥτις ὄζειν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐπιστῆθεν αὐτὴ εὐαεῖη, ὅτι τὰς θεὰς μάλιστα ὑπερλήστα μανταίους καὶ εὐδαιμόνας εἶναι· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπὸς ὄζειν, ὅτω βιώσει· πρὸς ἀλλ' ἢ θεῶν τι ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρχει.

L O N D O N.

Printed by Joseph Downing in Bartholomew-Close near
West-Smithfield, MDCCXII.

COLLETTION

Biological Works

FRANCIS & TAYLOR



T H E

Preface General.

1. The Author's Excuse for such Alterations as he has made in this Edition of his Books.
2. The general Scope of this whole Volume.
3. The excellency and necessity of Reason for the maintaining of the Truth of the Christian Religion.
4. His Apology for interweaving *Platonism* and *Cartesianism* so frequently into his Writings.
5. Certain Advertisements for the more profitably perusing his Books.
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7. The abovesaid Principle further illustrated and confirmed out of *Aristotle*.
8. The Author's Excuse for his omitting in his *Antidote*, to confute the *unconcluding* Reasons some use for the proof of a God.
9. His Excuse for not adding a Treatise of *Superstition* to that of *Enthusiasm*.
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11. Certain remarkable things concerning *Des-Cartes*, and his Writings.
12. Certain Considerations laid together which wholly prevent all imaginable Objections against the Extension of a Spirit.
13. The properties and offices of the Spirit of Nature further cleared and confirmed. A Confectary concerning the Conduct of Souls by the Spirit of Nature.
14. That the ancient *Judaical Cabbala* did consist of what we now call *Platonism* and *Cartesianism*, made farther probable from the Lineage of the *Pythagorick School*.
15. Particular considerations out of *Pherecydes*, *Parmenides*, and *Aristotle*, that might move one to believe, that the whole *Pythagorick Philosophy*, as well *Physical* as *Metaphysical*, was the Wisdom of the *Jews*.
16. The unhappy disjunction of the *Physical* part of the *Cabbala*, from the *Metaphysical* in *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*; with the Author's serious endeavour of re-uniting them again.
17. That what he applies to the Text of *Moses* in his *Philosophick Cabbala*, he conceives is *rational*, and is assured that it *exquisitely fits* the Text, but deliberates further concerning the *Truth* thereof.
18. The Testimony of several holy Persons that did either plainly assert, or at least had no dislike of the Doctrine of the Soul's *Præ-existence*; *Clem. Alexand.* *Origines Adamantius*, *Clemens* his Scholar, *S. Basil*, and *Gregory Nazianzen*, *Synesius* Bishop of *Cyrene*, *Arnobius*, *Prudentius*, *S. Augustine*, the Author of the Book of *Wisdom*, and our blessed Saviour.
19. That there is not the least clashing of *Præ-existence* with the Derivation of Original Sin from *Adam*.
20. That Mathematical certitude in mere Philosophical Speculations needs ob-

lige no man's conscience to make profession of them against the good liking of his Superiours. 21. That if the Philosophy which he has applied to Moses his Text be true, it is a real Restoration of the Mosaick Cabbala.

READER,

The Author's I.
Excuse for
such Altera-
tions as he has
made in this
Edition of his
Books.



THAT these Writings which thou findest bound up in one volume may appear also to be held together in some common consideration, I thought it not amiss to speak something by way of General Preface to them all. And therefore if thy curiosity be forward to enquire what I have done in these new Editions of my Books, I am ready to inform thee, that I have taken the same liberty in this Intellectual or Theoretical Garden of my own planting, that men usually take in their Natural ones: which is, To set, or pluck up, to transplant and inoculate where, and what they please. And therefore if I have rased out some things, (which yet are but very few) and transposed others, and interferred others, I hope I shall seem injurious to no man in ordering and cultivating this Philosophical Plantation of mine, according to mine own humour and liking.

The general
Scope of this
whole Vo-
lume.

2. But these are smaller matters, and scarce any part of what I was a going to speak. The great Cement that holds these several Discourses together is one main Design, which they jointly drive at, and which, I think, is confessedly generous and important; namely, The knowledge of God, and therein of true Happiness, so far as Reason can cut her way through those darkneses and difficulties she is incumbred with in this life. Which though they be many and great, yet I should belie the sense of my own success, if I should pronounce them insuperable; as also, if I were deprived of that sense, should lose many pleasures and enjoyments of mind, which I am now conscious to my self of. Amongst which, there is none so considerable as that tacit reflexion within my self, what real service may redound to Religion from these my labours. For what greater satisfaction can there be to a rational Spirit, than to find himself able to appeal to the strictest Rules of Reason and Philosophy, if those Doctrines of the Existence of God, and the Immortality of the Soul, be not true? And what greater Establishment to Religion, than to discover these two grand Pillars thereof so firm and stable, even upon these very grounds that our own faculties do naturally assent to as true? Which cannot but conciliate much honour and reverence to the Priesthood, and stop the mouths of shallow and profane Wits, that are so prone to look upon every Priest as either a Fool or an Impostor.

The excel-
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3. Nor would I be thought to restrain the Reasonableness of our Religion to those two main points only, as if the rest were not so too. For I conceive Christian Religion rational throughout, and I think I have proved it to be so in my Mystery of Godliness. Which I must confess was the main, if not the only scope of my so long and anxious search into Reason and Philosophy, and without which I had proved but a lazy and remiss enquirer into the nature of things. For to heap up a deal of Reading, and Notions, and Experiments, without some such noble and important Design, had

had but been, as I phansy'd, to make my Mind or Memory a shop of small-wares. But having this so eminent a scope in my view, and taking up that generous resolution of Marcus Cicero, *Rationem, quo ea me cunque ducet, sequar*; I make account I began then to adorn my Function, and amongst other Priestly Habiliments, in particular to put on the *Λόγην*, or Rationale, the Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which most justly challenges place in that region which is called the seat of the Heart; the simplicity and sincerity of that part being the Root or Well-spring of the soundest and purest Reason. And truly I cannot well imagine what may be the moral account why Aaron's Robes should be such an express Representation of the Universe, (*ἀπὸ κόσμου καὶ μίμημα τοῦ κόσμου*, as * Philo * Philo de Monarch. calls it) as in that every Priest should endeavour, according to his opportunity and capacity, to be also as much as he can a Rational man or Philosopher. (For which reason certainly Universities were first erected, and are still continued to this very day.) And Philo himself insinuates something to this purpose; *Βλέπει δὲ τὸν ἀρχιερεῖα εἰκόντα τὸ παντὸς ἔχει ἐμφορῇ, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς σωματικῆς διασῶν παρέχη τὴν ἰδίαν βίαν τῆς ὅλων φύσεως*. That the High Priest continually reflecting upon his attire, which represented the Universe, might be re-minded not to do or speak any thing contrary to the laws thereof, or repugnantly to the Rules of eternal Reason, which is that everlasting High Priest, as * Philo elsewhere intimates. *Δύο γὰρ ὡς εἰκάν, ἱερὰ τε· ἓν μὲν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς ὁ πρωτόγονος ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ, ἥ ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς ἀληθινὸν ἀνθρώπου*. That there are two Temples of God: the one the Universe, in which the First-Born of God, the Divine Logos, or eternal Wisdom is High Priest; the other the rational Soul, whose Priest is the true man, that is to say, the Intellect, (as Plotinus somewhere speaks) and which is the Image of the Divine Logos, as Clemens has expressed himself. *Εἰκὼν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλικὸς, ἀνθρώπου ἀπαρχὴς, εἰκὼν δ' εἰκὼν ἀνθρώπου νῦν*. The Image of God is the Royal and Divine Logos, the impassible man; but the Image of this Image is the humane Intellect. *In his De Somniis.*

So that though the Divine Reason or Logos be that eternal High Priest which in time was to be incarnate, and of which Aaron in his Priestly Robes was but a Type and Figure; yet Man being an Image of him, and every Priest in a more special manner, he is to endeavour the adorning of himself with such accomplishments as are set out by these rich and precious Habiliments of Aaron; amongst which the Rationale had a chief place. For though it belong to that everlasting Logos alone to be the Maker of the world, and to fill out all parts thereof by his presence, and to be in a manner vitally clad therewith; yet, through the goodness of God, it may fall to the share of every Christian Priest, to be invested as it were, and adorned with the Knowledge of the Laws and Measures of the Creation, and to take notice of the Reasons of Nature, of which the eternal Logos is the Maker and Governour. Which is very consonant to what Philo writes of the Figure of the Rationale, or Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which he saith was square, *ἐπὶ χοῦ καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ τὸν τῶ ἀνθρώπου βεβηκέναι πάντη, καὶ κατὰ μὲν ὅπῃν καθεστάναι*. Because the reason of Universal Nature, and of Man, ought to stand firm on all sides, and to be no where vacillant. Which things, as they were figured in Aaron, and are fulfilled

immensely in Christ, so are they also in their measure to be fulfilled in the Christian Priesthood. For if it were not lawful to offer up the blind or lame under the Law, sure the Priest ought to be neither under the Gospel, nor yet the People (so far as is possible) whom he presents to God.

To take away Reason therefore, under what Fanatick pretence soever, is to disrobe the Priest, and despoil him of his Breast-plate, and, which is worst of all, to rob Christianity of that special Prerogative it has above all other Religions in the World; namely, That it dares appeal unto Reason. Which as many as understand the true Interest of our Religion, will not fail to stick closely to, the contrary betraying it to the unjust suspicion of Falshood, and equallizing it to every vain Impostor. For take away Reason, and all Religions are alike true; as the Light being removed, all things are of one colour. Nay, which is worst of all, that Religion which is the truest, will seem the falsest in this superinduced Darkneß, it so strictly and positively declaring it self to be the only true. Which will not by any means be allowed, nor can any way be discovered in that Region of Midnight, which make all things look alike.

His Apology
for interwea-
ving Plato-
nism and Car-
tesianism so
frequently in-
to his Wri-
tings.

4. Which serious and weighty considerations lying before me, urged me with all possible care and vigour to search to the very bottom of things, that my heart might not fail me in the day of Tryal. The result of which Investigation is much of it compriz'd in this present Volume. Wherein, as I have gained no small satisfaction to my self in those grand points I have endeavoured to clear, so I am as desirous that nothing that occurs there may occasion the least dissatisfaction to others. And I think it will be impossible any thing should, if they will be but pleased to take notice of my Design, which is not to Theologize in Philosophy, but to draw an Exoterick Fence, or exterior Fortification about Theology; That making good those Out-works against all the assaults of the confident Atheist, and his Gigantick batteries raised against the belief of the existence of a God, and of a Reward in the World to come, I might teach him what a man of vanity and temerity he is, in that he imagines it so feasible a thing, in his unskilful thoughts, to over-run the Holy City and Sanctuary, he being so easily beat off from the walls thereof. And this is the true and genuine meaning of my interweaving of Platonism and Cartesianism so frequently as I do in these Writings, I making use of these Hypotheses as invincible Bulwarks against the most cunning and most mischievous efforts of Atheism. For I am certain that, taking the Suppositions which I have culled out of these two Philosophies for true, (and let our Adversaries prove them false if they can) there is not any Objection that Atheism can make against the above-named Doctrines, but I can return to it a full and irrefutable Answer.

Whence it is not hopeleß, but that as we may put many to flight, so the rest may voluntarily surrender themselves as Prisoners, being carried captive by the power of Reason, into a true belief of things for the main; and having all hopes of an After-impunity intercepted by so clear a conviction of the Soul's Immortality, be engaged to turn real Christians in the plainer points thereof, and be willingly detain'd in the outward Court, though by reason of the present Weakneß of their sight, they may not be as yet fit to enter into the more sacred smoak of the Temple. Wherefore I being so faithfully, and, as I conceive, so usefully taken up in managing these Out-works,

as I may so call them, I shall not impute it, no not so much as to an over-hasty zeal, but to mere mishap, if I be pelted behind my back by any shots of Obloquie from any unknown servant of the Sanctuary; and presume that if I receive any hurt, that their smart will be the greatest that did it, when they shall consider they have wounded a true and faithful friend, and even then when he was so busily and watchfully employ'd in facing the common Enemy.

5. If any expect or desire any general Instruction or Preparation for Certain Ad-
the more profitably perusing of these my Writings, I must profess, that vertisements for the more profitable perusing his Books. I can give none that is peculiar to them, but what will fit all Writings that are writ with Freedom and Reason. And this one Royal Rule I would recommend for all, Not to judge of the truth of any Proposition till we have a settled and determinate apprehension of the terms thereof. Which Law, though it be so necessary and indispensable, yet there is none so frequently broken as it: the effect whereof is those many heaps of voluminous writings, and inept Oppositions and Controversies that fill the World. Which were impossible to be, if men had not got an habit of flustering mere words against one another, without taking notice of any determinate sense, and so did fight as it were with so many Hercules clubs made of Pastboard, which cause a great sound, but do no execution towards the ending of disputes. For as no man will ever be so extravagant as to affirm, that a Triangle is a Quadrangle, or a Square a Circle, having the distinct Ideas of those Figures in his mind: so it would be as impossible for him to pronounce of any thing else falsely and absurdly, if he had as perfect and settled a Notion of the things concerning which he seems to pronounce. But this first and main Principle of wisdom being neglected, it is no wonder that men clash as ridiculously and causelessly as those two Country Clowns, who in their cups had like to have gone to blows, because the one professed himself a Lutheran, the other a Martinist.

I might add also another Advertisement (which will contribute much towards a greater Compendiousness in Controversies) which I think I have hinted upon occasion elsewhere; namely, That what will prove any thing, will prove nothing. Which if it were thoroughly taken notice of, would not only inable a man to defeat the seeming force of innumerable impertinent assaults, but also keep himself off, if he have any ingenuity in him, from assaulting, or rather disturbing, or interrupting the composure and silence of another man's mind, by the empty noise of such weak and groundless Arguments; I mean such as will infer or maintain Falshood as well as Truth. For all such Arguments ought to be exploded, especially in Philosophy. And I think if this kind of weapon were once out of fashion, contest would soon be at an end, and such a victory follow as all would be gainers by it.

6. But in the third and last place, (and which, though it has some considerable influence every where, yet is more peculiarly requisite in perusing writings upon such Subjects as these I treat of) I should commend to them that would successfully philosophize, the belief and endeavour after a certain Principle more noble and inward than Reason it self, and without which Reason will falter, or at least reach but to mean and frivolous things. I have a sense of something in me while I thus speak, which I must confess, is of so retruse a nature, that I want a name for it, unless I should

Divine Sagacity a Principle antecedent to successful Reason in Contemplations of the highest concernment.

adventure to term it Divine Sagacity, which is the first Rise of successful Reason, especially in matters of great comprehension and moment, and without which a man is as it were in a thick wood, and may make infinite promising attempts, but can find no open Champain, where one may freely look about him every way, (the *πρόιον τῆς ἀληθείας*) without the safe conduct of this good Genius.

All Pretenders to Philosophy will indeed be ready to magnify Reason to the skies, to make it the light of Heaven, and the very Oracle of God: but they do not consider that the Oracle of God is not to be heard but in his holy Temple, that is to say, in a good and holy man, thoroughly sanctified in Spirit, Soul, and Body. For there is a sanctity even of Body and Complexion, which the sensually-minded do not so much as dream of. Aaron's Rationale, his *Δόρυ*, or Oracle of Reason, did it not include in it the Urim and Thummim, the Purity and Integrity of the Will and Affections, as well as the Light of the Understanding? Was not that Breast-plate square, not only in reference to the firmness of Ratiocination, as Philo intimates; but also to denote the Evenness and Uprightness of his Spirit, that will take upon him to pronounce great Truths, that he must be, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ τεταγμένος ἀνὰ ψυχῆν* and that not only according to the measure of the City, but of the Sanctuary; not only to a Political degree of virtue, but Cathartical, or rather which

* Ennead. 1.
lib. 2.

* Plotinus places *ἐν τῷ καθαρίσματι*, and implies a Soul already purged.

Let a Man adorn himself as well as he can with the History of Universal Nature, represented by the long sacerdotal Robe, if this Breast-plate with the Urim and Thummim be wanting to him that thus far would act the Priest, he must of necessity fall so far short of approving himself a sound Philosopher, being at least unable to utter any Oracles himself, and but in a bad capacity of receiving them when they are utterr'd by another. For if this Divine Sagacity be wanting, by reason of the impurity of a man's Spirit, he can neither hit upon a right sense of things himself, nor easily take it, or rightly pursue it, when he is put upon by another. Which odd Position of mine, though it may make them fret and storm that have made the Contempt of Morality one part of their Philosophy, and may think themselves uncivilly dealt with, to be pronounced incompetent Judges of such things as they took for granted to be within their own sphere; yet I could not conceal so concerning a Truth, especially it self being not at all unphilosophical.

The above-
said Principle
further illu-
strated and
confirmed
out of Ari-
stotle.
De Subtilex-
ercit. 3. 7.
sect. 25.

* Arist. Moral.
Eudem. lib. 7.
cap. 14.

7. For it is not the saying of that so universally-applauded Aristotle, *Κινεῖ γὰρ πῶς πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, λόγος δ' ἀρχὴ ἔστι λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρῆστον*; What Plato, nay, what Chrysostom, what Augustin could have spoke more heavenly Language? Scaliger transported at the view of this Text, breaks out into this Encomiastick Interrogation, *Quid ais, divine vir? Estne in nobis aliquid divinum quod sit præstantius ipsa ratione? An tibi quoque noti fuerunt ipsi radii spiritus sancti? &c.* And that we may not think that this *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον* is any part of our selves, it appears both from what goes before and what follows after, that it is the very Deity: For he having made this the Question; *τίς ἡ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*; What is the beginning of motion in the Soul? the full Answer follows thus, *

Δηλαρ

Δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις θεοῖς, καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνῳ. κινεῖ γὰρ πᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν ἡμῶν θεοῖς. λόγος δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν κρείττον. πῶς δ' αὖ ἐν κρείττον καὶ ὁσιότητις πᾶσι, θεοῖς; It is evident, saith he, that it is, as in the Universe, God himself, and all in him. For it is the same Numen in us that moves all things in some sort or other: And the Beginning of Reason is not Reason, but something which is better: but what can be better than Science but God? *The Argument of the Chapter is a Question* οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, of good success in affairs, whether it be εὐσέβεια, νόμος, ἢ ἐπιστήμη, πᾶσι πᾶσι that is to say, whether it be by Nature, Reason, or by the procuration of some good Genius, of some δαίμων ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκρηνύτης, they are Aristotle's own words; which I cite the rather, because it is the only place that I know wherein there is such express mention of Dæmons: Which yet he does not assert here neither; but upon occasion of this subject his mind swelling higher, rose at last to such a pitch as to utter this so much admired Aphorism by Jul. Scaliger, namely, That there is something before and better than Reason, whence Reason it self has its rise.

Which though Aristotle mainly appropriates to external Affairs, I must (and may with equal right) transfer also to the Negotiations of the Mind, and the success of pure Speculation: Where the ἡ δὲ δία δυνάμειν as he calls it, is more likely to be continued, and to prove constant, (by reason of the natural cohesion of Truth with an impolluted Soul) than it is in external transactions. This intellectual success therefore is from the Presence of God, who does (κινεῖν πᾶς πᾶσι) move all Things in some sort or other, but residing in the most undefiled Spirit, moves it in the most excellent manner, and endues it with that Divine Sagacity I spoke of, which is a more inward, compendious, and comprehensive Presentation of Truth, ever antecedent to that Reason which in Theories of greatest importance approves it self afterwards, upon the exactest examination, to be most solid and perfect every way, and is truly that wisdom which is peculiarly styled, the Gift of God, and hardly competitible to any but to persons of a pure and unspotted mind. Of so great concernment is it sincerely to endeavour to be holy and good.

8. This is all that I thought fit to preface in a more general way. I will briefly cast an eye also upon the several parts of this present Volume, if any thing haply occurs that will be requisite for me to either excuse, complete, or any way give light to. As it may be some may conceive it an Omission in my Antidote, in that I have not brought in, and confuted the lubricious or unconvulsive Arguments which some use to prove the Existence of a Deity. But I think it may not unbeseem one that is faithful to the Cause, not to be over-industrious in discovering the weakness of such Arguments as are meant for the engendering in mens minds the belief of that Truth, which is of so necessary and vast importance for mankind to be persuaded of. For I charitably surmise, that the first inventors of those reasons thought them conclusive, or else they would not have made use of them. Whence it will follow, that they still may have their force with those that are but of the same pitch with their first Proposers. And he that guesses right, and goes on his journey, will as certainly come to the place he aims at, as he that perfectly knows the way. I must confess, I have been more free in my censure of Des-Cartes his second and third Argument: but there is the less hurt done, they being not so popular; and

The Author's excuse for his omitting in his Antidote, to confute the unconvulsive reasons some use for the proof of a God.

and besides, it was fit to shew my impartialness, because I have with that confidence avouched the solidity of the first. Which the more I considered, the more firm I found, nor have to this day met with either man or book that could produce any thing material towards the Confutation of it.

His Excuse
for not ad-
ding a Trea-
tise of Super-
stition to that
of Enthu-
siasm.

9. What Defect any one may spy in my Treatise of Enthusiasm, I cannot so easily presage, nor can secure my self from seeming deficient to him that more resentingly considers the usefulness of that Treatise, in that I have not added another of Superstition. But I have naturally and heedlessly hit upon that judicious advice of the Poet.

Et quæ

Desperas tractata nitescere posse relinque.

For I must confess I do not look upon that Subject as any thing polishable by my hand, it being an argument fitter for Rhetorick than Philosophy. Besides that I never found my mind low or abject enough to sink into any sense or conceit of that Dispensation, experimentally to find what is at the bottom thereof. I must ingenuously confess that I have a natural touch of Enthusiasm in my Complexion, but such as, I thank God, was ever governable enough, and have found at length perfectly subduable. In virtue of which victory, I know better what is in Enthusiasts than they themselves, and therefore was able to write what I have wrote with life and Judgment, and shall, I hope, contribute not a little to the peace and quiet of this Kingdom thereby.

But having had such a notion of God from my very youth, as represented him to me as the most noble and excellent Being that can be, it could never enter into my mind, that he was either irritable or propitiable, by the omitting or performing of any mean and insignificant services, such as are neither perfective of humane nature, nor the genuine result of that perfection. And therefore I had an early belief that he served God best, that was was least envious, worldly, or sensual; that delighted most in the common good of the Universe, and had the strongest faith in the bounty and mercy of God, of which his Son Jesus is the most palpable pledge that he could exhibit to the World. Which constant frame of Spirit made me wholly incapable of the least tincture of Superstition. For it is the Ignorance of better things that causes those perplexities and consternations of mind about matters of less moment.

The End of Religion is humane Happiness and Perfection; and he that so serves God as phansying Him to want any thing of his, instead of honouring of him, reproaches him. Wherefore Superstition is always accompanied with Ignorance or Hypocrisy. The first, when not knowing what that good and acceptable Will of God is, which is to become like unto him, (Τιμὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ τὸ δίδωαι ὁμοιωσιν, as Pythagoras taught) they do express their zeal and devotion in such things as neither themselves, nor any one else is better for. The second, when the same Trifles are offered up to God, not so much out of ignorance of what is better, as out of a kind of tacit fraud and cunning circumvention, as it were, of God, in making with him, or rather, whether he will or no, such an unequal exchange. By which Delusions, though they may for a while in some sort pacify their false hearts and consciences, yet in the mean time they really do but provoke God by their sacrifices of Fools.

This

This is the sum of what I am able to conceive of this other Disease of Superstition, which is by mere collection of Reason, having had no experience therein for the quickening my style, or enlarging my thoughts thereupon. But I think I may safely affirm, as I have elsewhere, That it is Superstition (if it be not Vain-glory, Interest, or something worse) where men have an over-proportioned Zeal for, or against such things in Religion as God puts little or no price upon either their performance or omission. Which thing, if it were seriously and conscientiously considered, would tend very much to the laying or preventing the usual blusters of Christendom. And there can be no better effect of writing a whole Volume. But I must confess that the success and growth of the Church is an Arcanum that lies more deep in Providence, and rather is a Mystery of Life, than of external Reason. Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but God gives the Increase.

10. As for the Letters that follow in the next place, themselves speak the occasion of them. I have superadded that to V. C. as for other reasons, so chiefly for the begetting a better opinion in such as are not so well acquainted with Des Cartes, and his Writings. For it cannot be but that men of very excellent spirits may labour with prejudice against so worthy an Author, by misrepresentation of things. And I must confess, that the very newness alone is occasion enough, even to those that are truly ingenuous, to make a stand; that which is strange having something of the face of what is hostile. Whence Hostis and Peregrinus had once the same signification, as Cicero observes. And it is a piece of Rudeness and Unskilfulness in the nature of things, and in the perfection of Divine Providence, (who has generally implanted a tenacious adhesion to what has customarily been received, that the mind of man might be the safer Receptacle when it lights upon what is best,) to conceit that because a Truth is demonstratively evident in it self, that therefore its Opposite shall immediately surrender the Castle. Which consideration with the ingenuous cannot but secure the continuance of unfeigned civility and respect even to the jealous Suspecters or Opposers of new Truths, and make them look upon it as a piece of surprizing Ignorance or Inhumanity to be otherwise affected towards them.

11. What particularly to take notice of in that Letter occurs not to my mind, unless I should applaud the luckiness of my Conjecture concerning Des-Cartes his distorting the true and natural Idea of motion, in reference to Galilæo's ill hap, who was so rudely handled for his Hypothesis of the Earth, by a Council of Cardinals. To which that he had an eye is now very evident from several of his * Letters to Marsennus, of which * Lett. de Mr. Passages, I had no knowledge till within these few days, and my Letter it self was writ before this second Volume of Des-Cartes his came out. But in the mean time I cannot but observe the inconvenience this external force and fear does to the Common-wealth of Learning, and how many innocent well-deserving young Wits have been put upon the Rack, as well as Galilæo into Prison. For his Imprisonment frightened Des Cartes into such a distorted description of Motion, that no man's Reason could make good sense of it, nor Modesty permit him to fancy any thing Nonsense in so excellent an Author.

My

and besides, it was fit to shew my impartialness, because I have with that confidence avouched the solidity of the first. Which the more I considered, the more firm I found, nor have to this day met with either man or book that could produce any thing material towards the Confutation of it.

His Excuse
for not ad-
ding a Trea-
tise of Super-
stition to that
of Enthu-
siasm.

9. What Defect any one may spy in my Treatise of Enthusiasm, I cannot so easily presage, nor can secure my self from seeming deficient to him that more resentingly considers the usefulness of that Treatise, in that I have not added another of Superstition. But I have naturally and heedlessly hit upon that judicious advice of the Poet.

Et quæ

Desperas tractata nitescere posse relinque.

For I must confess I do not look upon that Subject as any thing polishable by my hand, it being an argument fitter for Rhetorick than Philosophy. Besides that I never found my mind low or abject enough to sink into any sense or conceit of that Dispensation, experimentally to find what is at the bottom thereof. I must ingenuously confess that I have a natural touch of Enthusiasm in my Complexion, but such as, I thank God, was ever governable enough, and have found at length perfectly subduable. In virtue of which victory, I know better what is in Enthusiasts than they themselves, and therefore was able to write what I have wrote with life and Judgment, and shall, I hope, contribute not a little to the peace and quiet of this Kingdom thereby.

But having had such a notion of God from my very youth, as represented him to me as the most noble and excellent Being that can be, it could never enter into my mind, that he was either irritable or propitiable, by the omitting or performing of any mean and insignificant services, such as are neither perfective of humane nature, nor the genuine result of that perfection. And therefore I had an early belief that he served God best, that was was least envious, worldly, or sensual; that delighted most in the common good of the Universe, and had the strongest faith in the bounty and mercy of God, of which his Son Jesus is the most palpable pledge that he could exhibit to the World. Which constant frame of Spirit made me wholly incapable of the least tincture of Superstition. For it is the Ignorance of better things that causes those perplexities and consternations of mind about matters of less moment.

The End of Religion is humane Happiness and Perfection; and he that so serves God as phansying Him to want any thing of his, instead of honouring of him, reproaches him. Wherefore Superstition is always accompanied with Ignorance or Hypocrisy. The first, when not knowing what that good and acceptable Will of God is, which is to become like unto him, (Τιμὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ τῷ δίδωται ὁμοίωσις, as Pythagoras taught) they do express their zeal and devotion in such things as neither themselves, nor any one else is better for. The second, when the same Trifles are offered up to God, not so much out of ignorance of what is better, as out of a kind of tacit fraud and cunning circumvention, as it were, of God, in making with him, or rather, whether he will or no, such an unequal exchange. By which Delusions, though they may for a while in some sort pacify their false hearts and consciences, yet in the mean time they really do but provoke God by their sacrifices of Fools.

This

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My

Lett. 114.

My main design in my Letter was to clear Cartesius from that giddy and groundless suspicion of Atheism, (which surely could not be taken up by any but the more course and vulgar Spirits,) which I conceive I have done fully, and to the effectual stopping of all such surmises for the future, even in the weakest and most scrupulous suspects of him. And yet I might have added more even out of his first Volume of Letters, namely, That he did not only believe the Existence of God, but also his particular Providence, which he felt and acknowledged in that special Impulse and Success he had in his Philosophical Studies. Which I less wonder at, he beginning so piously in his youth, and exercising his first style upon that excellent Theme, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom, as I was inform'd by Letters from Mr. Clerfelier at Paris, when he sent me a Catalogue of what Writings Cartesius had left behind him. The notice whereof did not a little please me, it being the very Text upon which my self first common-placed in our College-Chappel.

Lett. de. Mr.
Des Cartes,
Tom. 2. Lett.
24.

But that which enravishes me the most is, that we both setting out from the same Lifts, though taking several ways, the one travelling in the lower Road of Democritism, amidst the thick dust of Atoms and flying particles of Matter; the other tracing it over the high and airy Hills of Platonism, in that more thin and subtil Region of Immateriality, meet together notwithstanding at last (and certainly not without a Providence) at the same Gaol, namely at the Entrance of the holy Bible, dedicating our joint Labours to the use and glory of the Christian Church, laying at their feet the most true, as we conceive, and the most approvable Philosophical Interpretation of the three first Chapters of Genesis as ever was yet offered to the World since the loss of the ancient Judaical Cabbala. Which is not a mere strain of Rhetorick of mine, but a free acknowledgment, or rather serious boast of Des-Cartes himself, in a Letter to a certain Friend, where he professes that he had found his own Philosophy even to admiration agreeable to the Text of Moses, above all other Interpretations whatsoever. Which I have abundantly made good in the Defense of my Philosophick Cabbala, and above what Des-Cartes could well perform, unless he had light on the same Key with my self.

Certain con-
siderations
laid together
which whol-
ly prevent all
imaginable
Objections
against the
Extension of
a Spirit.

12. Concerning my Immortality of the Soul, I shall take notice only of these two Dissatisfactions, which, because they seem main ones to some, though they never did so to me, I shall now bring into view. The first of which is this, That I have admitted a kind of Extension in the nature of a Spirit; the second, That I have not admitted perception in the Spirit of Nature. But as for the first, I can justly apologize for my self, that Necessity has no Law, and if they consider the demonstrable evidence of these two Conclusions, 1. That there is a Substance immaterial, really and specifically distinct from Body, 2. and, That there is no real Entity but what is in some sense extended, it will be impossible for them not to conclude as well as we, That a Spirit is in some sort extended also. Wherefore it is an unskilfully-framed complaint that cavils at the Inference, without searching into the strength of the Premisses. I do therefore here appeal to any indifferent Reader, whether I have not Mathematically demonstrated the Truth of the First both in my Antidote, and my Treatise of the Soul's Immortality.

And

And shall now, for his fuller satisfaction, demonstrate the Second more punctually; namely, that neither the Soul, nor any thing else, can be Totum in toto, and totum in qualibet parte, but that this Assertion (as I had once occasion to write to an ingenious friend of mine) is a mere chiming contradiction. Which I proved to him thus: namely, That Totum comprehends all that is of a thing both in a positive sense, and (consequently) in a negative, that is to say, If all A be in B, there is nothing left to be in C distant from B. For it is as if one should say, there is nothing of A but what is concluded within B, and yet at the same moment not only something of A, but all A should be in C also: which is impossible in any singular or individual Essence; and Universals are not Things, but Notions.

To which we may further add, that this Supposition makes that of which it is affirmed as small as the smallest thing conceivable. For if the Total be on every point, it is plain, that the amplitude of this Total is no bigger than the point it is in. Which is intolerable, apply'd to the Deity, and ridiculous in every thing else.

Wherefore it being so mathematically demonstrable that there is that which is properly called Spirit, and that no Being at all can be totally present in distant parts of Matter at once, it does unavoidably follow, that a Spirit is in some sort extended.

But you will further urge; If Spirit be extended as well as Body, how shall we conceive Perception more competent to a Spirit than to a Body? To which briefly I answer, that I have already demonstrated that Perception is incompatible to Body, which I challenge any one to do if he can, concerning a Spirit: And demand further of them that fancy a Spirit totally present in every part of Matter, whether they can any better conceive thereby the immediate reason of the power of perception; and ask those that say, It is neither as a Mathematical point, nor totally present, nor extended, whether they conceive it any thing more capable thereby of that vital Sympathy and Coactivity that transforms Objects in their exactest circumstances to the common Percipient. I dare say, if they will speak what they find, they will not fail to return answer, That they are not at all advantaged for the conceiving of the immediate reason of either simple Perception, or of the abovesaid vital Sympathy, by any such suppositions.

And therefore in the third place, I will take the boldness to advertise them, that the truth of my 9. Axiom, that declares, That some powers and properties are immediate to a Subject, had already fully accomplished my Purpose. For there being other properties in Body that intercepted from it the capacity of perceiving, it was necessarily left to some Substance Incorporeal, to be the immediate Subject of Perception. For it must be the immediate power of some Subject or other, so far as our Understanding reaches, nor can we find out an adequate cause besides the Subject it self, according to which precisely any thing is perceptive. It is true, that we are conscious to our selves, that that Being that is perceptive must be very Unitive, and Reason does evidence to us, that to be One more than Matter is one, (which is one only by juxtaposition of parts) is a necessary requisite of that which is capable of the function of Common-percipient, and therefore precedes in Nature. But that

which is as much one as any thing can be without a contradiction, that is to say, is so much one that it has immediately of its own nature vital Sympathy and Coactivity of parts, as I may so speak, and perfect Indiscernibility, does not for all this, imply a power of perception residing therein. For I conceive every Spirit may be thus Unitive; but I am not assured that every Spirit has Perception, but rather on the contrary, that some have not. Wherefore though every thing that is perceptive must be a Spirit, yet every Spirit need not be perceptive. Whence Perception must be an immediate power in that Rank of Spirits that are perceptive; and therefore it must be an argument of no small ἀταξία, or Unskilfulness to ask or expect a reason why it is so.

Nor can we give any account of that vital Oneness in every Spirit, consisting in Sympathy and Coactivity of parts, unless we should alledge that it is very fit, seeing the nature of a Spirit is opposite to that of matter, that the first and most immediate consequences of their natures should be opposite also; and that therefore, it being here acknowledged that Matter is stupid, or destitute of vital Sympathy and Coactivity, Spirit must be vital, and endued with such like properties: or that, as Matter which has not that Essential Unity consisting in Indiscernibility of parts, is also devoid of that vital Oneness; so Spirit, which has this Essential Unity, should consequently be endued with the vital. But this is not altogether according to the severity of the manner of reasoning which I affect; though the argument be in no wise contemptible, if we consider the immediate Opposition of the two species; and that it is but the first degree and most immediate emergency of Vitality, which we contend for in the comparison.

But I did not care to stand upon such kind of ratiocinations, being well assured that I had already done my business in merely demonstrating, that what I assert to belong to Spirit, was incompatible to Matter or Body, and that therefore Spirit must be necessarily acknowledged both to be, and to be also the Subject of such powers and properties; namely, of vital Sympathy and Coactivity of parts, and, which is the flower of all, of the faculty of Perception. And who can question but that they are rightly lodged?

For I think there is none but will acknowledge, that there is generally in all men, either a confused presage, or more determinate Notion, that that which has this power of Sympathy and Perception is the most subtil and unitive thing that is. Now I dare appeal to any one, if he can conceive any thing more subtil, or more unitive than the Essential Notion of a Spirit, as it is immediately counterdistinct to Matter. For can there be any thing more one than what is utterly indiscernible into parts? or more subtil than what is not only penetrative of Matter, but also of it self, or of things of its own kind? For Spirit will penetrate Spirit, though Matter cannot Matter. Wherefore there being no ἀντίωμα in a Spirit, neither to its own kind, nor to any thing else, it is evident, that it is the most subtil thing that is, and that therefore the communication of vital Impresses (and all Impresses here are vital, though not all Perceptions, nor any of them Motions) is not made by the jogging or crouding of parts, but by Spiritual Sympathy, which is more loose and free from those restrictions that are in the Mechanical laws of Matter.

Of which the natural Confectary is, That to resolve a Phænomenon into Sympathy, is not always to take sanctuary in the Asylum of Fools. For it is the result of very subtil and operose Demonstration, to come to the certain knowledge of the existence of spiritual Beings; which once granted, their nature is such, that it is impossible but that any one should confess that they are the proper subjects of Sympathy and Perception. And therefore to conclude that to be by Sympathy, that we can demonstrate not to be by mere mechanical Powers, is not to shelter a man's self in the common Refuge of Ignorance, but to tell the proximate and immediate cause of a Phænomenon, which is to philosophize to the height.

Briefly therefore to conclude: I having demonstrated with evidence no less than Mathematical, That there are Substances incorporeal, and that all Substance is in some sense extentional, because there is no Substance but is, or at least may be essentially present to Matter; it will necessarily follow from hence, That incorporeal Substance is in some sort extended; and consequently that a Soul or Spirit is capable of no other Unity or Oneness than what consists in Indiscernibility, and in vital Coactivity and Sympathy of parts; and that therefore, finally, the resolution of such Phænomena as we experience in our selves, or observe in other things, which exceed the mere mechanical laws of Matter into this vital Oneness, which consists in Coactivity and Sympathy of parts, is no vain Tautology, or the mere saying a thing is so, because it is so, but a distinct Indication of the proper and immediate cause thereof. All which things laid together, and seriously considered, will easily prevent whatever Objections any one might otherwise imagine against the Extension of a Spirit.

13. The second Dissatisfaction is touching the Spirit of Nature, in The Proper-
that I have not allow'd it the Power of Perception. That there is a ties and Offi-
Spirit of Nature, that is to say, a substance incorporeal, that does interest ces of Nature
it self in the bringing about some more general Phænomena in the World, further clear-
I think I have demonstrated so evidently, that nothing can be more evi- ed and con-
dent in Philosophy. Nor can a man doubt but that it is an universal firmed.
Principle, if he consider the nature of God, and the Divine Fecundity, and the use of this Spirit wherever there is Matter manageable to some serviceable end for the good of the whole Creation; besides those Testimonies of its Omnipresence, if I may so speak, it doing the same things at vast Distances. As for example, It remands down a stone toward the Center of the Earth, as well when the Earth is in Aries as in Libra, keeps the waters from swelling out of the Moon, curbs the matter of the Sun into roundness of figure, which would otherwise be oblong, restrains the crusty parts of a Star from flying a-pieces into the circumambient Æther, carries along those larger Regions of looser particles of the third Element, together with the Comets, in their peregrinations from Vortex to Vortex, every where directs the magnetick Atoms in their right Road; besides all the Plastick services it does both in Plants and Animals.

This therefore being a mute copy of the eternal Word, (that is, of that Divine Wisdom that is entirely every where) is in every part naturally appointed to do all the best services that matter is capable of, according to such or such modifications, and according to that Platform of which it is the Transcript, I mean, according to the Comprehension and Purpose

of those Ideas of things which are in the eternal Intellect of God. Whence it is plain, That there need be no other λόγοι ἀρχαῖοι, or seminal Forms, than this one, which virtually contains all every where, and is therefore rightly styl'd, The Universal Spirit of Nature: As also, that this Spirit need not be perceptive it self, it being the natural Transcript of that which is knowing or perceptive, and is the lowest substantial Activity from the All-wise God, containing in it certain general Modes and Laws of Nature, for the good of the Universe. But the eye of particular Providence is not therein. Else why does a tyle fall upon the head of him that passes by in the streets, go he to either Play or Sermon? And how come those bumbles in monstrous productions, or those inept and self-thwarting Attempts of this Spirit in certain experiments about the finding out a Vacuum? as I have particularly noted in my Antidote. Wherefore neither

Book 2. ch. 2.
sect. 8. Omnipotency nor Omniscieny acts in such cases, but this imperceptive Spirit of Nature. Whose Imperceptiveness is no more an Obstacle to her natural and plastick Operations, than the Soul's having no actual Idea of a thing aforehand is an hindrance of her occasional Perceptions,

* See sect. 11. as I have already intimated in my * Preface to my Treatise of the Soul's Immortality.

A Confectary concerning the Conduct of Souls by the Spirit of Nature. Which things well consider'd and allow'd, that special Office of this Spirit of Nature in conducting of Souls in their State of Silence, to actuate prepared Matter, and so to raise Animals into Life, will easily be conceived as becoming an employment as any of the rest, and not at all more difficult. For how much harder is it to apprehend that the Spirit of Nature may direct or carry down a silent Soul, than a dead stone, to their fit and natural abodes? For the liveless Spirit and the dead stone are alike easy to be taken hold upon, the Spirit of Nature penetrating them both alike; and body slipping up and down so easily in this Spirit of the World, as that it cannot be imagined that any Mechanical power, but that only which is truly called Sympathetical, must be the Tye where any hold is taken. Which Tye catches, and lets go, for the direction and transmission of things to their proper places in the several parts of the World, for the good of the whole, according to that essential Law, which is the Form and Being of this Spirit of Nature, the last Ideal or Omniform Efflux from God. Nor is it, as I have already said, any thing more marvellous that a liveless Soul should, by this imperceptive Spirit of Nature, be carried away and conducted to duly-prepared Matter, than that a dead stone, or the senseless Magnetick Particles should be guided thereby. For that whereby the Soul is caught so fast by its particular Body, is not the perceptive part thereof, but the plastick or natural; else in a pet she might easily leave the body without either hanging, drowning, or stabbing. Why then may not a Spirit that has subtiller fingers than the finest Matter, I mean the Spirit of Nature, lay hold on that imperceptive part of the Soul, or on the Soul it self, in the state of Silence or Imperception, and by the sympathy and coactivity of its own Essence, carry her away to such services as either her self had deserved, or the Universe had required? All which things, though I will not assert as true, yet I dare pronounce them as intelligible as the Union of the Soul with the Body, which experience makes us understand whether we will or no.

14. As for my Conjectura Cabbalistica, I have no new thing to take notice of there, unless what I have added there of anew, which is the Appendix to the Defence of my Philosophick Cabbala. Wherein I think I have cleared that Cabbala of all imaginable Objections of any moment; and, amongst other things, have plainly proved that not only Platonism, but that which now deserves to be called Cartesianism, for Des-Cartes his so happily recovering it again into view, was part of the ancient Judaical Cabbala, it being part of Pythagoras his Philosophy, which he had (as is abundantly testified out of ancient Writers) from the Jews. I omitted to set down the succession of the Pythagorick School, which yet had not been impertinent to our scope; and therefore I will here make a supply out of Diogenes Laertius, who reckons the Descent thus; Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Telauges, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno Eleates, Leucippus, Democritus, and then many others, amongst whom were Naufiphanes and Naucydes, and the last of all Epicurus.

This School was called the Italick School; the first of which succession, Pherecydes is said to have got certain secret Writings from the Phoenicians or Hebrews, as I have already observed out of * Hefychius: nor need here repeat those ample Testimonies that prove that Pythagoras, the immediate successor of Pherecydes, had his Philosophy from the Jews; nor how that the Cabbala was kept intire in him, and in some of his successors, that is to say, The Physical or Mechanical part was not severed from the Theological or Metaphysical, the body from the soul, as it seems to have happen'd in Leucippus and Democritus, and finally, to have grown cadaverous, and of an ill savour in Epicurus, and in as many as have insisted in his steps to this very day.

15. But in the mean time I cannot but note that this succession of that School is no small confirmation both that Pythagoras his Philosophy was the ancient Wisdom of the Jews, and especially that the Atomical or Mechanical Philosophy (such, in a manner, and so much as I have applied to Moses his Text) was also part of that Wisdom. It is needless here to repeat what I have already noted to make for the discovering that Pythagorism had relation to the Text of Moses. But besides what I have observed from Pherecydes his mentioning of Ophioneus as the Ring-leader of the Apostate Spirits, the beginning of a Book of his, which Laertius recites, methinks looks like a broken reflexion upon the Beginning of Genesis. *Ζῶς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ χρόνος ἦν. χρόνος δὲ ὅμοιος ἐγένετο τῷ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ Ζῶς ἦεν αὐτῷ.* Of which the easy English is this; God and Time (I suppose he means Duration) and the Ground were eternally: But the Ground, upon God's adorning it, was called Earth. Which latter, in all likelihood, was a glance at the third day's work. But the former part, that affirms the Ground eternal, reflects upon the first. For this *χρόνος*, which I have translated the Ground, is Hyle, which Plotinus calls *ὑποκάθετος*, and *ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις*, the Ground, or Foundation, and the ancient Nature; Hyle, or the Possibility of the external Creation, being eternal, which notwithstanding is but a kind of Non-entity, and yet the lowest Basis of Actual Being. According to which sense is Parmenides also to be understood, (the fifth in this Italick succession) in his making the two first Principles Fire and Earth, as appears out of Aristotle.

Aristot. *Meta-stotle.* Δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς τίθει, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. τῶν δὲ τὸ
phys. l. i. c. 5. μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ θερμῷ πάντῃ, δάπτειν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν. *Where the learned Stagi-*
rite is utterly out in his gloss, as if Parmenides meant by his Fire and
Earth nothing but heat and cold, and so made two Accidents the first
principles of all things. But by the bye he has lent unto us very useful
light, in that he witnesseth of Parmenides that he ranked the Earth in
the order of Non-entities. For hereby it is manifest that he spoke Sym-
bolically, and understood thereby the same that Pherecydes did by χθών,
the ancient Hyle. For who would say that this Physical Earth, which
is the most gross and palpable Entity in the World, is in the Rank of
Non-entities more than Fire, or Air, or the like? But Aristotle (though
he speak excellent things sometimes) does very often, without any victory,
triumph and trample upon the opinions of the ancient Philosophers, by
reason of his ignorance of what Clemens Alexandrinus so expressly in-

Clem. Strom. lib. 1. *structs us in, "Ὅτι ὁ τεύκτωρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας Ἑβραϊκὸς καὶ ἀνιγμωδὸς,*
That their manner of Philosophy was Mosaic and Symbolical.

And it being so evident, that Earth signifies symbolically with Parme-
nides, there can be no question but Fire signifies so too, and that it is no
other than אֵשׁ or Οὐρανός, Aether, and answer in significations to Light
or Heaven mentioned in the first day's Creation. Which is Parmenides
*his Plastical or * Demiurgical Principle (which Fire cannot be) as the*
*Earth the Material. Such Indications as these have I * produced to*
prove that the Pythagorick Philosophy has reference to Moses his
Text.

** See Append. to the De-*
fence of the Philosophick Cabbala, ch. 7. sect. 5.
** See Append. to the Philos. Cabb. ch. 1. sect. 8.*
And that that Philosophy which Pythagoras had from the Jews, was
*not merely Metaphysical, but also Physical or * Mechanical, and of such*
a nature as the Cartesian, not only the Motion of the Earth, which is
the famed opinion of Pythagoras, and which implies a Vortex about
the Sun, but also the confessed Atomical Philosophy of Leucippus,
Democritus and Epicurus, who are of the Italick line, does more fully
evince: Though what they speak of the Vortices are either corrupt no-
tions of that School then decaying, or but brokenly and confusedly set
down by the Historian. And yet something I have culled out in the life
of Parmenides, that is so perfectly agreeable to the Cartesian Philosophy,
that nothing can be more, and is indeed the very heart and marrow of it,
and in a manner comprehends or takes hold of all. Which is thus ex-
*pressed by the Interpreter of Laertius; * Solem ipsum frigidum esse &*
calidum: which is a monstrous saying of Parmenides, unless the mean-
ing be only this, Solem esse vel candentem vel extinctum, alluding to
שֶׁשׁ and כּוֹכַב. Nor can that be true that goes immediately before, that
men were generated out of the Sun, but as it is extinct, and becomes an
Earth or Planet. And Des-Cartes his Philosophy defines thus far, That
this out of which man at first was made, is of such a Nature as if it had
been once a Sun, nor dare I define any further.

** Append. to the Philos. Cabb. ch. 7. sect. 5.*
16. It is therefore very evident to me, That the ancient Pythagorick,
or Judaick Cabbala did consist of what we now call Platonism and
Cartesianism, the latter being as it were the Body, the other the Soul of
that Philosophy; the unhappy disjunction of which, has been a great evil to
both: the Metaphysicians growing vain in spinning out needless and
useless

The unhappy disjunction of the Physi- cal part of the Cabbala from the Metaphy- sical in Leu-

useless subtilties, and ridiculous falsities concerning immaterial Beings; ^{cippus, Demo-} for want of some other Object to exercise their Reason upon; and the A- ^{critus, and E-} tomical Philosophers becoming over-credulous of the powers of Matter; ^{picurus; with} nay, I may say, too too impious and impudent in exploding the belief of ^{the Author's} Immaterial Beings, in contemning the Rules and Maxims of Virtue and ^{serious en-} Morality, and in shamelessly obtruding upon the World their Mechan- ^{deavour of} ical Surmises for necessary Demonstrations, when they were indeed down- ^{re-uniting} right Falsities and Impossibilities. And therefore I do not a little please ^{them again;} my self, in that I have made some progress towards the resuscitating that ancient and venerable Wisdom again to life, and the bringing together, as it were, of the Soul and Body of Moses, fitly investing him, or cloathing him with the Covering of his own most sacred Text.

Which though it seemed something an hardy Exploit, and not much unlike the raising from the dead the dislimb'd Hippolytus; yet the consideration of the fate of Æsculapius could not deterr me from so glorious an Enterprize; but my free professing it to have been rather a Design, than an Atchievement, gave me no small assurance, that I was safe enough shelter'd from any Thunder-clap of either mis-directed Zeal, or glowing Envy.

17. But yet that I may not dissemble what cannot be conceal'd, that of ^{That what} Platonism and Cartesianism which I have applied to Moses his Text, ^{he applies to} is in it self, as I conceive, very rational. And I must further add, ^{the Text of} what I dare not conceal nor dissemble, it being for the interest and safe- ^{Moses in his} ty of Religion for me openly and earnestly to profess it; namely, That ^{Philosophick} what I have apply'd, is exquisitely and unexceptionably fitted to the ^{Cabbala, he} Text, from the beginning to the end, as I have made good in the Defence ^{conceives is} of that Cabbala, and in the Appendix thereto. Which is not a volun- ^{rational, and} tary Boast of mine, but a serious profession of the truth, extorted from ^{is assur'd that} me out of the great sense I have of that service it does to the Dignity and ^{it exquisitely} Authority of the Church. For being perswaded in my own judgment, that ^{sits the Text,} what I have apply'd is very consonant to humane Understanding. And ^{but delibe-} considering also how far that Philosophy has already got foot in Christen- ^{rates further} dom, and how easily those victories are gained, which prove the pleasure and ^{concerning} satisfaction of the conquered, (and such is Truth to the Soul of man) as ^{the Truth} also how hugely disadvantageous it would be to Religion and Theology to ^{thereof.} seem to be left so far behind, or to appear to be so opposite to that, which I foresaw might probably become the common Philosophy of the Learned; therefore to prevent all contempt and cavil against the Sacredness of Christianity, as holding any thing against the solid truths of approved Reason and Philosophy, I thought it necessary, and an indispensable duty of that Faithfulness I owe to the Christian Church, publickly to declare, That, if any one presume that he has found such points of Cartesianism or Platonism as I have applied to the Mosaick letter, to be really true upon thorough examination, I dare confidently pronounce to him, that if they be so, those truths were ever lodged in the Text of Moses, and that no Philosopher has any the least pretence to magnify himself against Religion, and the Church of God, wherein such rich Theories have been ever treasur'd up, though men have not had, for these many Ages, the leisure or opportunity of unlocking them till now. Which consideration, I think, is of main importance for stopping the mouths of Atheistical Wits, and

con-

conciliating unspeakable Honour and Reverence to Religion and the Church, in those who are knowing and ingenuous.

Thus much therefore I must, and ought to avouch, That what I have apply'd is exquisitely fit and applicable to the Text of Moses, and, I hope, without the breach of Modesty, may also add, That it is rational; but it must be the result of a longer deliberation with my self to avouch it true. For I must confess, though I find my self to have got a Key in my hand, whose structure and make is exquisitely fitted to every ward in the lock of this Mosaick Treasury, and which turns easily, locks, and unlocks, and I view within, as I conceive, inestimable riches of Knowledge: yet I dare not believe mine own eyes, nor conclude whether it be a real Vision, or a Dream, not knowing whether this be undoubtedly that ancient golden Key of the Cabbala, or one made of baser alloy. And truly a man's Jealousy may well be the more encreased, in that it opens immediately upon those two dazzling Paradoxes of the Motion of the Earth, and the Præ-existence of the Soul, which is enough to make the hardest beholder to step back, and to strike him into a sudden amazement, in which I confess I stand to this very day. At which Timidity of mine, none can justly wonder that considers how shie the ancient Fathers were of the Globosity of the Earth, and the Inhabitation thereof by the Antipodes: which was indeed the opinion of Pythagoras of old, but the certain Knowledge of these latter Ages.

The Testimony of several holy Persons that did either plainly assert, or at least had no dislike of the doctrine of the Soul's Præ-existence.

18. Besides, I must ingenuously confess, I know nothing more, nor better to be alledged for the Motion of the Earth, and other principal points of Cartesianism, than what I have comprised in my Letter to V. C. nor any thing more conclusive of the Præ-existence of the Soul, than what I have produced in my Treatise of her Immortality; which I brought into view, (as also whatever else any one shall conceive in my Writings in any measure to deviate from the common Tract) to enlarge the Object of more accurate Judgments; which confers very much to a right decision of what is true. Nor did any thing offer it self to my mind that seem'd worth the adding concerning the latter Subject of Præ-existence, unless (besides my shewing that it was the opinion of all Philosophers that held the Soul immortal, and more particularly of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, Authors appointed us by the very Statutes of our University; which is enough to make the opinion creditable,) I had taken also notice how innocent and inoffensive that doctrine was in the more pure and intemperate Ages of the Church.

Clemens Alexandrinus.

For I find Clemens Alexandrinus in several places describing it without the least intimation of any dislike thereof, as in the first of his Stromata's, where, writing of the Barbarians, (whose Wisdom he seems to prefer before the Greeks, haply in favour to the Hebrews) he speaks thus, *ἄλλοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ βάρβαροι διαφερόντως πηυσαντες τὰς αὐτῶν νομοθέτας τε καὶ διδασκαλίας, θεὸς προσφώνητες. ψυχὰς γὰρ ἀθάνατας, καὶ Πλάτωνα, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους τὸν ὑπερβαρύνον τόπον ὑπομείναι ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸνδε τὸν τόπον, καὶ σῶμα ἀναλαβέτας ὅς ἐν γένεσι καὶ ἀπάντων μετὰ τὴν ὑπολαβάνην, κηδεμόνας τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεας, αἱ νόμους τε ἔθεσαν, καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐκέρχον.* i. e. It is plain, that the Barbarians did in a special manner honour their Law-givers and Instructors, calling them Gods. For they conceive, with Plato, that certain good Souls, leaving their celestial mansions, did endure the coming into this

this *Tartarus*, and resumming bodies, did partake of all the miseries that attend Generation, as having committed to them the care of mankind, to whom they gave Laws, and preach'd Philosophy. Which opinion he is so far from exploding, that he premises in general, before he falls into this Discourse of the Philosophy of the Nations, this admirable comparison: That as the parts of the Universe, though they disagree one from another, yet have a peculiar consonancy and agreement to the whole World; ἔτις ἢ τε βάρβαροι ἢ τε Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τὴν αἰδὸν ἀλήθειαν συναγαγόντων τῆς τῷ Λόγῳ τῷ ὄντι αὐτῇ θεολογίας πεποιμένη. Ὅτι τὰ διηρημένα σωθεὶς αὖτις καὶ ἐνοποιήσας τέλος τὸν λόγον, ἀκινδύνως δὲ ἰδὲν ὅτι κατέβη τὴν ἀλήθειαν. So, saith he, the Barbarous and Greek Philosophy have made the eternal Truth a kind of discription of the Theology of the Logos, that abides for ever, into disperfed parts. But he that puts together what is thus disperfed, and brings them under one perfect confideration, know assuredly that this man shall see to the bottom of Truth. Which I was the more willing to rehearse, I seeming to my self to have attempted some such performance as this in my fitting together the scatter'd Wisdom of the Ancients, into one Mosaick Cabbala.

Again in the third Book, where he disputes against the Marcionites, he cites several sayings out of Plato, that either refer to, or directly aver the Præ-existence of the Soul. As that out of his Phædo, That it is ὁ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος λόγος, ὡς ἐν πνι φρεσὶ ἐσμέν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, That it is a Traditional Arcanum, that we men in this life are as it were kept in a prison. And he entitles also Heraclytus, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato at once to this sage saying, θανάτος ὄντι ὅκοσα ἐγερθέντες ὀρίομεν, ὅκοσα δὲ δόξας ὕπνῳ. But that is most fully to the purpose which he cites out of Philolaus the Pythagorean, μαρτυροῦντι καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ μάλιστα ὡς διὰ πνευματικῆς αἰ ψυχῆς τὴν σάρκα σωζέμεν, καὶ κατὰ πρῶτον ἐν σάρκα τέλει τεύχεσθαι. The ancient Divines and Prophets (he means, I suppose, especially those of the Jews) witness that the Soul is join'd to this earthly body in a way of punishment, that so far forth as she is in this body, she is, as it were buried. Against which Platonical opinions Clemens shews not the least disgust, but only blames Marcion for his abusing them to his absurd doctrine of the unlawfulness of Marriage, and complains that he did ungratefully and unskilfully take occasion from Plato of hatching his own strange and perverse Opinions.

And after in the same manner, though he did zealously oppose Julius Cassianus for speaking against those hidden parts of God's own making, in both Male and Female; yet when he mentions his holding of the Præ-existence of the Soul; Ἡγεῖται, saith he, ὁ γενναῖος ἔσθ' Πλάτων καὶ πλεον, διὰ τὴν αἰδὸν ἀνῶθεν ἀπορρέουσαν θεωρεῖσθαι δεῦρο ἡκὶν εἰς γένεσιν καὶ φθορῶν. This noble Spirit (saith he, meaning Cassianus) does something more expressly Platonize, in saying, That the Soul, a divine Essence, and from above, by being effeminated, descends hither into generation and corruption. And again in the same page, where he has produced Cassianus his Opinion concerning the Coats of skins God is said to cloath our first Parents with after their fall, (κατὰ τὴν δὲ δερματίνην ἡγεῖται) he passes it over only with this dilatory Promise or Threat-
* And it is no wonder Clemens speaks so well of himself seeming to assert the same Opinion in his

Protrept.
where,
speaking of
Christ, he
saith. He did
αὐτὸς εἰς ὅ-
σαυτὰς ἀνα-
λίσσας τὰς εἰς
τοῦ ἐπὶ μὲ-
ν.
Origenes A-
damantius,
Clemens his
Scholar.

Threatning (call it which you will) that he will shew that Cassianus was deceived, when he had prepared and perfected his Treatise of the generation of man, but declines to pronounce it an error for the present; and if he ever wrote any such Treatise, it is manifest, that he did not handle those skins so rudely, but that they were transmitted to that excellent Disciple of his Origenes Adamantius, that Miracle of the Christian World, if that Description of his life and worth be true which we find in Eusebius. For certainly (to say nothing of his stupendous parts and abilities, which his greatest Adversaries will not deny) it will be very hard to example so sincere and zealous an adhesion to the cause of Christ, even to the contempt of Death, and desire of Martyrdom. Which was no inconsiderate excursion of a juvenile fervour in him, but a permanent faithfulness and fortitude of Spirit; it being usual with that holy man to assist and encourage all the Martyrs, as well those unknown to him as of his acquaintance, openly to accompany them to their execution, friendly embracing them, and administering to them all the comfort he could, to his frequent hazard of being stoned by the incensed multitude.

It will seem a less matter to take notice of his assiduous reading and meditating on the holy Scripture day and night, and his wholly neglecting the World for the pleasure of divine contemplation, and the service of the Church of Christ, his excessive Charity to the indigent, his frequent Fastings and lyings on the ground, his undergoing cold and nakedness, his going barefoot on the hard stones, his abstinence from wine, and singular Temperance in all the pleasures of Nature. Whose great example of an Ascetick life gain'd many disciples to the Church, and bred up and furnished out many undaunted Champions of the Christian Faith, who willingly laid down their lives for the love of the Lord Jesus. Such out of Origen's School were Plutarchus, the two Sereni, Heraclides, Heron, Rhais, and Basilides, who receiv'd the Crown of Martyrdom through the intercession of that illustrious Virgin-Martyr Potamiana. What direful calamities Origen himself also underwent in the Decian Persecution, what Fetters and Torments of Body, what castings into Prisons and Dungeons, what stretching and racking of limbs, what terrors of fire and burnings, are to be read in the records of the Ecclesiastick History?

These and such like Instances as these, will make good the Integrity and Holiness of this Venerable Father. But I must confess I should be loath to be bound to answer for the truth of all those Opinions that are imputed to him. As for his making the Sun, Moon, and Stars, living and intelligent Creatures: which shews that he was a better Divine than Naturalist. His affirming that the power of God is finite; and that he made only so many things as did not imply a Contradiction to be managed by his Providence. Which Error (if it was Origen's) certainly was intended for an Apology for God's not making the World infinite, and shews that the Reverend Father had a greater solicitude for the Sovereign Goodness of God, than for his Power. His making the Punishment of the Devils and of the Damned not eternal: which yet Jacobus Merlinus quits him of by the Testimony of at least ten several Citations out of his Writings. His saying, That the bodies of men at the Resurrection will be raised in an

Or-

Orbicular figure: which is expressly against what * Methodius declares ^{* See Phot. Bibliothec. Excerpt. 234.} concerning Origen; namely, that his opinion was, That every one at the Resurrection should appear exactly in his own particular Form and Shape, as is rightly observed in the Letter of Resolution, whoever was the Author thereof; for I profess I know not who is, much less am I the Author of it my self, as some have groundlessly imagined. His * asserting that the ^{* Phot. Bibliothec. Excerpt. 117.} Soul of our Saviour was the same that was in Adam: which yet is impossible for him ever to assert, he so expressly declaring, that the Soul of the Messias never sinned. And lastly to omit several others, his transmitting the Souls of men into the bodies of brutes: which I question not, and could easily prove, to be falsely father'd as well upon Pythagoras as Origen. But some phansyful followers of both did affix these unhandsome and ridiculous Appendages, thinking every vain addition to be an improvement of those pure doctrines which were anciently deliver'd to the World. And such was Præ-existence in the Church of the Jews, where no such Fooleries were mix'd with it. And if it had so continued amongst the Origenists, certainly it would never have fallen under publick censure: though I dare not lay the blame solely upon them, their malevolent Adversaries taking liberty enough to charge Origen with such things as had no ground at all of report. Such was that formal story of his casting incense on the Altar of an Idol, being put to his choice whether he would yield to that, or the abuse of his body by an Æthiopian. Which is nothing but a * mere Romance, built upon the greatness of Origen's name and virtues. ^{* See Epitom. Spondan. Ann. 253. sect. 19.} Whose repute, though it may seem much blemish'd by that publick censure in the fifth General Council; yet he that considers, that the Particulars of his Condemnation were wholly removed out of the Records of that Council by the same power that first occasioned his censure, may easily find what will repair Origen's credit, in a great measure without, any detriment to the Authority of that grand Convention: For it was their Wrong, not their Fault, that they were misinformed.

S. Basil also and Gregory Nazianzen, that they were no enemies to ^{S. Basil and Gregory Nazianzen.} the opinion of the Soul's Præ-existence, but rather favourers thereof, appears out of the great esteem they had of Origen, and particularly out of that Present that Nazianzen made unto Theodorus Tyaneus, of a Book of Excerptions out of Origen's Writings, compiled by himself and S. Basil, which is styl'd *Ὁριγανὸς φιλοκαλία*, wherein are several Passages that plainly imply, or directly affirm the Præ-existence of the Soul.

The next open Assertor of the Soul's Præ-existence, is Synesius Bishop ^{Synesius Bishop of Cyrene.} of Cyrene, who, in a Letter to his Brother, does seriously profess that he cannot accept of that honourable employment offer'd him, without the liberty of enjoying; nay, I may say, of professing certain opinions of his, which had been a long time rooted in him upon duly-considerated reasons, in the head of which he names this of the Præ-existence of the Soul. ^{* Epist. 105.} *Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἵνα ἐκ ἀξιώσεως τοῦ σώματος ὑπεργρανῇ νομίζαν,* In good earnest, saith he, I shall never consent that the Soul is of later existence than Body or Matter: and deals so apertly, that he gives directions to his Brother to divulge the Letter to the Scholasticks, as he calls them, that so it might be communicated to that Reverend Father that offer'd him the Employment. Which freedom notwithstanding in professing the opinion, was no barr to his Preferment.

Arnobius. *To these you may add the authority also of two Latin Fathers, Arnobius and Prudentius. The former of whom writes thus expressly concerning this point; * Nonne Deo omnes debemus hoc ipsum primum quod sumus, quod esse homines dicimur, quod ab eo vel missi, vel lapsi cæcitate, hujus in corporis vinculis continemur? The other thus, in his Hymnus in Exequiis Defunctorum;*

* *Advers. gent. lib. 1.*

Prudentius.

Patet, ecce, fidelibus ampli
Via lucida jam Paradisi:
Licet & nemus illud adire
Homini quod ademerat unguis.
Illic, precor, optime Ductor,
• Famulam tibi præcipe mentem
Gentili in sede sacrari,
Quam liquerat exul & errans.

Which last verse answers exactly to that expression of Synesius in his Hymns, where he calls his Soul οὐράς ἀλῆνς, for quitting Heaven, and wandering into this lower World.

S. Augustine. *S. Augustine also speaks very favourably of this opinion in his de * Libero arbitrio, where he writes thus, Utrum ante consortium hujus corporis alia quâdam vitâ vixerit animus, magna quæstio est, magnum secretum. And then in * another place of the same Treatise, speaking again of the Soul's Præ-existence, he tells us freely and ingeniously, Si de Deo aliud senserimus quàm est, intentio nostra non in beatitatem sed in vanitatem compellet. De creatura verò siquid aliter quàm sese habet senserimus, dummodo non id pro cognito perceptoque teneamus, nullum periculum. And in a third place, in his discussion of that Fourfold Quære; namely, Whether the Souls be propagated, created, sent from God out of some hidden Repository where they did præ-exist, or fell hither of their own accords, Aut nondum ista quæstio, saith he, a divinorum librorum Catholicis tractatoribus pro merito suæ obscuritatis & perplexitatis evoluta atque illustrata est; aut, si jam factum est, nondum in manus nostras ejusmodi literæ pervenerunt. Whence, methinks, it is very plain that the primæval Ages of the Church had no ill conceit of the opinion of the Soul's Præ-existence.*

The Author
of the Book
of Wisdom.
Wisd. 8. 19.

*Which may further be evinced by the Book of Wisdom, where the Præ-existence of the Soul is as conspicuous as the Sun in the firmament, in these words; For I was a witty child, and of a good spirit; yea rather, being good, I came unto a body undefiled. Of which there can be no sense without the Soul's Præ-existence. And a further pledge of the certainty of this interpretation is that most rational conjecture of them that conclude Philo the Jew to be the Author of this Book, with whom there is no opinion more familiar than that of Præ-existence; besides other footsteps of his impression, as that especially concerning Aaron's robe, where he saith, That the whole World was in the long garment, and the Majesty of God upon the Diadem of his head. Which answers exquisitely to what I have produced out of him for the explaining those Sibylline verses I cite in my * Appendix to the Defence of my Philosophick*

Chap. 5.
sect. 3.

sophick Cabbala. Wherefore the Church in those primitive times so well approving of this Book of Wisdom, it argues the inoffensiveness of that opinion so clearly discoverable therein.

And lastly, from that question put to our Saviour himself by his disciples, Our blessed (Master, who did sin, this man, or his Parents, that he was born blind?) and his not at all chastizing them, nor shewing the least dislike of this Supposition of Pra-existence vulgarly known then to the Jews, and plainly imply'd in the question; I say, a man may fetch a demonstration from hence, That there is no hurt in the opinion, no posson nor danger therein, else assuredly our Saviour having so fit an opportunity, would not have omitted the discovery thereof.

19. And that there is not the least evil, or slightest coallision or clashing in this Hypothesis with the ordinary and literal sense of the Scripture, and universally acknowledged Canon of Faith, I am as certain as that the clear Air will not exclude the light of the Sun, but both be comprised in the same space. That which it seems most repugnant to, is the derivation of Original Sin from Adam. But they that assert the Pra-existence of the Soul, do not understand the Mystery aright, if they suppose not all Souls that come according to natural Order into these terrestrial Tenements, to be in the state of silence first. Which makes them in a manner as if they were not before, and the whole scene of things evidently to begin from Adam. Whose Soul God incorporating into such a Paradisiacal body, as did naturally charm his mind into as full a possibility of not falling, as the usual orthodox Theology supposes Adam to have been in, and designing the same advantage, if he had stood, to be derived upon his Posterity; it is plainly manifest from hence, that his fall was the cause of that which we now call, Original Sin; that is to say, of that over-proportionated Proneness, and almost irresistible Proclivity to what is evil: So far is this Hypothesis of Pra-existence from clashing with the derivation of Original Sin from Adam.

*Nay, I will add further, that what is said in Scripture of the first and second Adam cannot so well be understood as upon the Hypothesis of Pra-existence, and of an antecedent lapse of Souls in another state. For I desire any one to consider without prejudice, what so good meaning there can be of those words of S. Paul, where he says, that Adam was the figure of him that was to come, that is to say, of Christ, as that the office of Adam was preludious to, and typical of the office of Christ. Which would be very dilute, if it was only in this, that he was a publick Person as he was, but had not in any sense incumbent upon him the care of the Redemption of the Sons of men. Wherefore the office of Adam was to transmit that wholesome and paradisiacal complexion of body to his Seed, (in such sort as our ordinary Theology determines thereof) and thereby to be, as it were, the Saviour and Redeemer of his posterity from the ill effects of that former lapse they had fallen into; whence he was exquisitely the figure of him that was to come. But this earthly Adam failing in his office, the Heavenly was surrogated in his room, who is * able to * save to the utmost. Which Hypothesis in my mind makes S. Paul, and this part of the Mystery of our Religion, wonderfully easy and intelligible.*

These,

That Mathe-
matical certi-
tude in mere
Philosophical
Speculations
need oblige
no man's con-
science to
make pro-
fession of
them against
the good lik-
ing of his
Superiours.

These, and such like things as these may be alledged in the behalf of that ancient point of Platonism, The Pra-existence of the Soul.

20. But for mine own part, though I were as certain of the truth of Platonism and Cartesianism in all those points of them which I have applied to the Text of Moses in my Philosophick Cabbala, as I am of any Mathematical Demonstration; yet I do not find my self bound in conscience to profess my opinion therein any further than is with the good liking or permission of my Superiors. For though those Theories were so certain to me, yet I am as certain that Mathematical certitude is not absolute, and that God alone is infallible.

But that I may not seem injurious to my self, nor give scandal unto others by this so free profession, I am necessitated to add, That the Conscience of every holy and sincere Christian is as strictly bound up in matters of Religion, plainly and expressly determined by the infallible Oracles of God, as it is free in Philosophical Speculations: And that though out of love to his own ease, or in a reverential regard to the Authority of the Church, which undoubtedly every ingenious spirit is sensible of, he may have a great desire to say, profess, and do as they would have him; yet in cases of this kind, where any is expected contrary to the plain and express sense of those Divine Writings, he cannot but find himself streighten'd here, and will certainly be constrained *τὸ τῷ θεῷ προσέχοντες ποιεῖν ἢ τὰ ἄνθρωποι*

Herodot.

lib. 5. n. 63.

ἀνδράων, (as the Lacedæmonians are said to have done, though upon a religious mistake :) or rather he will use that short, but weighty apology of the Apostle, *Πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις*, That God is to be obey'd rather than men.

Act. 5. 29.

These are the Adamantine Laws and Tyes of Religion, against which no man can repine, but he must repine against the Being of a God, or against his indispensable Right of being served in the first place, and of binding our consciences to believe, and our tongues to profess what truths he has in a miraculous manner communicated to the World upon Terms. He that denies me before men, him will I deny before my Father which is in Heaven. But in Philosophical Theories, such as the Pra-existence of the Soul, the Motion of the Earth, and the like, where God has not required our profession, nor our Eternal Interest is concern'd, nor that which dictates is infallible; though we should conceit to our selves a Mathematical assurance of the Conclusions, yet I must profess, as I said before, that I do not see that any one is conscientiously bound to averr them against the Authority of the Church under which he lives, if they should at any time dislike them, but that he may with a safe conscience compromise with his Superiours, and use their language and phrases concerning such things. For if it was a Vertue in that holy and venerable Law-giver Moses, with such prudence and paternal sweetness to condescend to the Capacity of the Vulgar, as to describe the Creation of the World, according to the Appearance of things to them; certainly it cannot be a Vice in us, in humble submission and reverence to the Governours of the Church, (let our private judgment be what it will) to receive their definitive modes and phrases of speech in those things where God has not ty'd us to the contrary.

Matt. 10. 33.

21. But if Time, that brings on all great things pompously and by degrees, shall at last so universally discover that to be sound Philosophy which I have adventured to apply to the Mosaiick Text, as that it will pass as current and inoffensively as the doctrine of Antipodes does now, which once seemed so monstrous and extravagant to the Christian World; Approbation will hardly be able to keep a mean, but the Theorems being allowed for true, will be also necessarily acknowledged most lovely and glorious; nor will there be then wanting, I hope, who on our behalf will appeal to the Jews, whether it be not a real Restauration of the Mosaiick Cabbala, and whether we so devoutly worship the incarnate Logos for nought, the blessing of sound Reason, and a sagacious Spirit being so conspicuously found amongst the Christians, the affectionate Adorers of the Lord Jesus.

SCHOLIA

On the GENERAL PREFACE.

SECT. 4. pag. vi. l. 34. --- Meaning of my interweaving of Platonism and Cartesianism so frequently as I do, &c. What is meant here by Cartesianism, (and likewise by Platonism) is not meant universally, but only of some more select Theorems. For that part of it which insinuates that the World was either created or confited by mechanick Reasons, I not only refuse to admit, but explode, as you may see in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, and in my *Epistle ad V. C.*

Sect. 8. pag. x. l. 33. Nor have I to this day, met with either man or book that could produce any thing, &c. The Truth of which thing will appear plain enough to you from what occurs in the Scholia on the *Antidote against Atheism*, Book 1. Chap. 8. and in the *Appendix* Chap. 4, 5, 6, 7.

Sect. 10. pag. xv. l. 22. Or at least may be essentially present to Matter, &c. For what relates to the opinion of the Nullibists, I have abundantly demonstrated how wild a notion it is, in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, Chap. 27.

Sect. 15. pag. xvii. l. 33. But the former part, that affirms the Ground eternal. If by this Ground be understood a Potentiality of external future Creation, it may justly be call'd eternal: But if by it an Abyss of Monades be suppos'd to have been from eternity, it is highly improbable.

Sect. 18. pag. xxi. l. 22. This noble Spirit, says he, &c. Truly it is not at all to be wonder'd at, that Clement should speak so favourably of Cassian, since he seems to assert the same opinion in his *Protrepticon*, where speaking of Christ, he says, αὐτὸς εἰς ἑαυτὸς ἀνακαλεῖται τοὺς εἰς τὴν ἔρρημην, to recal to Heaven those that were cast on the Earth.

Sect.

Sect. 20. pag. xxv. l. 44. *Yet I do not find my self bound in conscience, &c.* What is mentioned in this Section concerning the *Philosophical Cabbala*, or rather the *Physical*, or interpretation of *Beresbith*, I would have the same be understood of *Mercava*, or the interpretation of *Ezechiel's Vision*, which is in this Volume: For there is the same reason for both.

Sect. 21. pag. xxvi. l. 77. *But if Time, that brings on all great things, &c.* I would likewise have the same to be extended to my *Mercavean Exposition* as well as to *Beresbith*.

A N

AN
ADVERTISEMENT
TO THE
READER.

THOU hast here, Good Reader, reprinted for thy Use, the Philosophical Collections of that most Excellent Person, Dr. HENRY MORE; so deservedly celebrated by the best Judges in the late Time in which he lived.

And thou art further to be informed, That, besides the Philosophical Treatises themselves, as they were at first collected together by him, they are enriched now with all the Scholia, or Notes, that he added to them afterwards in his Latin Edition of these Works; which both answer Objections, and tend in general very highly to the Improvement of the whole.

It is only to be noted, that whereas all the other Scholia are translated into English for a common use, and to make 'em of a Piece with the English Discourses, the Scholia upon the Cabala's remain alone as Printed in their original Latin. The Reasons of which are, the Disappointments that were met with in some Persons that should have Translated them, and were chiefly on this Occasion depended on; the hastening as much as possible the Edition of the Work, and not staying
ing

An Advertilement to the READER.

ing over-long for the Translation hop'd for, of this Part of the Notes upon it; some Difficulty more than ordinary, especially as to some Places, there might be in the Matter of these Scholia; and their being fitted rather for the use of the Learned, than of other Persons, who will with greater Advantage read them in Latin than in English: For these Causes, as I said, it is, that they remain in the Latin by themselves; and 'tis hop'd, the Candid will accept the Apology, or excuse the Fault.

For the Treatises themselves, they will be all found curious and important; and far from being handled in a Vulgar Way: And however they are said to be Philosophical, they are at the same Time, by their Intermixtures and Tendency, very highly Moral, or Divine; and contain the most improved Notions, or sublime Theories, that the Mind of Man can rise to easily, or be entertained with.

For those that are both of pious and speculative Genius's, and regard more what is true or noble, than what is Vulgar or Popular, these Writings of the Author will be for ever esteemed: As for others, they have certainly a Right to be contented with their own Thoughts; and it was the Author's Observation, That every Creature both chooseth its own Food, and loves to go on in its own Track.

A N
A N T I D O T E
A G A I N S T
A T H E I S M:
O R,

An Appeal to the Natural Faculties of
the Mind of Man, Whether there be
not a G O D.

By HENRY MORE, D. D.

The *Fourth Edition* corrected and enlarged:

W I T H A N
A P P E N D I X

Thereunto annexed.

Trismegist.

Ἡ μεγάλη νόσος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ἀθεότης.

Aristot.

Οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πρὸνυμνον ἱκανῶς, καὶ τὰ πλείω
τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας.

L O N D O N.

Printed by Joseph Downing in Bartholomew-Close near
West-Smithfield, MDCCXII.

AN INTRODUCTION

TO

ATHEISM

OR

An Appeal to the Natural Faculties of
the Mind of Man, Whether there be
or not a GOD.

BY HENRY MORE, D. D.

The fourth Edition corrected and enlarged.

WITH A

APPENDIX

THE SECOND EDITION.

LONDON,

Printed by J. Sturges, at the

Press

of the University, in the Strand, near St. Dunstons Church.

MDCCLXXII.

Printed by J. Sturges, at the

Press of the University, in the Strand, near St. Dunstons Church.

MDCCLXXII.

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE,
THE
Lady A N N E,
Viscountess

CONWAY and KILULTA.

M A D A M,

THE high opinion, or rather certain knowledge of your singular Wit and Vertues, has emboldened, or, to speak more properly, commanded me to make choice of none other than your self for a Patroness of this present Treatise. For besides that I do your Ladyship that Right, as also this present Age and succeeding Posterity, as to be a witness to the World of such eminent Accomplishments and transcendent Worth; so I do not a little please my self, while I find my self assured in my own conceit, that Cebes his mysterious and judicious Piece of Morality hung up in the Temple of Saturn, (which was done in way of Divine Honour to the Wisdom of the Deity) was not more safely and suitably placed, than this careful Draught of Natural Theology or Metaphysics, which I have dedicated to so Noble, so Wise, and so Pious a Personage. And for my own part, it seems to me as real a point of Religious Worship to honour the Vertuous, as to relieve the

The Epistle Dedicatory.

Neceſſitous, which Chriſtianity terms no leſs than a Sacrifice. Nor is there any thing here of Hyperboliſm or high-flown Language; it being agreed upon by all ſides, by Prophets, Apoſtles, and ancient Philoſophers, that holy and good Men are the Temples of the Living God. And verily the Reſidence of Divinity is ſo conſpicuous in that Heroical Pulchritude of your noble Perſon, that Plato, if he were alive again, might find his timorous Suppoſition brought into abſolute Act, and to the enraviſhment of his amazed Soul might behold Vertue become viſible to his outward ſight. And truly, Madam, I muſt confeſs that ſo Divine a Conſtitution as this wants no Preſervative, being both devoid and incapable of Infection; and that if the reſt of the World had attain'd but to the leaſt Degree of this ſound Complexion and generous frame of Mind, nay, if they were but brought to an æquilibrium Indifferency, and, as they ſay, ſtood but Neutrals, that is, If as many as are ſuppoſed to have no love of God, nor any knowledge or experience of the Divine Life, did not out of a baſe ignorant fear irreconcilably hate him; aſſuredly this Antidote of mine would either prove needleſs and ſuperfluous, or, if Occaſion ever called for it, a moſt certain Cure. For this Truth of the Exiſtence of God being as clearly demonſtrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, it would not fail of winning as firm and as univerſal Aſſent, did not the fear of a ſad After-clap pervert Mens
Under-

The Epistle Dedicatory.

Understandings, and Prejudice and Interest pretend uncertainty and obscurity in so plain a matter. But considering the state of things as they are, I cannot but pronounce, that there is more necessity of this my Antidote than I could wish there were. But if there were less or none at all, yet the pleasure that may be reaped in perusal of this Treatise (even by such as by an holy Faith and divine Sense are ever held fast in a full assent to the Conclusion I drive at) will sufficiently compensate the pains in the penning thereof. For as the best Eyes, and most able to behold the pure Light, do not unwillingly turn their backs on the Sun, to view his refracted Beauty in the delightful colours of the Rainbow; so the perfectest Minds, and the most lively possess of the Divine Image, cannot but take contentment and pleasure in observing the glorious Wisdom and Goodness of God, so fairly drawn out and skilfully variegated in the sundry Objects of external Nature. Which delight, though it redound to all, yet not so much to any as to those that are of a more Philosophical and Contemplative Constitution; and therefore, Madam, most of all to Your self, whose Genius I know to be so speculative, and Wit so penetrant, that in the knowledge of things as well Natural as Divine you have not only out-gone all of your own Sex, but even of that other also, whose ages have not given them over-much the start of you. And assuredly your Ladyship's Wisdom

A 3

and

The Epistle Dedicatory.

and Judgment can never be highly enough commended, that makes the best use that may be of those ample Fortunes that Divine Providence has bestowed upon you. For the best result of Riches, I mean in reference to our selves, is, that finding our selves already well provided for, we may be fully Masters of our own time: And the best improvement of this time is the Contemplation of God and Nature; wherein if these present Labours of mine may prove so grateful unto you and serviceable as I have been bold to presage, next to the winning of Souls from Atheism, it is is the sweetest fruit they can ever yield to

Your Ladyship's

humbly-devoted Servant,

HENRY MORE.

The

The PREFACE.

1. *The Author's Apology for writing this Treatise, there being so many already on the same Subject.*
2. *That what he has wrote are the proper Emanations of his own Mind, and may have their peculiar serviceableness for Men of the like Genius.*
3. *That he affects not Rhetorick, nor Philology, nor the pompous numerosity of more popular Arguments, but solid and unresistible Reason in a perspicuous Method.*
4. *That he has undeniably demonstrated the Existence of God, this one Postulate being but admitted, That our Faculties are true.*
5. *His peculiar Management of the first Argument of Des-Cartes.*
6. *And the Reason of his Rejection of the rest.*
7. *His caution and choiceness in the Managing such Arguments as are fetch'd from the more general Phænomena of Nature.*
8. *As also in those of Animals.*
9. *His careful choice in such Histories as tend to the proving of Spirits.*
10. *His assuredness of that kind of Argument.*
11. *The reason of his declining the recital of the miraculous Stories of Holy Writ.*
12. *His studied Condescension and compliance with the Atheist, to win him from his Atheism.*

READER,

1. **B**Y what inducements I was drawn to publish this present Treatise, notwithstanding the Numerosity of the Writings of this kind, I had rather leave to thine own quick-sightedness to spy out; than be put upon so much immodesty my self as to speak any thing that may seem to give it any precellency above what is already extant in the World about the same matter. Only I may say thus much, that I did on purpose abstain from reading any Treatises concerning this Subject, that I might the more undisturbedly write the easie *Emanations* of mine own Mind, and not be carried off from what should naturally fall from my self, by prepossessing my Thoughts by the inventions of others.

2. I have writ therefore after no Copy but the eternal Characters of the Mind of Man, and the known *Phænomena* of Nature.

Nature. And all Men consulting with these that endeavour to write Sense, though it be not done alike by all Men, it could not happen but I should touch upon the same Heads that others have that have wrote before me : Who, tho' they may merit very high Commendation for their learned Achievements; yet I hope my endeavours have been such, that tho' they care not to be corrivals or partners in their praise and credit, yet I do not distrust but they will do their share towards that *publick Good*, that such Performances usually pretend to aim at.

For that which did embolden me to publish this present Treatise was not, as I said before, because I flatter'd my self in a Conceit that it was gayer or more plausible than what is already in the Hands of Men; but that it was of a different sort, and has its peculiar Serviceableness and Advantages apart and distinct from others; whose proper Preeminences it may, aloof off, admire, but dare not in any wise compare with. So that there is no Tautology committed in recommending what I have written to the publick view, nor any lessening the Labours of others, by thus offering the Fruit of mine own. For considering there are such several complexions and tempers of Men in the World, I do not distrust but that, as what others have done has been very acceptable and profitable to many, so this of mine may be well relish'd of some or other, and so seem not to have been writ in vain.

3. For though I cannot promise my Reader that I shall entertain him with so much winning *Rhetorick* and pleasant *Philology* as he may find elsewhere; yet I hope he will acknowledge, if his Mind be unprejudic'd, that he meets with sound and plain Reason, and an easie and clear *Method*.

And though I cannot furnish him with that copious variety of Arguments that others have done; yet the frugal carefulness and safeness of choice that I have made in them, may compensate their paucity.

For

For I appeal to any Man, whether the proposal of such as will easily admit of evasions (though they have this peculiar advantage, that they make far greater pomp, and at first sight seem more formidable for their multitude) does not embolden the *Atheist*, and make him fancy, that because he can so easily turn the edge of these, the rest have no more solidity than the former; but that if he thought good, and had leisure, he could with like facility enervate them all.

4. Wherefore I have endeavour'd to insist upon such alone as are not only true in themselves, but are unavoidable to my Adversary, unless he will cast down his shield, forsake the free use of the natural Faculties of his Mind, and profess himself a mere puzzled *Sceptick*. But if he will with us but admit of this one *Postulate* or *Hypothesis*, *That our Faculties are true*; though I have spoke modestly in the Discourse it self, yet I think I may here, without vanity or boasting, freely profess, that I have no less than demonstrated, *That there is a God*: And by how much more any Man shall seriously endeavour to resist the strength of my Arguments, that by so much the more strong he shall find them; (as he that presses his weak finger against a wall of Marble) and that they can appear slight to none but those that carelessly and slightly consider them. For I borrowed them not from Books, but fetch'd them from the very nature of the thing it self, and indelible *Ideas* of the Soul of Man.

5. And I found, that keeping my self within so narrow a compass, as not to affect any Reasonings but such as had very clear affinity and close connexion with the Subject in hand, I naturally hit upon whatever was material to my purpose; and so contenting my self with my own, received nothing from the great store and riches of others. And what I might easily remember of others, I could not let pass, if in my own judgment it was obnoxious to evasion. For I intended not to impose upon the *Atheist*, but really to convince him. And therefore *Des-Cartes*, whose Mechanical Wit I can never highly enough admire, might be no Master of *Metaphysics* to me. Whence it is that I make use but of his first Argument only, if I may not rather call it the Schools,
or

or mine own. For I think I have managed it in such sort, and every way so propt it and strengthened it, that I may challenge in it as much interest as any.

6. But as for his following Reasons, that suppose the
 * *Objective Reality* of the *Idea* of a God does exceed the efficiency of the Mind of Man, and that the Mind of Man, were it not from another, would have conferred all that perfection upon it self that it has the *Idea* of; and, lastly, that it having no power to conserve it self, and the present and future time having no dependence one of another, that it is continually reproduc'd, that is, conserv'd, by some higher Cause, which must be God; these grounds, I say, being so easily evaded by the Atheist, I durst not trust to them, unless I had the Author's Wit to defend them, who was handsomely able to make good any thing. But they seem to me to be liable to such evasions as I can give no stop to.

* Per Realitatem objectivam *Ideæ* intelligo entitatem rei representatæ per *Ideam* quatenus est in *Idea*. Nam quæcunque percipimus tanquam in *Idearum* objectis, ea sunt in ipsis *Ideis* objective. Cartes. Resp. ad Object. 2. Metaphys. Defin. 3.

For the Mind of Man, as the Atheist will readily reply, may be able of her self to frame such an actual *Idea* of God as is there disputed of, which *Idea* will be but the present Modification of her, as other Notions are, and an effect of her essence and power, and that power a radical property of her essence. So that there is no excels of an Effect above the efficiency of the Cause, though we look no further than the Mind it self; for she frames this Notion of God as naturally and as much without the help of an higher Cause, as she does any thing else whatsoever.

And as for the Mind's contributing those perfections on her self she has an *Idea* of; if she had been of her self, the *Atheist* will say, it implies a contradiction, and supposes that a thing before it exists may consult about the advantages of its own Existence. But if the Mind be of it self, it is what it finds it self to be, and can be no otherwise.

And therefore, lastly, if the Mind find it self to exist, it can no more destroy it self, than produce it self; nor needs any thing to continue its Being, provided that there be nothing in Nature that can act against it and destroy it; for whatever is, continues so to be, unless there be some Cause to change it.

7. So

7. So likewise from those Arguments I fetch'd from *external Nature*, as well as in these from the innate properties of the Mind of Man, my careful choice made very large defalcations; insisting rather upon such things as might be otherwise, and yet are far better as they are, than upon such as were necessary, and could not be otherwise. As for Example, When I consider'd the distance of the Sun, I did not conceive that his not being plac'd so low as the Moon, or so high as the fixed Stars, was any great argument of Providence, because it might be reply'd, that it was necessary it should be betwixt those two distances, else the Earth had not been habitable, and so Mankind might have waited for a Being, till the agitation of the Matter had wrought things into a more tolerable fitness or posture for their production.

Nor simply is the annual Motion of the Sun, or rather of the Earth, any argument of Divine Providence, but as necessary as a piece wood's being carried down the stream, or straws about a whirl-pool. But the Laws of her Motion are such that they very manifestly convince us of a Providence; and therefore I was fain to let go the former, and insist more largely upon the latter.

Nor thought I it fit to Rhetoricate in proposing the great variety of things, and precellency of one above another; but to press close upon the design and subordination of one thing to another; shewing that, whereas the rude Motions of the Matter (a thousand to one) might have cast it otherwise, yet the productions of things are such as our own Reason cannot but approve to be best, or as we our selves would have designed them.

8. And so in the consideration of *Animals*, I do not so much urge my Reasons from their diversity and subsistence, (though the framing of *Matter* into the bare subsistence of an Animal is an Effect of no less Cause than what has some skill and counsel;) but what I drive at is, the exquisite contrivance of their parts, and that their structure is far more perfect than will merely serve for their bare Existence and Continuance in the World; which is an undenia-

nable Demonstration that they are the effects of Wisdom, not the results of Fortune or fermented Matter.

9. Lastly, when I descend to the History of things miraculous and above the ordinary course of Nature, for the proving that there are *Spirits*, that the Atheist thereby may the more easily be induced to believe that there is a *God*; I am so cautious and circumspect, that I make use of no Narrations that either the avarice of the *Priest*, or the credulity and fancifulness of the *Melancholist* may render suspected.

10. Nor could I abstain from that Subject, it being so pat and pertinent unto my purpose; though I am well aware how ridiculous a thing it seems to those I have to deal with. But their confident ignorance shall never dash me out of countenance with my well-grounded Knowledge: For I have been no careless Inquirer into these things, and from my Childhood to this very Day have had more Reasons to believe the Existence of God and a Divine Providence, than is reasonable for me to make particular profession of.

11. In this History of things Miraculous or Supernatural, I might have recited those notable Prodigies that happened after the Birth, in the Life, and at the Death of *Christ*: as the Star that led the Wise Men to the young Infant; Voices from Heaven testifying *Christ* to be the Son of God; and, lastly, that miraculous Eclipse of the Sun, made, not by interposition of the Moon, (for she was then opposite to him) but by the interposition or total involution, if you will, of those scummy spots that ever more or less are spread upon his Face, but now overflow'd him with such thickness, and so universally, that Day-light was suddenly intercepted from the astonished Eyes of the Inhabitants of the Earth. To which direful Symptomes, though the Sun hath been in some measure at several times obnoxious, yet that those latent Causes should so suddenly step out and surprise him, and so enormously at the Passion of the *Messias*, he whose Mind is not more prodigiously darkned than the Sun was then Eclips'd, cannot but at first sight acknowledge it a special designment of Providence.

But

But I did not insist upon any Sacred History, partly, because it is so well and so ordinarily known, that it seemed less needful; but mainly, because I know the *Atheist* will boggle more at whatever is fetch'd from establish'd Religion, and flie away from it, like a wild Colt in a Pasture at the sight of a Bridle or an halter, snuffing up the Air, and smelling a Plot afar off, as he foolishly fancies.


12. But that he might not be shie of me, I have conform'd my self as near his own *Garb* as I might, without partaking of his Folly or Wickedness; and have appear'd in the plain shape of a mere *Naturalist* my self, that I might, if it were possible, win him off from down-right Atheism.

For he that will lend his Hand to help another fallen into a Ditch, must himself, though not fall, yet stoop and incline his Body; and he that converses with a Barbarian, must Discourse to him in his own Language: So he that would gain upon the more weak and sunk Minds of sensual Mortals, is to accommodate himself to their capacity, who, like the *Bat* and *Owle*, can see no where so well as in the shady glimmerings of their Twilight.

A N
 ANTIDOTE
 A G A I N S T
 A T H E I S M.

C H A P I.

1. *That the proneness of these Ages of the World to wind themselves from under the Ave of Superstition, makes the attempt seasonable of endeavouring to steer them off from Atheism. 2. That they that adhere to Religion in a mere superstitious and accustomary way, if that they once fail, easily turn Atheists. 3. The usefulness of this present Treatise even to them that are seriously Religious.*

1.  HE grand Truth which we are now to be employed about and to prove, is, *That there is a God*: And I made choice of this Subject as very seasonable for the Times we are in, and are coming on, wherein Divine Providence more universally loosening the Minds of Men from the Aw and Tyranny of meer customary Superstition, and permitting a freer perusal of matters of Religion than in former Ages, the Tempter would take Advantage, where he may, to carry Men Captive out of one dark Prison into another, out of *Superstition* into *Atheism* it self.

2. Which is a thing feasible enough for him to bring about in such Men as have adhered to Religion in a meer external way, either for Fashion sake, or in a blind Obedience to the Authority of a Church. For when this external Frame of Godliness shall break about their Ears, they being really at the bottom devoid of the true Fear and Love of God, and destitute of a more free and unprejudic'd use of their Faculties, by reason of the Sifulness and Corruption of their Natures, it will be an easy thing to allure them to an Assent to that which seems so much their present Interest; and so being imboldened by the tottering and falling of what they took for the chief Structure of Religion before, they will gladly, in their conceit, cast down also the vey Object of that Religious Worship after it, and conclude that there is as well no God as no Religion; that is, they have a Mind there should be none, that they may be free from all

wringings of Conscience, trouble of correcting their Lives, and fear of being accountable before that great Tribunal.

3. Wherefore for the reclaiming of these, if it were possible, at least for the succouring and extricating of those in whom a greater measure of the love of God doth dwell, (who may probably by some darkening Cloud of Melancholy, or some more than ordinary importunity of the Tempter, be dissettled and intangled in their Thoughts concerning this weighty Matter) I held it fit to bestow mine Endeavours upon this so useful and seasonable an enterprise, as to demonstrate *That there is a God.*

CHAP II.

1. *That there is nothing so demonstrable, that the Mind of Man can rationally conclude that it is impossible to be otherwise.*
2. *That the Soul of Man may give full Assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise, made good by several Examples.*
3. *A like Example of Dissent.*
4. *The Reasons why he has so Sedulously made good this Point.*
5. *That the Atheist has no Advantage from the Author's free Confession, that his Arguments are not so Convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise.*

1. **B**UT when I speak of demonstrating there is a God, I would not be suspected of so much Vanity and Ostentation, as to be thought I mean to bring no Argument but such as are so Convictive, that a Mans Understanding shall be forced to confess that it is impossible to be otherwise than I have concluded. For, for my own part, I am prone to believe that there is nothing at all to be so Demonstrated. For it is possible that *Mathematical Evidence* it self may be but a constant undiscoverable Delusion, which our Nature is necessarily and perpetually Obnoxious unto, and that either fatally or fortuitously there has been in the World, time out of mind, such a Being as we call *Man*, whose essential Property it is to be then most of all mistaken, when he conceives a thing most evidently True. And why may not this be as well as any thing else, if you will have all things fatal or casual without a God? For there can be no Curb to this wild Conceit, but by the supposing that we our selves exist from some higher Principle that is absolutely Good and Wise, which is all one as to acknowledge *That there is a God.*

2. Wherefore, when I say that I will Demonstrate *That there is a God*, I do not promise that I will always produce such Arguments, that the Reader shall acknowledge so strong, as he shall be forced to confess that it is utterly impossible that it should be otherwise: But they shall be such as shall deserve full Assent, and win full Assent from any unprejudic'd Mind.

For I conceive that we may give full Assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise: Which I shall illustrate by several Examples. Suppose two Men got to the top of mount *Athos*, and there
viewing

viewing a Stone in the form of an *Altar* with *Ashes* on it, and the *Footsteps* of *Men* on thole *Ashes*, or some *Words*, if you will, as *Optimo Maximo*, or *πρὸς ἀγνῶστον θεῷ*, or the like, written or scrawled out upon the *Ashes*; and one of them should cry out, Assuredly here have been some *Men* that have done this: But the other more nice than wise should Reply, Nay, it may possibly be otherwise; for this *Stone* may have naturally grown into this very *Shape*, and the seeming *Ashes* may be no *Ashes*, that is, no remainders of any *Fewel* burnt there, but some unexplicable and imperceptible *Motions* of the *Air*, or other particles of this fluid *Matter* that is active every where, have wrought some parts of the *Matter* into the form and nature of *Ashes*, and have fridg'd and plaid about so, that they have also Figured those intelligible *Characters* in the same. But would not any *Body* deem it a piece of *Weakness*, no less than *Dotage*, for the other *Man* one whit to recede from his former *Apprehension*, but as fully as ever to agree with what he pronounced first, notwithstanding this bare Possibility of being otherwise?

So of *Anchors* that have been digged up, either in plain *Fields* or mountainous *Places*, as also the *Roman Urnes* with *Ashes* and *Inscriptions*, as *Severianus*, *Ful. Linus*, and the like, or *Roman Coins* with the *Effigies* and *Names* of the *Cæsars* on them, or that which is more ordinary, the *Skulls* of *Men* in every *Church-yard*, with the right *Figure*, and all those necessary *Perforations* for the passing of the *Vessels* besides those conspicuous *Hollows* for the *Eyes* and *Rows* of *Teeth*, the *Os Styloides*, *Ethooides*, and what not? If a *Man* will say of them, that the *Motion* of the particles of the *Matter*, or some hidden *Spermatick Power* has gendered these both *Anchors*, *Urnes*, *Coins*, and *Skulls* in the *Ground*, he doth but pronounce that which humane *Reason* must admit as possible: Nor can any *Man* ever so demonstrate that those *Coins*, *Anchors* and *Urnes* were once the *Artifice* of *Men*, or that this or that *Skull* was once a part of a living *Man*, that he shall force an *Acknowledgment* that it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But yet I do not think that any *Man*, without doing manifest *Violence* to his *Faculties*, can at all suspend his *Assent*, but freely and fully agree that this or that *Skull* was once a part of a living *Man*, and that these *Anchors*, *Urnes* and *Coins*, were certainly once made by human *Artifice*, notwithstanding the possibility of being otherwise.

3. And what I have said of *Assent* is also true in *Dissent*. For the *Mind* of *Man*, not craz'd nor prejudic'd, will fully and unreconcilably disagree, by its own natural *Sagacity*, where notwithstanding the thing that it doth thus resolvedly and undoubtedly reject, no wit of *Man* can prove impossible to be true. As if we should make such a *Fiction* as this, that *Archimedes* with the same individual *Body* that he had when the *Souldiers* slew him, is now safely intent upon his *Geometrical Figures* under *Ground*, at the *Center* of the *Earth*, far from the noise and din of this *World*, that might disturb his *Meditations*, or distract him in his curious *Delineations* he makes with his *Rod* upon the *Dust*; which no *Man* living can prove impossible: Yet if any *Man* does not as unreconcilably dissent from such a *Fable* as this, as from any *Falshood* imaginable, assuredly that *Man* is next door to *Madness* or *Dotage*, or does enormous violence to the free use of his *Faculties*.

Wherefore it is manifest that there may be very firm and unwavering *Assent* or *Dissent*, when as yet the thing we thus Assent to may be possibly otherwise, or that which we thus dissent from, cannot be proved impossible to be true.

4. Which Point I have thus long and thus variously sported my self in, for making the better Impression upon my Reader, it being of no small Use and Consequence, as well for the Adverting of him that the Arguments which I shall produce, though I do not bestow that ostentative Term of *Demonstration* upon them, yet they may be as effectual for winning a *firm and unshaken Assent*, as if they were in the strictest Notion such; as also to re-mind him, that if they be so strong, and so patly fitted and suitable with the Faculties of Mans Mind, that he has nothing to reply, but only that for all this it may possibly be otherwise, that he should give a free and full *Assent* to the Conclusion: And if he do not, that he is to suspect himself rather of some Distemper, Prejudice, or Weakness, than the Arguments of want of Strength.

5. But if the *Atheist* shall contrariwise pervert my Candour and fair Dealing, and Fancy that he has got some Advantage upon my free Confession, that the Arguments that I shall use are not so convictive, but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise; let him but compute his supposed Gains, by adding the limitation of this possibility, (*viz.* That it is no more possible, than that the clearest *Mathematical Evidence* may be false, (which is impossible if our Faculties be true) or in the second Place, than that the *Roman Urnes* and *Coins* above mentioned may prove to be the Works of Nature, not the Artifice of Man; which our Faculties admit to be so little probable, that it is impossible for them not fully to assent to the contrary:) And when he has cast up his Account, it will be evident that it can be nothing but his gross Ignorance in this kind of Arithmetick, that shall embolden him to write himself down Gainer, and not me.

CHAP III.

1. That we are first to have a settled Notion What God is, before we go about to demonstrate That he is. 2. The Definition of God. 3. That there is an Idea of a Being absolutely perfect in our Minds, whether the *Atheist* will allow it to be the Idea of God or not. 4. That it is no prejudice to the Naturality of this Idea, that it may be framed from some Occasions from without.

I. **A**ND now having premised thus much, I shall come no nearer to my present Design. In Prosecution whereof, it will be requisite for me, first to define *What God is*, before I proceed to *Demonstration That he is*. For it is obvious for Man's Reason to find Arguments for the impossibility, possibility, probability, or necessity of the Existence of a thing, from the explication of the Essence thereof.

And

And now I am come hither, I demand of any *Atheist* that denies there is a God, or of any that doubts whether there be one or no, what *Idea* or *Notion* they frame of that they deny or doubt of. If they will prove nice and squeamish, and profess they can frame no *Notion* of any such thing, I would gladly ask them, why they will then deny or doubt of they know not what? For it is necessary that he that would rationally doubt or deny a thing, should have some settled *Notion* of the thing he doubts of or denies. But if they profess that this is the very ground of their denying or doubting whether there be a God, because they can frame no *Notion* of him; I shall forthwith take away that Allegation, by offering them such a *Notion* as is as proper to God, as any *Notion* is proper to any thing else in the World.

2. I define God therefore thus, *An Essence or Being fully and absolutely Perfect*. I say, *fully and absolutely Perfect*, in counterdistinction to such *Perfection* as is not *full and absolute*, but the *Perfection* of this or that *Species* or *Kind* of *finite Beings*, suppose of a Lion, Horse, or Tree. But to be *fully and absolutely Perfect* is to be at least as *Perfect* as the apprehension of a Man can conceive without a Contradiction: For what is inconceivable or contradictory, is nothing at all to us, who are not now to wag one Atome beyond our Faculties; but what I have propounded is so far from being beyond our Faculties, that I dare appeal to any *Atheist*, that hath yet any command of Sense and Reason left him, if it be not very easy and intelligible at the first sight, and that if there be a God, he is to be deemed of us such as this *Idea* or *Notion* sets forth.

3. But if he will sullenly deny that this is the proper *Notion* of God, let him enjoy his own Humour; this yet remains undeniable, That there is in Man an *Idea* of a *Being absolutely and fully Perfect*, which we frame out by attributing all conceivable *Perfection* to it whatsoever that implies no Contradiction. And *this Notion* is natural and essential to the Soul of Man, and cannot be washt out, nor convey'd away by any Force or Trick of Wit whatsoever, so long as the Mind of Man is not craz'd, but hath the ordinary Use of her own Faculties.

4. Nor will that prove any thing to the Purpose, when as it shall be alledg'd that *this Notion* is not so connatural and essential to the Soul, because she framed it from some Occasions from without. For all those undeniable Conclusions in Geometry, which might be help'd and occasioned from something without, are so Natural notwithstanding and essential to the Soul, that you may as soon unsoul the Soul, as divide her from perpetual Assent to those Mathematical Truths, supposing no Distemper or Violence offered to her Faculties. As for example, she cannot but Acknowledge in her self the *several distinct Ideas* of the *five regular Bodies*, as also, that it is impossible that there should be any more than Five. And this *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* is as distinct and indeleble an *Idea* in the Soul as the *Idea* of the *five Regular Bodies*, or any other *Idea* whatsoever.

It remains therefore undeniable, that there is an inseparable *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* ever residing, though not always acting, in the Soul of Man.

C H A P IV.

1. *What Notions are more particularly comprised in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.* 2. *That the difficulty of framing the conception of a thing ought to be no Argument against the Existence thereof; the Nature of corporeal Matter being so perplex'd and intricate, which yet all Men acknowledge to Exist.* 3. *That the Idea of a Spirit is as easy a Notion as of any other Substance whatsoever. What Powers and Properties are contained in the Notion of a Spirit.* 4. *That Eternity and Infinity, if God were not, would be cast upon something else; so that Atheism cannot free the Mind from such Intricacies.* 5. *Goodness, Knowledge and Power, Notions of highest Perfection, and therefore necessarily included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.* 6. *As also Necessity, it sounding greater Perfection than Contingency.*

1. **B**UT now to lay out more particularly the *Perfections* comprehended in this Notion of a Being absolutely and fully Perfect, I think I may securely nominate these, *Self-subsistency, Immateriality, Infinity as well of Duration as Essence, Immensity and of Goodness, Omniscience, Omnipotency, and Necessity of Existence.* Let this therefore be the Description of a Being absolutely Perfect, That it is a Spirit, Eternal, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omniscient, Omnipotent, and it self necessarily Existent. All which *Attributes* being *Attributes of the highest Perfection* that falls under the apprehension of Man, and having no discoverable Imperfection interwoven with them, must of necessity be attributed to that which we conceive absolutely and fully Perfect. And if any one will say that this is but to dress up a *Notion* out of my own Fancy, which I would afterwards silyly insinuate to be the Notion of a God; I answer, that no Man can Discourse and Reason of any thing without recourse to settled Notions Deciphered in his own Mind: And that such an Exception as this implies the most contradictory Absurdities imaginable, to wit, as if a Man should reason from something that never entered into his Mind, or that is utterly out of the ken of his own Faculties. But such groundless Allegations as these, discover nothing but an unwillingness to find themselves able to entertain any conception of God, and a heavy propension to sink down into an utter oblivion of him, and to become as stupid and senseless in Divine things as the very Beasts.

2. But others, it may be, will not look on this Notion as contemptible for the easy Composition thereof, out of familiar Conceptions which the Mind of Man ordinarily Figures it self into, but reject it rather out of some unintelligible hard Terms in it, such as *Spirit, Eternal, and Infinite*; for they do profess they can frame no Notion of *Spirit*, and that any thing should be *Eternal* or *Infinite* they do not know how to set their Mind in a posture to apprehend, and therefore some would have no such thing as a *Spirit* in the World.

But if the difficulty of framing a Conception of a thing must take away the Existence of the thing it self, there will be no such thing as a *Body* left in

in the World, and then will all be *Spirit*, or nothing. For who can frame so safe a Notion of a *Body*, as to free himself from the intanglements that the *Extension* thereof will bring a long with it? For this *extended Matter* consists of either indivisible Points, or of Particles divisible *in infinitum*. Take which of these two you will, (and you can find no Third) you will be wound into the most notorious Absurdities that may be. For if you say it consists of Points, from this Position I can necessarily demonstrate, that every *Spear* or *Spire-Steeple*, or what long *Body* you will, is as thick as it is long; that the tallest *Cedar* is not so high as the lowest *Musbrome*; and that the *Moon* and the *Earth* are so near one another, that the thickness of your Hand will not go betwixt; that *Rounds* and *Squares* are all one Figure; that *Even* and *Odd Numbers* are equal one with another; and that the clearest *Day* is as dark as the blackest *Night*. And if you make choice of the other Member of the Disjunction, your Fancy will be a little better at ease; for nothing can be divisible into Parts it has not: Therefore if a *Body* be divisible into infinite Parts, it has infinite extended Parts: And if it has an infinite Number of extended Parts, it cannot be but a hard Mystery to the Imagination of Man, that infinite extended Parts should not amount to one whole infinite Extension. And thus a *grain of Mustard-Seed* would be as well infinitely extended as the whole Matter of the Universe, and a thousandth Part of that Grain as the Grain it self. Which things are more unconceivable than any thing in the Notion of a *Spirit*. Therefore we are not scornfully and contemptuously to Reject any Notion, for seeming at first to be clouded and obscur'd with some Difficulties and Intricacies of Conception; since that of whose Being we seem most assured, is the most intangled and perplex'd in the Conceiving, of any thing that can be propounded to the Apprehension of a Man. But here you will Reply, that our *Senses* are struck by so manifest Impressions from the *Matter*, that though the *Nature* of it be difficult to conceive, yet the *Existence* is palpable to us by what it acts upon us. Why then, all that I desire is this, that when you shall be re-minded of some *Actions* and *Operations* that arrive to the Notice of your Sense or Understanding, which, unless we do violence to our Faculties, we can never attribute to *Matter* or *Body*, that then you would not be so nice and averse from the admitting of such a Substance, as is called a *Spirit*, though you fancy some Difficulty in the conceiving thereof.

3. But for my own part, I think the *Nature* of a *Spirit* is as conceivable and easy to be defined as the *Nature* of any thing else. For as for the very *Essence* or bare *Substance* of any thing whatsoever, he is a very Novice in Speculation, that does not acknowledge that to be unknowable; but for the *Essential* and *inseparable Properties*, they are as intelligible and explicable in a *Spirit* as in any other Subject whatever. As for Example, I conceive the intire *Idea* of a *Spirit* in general, or at least of all finite, created, and subordinate *Spirits*, to consist of these several Powers or Properties, viz. *Self-penetration*, *Self-motion*, *Self-contraction*, and *Dilatation*, and *Indivisibility*; and these are those that I reckon more absolute; I will add also what has relation to another, and that is the Power of

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Penetration, Moving, and Altering the Matter. These *Properties* and *Powers* put together make up the *Notion* and *Idea* of a *Spirit*; whereby it is plainly distinguished from a *Body*, whose *Parts* cannot *penetrate* one another, is not *self-movable*, nor can *contract* nor *dilate* it self, is *divisible* and *separable* one part from another; but the *Parts* of a *Spirit* can be no more separated, though they be dilated, than you can cut off the *Rayes* of the *Sun* by a pair of *Scissors* made of pellucid *Crytal*. And this will serve for the settling of the *Notion* of a *Spirit*; the proof of its *Existence* belongs not unto this Place. And out of this Description it is plain that a *Spirit* is a *Notion* of more *Perfection* than a *Body*, and therefore the more fit to be an *Attribute* of what is *absolutely Perfect*, than a *Body* is.

4. But now for the other two hard Terms of *Eternal* and *Infinite*, if any one would excuse himself from assenting to the *Notion* of a *God* by reason of the *Incomprehensibleness* of those *Attributes*, let him consider, that he shall, whether he will or no, be forced to acknowledge something *Eternal*, either *God* or the *World*, and the *Intricacy* is alike in either. And though he would shuffle off the trouble of apprehending an *Infinite Deity*, yet he will never extricate himself out of the *Intanglements* of an *Infinite Space*; which *Notion* will stick as closely to his *Soul* as her *Power* of *Imagination*,

5. Now that *Goodness*, *Knowledge* and *Power*, which are the three following *Attributes*, are *Attributes* of *Perfection*, if a *Man* consult his own *Faculties*, it will be undoubtedly concluded; and I know nothing else he can Consult with. At least this will be returned as infallibly true, That a *Being absolutely Perfect* has these, or what supereminently contains these. And that *Knowledge*, or something like it, is in *God*, is manifest, because without *Animadversion*, in some Sense or other, it is impossible to be *Happy*. But that a *Being* should be *absolutely Perfect*, and yet not *Happy*, is as impossible. But *Knowledge* without *Goodness* is but dry *Subtilty* or mischievous *Craft*; and *Goodness* with *Knowledge* devoid of *Power* is but lame and ineffectual. Wherefore whatever is *absolutely Perfect*, is *Infinitely both Good, Wise and Powerful*.

6. And lastly, it is more *Perfection* that all this be *Stable, Immuttable* and *Necessary*, than *Contingent* or *but possible*. Therefore the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* represents to our *Minds*, That that of which it is the *Idea* is *necessarily to Exist*: And that which of its own Nature doth *necessarily Exist*, must never fail to be. And whether the *Atheist* will call this *absolute Perfect Being* *God* or not, it is all one; I list not to contend about Words. But I think any *Man* else at the first Sight will say that we have found out the true *Idea* of *God*.

C H A P. V.

1. *What has occasioned sundry Men to conceit that the Soul is Abrasa Tabula.* 2. *That the Mind of Man is not Abrasa Tabula, but has actual Knowledge of her own, and in what sense she has so.* 3. *A further Illustration of the truth thereof.*

1. **A**ND now we have found out this *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, that the *Use* which we shall hereafter make of it may take the better Effect, it will not be amiss, by way of further Preparation, briefly to touch upon that notable Point in Philosophy, *Whether the Soul of Man be Abrasa Tabula, a Table-book wherein nothing is Writ*; or *Whether she have some Innate Notions and Ideas in her self*. For so it is, that she having taken first Occasion of thinking from external Objects, it hath so imposed upon some Mens Judgments, that they have conceited that the Soul has no Knowledge nor Notion, but what is in a *Passive* way impressed or delineated upon her from the Objects of *Sense*; they not warily enough distinguishing betwixt extrinsical Occasions, and adequate or principal Causes of things.

2. But the Mind of Man more free, and better exercised in the close Observations of its own Operations and Nature, cannot but discover that there is an active and *actual Knowledge* in a Man, of which these outward Objects are rather the re-minders than the first Begetters or Implanters. And when I say *actual Knowledge*, I do not mean there is a certain Number of *Ideas* flaring and shining to the *Animadversive Faculty*, like so many *Torches* or *Stars* in the *Firmament* to outward Sight, that there are any *Figures* that take their distinct Places, and are legibly writ there, like the *Red Letters* or *Astronomical Characters* in an *Almanack*: But I understand thereby an active sagacity in the Soul, or quick recollection, as it were, whereby some small Business being hinted upon her, she runs out presently into a more clear and larger Conception.

3. And I cannot better describe her Condition than thus: Suppose a skilful *Musician* fallen asleep in the Field upon the Grass, during which time he shall not so much as dream any thing concerning his Musical Faculty, so that in one sense there is no *actual Skill* or Notion, nor representation of any thing Musical in him; but his Friend sitting by him, that cannot Sing at all himself, jogs him and awakes him, and desires him to Sing this or the other Song, telling him two or three Words of the beginning of the Song, whereupon he presently takes it out of his Mouth, and Sings the whole Song upon so slight and slender intimation: So the *Mind* of Man being jogg'd and awakened by the impulses of outward Objects, is stirred up into a more full and clear conception of what was but imperfectly hinted to her from external Occasions; and this Faculty I venture to call *actual Knowledge*, in such a Sense as the sleeping Musitian's skill might be called *actual Skill* when he thought nothing of it.

C H A P VI.

1. *Sundry Instances arguing actual Knowledge in the Soul: As that she has a more accurate Idea of a Circle and Triangle than Matter can exhibit to her: 2. And that upon one single consideration she assures her self of the Universal Affection of a Triangle. 3. The same argued from the Nature of Mathematical and Logical Notions, which come not in by the Senses, as being no Physical Affections of the Matter; 4. Because they are produced without any Physical motion upon the Matter; 5. And that contrary kinds may be intirely one and the same part of Matter at once. 6. That there are certain sure Complex Notions of the Mind for which she was not beholden to Sense.*

1. **A**ND that this is the condition of the Soul is discoverable by sundry Observations. As for example, Exhibit to the Soul through the outward Senses the figure of a *Circle*; she acknowledgeth presently this to be one kind of *Figure*, and can add forthwith, that if it be Perfect, all the lines, from some one Point of it drawn to the *Perimeter*, must be exactly *Equal*. In like manner shew her a *Triangle*; she will straightway pronounce, that if that be the right Figure it makes toward, the *Angles* must be closed in indivisible *Points*. But this accuracy either in the *Circle* or the *Triangle* cannot be set out in any material Subject: Therefore it remains that she hath a more full and exquisite Knowledge of things in her self than the *Matter* can lay open before her.

2. Let us cast in a third Instance: Let some body now demonstrate this *Triangle* described in the *Matter* to have its three *Angles* equal to two right ones; Why yes, saith the Soul, this is true, and not only in this particular *Triangle*, but in all plain *Triangles* that can possibly be described in the *Matter*. And thus, you see, the Soul sings out the whole Song upon the first hint, as knowing it very well before.

3. Besides this, there are a multitude of *Relative Notions* or *Ideas* in the Mind of Man, as well *Mathematical* as *Logical*, which if we prove cannot be the Impresses of any material Object from without, it will necessarily follow that they are from the Soul her self within, and are the natural Furniture of humane Understanding. Such are these, *Cause*, *Effect*, *Whole* and *Part*, *Like* and *Unlike*, and the rest. So *Equality* and *Inequality*, λόγος and ἀναλογία, *Proportion* and *Anology*, *Symmetry* and *Asymmetry*, and such like: All which *Relative Ideas* I shall easily prove to be no material Impresses from without upon the Soul, but her own active Conception proceeding from her self whilst she takes notice of *external Objects*. For that these *Ideas* can make no Impresses upon the outward Senses is plain from hence, because they are no sensible nor *Physical affections* of the *Matter*. And how can that that is no *Physical Affection* of the *Matter*, affect our corporeal Organs of *Sense*?

But now that these *Relative Ideas*, whether *Logical* or *Mathematical*, be no *Physical affections* of the *Matter*, is manifest from these two Arguments,

ments. First, They may be produced when there has been no *Physical Motion* nor alteration in the Subject to which they belong, nay, indeed, when there hath been nothing at all done to the Subject to which they do accrue. As for Example, suppose one side of a Room whitened, the other not touch'd or meddled with, this other has thus become unlike, and hath the Notion of *Diffimile* necessarily belonging to it, although there has nothing at all been done thereunto. So suppose two Pounds of *Lead*, which therefore are two *Equal* Pieces of that Metal cut away half from one of them, the other Pound nothing at all being done unto it has lost its Notion of *Equal*, and hath acquired a new one of *Double* unto the other. Nor is it to any purpose to answer, That though there was nothing done to this Pound of *Lead*, yet there was to the other; for that does not at all enervate the Reason, but shews that the Notion of *Sub-double*, which accrued to that *Lead* which had half cut away, is but our *Mode* of conceiving, as well as the other, and not any *Physical affection* that strikes the corporeal Organs of the *Body*, as *Hot* and *Cold*, *Hard* and *Soft*, *White* and *Black*, and the like do. Wherefore the *Ideas* of *Equal* and *Unequal*, *Double* and *Sub-double*, *Like* and *Unlike*, with the rest, are no external Impresses upon the Senses, but the Soul's own active manner of conceiving those things which are discovered by the outward Senses.

5. The Second Argument is, That one and the same part of the *Matter* is capable at one and the same time wholly and entirely of two contrary *Ideas* of this kind. As for Example, any piece of Matter that is a *Middle proportional* betwixt two other pieces is *Double*, suppose, and *Sub-double*, or *Triple* and *Sub-triple*, at once. Which is a manifest sign that these *Ideas* are no *affections* of the *Matter*, and therefore do not affect our Senses; else they would affect the Senses of *Beasts*, and they might also grow good Geometricians and Arithmeticians. And they not affecting our Senses, it is plain that we have some *Ideas* that we are not beholding to our Senses for, but are the meer exertions of the Mind, occasionally awakened by the Appulses of the outward Objects; which the outward Senses do no more teach us, than he that awakened the *Musician* to Sing, taught him his Skill.

6. And now, in the Third and last Place, it is manifest, besides these single *Ideas* I have proved to be in the Mind, that there are also several *complex Notions* in the same, such as are these, *The Whole is bigger than the Part: If you take Equal from Equal, the Remainders are Equal: Every Number is either Even or Odd*; which are true to the Soul at the very first Proposal, as any one that is in his Wits does plainly perceive.

C H A P. VII.

1. *The Mind of Man being not unfurnish'd of Innate Truth, that we are with confidence to attend to her natural and unprejudic'd Dictates and Suggestions.* 2. *That some Notions and Truths are at least naturally and unavoidably assented unto by the Soul, whether she have of her self Actual Knowledge in her or not.* 3. *And that the Definition of a Being absolutely Perfect is such.* 4. *And that this absolutely Perfect Being is God, the Creator and Contriver of all things.* 5. *The certainty and settledness of this Idea.*

1. **A**ND now we see so evidently the Soul is not unfurnished for the dictating of Truth unto us, I demand of any Man, why under a pretence that she having nothing of her own, but may be moulded into an assent to any thing, or that she does arbitrarily and fortuitously compose the several impresses she receives from without, he will be still so squeamish or timorous as to be afraid to close with his own Faculties, and receive the Natural Emanations of his own Mind, as faithful Guides.

2. But if this seem, though it be not, too subtile which I contend for, *viz.* That the Soul hath *actual Knowledge in her self* in that Sense which I have explained; yet surely this at least will be confess'd to be true, That the nature of the Soul is such, that she will certainly and fully assent to some Conclusions, however she came to the knowledge of them, unless she do manifest violence to her own Faculties. Which Truths must therefore be concluded not fortuitous or arbitrary, but Natural to the Soul: Such as I have already named, as, that *Every finite Number is either even or odd; If you add equal to equal, the wholes are equal:* And such as are not so simple as these, but yet stick as close to the Soul once apprehended, as, that *The three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones; That there are just five regular Bodies, neither more nor less,* and the like, which we will pronounce necessarily true according to the Light of Nature.

3. Wherefore now to re-assume what we have for a while laid aside, the *Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect* above proposed; it being in such sort set forth that a Man cannot rid his Mind of it, but he must needs acknowledge it to be indeed the *Idea of such a Being*, it will follow, that it is no *arbitrary* nor *fortuitous* concept, but *necessary*, and therefore *natural* to the Soul at least, if not ever actually there.

Wherefore it is manifest, that we consulting with our own Natural Light concerning the Notion of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, that this Oracle tells us, That it is *A Spiritual Substance, Eternal, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omnipotent, Omniscient, and of it self necessarily existent.*

For this Answer is such, that if we understand the sense thereof, we cannot tell how to deny it; and therefore it is true according to the Light of Nature.

4. But it is manifest that that which is *Self-subsistent, infinitely Good, Omniscient, and Omnipotent*, is the *Root and Original* of all things. For *Omnipotency* signifies a Power that can effect any thing that implies no Contradiction to be effected; and *Creation* implies no Contradiction: Therefore this *perfect Being* can create all things. But if it found the *Mat-*

ter or other Substances existing aforehand of themselves, this Omnipotency will not be in this absolute Omnipotent; which the free and unprejudic'd Faculties of the Mind of Man do not admit of, but look upon as a Contradiction. Therefore the Notion of *Being absolutely Perfect* implies that the same *Being* is *Lord and Maker of all things*. And according to Natural Light, that which is thus, is to be Adored and Worshipped of all that has the Knowledge of it, with all humility and thankfulness: And what is this but to be acknowledged to be God?

5. Wherefore I conceive I have sufficiently demonstrated that the *Notion* or *Idea* of God is as *natural, necessary* and *essential* to the Soul of Man, as any other *Notion* or *Idea* whatsoever, and is no more *Arbitrary* or *Fictitious* than the Notion of a *Cube* or *Tetraedrum*, or any other of the *Regular Bodies* in Geometry: Which are not deviled at our own pleasure (for such Figments and *Chimaras* are infinite,) but for these it is demonstrable that there can be no more than Five of them; which shews that their Notion is necessary, not an arbitrary Complement of what we please.

And thus having fully made good the Notion of God, *What he is*, I proceed now to the next Point, which is to prove, *That he is*.

CHAP. VIII.

1. That the very Idea of God implies his necessary Existence.
2. That his Existence is not hypothetically necessary, but absolutely, with the occasion noted of that slippery Evasion.
3. That to acknowledge God a Being necessarily Existent according to the true Notion of him, and yet to say he may not Exist, is a plain Contradiction.
4. That Necessity is a Logical term, and implies an indissoluble connexion betwixt Subject and Predicate, whence again this Axiome is necessarily and eternally true, God doth Exist.
5. A farther Demonstration of his Existence from the incompetibility of Contingency or Impossibility to his Nature or Idea.
6. That necessary Self-existence belongs either to God, or to Matter, or to both.
7. The great incongruities that follow the admission of the Self-existency of Matter.
8. An Answer to an Evasion.
9. That a number of Self-essentiated Deities plainly takes away the Being of the true God.
10. The only undeniable Demonstration of the Unity of the Godhead.
11. The absurdness in admitting actual Self-existence in the Matter, and denying it in God.
12. That this absurdity cannot be excused from the sensibleness of Matter, since the Atheist himself is forced to admit such things as fall not under Sense.
13. That it is as foolish a thing to reject the Being of God, because he does not immediately fall under the Senses, as it were to reject the Being of Matter, because it is incomprehensible to the Fancy.
14. The factious Humoursomeness of the Atheist in siding with some Faculties of the Soul, and rejecting the rest, though equally competent judges.

1. **A**ND now verily casting my Eyes upon the true *Idea* of God which we have found out, I seem to my self to have struck further into this Business, than I was aware of. For if this *Idea* or *Notion* of God be true, as I have undeniably proved, it is also undeniably true, That he doth

exist: For this *Idea* of God being no arbitrary Figment taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and natural Emanation of the Mind of Man, it signifies to us that the Notion and Nature of God implies in it *necessary Existence*, as we have shewn it does, unless we will wink against our own natural Light, we are without any further Scruple to acknowledge *That God does exist*.

2. Nor is it sufficient ground to diffide to the strength of this Argument, because our Fancy can shuffle in this Abater, *viz.* That indeed this *Idea* of God, supposing God did exist, shews us that this Existence is necessary, but it does not shew us that he doth necessarily exist. For he that answers thus, does not observe out of what prejudice he is enabled to make this Answer, which is this: He being accustomed to Fancy the Nature or Notion of every thing else without *Existence*, and so ever easily separating *Essence* and *Existence* in them, here unawares takes the same liberty, and divides the *Existence* from that *Essence* to which *Existence* it self is essential. And that's the witty Fallacy his unwariness has intangled him in.

3. Again, when as we contend that the true *Idea* of God represents him as a *Being necessarily existent*, and therefore that he does exist; and you to avoid the edge of the Argument reply, If he did at all exist; by this answer you involve your self in a manifest Contradiction. For first, you say with us, That the Nature of God is such, that in its very Notion it implies is *Necessary Existence*; and then again you unsay it, by intimating that notwithstanding this true *Idea* and *Notion*, God may not exist; and so acknowledge that what is *absolutely necessary* according to the free Emanation of our Faculties, yet may be otherwise: Which is a palpable Contradiction as much as respects us and our Faculties, and we have nothing more inward and immediate than these to steer our selves by.

4. And to make this plainer at least, if not stronger; when we say that the *Existence* of God is *Necessary*, we are to take Notice that *Necessity* is a *Logical Term*, and signifies so firm a Connexion betwixt the *Subject* and *Predicate* (as they call them) that it is impossible that they should be dissevered, or should not hold together; and therefore if they be affirmed one of the other, that they make *Axioma Necessarium*, an Axiome that is Necessary, or eternally true. Wherefore there being a *Necessary Connexion* betwixt *God* and *Existence*, this Axiome, *God does exist*, is an Axiome necessarily and eternally true. Which we shall yet more clearly understand, if we compare *Necessity* and *Contingency* together. For as *Contingency* signifies not only the *Manner of Existence* in that which is *Contingent* according to its *Idea*, but does intimate also a *Possibility of Actual Existence*; so (to make up the true and easie Analogy) *Necessity* does not only signify the *Manner of Existence* in that which is *Necessary*, but also that it does *actually exist*, and *could never possibly do otherwise*. For ἀναγκάειον and εἶναι ἀδύνατον εἶναι, *Necessity* of being an Impossibility of not being, are all one with *Aristotle* and the rest of the

Logi-

Logicians. But the *Atheist* and the *Enthusiast* are usually such profess'd Enemies against *Logick*; the one merely out of Dotage upon outward gross Sense, the other in a dear regard to his stiff and untamed Fancy, that Shop of Mysteries and fine things.

5. Thirdly, we may further add, That whereas we must needs attribute to the *Idea* of God either *Contingency*, *Impossibility*, or *Necessity of Actual Existence*, (some one of these belonging to every *Idea* imaginable) and that *Contingency* is incompetent to an *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, much more *Impossibility*, the *Idea* of God being compiled of no Notions but such as are *possible* according to the Light of Nature, to which we now appeal; it remains therefore that *Necessity of Actual Existence* be unavoidably cast upon the *Idea* of God, and that therefore God does *actually Exist*.

6. But Fourthly and Lastly, If this seem more subtle, though it be no less true for it, I shall now propound that which is so palpable, that it is impossible for any one that has the use of his Wits to deny it. I say therefore, that either *God*, or this *corporal* and *sensible World* must of it self *necessarily exist*. Or thus, Either *God* or *Matter*, or *both*, do of themselves *necessarily exist*: If *both*, we have what we would drive at, the *Existency* of God.

7. But yet to acknowledge the *necessary Existence* of the *Matter* of it self, is not so congruous and futeable to the Light of Nature. For if any thing can exist *independently* of God, all things may: So that not only the *Omnipotency* of God might be in vain, but beside, there would be a letting in from hence of all Confusion and Disorder imaginable; nay, of some grand Devil of equal Power and of as large Command as God himself; or, if you will, of Six Thousand Millions of such monstrous Gigantick Spirits, fraught with various and mischievous Passions, as well as armed with immense Power, who in anger or humour appearing in huge shapes, might take the Planets up in their prodigious Clutches, and pelt one another with them as Boys are wont to do with Snow-Balls. And that this has not yet happened, will be resolved only into this, that the Humour has not yet taken them: But the frame of Nature and the generation of things would be still liable to this Ruine and Disorder. So dangerous a thing it is to slight the natural *Dependencies* and *Correspondencies* of our *Innate Ideas* and *Conceptions*.

8. Nor is there any Refuge in such a Reply as this, that the full and perfect Infinitude of the Power of God is able easily to overmaster these six thousand Millions of Monsters, and to stay their Hands. For I say that six or fewer may equalize the Infinite Power of God. For if any thing may be *Self-effentiated* besides God, why may not a *Spirit* of just six times less Power than God *exist of it self*? and then six such will equalize him, a seventh will over-power him.

9. But such a rabble of *Self-effentiated* and *divided* Deities does not only hazzard the pulling the World in pieces, but plainly takes away the Existence of the true God. For if there be any *Power* or *Perfection* whatsoever which has its Original from any other than God, it manifestly demonstrates that God is not God, that is, is not a *Being*

ing absolutely and fully Perfect, because we see some Power in the World that is not his, that is, that is not from him. But what is fully and wholly from him is very truly and properly his, as the Thought of my Mind is rather my Mind's than my Thought's.

10. And this is the only way that I know to demonstrate that it is impossible that there should be any more than *One* true God in the World: For if we did admit another beside him, this other must be also *Self-originated*; and so neither of them would be God. For the *Idea* of God swallows up into it self all *Power* and *Perfection* conceivable, and therefore necessarily implies that whatever hath any Being derives it from him.

11. But if you say the *Matter* does only exist, and not *God*, then this *Matter* does necessarily exist of it self, and so we give that Attribute unto the *Matter* which our Natural Light taught us to be contained in the Essential Conception of no other thing besides *God*. Wherefore to deny that of *God* which is so necessarily comprehended in the true *Idea* of him, and to acknowledge it that in whose *Idea* it is not all contained, (for necessary Existence is not contained in the *Idea* of any thing but of a *Being absolutely Perfect*) is to pronounce contrary to our Natural Light, and to do manifest violence to our Faculties.

12. Nor can this be excused by saying that the Corporeal *Matter* is palpable and sensible unto us, but *God* is not, and therefore we pronounce confidently that it is, though *God* be not; and also that it is necessary of it self, sith that which is without the help of another, must necessarily be, and eternally.

For I demand of you then, since you profess your selves to believe thing but *Sense*, how could *Sense* ever help you to that Truth you acknowledged last, viz. That that which exists without the help of another is necessary and eternal? For Necessity and Eternity are no sensible Qualities, and therefore are not the Objects of any *Sense*; and I have already very plentifully proved, that there is other Knowledge and perception in the Soul besides that of *Sense*. Wherefore it is very unreasonable, whenas we have other Faculties of Knowledge besides the *Senses*, that we should consult with the *Senses* alone about matters of Knowledge, and exclude those Faculties that penetrate beyond *Sense*. A thing that the profess'd *Atheists* themselves will not do when they are in the humour of Philosophising; for their Principle of *Atomes* is a business that does not fall under *Sense*, as *Lucretius* at large confesses.

13. But now seeing it so manifest that the Soul of Man has other *Cognitive* Faculties besides that of *Sense*, (which I have clearly above demonstrated) it is as incongruous to deny there is a *God*, because *God* is not an Object fitted to the *Senses*, as it were to deny there is *Matter* or a *Body* because that *Body* or *Matter*, in the imaginative Notion thereof, lies so unevenly and troublesomly in our *Fancy* and *Reason*.

In the contemplation whereof our Understanding discovereth such contradictory Incoherencies, that were it not that the *Notion* is sustained by the confident dictates of *Sense*, *Reason* appealing to those more craft Representations of *Fancy*, would by her shrewd *Dilemmas* be able to argue it quite out of the World. But our *Reason* being well aware that corporeal *Matter* is the proper Object of the *Sensitive* Faculty

Faculty, she gives full belief to the information of *Sense* in her own Sphear, slighting the puzzling Objections of perplex'd *Fancy*, and freely admits the existence of *Matter*, notwithstanding the entanglements of *Imagination*; as she does also the existence of God, from the contemplation of his *Idea* in her Soul, notwithstanding the silence of the Senses therein.

14. For indeed it were an unexcusable piece of Folly and Madnes in a Man, whenas he has *Cognoscitive* Faculties reaching to the Knowledge of God, and has a certain unalterable *Idea* of God in his Soul, which he can by no device wipe out, as well as he has the Knowledge of *Sense* that reaches to the discovery of the *Matter*; to give *necessary Self-existence* to the *Matter*, no Faculty at all informing him so; and to take *necessary Existence* from God, though the natural Notion of God in the Soul inform him to the contrary; and only upon this pretence, because God does not immediately fall under the Knowledge of the *Senses*: thus partially siding with one kind of Faculty only of the Soul, and proscribing all the rest. Which is as humourfomely and foolishly done, as if a Man should make a faction amongst the *Senses* themselves, and resolve to believe nothing to be but what he could see with his *Eyes*, and so confidently pronounce that there is no such thing as the Element of *Aire*, nor *Winds*, nor *Musick*, nor *Thunder*. And the Reason, forsooth, must be, because he can see none of these things with his *Eyes*, and that's the sole *Sense* that he intends to believe.

C H A P IX.

1. *The Existence of God argued from the Final cause of the implantation of the Idea of God in the Soul.* 2. *An Evasion of the Argument, by supposing all things to be such as they are, by chance.* 3. *That the Evasion is either impossible, or but barely possible, and therefore of no weight.* 4. *That we are not to attend to what is simply possible, but to what our Natural Faculties determine.* 5. *He urges again the Final cause of the indeleble Idea or Image of God in the Soul, illustrating the force thereof from a Similitude.* 6. *That supposing God did exist, he would have dealt no otherwise with us for the making himself known unto us than we are de facto dealt with; which therefore again argues that he doth Exist.*

1. **A**ND hitherto I have argued from the Natural Notion or Idea of God as it is respects that of which it is the Idea or Notion. I shall now try what Advantage may be made of it from the respect it bears unto our Souls, the Subject thereof, wherein it does reside.

I demand therefore, Who put this Indeleble Character of God upon our Souls? Why, and to what purpose is it there?

2. Nor do not think to shuffle me off by saying, We must take things as we find them, and not inquire of the final Cause of any thing: for things are necessarily as they are of themselves, whose guidance and contrivance is from no Principle of Wisdom or Counsel, but every Substance is now and ever was of what Nature and Capacity it is found, having its Original from none other than it self; and all those changes and varieties we see in the World, are but the result of an Eternal Scuffle of coordinate Causes, bearing up as well as they can, to continue themselves in the present State they are in; and acting and being acted upon by others, these varieties of things appear in the World, but every particular Substance with Essential Properties thereof is self-originated, and independent of any other.

3. For to this I answer, That the very best that can be made of all this is but thus much, That it is merely and barely possible, nay, if we consult our own Faculties, and the Idea of God, utterly impossible; but admit it possible; this bare possibility is so lax, so weak and so undeterminate a Consideration, that it ought to have no Power to move the Mind this way or that way that has any tolerable use of her own Reason, more than the faint breathings of the loose Air have to shake a Mountain of Brass. For if bare possibility may at all intangle our assent or dissent in things, we cannot fully misbelieve the absurdest Fable in *Æsop* or *Ovid*, or the most ridiculous Figments that can be imagined; as suppose that *Ears of Corn in the Field hear the mistling of the Wind and chirping of the Bird: That the Stones in the Street are grinded with pain when the Carts goe over them; that the Heliotrope eyes the Sun, and really sees him, as well as turns round about with him: That the Pulp of the Wall-nut, as bearing the signature of the Brain, is indued with Imagination and Reason.* I say,

no Man can fully mis-believe any of these fooleries, if bare *Possibility* may have the least Power of turning the Scales this way or that way. For none of these, nor a Thousand more such like as these, imply a perfect and palpable Contradiction, and therefore will put in for their right of being deemed *Possible*.

4. But we are not to attend to what is simply *possible*, but to what our *Natural Faculties* do direct and determine us to. As for Example, Suppose the question were, *Whether the Stones in the Street have Sense or no*; we are not to leave the Point as indifferent, or that may be held either way, because it is *possible*, and implies no palpable Contradiction, that they may have *Sense*, and that a *painful Sense* too: But we are to consult our *Natural Faculties*, and see whether they propend; and they do plainly determinate the Controversy, by telling us, that what has *Sense* and is capable of *Pain* ought to have *progressive Motion*, to be able to avoid what is hurtful and painful, and we see it is so in all Beings that have any considerable share of *Sense*. And *Aristotle*, who was no doter on a *Deity*, yet frequently does assume this Principle, ἡ φύσις ἔστιν αἰσιν ποιεῖν, That *Nature does nothing in vain*. Which is either an acknowledgment of a *God*, or an appeal to our own *Rational Faculties*; and I am indifferent which, for I have what I have would out of either; for if we appeal to the natural Suggestions of our own *Faculties*, they will assuredly tell us, There is a *God*.

5. I therefore again demand, and I desire to be answered without prejudice, or any restraint laid upon our *Natural Faculties*, To what purpose is this indeleble *Image* or *Idea* of *God* in us, if there be no such thing as *God* existent in the World? Or who sealed so deep an Impression of that Character upon our Minds?

If we were travelling in a desolate *Wilderness*, where we could discover neither Man nor Horse, and should meet with *Herds of Cattle* or *Flocks of Sheep* upon whose Bodies there were branded certain *Marks* or *Letters*, we should without any hesitancy conclude that these have all been under the hand of some Man or other that has set his name upon them. And verily when we see writ in our Souls in such legible Characters the *Name*, or rather the *Nature* and *Idea* of *God*, why should we be so slow and backward from making the like reasonable Inference? Assuredly, he whose *Character* is signed upon our Souls has been here, and has thus marked us, that we and all may know to whom we belong. That *it is he that has made us, and not we our selves*; that *we are his People and the Sheep of his Pasture*. And it is evidently plain from the *Idea* of *God*, which includes *Omnipotency* in it, that we can be made from none other than he; as I have * before demonstrated. And therefore there was no better way then by sealing us with this *Image* to make us acknowledge our selves to be his, and to do that Worship and Adoration to him that is due to our mighty *Maker* and *Creator*, that is, our *God*.

* See the foregoing Chap. Sect. 7, 8, 9.

Wherefore things complying thus naturally and easily together according to the free Suggestions of our *Natural Faculties*, it is as perverse and forced a Business to suspend *Assent*, as to doubt whether those *Roman Urnes* and *Coins* I spoke of, digg'd out of the Earth, be the Works of Nature, or the Artifice of Men.

6. But

6. But if we cannot yet for all this give free assent to this Position, *That God does exist*, let us at least have the Patience a while to suppose it. I demand therefore, supposing God did *exist*, What can the Mind of Man imagine that this God should do better or more effectual for the making himself known to such a Creature as Man, indued with such and such Faculties, than we find really already done? For God being a *Spirit* and *Infinite*, cannot ever make himself known Necessarily and Adequately by any appearance to our outward *Senses*. For if he should manifest himself in any outward Figures or Shapes, portending either love or wrath, terrour or protection, our Faculties could not assure us that this were *God*, but some particular *Genius*, good or bad: And besides, such dazzling and affrightful external Forces are neither becoming the Divine Nature, nor suitable with the Condition of the Soul of a Man, whose *better Faculties* and more free God meddles with, does not force nor amaze us by a more urgent course and oppressing Power upon our weak and brutish *Senses*. What remains therefore but that he should manifest himself to our *Inward Man*? And what way imaginable is more fit than the indeleble Impression of the *Idea* of himself, which is (not Divine Life and Sense, for that's an higher prize laid up for them that can win it, but) a natural representation of the Godhead, and a Notion of his *Essence*, whereby the Soul of Man could no otherwise conceive of him than as an *Eternal Spirit*, *Infinite in Goodness*, *Omnipotent*, *Omniscient*, and necessarily of himself *existent*? But this, as I have fully proved, we find *de facto* done in us. Wherefore we being every way dealt with, as if there were a *God existing*, and no *Faculty* discovering any thing to the contrary, what should hinder us from the concluding that he does really *exist*?

C H A P. X.

1. Several other Affections or Properties in the Soul of Man that argue the Being of God.
2. As Natural Conscience.
3. A pious Hope or Confidence of success in affairs upon dealing righteously with the World.
4. An Answer to an Objection, That some Men are quite devoid of these Divine Senses.
5. That the Universality of Religious Worship argues the Knowledge of the Existence of God to be from the Light of Nature.
6. An Answer to an Objection, *viz.* That what is universally received by all Nations may notwithstanding be false.
8. An Objection taken from the general falseness and perverseness of the Religions of the Nations. The first Answer thereto by way of Apology.
9. The second Answer, supposing the Religions of the Nations as depraved as you please.
10. A further Objection from the long continuance of those false Religions, and the hopelessness of ever getting out of them, with a brief Answer thereto.

1. **H**itherto we have argued for the Existency of the Godhead from the natural *Idea* of God, inseparably and immutably residing in the Soul of Man. There are also other Arguments may be drawn from what

what we may observe to stick very close to Man's Nature; and such is *Natural remorse of Conscience*, and a fear and disturbance from the committing of such things as notwithstanding are not punishable by Men; as also a *Natural hope* of being Prosperous and Successful in doing those things which are conceived by us to be Good and Righteous; and lastly, *Religious Veneration*, or *Divine Worship*: All which are Fruits unforcedly and easily growing out of the Nature of Man; and if we rightly know the meaning of them, they all intimate, *That there is a God*.

2. And first, of *Natural Conscience* it is plain, that it is a Fear and Confusion of Mind arising from the presage of some mischief that may befall a Man beside the ordinary course of Nature, or the usual occurrences of Affairs, because he has done thus or thus. Not that what is Supernatural or absolutely Extraordinary must needs fall upon him, but that at least the ordinary Calamities and Misfortunes which are in the World, will be directed and levelled at him some time or other, because he hath done this or that Evil against his *Conscience*. And Men do naturally in some heavy *Adversity*, mighty *Tempest* on the Sea, or dreadful *Thunder* on the Land, (though these be but from Natural Causes) reflect upon themselves and their actions, and so are invaded with fear, or are unterrified, accordingly as they condemn or acquit themselves in their own *Consciences*. And from this supposal is that magnificent Expression of the Poet concerning the Just Man,

Nec fulminantis magna Jovis manus,

That he is not afraid of the darting down of *Thunder* and *Lightning* from Heaven. But this *Fear*, that one should be struck rather than the rest, or at this time rather than another time, because a Man has done thus or thus, is a natural acknowledgment that these things are guided and directed from some discerning Principle, which is all one as to confess, *That there is a God*. Nor is it material that some alledge, that *Mariners* curse and swear the lowdest when the Storm is the greatest; for it is because the unusualness of such dangers hath made them lose the Sense of the *Danger*, not the Sense of a *God*.

3. It is also very natural for a Man that follows honestly the dictates of his own *Conscience*, to be full of good *Hopes*, and much at Ease, and secure that all things at Home and Abroad will go successfully with him, though his Actions or sincere Motions of his Mind act nothing upon Nature or the course of the World to change them any way: Wherefore it implies that there is a *Superintendent Principle* over Nature and the material frame of the World, that looks to it so, that nothing shall come to pass but what is consistent to the good and welfare of honest and conscientious Men. And if it does not happen to them according to their expectations in this World, it does naturally bring in a belief of a World to come.

4. Nor does it at all enervate the strength of this Argument, that some Men have lost the sense and difference betwixt *Good* and *Evil*, if there be any so fully degenerate; but let us suppose it, this is a Monster, and, I suspect, of his own making. But this is no more prejudice to what I aim at, who argue from the *Natural Constitution* of a Man the *Existency* of

of a God, then if, because *Democritus* put out his Eyes, some are born blind, others drink out their Eyes and cannot see, that therefore you should conclude that there is neither *Light* nor *Colours*: for if there were, then every one would see them; but *Democritus* and some others do not see them. But the reason is plain, there hath been force done to their *Natural Faculties*, and they have put out their Sight.

Wherefore I conclude from *natural Conscience* in a Man, that puts him upon *Hope* and *Fear* of *Good* and *Evil* from what he does or omits, though those actions and omissions do nothing to the change of the course of Nature, or the affairs of the World, that there is an *Intelligent Principle* over universal Nature, that takes notice of the actions of Men, that is, that *there is a God*; for else this *Natural Faculty* would be false and vain.

5. Now for *Adoration* or *Religious Worship*, it is as universal as Mankind, there being no Nation under the cope of Heaven that does not do Divine Worship to something or other, and in it to God, as they conceive; wherefore, according to the ordinary *Natural Light* that is in all Men, *there is a God*.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be avoided, by saying it is but an universal *Tradition* that has been time out of Mind spread among the Nations of the World: For if it were so (which yet cannot at all be proved) in that it is universally received, it is manifest that it is according to the *Light of Nature* to acknowledge *there is a God*; for that which all Men admit true, though upon the proposal of another, is undoubtedly to be termed true according to the *Light of Nature*. As many Hundreds of *Geometrical Demonstrations*, that were first the Inventions of some one Man, have passed undeniable through all Ages and Places for true, according to the *Light of Nature*, with them that were but Learners, not Inventors of them. And it is sufficient to make a thing true according to the *Light of Nature*, that no Man upon a preception of what is propounded, and the Reason of it, (if it be not clear at the first Sight and need Reasons to back it) will ever stick to acknowledge it for a Truth. And therefore if there were any Nations that were destitute of the Knowledge of a God, as they may be, it is likely, of the Rudiments of *Geometry*; so long as they will admit of the Knowledge of one as well as of the other, upon due and fit Proposal, the acknowledgement of a God is as well to be said to be according to the *Light of Nature*, as the Knowledge of *Geometry* which they thus receive.

7. But if it be here objected, That a thing may be universally received of all Nations, and yet be so far from being true, according to the *Light of Nature*, that it is not true at all: As for Example, that the *Sun* moves about the *Earth*, and that the *Earth* stands still as the fixed *Center* of the World, which the best of Astronomers and the profoundest of Philosophers pronounce to be false; I answer, that in some Sense it does stand still, if you understand by *Motion* the translation of a Body out of the vicinity of other Bodies. But suppose it did stand still, this comes not home to our Case; for this is but the just victory of *Reason* over the general prejudice of *Sense*; and every one will acknowledge that *Reason* may correct the

the Impresses of *Sense*, otherwise we should, with * *Epicurus* and *Lucretius*, admit the Sun and Moon to be no wider than a Sieve, and the Bodies of the Stars to be no bigger than the ordinary flame of a Candle. Therefore you see here is a clashing of the Faculties one against another, and the stronger carries it. But there is no Faculty that can be pretended to clash with the Judgment of Reason and natural Sagacity, that so easily, either concludes or presages, that there is a God: Wherefore that may well go for a Truth, according to the *Light of Nature*, that is universally receiv'd of Men, be it by what Faculty it will they receive it, no other Faculty appearing that can evidence to the contrary. And such is the *universal Acknowledgment*, that *there is a God*.

* See Lucret.
de Natura Re-
rum, li. 5. and
Diog. Laert.
Vitâ Epicur.

8. Nor is it much more material to reply, That though there be indeed a *Religious Worship* exercised in all Nations upon the face of the Earth, yet many of them worship but *Stocks* and *Stones*, or some particular piece of Nature, the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars*. For I answer that, first, it is very hard to prove that they worship any Image or Statue without reference to some Spirit at least, if not to the Omnipotent God. So that we shall hence at least win thus much, That there are in the Universe some more subtile and Immaterial Substances that take notice of the Affairs of Men; and this is as ill to a slow Atheist as to believe that *there is a God*.

And for that *Adoration* some of them do to the *Sun* and *Moon*, I cannot believe they do it to them under the notion of mere *Inanimate Bodies*, but they take them to be the Habitation of some *Intellectual Beings*, as the Verse does plainly intimate to us,

Ἡλῖός δ' ὅς πᾶντ' ἐφορᾷ καὶ πᾶντ' ἐπαυέει,

The Sun that bears and sees all things: And this is very near the true Notion of a God.

9. But be this *universal Religious Worship* what it will, as absurd as you please to fancy it, yet it will not fail to reach very far for the proving of a Deity. For there are no *natural Faculties* in things that have not their Object in the World; as there is *Meat* as well as *Mouths*, *Sounds* as well as *Hearing*, *Colours* as well as *Sight*, *Dangers* as well as *Fear*, and the like. So there ought in like manner to be a God as well as a *natural Propension* in Men to *Religious Worship*, God alone being the proper Object thereof.

Nor does it abate the strength of the Argument, that this so deeply radicated Property of *Religion* in Man, that cannot be lost, does so ineptly and ridiculously display it self in Mankind.

For as the plying of a Dog's Feet in his sleep, as if there were some game before him, and the butting of a young Lamb before he has yet either Horns or Enemies to encounter, would not be in Nature, were there not such a thing as a Hare to be coursed, or an horned Enemy to be encountered with Horns: So there would not be to *universal* an exercise of *Religious Worship* in the World, though it be done never so ineptly and foolishly, were there not really a due Object of this *Worship*, and a capacity in Man for the right performance thereof; which could not be, unless there were a God.

But the truth is, Man's Soul, in this drunken drowzy Condition she is in, has fallen asleep in the Body, and like one in a Dream talks to the Bed-posts, Embraces her Pillow instead of her Friend, falls down before Statues instead of adoring the Eternal and Invisible God, Pray's to Stocks and Stones instead of speaking to him that by his Word created all things.

10. I but you will reply, that a young *Lamb* has at length both his *Weapon* and *Enemy* to encounter, and the dreaming *Dog* did once, and may again pursue some real Game; and so he that talks in his sleep did once confer with Men awake, and may do so once again: but whole Nations for many Successions of Ages have been stupid Idolaters, and do so continue to this Day. But I answer, that this rather informs us of another great Mystery, than at all enervates the present Argument, or obscures the grand Truth we strive for. For this does plainly insinuate thus much, That Mankind is in a laps'd Condition, like one fallen down in the fit of an *Epilepsie*, whose Limbs by force of the Convulsion are moved very incomposedly and illfavour'dly; but we know that he that does for the present move the Members of his Body so rudely and fortuitously, did before command the use of his Muscles in a decent Exercise of his progressive Faculty, and that when the Fit is over he will do so again.

This therefore rather implies, that these poor barbarous Souls had once the true Knowledge of God and his *Worship*, and by some hidden Providence may be recovered into it again, than that this propension to *Religious Worship*, that so conspicuously appears in them, should be utterly in vain: As it would be both in them and in all Men else, if there were no God.

C H A P. XI.

1. *A concerning Enquiry touching the Essence of the Soul of Man.* 2. *That the Soul is not a mere Modification of the Body, the Body being incapable of such Operations as are usually attributed to the Soul, as Spontaneous Motion, Animadversion, Memory, Reason.* 3. *That the Spirits are incapable of Memory, and consequently of Reason, Animadversion, and of Moving of the Body.* 4. *That the Brain cannot be the Principle of spontaneous Motion, having neither Muscles nor Sense.* 5. *That Fancy, Reason and Animadversion are seated neither in any Pore, nor any particular part of the Brain, nor is all the Brain figured into this or that Conception, nor every Particle thereof.* 6. *That the Figuration of one part of the Brain is not reflected to the rest, demonstrated from the Site of things.* 7. *That the Brain has no Sense, further demonstrated from Anatomical Experiments.* 8. *How ridiculously the Operations of the Soul are attributed to the Conarion.* 9. *The Conclusion, That the Impetus of Spontaneous Motion is neither from the Animal Spirits nor the Brain.* 10. *That the Soul is not any Corporeal Substance distinct from the Animal Spirits and the Body;* 11. *And therefore is a Substance Incorporeal.* 12. *The discovery of the Essence of the Soul, of what great usefulness for the easier conceiving the Nature of God.* 13. *And how there may be an Eternal Mind that has both Understanding and Power of Moving the Matter of the Universe.*

1. **W**E have done with those more obvious Faculties in the Soul of Man that naturally tend to the discovery of the Existence of a God. Let us briefly, before we loose from our selves and

and lanch out into the vast Ocean of the External *Phænomena* of *Nature*; consider the *Essence* of the *Soul* her self, what it is, whether a mere *Modification* of the *Body*, or *Substance* distinct therefrom; and then whether *Corporeal* or *Incorporeal*. For upon the clearing of this Point we may haply be convinced that there is a *Spiritual* Substance really distinct from the *Matter*; which who so does acknowledge, will be easilier induced to believe there is a God.

2. First therefore, if we say that the *Soul* is a mere *Modification* of the *Body*, the *Soul* then is but one universal Faculty of the *Body*, or many Faculties put together, and those Operations which are usually attributed unto the *Soul*, must of necessity be attributed unto the *Body*. I demand therefore, to what in the *Body* will you attribute *Spontaneous Motion*? I understand thereby, a power in our selves of moving or holding still most of the parts of our *Body*, as our Hand, suppose, or little Finger. If you will say that it is nothing but the *immission* of the *Spirits* into such and such Muscles, I would gladly know what does *immit* these *Spirits*, and *direct* them so curiously. Is it *themselves*, or the *Brain*, or that particular piece of the *Brain* they call the *Conarion* or *Pine-kernel*? Whatever it be, that which does thus *immit* them and *direct* them must have *Animadversion*, and the same that has *Animadversion* has *Memory* also and *Reason*. Now I would know whether the *Spirits* *themselves* be capable of *Animadversion*, *Memory* and *Reason*; for it indeed seems altogether impossible. For these *Animal Spirits* are nothing else but *Matter* very thin and liquid, whole *Nature* consists in this, that all the Particles of it be in Motion, and being loose from one another, fridge and play up and down according to the measure and manner of agitation in them.

3. I therefore now demand, which of the Particles in these so many loosely moving one from another has *Animadversion* in it? If you say that they all put together have, I appeal to him that thus answers, how unlikely it is that that should have *Animadversion* that is so utterly incapable of *Memory*, and consequently of *Reason*. For it is as impossible to conceive *Memory* competible to such a Subject, as it is how to write Characters in the Water or in the Wind.

4. If you say the *Brain* *immits* and *directs* these *Spirits*, how can that so freely and spontaneously move it self or another that has no *Muscles*? Besides, *Anatomists* tell us, that though the *Brain* be the Instrument of Sense, yet it has no Sense at all of it self; how then can that that has no Sense direct thus spontaneously and arbitrarily the *Animal Spirits* into any part of the *Body*? An Act that plainly requires determinate Sense and Perception. But let the *Anatomists* conclude what they will, I think I shall little less than demonstrate that the *Brains* have no Sense. For the same thing in us that has Sense has likewise *Animadversion*; and that which has *Animadversion* in us, has also a Faculty of free and arbitrary *Fancy* and of *Reason*.

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5. Let

5. Let us now consider the Nature of the *Brain*, and see how competent those Operations and Powers are to such a Subject. Verily if we take a right view of this lax pith or marrow in Man's Head, neither our Sense nor Understanding can discover any thing more in this Substance that can pretend to such noble Operations, as *free Imagination* and the sagacious Collections of *Reason*, than we can discern in a Cake of Sewet or a Bowl of Curds. For this loose Pulp that is thus wrapt up within our *Cranium* is but a spongy and porous Body, and pervious, not only to the Animal Spirits, but also to more gross Juice and Liquor; else it could not well be nourished, at least it could not be so soft and moistened by Drunkenness and Excess, as to make the Understanding inept and sottish in its Operations.

Wherefore I now demand, in this soft Substance which we call the *Brain*, whose *softness* implies that it is in some measure *liquid*, and *liquidity* implies a several *Motion* of loosned Parts, in what part or parcel thereof does *Fancy*, *Reason* and *Animadversion* lie? In this lax Consistence that lies like a Net all on heaps in the Water, I demand in what knot, loop or interval thereof, does this Faculty of *free Fancy* and *active Reason* reside? I believe you will be ashamed to assign me any one in particular.

And if you will say in *all together*, you must say that the whole *Brain* is figured into this or that Representation, which would cancel *Memory*, and take away all Capacity of there being any distinct Notes and Places for the several *Species* of things there represented.

But if you will say there is in *every Part* of the *Brain* this Power of *Animadversion* and *Fancy*, you are to remember that the *Brain* is in some measure a *liquid Body*, and we must enquire how these loose Parts understand one anothers several *Animadversions* and *Notions*: And if they could, (which is yet inconceivable) yet if they could from hence do any thing toward the *Immission* and *Direction* of the *Animal Spirits* into this or that part of the Body, we must consider that they must do it (upon the knowing one anothers Minds,) as it were by a joint contention of Strength; as when many Men at once, the Word being given, lift or tug together for the moving of some so massie a Body that the single Strength of one could not deal with. But this is to make the *several Particles* of the *Brain* so many *individual Persons*; a fitter Object for Laughter than the least measure of Belief.

6. Besides, How come these *many Animadversions* to seem but one to us, our Mind being these, as is supposed? Or rather why, if the Figuration of one part of the *Brain* be communicated to all the rest, does not the same Object seem situated behind us and before us, above and beneath, on the Right Hand and on the left, and every way as the Impress of the Object is reflected against all the parts of the *Brains*? But there appearing

pearing to us *but one Animadversion*, as but *one site of things*, it is a sufficient Argument that there is *but one*; or if there be *many*, that they are not mutually communicated from the Parts one to another, and that therefore there can be no such joint Endeavour toward one Design: Whence it is manifest, that the *Brains* cannot *immit* nor *direct* these *Animal Spirits* into what part of the *Body* they please.

7. Moreover, that the *Brain* has *no Sense*, and therefore cannot impress spontaneously any Motion on the *Animal Spirits*, it is no slight Argument, in that some being dissected have been found *without Brains*; and *Fontanus* tells us of a Boy at *Amsterdam* that had nothing but limpid *Water* in his Head instead of *Brains*; and the *Brains* generally are easily dissolvable into a *watery* Consistence; which agrees with what I intimated before. Now I appeal to any free Judge, how likely these *liquid* Particles are to approve themselves of that Nature and Power, as to be able, by erecting and knitting themselves together for a moment of time, to bear themselves so as with one joint Contention of Strength to cause an Arbitrarious Ablegation of the *Spirits* into this or that determinate Part of the *Body*. But the absurdity of this, I have sufficiently insinuated already.

Lastl^y, The *Nerves*, I mean the Marrow of them, which is of the self-same Substance with the *Brain*, have *no Sense*, as is demonstrable from a *Catalepsis* or *Catochus*. But I will not accumulate Arguments in a matter so palpable.

8. As for that little sprunt Piece of the *Brain* which they call the *Conarion*, that this should be the very Substance whose natural Faculty it is to move it self, and by its motions and nods to determinate the course of the *Spirits* into this or that part of the *Body*, seems tome no less foolish and fabulous, than the Story of him that could change the Wind as he pleased, by setting his Cap on this or that side of his Head.

If you heard but the magnificent Stories that are told of this little lurking Mushrome; how it does not only hear and see, but imagines, reasons, commands the whole fabrick of the *Body* more dexterously than an *Indian Boy* does an *Elephant*, what an acute *Logician*, subtle *Geometrician*, prudent *Statesman*, skilful *Physician*, and profound *Philosopher* he is, and then afterward by dissection you discover this Worker of Miracles to be nothing but a poor silly contemptible Knob or Protuberency, consisting of a thin Membrane, containing a little pulposus Matter, much of the same Nature with the rest of the *Brain*;

Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici?

would you not sooner laugh at it, than go about to confute it? And truly I may the better laugh at it now, having already confuted it in what I have afore argued concerning the rest of the *Brain*.

9. I shall therefore make bold to conclude, that the impress of *Spontaneous Motion* is neither from the *Animal Spirits*, nor from the *Brain*; and therefore that those Operations that are usually attributed unto the *Soul*, are really incompetent to any part of the *Body*; and therefore that the *Soul* is not a meer *Modification* of the *Body*, but a *Substance distinct* there-from.

10. Now we are to enquire whether this *Substance*, *distinct* from what ordinarily we call the *Body*, be also it self a *Corporeal Substance*, or whe-

ther it be *Incorporeal*. If you say that it is a *Corporeal* Substance, you can understand no other than *Matter* more subtile and tenuious than the *Animal Spirits* themselves, mingled with them, and dispersed through the Vessels and Porosities of the Body ; for there can be no Penetration of Dimensions. But I need no new Arguments to confute this fond conceit, for what I said of the *Animal Spirits* before, is applicable with all ease and fitness to this present Case. And let it be sufficient that I advertise you so much, and so be excused from the repeating the same thing over again.

11. It remains therefore that we conclude, That that which impresses *Spontaneous Motion* upon the *Body*, or more immediately upon the *Animal Spirits*, that which *imagines, remembers, and reasons*, is an *Immaterial Substance distinct from the Body*, which uses the *Animal Spirits* and the *Brains* for Instruments in such and such Operations. And thus we have found a *Spirit* in a proper Notion and Signification, that has apparently these Faculties in it, it can both *understand*, and *move Corporeal Matter*.

12. And now the prize that we have won will prove for our Design of very great Consequence : For it is obvious here to observe, that the Soul of Man is as it were *ἄγαλμα Θεῷ*, a *compendious Statue of the Deity* ; her Substance is a *solid Effigies of God*. And therefore as with ease we consider the Substance and Motion of the vast *Heavens* on a little *Sphere* or *Globe*, so we may with like facility contemplate the Nature of the *Almighty* in this little *Meddal of God*, the Soul of Man, enlarging to Infinity what we observe in our selves when we transfer it unto God ; as we do imagine those *Circles* which we view on the *Globe* to be vastly bigger, while we fancy them as described in the *Heavens*.


13. Wherefore being assured of this, That there is a *Spiritual* Substance in our selves in which both these Properties do reside, *viz.* of *Understanding*, and of *moving Corporeal Matter* ; let us but enlarge our Minds so as to conceive as well as we can of a *Spiritual* Substance, that is able to *move and actuate all Matter* whatsoever never so far extended, and after what way and manner soever it please, and that it has not the *Knowledge* only of this or that *particular thing*, but a distinct and plenary *Cognoscence* of *all things* ; and we have indeed a very competent apprehension of the Nature of the *Eternal and Invisible God*, who, like the Soul of Man, does not indeed fall under *Sense*, but does every where operate so, that his Presence is easily to be gathered from what is discovered by our outward Senses.

A N
ANTIDOTE
AGAINST
ATHEISM.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

- i. That the more general Phænomena of External Nature argue the Being of a God. 2. That if Matter be self-moved, it cannot work it self into these Phænomena. 3. Much less if it rest of it self. 4. That though it were partly self-moving, partly self-resisting, yet it could not produce either Sun or Stars of that figure they are. 5. That the Laws of the Motion of the Earth are not casual or fortuitous. 6. That there is a Divine Providence that does at least approve, if not direct, all the Motions of the Matter; with a Reason why she permits the Effects of the mere Mechanical motion of the Matter to go as far as they can.

- i.  HE last thing which I insisted upon was, the Specifick nature of the Soul of Man, how it is an *Immaterial* Substance indued with these two eminent Properties, of *Understanding*, and Power of *moving Corporeal Matter*. Which truth I cleared, to the intent that when we shall discover such motions and contrivances in the largely-extended Matter of the World as imply *Wisdom* and *Providence*, we may the easilier come off to the acknowledgment of that Eternal Spiritual Essence that has fram'd Heaven and Earth, and is the Author and Maker of all visible and invisible Beings.

Wherefore we being now so well furnish'd for the Voyage, I would have my *Atheist* to take Shipping with me, and loosing from this particular Speculation of our own inward Nature, to lanch out into that vast Ocean, as I said, of the External *Phænomena* of *Universal Nature*, or walk with me a while on the wide Theatre of this *Outward World*, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest Marks and

Signs that I shall point him to in this outward Frame of things, that naturally signifie unto us, *That there is a God.*

And now, first, to begin with what is most general, I say that the *Phænomena* of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, Spring-time and Harvest, that the manner of rising and setting of the Sun, Moon and Stars; that all these are Signs and Tokens unto us that there is a God, that is, that things are so framed, that they naturally imply a Principle of *Wisdom* and *Counsel* in the *Author* of them. And if there be such an *Author* of external Nature, there is a God.

See Des-
Cartes, Prin-
cip. Philos.
part. 2. artic.
22, 23.

2. But here it will be reply'd, that mere *Motion* of the *Universal Matter* will at last necessarily grind it self into those more rude and general Delineations of Nature that are observed in the Circuits of the Sun, Moon and Stars, and the general Consequences of them. But if the Mind of Man grow so bold as to conceit any such thing, let him examine his Faculties what they naturally conceive of the *Motion* of *Matter*. And verily the great Master of this Mechanical *Hypothesis* does not suppose or admit of any *Specifical difference* in this *Universal Matter*, out of which this outward frame of the World should arise. Neither do I think that any Man else will easily imagine but that all the *Matter* of the World is of one kind for its very Substance or *Essence*.

Now therefore I demand concerning this *Universal uniform Matter*, whether naturally *Motion* or *Rest* belongs unto it. If *Motion*, it being acknowledged *uniform*, it must be alike moved in every *Part* or *Particle* imaginable of it. For this *Motion* being natural and essential to the *Matter*, is alike every where in it, and therefore has loosened every Atome of it to the utmost Capacity; so that every Particle is alike, and moved alike. And therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one Atome above another in Bigness or Motion, it is manifest that this *universal Matter*, to whom *Motion* is so essential and intrinsecal, will be ineffectual for the producing of any *variety of Appearances* in Nature; and so no *Suns*, nor *Stars*, nor *Earths*, nor *Vortices* can ever arise out of this infinitely-thin and still *Matter*, which must thus eternally remain unperceptible to any of our Senses were our Senses, ten thousand millions of Times more subtile than they are: Indeed there could not be any such thing as either Man or Sense in the World. But we see this *Matter* shews it self to us in abundance of *varieties of Appearance*; therefore there must be another Principle besides the *Matter*, to order the *Motion* of it so as may make these *varieties* to appear: And what will that prove, but a God?

3. But if you'll say that *Motion* is not of the nature of *Matter*, (as indeed it is very hard to conceive it, the *Matter* supposed homogeneous) but that it is inert and stupid of it self; then it must be moved from some other, and thus of necessity we shall be cast upon a God, or at least a *Spiritual Substance* actuating the *Matter*; which the Atheists are as much afraid of, as Children are of Spirits, or themselves of a God.

4. But Men that are much degenerate know not the natural Emanations of their own Minds, but think of all things confusedly, and therefore,

fore, it may be, will not stick to affirm, that either the parts of the Matter are *Specifically different*, or though they be not, yet some are *Moveable* of themselves, others inclinable to *Rest*, and were ever so; for it happened so to be, though there be no reason for it in the thing it self; which is to wound our Faculties with so wide a gap, that after this they will let in any thing, and take away all pretence to any Principles of Knowledge.

But to scuffle and combat with them in their own dark Caverns, let the *Universal Matter* be a heterogeneal *Chaos* of confusion, variously moved and as it happens; I say, there is no likelihood that this mad *Motion* would ever amount to so wise a Contrivance, as is discernable even in the general Delineations of Nature: Nay, it will not amount to a Natural Appearance of what we see, and what is conceived most easie thus to come to pass, to wit, a round *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Earth*. For it is shrewdly to be suspected, if there were no *Superintendent* over the Motions of those *Æthereal Whirl-pools*, which the *French Philosophy* supposes, that the form of the *Sun* and the rest of the *Stars* would be *oblong*, or *round*, because the Matter recedes all along the *Axis* of a *Vortex*, as well as from the *Centre*; and therefore naturally the Space that is left for the finest and subtilest Element of all, of which the *Sun* and *Stars* are to consist, will be *long*, not *round*. Wherefore this *round Figure*, we see them in, must proceed from some higher Principle than the mere Agitation of the Matter: But whether simply *Spermatical*, or *Sensitive* also and *Intellectual*, I'll leave to the disquisition of others, who are more at leisure to meddle with such Curiosities.

5. The Business that lies me in hand to make good, is this, That taking that for granted which these great Naturalists would have allowed, to wit, *That the Earth moves about the Sun*; I say, the Laws of its *Motion* are such, that if they had been imposed on her by humane Reason and Counsel, they would have been no other than they are. So that appealing to our own Faculties, we are to confess that the *Motion* of the *Sun* and *Stars*, or of the *Earth*, as our Naturalists would have it, is from a *knowing Principle*, or at least hath passed the Approbation and Allowance of such a Principle.

For as *Art* takes what *Nature* will afford for her purpose, and makes up the rest her self: So the *Eternal Mind* (that put the *Universal Matter* upon Motion, as I conceive most reasonable, or if the Matter be confusedly mov'd of it self, as the Atheist wilfully contends) this *Eternal Mind*, I say, takes the easie and natural results of this general Impress of *Motion*, where they are for his Purpose; where they are not, he rectifies and compleats them.

6. And verily it is far more suitable to Reason, that God making the Matter of that nature, that it can by mere *Motion* produce something, that it should go on so far as that single Advantage could naturally carry it; that so the Wit of Man, whom God hath made to contemplate the *Phænomena* of Nature, may have a more fit object to exercise it self upon. For thus is the Understanding of Man very highly gratified, when the Works of God and their manner of production are made intelligible unto him by a natural deduction of one thing from another; which would
not

not have been, if God had on purpose avoided what the *Matter* upon *Motion* naturally afforded, and cancelled the Laws thereof in every thing. Besides, to have altered or added any thing further, where there was no need, had been to *multiply Entities* to no purpose.

Thus it is therefore with Divine Providence, what that one single Impress of *Motion* upon the *Universal Matter* will afford that is useful and good, it doth allow and take in; what it might have miscarried in or could not amount to, it directs or supplies. As in little pieces of Wood naturally bow'd like a Man's Elbow, the Carver doth not unbow it, but Carves an Hand at the one end of it, and shapes it into the compleat Figure of a Man's Arm.

That therefore that I contend for is this; That be the *Matter* moved how it will, the *Appearances* of things are such as do manifestly intimate that they are either appointed all of them, or at least approved, by an *Universal Principle* of *Wisdom* and *Counsel*.

CHAP. II.

1. The perpetual Parallelisme of the Axis of the Earth a manifest argument of Divine Providence.
2. The great Inconveniencies, if the posture of this parallel Axis were Perpendicular to the Plane of the Ecliptick:
3. Or Co-incident with the said Plane.
4. The excellent Advantages of that inclining Posture it hath, and what a manifest Demonstration it is of Providence.
5. The same Argument urged from the Ptolemaical Hypothesis.
6. A further Consideration of the Axis of the Earth, and of the Moon's crossing the Equinoctial Line.
7. A Demonstration from the Phænomenon of Gravity, that there is a Principle distinct from Matter.
8. That neither the Air, nor any more subtile Matter in the Air, have any Knowledge or free Agency in them.
9. A notable Demonstration from the Sucker of the Air-Pump's drawing up so great a weight, that there is a Substance distinct from Matter in the World.
10. That this Phænomenon cannot be salv'd by the Elastick Power of the Air, demonstrated from the Phænomenon it self.
11. An Evasion produced and answered.
12. Another Evasion anticipated.
13. That this preremptory force of Nature against the first Laws of Mechanical Motion, and against that of Gravity, is a palpable pledge, that where things fall out fitly, there is the same Immaterial Guide, though there be not the same sensibility of force on the Matter.
14. The ridiculous Sophistry of the Atheist, arguing from some petty effects of the mere Motion of Matter, that there is no higher Principle, plainly discovered, and justly derided.
15. Providence concluded from the Laws of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, &c.

I. **N**OW therefore to admit the *Motion* of the Earth, and to talk with the Naturalists in their own Dialect, I demand, Whether it be better to have the *Axis* of the Earth steady, and perpetually parallel with its

its self; or to have it *carelessly tumble* this way and that way, as it happens, or at least very variously and intricately. And you cannot but answer me, That it is better to have it *steady* and *parallel*; for in this lies the necessary Foundation of the Art of *Navigation* and *Dialling*. For that *steady* Stream of Particles, which is supposed to keep the *Axis* of the Earth *parallel* to it self, affords the Mariner both his *Cynosura* and his *Compass*; the *Load-stone* and the *Load-star* depend both on this; and *Dialling* could not be at all without it. But both of these *Arts* are pleasant, and the one especially of mighty importance to Mankind: For thus there is an ordinary measuring of *Time* for our Affairs at Home, and an Opportunity of Traffick Abroad with the most remote Nations of the World, and so there is a mutual Supply of the several Commodities of all Countreys, besides the enlarging of our Understanding by so ample Experience we get of both Men and Things. Wherefore if we were rationally to consult, Whether the *Axis* of the Earth is to be held *steady* and *parallel* to it self, or be left at *random*; we would conclude, That it ought to be *steady*. And so we find it *de facto*, though the Earth move floating in the liquid Heavens. So that appealing to our own Faculties, we are to affirm, That the constant Direction of the *Axis* of the Earth was established by a Principle of *Wisdom* and *Counsel*, or at least approved of it.

2. Again, there being several Postures of this *steady* Direction of the *Axis* of the Earth, *viz.* either *perpendicular* to a Plane going through the Centre of the Sun, or *Co-incident*, or *Inclining*; I demand which of all these Reason and Knowledge would make choice of. Not of a *Perpendicular* Posture: For both the pleasant variety and great conveniency of *Summer* and *Winter*, *Spring-time* and *Harvest*, would be lost; and for want of accession of the Sun, these parts of the Earth that bring forth Fruit now, and are habitable, would be in an incapacity of ever bringing forth any, and consequently could entertain no Inhabitants; and those Parts that the full heat of the Sun could reach, he plying them always alike, without any annual Recession or Intermission, would at last grow tir'd and exhausted. And besides, consulting with our own Faculties we observe, that an orderly *vicissitude* of things is most pleasant unto us, and doth much more gratifie the *Contemplative* Property in Man.

3. And now in the Second place, nor would Reason make choice of a *Co-incident* position of the *Axis* of the Earth. For if the *Axis* thus lay in a Plane that goes through the Centre of the Sun, the *Ecliptick* would, like a *Colour*, or one of the *Meridians*, pass through the *Poles* of the Earth, which would put the Inhabitants of the World into a pitiful Condition: For they that scape best in the *Temperate Zone*, would be accloy'd with very tedious long Nights, no less than Forty Days long; and they that now have their Night never above four and twenty Hours, as *Friseland*, *Ifeland*, the further Parts of *Russia* and *Norway*, would be deprived of the Sun above a Hundred and Thirty Days together; our selves in *England*, and the rest of the same *Clime*, would be closed up in Darkness no less than an hundred or eighty continual Days, and so proportionably of the rest both in and out of the *Temperate Zones*. And as for *Summer* and
Winter,

Winter, though those *vicissitudes* would be, yet it could not but cause very raging Diseases to have the Sun stay so long describing his little Circles near the Poles, and lying so hot upon the Inhabitants that had been in so large extremity of Darkness and Cold before.

4. It remains therefore, that the Posture of the *Axis* of the Earth be *Inclining*, not *Co-incident*, nor *Perpendicular* to the forenamed Plane. And verily it is not only *Inclining*, but in so fit Proportion, that there can be no fitter excogitated to make it to the utmost capacity as well pleasant as habitable. For though the course of the Sun be curbed within the compass of the *Tropicks*, and so makes those Parts very hot; yet the constant gales of Wind from the East, (to say nothing of the nature and fit length of their Nights) make the *Torrid Zone* not only habitable, but pleasant.

Now this best posture, which our Reason would make choice of, we see really establish'd in Nature; and therefore, if we be not perverse and wilful, we are to infer, that it was establish'd by a *Principle* that hath in it *Knowledge* and *Counsel*, not from a blind fortuitous jumbling of the Parts of the *Matter* one against another, especially having found before in our selves a *Knowing, Spiritual Substance*, that is also able to *move* and *alter* the *Matter*. Wherefore, I say, we would more naturally conclude, That there is some such *Universal Knowing Principle*, that hath Power to *move* and *direct* the *Matter* of the Universe; than to fancy that a confused juggling of the parts thereof should contrive themselves into such a condition, as if they had in them *Reason* and *Counsel*, and could *direct* themselves. But what could this *directing* Principle be but *God*?

5. But to speak the same thing more briefly, and yet more intelligibly, to those that are only acquainted with the *Ptolemaical Hypothesis*: I say, that being it might have happened, that the annual course of the *Sun* should have been through the *Poles* of the World, and that the *Axis* of the Heavens might have been very troublesomely and disorderly moveable, from whence all those Inconveniencies would arise, which I have before mentioned, and yet they are not, but are so ordered as our own Reason must approve of as best; it is natural for a Man to conceive, that they are really ordered by a *Principle* of *Reason* and *Counsel*, that is, that they are made by an All-wise and All-powerful *God*.

6. I will only add one or two Observables more, concerning the *Axis* of the *Earth* and the course of the *Moon*, and so I will pass to other things.

It cannot but be acknowledged, that if the *Axis* of the Earth were *perpendicular* to the Plane of the *Sun's Ecliptick*, that her *Motion* would be more easie and natural; and yet for the Conveniencies afore-mentioned, we see it is made to stand in an *inclining* Posture: So in all likelihood it would be more easie and natural for the Hand-maid of the Earth, the *Moon*, to finish her Monthly Courses in the *Equinoctial Line*; but we see, like the *Sun*, she crosses it, and expatiates some degrees further than the *Sun* himself, that her exalted Light might be more comfortable to those that live very much North, in their long Nights.

Wherefore I conclude, That though it were possible that the con-

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used agitation of the Parts of the Matter might make a round hard heap like the *Earth*, and more thin and liquid Bodies like the *Aether* and *Sun*, and that the *Earth* may swim in this liquid *Aether*, like a roasted Apple in a great Bowl of Wine, and be carried about like Straws or Grass cast upon a Whirlpool; yet that its *Motion* and *Posture* would be so directed and attemper'd, as we our selves that have Reason, upon due Consideration, would have it to be, and yet not to be from that which is *Knowing*, and in some sense *Reasonable*, is to our Faculties, if they discern any thing at all, as absonous and absurd as any thing can be. For when it had been easier to have been otherwise, why should it be thus, if some *Superintendent Cause* did not oversee and direct the Motions of the Matter, allowing nothing therein but what our Reason will confess to be to very good Purpose?

7. And that the foregoing *Phænomena* are not by chance or luck, but directed and effected by the abovesaid Superintendency, will be more evincingly confirmed, if we add the Consideration of two other *Phænomena* in Nature, which are very plain and simple, but even violently cross to the mere *Mechanical Powers* of Matter. The one is that of *Gravity*, or the Descent of heavy Bodies toward the Earth; the other what they ordinarily call *Fuga Vacui*: Wherein I shall bring such an Instance out of that noble and ingenious Gentleman's Experiments of his *Air-pump*, as will plainly demonstrate there must be some *Immaterial Being* that exercises its *directive Activity* on the Matter of the World. But first I shall recur, and give a touch upon the nature of *Gravity*.

That, upon supposition the Earth runs round in four and twenty Hours, it will violently fling off such things as lie upon it, (unless there be some other Substance distinct from Matter that resists the *Mechanical Powers* thereof,) I have clearly and copiously demonstrated in my Treatise of the *Immortality of the Soul*. And if we consider more particularly what a strong tug a massie Bullet, suppose of Lead or Brass, must needs give (according to that prime *Mechanical Law* of Motion persisting in a right Line) to recede from the superficies of the Earth, the Bullet being in so swift a Motion as would dispatch some fifteen Miles in one Minute of an Hour; it must needs appear that a wonderful Power is required to curb it, regulate it, or remand it back to the Earth, and keep it there, notwithstanding the strong Reluctancy of that first *Mechanical Law* of Matter that would urge it to recede. Whereby is manifested not only the marvelous Power of *Unity* and *Indiscernibility* in the *Spirit of Nature*, but that there is a peremptory, and even forcible Execution of an *All-comprehensive and Eternal Counsel* for the ordering and the guiding of the Motion of the Matter in the Universe to what is for the best. And this *Phænomenon* of *Gravity* is of so good and necessary consequence, that there could be neither Earth nor Inhabitants without it, in this State that things are.

For the *Air*, whether a Man will be so delirous as to fancy it all endued with *perception* and *liberty of will* to resist as it pleases, or to be interspersed with some *subtiler Matter* so qualified, which they must ridiculously make either a disjointed or else spongy and perforated Deity; all

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the resistance that this lax and disunited Element could make, call it Natural or Divine, (for Words have no force) could no more keep down the above-said Bullets from receding from the Earth, than an Army of the smallest Flies stop a Cannon-bullet flying in the Air, let them resist it as stoutly as they can. So plain a Demonstration is this *Phænomenon* of the Gravity, that there is a *Spirit of Nature* which is the Vicarious Power of God upon the Motion of the Matter of the Universe.

*TheHonourable Robert Boyle Esq; his Treatise entitled New Experiments Physico-Mechanical touching the Air.

8. And that neither the *Air* it self has any such Power, Knowledge and liberty of Will, nor that there are any such Divine Particles interspersed in the *Air* that have, in my Opinion is plainly manifest from the second and thirty second Experiments of the abovenamed Treatise of that Learned * Gentleman. For, whereas in the first of those Experiments, the Brass Key or Stopple of the Cover of the Receiver, after the Receiver is emptied well of the Air, is with much difficulty lifted up; and in the other, if you apply a tapering Valve of Brass to the lower branch of the Stop-cock of the Receiver well emptied of Air, as before, and turn the Key of the Stop-cock, the external Air beating like a forcible Stream upon the Valve to get in there, will suddenly both shut the Valve, and keep it shut so strongly, that it will bear up with it a ten pound weight (which are evident Arguments of an earnest endeavour in Nature to fill the Receiver again with Air, as it was naturally before, though this Motion, whereby it attempts so strongly to get in, does more accurately exclude it:) It is apparent from hence, that neither the *Air* it self, nor any more Subtile and Divine Matter (which is more througly congregated together in the Receiver upon the Pumping out of the Air) has any freedom of Will, or any Knowledge or Perception to do any thing, they being puzzled and acting so fondly and preposterously in their Endeavours to replenish the Receiver again with Air.

For if the external *Air* and that subtiler Matter in the Receiver had been knowing and free Agents, there would have been that Correspondence betwixt them, that the Exterior *Air* would have suspended or withdrawn its Pressure without, and the Subtile and Divine Matter within, would have directed its Motion against the Stopple and Valve to let in the Air, according to the intention of Nature. Or if nothing but that subtiler Body be Free and Knowing, that alone by mutual Correspondence (that in the Air, without bearing off the Pressure of the outward Air against the Receiver, and that part within bearing against the Valve or Stopple) would let in the Air, according to the earnest and serious purpose of Nature. But their acting being so clear contrary to the End designed, and their attempts so inept, (whenas yet the thing were easily done, if there were Knowledge and free Agency in either the *Air* or any other more subtiler Matter) it is a Demonstration that the Impetus of Motion in all Matter is blind and necessary, and that there is no Matter at all that is Free and Knowing, but moves and acts of it self (if undirected by some other Immaterial Principle) according to the mere Mechanical Laws of Motion.

* See Mr. Boyle's New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Exper. 23.

9. According to which that notable * *Phænomenon*, which now at last I come to, cannot be brought to pass; namely, That the Sucker of the

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Air-pump, the Cylinder being well emptied of the Air, should draw up above an hundred pound weight, moving up as it were of his own accord. For, as the ingenious Experimenter has observ'd in his third Experiment, this forcible endeavour of the subingression of the Air is not from the pressure of the ambient Air as strengthened by the accessi- on of the Air sucked out, because then he that manages the Pump would find the resistance of the Air increased as the Sucker is drawn down lower, which yet is not observ'd. To which we may add in Reason, that the Air being nothing but a thin Body, or *Congeries* of small Particles in perpetual Motion, what is Pumped will naturally spread out into such distances as it may move more freely in, that is, into those spaces where the Air is more thin; so that, as it were in a Moment, all the Air becomes of one and the same Consistency. And therefore any new pressure (upon the account of the Air nearest to the Pump becoming more thick) cannot come into compute in this case.

10. The most plausible *Mechanical* Solution therefore that can be given of this *Phenomenon*, is that *Hypothesis* which the excellent Author himself has made use of, and which will agree universally to the Air, though in its own natural Temper: Namely, that there is an *Elastick* power in the Air, whether you explain it the *Cartesian* way, by the playing and whirling of every Particle thereof, whereby they attempt to possess a large space; or whether there be such a comprehension of the Particle as there is in the hairs of a lock of Wool, which will expand it self upon the receding of what bore too strongly against it.

But let this *Elastical* Power consist in this or in what else it will, though the Solution look at first sight very hopeful and promising, yet I must confess (but with submission to better Judgments) that the Effect that is attributed to the *Hypothesis* in this Experiment, seems to me a Demonstration against the *Hypothesis* it self. For this *Elastical* Power, according to the Experiment, has no less force of Pressure than an hundred pound weight or more: Which Pressure (as in all flexible Bodies that have a *Spring-power* in them) is perpetual, and every where in the Air, if it be there at all. And therefore any Cylinder of Air, in the same height from the Ground, and of the same diameter with that of the Sucker of the Pump, will press as forcibly as an hundred pound Weight.

Now suppose a lump of Butter in a pair of wooden Scales having the same diameter with the Sucker of the *Air-pump*: It is manifest that this Butter will be pressed with the force of the Pressure of two hundred pound weight, a Cylinder of Air from beneath, and another from above, pressing with the force of an hundred pound weight apiece. This would necessarily follow if there were this *Elastick* Power in the Air. But the Butter is not pressed at all, as appears in that serene humour is squeezed out of it; nor is it at all flatted or spread out by any such Compression, although it have the force of two hundred pound weight pressing it, according to this *Hypothesis* of the *Elastick* Power of the Air.

11. Nor can I excogitate any Evasion against this Demonstration, unless it be that the *Spring* of the Air pressing against the sides of the Butter, as well as the bottom and top, keeps it from flatting. But it is

easily answered, That yet it cannot keep it from squeezing on all sides, and pressing out the milky and ferose Humour in the Butter, if there were any such Pressure, as is supposed. To which you may further add, That the lump of Butter being reduced to the Figure, suppose of a round Trencher, whose edge should fall short of the Area of the two sides an hundred or two hundred times, and then placed betwixt two thin light Trenchers broad enough for the Purpose, and hung free in the Air, with strings, as in a Scale, so that the force of Pressure from above and beneath shall exceed that of the round edge of the Butter an hundred or two hundred times; yet the Butter will not for all this be pressed closer by the *Spring of the Air*, nor have any more effect upon it than it had before: When notwithstanding it is so soft and yielding, that a very small force of our Hands will press it betwixt the two Trenchers.

12. Which yet is not, because our Strength is superadded to the force of the *Spring of the Air*: For the excess of the force of the *Spring of the Air* against the sides of the Trenchers above that which is against the round edge of the Butter, is far greater than the addition of the force of our pressing Hand added to the force of the *Air-Spring* against the sides of the Trencher, and yet there was no new effect.

And moreover, where this *Air-Spring* does not reach, namely, within the sides of a Pail filled with Water, in which you may put a lump of Butter, the Butter will there as easily yield to the pressure of your Hand as in the Air it self. So that it is irrefragably evident, that there is no such *Spring of the Air* as some learned Men have supposed, much less so strong as to master an hundred pound weight, as it is conceived to do in this notable Experiment of the *Air-pump*.

13. But as the *Phænomenon* of Gravity is quite cross and contrary to the very first *Mechanick Laws of Motion*, which yet is an Universal Law of Terrestrial Bodies, put upon them by that which is not only not Terrestrial, but *Immaterial*: So likewise this ascending of the Sucker of the *Air-pump* with above an hundred pound weight at it, is as cross and violent a breach of that Universal Law of Gravity, and so forcible, that it is apparent, that there is a *Principle* transcending the nature and power of *Matter* that does *umpire* and *rule* all, that *directs* the *Motion* of every part and parcel of *Matter* backwards and forwards, and contrary ways, in pursuance of such *General Designs* as are best for the Whole. And no less good than the *living* and *breathing* of Animals is aimed at in this so industriously and peremptorily keeping the parts of the *Air* together, as is well observed by this virtuous and judicious Author, upon his 41 Experiment.

Wherefore it being so manifest, that there is a *Principle* in the World that does tug so stoutly and resolutely against the *Mechanick Laws of Matter*, and that forcibly resists or nulls one common Law of Nature, for the more seasonable exercise of another; this, I say, is a very sure Pledge to us, that when things are fitly done, though not with this seeming violence and peremptoriness, yet they are the Effects of the same *Immaterial Principle*, (call it the *Spirit of Nature*, or what you will) which is the Vicarious Power of God upon this great *Automaton*, the World.

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14. But because so many *Bullets* joggled together in a Man's Hat will settle to such a determinate Figure, or because the *Frost* and *Wind* will draw upon Doors and Glass-Windows pretty uncouth streaks like feathers and other fooleries, which are to no Use or Purpose, to infer thence, that *all the Contrivances* that are in *Nature*, even the *Frame* of the *Bodies* both of *Men* and *Beasts*, are from no other Principle but the jumbling together of the *Matter*, and so because that this doth naturally effect *something*, that it is the Cause of *all things*, seems to me to be reasoning in the same *Mood* and *Figure* with that wise Market-man's, who going down a Hill, and carrying his *Cheeses* under his Arms, one of them falling and trundling down the Hill very fast, let the other go after it, appointing them all to meet him at his House at *Gotham*, not doubting but they beginning so hopefully, would be able to make good the whole Journey: or like another, of the same Town, who perceiving that his *Iron Turret* he had bought had three Feet, and could stand, expected also that it should walk too, and save him the labour of the Carriage. So our profound *Atheists* and *Epicureans*, according to the same pitch of Wisdom, do not stick to infer, because this confused *Motion* of the Parts of the *Matter* may amount to a rude delineation of *hard* and *soft*, *rigid* and *fluid*, and the like, that therefore it will go on further, and reach to the disposing of the *Matter* in such order as doth naturally imply a *Principle* that some way or other contains in it exact *Wisdom* and *Counsel*. A Position more befitting the Wise-men above mentioned, than any one that hath the least command of his natural Wit and Faculties.

15. Wherefore we having sufficiently detected the ridiculous folly of this present Sophism, let us, attending heedfully to the natural Emanations of unprejudic'd Reason, conclude, That *the Rising and Setting of the Lights of Heaven*, the *vicissitude of Day and Night*, *Winter and Summer*, being so ordered and guided as if they had been settled by exquisite Consultation and by clearest Knowledge; That therefore that which did thus ordain them is a *Knowing Principle*, able to move, alter and guide the *Matter* according to his own will and pleasure; that is to say, *That there is a God*.

And verily I do not at all doubt but that I shall evidently trace the visible Foot-steps of this *Divine Counsel* and *Providence*, even in all things discoverable in the World. But I will pass through them as lightly and briefly as I can.

CHAP. III.

1. That there is nothing in *Nature* but what passes the Approbation of a *Knowing Principle*.
2. The great Usefulness of Hills and Mountains.
3. The Condition of Man in order and respect to the rest of the Creation.
4. The designed Usefulness of Quarries of Stone, Timber-Wood, Metals and Minerals.
5. How upon these depend the Glory and Magnificence both of Peace and War.
6. As also the defence of Men against Beasts.

1. LET us therefore swiftly course over the Valleys and Mountains, sound the depth of the Sea, range the Woods and Forrests, dig into the Entrails of the Earth, and let the Atheist tell

the which of all these places are silent, and say nothing of a God. Those that are most dumb will at least compromise with the rest, that all things are by the *Guidance* and *Determination*, (let the *Matter* move as it will) or at least by the *allowance* and *approbation*, of a *Knowing Principle*. As a Mason that makes a Wall, sometimes meets with a *Stone* that wants no cutting, and so only approving of it, he places it in his Work: and a *piece of Timber* may happen to be crack'd in the very place where the Carpenter would cleave it, and he need not close it first, that he may cleave it a-funder afterwards. Wherefore if the mere *Motion* of the *Matter* can do any rude general thing of good Consequence, let it stand as allowable: But we shall find out also those things which do so manifestly favour of *Design* and *Counsel*, that we cannot naturally withhold our assent, but must say *There is a God*.

2. And now let us betake our selves to the search, and see if all things be not so as our Reason would desire them. And to begin at the Top first, even those rudely-scattered *Mountains*, that seem but so many Wens and unnatural Protuberancies upon the face of the Earth, if you consider but of what consequence they are, thus reconciled you may deem them Ornaments as well as useful.

For these are Nature's *Stillatories*, in whose hollow Caverns the ascending Vapours are congealed to that universal *Aqua vite*, that good *fresh-water*, the Liquor of Life, that sustains all the living Creatures in the World, being carried along in all Parts of the Earth in the winding Channels of *Brooks* and *Rivers*. Geography would make it good by a large induction. I will only instance in three or four; *Ana* and *Tagus* run from *Sierra Molina* in Spain, *Rhenus*, *Padus* and *Rhodanus* from the *Alps*, *Tanais* from the *Riphean*, *Garonna* from the *Pyrenean Mountains*, *Achelous* from *Pindus*, *Hebrus* from *Rhodope*, *Tigris* from *Niphates*, *Orontes* from *Libanus*, and *Euphrates* from the Mountains of *Armenia*, and so in the rest. But I will not insist upon this; I will now betake my self to what doth more forcibly declare an *Eye of Providence* directing and determining, as well as approving of, the result of the supposed Agitation of the Parts of the *Matter*.

3. And that you may the better feel the strength of my Argument, let us first briefly consider the Nature of Man, what Faculties he hath, and in what order he is in respect of the rest of the Creatures. And, indeed, though his Body be but weak and disarmed, yet his inward Abilities of Reason and Artificial Contrivance is admirable. He is much given to *Contemplation*, and the viewing of this Theatre of the World; to Traffick and Commerce with foreign Nations; to the building of Houses and Ships; to the making curious Instruments of Silver, Brass or Steel, and the like: In a Word, he is the flower and chief of all the products of Nature upon this Globe of the Earth. Now if I can shew, that there are Designs laid even in the lowest and vilest products of Nature that respect Man, the highest of all, you cannot deny but that there is an *Eye of Providence* that respecteth all things,

things, and passeth very swiftly from the Top to the Bottom, disposing all things wisely.

4. I therefore now demand, Man being of this Nature that he is, whether these noble Faculties of his would not be lost and frustrate, were there not Materials to exercise them on. And in the Second Place, I desire to know, whether the rude confused *Agitation* of the *Particles* of the *Matter*, do certainly produce any such Materials fit for Man to exercise his skill on, or no: That is to say, whether there were any Necessity that could infallibly produce *Quarries of Stone* in the Earth, which are the chief Materials of all the Magnificent Structures of Building in the World; and the same of *Iron* and *Steel*, without which there had been no use of these Stones; and then of *Sea-Coal*, and other necessary *Fuel*, fit for the Working or Melting these Metals; and also of *Timber-Trees*, for all might have been as well Brush-wood and Shrubs, and then assuredly there had been no such convenient *Shipping*, whatever had become of other Buildings: And so of the *Load-stone*, that great help to Navigation, whether it might not have lain so low in the Earth as never to have been reached by the Industry of Man; and the same may be said also of other *Stones* and *Metals*, that they being heaviest, might have lain lowest. Assuredly the *agitated Matter*, unless there were some special overpowering Guidance over it, might as well have overslipt these necessary useful Things as hit upon them: But if there had not been such a Creature as *Man*, these very things had themselves been useless, for none of the *brute Beasts* make use of such Commodities. Wherefore, unless a Man will do enormous violence to his Faculties, he must conclude, that there is a contrivance of *Providence* and *Counsel* in all those things, which reacheth from the beginning to the end, and orders all things sweetly: And that *Providence* foreseeing what a kind of Creature she would make *Man*, provided him with Materials from whence he might be able to adorn his present Age, and furnish History with the Records of egregious Exploits both of Art and Valour.

5. But without the Provision of the forenamed Materials, the Glory and Pomp both of *War* and *Peace* had been lost. For Men, instead of those Magnificent Buildings which are seen in the World, could have had no better kind of Dwellings than a bigger sort of Bee-hives or Birds-nests, made of contemptible Sticks, and Straws, and dirty Morter. And instead of the usual Pomp and Bravery of *War*, wherein is heard the solemn Sound of the hoarse Trumpet, the courageous beating of the Drum, the neighing and prancing of the Horses, clattering of Armour, and the terrible thunder of Canons; to say nothing of the glittering of the Sword and Spear, the waving and fluttering of display'd Colours, the gallantry of Charges upon their well-managed Steeds, and the like: I say, had it not been for the forenamed Provision of *Iron*, *Steel* and *Brass*, and such like necessary Materials, instead of all this Glory and Solemnity there had been nothing but howlings and shoutings of poor Naked Men belabouring one another with snag'd Sticks, or dully falling together by the Ears at Fifti-cuffs.

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6. Besides this, Beasts being naturally *Armed*, and Men naturally *Unarmed* with any thing save their *Reason*, and *Reason* being ineffectual, having no Materials to Work upon; it is plain, that that which made Men, Beasts and Metals, knew what it did, and did not forget it self in leaving Man destitute of natural Armature, having provided Materials, and giving him Wit and Abilities to arm himself, and so to be able to make his party good against the most fierce and stoutest of all living Creatures whatsoever; nay indeed, left him unarmed on purpose, that he might arm himself, and exercise his natural Wit and Industry.

CHAP. IV.

1. *Distinction of Land and Sea not without a Providence.* 2. *As also the Consistence of the Sea-Water that it can bear Ships.* 3. *The great convenience and pleasure of Navigation.* 4. *The admirable train of fit Provisions in Nature for the gratifying the Wit of Man in so concerning a Curiosity.*

I. **H**AVING thus passed over the *Hills*, and through the *Woods* and hollow *Entrails* of the *Earth*, let us now view the wide *Sea* also, and see whether that do not inform us, that there is a *God*; that is, whether things be not there in such sort as a rational Principle would either order or approve, whenas yet notwithstanding they might have been otherwise. And now we are come to view those *Campos natantes*, as *Lucretius* calls them, that vast *Champaign* of *Water*, the *Ocean*; I demand first, Whether it might not have been wider than it is, even so large as to overspread the Face of the whole *Earth*, and so to have taken away the Habitation of Men and Beasts. For the wet Particles might have easily ever mingled with the dry, and so all had either been *Sea* or *Quag-mire*.

2. And then again, though this distinction of *Land* and *Sea* be made, Whether this watry Element might not have fallen out to be of so thin a consistency, as that it would not bear *Shipping*; for it is so far from impossibility, as there be *de facto* in Nature such Waters as the *River Silas*, for example, in *India*. And the Waters of *Borysthenes* are so thin and light, that they are said to swim upon the top of the Stream of the *River Hypanis*. And we know there is some kind of Wood so heavy, that it will sink in any ordinary kind of *Water*.

I appeal therefore to any Man's Reason, whether it be not better that there should be a distinction of *Land* and *Sea*, than that all should be *Mire* and *Water*; and whether it be not better that the *Timber-Trees* afford Wood so light that it swim on the *Water*, or the *Water* be so heavy that it will bear up the Wood, than the contrary. That therefore which might have been otherwise, and yet is settled according to our own Hearts wish, who are

are knowing any rational Creatures, ought to be deemed by us as establish'd by *Counsel* and *Reason*.

3. And the closer we look into the Business, we shall discern more evident Foot-steps of *Providence* in it: For the two main Properties of Man being *Contemplation*, and *Sociableness* or love of *Converse*, there could nothing so highly gratifie his Nature as power of *Navigation*, whereby he, riding on the back of the Waves of the *Sea*, views the Wonders of the Deep, and by reason of the glibness of that Element, is able in a competent time to prove the Truth of those sagacious Suggestions of his own Mind; that is, whether the *Earth* be every way round, and whether there be any *Antipodes*, and the like; and by cutting the *Equinoctial Line*, decides that Controversie of the habitableness of the *Torrid Zone*, or rather wipes out that blot that lay upon Divine Providence, as if so great a share of the World had been lost by reason of unfitness for Habitation.

Besides, the falling upon *strange Coasts*, and *discovering* Men of so great a diversity of Manners from our selves, cannot but be a thing of infinite *Pleasure* and *Advantage*, to the enlargement of our Thoughts from what we observe in their Conversation, Parts and Policy. Add unto this the sundry *Rarities of Nature* and *Commodities* proper to several Countreys, which they that stay at home enjoy by the Travels of those that go abroad, and they that travel grow Rich by their Adventure.

4. Now therefore, *Navigation* being of so great Consequence to the *delight* and *convenience* of Humane Life, and there being both Wit and Courage to attempt the *Seas*, were he but fitted with right Materials and other Advantages requisite: When we see there is so pat a Provision made for him to this Purpose in large *Timber*, for the building of his *Ship*; in a *thick Sea-water*, sufficient to bear the *Ships* Burthen; in the *Magnet* or *Load-stone*, for his *Compass*; in the steady and parallel *Direction of the Axis* of the Earth, for his *Cynosura*; and then observing his natural *Wit* and *Courage* to make use of them, and how that ingenite Desire of *Knowledge* and *Converse*, and of the *improving* of his own *Parts* and *Happiness*, stir him up to so notable a Design; we cannot but conclude from *such a train of Causes*, so fitly and congruously complying together, That it was really the Counsel of an *Universal* and *Eternal Mind*, that hath the overseeing and guidance of the whole frame of Nature, that laid together these *Causes* so carefully and wisely, that is, we cannot but conclude *That there is a God*.

And if we have got so fast Foot-hold already in this Truth, by the consideration of such *Phenomena* in the World that seem more *rude* and *general*, what will the Contemplation of the more *particular* and *polished* pieces of Nature afford in *Vegetables*, *Animals*, and the *Body of Man*?

C H A P. V.

1. That the Form and Beauty, Seed and Signature of Plants, are Arguments of a Providence. 2. That though the mere Motion of the Matter might produce certain Meteors, as Hail, Snow, Ice, &c. yet it will not follow that the same is the adequate cause of Animals and Plants. 3. That it were no great botch nor gap in Nature, if some more rude Phænomena were acknowledged the Results of the mere Mechanical Motion of Matter. 4. That the Form and Beauty of Flowers and Plants are from an higher Principle. 5. That there is such a thing as Beauty, and that it is the Object of our Intellectual Faculties. 6. From whence it follows, that the beautiful Forms and Figures of Plants and Animals are from an Intellectual Principle.

1. **H**itherto we have only considered the more rude and careless strokes and delineaments of Divine Providence in the World, set out in those more large Phenomena of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, Land and Sea, Rivers, Mountains, Metals, and the like; we now come to a closer view of God and Nature in Vegetables, Animals, and Man.

And first of Vegetables, where I shall touch only these four Heads; their Form and Beauty, their Seed, their Signatures, and their great Use as well for Medicine as Substance. And that we may the better understand the Advantage we have of this closer contemplation of the Works of Nature, we are in the first place to take notice of the condition of that Substance which we call Matter, how fluid and slippery and undeterminate it is of it self; or if it be hard, how unfit it is to be chang'd into any thing else. And therefore all things rot into a Moisture before any thing can be generated of them, as we soften the Wax before we set on the Seal.

2. Now therefore, unless we will be foolish, as, because the uniform Motion of the Air, or some more subtile corporeal Element, may so equally compress or bear against the Parts of a little vaporous Moisture, as to form it into round Drops (as some say it doth in the Dew and other Experiments) and therefore because this more rude and general Motion can do something, conclude that it does all things; we must in all Reason confess that there is an *Eternal Mind*, in virtue whereof the Matter is thus usefully formed and changed.

But mere rude and undirected Motion, because naturally it will have some kind of Results, that therefore it will reach to such as plainly imply a wise contrivance of Counsel, is so ridiculous a Sophism, as I have already intimated, that it is more fit to impose upon the inconsiderate Souls of Fools and Children, than upon Men of mature Reason and well exercis'd in Philosophy. Admit that Rain and Snow and Wind and Hail and Ice, and such like Meteors, may be the products of Heat and Cold, or of the Motion and Rest of certain small Particles of the Matter; yet that the
useful

useful and beautiful contrivance of the *Branches, Flowers and Fruits* of *Plants* should be so too, (to say nothing yet of the *Bodies* of *Birds, Fishes, Beasts and Men*) is as ridiculous and supine a Collection, as to infer that, because mere *Heat* and *Cold* does *soften* and *harden Wax*, and puts it into some shape or other, that therefore this mere *Heat* and *Cold*, or *Motion* and *Rest*, without any *Art* and *Direction*, made the *Silver Seal* too, and graved upon it so curiously some *Coat of Arms*, or the shape of some *Birds* or *Beasts*, as an *Eagle*, a *Lion*, and the like. Nay, indeed this inference is more tolerable far than the other, these effects of *Art* being more easie and less noble than those others of *Nature*.

3. Nor is it any botch or gap at all in the Works of Nature, that some particular *Phenomena* be but the easie results of that *general Motion* communicated unto the *Matter* from God, others the effects of more curious *Contrivance*, or of the *divine Art* or *Reason* (for such are the λόγοι σπερματικοί, the * *Rationes Seminales*) incorporated in the *Matter*, especially the *Matter* it self being in some sort vital; else it would not continue the *Motion* that it is put upon, when it is occasionally this or the other way moved: And besides, the Nature of God being the most perfect fulness of Life that is possibly conceivable, it is very congruous that this utmost and remotest Shadow of himself be some way, though but obscurely, vital. Wherefore things falling off by degrees from the highest Perfection, it will be no uneven or unproportionable Step, if descending from the Top of this outward Creation, *Man*, in whom there is a principle of more fine and reflexive Reason, which hangs on, though not in that manner, in the more perfect kind of Brutes, as Sense also, loth to be curb'd within too narrow compass, lays hold upon some kinds of *Plants*, as in those fundry sorts of *Zoophyta*, (but in the rest there are no further Foot-steps discovered of an *Animadversive* form abiding in them, though there be the effects of an *Inadvertent* form (λόγος ἐνυλός) of materiated or incorporated Art or Seminal Reason:) I say, it is no uneven jot, to pass from the more faint and obscure Examples of *Spermatical* Life to the more considerable effects of *general Motion* in *Minerals, Metals*, and fundry *Meteors*, whose easie and rude Shapes may have no need of any Principle of Life, or *Spermatical form* distinct from the *Rest* or *Motion* of the Particles of the *Matter*.

* Concerning these *Rationes Seminales*, whether they be distinct, or one Common Spirit of Nature; see Book. 3. c. 12, and 13. in the Discourse Of the Immortality of the Soul.

4. But there is that Curiosity of *Form* and *Beauty* in the more noble kind of *Plants*, bearing such a suitableness and harmony with the more refined Sense and Sagacity of the Soul of Man, that he cannot chuse (his Intellectual Touch being so sweetly gratified by what it deprehends in such like Objects) but acknowledge that some hidden Cause, much akin to his own Nature, that is *Intellectual*, is the contriver and perfecter of these so pleasant Spectacles in the World.

5. Nor is it at all to the Purpose to object, that this business of *Beauty* and *Comeliness* of *Proportion* is but a conceit, because some Men acknowledge no such thing, and all things are alike handsome to them, who yet notwithstanding have the use of their *Eyes* as well as other Folks. For, I say, this rather makes for what we aim at, that *Pulchritude* is convey'd indeed by the outward *Senses* unto the Soul, but a more *Intellectual*

lectual Faculty is that which relishes it; as a *Geometrical Scheme* is let in by the *Eyes*, but the *Demonstration* is discern'd by *Reason*. And therefore it is more rational to affirm, that some *Intellectual Principle* was the Author of this *Pulchritude* of things, than that they should be thus fashioned without the help of that Principle. And to say that there is no such thing as *Pulchritude*, because some *Mens Souls* are so dull and stupid that they relish all Objects alike in that respect; is as absurd and groundless, as to conclude there is no such thing as *Reason* and *Demonstration*, because a natural Fool cannot reach unto it. But that there is such a thing as *Beauty*, and that it is acknowledged by the whole Generations of Men to be in *Trees*, *Flowers* and *Fruits*, the adorning and beautifying of *Buildings* in all Ages is an ample and undeniable Testimony. For what is more ordinary with them than the taking in *Flowers* and *Fruitage* for the garnishing of their Work? Besides, I appeal to any Man that is not sunk into so forlorn a pitch of Degeneracy, that he is as stupid to these things as the basest of Beasts, whether, for Example, a rightly-cut *Tetraedrum*, *Cube*, or *Icosaedrum*, have no more *Pulchritude* in them, than any rude broken Stone lying in the Field or High-ways; or to name other *solid Figures*, which though they be not Regular, properly so called, yet have a settled *Idea* and Nature, as a *Cone*, *Sphere* or *Cylinder*, whether the sight of these do not gratifie the Minds of Men more, and pretend to more Elegancy of Shape, than those rude cuttings and chippings of *Free-stone* that fall from the Mason's Hands, and serve for nothing but to fill up the middle of the Wall, and so to be hid from the Eyes of Man for their ugliness. And it is observable, that if Nature shape any thing near this *Geometrical* accuracy, that we take notice of it with much content and pleasure: As if it be but exactly round (as there are abundance of such Stones found betwixt two Hills in *Cuba*, an Island of *America*) or *ordinately Quinquangular*, or have the *sides* but *Parallel*, though the *Angles* be unequal, as is seen in some little Stones, and in a kind of *Alabaſter* found here in *England*; these Stones, I say, gratifie our Sight, as having a nearer cognation with the Soul of Man, that is Rational and Intellectual, and therefore is well pleased when it meets with any outward Object that fits and agrees with those cogenite *Ideas* her own Nature is furnished with. For *Symmetry*, *Equality* and *Correspondency of Parts*, is the discernment of *Reason*, not the object of *Sense*, as I have heretofore proved.

6. Now therefore it being evident that there is such a thing as *Beauty*, *Symmetry* and *Comeliness of Proportion*, (to say nothing of the delightful mixture of *Colours*) and that this is the proper Object of the *Understanding* and *Reason*, (for these things be not taken Notice of by the *Beasts*) I think I may safely infer, That whatever is the first and principal Cause of changing the fluid and undetermined *Matter* into Shapes so comely and symmetrical, as we see in *Flowers* and *Trees*, is an *Understanding Principle*, and knows both the Nature of Man, and of those Objects he offers to his Sight in this outward and visible World. For these things cannot come by chance, or by a multifarious attempt of the Parts of the *Matter* upon themselves; for then it were likely that the *Species* of things (though some might hit right, yet most) would be maim'd and ridiculous;

lous; but now there is not any ineptitude in any thing, which is a sign that the fluidness of the *Matter* is guided and determined by the over-powering Counsel of an *Eternal Mind*, that is, of a God.

If it were not needless, I might now instance in sundry kinds of *Flowers, Herbs and Trees*: But these Objects being so obvious, and every Man's Fancy being branched with the remembrance of *Roses, Marigolds, Gilly-flowers, Pionyes, Tulips, Pansies, Primroses, the Leaves and Clusters of the Vine*, and a thousand such like, of all which they cannot but confess, that there is in them *Beauty and Symmetry* and grateful *Proportion*; I hold it superfluous to weary you with any longer Induction, but shall pass on to the three Considerations behind, of their *Seed, Signatures, and Usefulness*, and shall pass through them very briefly, the Observables being very ordinary and easily intelligible.

CHAP. VI.

1. Providence argued from the Seeds of Plants.
2. An Objection answered concerning stinking Weeds and poysonous Plants.
3. The Signature of Plants an argument of Providence.
4. Certain Instances of Signatures.
5. An Answer to an Objection concerning such Signatures in Plants as cannot refer to Medicine.

1. **I** Say therefore, in that every *Plant* has its *Seed*, it is an evident sign of Divine Providence. For it being no necessary Result of the *Motion* of the *Matter*, as the whole contrivance of the *Plant* indeed is not, and it being of so great Consequence that they have *Seed* for the continuance and propagation of their own *Species*, and for the gratifying of Man's Art also, Industry and Necessities, (for much of Husbandry and Gardening lies in this) it cannot but be an act of *Counsel* to furnish the several kinds of *Plants* with their *Seeds*, especially the Earth being of such a Nature, that though at first for a while it might bring forth all manner of *Plants*, (as some will have it also to have brought forth all kinds of *Animals*) yet at last it would grow so sluggish, that without the advantage of those small compendious Principles of Generation, the Grains of *Seed*, it would yield no such Births; no more than a Pump grown dry will yield any Water, unless you pour a little Water into it first, and then for one Basen-full you may fetch up so many Soe-fulls.

2. Nor is it material to object, That stinking *Weeds* and poysonous *Plants* bear *Seed* too as well as the most pleasant and useful: For even those stinking *Weeds* and poysonous *Plants* have their use. For first, the Industry of Man is exercis'd by them to weed them out where they are hurtful. Which reason if it seem slight, let us but consider, that if humane Industry had nothing to conflict and struggle with, the fire of Man's Spirit would be half extinguish'd in the Flesh; and then we shall acknowledge, that that which I have alledged is not so contemptible nor invalid.

F

But

But Secondly, who knows but it is so with poysonous *Plants* as vulgarly is fanfied concerning *Toads* and other poysonous *Serpents*, that they lick the Venome from off the Earth? So poysonous *Plants* may well draw to them all the malign Juice and Nourishment, that the other may be more pure and defæcate; as there are Receptacles in the Body of Man and Emunctories to drain them of superfluous Choler, Melancholy, and the like.

But lastly, it is very well known by them that know any thing in Nature and Physick, that those *Herbs* that the rude and ignorant would call *Weeds*, are the Materials of very soveraign Medicines; that *Aconitum hyemale* or *Winter-wolfs-bane*, that otherwise is rank Poyson, is reported to prevail mightily against the bitings of Vipers and Scorpions, which *Crollius* assenteth unto; and that that Plant that bears *Death* in the very name of it, *Solanum lethiferum*, prevents Death by procuring Sleep, if it be rightly apply'd in a Fever. Nor are those things to be deemed unprofitable whose use we know not yet; for all is not to be known at once, that succeeding Ages may ever have something left to gratifie themselves in their own Discoveries.

3. We come now to the *Signatures* of Plants, which seem no less Argument that the highest Original of the Works of Nature is some *understanding Principle*, than that so careful provision of their *Seed*. Nay, indeed this respects us more properly and adequately than the other, and is a certain Key to enter Man into the knowledge and use of the Treasures of Nature. I demand therefore, whether it be not a very easie and genuine Inference, from the observing that several *Herbs* are marked with some *Mark* or *Sign* that intimates their virtue, what they are good for, and there being such a Creature as Man in the World, that can read and understand these *Signs* and *Characters*; hence to collect that the Author both of Man and them, knew the Nature of them both: For it is like the *Inscriptions* upon Apothecaries Boxes, that the Master of the Shop sets on, that the Apprentice may read them; nay, it is better, for here is in *Herbs* inscribed the very *Nature* and *Use* of them, not the mere *Name*. Nor is there any necessity that all should be thus signed, though some be; for the rarity of it is the Delight: For otherwise it had been dull and cloying, too much harping upon the same String. And besides, Divine Providence would only intimate and enter Mankind into the useful Knowledge of her Treasures, leaving the rest to imploy our Industry, that we might not live like idle Loyterers and Truants: For the Theatre of the World is an exercise of Man's Wit, not a lazy *Polyanthea*, or Book of Common-places. And therefore all things are in some measure obscure and intricate, that the Sedulity of that Divine Spark, the Soul of Man, may have Matter of Conquest and Triumph, when he has done bravely by a superadvenient assistance of his God.

4. But that there be some *Plants* that bear a very evident *Signature* of their *Nature* and *Use*, I shall fully make good by these following Instances.

Capillus Veneris, *Polytrichon* or *Maiden-hair*, the Lye in which it is sodden or infus'd, is good to wash the Head, and make the Hair grow in those places that are more thin and bare.

And

And the decoction of *Quindies*, which are a downy and hairy Fruit, is accounted good for the fetching again Hair that has fallen by the French Pox.

The Leaf of *Balm*, and of *Alleluia* or *Wood-Sorrel*, as also the Roots of *Anthora*, represent the Heart in Figure, and are Cardiacal.

Wall-nuts bear the whole signature of the Head. The outward green *Cortex* answers to the *Pericranium*, and a Salt made of it singularly good for Wounds in that Part; as the Kernel is good for the Brains, which it resembles.

Umbilicus Veneris is powerful to provoke Lust, as *Dioscorides* affirms. As also your several sorts of *Satyrions*, which have the evident resemblance of the genital Parts upon them; * *Aron* especially, and all your *Orchisses*, that they have given Names unto from some Beasts or other, as *Cynosorchis*, *Orchis Myodes*, *Tragorchis*, and the like. The last whereof, notorious also for its goatish smell, and tufts not unlike the Beard of that lecherous Animal, is of all the rest the most powerful Incentive to Lust.

*Sunt qui putant verum Paracelsi Satyrion esse Aron. Croll. de Signaturis rerum intern.

The Leaves of *Hypericon* are very thick prick'd, or pink'd with little Holes, and it is a singular good Wound-herb, as useful also for de-obstructing the pores of the Body.

Scorpioides, *Echium*, or *Scorpion-grass*, is like the crooked Tail of a Scorpion, and *Ophioglossum*, or *Adders Tongue*, has a very plain and perfect resemblance of the Tongue of a Serpent, as also *Ophioscorodon* of the intire Head and upper parts of the Body; and these are all held very good against Poyson, and the biting of Serpents. And generally all such Plants as are speckled with Spots like the Skins of *Vipers*, or other venomous Creatures, are known to be good against the stings or bitings of them, and are powerful Antidotes against Poyson.

Thus did Divine Providence by natural *Hieroglyphicks* read short Physick-Lectures to the rude Wit of Man, that being a little entred and engaged, he might by his own Industry and Endeavours search out the rest himself; it being very reasonable that other Herbs that had not such Signatures might be very good for Medicinal uses, as well as they that had.

5. But if any here object, that some Herbs have the resemblance of such things as cannot in any likelihood refer to Physick, as *Geranium*, *Cruciata*, *Bursa Pastoris*, the *Bee-Flower*, *Fly-Orchis*, and the like; I say, they answer themselves in the very proposal of their Objection: For this is a sign that they were intended only for ludicrous Ornaments of Nature, like the flourishes about a great Letter, that signifie nothing, but are made only to delight the Eye. And 'tis so far from being any inconvenience to our first Progenitors, if this intimation of Signatures did fail, that it cast them with more courage upon attempting the virtue of those that had no such Signatures at all; it being obvious for them to reason thus, Why may not those Herbs have Medicinal virtue in them that have no Signatures, as well as they that have Signatures have no virtue answerable to the signs they bear? Which was a further Confirmation to them of the former Conclusion; and still a greater Provocation of their Industry,

dustry, if they at any time light upon *Signatures* of a contrary effect.

And it was sufficient that those that were of so present and great consequence as to be Antidotes against Poyson, (that so quickly would have dispatch'd poor rude and naked Antiquity,) or to help on the small beginnings of the World, by quickning and actuating their phlegmatick Natures to more frequent and effectual Venery (for their long Lives shew they were not very fiery) I say, it was sufficient that Herbs of this kind were both so obvious and so legibly *sign'd* with *Characters* that so plainly bewray'd their usual Virtues, as is manifest in your *Satyriion*, *Ophioglossum*, and the like. But I have dwelt too long upon this Theory; we'll betake our selves to what follows, and what is more unexceptionably stringent and forcing.

CHAP. VII.

1. That the Usefulness of Plants argues a Providence, particularly those that afford Timber.
2. As also such Herbs and Plants as serve for Physick for Men and Beasts.
3. Of Plants fit for Food.
4. Of the Colour of Grass and Herbs, and of the Fruits of Trees.
5. The notable Provisions in Nature for Husbandry and Tillage, with the universal usefulness of Hemp and Flax.
6. The marvellous usefulness of the Indian Nut-Tree.

1. **W**E are at length come to the fourth and last Consideration of *Plants*, viz. their *Use* and *Profitableness*. We shall say nothing now of those great *Trees* that are fit for *Timber*, and are the requisite Materials for the *building* of Ships and magnificent Houses, to adorn the Earth, and make the Life of Man more splendid and delectable; as also for the erecting of those *holy Structures* consecrated to Divine Worship. Amongst which we are not to forget that famous Edifice, that glorious Temple at *Jerusalem*, consecrated to the Great God of Heaven and Earth: As indeed it was most fit that He, whose Guidance and Providence permitted not the strength of the Earth to spend it self in base Gravel and Pebbles instead of Quarries of Stone, nor in Briers and Brush-wood instead of Pines, Cedars and Oaks, that He should at some time or other, have the most stately Magnificent *Temples* erected to Him, that the Wit and Industry of Man, and the best of those Materials could afford; it being the most suitable acknowledgment of Thanks for that piece of Providence that can be invented. And it is the very Consideration that moved that pious King *David* to design the Building of a Temple to the God of *Israel*: See now, says he, *I dwell in a House of Cedar, but the Ark of God dwelleth within Curtains*. But, as I said, I will add nothing concerning these things, being contented with what I have glanced upon heretofore.

2. We will now briefly take notice of the *Profitableness* of Plants for
Physick

Physick and *Food*, and then pass on to the Consideration of *Animals*. And as for their *Medicinal* uses, the large Herbals that are every where to be had, are so ample Testimonies thereof, that I have said enough in but reminding you of them. That which is most observable here is this, that brute *Beasts* have some share in their virtue as well as *Men*. For the *Toad* being overcharged with the Poyson of the *Spider*, as is ordinarily believed, hath recourse to the *Plantane Leaf*: The *Weasel*, when she is to encounter the *Serpant*, arms herself with the eating of *Rue*: The *Dog*, when he is sick at the Stomach, knows his Cure, falls to his *Grass*, vomits, and is well: The *Swallows* make use of *Celandine*, the *Linnet* of *Euphrasia*, for the repairing of their Sight: And the *Ass*, when he is oppress'd with Melancholy, eats of the Herb *Asplenium* or *Miltwaste*, and so eases himself of the swelling of the *Spleen*. And *Virgil* reports of the *Dictamnium Cretense* or *Cretian Dittany*, that the wild *Goats* eat it when they are Shot with Darts or Arrows; for that Herb has the virtue to work them out of their Body, and to heal up the Wound.

— non illa feris incognita Capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ.

Which things I conceive no obscure Indigitation of *Providence*: For they doing that by Instinct and Nature which Men, who have free Reason, cannot but acknowledge to be very pertinent and fitting; nay, such that the skillful Physician will approve and allow; and these Creatures having no such reason and skill themselves as to turn Physicians; it must needs be concluded, that they are enabled to do these things by virtue of that *Principle* that contrived them, and made them of that Nature they are, and that that *Principle* therefore must have Skill and Knowledge, that is, that it must be God.

3. We come now to the consideration of Plants, as they afford Food both to Man and Beasts. And here we may observe, That as there was a general Provision of *Water*, by setting the Mountains and Hills abroad, from whence through the Spring-heads and continued Rivulets drawn together (that caused afterwards greater Rivers, with the long winding Distributions of them) all the Creatures of the Earth quench their Thirst: So *Divine Providence* has spread her Table every where, not with a juiceless green Carpet, but with succulent *Herbage* and nourishing *Grass*, upon which most of the Beasts of the Field do feed; and they that feed not on it, feed on those that eat it, and so the Generations of them all are continued.

4. But this seeming rather necessary than of choice, I will not insist upon it. For I grant that Counsel most properly is there employ'd, where we discern a variety and possibility of being otherwise, and yet the Best is made choice of. Therefore I will only intimate thus much, That though it were necessary that some such thing as *Grass* should be, if there were such and such Creatures in the World; yet it was not at all necessary that *Grass* and *Herbs*

should have that Colour which they have; for they might have been *Red* or *White*, or some such Colour as would have been very offensive and hurtful to our Sight. But I will not insist upon these things; let us now consider the *Fruits of Trees*, where I think it will appear very manifestly, that there was one and the same Author both of Man and them, and that assuredly he knew what he did when he made them. For could *Apples*, and *Oranges*, and *Grapes*, and *Apricocks*, and such like Fruit, be intended for *Beasts* that hold their Heads downward, and can scarce look up at them, much less know how to reach them? When we feed our Dogs, we set the Dish or Trencher upon the Ground, not on the Table. But you'll say, That at last the Fruits would fall down, and then the Beasts may come at them. But one thing is, there are not many that desire them, and so they would rot upon the Ground before they be spent, or be squander'd away in a Moment of Time, as it might easily fare with the most precious of Plants, the *Vine*. But *Man*, who knows the worth of the *Grape*, knows how to preserve it a long Season, (for it is *eaten* and *drunk* some Years after the rest of the Vintage) as he does also gather the rest of the Fruits of the Earth, and laies up both for himself and his Cattel. Wherefore it is plainly discoverable, that Man's coming into the World is not a thing of *Chance* or *Necessity*, but a *Design*, as the bringing of worthy Guests to a well-furnish'd Table.

5. And what I have intimated concerning the *Vine*, is as eminently, if not more eminently, observable in the ordinary kinds of *Grain*, as *Wheat* and *Barly*, and the like, which also, like the *Vine*, are made either *Edible* or *Potable* by Man's Art and Industry. But that's not the thing that I care so much to observe. That which I drive at now is this; That *Bread-corn*, that brings so considerable Increase by *Tillage* and *Husbandry*, would scarce be at all without it; for that which grows wildly of it self is worth nothing: But it being so wholesome and strengthening a Food, that it should yield so plentiful Increase, and that this should not be without humane Art and Industry, does plainly insinuate that there is a *Divine Providence* that intended to exercise the Wit of Man in *Husbandry* and *Tillage*. Which we may the more firmly assure our selves of, if we add unto this the careful Provision of *Instruments*, so exactly fitted out for this Employment; *viz.* the laborious *Ox*, and the stout, but easily manageable *Horse*; *Iron* for the Plough-share, and *Ropes* for the Horse-gears to pull by. And it is very seasonable to take notice of this last, it belonging to this Consideration of the *Profitableness of Plants*. And I appeal to any body that will but take the Pains a while to consider of what great Use and Consequence *Cordage* is in the Affairs of Men, whether it was not a palpable Act of Providence to send out such Plants out of the Earth which would afford it. For we can discover no necessity in Nature that there must needs be such Plants as *Hemp* and *Flax*. Wherefore if we will but follow the easie Suggestions of free Reason, we must cast it upon *Providence*, which has provided Mankind of such a Commodity, that no less Affairs depend upon, than all the *Tackling* of Ships, their *Sails* and *Cables*,
ropes,

roaps, and what not? And so consequently all Foreign Traffick, and then the Transportation of Wood and Stone, and other Materials for Building, or the Carriage of them by Land in Wains and Carts, besides the ordinary use of Pulleys, or rather Engines, for the lifting up of heavy Weights, which the strength of Man, without these helps, would not easily master; besides what I hinted before concerning the use of Cordage in Husbandry, in Plowing and carrying home the Fruits of the Earth. The Uses indeed of the fore-named Plants are so universal, and take place so in every Affair of Man, that if it were lawful to be a little merry in so serious a Matter, a Man might not unfittingly apply that Verse of the Poet, to this so general a Commodity,

Omnia sunt homini tenui pendentia filo;
that all the Businesses of Men do very much depend upon these little long Fleaks or Threads of Hemp and Flax. Or if you will say, that there may some scrambling shift be made without them in long Chains of Iron, or Sails of Woollen, and the like; yet we seeing our selves provided for infinitely better, are in all reason to judge it to proceed from no worse a Principle than Divine Providence.

6. I might now reach out to Exotick Plants, such as the Cinnamon-Tree, the Balsame-Tree, the Tree that bears the Nutmeg invelliped with the Mace, as also the famous Indian Nut-Tree, which at once almost affords all the Necessaries of Life. For if they cut but the Twigs at Evening, there is a plentiful and pleasant Juice comes out, which they receive into Bottles, and drink instead of Wine, and out of which they extract such an *Aqua vita* as is very sovereign against all manner of Sickneses. The Branches and Boughs they make their Houses of; and the Body of the Tree, being very spongy within, though hard without, they easily contrive into the frame and use of their Canoes or Boats. The Kernel of the Nut serves them for Bread and Meat, and the Shells for Cups to drink in; and indeed they are not mere empty Cups, for there is found a delicious cooling Milk in them. Besides, there is a kind of Hemp that incloses the Nut, of which they make Roaps and Cables, and of the finest of it Sails for the Ships: And the Leaves are so hard and sharp-pointed, that they easily make Needles and Bodkins of them, for stitching their Sails, and for other necessary purposes. And that Providence may shew her self Benign as well as Wise, this so notable a Plant is not restrain'd to one Coast of the World, as suppose the East-Indies, but is found also in some Parts of Africa, and in all the Islands of the West-Indies, as Hispaniola, Cuba, and also upon the Continent of Carthazena in Panama, Norembega, and several other Parts of the New-found World.

But I thought fit not to insist upon these things, but to contain my self within the Compass of such Objects as are familiarly and ordinarily before our Eyes, that we may the better take occasion from thence to return Thanks to him who is the bountiful Author of all the Supports of Life.

C H A P. VIII.

1. The designed Usefulness of Animals for Man, as in particular of the Dog and the Sheep. 5. As also of the Oxe and other Animals. 3. Of Man's subduing the Creatures to himself. 4. Of those that are as yet untamed. 5. The excellent Usefulness of the Horse. 6. The Usefulness of some Animals that are Enemies to such Animals as are hateful or noisome to Man.

1. **W**E are now come to take a view of the nature of *Animals*: In the Contemplation whereof we shall use much what the same Method we did in that of *Plants*, for we shall consider in them also their *Beauty*, their *Birth*, their *Make* and *Fabrick* of Body, and *Usefulness* to Mankind. And to dispatch this last first: It is wonderful easie and natural to conceive, that as almost all are made in some sort or other for humane Uses, so some so notoriously and evidently, that without main violence done to our Faculties we can in no wise deny it. As to Instance in those things that are most obvious and familiar; when we see in the solitary Fields a *Shepherd*, his *Flock* and his *Dog*, how well they are fitted together; when we knock at a Farmer's Door, and the first that answers shall be his vigilant *Mastiff*, whom from his Use and Office he ordinarily names *Keeper*; (and I remember, *Theophrastus* in his Character *περί ἀγροικίας*, tells us, that his Master when he has let the stranger in, *ἡλαβόμενος ἐπ' ὀύχνης*, taking his *Dog* by the Snout, will relate long Stories of his Usefulness and his Services he does to the House and them in it; οὗτος φυλάσσει τὸ χάριον καὶ τὰ οἴκταν καὶ τὰς ἐνδον, *This is he that keeps the Yard, the House, and them within*) lastly, when we view in the open Champain a brace of swift *Grey-hounds* coursing a good stout and well-breathed *Hare*, or a Pack of well-tuned *Hounds* and Huntsmen on Horse-back with pleasure and alacrity pursuing their Game, or hear them winding their Horns near a Wood-side, so that the whole Wood rings with the Echo of that Musick and chearful yelping of the eager *Dogs*; to say nothing of *Duck-hunting*, of *Fox-hunting*, of *Otter-hunting*, and a hundred more such like Sports and Pastimes, that are all performed by this one kind of *Animal*: I say, when we consider this so multifarious congruity and fitness of things in reference to our selves, how can we withhold from inferring, That that which made both *Dogs* and *Ducks*, and *Hares* and *Sheep*, made them with a reference to us, and knew what it did when it made them? And though it be possible to be otherwise, yet it is highly improbable that the Flesh of *Sheep* should not be designed for Food for Men; and that *Dogs*, that are such a familiar and domestick Creature to Man, amongst other pretty feats that they do for him, should not be intended to supply the place of a Servitour too, and to take away the Bones and Scraps, that nothing might be lost. And unless we should expect that Nature should make *Jerkens* and *Stockens* grow out of the Ground, what could she do better than afford us so fit materials for *Cloathing* as the
Wool

Wool of the *Sheep*, there being in *Man* Wit and Art to make use of it? To say nothing of the *Silk-worm*, that seems to come into the World for no other Purpose than to furnish man with more costly Cloathing, and to spin away her very entrails to make him fine without.

2. Again, When we view those large Bodies of *Oxen*, what can we better conceit them to be, than to many living and walking Powdering-Tubs, and that they have *animam pro Sale*, as *Philo* speaks of Fishes, that their Life is but for Salts, to keep them sweet till we shall have need to eat them? Besides, their *Hides* afford us *Leather* for *Shoes* and *Boots*, as the *Skins* of other Beasts also serve for other uses. And indeed *Man* seems to be brought into the World on purpose that the rest of the Creation might be improved to the utmost Usefulness and Advantage: For were it not better that the *Hides* of Beasts and their *Flesh* should be made so considerable use of as to feed and cloath Men, than that they should rot and stink upon the Ground, and fall short of so noble an improvement as to be matter for the exercise of the Wit of *Man*, and to afford him the necessary Conveniencies of Life? For if *Man* did not make use of them, they would either die of Age, or be torn a pieces by more cruel Masters. Wherefore we plainly see that it is an Act of Reason and Counsel to have made *Man*, that he might be a Lord over the rest of the Creation, and keep good quarter among them.

3. And being furnished with fit Materials to make himself Weapons, as well as with natural Wit and Valour, he did bid Battel to the very fiercest of them, and either chased them away into Solitudes and Desarts, or else brought them under his Subjection, and gave Laws unto them, under which they live more peaceably and better provided for (or at least might be, if Men were good) than they could be when they were left to the mercy of the *Lion*, *Bear*, or *Tiger*. And what if he do occasionally and ordinarily kill some of them for Food? Their dispatch is quick, and so less dolorous than the Paw of the *Bear*, or the Teeth of the *Lion*, or tedious Melancholy and Sadness of old Age, which would first torture them, and then kill them, and let them rot upon the Ground stinking and useless.

Besides, all the Wit and Philosophy in the World can never demonstrate, that the killing and slaughtering of a Beast is any more than the striking of a Bush where a Birds Nest is, where you fright away the Bird, and then seize upon the empty Nest. So that if we could pierce to the utmost Catastrophe of things, all might prove but a Tragick-Comedy.

4. But as for those *Rebels* that have fled into the *Mountains* or *Desarts*, they are to us a very pleasant subject of Natural History; besides, we serve our selves of them as much as is to our Purpose: And they are not only for Ornaments of the Universe, but a continual Exercise of *Man's* Wit and Valour when he pleases to encounter. But to expect and wish that there were nothing but such dull tame things in the World that will neither bite nor scratch, is as groundless and childish as to wish that were no *Choler* in the Body, nor *Fire* in the universal compass of Nature.

5. I cannot insist upon the whole result of this War, nor must forget how that generous Animal the *Horse* had at last the Wit to yield himself up

up to his own great advantage and ours. And verily he is so fitly made for us, that we might justly claim a particular right in him above all other Creatures. When we observe his patient Service he does us at the Plough, Cart, or under the Pack-saddle, his Speed upon the Highway in matters of Importance, his docibleness and desire of glory and praise, and consequently his notable achievements in War, where he will snap the Spears a pieces with his Teeth, and pull his Rider's Enemy out of the Saddle; and then that he might be able to perform all this Labour with more ease, that his Hoofs are made so fit for the Art of the Smith, and that round armature of Iron he puts upon them; it is a very hard thing not to acknowledge, that this congruous Contrivance of things was really from a Principle of Wisdom and Counsel.

6. There is also another Consideration of Animals and their Usefulness, in removing those Evils we are pester'd with by reason of the abundance of other hurtful Animals, such as are Mice and Rats, and the like; and to this End the Cat is very serviceable. And there is in the West-Indies a Beast in the form of a Bear, which Cardan calls *Ursus Formicarius*, whose very Business it is to eat up all the Ants, which some Parts of the Quarter of the World are sometimes excessively plagued withall.

We might add also sundry Examples of living Creatures that not only bear a singular good Affection to Mankind, but are also fierce Enemies to those that are very hurtful and cruel to Man: And such are the Lizard, an Enemy to the Serpent; the Dolphin to the Crocodile; the Horse to the Bear; the Elephant to the Dragon, &c. But I list not to insist upon these things.

C H A P. IX.

1. The Beauty of several brute Animals. 2. The goodly Stateliness of the Horse. 3. That the Beauty of Animals argues their Creation from an Intellectual Principle. 4. The difference of Sexes, a Demonstration of Providence. 5. That this difference is not by Chance. 6. An Objection answered concerning the Eele. 7. Another answered, taken from the consideration of the same careful Provision of difference of Sexes in viler Animals. 8. Of Fishes and Birds being Oviparous. 9. Of Birds building their Nests and hatching their Eggs. 10. An Objection answered concerning the Ostrich. 11. That the Homogeneity of that Crystalline Liquor, which is the immediate Matter of the generation of Animals, implies a Substance Immaterial or Incorporeal in Animals thus generated. 12. An Answer to an Elusion of the foregoing Argument.

I Return now to what I proposed first, the Beauty of living Creatures: Which though the course-spirited Atheist will not take Notice of, as relishing nothing but what is subservient to his Tyranny or Lust; yet I think it undeniable but that there is comely Symmetry and Beautifulness in sundry living Creatures, a tolerable useful Proportion of Parts in

in all. For neither are all Men and Women exquisitely handsome, indeed very few, that they that are may raise the greater Admiration in the Minds of Men, and quicken their natural Abilities to brave Adventures either of Valour or Poetry: But as for the brute Creatures, though some of them be of an *hateful* aspect, as the *Toad*, the *Swine*, and the *Rat*; yet these are but like *Discords* in Musick, to make the succeeding chord go off more pleasantly; as indeed most of those momentary Inconveniencies that the Life of Man ever and anon meets withal, they do put but a greater edge and vigour upon his Enjoyments.

2. But it is not hard to find very many Creatures that are either καλὰ χρήματα, or εἴεῖα, as the Philosopher distinguishes, that are either very Goodly things and Beautiful, or at least Elegant and Pretty; as most of your Birds are. But for Stateliness and Majesty, what is comparable to a Horse? Whether you look upon him single, with his Mane and his Tail waving in the Wind, and hear him coursing and neighing in the Pastures; or whether you see him with some galant Heros on his back, performing gracefully his usual Postures, and practising his exploits of War; who can withhold from concluding that a Providence brought these two together, that are fitted so well to each other, that they seem but one compleat Spectacle of Nature? which imposed upon the rude People near *Theffaly*, and gave the occasion of the fabulous *Centaur*s, as if they had been one living Creature made up of Horse and Man.

3. That which I drive at is this, There being that Goodliness in the Bodies of Animals, as in the Ox, Grey-hound, and Stag; or that Majesty and Stateliness, as in the Lion, the Horse, the Eagle, and Cock; or that grave Awfulness, as in your best breed of Mastiffs; or Elegancy and Prettiness, as in your lesser Dogs, and most sorts of Birds; all which are several Modes of Beauty, and Beauty being an intellectual Object, as Symmetry and Proportion is (which I proved sufficiently in what I spake concerning the Beauty of Plants :) That which naturally follows from all this is, The Author or Original of these Creatures which are deemed beautiful, must himself be Intellectual, He having contrived so grateful Objects to the Mind or Intellect of Man.

4. After their Beauty, let us touch upon their Birth or manner of Propagation. And here I appeal to any Man, whether the contrivance of Male and Female in living Creatures, be not a genuine Effect of Wisdom and Counsel; for it is notoriously obvious that these are made one for the other, and both for the continuation of the Species. For though we should admit, with Cardan and other Naturalists, That the Earth at first brought forth all manner of Animals as well as Plants, and that they might be fastned by the Navel to their common Mother the Earth, as they are now to the Female in the Womb; yet we see she is grown sterile and barren, and her Births of Animals are now very inconsiderable. Wherefore what can it be but a Providence, that whiles she did bear she sent out Male and Female, that when her own Prolifick virtue was wasted, yet she might be a dry Nurse, or an officious Grand-mother, to thousands of Generations? And I say it is Providence, not Chance, nor Necessity; for what is there imaginable in the Parts of the Matter, that they

they should necessarily fall into the Structure of so much as an *Animal*, much less into so careful a Provision of *difference of Sexes* for their continual Propagation?

5. Nor was it the frequent attempts of the *moved Matter* that first light on *Animals*, which perpetually were suddenly extinct for want of the difference of *Sexes*, but afterward by *chance* differenced their *Sexes* also, from whence their kind have continued. For what is perpetual is not by *chance*; and the Births that now are by Putrefaction, shew that it is perpetual; for the Earth still constantly brings forth *Male* and *Female*.

See Plin. Natural. Histor. lib. 10. cap. 68. and Aristot. Histor. Animal. lib. 6. cap. 14, and 16. Allolib. 4. cap. 11. and lib. 9. cap. 30.

6. Nor is it any thing to the purpose to reply (if you will make so large a skip as to cast your self from the Land into the Water to dive for Objections) that the *Eele*, according to *Plinie* and *Aristotle*, though it be ζῷον ἑνερμεν, an *Animal* so perfect as to have *Blood* in it, yet that it has no distinction of *Sex*: For if it have not, there is good reason for it, that Creature arising out of such kind of *Matter* as will never fail Generation; for there will be such like *Mud* as will serve this end so long as there be *Rivers*, and longer too, and *Rivers* will not fail so long as there is a *Sea*. Wherefore this rather makes for discriminative Providence, that knew afore the nature and course of all things, and made therefore her contrivances accordingly, doing nothing superfluously or in vain.

7. But in other *Generations* that are more hazardous, though they be sometimes by Putrefaction, yet she makes them *Male* and *Female*; as 'tis plain in *Frogs* and *Mice*. Nor are we to be scandaliz'd at it, that there is such careful Provision made for such contemptible *Vermine* as we conceive them: For this only comes out of *Pride* and *Ignorance*, or a haughty Presumption, that because we are encouraged to believe that in some Sense all things are made for Man, therefore they are not at all made for themselves. But he that pronounces thus is ignorant of the Nature of God, and the Knowledge of things. For if a good Man be merciful to his Beast; then surely a good God is bountiful and benign, and takes Pleasure that all his Creatures enjoy themselves that have Life and Sense, and are capable of any Enjoyment. So that the swarms of little *Vermine*, and of *Flies*, and innumerable such like diminutive Creatures, we should rather congratulate their coming into Being, than murmur sullenly and scornfully against their Existence; for they find nourishment in the World, which would be lost if they were not, and are again convenient nourishment themselves to others that prey upon them.

But besides, *Life* being individuated into such infinite numbers that have their distinct sense and pleasure, and are sufficiently fitted with Contentments; those little Souls are in a manner as much considerable for the taking off, or carrying away to themselves the overflowing Benignity of the first Original of all things, as the *Ox*, the *Elephant*, or *Whale*. For it is *sense*, not *bulk*, that makes things capable of Enjoyments.

Wherefore it was fit that there should be a safe Provision made for the propagation and continuance of all the *kinds* of living Creatures, not only of those that are good, but of those also that we rashly and inconsiderately call *Evil*: For they are at least good to enjoy themselves, and to partake of the bounty of their Creator. But if they grow noisome and trouble-

troublesome to us, we have both Power and right to curb them: For there is no question but we are more worth than they, or any of the brute Creatures.

8. But to return to the present point in hand; There are also other manifest footsteps of *Providence* which the *Generation* of living Creatures will discover to us; as for Example, the manner of Procreation of *Fishes* and *Birds*. For there being that notable difference in Animals, that some of them are *Oviparous*, others *Viviparous*; that the *τὰ νηῆτα* (as *Philo* comprehends them by that general term) that *Fishes* and *Birds* should be *Oviparous*, is a plain sign of *Counsel* and *Providence*. For though it will be granted that their *Species* might continue and subsist though they had been *Viviparous*; yet it would have brought their Individuals to very small numbers.

For as for *Fishes*, since *Grass* and *Herbs* are no fruit of the Sea, it was necessary that they should feed one upon another, and therefore that they should multiply in very great plenty; which they could not have done any thing near to that fulness they now do, if they had been *Viviparous*, as four-footed Beasts are: But being now *Oviparous*, and the lesser kinds of them so many at first, and sending forth such infinite numbers of Spawn, their generations are neither extinct or scantied, but are as plentiful as any Creatures on the Land.

And the reason why *Birds* are *Oviparous*, and lay Eggs, but do not bring forth their young alive, is, because there might be more plenty of them also, and that neither the Birds of prey, the Serpent nor the Fowler, should streighten their generations too much. For if they had been *Viviparous*, the burthen of their Womb, if they had brought forth any competent number at a time, had been so big and heavy, that their wings would have failed them, and so every body would have had the wit to catch the Old one. Or if they brought but one or two at a time, they would have been troubled all the year long with feeding their young, or bearing them in their Womb; Besides, there had been a necessity of too frequent Venery, which had been very prejudicial to their dry carcases. It was very reasonable therefore that *Birds* should propagate by laying of Eggs.

9. But this is not all the advantage we shall make of his Consideration. I demand further, What is it that makes the Bird to prepare her Nest with that Artifice, to sit upon her Eggs when she has laid them, and to distinguish betwixt these and her useless Excrement? Did she learn it of her Mother before her? Or rather, does she not do she knows not what, but yet what ought to be done, by the appointment of the most exquisite Knowledge that is? Wherefore something else has knowledge for her, which is the Maker and Contriver of all things, the Omniscient and Omnipotent God.

And though you may reply, that the Hatching of their Eggs is necessary, else their generations would cease; yet I answer, that all the Circumstances and Curiosities of Brooding them are not necessary: For they might have made shift on the ground in the Grass, and not made themselves such curious and safe Nests in Bushes and Trees. Besides, if all

things were left to *Chance*, it is far easier to conceive that there should have been no such things as *Birds*, than that the *blind Matter* should ever have stumbled on such lucky *Instincts* as they that seem but barely necessary.

10. But you'll object, that the *Ostrich* lays Eggs and hatches them not, so that these things are rather by *Chance* than *Providence*. But this rather argues a more exquisite discerning *Providence*, than is any Argument against it. For the heat of the ground (like those *Ovens* in *Egypt* *Diodorus* speaks of) whereon she lays them, proves effectual for the production of her young. So Nature ties not the Female to this tedious service where it is needless and useless; as in *Fishes* also, who when they have spawn'd, are discharged of any further trouble: Which is a most manifest discovery of a very curious and watchful *Eye of Providence*, which suffers nothing to be done ineptly and in vain.

11. I will only make one Advantage more of this Speculation of the *Birth of Animals*, and then pass on to what remains. It is observed by those that are more attentive watchers of the Works of Nature, that the *fœtus* is framed out of some *homogeneous liquor* or moisture, in which there is no variety of parts of Matter to be contrived into Bones and Flesh: But as in an *Egg* for Example, about the third day the Hen has fate on it, in that part where Nature begins to sit upon her work of efformation, all is turned into a *Crystalline liquid* substance about her; as also several *Insects* are bred of little drops of *Dew*; so in all *Generations* besides it is supposed by them, that Nature does as it were wipe clean the Table-book first, and then pourtray upon it what she pleaseth. And if this be her course, to corrupt the subject Matter into as perfect Privation of Form as she may, that is, to make it as *homogeneous* as she can, but *liquid* and pliable to her Art and Skill; it is to me very highly probable, if not necessary, that there should be something besides this *fluid Matter* that must change it, alter and guide it into that wise contrivance of parts that afterwards we find it. For how should the parts of this *liquid Matter* ever come into this exquisite Fabrick of themselves? And this may convince any *Atheist*, that there is a *Substance besides corporeal Matter*; which he is as loath to admit of as that there is a *God*.

For there being nothing else in Nature but *Substantia* or *Modus*, this power of contriving the *liquid Matter* into such order and shape as it is being incompetent to the *liquid Matter* it self, it must be the *Modus* of some other Substance latent in the *fluid Matter*, and really distinguishable from it; which is either the *Soul*, or some seminal Form or *Archeus*, as the *Chymist* calls it; and they are all alike indifferent to me at this time, I aiming here only at a *Substance* besides the *Matter*, that thence the *Atheist* may be the more easily brought off to the acknowledgment of the Existence of a *God*.

12. Nor can the force of this Argument be eluded, by saying the *Matter* is touched and infected by the *life* of the Female whiles she bore the *Egg*, or that her *Fancy* gets down into her Womb.

For what *life* or *fancy* has the *Earth*, which, as they say, gendred at first all *Animals*, some still? And what similitude is there betwixt a *Bee* and

and an Ox, or a *Wasp* and an *Horse*, that those *Insects* should arise out of the putrify'd Bodies of these Creatures? It is but some rude and general congruity of vital preparation that sets this *Archeus* on work rather than another: As mere *Choler* engages the Fancy to dream of firing of Guns and fighting of Armies; *Sanguine* figures the Imagination into the representation of fair Women and beautiful Children; *Phlegm* transforms her into Water and Fishes; and the shadowy *Melancholy* intangles her in collutation with old Hags and Hobgoblins, and frights her with dead Mens Faces in the dark. But I have dwelt on this Subject longer than I intended.

CHAP. X.

1. *That the Fabrick of the Bodies of Animals argues a Deity: As namely the number and scituation of their Eyes and Ears; 2. As also of their Legs. 3. The Armature of Beasts, and their Use thereof. 4. Of the general structure of Birds and Fishes. 5. The admirable Fabrick of the Mole. 6. Cardan's rapture upon the consideration thereof. 7. Of the Hare and Grey-hound. 8. Of the structure of the Body of the Camel.*

1. **I** Come now to the last consideration of *Animals*, the outward Shape and Fabrick of their Bodies; which when I have shew'd you that they might have been otherwise, and yet are made according to the most exquisite pitch of *Reason* that the Wit of Man can conceive of, it will naturally follow that they were really made by *Wisdom* and *Providence*, and consequently, *That there is a God*. And I demand first in general, concerning all those Creatures that have *Eyes* and *Ears*, whether they might not have had only *one Eye* and *one Ear* a-piece; and to make the supposition more tolerable, had the *Eye* on the one side the Head, and the *Ear* on the other; or the *Ear* on the Crown of the Head, and the *Eye* in the Forehead: For they might have lived and subsisted, though they had been no better provided for than thus. But it is evident that their having *two Eyes* and *two Ears*, so placed as they are, is more safe, more sightly, and more useful. Therefore that being made so constantly choice of which our own *Reason* deemeth best, we are to infer, that that choice proceeded from *Reason* and *Counsel*.

2. Again, I desire to know why there be no *three-footed Beasts*, (when I speak thus, I do not mean *Monsters*, but a constant *Species* or kind of Animals) for such a Creature as that would make a limping shift to live as well as they that have *four*? Or why have not some Beasts more than four Feet, suppose *six*, and the two middle-most shorter than the rest, hanging like the two Legs of a Man a horse-back by the horse-sides? For it is no harder a thing for Nature to make such frames of Bodies than others that are more elegant and useful. But the Works of Nature being neither useless nor inept, she must either be wise her self, or be guided by some higher Principle of *Knowledge*: As that Man that does nothing foolishly all the Days of his Life, is either wise himself, or consults with them that are so.

3. And then again for the *Armature* of Beasts, who taught them the use of their *Weapons*? The *Lion* will not kick with his *Feet*, but he will strike such a stroke with his *Tail*, that he will break the back of his *Encounterer* with it. The *Horse* will not use his *Tail*, unless against the busie flies, but kicks with his *Feet* with that force, that he lays his *Enemy* on the *Ground*. The *Bull* and *Ram* know the use of their *Horns* as well as the *Horse* of his *Hoofs*. So the *Bee* and *Serpent* know their *Stings*, and the *Bear* the use of his *Paw*. Which things they know merely by natural instinct, as the *Male* knows the use of the *Female*. For they gather not this skill by observation and experience, but the frame of their natures carries them to it; as it is manifest in young *Lambs*, that will butt before they have *Horns*. Therefore it is some higher *Providence* that has made them of this nature they are. And this is evident also in *Birds* that will flutter with their *Wings* when there is but a little *Down* upon them, and they as yet utterly unuseful for flying.

4. And now I have fallen upon the mention of this kind of Creature, let me make my Advantage of that general structure observable in them: The form of their *Heads* being narrow and sharp, that they may the better cut the *Air* in their swift flight; and the spreading of their *Tails* parallel to the *Horizon*, for the better bearing up their *Body*; for they might have been perpendicular, as the *Tails* of *Fishes* in the *Water*. Nor is it any thing that the *Owl* has so broad a *Face*, for her flight was not to be so swift nor so frequent.

And as for *Fishes*, to say nothing how handsomely their *Gills* supply the place of *Lungs*, and are replenished with the like plenty of *Veins* and *Arteries*, that their *Blood* may be cool'd by the *Water*, as it is in the *Lungs* of other *Animals* by the *Air*, we will take notice of more easie and vulgar considerations. The bladder of wind found in their *Bodies*, who can say it is convey'd thither by chance, but that it is contrived for their more easie swimming? As also the manner of their *Fins*, which consist of a number of gristly bones, long and slender like pins and needles, and a kind of a skin betwixt, which is for the more exactness, and makes them thin and flat like *Oars*. Which perfect artifice and accuracy might have been omitted, and yet they have made a shift to move up and down in the *Water*.

But I have fallen upon a Subject that is infinite and inexhaustible; therefore, that I be not too tedious, I will confine my self to some few Observations in ordinary *Beasts* and *Birds*, (that which is most known and obvious being most of all to our purpose) and then I shall come to the contemplation of *Man*.

5. And indeed what is more obvious and ordinary than a *Mole*? And yet what more palpable Argument of *Providence* than she? The members of her *Body* are so exactly fitted to her *Nature* and manner of *Life*. For her dwelling being under *Ground*, where nothing is to be seen, Nature has so obscurely fitted her with *Eyes*, that Naturalists can scarce agree whether she have any *Sight* at all or no. But for amends, what she is

is capable of for her defence and warning of Danger, she has very eminently conferred upon her; for she is exceeding quick of hearing. And then her *short Tail* and *short Legs*, but broad *Fore-feet* armed with *sharp Claws*, we see by the Event to what purpose they are, she so swiftly working her self under Ground, and making her way so fast in the Earth, as they that behold it cannot but admire it. Her *Legs* therefore are short, that she need dig no more than will serve the mere thickness of her Body; and her *Fore-feet* are broad, that she may scoup away much Earth at a time; and little or no *Tail* she has, because she courses it not on the Ground, like the *Rat* or *Mouse*, of whose kindred she is, but lives under the *Earth*, and is fain to dig her self a dwelling there: And she making her way through so thick an Element, which will not yield easily, as the *Air* or the *Water*, it had been dangerous to have drawn so long a train behind her; for her Enemy might fall upon her Reer, and fetch her out before she had compleated, or had got full possession of her Works.

6. *Cardan* is so much taken with this Contemplation, that though I find him often staggering, yet here he does very fully and firmly profess, that the contrivance of all things is from *Wisdom* and *Counsel*: His Words are so generous and significant, that I hold them worth the Transcribing. *Palam est igitur, Naturam in cunctis sollicitam mirum in modum fuisse, nec obiter, sed ex sententia omnia praevidisse; hominesque, quibus hoc beneficium Deus largitus est, ut Causam rerum primam inveniant, participes esse illius primæ Naturæ; neque alterius esse generis Naturam quæ hæc constituit, ab illorum mente qui causam eorum cur ita facta sint plenè assequi potuerunt.* Thus forcibly has the due Contemplation of *Nature* carried him beyond Nature and himself, and made him write like a Man rap'd into a Divine Exstasie.

7. But there are as manifest Foot-steps of *Divine Providence* in other Creatures as in the *Mole*: As for Example, the *Hare*, whose temper and frame of body are plainly fitted on purpose for her Condition.

For why is she made so full of *Fear* and *Vigilancy*, ever rearing up and listning whilst she is feeding? And why is she so exceeding swift of foot, and has her *Eyes* so prominent, and placed so that she can see better behind her than before? But that her flight is her only safety; and it was needful for her perpetually to eye her pursuing Enemy, against whom she durst never stand at the Bay, having nothing but her long soft limber *Ears* to defend her. Wherefore he that made the *Hare*, made the *Dog* also, and guarded her with these Properties from her eager Foe, that she might not be too easie a Booty for him, and so never be able to save her self, or afford the Spectator any considerable Pastime. And that the *Hare* might not always get away from the *Grey-hound*, see how exquisitely his shape is fitted for the Course: For the narrowness and slenderness of his Parts are made for speed; and that seeming impertinent long *Appendix* of his Body, his *Tail*, is made for more nimble turning.

8. There are other *Animals* also whose particular fabrick of Body does manifestly appear the Effect of *Providence* and *Counsel*, though Naturalists cannot agree whether it be in the behalf of the *Beast* thus framed,

or of *Man*. And such is that Creature which, though it be Exotick, yet is ordinarily known by the name of *Camel*: For why are those *bunches* on his Back, but that they may be instead of a *Pack-saddle* to receive the burthen? And why has he four *knees*, and his *hinder Legs bending inwards*, as also a *Protuberancy* under his *Breast* to lean on, but that, being a tall Creature, he might with ease *kneel down*, and so might the more gainly be loaden?

But *Cardan* will by no means have this the design of Nature, but that this frame of the *Camel's* Body is thus made for his own convenience: For he being a Creature that lives and seeks his Food in wast and dry Desarts, those *Bunches* he would have *Receptacles* of redundant *Moisture*, from whence the rest of his Body is to be supply'd in a hard and tedious time of drought; and that his Legs being very long, he ought to have *Knees* behind and a *knob* beneath, to rest his weary limbs in the Wilderness, by sitting or kneeling in that posture he does; for he could not so conveniently lie along, as the Horse, or Ass, or other Creatures. But I should not determine this to either alone, but take in both Causes, and acknowledge therein a richer design of *Providence*, that by this Frame and Artifice has gratifi'd both the *Camel* and his *Master*.

C H A P. XI.

1. Some general Observables concerning Birds. 2. Of the Cock. 3. Of the Turkey-Cock. 4. Of the Swan, Hern, and other Water-fowl. 5. Of the *καυδονοχα* and *πικρολεπιδες*, and of the peculiarity of Sight in Birds of prey. 6. The Description of the Bird of Paradise according to *Cardan*. 7. The suffrages of *Scaliger*, *Hernandes* and *Nierembergius*. 8. *Aldrovandus* his Objections against her feeding on the Dew only, with what they might probably answer thereto. 9. His Objections against her manner of Incubiture, with the like Answer. 10. What Properties they are all five agreed on. 11. In what *Pighafetta* and *Clusius* dissent from them all, with the Author's conditional inclination to their Judgment. 12. The main Remarkables in the story of the Bird of Paradise. 13. A supply from ordinary and known Examples as convictive or more convictive of a discerning Providence.

1. **W**E pass on now to the consideration of *Fowls* or *Birds*. Where omitting the more general Properties, of having two Ventricle, and picking up Stones, to convey them into their second Ventricle, the Gizzard, (which provision and instinct is a supply for the want of Teeth;) as also their having no Paps as *Beasts* have, their young ones being nourished so long in the Shell, that they are presently fit to be fed by the Mouths of the old ones, and unfit to suck by reason of the shape and hardness of their Bills: (which Observations plainly signify that Nature does nothing ineptly and foolishly, and that therefore there is a
Provi-

Providence) I shall content my self in taking notice only of the outward frame of some few *kinds* of this Creature that familiarly come into our sight, such as the *Cock*, the *Duck*, the *Swan*, and the like.

2. I demand therefore concerning the *Cock*, why he has *Spurs* at all; or having them, how they come to be so fittingly placed. For he might have had none, or so misplaced, that they had been utterly useless, and so his courage and pleasure in fighting had been to no purpose. Nor are his *Comb* and his *Wattles* in vain, for they are an *Ornament* becoming his Martial Spirit; yea an *Armature* too, for the tugging of those often excuses the more useful parts of his Head from harm. Thus fittingly does Nature gratifie all Creatures with accommodations fuitable to their temper, and nothing is in vain.

3. Nor are we to cavil at the red pugger'd attire of the *Turky*, and the long *Excrescency* that hangs down over his Bill, when he swells with pride and anger : For it may be a Receptacle for his heated Blood, that has such free recourse to his Head ; or he may please himself in it, as the rude *Indians*, whose Jewels hang dangling at their Noses. And if the Bird be pleasur'd, we are not to be displeased, being always mindful that Creatures are made to enjoy themselves as well as to serve us ; and it is a gross piece of Ignorance and Rusticity to think otherwise.

4. Now for *Swans* and *Ducks*, and such like *Birds* of the *Water*, it is obvious to take notice how well they are fitted for that manner of Life. For those that swim, their *Feet* are framed for it like a pair of *Oars*, their *Claws* being connected with a pretty broad Membrane; and their *Necks* are long, that they may dive deep enough into the *Water*. As also the *Neck* of the *Hern*, and such like *Fowl* who live of *Fishes*, and are fain to frequent their Element, who walk on long stilts also like the People that dwell in the *Marshes*; but their *Claws* have no such Membranes, for they had been but a hindrance to those kind of *Birds* that only wade in the water, and not swim.

Aristotle is witty, in comparing the * *long necks* of these *Water-fowls* to an *Angle-Rod*, and their *long Bills* to the *Line* and *Hook*. And adds also another observable concerning their *long Legs*, that their *Tails* are therefore the shorter: Though I do not much admire his reason, who makes them so for want of matter that was spent upon the *Legs*. But the reason is, because they are Birds less volacious; and besides, the posture of their *long Legs* cast backwards while they fly, supplies the office of a larger *ὀρθόπυγον*, and so they are helps to their flying, whenas otherwise they would be a trouble and hindrance. Wherefore, I said, their *Tails* are so short, not because the Matter was spent upon their *Legs*, but because their *Legs* supply the office of the *Tail*, according to that excellent Aphorism of * *Aristotle*, ἅτε περίεργον ἔδ' ἅτε μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ, *Nature does nothing vainly and superfluously.*

Which is the reason *Fishes* have no *Legs*, though they have *Fins*; and that the *Torpedo* has no *Fins* at the *sides* of his round *Body*, but only at the *sides* of his *Tail*, the breadth and flatness of his *Body* serving him instead of fore-fins to swim with. But this speculation of the *Water-Fowls* has engaged me amongst the *Fishes* further than I intended.

De part. A-
nimal. l. 4.
c. 12.

5. I shall return, and make a short stay with the *Birds*; those *Martial* ones, I mean, and *Birds of Prey*. In which the Philosopher has observed *shortness of Neck* as fittest for *strength*; and that none of the *καμψύνοχα*, or *Birds with crooked Claws*, have long Necks, or plain and straight Beaks, but crooked; and that all carnivorous Birds that are forced to hunt for their prey, are such. *καμψὸν δὲ τὸ ὁμοειδὲς · χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον.* *τὸ δὲ τετραπὺν ἀναγκαῖον ἀπὸ ζώων πορίζεται.* And therefore their crooked Talons are fit to hold fast the live prey that otherwise would wriggle from them, and their crooked Beaks to tear tough flesh, (as it were with a sharp hook) that with a plain Beak would not so easily be riven in pieces. But the Bills of *Geese* and *Ducks* are quite of another form, but fit for rooting in the ground or mud, or shearing of herbs and grafs, and such easie manner of feeding.

That also is ingeniously observed of *Aristotle* concerning the *καμψύνοχα*, that their *Bodies* are but small in comparison of their *Wings*, their greatest succour lying in them if they were assaulted: But that more *heavy* Birds are otherwise provided for defence, namely either by *Spurs* that grow on their Legs, or by the strength and sharpness of some single cley in their Foot; as I have observed in the *Cassoware* or *Emeu*. But he gives it for a Maxim, *That the same Birds are never καμψύνοχα and πτεροφόρα, never have crooked claws and spurs together.* For the *Armature of Spurs* is fit only for such Birds as fight on the Ground; but the *crooked-claw'd* Birds are scarce well provided to tread upon it. And therefore none of the heavy-bodied Fowl have crooked Talons.

But the greatest observable in Nature concerning these *Birds of Prey* is the strangeness of their *Sight*. For by a peculiar frame of their *Eye* they are inabled to spy their booty from aloft in the Air, and see best at that distance, scarce see at all near at hand. So they are both the *Archer* and *Shaft*; taking aim afar off, and then shooting themselves directly upon the desired Mark, they seize upon the prey having hit it. The works of *Providence* are infinite: I will close all with the description of that strange *Bird of Paradise*, for the strangeness has made it notorious.

6. There is a *Bird* that falls down out of the Air dead, and is found sometimes in the *Molucco* Islands, that has no Feet at all. The bigness of her Body and Bill, as likewise the form of them, is much the same as a Swallow's; but the spreading out of her Wings and Tail has no less compass than an Eagle's. She lives and breeds in the Air, comes not near the Earth but for her burial; for the largeness and lightness of her Wings and Tail sustain her without lassitude. And the laying of her Eggs and brooding of her young is upon the back of the Male, which is made hallow, as also the breast of the Female, for the more easie incubation. Also two strings like two Shoe-makers ends come from the hinder parts of the Male, wherewith it is conceived that he is fastned closer to the Female while she hatches her Eggs on the hollow of his back. The dew of Heaven is appointed her for Food, her Region being too far removed from the approach of Flies and such like Insects.

This is the entire Story and Philosophy of this miraculous *Bird* in *Cardan*, who professes himself to have seen it no less than thrice, and to have

have describ'd it accordingly. The Contrivances whereof, if the Matter were certainly true, are as evident Arguments of a Divine Providence, as that *Copper-Ring*, with the Greek * inscription upon it, was an * The In-
undeniable monument of the Artifice and Finger of Man. scription runs thus ;

7. But that the reproach of over-much credulity may not lie upon *Cardan* alone, *Scaliger*, who lay at catch with him to take him tripping wherever he could, cavils not with any thing in the whole Narration but the *bigness* of the *Wings* and *littleness* of the *Body*; which he undertakes to correct from one of his own which was sent him by *Orvesanus* from *Java*. Εἰμὶ ἐμείνῳ ἰχθὺς ταύτης λίμνη παλαιο- πρῶτῳ ὀπί- τεθεῖς διὰ τῆ κοσμητῆς φε- Nay, he confirms what his Antagonist has wrote, partly by History, and partly by Reason; affirming that himself in his own Garden found two little Birds with membranaceous Wings utterly devoid of Legs, their form was near to that of a Bat's. Nor is he deterr'd from the belief of the perpetual flying of the *Manucodiata*, by the gaping of the Feathers of her Wings, (which seem thereby less fit to sustain her Body) but further makes the narration probable by what he has observed in Kites hovering in the Air, as he saith, for a whole hour together without any flapping of her Wings or changing place. And he has found also how she may sleep in the Air from the Example of *Suevia*, in the *Fishes*, which he has seen sleeping in the Water, without sinking themselves to the bottom, and without changing place, but lying stock still, *pinnulis tantum nescio quid motiuncula meditantes*, only wagging a little their fins, as heedlessly and unconcernedly as Horses while they are asleep wag their Ears, to displace the flies that sit upon them. Οὐκ ἔστιν α. σ. λ. This Pike was taken about Hail-prun, the Imperial City of Suevia, in the year 1497. Gesner. Wherefore *Scaliger* admitting that the *Manucodiata* is perpetually on the Wing in the Air, he must of necessity admit also that manner of Incubation that *Cardan* describes; else how could their Generations continue? Jul. Scalig. de Subtil. exercit. 228. §. 2. 229. §. 2. Cardan. de Subtil. l. 10.

Franciscus Hernandez affirms the same with *Cardan* expressly in every thing: As also * *Eusebius Nierembergius*, who is so taken with the story of this Bird, that he could not abstain from celebrating her miraculous properties in a short but elegant copy of Verses; and does after, though confidently oppos'd, assert the main matter again in Prose. * Nierem- berg. Hist. Nat. cur. lib. 10. cap. 13.

1. Such are the Suffrages of *Cardan*, *Scaliger*, *Hernandes*, and *Nierembergius*. But *Aldrovandus* rejects that Fable of her feeding on the dew of Heaven, and of her Incubiture on the back of the Male, with much scorn and indignation. And as for the former, his Reasons are no ways contemptible, he alledging that Dew is near the Earth, and not at all times of the Year, nor unless in clear Days, and that only in the Morning, and that the perpetual flying of the Bird must needs exhaust her Spirits; lastly, that Dew is a body not perfectly-enough mixt, or heterogeneous enough for Food, nor the hard Bill of the Bird made for such easie uses as sipping this soft moisture.

To which I know not what *Cardan* and the rest would answer, unless this, That they mean by Dew the more unctuous moisture of the Air, which as it may not be alike every where, so these Birds may be fitted with a natural Sagacity to find it out where it is: That there is Dew in this sense Day and Night, (as well as in the Morning) and in all seasons of the Year; and therefore a constant supply of Moisture and Spirits to their perpetual flying, which they more

more copiously imbibe by reason of their exercise: That the thicker parts of this moisture stick and convert into Flesh, and that the lightness of their Feathers is so great, that their pains in sustaining themselves are not over-much: That what is homogeneal and simple to our Sight, is fit enough to be the rudiments of *Generation*, (all Animals being generated of a kind of clear CrySTALLINE LIQUOR) and that therefore it may be also of *Nutrition*: That *Orpine* and *Sea-House-leek* are nourished and grow being hung in the Air, and that *Duck-weed* has its root no deeper than near the upper parts of the Water. And lastly, that the Bills of these Birds are for their better flying, by cutting the way, and for better Ornament; for the rectifying also and composing of their Feathers, while they swim in the Air with as much Ease as Swans do in the Rivers.

9. To his great impatience against *their manner of Incubation* they would happily return this Answer; That the way is not ridiculous, but, it may be, rather necessary, from what *Aldrovandus* himself not only acknowledges, but contends for; namely, that they *have no Feet at all*. For hence it is manifest that they cannot light on the ground, nor any where rest on their Bellies, and be able to get on wing again; because they cannot creep out of Holes of Rocks, as *Swifts*, and such like short-footed Birds can, they having no Feet at all to creep with. Besides, as *Aristotle* well argues concerning the long Legs of certain *Water-Fowl*, that they were made so long, because they were to wade in the Water and catch Fish, adding that excellent Aphorism, τὰ ὄρνιθα ποτὲς τὸ ἔργον ἢ φύσιν ποιεῖ ἀλλ' ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ποτὲς τὰ ὄρνιθα. So may we rationally conclude, will they say, that as the long Legs of these *Water-fowl* imply a design of their haunting the Water, so want of *Legs* in these *Manucodiata's* argue they are never to come down to the Earth; because they can neither stand there, nor go, nor get off again. And if they never come on the Earth, or any other resting-place, where can their Eggs be laid or hatched but on the back of the Male?

De part. Ani-
mal. lib. 4. c.
12.

Besides that *Cardan* pleases himself with that *Antiphonie* in Nature, that as the *Ostrich* being a Bird, yet never flies in the Air; so this *Bird of Paradise* should always be in the Air, and never rest upon the Earth. And as for *Aldrovandus* his Presumption from the five several *Manucodiata's* that he had seen, and in which he could observe no such figuration of parts as imply'd a fitness for such a manner of *Incubation*, *Cardan* will answer, my self has seen three, and *Scaliger* one, who both agree against you.

10. However, you see that both *Cardan*, *Aldrovandus* and the rest do jointly agree in allowing the *Manucodiata* no Feet, as also in furnishing her with two strings hanging at the hinder parts of her Body; which *Aldrovandus* will have to be in the Female as well as in the Male, though *Cardan's* Experience reacheth not so far.

11. But *Pighafetta* and *Clusius* will easily end this grand Controversy betwixt *Cardan* and *Aldrovandus*, if it be true which they report, and if they speak of the same kind of Birds of Paradise. For they both affirm that they have Feet a palm long, and that with all confidence imaginable.

But

But *Nierembergius* on the contrary affirms, that one that was an eye-witness, and that had taken up one of these Birds newly dead, told him that it had no Feet at all. *Johnston* also gives his suffrage with *Nierembergius* in this, though with *Aldrovandus* he rejects the manner of their *Incubation*.

But unless they can raise themselves from the ground by the stiffness of some of the feathers of their Wings, or rather by virtue of those nervous strings which they may have a power to stiffen when they are alive, by transfusing spirits into them, and make them serve as well instead of Legs to raise them from the Ground, as to hang upon the Boughs of Trees by, (a slight thing being able to raise or hold up their light feathered Bodies in the Air, as a small twig will us in the Water;) I should rather incline to the testimony of *Pighafetta* and *Clusius* than to the judgment of the rest, and believe those Mariners that told him, that the Legs are pulled off by them that take them, and exenterate them and dry them in the Sun, for either their private use or sale.

Which Conclusion would the best save the credit of *Aristotle*, who long since has so peremptorily pronounced, ὅτι πῦνδρ μόνον ἔστιν ἔχειν, ὡς αἰσρ ἰδυστῶν μόνον ἔστιν ἔχειν, That there is not any Bird that only flies, as the Fish only swims.

Hist. Animal. l. i. c. 1.

12. But thus our Bird of Paradise is quite flown and vanished into a Figment or Fable. But if any one will condole the loss of so convincing an Argument for a Providence that fits one thing to another, I must take the freedom to tell him, that unless he be a greater admirer of Novelty than a searcher into the indissoluble consequences of things, I shall supply his Meditations with what of this Nature is as strongly conclusive, and remind that it will be his own reproach if he cannot spy as clear an inference from an ordinary Truth, as from either an Uncertainty or a Fiction. And in this regard the bringing this doubtful narration into play may not justly seem to no purpose, it carrying so serious and castigatory a piece of pleasantry with it.

The *Manucodiata's* living on the Dew is no part of the Convictiveness of a Providence in this story: But the being excellently-well provided of Wings and Feathers, *tantâ levitatis supellectile exornata*, (as *Nierembergius* speaks) being so well furnished with all the advantages for lightness, that it seems harder for her to sink down (as he conceits) than to be born up in the Air; that a Bird thus fitted for that Region should have no Legs to stand on the Earth, this would be a considerable indication of a discriminative Providence, that on purpose avoids all uselessness and superfluities.

The other Remarkable, and it is a notorious one, is the Cavity on the back of the Male and in the breast of the Female, for Incubation.

And the third and last, the use of those strings, as *Cardan* supposes, for the better keeping them together in this Incubiture.

If these considerations of this strange Story strike so strongly upon thee as to convince thee of a Providence, think it humour and not judgment, if what I put in lieu of them, and is but ordinary, have not the same force with thee.

13. For is not the Fish's wanting Feet, (as we observed before) she being sufficiently supply'd with Fins in so thick an Element as the Water, as great an Argument for a Providence, as so light a Bird's wanting Feet in that thinner Element of the Air, the extream lightness of her furniture being appportionated to the thinness of that Element? And is not the same

same Providence seen, and that as conspicuously, in allotting but very short Legs to those Birds that are called *Apodes* (both in *Plinie* and *Aristotle*,) upon whom she has bestow'd such large and strong Wings, and a power of flying so long and swift, as in giving no Legs at all to the *Manucodonta*, who has still a greater power of Wing and lightness of Body?

And as for the Cavities on the back of the Male and in the breast of the Female, is that design of Nature any more certain and plain than in the Genital Part of the Male and Female in all kinds of Animals? What greater Argument of Counsel and Purpose of fitting one thing for another can there be than that? And if we should make a more inward search into the contrivances of these parts in an ordinary *Hen*, and consider how or by what force an Egg of so great a growth and bigness is transmitted from the *Ovarium* through the *Infundibulum* into the *processus* of the *uterus*, (the Membranes being so thin and the passage so very small to see to) the Principle of that Motion cannot be thought less than *Divine*. And if you would compare the *protuberant* Paps or Teats in the Females of Beasts with that Cavity in the Breast of the *Manucodiata*, whether of them think you is the plainer pledge of a knowing and a designing Providence?

And lastly, for the Strings that are conceived to hold together the Male and Female in their Incubiture, what a toy is it, if compared with those invisible links and ties that engage ordinary Birds to sit upon their Eggs, they having no visible allurement to such a tedious Service?

C H A P. XII.

1. That there is not an ampler Testimony of Providence than the structure of Man's Body.
2. The safeness of the fabrick of the Eyes.
3. Their exquisite fittedness to their use.
4. The superadded advantage of Muscles to the Eye.
5. The admirable contrivance of Muscles in the whole Body.
6. The fabrick of the Heart and of the Veins.
7. Of the Teeth and of the Joints, of the Arms and Legs.
8. Of the hinder parts of the Body, and Head, Vertebrae, Nails, Bones, &c.
9. That there is proportionably the same evidence of Providence in the Anatomie of all Bodies as in that of Man.
10. The sottishness of them that are not convinced from these Considerations.
11. Of the Passions in Man, and particularly that of Devotion.
12. Of the Passions of Animals, and their usefulness to themselves;
13. As also to Man. The ridiculous Antipathy of the Ape to the Snail.
14. How inept and frustraneous a Passion Religion would be in Man, if there were neither God nor Spirit in the the World.
15. The outrageous mistake of Nature in implanting this Property of Religion in Man, if there be no God.
16. The necessary cause of Disorder in Man's Nature.
17. The exquisite fitness that there should be such a Creature as Man upon Earth.
18. That the whole Creation and the several parts thereof are an undeniable Demonstration that there is a God.

1. **B**UT we needed not to have rambled so far out into the Works of Nature, to seek out Arguments to prove a God, we being so plentifully furnish'd with that at home, which we took the pains

pains to seek for abroad. For there can be no more ample testimony of a God and Providence than the *frame and structure of our own Bodies*. The admirable *Artifice* whereof *Galen*, though a mere Naturalist, was so taken with, that he could not but adjudge the Honour of a *Hymn* to the wise Creator of it. The contrivance of the *whole and every particular* is so evident an argument of exquisite skill in the Maker, that if I should pursue all that suits to my purpose it would amount to an intire Volume. I shall therefore only hint at some few things, leaving the rest to be supply'd by *Anatomists*. And I think there is no man that has any skill in that Art, but will confess, the more diligently and accurately the *Frame of our Body* is examined, it is found the more exquisitely conformable to our Reason, Judgment and Desire. So that supposing the same matter that our Bodies had been made of, if it had been in our power to have made our selves, we should have fram'd our selves no otherwise than we are.

2. To instance in some particular. As in our *Eyes*, the *number*, the *situation*, the *fabrick* of them is such, that we can excogitate nothing to be added thereto, or to be altered, either for their *Beauty*, *Safety*, or *Usefulness*. But as for their *Beauty*, I will leave it rather to the delicate wit and pen of Poets and amorous persons, than venture upon so tender and nice a Subject with my severer style: I will only note how *safely* they are *guarded*, and *fitly framed* out for the *use* they are intended. The *Brow* and the *Nose* saves them from harder strokes: but such a curious part as the *Eye* being necessarily liable to mischief from smaller matters, the *sweat* of the Forehead is fenced off by those two wreaths of hair which we call the *Eye-brows*; and the *Eye-lids* are fortified with little stiff *bristles*, as with *Palisadoes*, against the assault of Flies and Gnats, and such like bold *Animalcula*. Besides, the *upper-lid* presently claps down, and is as good a fence as a *Port-cullis* against the importunity of the Enemy: which is done also every night, whether there be any present Assault or no; as if Nature kept garrison in this *Acropolis* of Man's body, the *Head*, and look'd that such Laws should be duly observed as were most for his safety.

3. And now for the *Use* of the *Eye*, which is *Sight*, it is evident that this Organ is so exquisitely framed for that purpose, that not the least curiosity can be added. For, first, the *Humour* and *Tunicles* are purely *Transparent*, to let in *Light* and *Colours* unsoul'd and unsophisticated by any outward tincture. And then again, the parts of the *Eye* are made *Convex*, that there might be a direction of many rays coming from one point of the Object unto one point answerable in the bottom of the *Eye*; to which purpose the *Crystalline Humour* is of great moment, and without which the sight would be very obscure and weak. Thirdly, the *Tunica Uvea* has a *Musculous* power, and can dilate and contract that round hole in it which is called the *Pupil* of the *Eye*, for the better moderating the transmission of light. Fourthly, the inside of the *Uvea* is *black'd* like the walls of a Tennis-court, that the rays falling upon the *Retina*, may not, by being rebounded thence upon the *Uvea*, be returned from the *Uvea* upon the *Retina* again; for such a repercussion would make the sight more

confused. Fifthly, the *Tunica Arachnoides*, which envelops the *Crystalline Humour*, by virtue of its *Processus Ciliares*, can thrust forward or draw back that precious useful part of the *Eye*, as the nearness or distance of the Object shall require. Sixthly and lastly, the *Tunica Retina* is *white*, for the better and more true reception of the *species* of things, (as they ordinarily call them) as a white Paper is fittest to receive those Images in a dark Room. If the wit of Man had been to contrive this *Organ* for himself, what could he have possibly exco-
 gitated more accurate? Therefore to think that *mere Motion of the Matter*, or any other blind Cause, could have hit so punctually, (for Creatures might have subsisted without this accurate provision) is to be either mad or fottish.

4. And the *Eye* is already so perfect, that I believe the Reason of Man would have easily rested here, and admir'd at its own contrivance: for he being able to *move* his whole *Head* upward and downward, and on every side, might have unawares thought himself sufficiently well provided for. But Nature has added *Muscles* also to the *Eyes*, that no Perfection might be wanting: For we have oft occasion to *move our Eyes*, our *Head* being *unmoved*, as in reading and viewing more particularly any Object set before us: and that this may be done with more ease and accuracy, she has furnished that Organ with no less than six several *Muscles*.

5. And indeed this framing of *Muscles* not only in the *Eye*, but in the *whole Body*, is admirable. For is it not a wonder that even all our flesh should be so handsomely contrived into distinct pieces, whose Rise and Insertions should be with such advantage, that they do serve with such ease to move some part of the Body or other; and that the parts of our Body are not moved only so conveniently as will serve us to walk and subsist by, but that they are able to move every way imaginable that will advantage us? For we can fling our *Legs* and *Arms* upwards and downwards, backwards, forwards, and round, as they that spin, or would spread a Mole-hill with their feet. To say nothing of *Respiration*, the constriction of the *Diaphragme* for the keeping down the *Guts*, and so enlarging the *Thorax*, that the *Lungs* may have play, and the assistance of the inward *Intercostal Muscles* in deep *Suspirations*, when we take more large gulps of Air to cool our Heart overcharged with Love or Sorrow: nor of the curious fabrick of the *Larynx*, so well fitted with *Muscles* for the modulation of the *Voice*, tunable *Speech*, and delicious *Singing*: nor, lastly, of Nature's so industriously perforating the *Tendons* of the second Joints both of *Fingers* and *Toes*, and her so careful transmitting of the *Tendons* of the third Joints through them.

6. You may add to these the notable contrivance of the *Heart*, its two *Ventricles* and its many *Valvule*, so framed and situated as is most fit for the reception and transmission of the *Blood*, which comes about through the *Heart*, and is sent thence away warm to comfort and cherish the rest of the Body: For which purpose also the *Valvule* in the *Veins* are made, that the *Blood* may the more easily ascend upwards.

7. But

7. But I will rather insist upon such things as are easie and intelligible even to Idiots, who, if they can but tell the *Joints* of their *Hands*, or know the use of their *Teeth*, they may easily discover it was *Counsel*, not *Chance* created them. For why have we *three Joints* in our *Legs* and *Arms*, as also in our *Fingers*, but that it was much better than having but *two*, or *four*? And why are our *fore-teeth sharp* like chiefels to cut, but our *inward-teeth broad* to grind, but that this is more exquisite than having them *all sharp* or *all broad*, or the *fore-teeth broad* and the *other sharp*? But we might have made a hard shift to have lived in that worser condition. Again, why are the *Teeth* so luckily *placed*, or rather, why are there not *Teeth* in *other bones* as well as in the *jaw-bones*? for they might be as capable as these. But the reason is, Nothing is done foolishly nor in vain; that is, there is a *Divine Providence* that orders all things. Again, to say nothing of the inward curiosity of the *Ear*, why is that outward frame of it, but that it is certainly known that it is for the bettering of our *Hearing*?

8. I might add to these, that Nature has made the *hindmost parts* of our body which we sit upon most *fleshy*, as providing for our Ease, and making us a natural Cushion, as well as for instruments of Motion for our *Thighs* and *Legs*. She has made the *hinder part* of the *Head* more strong, as being otherwise unfenced against falls and other casualties. She has made the *Backbone* of several *Vertebrae*, as being more fit to bend, more tough, and less in danger of breaking, than if they were all one intire bone without those gristly *Junctures*. She has strengthen'd our *Fingers* and *Toes* with *Nails*, whereas she might have sent out that substance at the end of the first and second joint; which had not been so handsome nor useful, nay rather, somewhat troublesome and hurtful. And lastly, she has made all the *Bones* devoid of *sense*, because they were to bear the weight of themselves and of the whole Body. And therefore if they had had *sense*, our life had been painful continually and dolorous.

9. And what she has done for *us*, she has done proportionably in the contrivance of all *other Creatures*; so that it is manifest that a *Divine Providence* strikes through all things.

10. And therefore things being contrived with such exquisite *Curiosity* as if the most watchful *Wisdom* imaginable did attend them, to say they are thus framed without the assistance of some *Principle* that has *Wisdom* in it, and that they come to pass from *Chance* or some other blind unknowing Original, is fullenly and humorously to assert a thing because we will assert it, and under pretence of avoiding Superstition, to fall into that which is the only thing that makes Superstition it self hateful or ridiculous, that is, a wilful and groundless adhering to conceits without any support of Reason.

11. And now I have considered the fitness of the parts of Man's Body for the good of the whole, let me but consider briefly the fitness of the *Passions* of his *Mind*, whether *proper*, or *common* to him with the rest of Animals, as also the fitness of the *whole Man*, as he is *part of the Universe*, and then I shall conclude.

And it is manifest that *Anger* does so actuate the Spirits and heighten the Courage of men and beasts, that it makes them with more ease break through the difficulties they encounter. *Fear* also is for the avoiding of danger, and *Hope* is a pleasant premeditation of enjoyment, as when a Dog expects till his Master has done picking of the bone. But there is neither *Hope*, nor *Fear*, nor *Hate*, nor any peculiar Passion or Instinct in *Brutes*, that is in vain: why should we then think that Nature should miscarry more in *us* than in any other Creature, or 'should be so careful in the Fabrick of our *Body*, and yet so forgetful or unlucky in the framing of the Faculties of our *Souls*; that that *Fear* that is so peculiarly natural to us, viz. the *Fear of a Deity*, should be in vain, and that pleasant *Hope* and heavenly Joys of the Mind which man is naturally capable of, with the earnest direction of his Spirit towards God, should have no real Object in the world; and so *Religious affection* which Nature has so plainly implanted in the Soul of Man should be to no use, but either to make him ridiculous or miserable? Whenas we find no *Passion* or *Affection* in *Brutes*, either common or peculiar, but what is for their good and welfare.

12. For it is not for nothing that the *Hare* is so fearful of the *Dog*, and the *Sheep* of the *Wolf*: and if there be either *Fear* or *Enmity* in some Creatures for which we cannot easily discern any reason in respect of themselves, yet we may well allow it reasonable in regard of us, and to be to good purpose. But I think it is manifest, that *Sympathy* and *Antipathy*, *Love* and *Enmity*, *Aversation*, *Fear*, and the like, are notable whetters and quickeners of the Spirit of Life in all *Animals*; and that their being obnoxious to Dangers and Encounters does more closely knit together the vital Powers, and make them more sensibly relish their present Safety; and they are more pleased with an Escape than if they had never met with any Danger. Their greedy assaults also one upon another while there is *hope* of Victory highly gratifies them both: and if one be conquer'd and slain, the Conqueror enjoys a fresh improvement of the pleasure of life, the Triumph over his Enemy. Which things seem to me to be contriv'd even in the behalf of these Creatures themselves, that their vital heat and moisture may not always only simmer in one sluggish tenour, but sometimes boil up higher and seeth over, the fire of Life being more than ordinarily kindled upon some emergent Occasion.

13. But it is without Controversy that these peculiar *Passions* of Animals many of them are *useful* to Men, (as that of the *Lizard's* enmity against the *Serpent*;) all of them highly gratify his Contemplative faculty, some seem on purpose contriv'd to make his Worship merry: For what could Nature intend else in that *Antipathy* betwixt the *Ape* and *Snail*, that that Beast that seems so boldly to claim kindred of Man from the resemblance of his outward shape, should have so little Wit or Courage as to run away from a *Snail*, and very ruefully and frightfully to look back, as being afraid she would follow him, as *Erasmus* more largely and pleasantly tells the whole Story?

See also John-
ston, *Histor.*
Natur. de
Quadruped.
l. 3. titul. 2.
cap. 2.

14. But

14. But that Nature should implant in Man such a *strong propension to Religion*, which is the *Reverence of a Deity*, there being neither *God* nor *Angel* nor *Spirit* in the world, is such a Slur committed by her, as there can be in no wise excogitated any Excuse. For if there were a higher *Species* of things to laugh at us, as we do at the *Ape*, it might seem more tolerable. But there can be no end, neither ludicrous nor serious, of this *Religious property* in Man, unless there be something of an higher Nature than himself in the World. Wherefore *Religion* being convenient to no other *Species* of things besides Man, it ought to be convenient at least for himself: But supposing there were no *God*, there can be nothing worse for Man than *Religion*.

15. For whether we look at the *External Effects* thereof, such as are bloody *Massacres*, the *disturbance* and *subversion* of *Commonweals*, *Kingdoms* and *Empires*, most savage *Tortures* of particular persons, the *extirpating* and *dispossession* of whole *Nations*, as it hath happen'd in *America*, where the remorseless *Spaniards*, in pretence of being educated in a better *Religion* than the *Americans*, vilified the poor *Natives* so much, that they made nothing of knocking them on the head merely to feed their dogs with them; with many such unheard of Cruelties: Or whether we consider the great affliction that that severe Governess of the life of Man brings upon those *Souls* she seizes on, by affrighting *horrors of Conscience*, by puzzling and *befooling* them in the free use of their *Reason*, and putting a bar to more large searches into the pleasing *knowledge of Nature*, by anxious *cares* and disquieting *fears* concerning their *state in the Life to come*, by curbing them in their natural and kindly *enjoyments* of the *Life present*, and making *bitter* all the *pleasures* and contentments of it by some *checks* of *Conscience* and suspicions that they do something now that they may rue eternally hereafter; besides those ineffable *Agonies* of Mind that they undergo that are more generously *Religious*, and contend after the participation of the Divine Nature, they being willing, though with unspeakable pain, to be torn from themselves to become one with that universal Spirit that ought to have the guidance of all things, and by an unsatiable desire after that just and decorous temper of Mind (whereby all Arrogancy should utterly cease in us, and that which is due to God, that is, all that we have or can do, should be lively and sensibly attributed to him, and we fully and heartily acknowledge our selves to be nothing, that is, be as little elated, or no more relish the glory and praise of Men, than if we had done nothing, or were not at all in being) do plunge themselves into such *damps* and *deadness of Spirit*, that to be buried quick were less torture by far than such dark *privations* of all the *joys of life*, than such sad and heart-sinking *Mortifications*: I say, whether we consider these *inward pangs* of the Soul, or the *external outrages* caused by *Religion* (and *Religious* pretence will animate men to the committing such violences as bare Reason and the single Passions of the Mind unback'd with the fury of Superstition will never venture upon) it is manifest that if there were no *God*, no *Spirit*, no *Life to come*, it were far better that there were no such *Religious propensions* in Mankind as we see universally there are.

For the fear of the Civil Magistrate, the convenience of mutual aid and support, and the natural scourge and plague of Diseases would contain men in such bounds of *Justice, Humanity and Temperance*, as would make them more clearly and undisturbedly happy, than they are now capable of being from any advantage *Religion* does to either publick State or private person, supposing *there were no God*.

Wherefore this *Religious Affection* which Nature has implanted and as strongly rooted in Man as the fear of Death or the love of Women, would be the most enormous slip or bungle she could commit; so that she would so shamefully fail in the last Act, in this contrivance of the Nature of Man, that instead of a *Plaudite*, she would deserve to be hissed off the Stage.

16. But she having done all things else so wisely, let us rather suspect our own Ignorance than reproach her, and expect that which is allowed in well-approved Comedies, *ὅτι τὸ μὴ γινῆσθαι* for nothing can unloose this knot but a *Deity*. And then we acknowledge Man to dwell as it were in the borders of the Spiritual and Material world (for he is *utriusque mundi nexus*, as *Scaliger* truly calls him) we shall not wonder that there is such tugging and pulling this way and that way, upward and downward, and such broken disorder of things; those that dwell in the confines of two Kingdoms being most subject to disquiet and confusion. And hitherto of the *Passions* of the Mind of Man, as well those that tie him down to the Body, as those that lift him up towards God. Now briefly of the *whole Man*, as he is *part* of the *Universe*.

17. It is true, if we had not been here in the world, we could not then have missed our selves: but now we find our selves in being, and able to examine the reasonableness of things, we cannot but conclude that our Creation was an Act of very exquisite *Reason* and *Counsel*. For there being so many notable Objects in the world to entertain such Faculties as *Reason* and *inquisitive Admiration*, there ought to be such a member of this visible Creation as *Man*, that those things might not be in vain: And if *Man* were out of the world, who were then left to view the face of *Heaven*, to wonder at the transcurfion of *Comets*, to calculate Tables for the *Motions* of the *Planets* and *fix'd Stars*, and to take their *Heights* and *Distances* with *Mathematical Instruments*; to invent convenient *Cycles* for the computation of time, to consider the several *forms* of *Tears*; to take notice of the *Directions, Stations* and *Repedations* of those *Erratick Lights*, and from thence most convincingly to inform himself of that pleasant and true Paradox of the *Annual Motion* of the *Earth*; to view the *Asperities* of the *Moon* through a *Dioptrick-glass*, and venture at the Proportion of her *Hills* by their shadows; to behold the beauty of the *Rain-bow*, the *Halo*, *Parellii*, and other *Meteors*; to search out the causes of the *Flux* and *Reflux* of the *Sea*, and the hidden virtue of the *Magnet*; to inquire into the usefulness of *Plants*, and to observe the variety of the *Wisdom* of the first Cause in framing their bodies, and giving sundry observable instincts to *Fishes, Birds* and *Beasts*? And lastly, as there are particular *Priests* among *Men*, so the whole *Species* of *Mankind* being

being indued with *Reason*, and a power of finding out God, there is yet one singular End more discoverable of his Creation, *viz.* that he may be a *Priest* in this magnificent *Temple* of the *Universe*, and send up Prayers and Praises to the great Creator of all things in behalf of the rest of the *Creatures*. Thus we see all filled up and fitted without any defect or useless superfluity.

18. Wherefore the *whole Creation* in general and *every part* thereof being so ordered as if the *most exquisite Reason* and *Knowledge* had contrived them, it is as natural to conclude that all this is the work of a *Wise God*, as at the first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed *Urns* and *Coins* digg'd out of the Earth were not the *Products* of *unknowing Nature*, but the *Artifice* of *Man*.

A N

A N
 ANTIDOTE
 AGAINST
 ATHEISM.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

1. That, good men not always faring best in this world, the great examples of Divine Vengeance upon wicked and blasphemous Persons are not so convincing to the obstinate Atheist. 2. The irreligious Feers and Sacrileges of Dionysius of Syracuse. 3. The occasion of the Atheists incredulity in things supernatural or miraculous. 4. That there have been true Miracles in the world as well as false. 5. And what are the best and safest ways to distinguish them, that we may not be impos'd upon by History.



1. **H**ITHERTO I have insisted upon such Arguments for the proving of the *Existence of God* as were taken from the ordinary and known *Phænomena of Nature*; for such is the History of *Plants, Animals, and Man*. I shall come now to such *Effects* discovered in the World as are not deemed *Natural*, but *Extraordinary and Miraculous*. I do not mean unexpected Discoveries of Murthers, a conspicuous Vengeance upon proud and blasphemous Persons, such as *Nicanor, Antiochus, Herod*, and the like, of which all Histories, as well Sacred as Profane, are very full, and all which tend to the impressing of this divine Precept in the Poet upon the minds of Men,

Discite Justitiam moniti & non temnere Divos.

For though these Examples cannot but move indifferent men to an acknowledgment of Divine Providence, and a Superior Power above, and different from the Matter; yet I having now to do with the obstinate and refractory Atheist, who, though an obdurate contemner of the Deity, finding himself to be safe and well at ease, will shuffle all these things off, by asking such a Question as he did to whom the Priest of Neptune shewed the many *Donaxia* hung up in his Temple
 by

by his *Votaries* saved from ship-wreck; and therefore vaunted much of the Power of that God of the Sea; But *what is become of all those*, said he, *that notwithstanding their Vows have been lost?* so I say, the *Atheist*, to evade the force of this Argument, will whisper within himself, *But how many proud blasphemous Atheistical men, like my self, have escaped, and those that have been accounted good have died untimely deaths?*

Such as *Æsop* and *Socrates*, the *Prophets*, *Apostles* and *Martyrs*, with fundry other wise and good men in all Ages and Places, who yet being not so well aware of the ill condition and restiness of this wicked World, of which they have truly profest themselves no Citizens, but Strangers, have suffered the greatest mischiefs that can happen to humane Nature, by their innocent meaning and intermeddling in *aliena Republica*: It having usually been more safe, craftily and cautiously to undermine the Honour of God, than plainly and honestly to seek the good and welfare of Men.

2. Nay, outrageous affronts done on purpose to *Religion*, will the *Atheist* further reply, have not only past applauded by the World, but unpunish'd by Divine Justice: As is notorious in that Sacrilegious Wit, *Dionysius* of *Syracuse*, who spoiling *Jupiter Olympius* of his costly Robe very stiff and ponderous with Gold, added this Apologetical jeer to his Sacrilege, That this golden Vestment was too heavy for the Summer, and too cold for the Winter, but one of wool would fit both Seasons.

So at *Epidaurus* he commanded the golden Beard of *Æsculapius* to be cut off and carried away, alledging, that it was very unfit that the Son should wear a Beard, whenas his Father *Apollo* wore none.

That also was not inferiour to any of his Sacrilegious jests, when taking away the golden Cups and Crowns held forth by the hands of the Images of the Gods, he excused himself, saying, that he received but what they of their own accord gave him; adding, that it were a very gross piece of foolishness, whenas we pray to the Gods for all good things, not to take them when they so freely offer them with their own hands.

These and other such like irreligious Pranks did this *Dionysius* play, who, notwithstanding he fared no worse than the most demure and innocent, dying no other death than what usually other Mortals do: as if in those Ages there had been as great a lack of *Wit* as there was here in *England* once of *Latin*, and that he escaped a more severe Sentence by the benefit of his Clergy. But others think that he was pay'd home and punished in his Son that succeeded him. But that, will the *Atheist* reply, is but to whip the absent; as *Aristotle* wittily said to him that told him that such an one did unmercifully traduce him behind his back.

Wherefore I hold it more convenient to omit such Arguments as may intangle us in such endless Altercations, and to bring only those that cannot be resolved into any *Natural causes*, or be phansied to come by *Chance*, but are so *Miraculous*, that they do imply the presence of some free subtile understanding Essence distinct from the brute *Matter*, and ordinary power of Nature.

3. And

3. And these *Miraculous* effects, as there is nothing more cogent if they could be believed, so there is nothing more hard to the *Atheist* to believe than they are. For *Religionists* having for pious purposes, as they pretend, forged so many false Miracles to gull and spoil the credulous people; they have thereby with the *Atheist* taken away all belief of those which are true. And the childish and superstitious fear of *Spirits* in *Melancholick* persons, who create strange Monsters to themselves and terrible *Apparitions* in the dark, hath also helped them with a further evasion, to impute all *Speetres* and strange *Apparitions* to mere *Melancholy* and disturbed *Phancy*.

4. But that there should be so *universal a fame* and *fear* of that which never was, nor is, nor can be ever in the World, is to me the greatest *Miracle* of all.

For if there had not been at some time or other *true Miracles*, (as indeed there ought to be, if the Faculties of Man, who so easily listens to and allows of such things, be not in vain) it is very improbable that Priests and cunning Deluders of the people would have ever been able so easily to impose upon them by their *false*. As the *Alchymist* would never go about to sophisticate *Metals*, and then put them off for *true Gold* and *Silver*, but that it is acknowledged that there is such a thing as *true Gold* and *Silver* in the world. In like manner therefore as there is an endeavour of deluding the people with *false Miracles*, so it is a sign there have been and may be those that are *true*.

5. But you'll say, there is a *Touchstone* whereby we may discern the truth of *Metals*, but that there is nothing whereby we may discover the truth of *Miracles* recorded every where in History. But I answer, There is, and it is this.

First, if what is recorded was avouched by such persons who had *no end nor interest* in avouching such things.

Secondly, if there were many *Eye-witnesses* of the same Matter.

Thirdly and lastly, if these things, which are so strange and miraculous, leave any sensible *effect* behind them.

Though I will not acknowledge that all those Stories are *false* that want these conditions, yet I dare affirm that it is mere humour and fullness in a man to reject the *truth* of those that have them; for it is to believe nothing but what he seeth himself: From whence it will follow, that he is to read nothing of History, for there is neither pleasure nor any usefulness of it, if it deserve no belief.

CHAP. II.

1. *The Moving of a Sieve by a Charm. Coskinomancy.* 2. *A Magical Cure of an Horse.* 3. *The Charming of Serpents. A strange Example of one Death-stricken as he walked the Streets.* 5. *A Story of a sudden Wind that had like to have thrown down the Gallows at the hanging of two Witches.*

1. **A**ND now that I have premised thus much, I will briefly recite some few of those many *Miraculous* passages we meet with in Writers; beginning first with the *bare* and *simple Effects* of *Spirits*, as I will aforehand adventure to pronounce them, and then afterwards we shall come to the *Apparitions* of *Spirits* themselves.

And of those *bare Effects* we will not care to name what may seem slightest first. * *Bodinus* relates how himself and several others at *Paris* saw a young Man with a *Charm* in *French*, move a *Sieve* up and down. And that ordinary way of Divination which they call *Coskinomancy*, or finding who stole or spoiled this or that thing by the *Sieve* and *Shears*, * *Pictorius Vigillanus* professeth he made use of thrice, and it was with success.

* *Mag. Demonoman. l. 2. c. 1.*

* *De speciebus Magie Cere- monialis, c. 21.*

2. A Friend of mine told me this Story concerning *Charms*: That himself had an *Horse* which, if he had stood sound, had been of a good value. His Servants carried him to several Farriers, but none of them had the skill to cure him. At last, unknown to their Master, they led him to a Farrier that had, it should seem, some tricks more than ordinary, and dealt in *Charms* or *Spells*, and such like Ceremonies: in virtue of these he made the *Horse* sound. The Owner of him, after he had observ'd how well his *Horse* was, asked his Servants how they got him cured: whence understanding the whole matter, and observing also that there was an *S. branded* on his buttock, which he conceited stood for *Satan*, chid his Servants very roughly, as having done that which was unwarrantable and impious. Upon this profession of his dislike of the fact, the *Horse* forthwith fell as ill as ever he was, insomuch that for his unserviceableness he was fain to be turned up loose in the pasture. But a Kinsman of the Owners coming to his house, and after chancing to see the *Horse* in the Grounds, took the advantage of a low price for so fair a Gelding, and bought him. The *Horse* had no sooner changed his Master, but presently changed his plight of Body also, and became as sound as ever.

3. *Charming* also of *Serpents* is above the power of Nature. And * *Wierus* tells us this Story of a *Charmer* at *Saltzburg*, That when in the sight of the people he had charmed all the *Serpents* into a ditch and killed them, at last there came one huge one far bigger than the rest, that leapt upon him, and winded about his waste like a girdle, and pulled him into the ditch, and so killed the *Charmer* himself in the conclusion.

* *De Praesig. Demon. lib. 2. cap. 4.*

4. That

4. That also I will adventure to refer to the *Effects* of *Spirits* which I heard lately from one Mrs. *Dark* of *Westminster* concerning her own *Husband*, who being in the flower of his Age, well in health, and very chearful, going out of his house in the morning with an intent to return to Dinner, was, as he walked the streets, sensibly struck upon the thigh by an invisible hand, (for he could see no man near him to strike him.) He returned home indeed about dinner-time, but could eat nothing, only he complain'd of the sad Accident that befel him, and grew forthwith so mortally sick, that he died within three days. After he was dead, there was found upon the place where he was struck the perfect figure of a man's hand, the four fingers, palm and thumb, black and sunk into the flesh, as if one should clap his hand upon a lump of dow.

And hitherto there is nothing related which will not abide the exactest trial, and be cleared from all suspicion of either *Fraud* or *Melancholy*. But I shall propound things more strange, and yet as free from that suspicion as the former.

5. And to say nothing of *Winds* sold to Merchants by *Laplanders*, and the danger of loosing the *Third knot* (which was frequent, as * *O-*
* De Gentibus Septentrional. laus affirms, before those parts of the world were converted to Chri-
lib. 3. sub. tit. stianity) I shall content my self for the present with a true Story
De Magis & Maleficis Fin- which I heard from an eye-witness concerning these preternatural
norum. *Winds*. At *Cambridge*, in the reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, there were two *Witches* to be executed, the *Mother* and *Daughter*. The *Mother*, when she was called upon to repent and forsake the *Devil*, said, there was no reason for that, for he had been faithful to her these threescore years, and she would be so to him so long as she lived; and thus she died in this obstinacy. But she hanging thus upon the Gallows, her *Daughter* being of a contrary mind, renounced the *Devil*, was very earnest in Prayer and Penitence; which, by the effect, the people conceived the *Devil* to take very heinously; for there came such a sudden blast of Wind, (whenas all was calm before) it drave the *Mother's* body against the Ladder so violently, that it had like to have overturn'd it, and shook the Gallows with such force, that they were fain to hold the posts for fear of all being flung down to the ground.

CHAP. III.

1. That Winds and Tempests are raised upon mere Ceremonies or forms of words. 2. The unreasonableness of Wierus his doubting of the Devil's power over the Meteors of the Air. 3. Examples of that power in Rain and Thunder. 4. Margaret Warine discharged upon an Oak at a Thunder-Clap. 5. Amantius and Rotarius cast headlong out of a cloud upon an house-top. 6. The Witch of Constance seen by the Shepherds to ride through the Air. 7. That he might add several other Instances from Eye-witnesses, of the strange Effects of invisible Demons. 8. His compendious Rehearsal of the most remarkable exploits of the Devil of Mascon in lieu thereof. 9. The Reasons of giving himself the trouble of this Rehearsal.

1. **W**IERUS, that industrious Advocate of Witches, recites several Ceremonies that they use for the raising of Tempests, and doth acknowledge that Tempests do follow the performance of those Ceremonies, but that they had come to pass nevertheless without them: which the Devil foreseeing, excites the deluded Women to use those Magick Rites, that they may be the better perswaded of his power. But whether there be any causal connexion betwixt those Ceremonies and the ensuing Tempests, I will not curiously decide. But that the connexion of them is supernatural, is plain at first sight. * For what is casting of Flint-stones behind their backs toward the West, or flinging a little Sand in the Air, or striking a River with a Broom, and so sprinkling the Wet of it toward Heaven, the stirring of Urine or Water with their finger in a Hole in the ground, or boiling of Hog's Bristles in a Pot? What are those fooleries available of themselves to gather Clouds and cover the Air with Darkneß, and then to make the ground smoak with peals of Hail and Rain, and to make the Air terrible with frequent Lightnings and Thunder? Certainly nothing at all. Therefore the ensuing of these Tempests after such like Ceremonies must be either from the prevision of the Devil, (as Wierus would have it) who set the Witches on work, or else from the power of the Devil which he hath in his Kingdom of the Air.

2. And it seems strange to me that Wierus should doubt this power, when he gives him a greater; for what is the transporting of Vapours or driving them together, to the carrying of Men and Cattel in the Air, (of which he is a confident Asserter) unless it require larger Devils or greater numbers? And that there are sufficient numbers of such Spirits will seem to any body as credible as that there are any at all. But now for the truth of this, that certain Words or Ceremonies do seem at least to cause an alteration in the Air, and to raise Tempests, Remigius writes that he had it witnessed to him by the free confession of near two hundred men that he examined: Where he adds a Story or two, in which there being neither Fraud nor Melancholy to be suspected, I think them worth the mentioning.

3. The one is of a *Witch*, who, to satisfy the curiosity of them that had power to punish her, was set free that she might give a proof of that power she professed she had to raise *Tempests*. She therefore being let go, presently betakes her self to a place thick set with Trees, scrapes a *Hole* with her hands, fills it with *Urine*, and stirs it about so long, that she caused at last a thick *Cloud* charged with *Thunder* and *Lightning*, to the terror and affrightment of the beholders. But she bad them be of good courage, for she would command the *Cloud* to discharge upon what place they would appoint her; which she made good in the sight of the *Spectators*.

The other Story is of a *young Girl*, who, to pleasure her Father complaining of a drought, by the guidance and help of that ill Master her Mother had devoted and consecrated her unto, rais'd a *Cloud*, and watered her Father's ground only, all the rest continuing dry as before.

4. Let us add to these that of *Cuinus* and *Margaret Warrine*. While this *Cuinus* was busie at his Hay-making, there arose suddenly great *Thunder* and *Lightning*, which made him run homeward and forsake his work, for he saw six *Oaks* hard by him overturned from the very *Roots*, and a seventh also shatter'd and torn a-pieces: he was fain to lose his hat, and leave his fork or rake for haste; which was not so fast, but another crack overtakes him and rattles about his ears: upon which *Thunder-clap* he presently espied this *Margaret Warine*, a reputed *Witch*, upon the top of an *Oak*, whom he began to chide. She desired his secrecy, and she would promise that never any injury or harm should come to him from her at any time.

See Remigius
his *Demonolatr.* l. 1. c. 29.

This *Cuinus* deposed upon Oath before the Magistrate, and *Margaret Warine* acknowledged the truth of it without any force done unto her, several times before her death, and at her death. *Remigius* conceives she was discharged upon the top of the *Oak* at that last *Thunder-clap*, and there hung amongst the boughs; which he is induced to believe from two Stories he tells afterwards.

5. The one is of a *Tempest* of *Thunder* and *Lightning*, that the Herdsmen tending their Cattel on the brow of the Hill *Alman* in the field of *Guicuria* were frighted with, who running into the Woods for shelter, suddenly saw two countrey men on the top of the Trees which were next them, so dirty, and in such a pickle, and so out of breath, as if they had been dragg'd up and down through thorns and miry places; but when they had well eyed them, they were gone in a moment out of their sight they knew not how nor whither. These herdsmen talked of the business, but the certainty of it came out not long after. For the free confessions of those two men they then saw, being so exactly agreeing with what the Herdsmen had related, made the whole matter clear and undoubted.

The other Story is of the same persons known afterward by their names, viz. *Amatius* and his partner *Rotarius*, who having coursed it aloft again in the Air, and being cast headlong out of a *Cloud* upon an house, the latter of them being but a Novice, and unexperienced in those supernatural exploits, was much astonish'd and afraid at the strangeness of the matter; but *Amatius* being used to those feats from his youth,
his

his Parents having devoted him from his childhood to the *Devil*, made but a sport of it, and laughing at his friend, called him a Fool for his fear, and bad him be of good courage; for their Master, in whose power they were, would safely carry them through greater dangers than those. And no sooner had he said these words, but a *whirlwind* took them and set them safe upon the ground: but the house they were carried from so shook, as if it would have been overturn'd from the very foundations. This both these men, examin'd apart, confessed in the same words, not varying their story at all; whose confessions exactly agreed in all circumstances with what was observed by the Country people, concerning the time and the manner of the *Tempest* and shaking of the house.

6. I will only add one Relation more of this nature, and that is of a Witch of *Constance*, who being vex'd that all her Neighbours in the Village where she lived were invited to the Wedding, and so were drinking, and dancing, and making merry, and she solitary and neglected, got the *Devil* to transport her through the Air, in the midst of day, to a Hill hard by the Village: where she *digging a hole*, and *putting Urine into it*, rais'd a great *Tempest* of *Hail*, and directed it so that it fell only upon the Village, and pelted them that were dancing with that violence, that they were forc'd to leave off their sport. When she had done her exploit, she returned to the Village, and being spied, was suspected to have rais'd the *Tempest*; which the Shepherds in the field that saw her riding in the Air knew well before, who bringing in their witness against her, she confess'd the fact.

See Bodin.
Mag. Demo-
noman. lib. 2.
cap. 8.

7. We might abound in instances of this kind (I mean, supernatural effects unattended with miraculous Apparitions) if I would bring in all that I have my self been informed of by either Eye-witnesses themselves, or by such as have had the narrations immediately from them. As for Example, Bricks being carried round about a room without any visible hand; Multitudes of Stones flung down at a certain time of the day from the roof of an house for many months together, to the amazement of the whole Country; Pots carried off from the fire, and set on again, no body meddling with them; The violent flapping of a Chest-cover, no hand touching it; The carrying up Linens that have been a bleaching, so high into the Air, that Table-cloaths and Sheets looked but like Napkins, and this when there was no wind, but all calm and clear; Glass-windows struck with that violence as if all had been broken to shivers, the glass jingling all over the Floor, and this for some quarter of an hour together, when yet all has been found whole in the Morning; * Boxes carefully lock'd, unlocking themselves, and flinging the Flax out of them; Bread tumbling off from a Fourm of its own accord; Womens pattens rising up from the floor, and whirling against people; The breaking of a Comb in two pieces of it self in the window, the pieces also flying in mens faces: The rising up of a Knife also from the same place, being carried with its haft forwards; Stones likewise flung about the house, but not hurting any man's person; with several things, which would be too voluminous to repeat with their due circumstances; and the

* These following passages, with some others, being carefully enquired into by a learned and judicious person, but very incredulous, did so convince him of Witches and Spirits, that he could not abstain from acknowledging it to a friend of his, under his own hand.

less needful, there being already published to our hands such Narrations as will store us with Examples enough of this kind.

8. Amongst which that Relation of Mr. *Francis Perreand*, concerning an unclean Spirit that haunted his house at *Mascon* in *Burgundy*, both for the variety of matter, and the Authentickness of the Story, is of prime use. For though this *Demon* never appear'd visible to the eye, yet his presence was palpably deprehensible by many freaks and pranks that he play'd. As in drawing the Curtains at Midnight, and plucking off the blankets; In his holding of the doors, and in rolling of billets; In his knocking and flinging things against the Wainscot; In his whistling such tunes as they teach Birds, and in his singing profane and bawdy Songs; In his repeating aloud the Lord's Prayer, and the Creed; In his imitating the voices and dialects of several persons, as also the crying of Huntsmen, the croaking of Frogs, and the speeches of Jugglers and Mountebanks; His scoffing and jeering and uttering merry conceits, as that of *Pays de Vaux*, where he said they made goodly Carbonado's of Witches, and thereupon laughed very loud; His bringing of commendations from remote friends, and his telling stories of fightings and murders; His discovering of things done in private to the Actors of them; His exprobrating to a grave Divine the singing of a bawdy Song in a Tavern:

His tossing of a roll of cloth of fifty ells; His disordering of skeans of yarn, and pulling men at their work by their coats backward; His flinging the hat of one at his face while he was asleep in his house, and snatching a candlestick out of a maid's hand; His entangling and tying things in such knots as it was impossible for any one to untye them, and yet himself untying them in a moment; His tumbling the bed as soon as it had been made into the midst of the floor, and taking down books from their shelves in the study; His making a noise like a volley of shot, and imitating the sound of Hemp-dressers, four beating together; His making musick of two little bells he found amongst rusty iron in the house, which he used not only there, but in several other places, whose sound they could hear pass by them in the Air, though they could see nothing; His hiding of a Goldsmith's Jewels and Tools for a while, and then dropping them out of the Air on the table; His flinging of stones about the house, but without hurt, as in the former Narration; His often beating a new Maid in her bed, and pouring water on her head, till he had forced her away; And lastly, his pulling a certain Lawyer by the arm into the midst of the room, and there whirling him about on the tiptoe, and then flinging him on the ground.

This is a short *Epitome* of the most remarkable exploits of that invisible Devil of *Mascon*. For, as I remember, he was not so much as once seen in any shape all this time, unless it was he that *Lullier* and *Repay* met at a corner of the street, in the habit of Country-woman, spinning by Moon-shine, who, upon their nearer approach, vanished from their sight.

9. I have given my self the trouble of transcribing these particulars, partly because they conduce so much to the discovery of the nature of these kind of Spirits (these Effects making it suspicious that he did

did not much miss the mark that ventur'd to style them *Homines Aereos*) and partly for the both copiousness and suitableness of the story to the present Theme; but lastly and chiefly, for the unexceptionable truth and Authentickness of the Narration: the observation of these strange passages being made not by * one solitary person, but by many together; nor by a person of suspected integrity, but of singular gravity and exemplarity of life; not carelessly or credulously, but cautiously and diligently, by searching every corner of the house, and setting bolts and barricadoes to all the doors and windows thereof, stopping the very Cat-holes of the doors, and leaving nothing that might give way to suspicion of Imposture; a candle also burning every night all the night long, the places also from whence the voice came in the day-time being searched, and the things therein by divers persons; from whence when one *Simeon Meissonier* had, amongst other things, brought away a bottle, the Devil fell a laughing, that he should think him such a fool as to go into it, as being liable thereby to be stopped up therein by his finger; and lastly, the experience made not once or twice, but in a manner every day for a quarter of a year together.

* Nor writ by one pen. For *Marcelin*, a Preacher then at *Mafcon*, wrote the same story; and *Tornus*, a frequent eye-witness of the pranks of this *Demon*, left a Relation written and signed with his own hand, which *Perreand* kept by him.

To the Truth of the miraculousness of the Narration, the silence of the Dog gives also a further suffrage, he being otherwise very watchful and ready to bark at the least noise, and yet never barking at the loud speaking and hideous noises of the *Demon*: Which the prophane Goblin himself took notice of, roguishly avouching that it was because he had made the sign of the Cross on his head; for he was then on a merry pin, and full of jearing.

To all which you may further add the Authority of the Reverend and Learned Mr. *P. Du Moulin*, Father to the now Dr. *Du Moulin*, and the smart judicious reasoning of his accomplish'd Son, in his Preface to Mr. *Perreand's* Relation, namely, *That this familiar Conversation of the Devil was not in a corner, or in a Desert, (where the Melancholy of Witches is supposed, to make them fancy they converse with him) but in the midst of a great City, in an house where there was daily a great resort to hear him speak, and where men of contrary Religions met together; whose proneness to cast a disgrace upon the dissenting parties, did occasion the narrow examining and full confirming the truth thereof, both by the Magistrate, and by the Diocesan of the place.*

And lastly, that nothing may be wanting to convince the incredulous, we adjoin the Testimony of that excellently-learned and noble Gentleman Mr. *R. Boyle*, who conversed with Mr. *Perreand* himself at *Geneva*, where he received from him, as a present, a Copy of his Book before it was printed, and where he had the opportunity to enquire both after the Writer, and several passages of his Book; and was so well satisfied, that he professes, that all his settled indisposedness to believe strange things was overcome by this special Conviction.

C H A P. IV.

1. *The Supernatural Effects observed in the bewitched Children of Mr. Throgmorton and Mrs. Muschamp.* 2. *The general Remarkables in them both.* 3. *The possession of the Religious Virgins of Werts, Hefliemont, &c.* 4. *The story of that famous Abbateſſ Magdalena Crucia, her uſeleſſ and ludicrous Miracles.* 5. *That ſhe was a Sorcereſſ, and was thirty years married to the Devil.* 6. *That her ſtory is neither any Figment of Priests, nor deluſion of Melancholy.*

1. **W**E will now paſs to thoſe *ſupernatural Effects* which are obſerved in *Persons* that are *bewitch'd* or *poſſeſſ'd*. And ſuch are, *Foretelling things to come*; *telling what ſuch and ſuch perſons ſpeak or do*, as exactly as if they were by them, when the party *poſſeſſ'd* is at one end of the Town, and ſitting in a houſe within doors, and thoſe parties that act and confer together, are without at the other end of the Town; to be able to ſee ſome, and not others; to play at Cards with one certain perſon, and not to diſcern any body elſe at the table beſides him; to act, and talk, and go up and down, and tell what will become of things, and what happens in thoſe *fits* of *poſſeſſion*, and then, ſo ſoon as the poſſeſſed or bewitched party is out of them, for him to *remember nothing* at all, but to enquire concerning the welfare of thoſe whoſe faces he ſeemed to look upon but juſt before, when he was in his *fits*. All which can be no ſymptoms nor ſigns of any thing elſe, but the *Devil* got into the body of a man, and holding all the Operations of his Soul, and then acting, and ſpeaking, and ſporting as he pleaſes, in the miſerable Tenement he hath crouded himſelf into, making uſe of the Organs of the Body at his own pleaſure, for the performing ſuch pranks and feats as are above the capacity, ſtrength, or agility of the party thus *bewitched* or *poſſeſſed*.

All theſe things are fully made good by long and tedious obſervations, recorded in the *The diſcovery of the Witches of Warbois in Huntingdonſhire, Anno 1594.* the memory whereof is ſtill kept freſh by an Anniverſary Sermon, preach'd at *Huntingdon* by ſome of the Fellows of *Queen's College* in *Cambridge*.

There is alſo lately come forth a Narration how one *Mrs. Muſchamp's* Children were handled in *Cumberland*; which is very like this of *Mr. Throgmorton's* Children of *Warbois*.

2. That which is generally obſerved in them both, is this, That in their *fits* they are as if they had no Soul at all in their Bodies, and that whatſoever operations of Senſe, Reason, or Motion there ſeems to be in them, 'tis not any thing at all to them, but is wholly that Stranger's that hath got into them. For as ſoon as their *fits* are over, they are as if they had been in ſo profound a ſleep, that they did not ſo much as dream, and ſo remember nothing at all of what they either ſaid or did, or where they had been; as is manifeſt by an infinite number of Examples in the forenamed relation.

3. Of

3. Of the truth of which passages here at home we being very well ascertain'd, we may, with the more confidence, venture upon what is recorded concerning others abroad. As for example, The possession of the *Religious Virgins* in the Monastery of *Werts*, others in *Hessimont*,^{See Wierus de Praestig. Demon. l. 4. c. 10.} others also not far from *Xantes*, and in other places, where there were Eye-witnesses enough to take notice how strangely they were handled, being flung up from the ground higher than a man's head, and falling down again without harm; swarming upon Trees as nimbly as Cats, and hanging upon the boughs; having their flesh torn off from their bodies without any visible hand or instrument; and many other mad pranks, which is not so fit to name, but they that have a mind, may read at large in *Wierus*.

4. I would pass now to other *Effects* of *Witchcraft*; as the conveying of *Knives*, *Balls of Hair* and *Nails* into the bodies of them that are bewitched; but that the mention of these *Nuns* puts me in mind of that famous story in *Wierus* of *Magdalena Crucia*, first a *Nun*, and then an *Abbateß* of a Nunnery in *Corduba* in *Spain*. Those things^{De Praestig. Demon. l. 6. c. 6.} which were miraculous in her, were these; That she could tell almost at any distance how the affairs of the world went, what consultations or transactions there were in all the Nations of Christendom, from whence she got to her self the reputation of a very *holy Woman*, and a great *Prophetess*. But other things came to pass by her, or for her sake, no less strange and miraculous; as that at the celebrating of the holy *Eucharist*, the Priest should always want one of his round *Wafers*, which was secretly conveyed to *Magdalen*, by the administration of Angels, as was supposed, and she receiving of it into her mouth, ate it in the sight of the people, to their great astonishment and high reverence of the *Saint*. At the elevation of the Host, *Magdalen* being near at hand, but yet a wall betwixt, that the wall was conceived to open, and to exhibit *Magdalen* to the view of them in the Chappel, and that thus she partaked of the consecrated bread. When this *Abbateß* came into the Chappel her self upon some special day, that she would set off the solemnity of the day by some notable and conspicuous Miracle: for she would sometimes be lifted up above the ground three or four cubits high; other sometimes bearing the Image of Christ in her arms, weeping favourly, she would make her hair to increase to that length and largeness, that it would come to her heels, and cover her all over, and the Image of Christ in her arms, which anon notwithstanding would shrink up again to its usual size; with many such specious, though unprofitable Miracles.

5. But you'll say, that the Narration of these things is not true, but they are feigned for the advantage of the *Roman Religion*, and so it was profitable for the Church to forge them, and record them to posterity. A man that is unwilling to admit of any thing *supernatural*, would please himself with this general shuffle, and put-off. But when we come to the *Catastrophe* of the Story, he will find it quite otherwise: for this *Saint* at last began to be suspected for a *Sorcereß*, as it is thought, and she being conscious, did, of her own accord, to save her self, make confession of her wickedness to the Visitors of the Order,

Order, as they are called, *viz.* That for thirty years she had been married to the *Devil* in the shape of an *Aethiopian*; that another *Devil*, servant to this, when his Master was at dalliance with her in her Cell, supplied her place amongst the *Nuns* at their publick Devotions; that by virtue of this Contract she made with this *Spirit*, she had done all those Miracles she did. Upon this confession, she was committed, and while she was in durance, yet she appear'd in her devout postures, praying in the Chappel as before, at their set hours of Prayer: which being told to the Visitors by the Nuns, there was a strict watch over her, that she should not stir out. Nevertheless she appeared in the Chappel, as before, though she were really in the Prison.

6. Now what credit or advantage there can be to the *Roman Religion* by this Story, let any man judge. Wherefore it is no Figment of the Priests or Religious persons, nor Melancholy, nor any such matter, (for how could so many spectators at once be deluded by Melancholy?) but it ought to be deem'd a real Truth: And this *Magdalena Crucia* appearing in two several places at once, it is manifest, that there is such a thing as *Apparitions of Spirits*. But I must abstain as yet from touching that argument, I having not dispatched what I propounded concerning the vomiting up of *Nails*, the conveying of *Knives* and *pieces of wood* into the bodies of men, and the like. Which things are so palpable, and uncapable of delusion, that I think it worth the while to insist a little upon them.

CHAP. V.

1. *Knives, Wood, Pieces of Iron, Balls of Hair in the body of Ulricus Neufesser.*
2. *The vomiting of Cloth stuck with Pins, Nails, and Needles, as also Glass, Iron, and Hair, by Wierus his Patients, and by a friend of Cardan's.*
3. *Wierus his Story of the thirty possessed Children of Amsterdam.*
4. *The Convictiveness of these Narrations.*
5. *Objections against their Convictiveness answered.*
6. *Of a Maid Demoniack speaking Greek; and of the miraculous binding of another's hands by an invisible power.*

1. I Will begin with that memorable true Story that *Langius* tells of one *Ulricus Neufesser*, who being grievously tormented with a pain in his side, suddenly felt under his skin, which yet was whole, an iron Nail, as he thought. And so it prov'd when the Chirurgeon had cut it out: But nevertheless his great torments continued, which enraged him so that he cut his own Throat. The third day, when he was carried out to be buried, *Eucharius, Rosenbader, and Johannes ab Ettenstet*, a great company of people standing about them, dissected the Corps, and ripping up the Ventricle, found a round piece of Wood of good length, four *Knives*, some even and sharp, others indented like a Saw, with other two rough pieces of Iron a span long. There was also a ball of Hair. This happen'd at *Eugenstal*, 1539.

2. *Wierus*

2. *Wierus* tells also of one that was possessed, of which himself was an Eye-witness, that vomited up pieces of Cloth with pins stuck in them, Nails, Needles, and such like stuff: which he contends doth not come from the stomach, but by a prestigious sleight of the Devil is only ingested into the mouth. *De Prestig. Demon. l. 4. c. 2, 3.*

Cardan relates the like of a good simple Country-fellow, and a friend of his, that had been a long time troubled with vomiting up Glass, Iron, Nails, and Hair, and that at that time he told *Cardan* of it, he was not so perfectly restor'd, but that something yet crash'd in his belly, as if there were a Bag of Glass in it. *De Varietate Rerum, lib. 15. cap. 80.*

I might add seasonably hereunto what is so credibly reported of Mrs. *Muschamp's* Child, that it was seen to vomit up pieces of Wood, with Pins stuck in it.

3. But I will conclude all with that Story of about thirty Children that were so strangely handled at *Amsterdam*, 1556. of the truth whereof, *Wierus* professeth himself very well assured. They were tortured very much, and cast violently upon the ground; but when they arose out of their fit, knew nothing, but thought they had been only asleep. For the remedying of this mischief, they got the help of Physicians, Wizards, and Exorcists, but without success. Only while the Exorcists were reading, the Children vomited up Needles, Thimbles, shreds of Cloth, pieces of Pots, Glass, Hair, and other things of the like nature. *Wierus de Prestig. Demon. l. 4. c. 8.*

4. Now the advantage I would make of these Relations is this: That these Effects extraordinary and supernatural being so palpable and permanent, they are not at all liable to such Subterfuges as Atheists usually betake themselves to, as of Melancholy, and disturbance of Phancy in those that profess they see such strange things, or any Fraud or Imposture in those that act.

5. All that can with any shew of Reason be alledged is this, That such parties, in their fits of Distraction, may devour such things as they vomit up, or at least put them into their mouths. But they that are by, might easily see that, distracted people doing things carelessly and openly. And these things happen to those that are thus against their wills: and as they are not discovered to do any such things of themselves, so neither do they confess afterwards that they did it, when they come to their right senses; and ordinarily it is found out that some Woman or other, by Sorcery or Witchcraft, was the Author of it.

Besides, it is evident that there can be no mistake at all in some of these passages: For how can an iron Nail get betwixt the skin and the flesh, the skin not at all ripped or touch'd? or how is it possible for any body to swallow down Knives and pieces of Iron a span long? which, besides that Story of *Ulricus Neufesser*, is made good in another of a young Wench, who, when she had made clean a pair of shoes with a Knife, which she put in her bosom, she after seeking for it, it could not be found any where, till at length it began to discover it self in a swelling on her left side, and at last was pulled out thence by a Chirurgeon. You may read the whole Relation in *Wierus*. It was done at *Levenstreet*, in the Dukedom of *Brunswick*, 1562. An old Woman *De Prestig. Demon. l. 4. cap. 13.*

Woman had come to the house in the morning, and a strange *black Dog* was found under the table.

See Bodin.
Mag. Demonoman.
lib. 2. cap. 3.

6. There are also other miraculous and supernatural Effects, as in that Maid of Saxony's speaking of *Greek*; and in another, whom *Calius Rhodiginus* professes he saw, that spoke from betwixt her Legs; a third at *Paris*, whom Dr. *Picard*, and other Divines, would have dispossessed, whom one *Hollerius* a Physician deriding, as if it had been nothing but *Melancholy* in the Woman, and *Ignorance* in those Divines, was after convinced of the contrary; when he saw her standing betwixt two other women, and crying out of a sudden, discerning her hands to be so fast bound, that there was no loosing of them without cutting the string. There was not the appearance of any thing to any body but to the possessed only, who said, she saw then a white cloud come near her when she was bound..

C H A P. VI.

1. *The Apparition Eckerken.* 2. *The Story of the pyed Piper.* 3. *A Triton or Sea-God seen on the banks of Rubicon.* 4. *Of the Imps of Witches, and whether these old women be guilty of so much dotage as the Atheist fancies them.* 5. *That such things pass betwixt them and their Imps as are impossible to be imputed to Melancholy.* 6. *The examination of John Winnick of Molfeworth.* 7. *The reason of Sealing Covenants with the Devil.*

1. **B**UT it is high time to clear up this more dim and cloudy discovery of *Spirits*, into more distinct and articulate *Apparitions*, according as I did at first propound. And these I shall cast into two ranks: such as appear near to us on the *Ground*, or such as are seen afar off, above in the *Air*. And here again, to begin with small things first. Near *Elton*, a Village half a mile distant from *Embrica*, in the Dukedom of *Cleve*, there was a thing had its haunt, they called it *Eckerken*; there appeared never more than the shape of an *Hand*, but it would beat Travellers, pull them off from their horses, and overturn carriages. This could be no *Phancy*, there following so real *Effects*.

Wierus de
Praestig. Demon.
lib. 6. c. 15.

2. The Story of the *pyed Piper*, that first by his Pipe gathered together all the *Rats* and *Mice*, and drown'd them in the River; and afterward, being defrauded of his Reward, which the Town promis'd him if he could deliver them from the plague of those *Vermin*, took his opportunity, and by the same Pipe, made the *Children* of the Town follow him, and leading them into a Hill that opened, buried them there all alive; hath so evident proof of it in the town of *Hammel*, where it was done, that it ought not at all to be discredited. For the fact is very religiously kept amongst their ancient Records, painted out also in their Church-windows, and is an *Epoche* join'd with the year of our Lord in their Bills and Indentures, and other Law-Instruments.

De Praestig.
Demon. l. 1.
cap. 16.

3. That

3. That also seems to me beyond all exception and evasion which *Suetonius* relates of a *Spectrum* appearing on the banks of the River *Rubicon*; which was thus, *Julius Caesar* having marched with his Army to this River, which divides *Gallia citerior* from *Italy*, and being very doubtful with himself whether he should pass over into *Italy*, or not, there was seen on the River side a Man of a prodigious stature and form, playing on a Reed. The strangeness of his person as well as the pleasantness of his Musick had drawn several of the Shepherds unto him, as also many of the Soldiers, amongst whom were some Trumpeters; which this *Triton* (as *Melanchthon* ventures to call him) or *Sea-God* well observing, nimbly snatches away one of the Trumpets out of their hands, leaps forthwith into the River, and founding a March with that strength and violence that he seem'd to rend the Heaven, and made the Air ring again with the mighty forcibleness of the Blast, in this manner he passed over to the other side of the River: whereupon *Caesar* taking the *Omen*, leaves off all further dispute with himself, carries over his Army, enters *Italy*, secure of success from so manifest tokens of the favour of the Gods.

4. To confirm this truth of *Apparitions*, if we would but admit the free confessions of *Witches* concerning their *Imps*, whom they so frequently see and converse withal, know them by their Names, and do obeisance to them, the point would be quite out of all doubt, and their proofs would be so many, that no Volume would be large enough to contain them. But forsooth these must be all *Melancholy old women* that dote and bring themselves into danger by their own *Phantasies* and *Conceits*. But that they do not dote I am better assured of, than of their not doting that say they do. For, to satisfy my own curiosity, I have examined several of them, and they have discoursed as cunningly as any of their quality and education. But by what I have read and observed, I discern they serve a very perfidious Master, who plays wrecks many times on purpose to betray them. But that is only by the Bye.

5. I demand concerning these *Witches* who confess their contract and frequent converse with the *Devil*, some with him in one shape, others in another, whether mere *Melancholy* and *Imagination* can put *Powders*, *Rods*, *Ointments*, and such like into their hands, and tell them the use of them; can impress *Marks* upon their bodies, so deep as to take away all sense in that place; can put *Silver* and *Gold* into their hands, which afterward commonly proves but either *Counters*, *Leaves*, or *Shells*, or some such like useless matter? These *real Effects* cannot be by mere *Melancholy*. For if a Man receives any thing into his hand, be it what it will be, there was some body that gave it him. Therefore the *Witch* receeiving some real thing from this or that other shape that appeared unto her, it is an evident sign that it was an external thing that she saw, not a mere figuration of her *Melancholy Phancy*. There are innumerable Examples of this kind; but the thing is so trivial and ordinary, that it wants no Instances. I will only set down one, wherein there is the apparition of three Spirits.

6. *John Winnick* of *Molfeworth* in *Huntingdonshire* being examined April 11th 1646. confessed as follows. " Having lost his purse with
" seven

“ seven shillings in it, for which he suspected one in the family
 “ where he lived, he saith, that on a *Friday*, while he was making hay-
 “ bottles in the barn, and swore and curs’d and rag’d, and wish’d
 “ to himself that some *wife* body would help him to his purse and
 “ money again, there appeared unto him a *Spirit* in the shape of a
 “ *Bear*, but not so big as a *Coney*, who promis’d, upon condition that
 “ he would fall down and worship him, he would help him to his
 “ purse. He assented to it; and the *Spirit* told him, to morrow about
 “ this time he should find his purse upon the floor where he made
 “ bottles, and that he would come himself also; which was done ac-
 “ cordingly: and thus at the time appointed recovering his purse, he
 “ fell down upon his knees to the *Spirit*, and said, *My Lord and God,*
 “ *I thank you.* This *Spirit* brought then with him two other, in the
 “ shape the one of a white *Cat*, the other of a *Coney*, which at the
 “ command of the *Bear-Spirit* he worshipped also. The *Bear-Spirit*
 “ told him he must have his Soul when he died, that he must suck
 “ of his body, that he must have some of his Blood to seal the Co-
 “ venant. To all which he agreed; and so the *Bear-Spirit* leaping up
 “ to his shoulder, prick’d him on the head, and thence took blood.
 “ After that they all three vanished, but ever since came to him once
 “ every twenty four hours, and suck’d on his body, where the *Marks*
 “ are found. And that they had continually done thus for this twenty
 “ nine years together. That all these things should be a mere *dream*,
 is a conceit more flight and foolish than any dream possibly can be.
 For that receiving of his purse was a palpable and sensible pledge of
 the truth of all the rest. And it is incredible that such a *series* of
 circumstances, back’d with twenty nine years experience of being
 suck’d and visited daily, sometimes in the day-time, most commonly
 by night, by the same three *Familiars*, should be nothing but the hang-
 ing together of so many *Melancholy Conceits* and *Fancies*.

7. Nor doth the *sealing* of *Covenants* and *writing* with *Blood* make
 such Stories as these more to be suspected: for it is not at all unrea-
 sonable that such *Ceremonies* should pass betwixt a *Spirit* and a *Man*,
 when the like palpable Rites are used for the more firmly tying of
 Man to God. For whatsoever is crass and external leaves a stronger
 Impression upon the *Phancy*, and the remembrance of it strikes the Mind
 with more efficacy. So that assuredly the *Devil* hath the greater hanck
 upon the Soul of a *Witch* or *Wizard* that hath been perswaded to
 compleat their *Contract* with him in such a gross sensible way, and
 keeps them from revolting from him, than if they had only con-
 tracted in bare Words.

CHAP. VII.

1. *The Story of Anne Bodenham, a Witch who suffered at Salisbury, Anno 1653. The Author's punctual Information concerning her.* 2. *The manner and circumstances of her first conjuring up the Devil.* 3. *An Objection answered concerning the truth thereof.* 4. *The Objection more fully answered by a second Conjuratation. An Objection answer'd concerning this second Conjuratation, and still further cleared by the circumstances of a third. The Witch's fourth and last Conjuratation, at which Anne Styles made a Contract with the Devil.* 7. *That these Transactions could be no Dreams nor Fancies of Anne Styles, nor she knowingly forsworn in avouching them upon Oath.* 8. *Which is further proved by the impartialness of her Confession.* 9, 10. *By her Contract with the Devil, evidenced from the real effects thereof.* 11. *And by her behaviour at the Assizes when she gave evidence.* 12. *An Answer to certain Objections.* 13. *Sundry Indications that Anne Bodenham was a Witch.* 14. *The Summary Conclusion, That the above-related Conjuratations are no Fictions of Anne Styles, but real Transactions by Anne Bodenham.*

1. **T**O that of John Winnick, it will not be amiss to add a more late and more notable Narration concerning one Anne Bodenham, a Witch, who lived in Fisherton-Anger, adjacent to the City of new Sarum, in the County of Wilts, who was arraigned and executed at Salisbury 1653. He that has a mind to read the Story more at large, may consult Edmond Bower, who was an eye-witness and ear-witness of several passages. But I shall only set down here what is most material to our present purpose, partly out of him, and partly from others, who were then at the Assizes, and had also private Conferences with the Witch, and spoke also with the Maid that gave evidence against her.

This Anne Bodenham, it seems, concealed not her skill in foretelling things to come, and helping men to their stolen goods, and other such like feats, that the more notable sort of Wizards and Witches are said to pretend to, and to practise.

2. Amongst others that resorted to her, there was one Anne Styles, servant to Richard Goddard Esq; of the Close in new Sarum, sent by Mr. Mason, this Goddard's Son in Law, (he having a design to commence a Law-Suit against his Father) to learn of the Witch what would be the event of the Suit. Who being ask'd by the Maid, who had three shillings to give her for her pains, she took her staff, and there drew it about the house, making a kind of a Circle; and then took a book, and carrying it over the Circle with her hands, and taking a green glass, did lay it upon the book, and placed in the Circle an earthen pan of Coals, wherein she threw something, which burning, caused a very noisom stink, and told the Maid, she should not be afraid of what she should then see, for now they would come: (they are the Words she used) and so calling Belzebub, Tormentor, Satan and Lucifer appear; there suddenly arose a very high wind, which made the house shake, and presently the back-door of

the house flying open, there came five Spirits, as the Maid supposed, in the likeness of ragged Boys, some bigger than others, and ran about the house, where she had thrown the staff; and the Witch threw down upon the ground crumbs of bread, which the Spirits picked up, and leapt over the Pan of coals oftentimes, which she set in the midst of the Circle, and a Dog and a Cat of the Witch's danced with them: and after some time the Witch looked again into her Book, and threw some great white seeds upon the ground, which the said Spirits picked up; and so in a short time the Wind was laid, and the Witch going forth at her back-door, the Spirits vanished. After which the Witch told the Maid, that Mr. Mason should demand fifteen hundred pound, and one hundred and fifty pounds per annum, of Mr. Goddard; and if he denied it, he should prosecute the Law against him, and be gone from his Father, and then she should gain it: with which message the Maid returned, and acquainted Mr. Mason.

3. But, it may be, it will be objected, That these were some poor ragged Boys that conspired there with Anne Bodenham to get money, upon pretence of conjuring and foretelling future events, whenas it was indeed nothing else but a cheat within the power of an ordinary knavish wit. But the loudness of the wind, and the forcible shaking of the house upon those magical Words and Ceremonies, may easily answer, or rather quite blow away such frivolous Evasions.

4. But if the Objector will yet persist in his opinion, let him read the circumstances of the second Conjurament of this Witch's. For the same Maid being sent to her again from the same party, to enquire in what part of the house the Poyson was that should be given her Mistress, Hereupon she took her stick, as before, and making therewith a Circle, the wind rose forthwith: then taking a besom, she swept over the Circle, and made another; and looking in her book and glass, as formerly, and using some words softly to her self, she stood in the Circle, and said, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer, and Satan, appear. There appeared first a Spirit in the shape of a little Body, as she conceived, which then turned into another shape, something like a Snake, and then into the shape of a shagged Dog with great eyes, which went about in the Circle; and in the Circle she set an earthen Pan of Coals, wherein she threw something which burned and stank, and then the Spirit vanished. After which the Witch took her book and glass again, and shewed the Maid in the glass Mrs. Sarah Goddard's Chamber, the colour of the Curtains, and the bed turned up the wrong way, and under that part of the bed where the Bolster lay, she shewed the Poyson in a white paper. The Maid afterward returned home, and acquainted Mrs. Roswell with what the Witch had shewed her in a glass, that the poyson lay under Mrs. Sarah's Bed, and also spoke to her, that they might go together and take it away.

The transformation of a Boy into a Snake, and of that Snake into a shagged Dog with staring eyes, is a feat far above all humane art or wit whatsoever.

5. Nor can it be imagined that Melancholy had so disturbed the mind of the Maid, that she told her own dreams or fancies for external sensible transactions. For she was employed by others in a real Negotiation betwixt them and the Witch, and ever brought back her answers to them, receiving also things from her, by the help of those

those ragged Boys she raised up; as appears in a third Conjuraton of hers, when the Maid was another time sent to procure some exemplary punishment upon Mr. Goddard's two Daughters, who were unjustly, as it seems, aspersed with the suspicion of endeavouring to poyson their Mother in Law. *The Witch receiving the Wench's errand, made a Circle, as formerly, and set her Pan of Coals therein, and burnt somewhat that stank extremely, and took her book and glass, as before is related, and said, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer, and Satan, appear. And then appeared five Spirits, as she conceived, in the shapes of little ragged Boys, which the Witch commanded to appear, and go along with the Maid to a Meadow at Wilton, which the Witch shewed in a glass, and there to gather Vervaine and Dill. And forthwith the ragged Boys ran away before the Maid, and she followed them to the said Meadow: and when they came thither, the ragged Boys looked about for the Herbs, and removed the Snow in two or three places before they could find any, and at last they found some, and brought it away with them; and then the Maid and the Boys returned again to the Witch, and found her in the Circle, paring her Nails: and then she took the said Herbs, and dried the same, and made Powder of some, and dried the Leaves of other, and threw bread to the Boys, and they eat and danced, as formerly; and then the Witch, reading in a book, they vanished away. And the Witch gave the Maid in one paper the Powder, in another, the Leaves, and in the third, the paring of the Nails; all which the Maid was to give to her Mistress. The Powder was to put in the young Gentlemen's, Mrs. Sarah, and Mrs. Anne Goddard's drink or broth, to rot their guts in their bellies; the Leaves, to rub about the brims of the Pot, to make their teeth fall out of their heads; and the paring of the Nails, to make them drunk and mad. And when the Maid came home, and delivered it to her Mistress, and told her the effects of the Powder, and the other things, her Mistress laughed, and said, That is a very brave thing indeed. But she had the discretion not to make use of it.*

6. This Powder was shewn at the Assizes, (so that it could be no Fancy or Dream, together with a piece of Money that she received of the Spirits, which one of them first bit, and gave it to the Witch, and then the Witch gave it to the Maid. The hole also in her finger was then shown, out of which blood was squeez'd to subscribe a Covenant with the Devil, as you may see in the fourth and last bout of Conjuring, the Witch performed in the Maid's presence. For she being advised by Mr. Goddard's household to go to London, she went to the Witch's first before she quit the Country; who being made acquainted with her journey, asked her, whether she would go to London High or Low? To which she replied, What do you mean by that? She answered, If you will go on High, you shall be carried to London in the Air, and be there in two hours; but if you go a Low, you shall be taken at Sutton Towns end, and before, unless you have help. But before she departed, the Witch earnestly desired the Maid to live with her, and told her, if she would do so, she would teach her to do as she did, and that she should never be taken. Then the Maid asked her what she could do. She answered, You shall know presently; and forthwith she appeared in the shape of a great black Cat, and lay along by the Chimney: at which the Maid being very much affrighted, she came into her own shape again, and told her, I see

you are afraid, and I see you are willing to be gone; and told her, if she was, she should say so, and not speak against her Conscience: and the Maid replied, she was willing to go, and not to dwell with the Witch. Then the Witch said, She must seal unto her body and blood not to discover her: which she promising to do, she forthwith made a Circle, as formerly she had done, and looking in her book, called, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer, and Satan, appear. Then appeared two Spirits, in the likeness of great Boys, with long shagged black hair, and stood by her, looking over her shoulder; and the Witch took the Maid's fore-finger of her right hand in her hand, and prick'd it with a pin, and squeezed out the blood, and put it into a Pen, and put the Pen in the Maid's hand, and held her hand to write in a great book; and one of the Spirits lay'd his hand or Claw upon the Witch's whilst the Maid wrote: and when she had done writing, whilst their hands were together, the Witch said, Amen, and made the Maid say, Amen, and the Spirits said, Amen, Amen: and the Spirit's hand did feel cold to the Maid, as it touched her hand, when the Witch's hand and hers were together writing. And then the Spirit gave a piece of Silver (which he first bit) to the Witch, who gave it to the Maid; and also stuck two pins in the Maid's head-cloaths, and bid her keep them, and bid her be gone; and said also, I will vex the Gentlewoman well enough, as I did the Man in Clarrington Park, which I made walk about, with a bundle of Pales on his back, all night in a pond of water, and he could not lay them down, till the next morning.

7. All these things the Maid deposed upon Oath; and I think it now beyond all controversy evident, that unless she did knowingly forswear her self, that they are certainly true: for they cannot be imputed to any Dreamings, Phancy, nor Melancholy. Now that the Maid did not forswear her self, or invent these Narrations she swore to, many Arguments offer themselves for eviction.

As first, That it is altogether unlikely that a sorry Wench, that could neither write nor read, should be able to excogitate such Magical Forms and Ceremonies, with all the Circumstances of the effects of them, and declare them so punctually, had she not indeed seen them done before her eyes.

Secondly, If she had been so cunning at inventing Lies, she could not but have had so much wit as to frame them better for her own advantage, and for theirs, by whom she was employed; or told so much only of the truth as would have been no prejudice to her self, nor any else, to have it revealed.

8. For in brief, the case stood thus; Her Mistress either had, or feigned her self to have a suspicion that her two Daughters in Law, Mistress Sarah, and Mistress Anne Goddard, conspired to poyson her. Hereupon this Maid, Anne Styles, was sent to the Witch, upon pretence to know when this poysoning would be, and how to prevent it; and at the second time she consulted her, the Witch sent her to the Apothecaries to buy her some white Arsenick, and bring her it, which she taking, told her, she would burn it, and so prevent the poysoning of her Mistress. The buying of this Arsenick, was the great occasion of the Maid's flying. For it coming to the knowledge
of

of the two Sisters how they were suspected to endeavour the poysoning of their Mother, and that they had bought an ounce and half of Arsenick; lately at the Apothecaries, they, to clear themselves from this suspicion, made diligent enquiry at all the Apothecaries shops throughout *Sarum*, and at last found where the poyson was bought. Hereupon the Maid was desired by her Mistress to go away, and shift for her self, to avoid that trouble and disgrace that might come upon them, if she should stay, and be examined before some Justice. While she was upon her journey, Mr. *Chandler*, Son in Law to Mr. *Goddard*, hearing how his Mother in Law was in danger of being poysoned, and that a Servant of hers that had bought the Poison, was fled, he forthwith, with another man, made after her, overtook her near *Sutton*, had her there into an Inn, where she confessed what has been above related. Which confession, I say, cannot be any Figment or forged Tale, but certain Truth, it making nothing for the parties advantage, or theirs that imployed her, but rather against them, and mainly against her self; whenas if she had only confessed the buying of the Arsenick, with the purpose of preventing her Mistress's being poysoned, by the help and skill of the Witch or Wife-woman, it might have gone for a tolerable piece of folly, could not seem so criminal and execrable as these other acts do. Nothing therefore but a guilty Conscience, and the power of truth did extort from her this impartial Confession, which thus every way touches her friends, her self, and the Witch.

9. Thirdly, That her compact with the Devil was no Fable, but a sure truth, (and if that be true, there is no reason to doubt of the rest) was abundantly evidenced by the real effects of it. For after she had delivered the piece of Money abovementioned, and the two pins to Mr. *Chandler*, she said, she should be troubled for not keeping these things secret. For the Devil told her, so long as she kept them secret, she should never be troubled; but now, she said, having revealed them, she feared she should be troubled. And that those grievous troubles and agonies she was after found in, were not mere freaks of her own disturbed Phancy, but the Tyranny of *Satan*, will appear from several Circumstances.

For, at her recovery from the first fit she fell into, (which was in *Stockbridge*) both Mr. *Chandler* and Mr. *William Atwood*, the man that went with him, saw a black shade come from her, whereupon presently she came to her self.

Again, she was so struck in her fits, that six men or more could not hold her; and once, as they were holding her, she was caught up from them so high, that her feet touched their breasts, when she was in the Prison at *Sarum*. As also at another time about midnight, she being miserably tormented, and crying out, *The Devil will carry me away*, she was pulled from them that held her, and cast from the low bed where she lay, to the top of an high bed, with her Cloaths torn off her back, and a piece of her skin torn away. *The Candle in the room standing on the Table, was thrown down, and put out: at which time there being a little Boy that was almost asleep, but with this noise affrighted, he had no power with the rest to go out of the*

room, but stay'd there, and saw a Spirit in the likeness of a great black man with no head, in the room, scuffling with the Maid, who took her, and set her into a Chair, and told her, that she must go with him, he was come for her Soul, she had given it to him. But the Maid answered, that her Soul was none of her own to give; and he had already got her blood, but as for her Soul, he should never have it: and after a while, tumbling and throwing about of the Maid, he vanish'd away.

And that that which the Boy heard and saw, was no fancy of his own, but a real object of his Senses, the Witch's condition in another Chamber at the same time, does not obscurely argue. For she was then seen with her cloaths off, in her fetters, running about like mad; and being asked, why she ran about the room, she reply'd, She could not keep her bed, but was pulled out by violence; and being ask'd the reason why, she replied, Pray you what is the matter in your Chamber? Nothing, said they, but a Child is not well. To which she answered, Do not you lie to me, for I know what is the matter, as well as your selves.

10. But to return to the Maid, from whence we may draw further Arguments relating also to the Witch. As that, when the Maid had not for many days and nights together taken any rest, and being then under most grievous hurrying and tortures of the body, the Witch, being brought into the room where she lay, the design unknown to her, and the time of her entring, yet so soon as the Witch had set one foot into the room, she gave a most hideous glance with her eyes, and shut them presently after, falling asleep in a moment, and slept about three hours so fast, that when they would have awaken'd her, they could not by any art or violence whatever, as by stopping her breath, putting things up her nostrils, holding her upright, striking of her, and the like. The Witch also declared her unwillingness that she should be waken'd, crying out, *O pray you by no means awake the Maid; for if she should awake, I should be torn in pieces, and the Devil would fetch me away bodily.* And a further evidence that this sleep of the Maid did some way depend upon the Witch is, that so soon as the Witch had gone from under the roof where she was, the Maid waken'd of her self; and so soon as the Maid awaken'd, and was at ease, (the Devil, as she said, having gone out of her stomach, but doing her no violence, only making her body tremble a little,) the Witch began to roar, and cry out, *The Devil will tear me in pieces.* These things you may read more fully and particularly, in the Narration of *Edmond Bower*, who was an eye-witness of them. But what I have transcrib'd from thence, I think is sufficient to convince any indifferent man, that what befel the Maid after her revealing those secrets she was entrusted with, was not counterfeited, but real, nay, I may safely say, Supernatural.

11. Fourthly and lastly, Her behaviour at the Assizes, when she gave evidence against the Witch, was so earnest and serious, with that strength of mind, and free and confident appeals to the Witch her self, that, as I was informed of those that were Spectators of that Transaction, it had been argument enough to the unprejudic'd, that she swore nothing but what she was assured was true. And those
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floods of tears, and her bitter weepings after Sentence was pass'd on the Witch, and her bewailing of her own wickedness and madness, and professing her willingness notwithstanding, if it might be done without Sin, that the Witch might be repriev'd, may further wash away all suspicion of either Fraud or Malice.

12. Nor can the Witch's denying, (even to her dying day) what the Maid swore to, enervate her testimony. For the Maid tells the whole truth as it was, even to the hazard of her own life; which the Witch indeed denies, but for the saving of hers. And it is no wonder that one that would bid a Pox on the Hangman, when he desired her to forgive him at her death, should lie, and impudently deny any thing to save her own life.

But you'll object, that this reputed Witch may indeed be wicked enough, and willing enough to do any thing; but the power of her wickedness not reaching to such performances as the Maid witnessed against her, we may well believe her, rather than the Maid. The sense of which Objection, if I understand it, can be nothing but this; that either this *Anne Bodenham* was no Witch, or else the things charged upon her were absolutely impossible. The meaning of the latter whereof assuredly is, that it is impossible any one should be a *Witch*, there being no such things as *Spirits* to be conjured up by them. Which is unskilfully to let go the Premises as finding them too strong, and to quarrel with the Conclusion.

13. But if the sense be, (admitting there are *Witches*) that she was none; I think it may be evidently evinced that she was, from what she undoubtedly both did and spake. As for example, from her shewing of the Maid in Glass the shapes of sundry persons, and their actions and postures, in several rooms in her Master's house, whether, when she returned from the Witch, she told them punctually what they had been doing in her absence; which made *Elizabeth Roswell*, one of the Family, profess, that she thought Mrs. Bodenham was either a Witch, or a Woman of God. Besides, what happen'd to her in reference to the fits of the Maid, which has been already insisted upon, are shrewd suspicions of her being a Witch. As also what she boasted of to Mr. *Tucker's* Clerk, concerning a purse that hung about her neck in a green string, that she could do many feats with it; and that, if he would give half a dozen of Ale, she would make a Toad spring out of it. Her confession to Mr. *Langley* of *Sarum*, that she lived with Dr. *Lamb*, and learn'd the art of raising Spirits from him, which she also confessed to *Edmond Bower*; to whom also she acknowledg'd her skill of curing diseases by *Charms* and *Spells*, that she could discover stolen goods, and shew any one the Thief in a glass: and being asked by him for the *Red Book*, half wrote over with blood, being a Catalogue of those that had sealed to the Devil, she denied not the knowledge of the book, but said, it was in *Hampshire*. She also professed that she used many good Prayers, and said the Creed backwards and forwards, and that she prayed to the Planet *Jupiter* for the curing of Diseases.

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She had also acknowledged she had a Book whereby she raised *Spirits*, calling it, *A Book of Charms*, and said, it was worth thousands of other books; and that there was a particular *Charm* in it for the finding of a Treasure hid by the old Earl of Pembroke, in the North part of *Wilton Garden*.

To another party, being asked by him, whether there were any *Spirits*, she made this reply, That she was sure there were; and confirmed it to him by several passages of late, and particularly by that of one forced to *walk about all night, with a bundle of Pales on his back, in a pond of water*, which is mentioned at the end of the fourth Conjur-ation above recited. She did also magnify her own art to him, venturing at *Aströlogical* terms and phrases, and did much scorn and blame the ignorance of the people; averring to him with all earnestness and confidence, that there was no hurt in those *Spirits*, but that they would do a man all good offices, attending upon him, and guarding him from evil all his life long.

But certainly, her *ragged Boys* were no such, who discharged the Maid from keeping the Commandments of God, and told her, they would teach her a better way; as she confessed to the same party.

Add unto all this, that this *Anne Bodenham* was searched both at the Goal, and before the Judges at the Assizes, and there was found on her shoulder, a certain mark or teat, about the length and bigness of the nipple of a woman's breast, and hollow and soft as a nipple, with an hole on the top of it.

14. Wherefore to conclude, there being found upon her, there being done and spoken by her such things as do evidently indigitate that she is a Witch, and has the power of raising *Spirits*, and she being accused by one of raising them up, who, in no likelihood, could excogitate any such either Magical Forms, Effects, or Circumstances, as are above recited, and who tells the story so indifferently, that it touches her self near as much as the Witch, and upon her revealing of the villany, was so handled, that it was plainly above any natural distemper imaginable; it cannot, I say, but gain full assent of any man, whom prejudice and obstinacy has not utterly blinded, that what the Maid confessed concerning her self, and the Witch, is most certainly true.

CHAP. VIII.

1. Two memorable Stories, with the credibility of them. 2. The first of a Shoemaker of Breslaw, who cut his own throat. 3. His appearing after death in his usual habit, and his vexatious haunting the whole Town. 4. That he being dug up after he had been eight months buried, his body was found intire and fresh, and his joynts limber and flexible. 5. That upon the burning thereof the Apparition ceased. 6. Which also happen'd in a Maid of his, when she had vex'd and disturbed people for a whole month together. 7. That the Relator of the Story lived in the Town at what time these things fell out.

I. Have insisted so long upon the foregoing Narration, partly because it is very fresh, so that any man may satisfy himself concerning the truth thereof that has doubt of such things; and partly because it is so notorious, that it is hardly to be parallel'd by any we meet with in Writers, considering all circumstances. And yet if they were as new, I know not but those Relations of *Martinus Weinrichius*, a *Silesian* Physician and Philosopher, which, by way of Preface, are prefixt to *Picus Mirandula* his *Strix*, or *De ludificatione Dæmonum*, may seem as convincing as that.

The Stories are two, and very memorable, and the more credible, because the things happen'd in the age of the Narrator, some few years before he wrote them, and in his own Country; and he doth avouch them with all imaginable confidence, to be most certainly true. The former of them is this.

2. A certain Shoemaker in one of the chief Towns of *Silesia*, in the year 1591. *Septemb. 20.* on a Friday betimes in the morning, in the further parts of his house, where there was adjoining a little Garden, cut his own Throat with his Shoemakers knife. The Family, to cover the foulness of the fact, and that no disgrace might come upon his Widow, gave out, that he died of an Apoplexy, declined all visits of friends and neighbours, in the mean time got him washed, and laid Linens so handsomly about him, that even they that saw him afterwards, as the Parson, and some others, had not the least Suspicion but that he did die of that disease; and so he had honest Burial, with a funeral Sermon, and other circumstances becoming one of his rank and reputation. Six weeks had not past, but so strong a rumour broke out, that he died not of any disease, but had laid violent hands upon himself, that the Magistracy of the place could not but bring all those that had seen the corps, to a strict examination. They shuffled off the matter as well as they could at first, with many fair Apologies, in behalf of the diseased, to remove all suspicion of so heinous an act: but it being pressed more home to their Conscience, at last they confessed, he died a violent death, but desired their favour and clemency to his widow and children, who were in no fault; adding also, that it was uncertain but that he might be slain by some external mishap, or, if by himself, in some irresistible fit of phrency or madness.

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Hereupon the Council deliberate what is to be done. Which the Widow hearing, and fearing they might be determining something that would be harsh, and to the discredit of her Husband, and her self, being also animated thereto by some busie bodies, makes a great complaint against those that raised these reports of her Husband, and resolved to follow the Law upon them, earnestly contending that there was no reason, upon mere rumours and idle defamations of malevolent people, that her Husband's body should be digged up, or dealt with as if he had been either *Magician*, or *Self-murtherer*. Which boldness and pertinacity of the woman, though after the confession of the fact, did in some measure work upon the Council, and put them to a stand.

3. But while these things are in agitation, to the astonishment of the Inhabitants of the place, there appears a *Spectrum* in the exact shape and habit of the deceased, and that not only in the night, but at mid-day. Those that were asleep it terrified with horrible visions; those that were waking it would strike, pull, or press, lying heavy upon them like an *Ephialtes*: so that there were perpetual complaints every morning of their last night's rest through the whole Town. But the more freaks this *Spectrum* play'd, the more diligent were the friends of the deceased to suppress the rumours of them, or at least to hinder the effects of those rumours; and therefore made their addresses to the President, complaining how unjust a thing it was, that so much credit should be given to idle reports and blind suspicions, and therefore beseech'd him that he would hinder the Council from digging up the corps of the deceased, and from all ignominious usage of him: adding also, that they intended to appeal to the Emperour's Court, that their Wisdoms might rather decide the Controversy, than that the cause should be determined from the light conjectures of malicious men.

But while by this means the business was still protracted, there were such stirs and tumults all over the Town, that they are hardly to be described. For no sooner did the Sun hide his head, but this *Spectrum* would be sure to appear, so that every body was fain to look about him, and stand upon his guard, which was a fore trouble to those whom the Labours of the Day made more sensible of the want of rest in the night. For this terrible *Apparition* would sometimes stand by their bed-sides, sometimes cast it self upon the midst of their beds, would lie close to them, would miserably suffocate them, and would so strike them and pinch them, that not only blue marks, but plain impressions of his fingers would be upon sundry parts of their bodies in the morning. Nay, such was the violence and impetuosity of this Ghost, that when men forsook their beds, and kept their dining-rooms, with Candles lighted, and many of them in company together, the better to secure themselves from fear and disturbance; yet he would then appear to them, and have a bout with some of them, notwithstanding all this provision against it. In brief, he was so troublesome, that the people were ready to forsake their houses, and seek other dwellings, and the Magistrate so awaken'd at the perpetual complaints of them, that at last they resolved, the President agreeing thereto, to dig up the Body.

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4. He had lain in the ground near eight months, *viz.* from *Sept.* 22, 1591. to *April* 18, 1592. When he was digged up, which was in the presence of the Magistracy of the Town, his body was found entire, not at all putrid, no ill smell about him, saving the mustiness of the Grave-cloaths, his joints limber and flexible, as in those that are alive, his skin only flaccid, but a more fresh grown in the room of it, the wound of his throat gaping, but no gear nor corruption in it; there was also observed a Magical mark in the great toe of his right foot, *viz.* an Excrescency in the form of a Rose. His body was kept out of earth from *April* 18, to the 24th, at what time many both of the same town and others came daily to view him. These unquiet stirs did not cease for all this, which they after attempted to appease, by burying the corps under the Gallows, but in vain; for they were as much as ever, if not more, he now not sparing his own Family: insomuch that his Widow at last went her self to the Magistrate, and told them, that she should be no longer against it, if they thought fit to fall upon some course of more strict proceedings touching her Husband.

5. Wherefore the seventh of *May* he was again digged up, and it was observable, that he was grown more sensibly fleshy since his last interment. To be short, they cut off the Head, Arms, and Legs of the Corps, and opening his Back, took out his Heart, which was as fresh and intire as in a Calf new kill'd. These, together with his Body, they put on a pile of wood, and burnt them to Ashes, which they carefully sweeping together, and putting into a Sack, (that none might get them for wicked uses) poured them into the River, after which the *Spectrum* was never seen more.

6. As it also happen'd in his Maid that dy'd after him, who appeared within eight days after her death, to her fellow-servant, and lay so heavy upon her, that she brought upon her a great swelling of her eyes. She so grievously handled a Child in the cradle, that if the Nurse had not come in to his help, he had been quite spoil'd; but she crossing her self, and calling upon the Name of *Jesus*, the Spectre vanished. The next night she appeared in the shape of an *Hen*, which, when one of the Maids of the house took to be so indeed, and followed her, the Hen grew into an immense bigness, and presently caught the Maid by the throat, and made it swell, so that she could neither well eat nor drink of a good while after.

She continued these stirs for a whole month, flapping some so smartly, that the strokes were heard of them that stood by, pulling the bed also from under others, and appearing sometimes in one shape, sometimes in another, as of a Woman, of a Dog, of a Cat, and of a Goat. But at last her body being digged up, and burnt, the Apparition was never seen more.

7. These things were done at *Breslaw* in *Silesia*, where this *Weinrichius* then lived, which makes the Narration more considerable. This concealing the name of the parties, I conceive, was in way of civility to his deceased Towns-man, his Towns-man's Widow, and their Family.

C H A P. IX.

1. The second Story of one Cuntius, whose first Pen-man not only dwelt in the Town, but was a sad sufferer in the Tragedy.
2. The quality of Cuntius, his fatal blow by his Horse, and his desperate affliction of Mind.
3. Prodigies attending his death.
4. A Spiritus Incubus in the shape of him, with other disorders.
5. More hideous disorders, as also his appearing to a Gossip of his in behalf of his Child.
6. Several sad effects of his appearing upon several persons.
7. His miserable usage of the Parson of the Parish and his Family, who is the Pen-man of the Story.
8. A brief Rehearsal of many other mad Pranks of this Spectre.
9. A remarkable Passage touching his Grave-stone.
10. The florid plight of Cuntius after he had been buried near half a year, his grasping of a Staff, and the motion of his Eyes and of his Blood.
11. The prodigious Weight of his body.
12. As also the Incombustibleness thereof.
13. How hard set the Atheist will be for a subterfuge against this Story.

1. **T**HE other Story he sets down he is not the first Pen-man of, (though the things were done in his time, and, as I conceive, some while after what was above related, as a passage in the Narration seems to intimate) but he transcrib'd it from one that not only dwelt in the place, but was often infested with the noisom occurrences of that troublesome Ghost, that did so much mischief to the place where he dwelt. The Relation is somewhat large, I shall bring it into as narrow compass as I can.

2. *Johannes Cuntius*, a Citizen of *Pentsch* in *Silesia*, near sixty years of age, and one of the *Aldermen* of the Town, very fair in his carriage, and unblameable, to mens thinking, in the whole course of his life, having been sent for to the *Mayor's* house (as being a very understanding man, and dexterous at the dispatch of businesses) to end some controversies concerning certain Waggoners, and a Merchant of *Pannonia* having made an end of those affairs, is invited by the *Mayor* to Supper: he gets leave first to go home to order some businesses, leaving this sentence behind him, *It's good to be merry while we may, for mischiefs grow up fast enough daily.*

This *Cuntius* kept five lusty Geldings in his Stable, one whereof he commanded to be brought out, and his shoe being loose, had him ty'd to the next post: his Master with a Servant busied themselves to take up his leg to look on his hoof, the Horse being mad and mettlesom, struck them both down; but *Cuntius* received the greatest share of the blow: one that stood next by help'd them both up again. *Cuntius* no sooner was up and came to himself, but cry'd out, *Wo is me, how do I burn, and am all on a fire!* which he often repeated. But the parts he complain'd of most, the Women being put out of the room, when they were searched, no appearance of any stroke or hurt was found upon them. To be short, he fell downright sick, and grievously afflicted in Mind, loudly complaining, that his Sins were such, that they were utterly unpardonable, and that
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the least part of them were bigger than all the Sins of the World besides; but would have no Divine come to him, nor did particularly confess them to any. Several rumours indeed there were that once he sold one of his Sons, but when, and to whom, it was uncertain; and that he had made a Contract with the Devil, and the like. But it was observed, and known for certain, that he had grown beyond all expectation rich, and that four days before this mischance, he being witness to a Child, said, that that was the last he should be ever witness to.

3. The night he dy'd, his eldest Son watched with him. He gave up the Ghost about the third hour of the night, at what time a black Cat, opening the Casement with her nails, (for it was shut) ran to his bed, and did so violently scratch his face and the bolster, as if she endeavoured by force to remove him out of the place where he lay. But the Cat afterwards suddenly was gone, and she was no sooner gone, but he breathed his last. A fair Tale was made to the Pastor of the Parish, and the Magistracy of the Town allowing it, he was buried on the right side of the Altar, his Friends paying well for it. No sooner *Cuntius* was dead, but a great Tempest arose, which raged most at his very Funeral, there being such impetuous Storms of Wind with Snow, that it made mens bodies quake, and their teeth chatter in their heads. But so soon as he was interred, of a sudden all was calm.

4. He had not been dead a day or two, but several rumours were spread in the town of a *Spiritus incubus*, or *Ephialtes*, in the shape of *Cuntius*, that would have forced a Woman. This happen'd before he was buried. After his burial, the same *Spectre* awaken'd one that was sleeping in his dining-room, saying, *I can scarce withhold my self from beating thee to death.* The voice was the voice of *Cuntius*. The watchmen of the Town also affirmed, that they heard every night great stirs in *Cuntius* his House, the fallings and throwings of things about, and that they did see the gates stand wide open betimes in the mornings, though they were never so diligently shut o're night; that his Horses were very unquiet in the Stable, as if they kick'd, and bit one another; besides unusual barkings and howlings of the Dogs all over the Town. But these were but preludious suspicions to further evidence, which I will run over as briefly as I may.

5. A Maid-servant of one of the Citizens of *Pentsch* (while these Tragedies and Stirs were so frequent in the Town) heard, together with some others lying in their beds, the noise and trappings of one riding about the House, who at last ran against the Walls with that violence, that the whole House shook again, as if it would fall, and the windows were all fill'd with flashings of light. The Master of the house being informed of it, went out of doors in the morning to see what the matter was; and he beheld in the Snow the impressions of strange feet, such as were like neither Horses, nor Cows, nor Hogs, nor any Creature that he knew.

Another time, about eleven of the clock in the night, *Cuntius* appears to one of his Friends that was a witness to a Child of his, speaks unto him; and bids him be of a good courage, for he came on-

ly to communicate unto him a matter of great importance. *I have left behind me*, said he, *my youngest Son James, to whom you are God-father. Now there is at my eldest Son Steven's, a Citizen of Jegerdorf, a certain Chest, wherein I have put four hundred and fifteen Florens: This I tell you, that your God-son may not be defrauded of any of them, and it is your duty to look after it; which if you neglect, wo be to you.* Having said this, the *Spectre* departed, and went up into the upper rooms of the House, where he walked so stoutly that all rattled again, and the roof swagged with his heavy stampings. This *Cuntius* his Friend told to the Parson of the Parish a day or two after for a certain truth.

6. But there are also other several notorious passages of this *Cuntius*. As his often speaking to the Maid that lay with her Mistress, his Widow, to give him place, for it was his right; and if she would not give it him, he would writh her neck behind her.

His galloping up and down like a wanton horse in the Court of his House. He being divers times seen to ride, not only in the streets, but along the vallies of the field, and on the Mountains, with so strong a trot, that he made the very ground flash with fire under him.

His bruising of the body of a Child of a certain Smiths, and making his very bones so soft, that you might wrap the corps on heaps like a glove.

His miserably tugging all night with a *Jew* that had taken up his Inn in the Town, and tossing him up and down in the lodging where he lay.

His dreadful accosting of a Waggoner, an old acquaintance of his, while he was busie in the stable, vomiting out fire against him to terrify him, and biting of him so cruelly by the foot, that he made him lame.

7. What follows, as I above intimated, concerns the Relator himself, who was the Parson of the Parish, whom this Fury so squeez'd and press'd when he was asleep, that wakening he found himself utterly spent, and his strength quite gone, but could not imagine the reason. But while he lay musing with himself what the matter might be, this *Spectre* returns again to him, and holding him all over so fast, that he could not wag a finger, rowled him in his bed backwards and forwards a good many times together. The same happen'd also to his Wife another time, whom *Cuntius*, coming thro' the casement in the shape of a little Dwarf, and running to her bed side, so wrung and pulled as if he would have torn her throat out, had not her two Daughters come in to help her.

He pressed the lips together of one of this *Theologer's* Sons so, that they could scarce get them asunder.

His House was so generally disturbed with this unruly Ghost, that the Servants were fain to keep together anights in one room, lying upon straw, and watching the approaches of this troublesome Fiend. But a Maid of the House, being more courageous than the rest, would needs one night go to bed, and forsake her company. Whereupon *Cuntius* finding her alone, presently assaults her, pulls away the bedding, and would have carried her away with him; but she hardly escap-

escaping, fled to the rest of the Family, where she espied him standing by the candle, and straightway after vanishing.

Another time he came into her Master's Chamber, making a noise like a Hog that eats grains, smacking and grunting very sonorously. They could not chase him away, by speaking to him; but ever as they lighted a Candle, he would vanish.

On another Time about Evening, when this *Theologer* was sitting with his Wife and Children about him, exercising himself in Musick, according to his usual manner, a most grievous stink arose suddenly, which by degrees spread it self to every corner of the room. Hereupon he commends himself and his family to God by Prayer. The smell nevertheless encreased, and became above all measure pestilently noisom, insomuch that he was forced to go up to his chamber. He and his Wife had not been in bed a quarter of an hour, but they find the same stink in the bed-chamber; of which, while they are complaining one to another, out steps the *Spectre* from the Wall, and creeping to his bed-side, breaths upon him an exceeding cold breath, of so intolerable stinking and malignant a scent, as is beyond all imagination and expression. Hereupon the *Theologer*, good soul, grew very ill, and was fain to keep his bed, his face, belly, and guts swelling, as if he had been poisoned; whence he was also troubled with a difficulty of breathing, and with a putrid inflammation of his eyes, so that he could not well use them of a long time after.

*8. But taking leave of the sick Divine, if we should go back, and recount what we have omitted, it would exceed the number of what we have already recounted. As for example, The trembling and sweating of *Cuntius* his Gelding, from which he was not free night nor day: The burning blue of the Candles at the approaches of *Cuntius* his Ghost: His drinking up the milk in the milk-bowls, his flinging dung into them, or turning the milk into blood: His pulling up posts deep set in the ground, and so heavy, that two lusty Porters could not deal with them: His discoursing with several men he met concerning the affairs of the Waggoners: His strangling of old men: His holding fast the Cradles of Children, or taking them out of them: His frequent endeavouring to force women: His defiling the Water in the Font, and fouling the Cloth on the Altar on that side that did hang towards his grave with dirty bloody spots: His catching up Dogs in the streets, and knocking their brains against the ground: His sucking dry the Cows, and tying their tails like the tail of an Horse: His devouring of Poultry, and his flinging of Goats bound into the Racks: His tying of an Horse to an empty Oat-tub in the Stable, to clatter up and down with it, and the hinder foot of another to his own head-stall: His looking out of the Window of a low Tower, and then suddenly changing himself into the form of a long staff: His chiding of a Matron for suffering her servant to wash dishes on a Thursday, at what time he laid his hand upon her, and she said, it felt more cold than ice: His pelting one of the Women that washed his corps, so forcibly, that the prints of the Clods he flung, were to be seen upon the wall: His attempting to ravish another, who excusing her self, and saying, *My Cuntius, thou seest how old, wrinkled,*

and deformed I am, and how unfit for those kind of sports, he suddenly set up a loud laughter, and vanished.

9. But we must not insist upon these things; only we will add one passage more that is not a little remarkable. His grave-stone was turned of one side, shelving, and there were several holes in the earth, about the bigness of mouse-holes, that went down to his very Coffin, which, however they were filled up with earth over night, yet they would be sure to be laid open the next morning.

It would be a tedious business to recite these things at large, and prosecute the Story in all its particular Circumstances. To conclude therefore, their calamity was such, from the frequent occurrences of this restless Fury, that there was none but either pitied them, or despis'd them; none would lodge in their Town, Trading was decay'd, and the Citizens impoverish'd by the continual stirs and tumults of this unquiet Ghost.

10. And though the *Atheist* may perhaps laugh at them, as men undone by their own Melancholy and vain imaginations, or by the waggery of some ill neighbours; yet if he seriously consider what has been already related, there are many passages that are by no means to be resolved into any such Principles: but what I shall now declare, will make it altogether unlikely that any of them are.

To be short therefore, finding no rest, nor being able to excogitate any better remedy, they dig up *Cuntius* his body, with several others buried both before and after him. But those both after and before were so putrify'd and rotten, their Skulls broken, and the Sutures of them gaping, that they were not to be known by their shape at all, having become in a manner but a rude mass of earth and dirt; but it was quite otherwise in *Cuntius*: His Skin was tender and florid, his Joynts not at all stiff, but limber and moveable, and a staff being put into his Hand, he grasped it with his fingers very fast; his Eyes also of themselves would be one time open, and another time shut; they opened a vein in his Leg, and the blood sprang out as fresh as in the living; his Nose was entire and full, not sharp, as in those that are gastly sick, or quite dead: and yet *Cuntius* his body had lien in the grave from Feb. 8. to July 20. which is almost half a year.

11. It was easily discernible where the fault lay. However, nothing was done rashly, but Judges being constituted, Sentence was pronounced upon *Cuntius* his Carcase, which (being animated thereto from success in the like case, some few years before in this very Province of *Silesia*, I suppose he means at *Breslaw*, where the Shoemakers body was burnt) they adjudged to the fire.

Wherefore there were Masons provided to make a hole in the wall near the Altar to get his body through, which being pulled at with a rope, it was so exceeding heavy, that the rope brake, and they could scarce stir him. But when they had pull'd him through, and gotten him on a Cart without, which *Cuntius* his Horse that struck him (which was a lusty-bodied Jade) was to draw; yet it put him to it so, that he was ready to fall down ever and anon, and was quite out of breath with striving to draw so intolerable a load, who not-with-

withstanding could run away with two men in the same Cart presently after, their weight was so inconsiderable to his strength.

12. His body, when it was brought to the fire, proved as unwilling to be burnt, as before to be drawn; so that the Executioner was fain with hooks to pull him out, and cut him into pieces to make him burn. Which, while he did, the blood was found so pure and spiritous, that it spurted into his face as he cut him; but at last, not without the expence of two hundred and sixteen great billets, all was turned into ashes. Which they carefully sweeping up together, as in the foregoing Story, and casting them into the River, the *Spectre* never more appeared.

13. I must confess, I am so slow-witted my self, that I cannot so much as imagine, what the *Atheist* will excogitate for a subterfuge or hiding place, from so plain and evident Convictions.

Hitherto of Witches, and other devoted Vassals of *Satan* in several; we shall now consider their Assemblies and Conventicles, and urge further proofs of *Spirits* and *Apparitions* from thence.

CHAP. X.

1. *The Nocturnal Conventicles of Witches; two examples thereof out of Paulus Grillandus.*
2. *Of the Witch of Lochiæ, with a reflection on the unexceptionableness of these Instances for the proof of Spirits.*
3. *The piping of John of Hembach to a Conventicle of Witches.*
4. *The dancing of Men, Women, and cloven-footed Satyrs, at Mid-day.*
5. *John Michael's dumb Musick on his crooked staff, from the bough of an Oak at that Antick dancing.*
6. *The Impress of a Circle, with cloven-feet in it, on the ground where they danced.*

1. **P**AULUS Grillandus reports of one not far from Rome, who, at the perswasion of his Wife, anointing himself, as she had done before, was carried away into the air to a great Assembly of Wizards and Witches, where they were feasting under a Nut-tree. But this stranger not relishing his chear without Salt, at last the Salt coming, and he blessing of God for it, at that Name the whole Assembly disappeared, and he, poor man, was left alone naked an hundred miles off from home; whither, when he had got, he accused his Wife: she confess'd the fact, discovering also her companions, who were burnt with her.

The same Author writes also of a young Girl thirteen years old, in the Dukedom of Spalatto, who, being brought into the like company, and admiring the strangeness of the thing, and crying out, *Blessed God, what's here to do!* made the whole Assembly vanish, was left herself in the field alone, and wandering up and down, was found by a contryman, to whom she told the whole matter.

See Bodin,
Mag. Demon.
l. 2. c. 4.

2. So the Husband of the Witch of *Loebia*, whom she brought in to the like Assembly, by saying, *O my God, where are we?* made all to vanish, and found himself naked alone in the field, fifteen days journey from home.

Several other Narrations to this purpose *Bodinus* sets down, which these sensible effects of being so far distant from home, and being found naked in the fields, shew to be no freaks of *Melancholy*, but certain truth. But that the *Devil*, in these junquetings, appears to the Guests in the form of a *Satyr*, *black Goat*, or else sometimes in the shape of an ill-favoured *black man*, is the ordinary Confession of *Witches*, by this way discovered and convicted.

3. I will only add a Story or two out of *Remigius*, concerning these kinds of *Conventicles*, and then I will proceed to some other proofs.

See Remigius
his Demonolatr.
l. 1. c. 14.

John of *Hembach* was carried by his Mother, being a Witch, to one of these Meetings; and because he had learn'd to play on the Pipe, was commanded by her to exercise his faculty, and to get up into a Tree, that they might the better hear his Musick. Which he doing, and looking upon the Dancers, how uncouth and ridiculous they were in their motions and gestures, being struck with admiration at the novelty of the matter, suddenly burst out into those words, *Good God, what a mad company have we here!* Which was no sooner said, but down came *John*, Pipe and all, and hurt his shoulder with the tumbling cast; who, when he call'd to the company to help him, found himself alone, for they had all vanished. *John* of *Hembach* told what had happen'd, but people knew not what to make of it, till some of that mad Crew that danced to his Pipe, were apprehended upon other suspicions, as *Catharina Prevotia*, *Kelviers Orilla*, and others, who made good every whit what *John* had before told, (though they knew nothing of what he told before) adding also more particularly, that the place where he pip'd to them was *Maybuch*.

Demonolatr.
l. 1. c. 14.

4. The other memorable Story that I shall relate out of *Remigius*, is this. One *Nicolea Langbernhard*, while she was going towards *Assenunturia*, along a hedge-side, spied in the next field (it was about Noon time of day) a company of men and women dancing in a ring; and the posture of their bodies being uncouth and unusual, made her view them more attentively, whereby she discerned some of them to have cloven feet like Oxen or Goats (it should seem they were *Spirits* in the shape of lusty *Satyrs* :) she being astonish'd with fear, cries out, *Jesus, help me, and send me well home.* She had no sooner said so, but they all vanished, saving one *Peter Grosspetter*, whom, a little after, she saw snatch'd up into the air, and to let fall his Maulkin, (a stick that they made clean Ovens withal) and her self was also driven so forcibly with the wind, that it made her almost lose her breath. She was fain to keep her bed three days after.

5. This *Peter* (though at first he would have followed the Law on *Nicolea* for flandering him, yet) afterward freely confess'd, and discover'd others of his companions, as *Barbelia* the wife of *Joannes Latomus*, and *Mayetta* the wife of *Laurentius*, who confessed she danced with those cloven-footed Creatures at what time *Peter* was amongst them. And for further evidence of the business, *John Michael*, Herdman,

man, did confess, that while they thus danced, he play'd upon his *Crooked staff*, and struck upon it with his fingers, as if it had been a Pipe, sitting upon an high bough of an Oak; and that so soon as *Nicolea* called upon the Name of *Jesus*, he tumbled down headlong to the ground, but was presently catch'd up again with a whirlwind, and carried to *Weiller Meadows*, where he had left his Herds a little before.

6. Add unto all this, that there was found in the place where they danced, a round *Circle*, wherein there was the manifest marks of the treading of cloven-feet, which was seen from the day after *Nicolea* had discover'd the business, till the next Winter that the Plough cut them out. These things happen'd in the year 1590.

C H A P. XI.

1. Of Fairy-Circles. 2. Questions propounded concerning Witches leaving their bodies, as also concerning their Transformation into bestial shapes.
3. That the Reasons of Wierus and Remigius against real Transformation are but weak. 4. The Probabilities for, and the manner of real Transformation.. 5. An Argumentation for their being out of their bodies in their Ecstasies. 6. That the Soul's leaving the Body thus, is not Death, nor her return, any proper Miracle. 7. That it is in some cases most easy and natural to acknowledge they do leave their bodies, with an Instance out of Wierus that suits to that purpose. 8. The Author's Scepticism in the point, with a favourable Interpretation of the proper extravagances of Temper in Bodinus and Des-Cartes.

1. **I**T might be here very seasonable, upon the foregoing Story, to enquire into the nature of those *dark Rings* in the grass, which they call *Fairy-Circles*, whether they be the *Rendezvous* of Witches, or the dancing places of those little Puppet-Spirits, which they call *Elves* or *Fairies*. But these curiosities I leave to more busie wits. I am only intent now upon my serious purpose of proving there are *Spirits*; which I think I have made a pretty good progress in already, and have produced such Narrations as cannot but gain credit with such as are not perversly and wilfully incredulous.

2. There is another more profitable Question started, if it could be decided, concerning these *Night-revellings* of Witches, Whether they be not sometimes there, their Bodies lying at home; as sundry Relations seem to favour that opinion: * *Bodinus* is for it, * *Remigius* is ^{*Mag. Demonoman. lib. 2.} against it.

It is the same Question, Whether when Witches or Wizards profess ^{cap. 5.} they will tell what is done within so many miles compass, and after- ^{* Remig. D. c. monolarr. l. 1.} wards to give a proof of their skill, first anoint their Bodies, and then ^{c. 14.} fall down dead in a manner, and so lie a competent time senseless, whether, I say, their Souls go out of their Bodies, or all be but represented to their Imagination.

We

Bodin. Mag. We may add a third, which may haply better fetch off the other
 Demon. lib. 2. two; and that is concerning your *Λυγίσθητοι*, (which the Germans call
 cap. 6. *Were-Wolf*, the French, *Loups garous*) Men transformed into *Wolves*:
 and there is much-what the same reason of other *Transformations*. I
 shall not trouble you with any Histories of them, though I might
 produce many. But as well those that hold it is but a delusion of the
 Devil, and mere Tragedies in Dreams, as they that say they are re-
 al transactions, do acknowledge, that those parties that have confes-
 sed themselves thus transformed, have been *weary* and *fore* with run-
 ning, have been *wounded*, and the like. Bodinus here also is deserted
 of Remigius, who is of the same mind with *Wierus*, that sly, smooth
 Physician, and faithful Patron of Witches, who will be sure to load
 the Devil as much as he can, his shoulders being more able to bear it,
 and so to ease the *Hags*.

Remig. De-
 monolatr. l. 2.
 c. 5.

* De Præstigi.
 Demon. l. 3.
 c. 10; l. 1. c.
 24. l. 2. c. 8.
 l. 4. c. 20.
 || Remig. De-
 monolatr. l. 2.
 c. 5.

3. But for mine own part, though I will not undertake to decide
 the Controversy; yet I think it not amiss to declare, that Bodinus may
 very well make good his own, notwithstanding any thing those do
 alledge to the contrary. For that which * *Wierus* and || *Remigius* seem
 so much to stand upon, that it is too great a power for the Devil,
 and too great indignity to Man, that he should be able thus to *trans-*
form him, are, in my mind, but slight Rhetorications, no sound Ar-
 guments.

For what is that *outward mis-shapement* of Body, to the *inward defor-*
mity of their Souls, which he helps on so notoriously? And they hav-
 ing given themselves over to him so wholly, why may he not use
 them thus *here*, when they shall be worse used by him *hereafter*?
 And for the changing of the *species* of things, if that were a power
 too big to be granted the Devil, yet it is no more done here, when
 he thus *transforms* a *Man* into a *Wolf*, than when he transforms *him-*
self into the shape of a *Man*. For this *Wolf* is still a *Man*, and that
Man is still a Devil. For it is so as the Poet says it was in *Ulysses*
 his Companions with *Circe*, turned into Hogs, they had the Head,
 the Voice, the Body and Bristles of Hogs;

— Αὐτὰς ὁ νῦν λῶς ἐμυθεῖτο ὡς τὸ πλεονεξῆς,

but their understanding was unchanged, they had the Mind and
 Memory of a Man, as before. As *Petrus Bourgotus* professeth, that
 when his companion, *Michael Verdung*, had anointed his body, and
 transform'd him into a *Wolf*, when he look'd up to his hairy Feet, he
 was at first afraid of himself.

4. Now therefore it being plain, that nothing material is alledged
 to the contrary, and that *Men* confess they are turned into *Wolves*,
 and acknowledge the salvage cruelties they then committed upon
 Children, Women, and Sheep, that they find themselves exceeding
weary, and sometimes *wounded*; it is more natural to conclude they
 were *really* thus *transformed*, than that it was a mere delusion of
Phancy.

For I conceive the Devil gets into their Body, and by his subtle
 substance, more operative and searching than any fire or putrifying
 liquor,

liquor, melts the yielding *Compages* of the Body to such a consistency, and so much of it as is fit for his purpose, and makes it pliable to his Imagination; and then it is as easy for him to work it into what *shape* he pleaseth, as it is to work the Air into such forms and figures as he ordinarily doth. Nor is it any more difficulty for him to mollify what is hard, than it is to harden what is so soft and fluid as the Air.

5. And he that hath this power, we can never stick to give him that which is lesser, *viz.* to instruct men how they shall for a time forsake their Bodies, and come in again. For can it be a hard thing for him that can thus melt and take a-pieces the particles of the Body, to have the skill and power to loosen the Soul, a Substance really distinct from the the Body, and separable from it; which at last is done by the easy course of Nature, at that final dissolution of Soul and Body, which we call *Death*? But no course of Nature ever transforms the Body of Man into the shape of a Wolf; so that this is more hard and exorbitant, from the order of Nature, than the other.

6. I but, you'll say, the greatness and incredibleness of the Miracle is this, That there should be an actual separation of Soul and Body, and yet no *Death*. But this is not at all strange, if we consider that *Death* is properly a disjunction of the Soul from the Body, by reason of the Body's *unfitness* any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of *Diseases*, outward *Violence* or *Age*; and if the Devil could restore such Bodies as these to Life, it were a *Miracle* indeed. But this is not such a *Miracle*, nor is the Body properly dead, though the Soul be out of it. For the *life* of the Body is nothing else, but that *fitness* to be actuated by the Soul. The conservation whereof is help'd, as I conceive, by the *anointing* of the Body before the *Ecstasy*; which ointment filling the pores, keeps out the cold, and keeps in the heat and spirits, that the frame and temper of the Body may continue in fit case to entertain the Soul again at her return. So the vital steams of the carcase being not yet spent, the pristine operations of Life are presently kindled; as a Candle new blown out, and as yet reeking, suddenly catches fire from the flame of another, though at some distance, the light gliding down along the smoak.

7. Wherefore there being nothing in the nature of the thing that should make us incredulous, these *Sorceresses* so confidently pronouncing, that they are *out of their Bodies* at such times, and see and do such and such things, meet one another, bring messages, discover secrets, and the like, it is more natural and easy to conclude, they be *really out of their Bodies, than in them*. Which we should the more easily be induced to believe, if we could give credit to that Narration *Wierus* tells of a Soldier, out of whose mouth, whilst he was asleep, a thing in the shape of a Weasel came, which nudling along in the grass, and at last coming to a brook-side, very busily attempting to get over, but not being able, some one of the standers by that saw it, made a bridge for it of his sword, which it pass'd over by, and coming back, made use of the same passage, and then enter'd into the Soldier's mouth again, many looking on. When he awaked, he told how he dream'd, he had gone over an iron bridge, and other particulars

* *De Præstigi.* lars answerable to what the spectators had seen afore-hand. * *Wierus*
Dæmon. l. 1. acknowledgeth the truth of the Relation, but will by all means have
cap. 14. it to be the *Devil*, not the Soul of the Man; which he doth in a
tender regard to the Witches, that from such a truth as this, they
might not be made so obnoxious to suspicion, that their *Ecstasies* are
not mere *Dreams* and *Delusions* of the Devil, but are accompanied
with *real Effects*.

8. I will not take upon me to decide so nice a Controversy, only I
will make bold to intermeddle thus far, as to pronounce *Bodinus* his
opinion not at all unworthy of a rational and sagacious man: and
that though, by his being much addicted to such like speculations, he
might attribute some natural effects of the ministry of *Spirits*, when
there was no need so to do; yet his Judgment in other things of this
kind is no more to be flighted for that, than *Cartesius*, that stupen-
dious Mechanical Wit, is to be disallowed in those excellent inventi-
ons of the causes of those more general *Phænomena* of Nature, because,
by his Success in those, he was embolden'd to enlarge his Principles
too far, and to assert that *Animals* themselves were mere *Machinas*:
like *Aristoxenus* the Musician, that made the Soul nothing else but an
Harmony; of whom *Tully* pleasantly observes, *Quod non recessit ab arte*
sua.

Every *Genius* and *Temper*, as the fundry sorts of Beasts and living
Creatures, have their proper excrement: and it is the part of a wise
man to take notice of it, and to chuse what is profitable, as well as
to abandon what is useless and excrementitious.

C H A P. XII.

1. The Coldness of those Bodies that Spirits appear in, witnessed by the
experience of Cardan and Bourgotus.
2. The natural reason of this
Coldness.
3. That the Devil does really lie with Witches.
4. That the
very Substance of Spirits is not Fire.
5. The Spectre at Ephesus.
6.
Spirits skirmishing on the ground.
- 7, 8. Field-fights and Sea-fights
seen in the Air.

1. **B**UT to return into the way, I might add other Stories of your
Dæmones Metallici, your *Guardian Genii*, such as that of *So-*
crates, and that other of which *Bodinus* tells an ample Relation, which
he received from him who had the society and assistance of such an
Angel or *Genius*, which for my own part I give as much credit to, as
to any Story in *Livy* or *Plutarch*; your *Lares familiares*, as also those
that haunt and vex Families, appearing to many, and leaving very
sensible effects of their appearances. But I will not so far tire either
my self, or my Reader. I will only name one or two more, rather
than recite them. As that of *Facius Cardanus*, who relates, as you may see
in *Cardan*, how a *Spirit* that familiarly was seen in the house of a friend
of his, one night laid his hand upon his brow, which felt intolerably cold.
And

See Cardan
De rerum va-
riet. lib. 16.
cap. 93.

And so * *Petrus Bourgotus* confessed, that when the *Devil* gave him * *Wierus de*
his hand to kiss, it felt cold. And many more examples there be to *Præstig. Dæ-*
this purpose. *mon. l. 6. c. 13*

2. And indeed it stands to very good reason that the *Bodies* of *Devils*, being nothing but *coagulated Air*, should be cold, as well as *coagulated Water*, which is *Snow* or *Ice*; and that it should have more keen and piercing cold, it consisting of more subtile particles than those of *Water*, and therefore more fit to insinuate, and more accurately and stingingly to affect and touch the nerves.

3. Wherefore *Witches* confessing so frequently as they do, that the *Devil* lies with them, and withal complaining of his tedious and offensive coldness, it is a shrewd presumption that he doth lie with them indeed, and that it is not a mere *Dream*, as their friend *Wierus* would have it.

4. Hence we may also discover the folly of that opinion that makes the very *Essence* of *Spirits* to be *Fire*: for how unfit that would be to *coagulate* the *Air*, is plain at first sight. It would rather melt and dissolve these consistencies, than constringe and freeze them in a manner. But it is rather manifest, that the *Essence* of *Spirits* is a substance specifically distinct from all corporeal matter whatsoever. But my intent is not to philosophize concerning the nature of *Spirits*, but only to prove their *Existence*.

5. Which the *Spectre* at *Ephesus* may be a further Argument of. For that old man which *Appollonius* told the *Ephesians* was the walking plague of the City, when they stoned him, and uncovered the heap, appear'd in the shape of an huge *black Dog*, as big as the biggest *Lion*. This could be no imposture of *Melancholy*, nor *Fraud* of any Priest. And the learned *Grotius*, a man far from all Levity and vain Credulity, is so secure of the truth of *Tyaneus* his miracles, that he does not stick to term him impudent that has the face to deny them.

6. Our *English Chronicles* also tell us of *Apparitions*, armed men, foot and horse, fighting upon the ground in the North part of *England*, and in *Ireland*, for many Evenings together, seen by many hundreds of men at once, and that the grass was trodden down in the places where they were seen to fight their *Battles*: which agreeth with *Nicolaus Langbernhard* her Relation of the cloven-footed *Dancers*, that left the print of their hoofs in the ring they trod down for a long time after. See Mystery of Godliness, Book 6. ch. 2. sect. 5.

7. But this skirmishing upon the *Earth*, puts me in mind of the last part of this argument, and bids me look up into the *Air*. Where, omitting all other Prodigies, I shall only take notice of what is most notorious, and of which there can by no means be given any other account, than that it is the effect of *Spirits*. And this is the Appearance of armed Men fighting and encountering one another in the Sky. There are so many examples of these Prodigies in *Historians*, that it were superfluous to instance in any. That before the great slaughter of no less than fourscore thousand made by *Antiochus* in *Jerusalem*, recorded in the second of *Maccabees* Chap. 5. is famous. The Historian there writes, "That through all the City, for the space almost of forty days, there were seen *Horsemen* running in the *Air* in cloth of Gold, and arm'd with Lances, like a band of Soldiers, and Troops
" of

“ of Horsemen in array, *encountering* and running one against another,
 “ with shaking of shields, and multitude of pikes, and drawing of
 “ swords, and casting of darts, and glittering of golden ornaments,
 “ and harness of all sorts. And *Josephus* writes also concerning the
 like Prodigies that happen'd before the destruction of the City by
Titus, prefacing first, that they were incredible, were it not that they
 were recorded by those that were Eye-witnesses of them.

8. The like *Apparitions* were seen before the Civil Wars of *Marius*
 and *Sylla*. And *Melanchthon* affirms, that a world of such Prodigies
 were seen all over *Germany*, from 1524, to 1548. *Snellius*, amongst o-
 ther places, doth particularize in *Amortsfort*, where these *fightings*
 were seen not much higher than the house-tops; as also in *Amsterdam*,
 where there was also a *Sea-fight* appearing in the *Air* for an hour or
 two together, many thousands of men looking on. And to say no-
 thing of what hath been seen in *England* not long ago, there is lately
 a punctual narration of such a *Sea-fight*, seen by certain *Hollanders*,
 and sent over hither into *England*; but a *Lion* appearing alone at the
 end of that *Apparition*, though it may be true, for ought I know,
 yet it makes it obnoxious to *Suspicion* and evasion, and so unprofitable
 for my purpose. But the *Phenomena* of this kind, whose reports can-
 not be suspected to be in subserviency to any Politick design, ought
 in reason to be held true, when there have been many profest Eye-
 witnesses of them. And they being resolvable into no *natural* causes,
 it is evident that we must acknowledge *supernatural* ones, such as *Spi-
 rits*, *Intelligencies*, or *Angels*, term them what you please.

C H A P. XIII.

1. The main reason why good Spirits so seldom consociate with men.
2. What manner of Magick *Bodinus* his friend used to procure the more sensible assistance of a good Genius.
3. The manner of this Genius his sensible Converse.
4. The Religiousness of the Party, and the Character of his Temper.
5. His escapes from danger by advertisements of the good Genius.
6. The Genius his averfeness from vocal conversation with him.
7. His useful Assistance by other Signs.
8. The manner of his appearing to him awake, and once in a Slumber.

Mag. Demo-
noman. lib. 1.
cap. 2.

1. **I** Had here ended all my Stories, were I not tempted by that re-
 markable one in *Bodinus* to out-run my method. I but named
 it in the foregoing Chapter; I shall tell it now at large. I am the
 more willingly drawn to relate it, such Examples of the consociation
 of good Spirits being very scarce in History. The main reason where-
 of, as I conceive, is, because so very few men are heartily and sin-
 cerely good. The Narration is more considerable, in that he that
 writes it, had it from the man's own mouth whom it concerns, and
 is as follows.

2. This

2. This Party, a holy and pious man, as it should seem, and an acquaintance of *Bodinus's*, freely told him, how that he had a certain *Spirit* that did perpetually accompany him, which he was then first aware of, when he had attain'd to about thirty seven years of age, but conceiv'd that the said *Spirit* had been present with him all his life-time, as he gather'd from certain *Monitory Dreams* and *Visions*, whereby he was forewarn'd as well of several Dangers as Vices. That this *Spirit* discover'd himself to him after he had for a whole year together, earnestly pray'd to God to send a good *Angel* to him, to be the Guide and Governour of his life and actions; adding also, that before and after Prayer, he used to spend two or three hours in meditation and reading the Scriptures, diligently enquiring with himself what *Religion*, amongst those many that are controverted into the world, might be best, beseeching God, that he would be pleas'd to direct him to it; and that he did not allow of their way, that at all adventures pray to God, to confirm them in that opinion they have already preconceived, be it right or wrong. That while he was thus busy with himself, in matters of Religion, that he lighted on a passage in *Philo Judæus*, in his Book, *De Sacrificiis*, where he writes, that a good and holy Man can offer no greater, nor more acceptable Sacrifice to God, than the Oblation of himself; and therefore following *Philo's* counsel, that he offered his Soul to God. And that after that, amongst many other divine *Dreams* and *Visions*, he once, in his sleep, seem'd to hear the voice of God saying to him, *I will save thy Soul, I am he that before appeared unto thee.* Afterwards that the *Spirit* every day would knock at the door about three or four a clock in the morning, though he rising and opening the door, could see no body; but that the *Spirit* persisted in this course, and unless he did rise, would thus rouse him up.

3. This trouble and boisterousness made him begin to conceit, that it was some evil *Spirit* that thus haunted him, and therefore he daily pray'd earnestly unto God, that he would be pleas'd to send a good *Angel* unto him; and often also sung Psalms, having most of them by heart.

Wherefore the *Spirit* afterward knocked more gently at the door, and one day discover'd himself to him waking, which was the first time that he was assured by his senses that it was he; for he often touched and stirred a Drinking-glass that stood in his chamber, which did not a little amaze him.

Two days after, when he entertain'd at Supper a certain friend of his, *Secretary* to the *King*, that this friend of his was much abash'd while he heard the *Spirit* thumping on the bench hard by him, and was stricken with fear; but he bad him be of good courage; there was no hurt towards him; and the better to assure him of it, told him the truth of the whole matter.

Wherefore from that time, saith *Bodinus*, he did affirm that this *Spirit* was always with him, and, by some sensible sign, did ever advertize him of things; as by striking his right Ear, if he did any thing amiss; if otherwise, his left. If any body came to circumvent him, that his right Ear was struck; but his left Ear, if a good man, and

to good ends accosted him. If he was but to eat or drink any thing that would hurt him, or intended, or purpos'd with himself to do any thing that would prove ill, that he was inhibited by a *sign*; and if he delayed to follow his business, that he was quicken'd by a *sign* given him.

When he began to praise God in Psalms, and to declare his marvellous Acts, that he was presently raised and strengthen'd with a spiritual and supernatural power.

4. That he daily begg'd of God, that he would teach him his Will, his Law, and his Truth; and that he set one day of the week apart for reading the Scripture and Meditation, with singing of Psalms, and that he did not stir out of his house all that day: but that, in his ordinary conversation, he was sufficiently merry, and of a cheerful mind, and he cited that saying for it, *Vidi facies Sanctorum letas*. But in his conversing with others, if he had talk'd vainly and indiscreetly, or had some days together neglected his Devotions, that he was forthwith admonished thereof by a *Dream*. That he was also admonished to rise betimes in the morning, and that about four of the clock, a voice would come to him while he was asleep, saying, *Who gets up first to pray?*

5. He told Bodinus also how he was often admonished to give Alms, and that the more Charity he bestow'd, the more prosperous he was. And that on a time, when his enemies sought after his Life, and knew that he was to go by water, that his Father, in a *Dream*, brought two horses to him, the one white, the other bay; and that therefore he bid his servant hire him two horses, and though he told him nothing of the colours, that yet he brought him a white one, and a bay one.

That in all difficulties, journeyings, and what other enterprises soever, he used to ask counsel of God; and that one night, when he had begged his blessing, while he slept, he saw a *Vision*, wherein his Father seem'd to bless him.

At another time, when he was in very great Danger, and was newly gone to bed, he said, that the Spirit would not let him alone till he had raised him again; wherefore he watch'd and pray'd all that night. The day after, he escaped the hands of his Persecutors in a wonderful manner; which being done, in his next sleep he heard a voice, saying, Now sing, *Qui sedet in latibulo Altissimi*.

6. A great many other passages this Party told Bodinus, so many, indeed, that he thought it an endless labour to recite them all. But what remains of those he has recited, I will not stick to take the pains of transcribing.

Bodinus asked him, why he would not speak to the Spirit, for the gaining of the more plain and familiar converse with it. He answered, that he once attempted it, but the Spirit instantly struck the door with that vehemency, as if he had knock'd upon it with an hammer: whereby he gather'd his dislike of the matter.

7. But though the Spirit would not talk with him, yet he could make use of his judgment in the reading of books, and moderating his studies. For if he took an ill book into his hands, and fell a reading, the

the *Spirit* would strike it, that he might lay it down; and would also sundry times, be the books what they would, hinder him from reading and writing overmuch, that his mind might rest, and silently meditate with it self. He added also, that very often while he was awake, a small, subtile, inarticulate sound would come unto his Ears.

8. *Bodinus* further enquiring, whether he ever did see the *Shape* and *Form* of the *Spirit*, he told him, that while he was awake he never saw any thing but a certain light very bright and clear, and of a round *Compass* and *Figure*; but that once, being in great jeopardy of his life, and having heartily pray'd to God, that he would be pleas'd to provide for his safety, about break of day, amidst his slumberings and wakings, he espy'd on his bed where he lay, a young Boy clad in a white Garment, tinctur'd somewhat with a touch of purple, and of a visage admirably lovely, and beautiful to behold. This he confidently affirmed to *Bodinus* for a certain truth.

CHAP. XIV.

1. *Certain Enquiries upon the preceding Narration; as, What these Guardian Genii may be. 2. Whether one or more of them be allotted to every man, or to some none. 3. What may be the reason of Spirits so seldom appearing; 3. And whether they have any settled shape or no. 5. What their manner is of assisting men in their Devotion or Prophecy. 6. Whether every man's complexion is capable of the Society of a good Genius. And lastly, Whether it be lawful to pray to God to send such a Genius or Angel to one, or no. 8. What the most effectual and divinest Magick.*

i. **I**T is beside my present scope, as I have already professed, to enter into any more particular and more curious Disquisitions concerning the nature of *Spirits*, my aim being now only to demonstrate their *Existence* by those strange *Effects* recorded every where in History. But this last Narration is so extraordinarily remarkable, that it were a piece of disrespect done to it, to dismiss it without some *Enquiries*, at least into such *Problems* as it naturally affords to our consideration; though it may well seem plainly beyond the power of humane Wit, or Laws of Modesty, to determine any thing therein.

In the first place therefore, it cannot but amuse a man's mind to think what these officious *Spirits* should be, that so willingly sometimes offer themselves to consociate with a man: Whether they may be *Angels* incapable of incorporation into humane Bodies, which vulgarly is conceived? Or whether the *Souls of the Deceased*, they having more affinity with mortality and humane frailty than the other, and so more sensible of our necessities and infirmities, having once felt them themselves; a reason alledged for the Incarnation of *Christ* by the Author to the *Hebrews*? which opinion has no worse favourers

than *Plutarch*, *Maximus Tyrius*, and other *Platonists*: Or lastly, Whether there may not be of *both sorts*. For separate Souls being *ἰαγγελοι*, in a condition not unlike the *Angels themselves*, it is easy to conceive that they may very well undergo the like offices.

2. Secondly, we are invited to enquire, Whether every man have his *Guardian Genius*, or no? That *Witches* have many, such as they are, their own *Confessions* testify. The *Pythagoreans* were of opinion, that every man has *two Genii*, a good one and a bad one. Which *Mahomet* has taken into his Religion, adding also, that they sit on mens shoulders with table-books in their hands, and that the one writes down all the good, the other all the evil a man does. But such expressions as those I look upon as symbolical, rather than natural. And I think it more reasonable, that a man changing the frame of his mind, changes his *Genius* withal: or rather, unless a man be very sincere, and single-hearted, that he is left to common Providence; as well as if he be not desperately wicked or deplorably miserable, scarce any particular *evil Spirit* interposes, or offers himself a perpetual *Assistant* in his affairs and fortunes. But extreme Poverty, irksome old Age, want of Friends, the Contempt, Injury, and Hard-heartedness of evil Neighbours, working upon a Soul low sunk into the Body, and wholly devoid of the divine Life, does sometimes kindle so sharp, so eager, and so piercing a desire of *Satisfaction* and *Revenge*, that the shrieks of men while they are a murdering, the howling of a Wolf in the fields in the night, or the squeaking and roaring of tortured Beasts, do not so certainly call to them those of their own kind, as this powerful *Magick* of a pensive and complaining Soul, in the bitterness of its affliction, attracts the aid of these over-officious *Spirits*. So that it is most probable, that they that are the forwardest to hang *Witches*, are the first that made them, and have no more goodness nor true piety, than these they so willingly prosecute, but are as wicked as they, though with better luck, or more discretion, offending no further than the Law will permit them; and therefore they securely starve the poor helpless man, though with a great deal of clamour of Justice, they will revenge the death of their *Hog* or *Cow*.

3. Thirdly, it were worth our disquisition, Why *Spirits* so seldom now a-days appear, especially those that are good? whether it be not the wickedness of the present Age, as I have already hinted; or the general prejudice men have against all *Spirits* that appear, that they must be straightways *Devils*; or the frailty of humane nature, that is not usually able to bear the appearance of a *Spirit*, no more than other Animals are; for into what agonies Horses and Dogs are cast upon their approach, is in every one's mouth, and is a good circumstance to distinguish a real *Apparition* from our own Imaginations? Or lastly, Whether it be the condition of *Spirits* themselves, who, it may be, without some violence done to their own nature, cannot become visible; it being haply as troublesome a thing to them to keep themselves in one steady visible consistency in the Air, as it is for men that dive, to hold their breath in the water.

4. Fourthly,

4. Fourthly, it may deserve our search, Whether Spirits have any settled *form* or *shape*. *Angels* are commonly pictur'd like good plump cherry-cheek'd Lads. Which is no wonder, the boldness of the same *Artists* not sticking to picture God Almighty in the shape of an old man. In both it is as it pleases the *Painter*. But this Story seems rather to favour their opinion that say, that *Angels* and separate *Souls* have no settled *form*, but what they please to give themselves upon occasion, by the power of their own Phancy. *Phicinus*, as I remember, somewhere calls them *Aereal Stars*. And the good *Genii* seem to me to be as the benign Eyes of God, running to and fro in the world, with love and pity beholding the innocent endeavours of harmless and single-hearted men, ever ready to do them good, and to help them.

What I conceive of separate *Souls* and *Spirits*, I cannot better express than I have already in my *Poem* of the *Pra-existency* of the *Soul*; which therefore will not be altogether impertinent to repeat in this place.

*Like to a Light fast lock'd in Lanthorn dark,
Whereby by Night our wary steps we guide
In slabby streets, and dirty Chânels mark;
Some weaker rays from the black top do glide,
And flusher streams perhaps through th' horny side:
But when we've past the peril of the way,
Arriv'd at home, and laid that case aside,
The naked light how clearly doth it ray,
And spread its joyful beams as bright as Summers day!*

*Even so the Soul, in this contracted state,
Confin'd to these streight Instruments of Sense,
More dull and narrowly doth operate;
At this hole hears, the Sight must ray from thence,
Here tastes, there smells: But when she's gone from hence,
Like naked lamp, she is one shining sphear,
And round about has perfect cognoscence,
Whate're in her Horizon doth appear;
She is one Orb of Sense, all Eye, all airy Ear.*

And what I speak there of the condition of the *Soul* out of the *Body*, I think is easily applicable to other *Genii* or *Spirits*.

5. The fifth Enquiry may be, How these good *Genii* become serviceable to men, for either heightening their *Devotions*, or inabling them to *Prophecy*; whether it can be by any other way than by descending into their *Bodies*, and possessing the *Heart* and *Brain*? For the *Euchites*, who affected the gift of *Prophecy*, by familiarity with evil *Spirits*, did utterly obliterate in their *Souls* the *πνευματικά σύμβολα*, the Principles of Goodness and Honesty, (as you may see in *Pfellus* *περὶ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων*) that the evil *Spirits* might come into their *Bodies*, whom those sparks of *Virtue*, as they said, would drive away; but those being extinguish'd, they could come in and possess them, and inable

them to *prophecy*. And that the Imps of Witches do sometimes enter their own Bodies, as well as those to whom they send them, is plain in the story of the Witches of *Warbois*. It is also the opinion of *Trismegist*, that these Spirits get into the Veins and Arteries both of men and beasts.

Wherefore concerning the *Dreams* and *Visions* of this holy man that so freely imparted himself to *Bodinus*, it may be conceived reasonable, that the *good Genius* insinuated himself into his very Body, as well as the *bad* into the Bodies of the wicked; and that residing in his *Brain*, and *figuring* of it, by thinking of this, or that Object, as we our selves *figure* it when we think, the external senses being laid asleep, those *figurations* would easily be represented to the *Common sense*; and that *Memory* recovering them when he was awaked, they could not but seem to him as other *Dreams* did, saving that they were better, they ever signifying something of importance unto him.

But those Raptures of *Devotion* by day might be by the Spirit's kindling a purer kind of Love-flame in his *Heart*, as well as by fortifying and raising his *Imagination*. And how far a man shall be carried beyond himself in this redoubled Soul in him, none, I think, can well conceive, unless they had the experience of it.

6. And if this be their manner of communion, it may well be enquired into, in the sixth place, Whether *all men* be capable of conso- ciation with these *good Genii*? *Cardan* somewhere intimates, that their approaches are deprehensible by certain *sweet smells* they cast. From whence it may seem not improbable, that those Bodies that smell *sweet* themselves, where the Mind does not *stink* with *Pride* and *Hypocrisy*, have some natural advantage for the gaining of their Society. But if there be any peculiar *complexion* or *natural condition* required, it will prove less hopeful for every one to obtain their acquaintance. Yet *Regeneration* come to its due pitch, though it cannot be without much pain and anguish, may well rectify all uncleanness of nature; so that no singularly-good and sincere man can reasonably despair of their familiarity. For he that is so highly in favour with the *Prince*, it is no wonder he is taken notice of by his *Courtiers*.

7. But the last and most considerable question is, Whether it be lawful to *pray* to God for such a *good Genius* or *Angel*. For the Example in the foregoing Story seems a sufficient warrant. But I conceive Faith and Desire ought to be full-sail to make such Voyages prosperous, and our end and purpose pure and sincere. But if Pride, Conceitedness, or Affectation of some peculiar privilege above other mortals, spur a man up to so bold an Enterprize, his Devotions will no more move either God or the *good Genii*, than the whining voice of a Counterfeit will stir the affection of the discreetly Charitable. Nay, this high Presumption may invite some real *Fiends* to put a worse jest upon him, than was put upon that tatter'd Rogue *Guzman* by those *Mock-Spirits*, for his so impudently pretended Kindred, and so boldly intruding himself into the knowledge and acquaintance of the Gentry and Nobility of *Genoa*.

8. But the *safest Magick* is the sincere consecrating a man's Soul to God, and the aspiring to nothing but so profound a pitch of *Humility*, as not to be conscious to our selves of being at all touched with the praise and applause of men; and to such a free and universal sense of *Charity*, as to be delighted with the welfare of another as much as our own. They that solely have their eye upon these, will find coming in whatever their heart can desire. But they that put forth their hand to catch at high things, as they fancy, and neglect these, prove at last but a Plague to themselves, and a Laughing-stock to the world.

These are the several Speculations that the foregoing Narration would naturally beget in the minds of the curious. But methinks I hear the *Atheist* replying to all this, That I have run a long division upon uncertain grounds, and asking me, not without some scorn and anger, whether I believe that multifarious Fable I have rehearsed out of *Bodinus*, and so much descanted upon? To which I answer, That I will not take my oath that the most likely passage in all *Plutarch's Lives*, or *Livie's History*, is assuredly true. But however that I am not ashamed to profess, that I am as well assured in my own judgment of the *Existence of Spirits*, as that I have met with men in *Westminster-Hall*, or seen beasts in *Smithfield*.

CHAP. XV.

1. *The Structure of Man's body, and Apparitions, the most convictive Arguments against the Atheist.* 2. *His first evasion of the former of them, pretending it never was, but there were men and women, and other Species in the World.* 3. *The Author's answer to this pretension. First, That every man was mortal, and therefore was either created, or rose out of the Earth.* 4. *Secondly, That even in infinite succession there is something First ordine Naturæ, and that these First were either created, or rose out of the Earth.* 5. *Thirdly, That if there were always men in the world, and every man born of a woman, some was both Father and Son, Man and Babe at once.* 6. *That it is contrary to the Laws of mere blind Matter, that man, in his adult perfections, should exist there from at once.* 7. *The Atheist's second evasion, That the Species of things arose from the multifarious attempts of the motion of the matter; with a threefold Answer thereto.* 8. *An evasion of the last Answer, touching the perpetual exactness in the fabrick of all living Species; with a threefold Answer also to that Evasion. The further serviceableness of this Answer for the quite taking away the first Evasion of the Atheist.*

1. **T**HUS have we gone through the many and manifold Effects represented to our Senses on this wide Theatre of the world; the faintest and obscurest whereof are Arguments enough to prove the *Existence of a Deity*. But some being more palpable than others, some,

some, and more accommodate to awaken the dull and flow belief of the *Atheist* into the acknowledgment of a *God*, it will not be amiss to take notice of what *Evasions* he attempts to make for the extricating himself out of those that he fancies the most sensibly to entangle him, and the most strongly to hinder his escape.

And such are especially these two last I insisted upon, *The curious frame of Man's Body*, and *Apparitions*.

2. And the force of the former, some endeavour to evade thus; "That there hath ever been Man and Woman, and other *Species* in the world, and so it is no wonder that like should propagate its like, and therefore that there is no want of any other invisible or material cause, but the *Species* of things themselves: and so these admirable contrivances in Nature must imply no divine *Wisdom* nor *Counsel*, nor any such thing.

3. But here I demand, whether there were ever any *Man* that was not mortal? and whether there be any mortal that had not a *beginning*? and if he had, it must be either by *Generation*, or *Creation*. If by *Creation*, there is a *God*: If by equivocal *Generation*, as rising out of *Earth*, our Argument will hold good still, notwithstanding this *Evasion*. But if you'll say, there was never any man in the world but was born of a woman, this must amount but to thus much, that there hath been an *infinite* number of *successions* of births. If there be meant by it any thing more than thus, it will not prove sense.

4. For though our Phancy cannot run through an *infinite series* of *Effects*, yet our Reason is assured there is no *Effect* without a *Cause*, and be the Progress of *Causes* and *Effects* as *infinite* as it will, at last we resolve it naturally into some *First*: and he that denies this, seems to me wilfully to wink against the light of Nature, and do violence to the Faculties of his Mind. And therefore of necessity there must be at least one *first Man* and *Woman*, which are *first ordine Nature*, though infinity of time, reckoning from the present, causeth a confusion and obscurity in our apprehensions. And these which are thus *first* in order of *Nature* or *Causality*, must also exist first before there can be any other Men or Women in the World. And therefore concerning these *first*, it being manifest, that they were born of no Parents, it follows they were *Created*, or rose out of the *Earth*, and so the *Evasion* will be frustrated.

5. Besides, if you affirm that there was never any *Man* in the world but was born of a *Woman*, and so grew to Man's estate by degrees, it will fall to some man's share to be a *Babe* and a *Man* at once, or to be both *Father* and *Child*. For so soon as Mankind was, (let it be from Eternity, and beyond Eternity is nothing) those that then existed were begot of *some body*, and there was *nothing* before them to beget them, therefore they begot *themselves*.

6. But that they should at once then have been *perfect Men*, their substances being of alterable and passive matter, that is, wrought diversly, and by degrees into the frame it hath, according to the perpetual testimony of Nature, is as rash as if they should say that *Boots*,
and

and *Shoes*, and *Stockins*, and *Pyes*, and *Peels*, and *Ovens*, have been together with all *Eternity*: whenas it is manifest, there ought to be an orderly interval of time before these things can be, wherein must precede the killing of Oxen, and slaying of them, as also of Sheep, tanning, spinning, cutting, and many more such like circumstances. So that it is enormously ridiculous to say, that *Mankind* might have been at once from all *Eternity*, unless the *Omnipotency* of a God, who can do whatever we can imagine, and more, should by his irresistible *Fiat*, cause such a thing in a moment, so soon as himself was, which was ever, and he was never to seek for either power or skill.

But that the fluid and blind *Matter* of it self should have been thus raised up from all *Eternity* into such compleat *Species* of things, is very groundless and irrational. I say, that there ever should be such a thing as this in the World, a *Man* at once existing of himself in this corporeal frame that we see, who notwithstanding did afterwards die like other mortals, is a Fable above all Poetical Figments whatsoever, and more incredible than the fondest Legend that any Religion ever offer'd to the *Atheists* belief.

7. Others therefore deserting this way of *Evasion*, betake themselves to another, which, though it seem more plausible at first view, is fully as frivolous. They say, "That all the *Species* of things, *Man* himself not excepted, came first out of the Earth, by the omni-
" farious attempt of *the particles of the matter* upon one another,
" which at last light on so lucky a construction and fabrick of the
" Bodies of Creatures as we see; and that having an infinite *series*
" of time to try all tricks in, they would of necessity at last come to
" this they are.

But I answer, that *these particles* might commit infinite *Tautologies* in their strokes and motions, and that therefore there was no such necessity at all of falling into those forms and shapes that appear in the world.

Again, there is that excellent contrivance in the *Body*, suppose of a *Man*, as I have heretofore instanced, that it cannot but be the effect of very accurate *Knowledge* and *Counsel*.

And lastly, This concourse of *Atoms*, they being left without a guide, it is a miracle above all apprehension, that they should produce no *inept Species* of things, such as should of their own nature have but three Legs, and one Eye, or but one Ear, rows of Teeth along the *Vertebrae* of their Backs, and the like, as I have above intimated; these *Inep- titudes* being more easy to hit upon, than such *accurate* and irreprehensible *frames* of Creatures.

8. But to elude the force of this Argument against the fortuitous concourse of *Atoms*, they'll excogitate this mad evasion; "That Na-
" ture did indeed at first bring forth such ill-favoured and ill-appoint-
" ed *Monsters*, as well as those that are of a more exquisite frame;
" but those that were more perfect fell upon those other, and kill'd
" them, and devoured them, they being not so well provided of
" either limbs or senses as the other, and so were never able to hop
" fast enough from them, or maturely to discover the approaching
" dangers that ever and anon were coming upon them. But this un-
just

just and audacious calumny cast upon God and Nature, will be easily discover'd, and convicted of falshood, if we do but consider;

First, That *Trees, Herbs, and Flowers*, that do not stir from their places, or exercise such fierce cruelty one upon another, are all, in their several kinds, *handsome and elegant*, and have no *ineptitude or defect* in them.

Secondly, That all Creatures born of *Putrefaction*, as *Mice and Frogs*, and the like, as those many hundreds of *Insects*, as *Grashoppers, Flies, Spiders*, and such other, that these also have a most *accurate contrivance of parts*, and that there is nothing fram'd rashly or ineptly in any of them.

Lastly, In more perfect Creatures, as in the *Scotch Barnacles*, which *Historians* write of; of which, if there be any doubt, yet *Gerard* relates that of his own knowledge, (which is as admirable, and as much to our purpose,) there is a kind of *Fowl*, which in *Lancashire* are called *Tree-Geese*; they are bred out of rotten pieces of broken Ships, and trunks of *Trees* cast upon a little Island in *Lancashire*, they call the *Pile of Foulders*: the same Author, saith he, hath found the like also in other parts of this Kingdom. Those *Fowls* in all respects, though they are bred thus of *putrefaction*, (and that they are thus bred, is undeniably true, as any man, if he please, may satisfy himself by consulting *Gerard*, the very last page of his *History of Plants*,) are of as exact a *Fabrick of Body*, and as fitly contriv'd for the Functions of such a kind of living Creature, as any of those that are produced by *propagation*. Nay, these kind of *Fowls* themselves do also propagate, which has imposed so upon the foolishness of some, that they have denied that other way of their generation; whenas the being generated one way does not exclude the other, as is seen in *Frogs and Mice*.

Wherefore those Productions out of the *Earth* and of *Putrefaction*, being thus perfect and accurate in all points, as well as others, it is a manifest discovery that Nature did never frame any *Species* of things ineptly and foolishly, and that therefore she was ever guided by *Counsel and Providence*, that is, That *Nature* her self is the effect of an all-knowing God.

9. Nor doth this consideration only take away this present *Evasion*, but doth more palpably and intelligibly enervate the former. For what boots it them to fly unto an infinite propagation of *Individuals* in the same eternal *Species*, as they imagine, that they might be able always to assign a Cause answerable to the effect; whenas there are such Effects as these, and Products of *Putrefaction*, where *Wisdom and Counsel* are as truly conspicuous as in others? For thus are they nevertheless necessarily illaqueated in that inconvenience, which they thought to have escaped by so quaint a subtilty.

CHAP. XVI.

1. *The Atheists Evasions against Apparitions: as first, That they are mere Imaginations. 2. Then, that though they be realities without, yet they are caused by the force of Imagination; with the confutation of these Conceits. 3. Their fond conceit, That the Skirmishings in the Air are from the exuvius Effluxes of things; with a confutation thereof. 4. A copious confutation of their last subterfuge, (viz. That those Fightings are the Reflexions of Battels on the Earth) from the distance, and debility of Reflexion; 5. From the rude Politure of the Clouds; 6. From their inability of reflecting so much as the image of the stars; which yet were a thing far easier; First, by reason of the undiminisshableness of their magnitude. 7. Then from the purity of their light. 8. Thirdly, From the posture of our Eye on the shade of the Earth. 9. Lastly, From their dispersedness; ready from every part to be reflected; if the Clouds had any such Reflexivity in them. 10. That if they have any such Reflexivity as to represent battels so exceeding distant, it is by some supernatural Artifice. 11. That this Artifice has its limited Laws. 12. Whence at least some of ther Aerial battles cannot be Reflexions from the Earth. 13. Machiavel's opinion concerning these Fightings in the Air. 14. Nothing so demonstrable in Philosophy as the Being of a God. 15. That Pedantick affectation of Atheism, whence it probably arose. 16. The true causes of being really prone to Atheism. 17. That men ought not to oppose their mere complexional humours against the Principles of Reason, and Testimonies of Nature and History. His Apology for being so copious in the reciting of Stories of Spirits.*

1. **N**OW for their *Evasions* whereby they would elude the force of that Argument for *Spirits*, which is drawn from *Apparitions*; they are so weak and silly, that a man may be almost sure they were convinced in their judgment of the truth of such like Stories, else it had been better flatly to have denied them, than to feign such idle and vain Reasons of them.

For first, they say, they are nothing but *Imaginations*, and that there is nothing real without us in such *Apparitions*.

2. But being beaten off from this slight account, for that many see the same thing at once, then they fly to so miraculous a power of *Phancy*, as if it were able to change the Air into a real shape and form, so that others may behold it, as well as he that fram'd it by the power of his *Phancy*.

Now I demand of any man, whether this be not a harder Mystery, and more unconceivable, than all the *Magical Metamorphoses* of Devils or Witches. For it is far easier to conceive, that some knowing thing in the Air should thus transform the Air into this or that shape, being in that part of the Air it doth thus transform, than that the *Imagination* of man, which is but a Modification of his own Mind, should be able at a distance to change it into such like *Appearances*. But suppose it could, can it animate the Air, that it doth thus meta-
mor-

morphize, and make it *ſpeak*, and *answer* to questions, and *put things* into mens hands, and the like? O the credulity of besotted *Atheism*! How intoxicated and infatuated are they in their conceits, being given up to sensuality, and having lost the free use of the natural Faculties of their Mind!

But shall this force of *Imagination* reach as high as the *Clouds* also, and make Men *fight* pitched Battles *in the Air*, running and charging one against the other?

In his 51 Dial.
de Apparitionibus.

3. Here the same bold pretender to Wit and Philology, *Cesar Vaninus*, (who cunningly and juggingly endeavours to infuse the poyson of *Atheism* into the mind of his Reader on every occasion) hath recourse to those old cast rags of *Epicurus* his School, the *exuvius Effluxes* of things, and attempts to ſolve these *Phænomena* thus: That the *vapours* of *Mens bodies*, and it ſeems of *Horses* too, are carried up into the *Air*, and fall into a certain proportionable poſture of parts, and ſo imitate the figures of them aloft among the *Clouds*.

But I demand how the *vapours* of the *horses* find the *vapours* of their *Riders*: and when, and how long are they coming together? and whether they appear not before there be any Armies in the field, to ſend up ſuch *vapours*? and whether *harness* and *weapons* ſend up *vapours* too, as *Swords*, *Pikes*, and *Shields*? and how they come to light ſo happily into the hands of thoſe Aerial-men of war, eſpecially the *vapours* of *Metals* (if they have any) being heavier in all likelihood than the reek of *Animals* and *Men*? and laſtly, how they come to *diſcharge* at one another, and to *fight*, there being neither life nor ſoul in them? and whether *Sounds* alſo have their *Exuvia* that are reſerved till theſe ſolemnities; for at *Alborough* in *Suffolk*, 1642. were heard in the *Air*, very loud beating of *Drums*, ſhooting of *Muſquets* and *Ordnance*; as alſo in other ſuch like Prodigies there hath been heard the ſounding of *Trumpets*, as *Snellius* writes. And *Pliny* alſo makes mention of the ſounding of *Trumpets*, and *clashing* of *Armour* heard out of the heavens, about the *Cimbrick Wars*, and often before. But here at *Alborough*, all was concluded with a melodious noiſe of *Muſical Inſtruments*.

Hiſt Natural.
lib. 2. cap. 57.

The *Exuvia* of *Fiddles*, it ſeems, fly up into the *Air* too; or were thoſe *Muſical Accents* frozen there for a time, and at the heat and firing of the *Canons*, the *Air* relenting and thawing, became ſo harmoniouſly vocal? With what vain conceits are men intoxicated, that wilfully wink againſt the light of Nature, and are eſtranged from the true knowledge and acknowledgment of a God!

Dialog. 51.

4. But there is another *Evaſion* which the ſame ſedulous Inſinuator of *Atheism* would make uſe of in caſe this ſhould not hold, which ſeems more ſober, but no leſs falſe: and that is this; That theſe *fightings* and *ſkirmiſhings* *in the Air* are only the *reflexion* of ſome real battle on the Earth. But this in Nature is plainly impoſſible. For of neceſſity theſe Armies thus fighting, being at ſuch a *diſtance* from the *Spectators*, that the ſame of the battle never arrives to their ears, their eyes can never behold it by any *reflexion* from the *Clouds*. For beſides that *reflexion* makes the images more *dim* than *direct* fight,

sight, such a *distance* from the Army to the clouds, and then from the clouds to our eye, will lessen the *species* so exceedingly, that they will not at all be *visible*.

5. Or if we could imagine that there might be sometimes such an advantage in the figure of these Clouds, as might in some sort remedy this *lessening* of the *species*, yet their surfaces are so exceeding *rudely polish'd*, and *reflection* (which, as I said, is ever *dim* enough of it self,) is here so extraordinarily *imperfect*, that they can never be able, according to the course of nature, to return the *species* of terrestrial Objects back again to our sight, it being so evident that they are unfit for what is of far less difficulty. For we never find them able to reflect the image of a *Star*, whenas not only glass, but every troubled pool, or dirty splash of water in the high-way, does usually do it.

6. But that it is far easier for a *Star* than for any of *these Objects* here upon Earth to be *reflected* to our Eyes by those rude natural Looking-glasses placed among the Clouds, sundry reasons will sufficiently inform us.

For first, the Stars do not abate at all of their *usual magnitude* in which they ordinarily appear to us by this reflexion, the difference of many hundreds of Leagues making no difference of magnitude in them; for indeed the distance of the *Diameter* of the *Orbite* of the Earth makes none, as must be acknowledged by all those that admit of the *annual motion* thereof. But a very few miles do exceedingly diminish the usual bigness of the *species* of an Horse or Man, even to that littleness, that they grow invisible. What then will become of his *sword*, *shield*, or *spear*? And in these cases we now speak of, how great a journey the *species* have from the Earth to the Cloud that reflects them, I have intimated before.

7. Secondly, It is manifest that a Star hath the pre-eminence above these *Terrestrial Objects*, in that it is as *pure* a light as the Sun, though not so *big*, but they but *opaque* coloured bodies; and that therefore there is no comparison betwixt the vigour and strength of the *species* of a Star, and of them.

8. Thirdly, In the *Night-time* the Eye being placed in the shadow of the Earth, those *reflexions* of a Star will be yet more easily visible; whenas the great light of the Sun by Day, must needs much debilitate these reflected Images of the Objects upon the Earth, his beams striking our Eyes with so strong vibrations.

9. Fourthly and lastly, There being Stars all over the Firmament so as there are, it should seem a hundred times more easy for natural Causes to hit upon a *Paraster* or *Parastron*, (for let Analogy embolden me so to call these seldom, or never seen *Phenomena*, the image of a single Star, or whole Constellation reflected from the Clouds) than upon a *Parelios* or *Paraselené*. But now the Story of these is more than an hundred times more frequent than that of the *Paraster*. For it is so seldom discover'd, that it is doubted whether it be or no, or rather acknowledged not to be; of which there can be no reason, but that the *clouds* are so *ill polish'd*, that they are not able to reflect so considerable a light as a Star. From whence, I think, we may safely

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gather, that it is therefore impossible that they should reflect so debile *Species* as the colours and shapes of Beasts and Men, and that so accurately as that we may see their swords, helmets, shields, spears, and the like.

10. Wherefore it is plain, that these *Apparitions* on high in the Air are no reflexions of any Objects upon Earth; or if it were imaginable that they were, that some *supernatural Cause* must assist to conglaciate and polish the surfaces of the clouds to such an extraordinary accuracy of figure and smoothness as will suffice for such prodigious reflexions.

And that these *Spirits* that rule in the Air may not act upon the materials there, as well as *Men* here upon the Earth work upon the parts thereof, as also upon the neighbouring Elements so far as they can reach, shaping, perfecting, and directing things according to their own purpose and pleasure, I know no reason at all in Nature or Philosophy for any man to deny. For that the help of some officious *Genii* is employ'd in such like Prodigies as these, the seasonableness of their appearance seems no contemptible argument, they being, according to the observation of Historians, the * *Forerunners of Com-motions and Troubles* in all Kingdoms and Common-wealths.

* The same which *Vani-nus* himself acknowledges in his Dialogues, *Dial.* 51.

11. Yet nevertheless as good Artificers as I here suppose, they working upon Nature must be bounded by the Laws of Nature: and *reflexion* will have its limits as well as *refraction*, whether for conveyance of *species*, or kindling of heat; the laws and bounds whereof that discerning Wit *Cartesius* being well aware of, doth generously and judiciously pronounce, *That a burning-Glass, the distance of whose focus from the Glass doth not bear a less proportion to the Diameter thereof than the distance of the Earth from the Sun to the Diameter of the Sun, will burn no more vehemently than the direct rays of the Sun will do without it, though in other respects this Glass were as exactly shaped and curiously polished as could be expected from the hand of an Angel.*

12. Wherefore suppose the surface of the clouds polished never so well, and fitted for reflexion, it is still evident that some of these *Ap-paritions* cannot be such as are mere reflexions of Armies skirmishing on the ground. For those that are observed to fight determinately over such and such a City, if they be but the mere reflexions of fights, of necessity they must be from some Armies not far off: and if so, they could not but be discover'd, at least by speedy report. Whence it is manifest, that such Skirmishings in the clouds are real Encounters there, not the Images or Reflexions of Battles on the Ground. And considering that there have been such real Prodigies of fightings on the ground it self by these Aerial Coursers, as I have * above intimated, it is but reasonable to conceive, that the generality of the rest of these prodigious Skirmishings, though not determinate to this or that City, are really in the clouds or sky, not a shadow or reflexion of Battles upon the Earth.

• See chap. 12. sect. 6.

But that these Fightings have been seen over such and such Cities, were easy to make good out of History: I shall only instance in *Snellius* his report of *Amortfort*, that such Skirmishings were seen there, and that nigh over the very tops of their houses. The like

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Machiavel reports concerning *Aretium*, and acknowledges that such kind of Prodigies are very frequent in History, as also certain fore-runners of the Troubles and Disturbances of that State and Country wherein they appear.

13. His own words are so free and ingenuous, and his judgment so considerable, (though he will not pretend to Philosophy) touching the reason of these strange sights, that I think it worth the while to transcribe them. * *Hujusmodi rerum causas ab iis explicari posse credo qui rerum naturalium ac supranaturalium cognitione insignes sunt, a qua me alienum esse fateor: nisi forte cum philosophis quibusdam pronuncian-* * Disput. de
Republica. 1.
cap. 56.
dum censeamus, aerem plenum spiritibus & intelligentiis esse, qua res futuras praevidentes, & casibus humanis condolentes, eas hominibus per hujusmodi signa prae-nuncient, ut se adversus eas tempestivius preparare & commu-nire queant. Utut se res habeat, Experiencia certè compertum habemus talia signa sequi solere magnos aliquos motus.

14. I have now compleated this present Treatise against *Atheism* in all the Three parts thereof: upon which while I cast mine eye, and view that clear and irrefutable evidence of the Cause I have undertaken, the *external appearances* of things in the world, so faithfully seconding the undeniable dictates of the *innate Principles* of our own Minds, I cannot but with confidence aver, That there is not any one notion in all Philosophy more certain and demonstrable than *That there is a God.*

And verily I think I have ransacked all the corners of every kind of Philosophy that can pretend to bear any stroke in this Controversy with that diligence, that I may safely pronounce, that it is mere brutish *Ignorance* or *Impudence*, no *Skill in Nature*, or the *Knowledge* of things, that can encourage any man to profess *Atheism*, or to embrace it at the proposal of those that make profession of it.

15. But so I conceive it is, that at first some famously-learned men being not so indiscreetly zealous and superstitious as others, have been mistaken by *Ideots*, and traduced for *Atheists*; and then ever after some vain-glorious Fool or other hath affected, with what Safety he could, to seem *Atheistical*, that he might thereby forsooth be reputed the more learned, or the profounder *Naturalist*.

16. But I dare assure any man, that if he do but search into the bottom of this enormous *disease of the Soul*, as *Trismegist* truly calls it, he will find nothing to be the cause thereof but either *vanity* of mind, or brutish *sensuality*, and an untamed desire of satisfying a man's own will in every thing, an *obnoxious* Conscience, and a base *Fear* of divine Vengeance, *ignorance* of the scantness and insufficiency of second causes, a jumbled *feculency* and *incomposedness* of the spirits, by reason of perpetual intemperance and luxury, or else a dark bedeadening *Melancholy*, that so starves and kills the apprehension of the Soul, in divine matters especially, that it makes a man as inept for such contemplations, as if his head was filled with cold Earth, or dry Grave-moulds.

17. And to such flow Constitutions as these, I shall not wonder if, as the *first Part* of my Discourse must seem marvellous subtil, so the *last* appear ridiculously incredible. But they are to remember, that I

do not here appeal to the *Complexional* humors or peculiar Relishes of men that arise out of the temper of the *Body*, but to the known and unalterable *Ideas* of the *Mind*, to the *Phænomena* of *Nature*, and Records of *History*. Upon the last whereof, if I have something more fully insisted, it is not to be imputed to any vain credulity of mine, or that I take a pleasure in telling strange Stories, but that I thought fit to fortify and strengthen the Faith of others as much as I could; but being well assured that a contemptuous misbelief of such like Narrations concerning *Spirits*, and an endeavour of making them all ridiculous and incredible, is a dangerous Prelude to *Atheism* it self, or else a more close and crafty profession and insinuation of it. For assuredly that Saying is not more true in Politick, *No Bishop, no King*; than this is in Metaphysics, *No Spirit, no God*.

SCHOLIA

SCHOLIA

ON THE

ANTIDOTE

AGAINST

ATHEISM.

BOOK I. CHAP. IV. SECT. 2. PAG. 15.

— **O**R *what long Body you will, is as thick as it is long, &c.* This may be demonstrated from what we have prov'd in the Notes on the *Immortality of the Soul, Lib. 1. Cap. 2.* Namely, supposing that a Line consists of Points, the *Scalenum* is the same as the *Isoceles*. For the Area of the scalenum A B C being filled



with Lines parallel to A C, since no line can have more than two extremes, it is plain that the Crus B C hath as many Points as the Crus A B, and therefore that the Crura are equal to one another, and the whole long Figure A B C D is as broad as long, and if it were a body, as thick.

Ibid. *And that the tallest Cedar is not so high, &c.* The reason is the same, if you take the line in the basis of the Cedar to be no greater than the height of the Mushroom. But it is not worth while to dwell longer on so obvious a matter.

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Ibid.

Ibid. l. 10. *That the Moon and the Earth are so near to one another, &c.* This is plain from the same Principles. For if you draw a Line in the Diameter of the Earth, scarce the thickness of a Hand, and from the extremes of it fix two Parallels drawn to the Diameter of the Moon, which are *AB*, and *DC*, the line *AD*, suppose, taken in the Diameter of the Earth, will be equal to the line *AB* of the distance of the Moon from the Earth, as aforesaid.

Ibid. l. 20. *That Rounds and Squares are all one Figure, &c.* For in the Square *ABCD*, all the Lines drawn from the Center *E* are equal, as appears in the Scalenum *DEF*, where *DE* and *FE* are equal, as consisting of an equal number of points. And the reason is the same for the rest of the scalenums which make the Square, and for infinite other scalenums, of which it is to be supposed the Square is composed, as *FEG*, *GEH*, *HEI*, *IEC*. All the Crura's *EG*, *EH*, *EI*, *EC*, are easily demonstrated to be equal to the Crus *EF*, so that all the lines drawn from the Center *E*, into the Perimeter of the Square *ABCD*, are demonstrated to be equal, and that the Square it self is a Circle.

Ibid. l. 13. *That Even and Odd numbers are equal one with another, &c.* As in a Triangle rectangular to the *Isoceles*, whose *Hypotenusa* consists of odd points, it is plain, that the Square of the points of the *Hypotenusa*, would be an odd number. Yet the Square of the *Hypotenusa* is equal to these Squares put together, as an odd number is to an even.

Ibid. *And that the clearest day, &c.* For since a large Sphere of Light doth more enlighten a shady Body near, than at a distance, and that there is no motion, which cannot pass through the least atom of Space, and the Sun in his *Apogeeum*, being 52 Diameters of the Earth more distant from the Earth than in his *Perigeum*, it is plain, if the line consists of points, that day in the Sun's *Apogeeum* is carried up into the *Æther*, some thousands of Miles distant from the Earth. See the Notes on the *Immortality of the Soul*, *Lib. 1. Cant. 2. Enneastich. 57, 58.*

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On BOOK I. CHAP. 5. Sect. 3. Pag. 17. l. 39.

AND that faculty I venture to call Actual Knowledge, &c. The similitude comprehended in this Section, and added to what hath been before mentioned in the immediately preceding Section, does so fully and distinctly describe the controversy about innate Ideas, that

that it ought deservedly for the future to prevent any dispute in this matter. Yet, for further Illustration, I shall add what may weigh with those that acknowledge the *Spirit of Nature*; namely, that the humane Soul is no more a *blank Table*, than the *Spirit of Nature*, whose *vital Ideas* (the likeness of which we see in matter form'd to the likeness of those *Ideas*) the matter neither imposes nor impresses on that *Spirit*, but they being occasionally moved act upon the Matter some certain way or other prepared, and form it into this or that *Plasma* or *Fashion*. And thus it is in the *Notions* of the Soul and actual *Ideas*. They are not made out of external things, as if it were by measure or module, which should limit, and, as it were, design and determine them, but are moved by the *radical Ideas* of the Soul, (which answer to the *vital Ideas* in the *Spirit of Nature*) to some *Phantasma*, according to that radical *Idea*, and that *intellectual* too, as the *vital Ideas* are into some certain *Fashion*, so limited and framed by a proper *Idea*.

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On BOOK I. CHAP. 8. Sect. 3. p. 22. l. 19.

A GAIN, whenas we contend, that the true *Idea* of God represents him as a Being necessarily existent, and therefore that he does exist, &c. Note in these Words, [as a Being necessarily existing] that the word *Existing* signifies otherwise than what follows, [and therefore that he does exist] else we should seem to prove one thing by the same. But by a Being *necessarily existing* must be understood such a Being as that to whose Nature or Essence *necessary Existence* may belong: Or whose *essence* or habitude to *Existence* is the disposition of *Necessity*, as in all things their Essence or Nature implies a habitude either of Contingency or Impossibility. And that this is the meaning of our Reasoning, may be proved from many places. Which if S. P. in other things an ingenious Person, had freely animadverted on, it would have prevented all occasion of his cavilling at this Argument. *Tentam Physico-Theolog. lib. 1. cap. 5.*

Nay, in that place he mistakes upon a double account. First, because he reckons me in the number of those, who esteem those Arguments of *Cartes*, viz. One in the third Meditation on the first Philosophy, the other in the fifth, as much as *Archimedes's* demonstrations; whereas I always had a very mean opinion indeed of that argument in the third Meditation, and which is put in the second place in *Princip. Philosoph. Part 1. Art. 17.* as you may see in the Preface to the *Antidote against Atheism*, Sect. 6. But the other Argument which first occurs in the Principles, I always judg'd firm and solid (especially being apply'd the same way I use to apply it.)

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Moreover, he mistakes in this, that he, after a lame and deprav'd manner, proposes that Argument, which I always espous'd as true. Which, if it were certainly so, would be a Sophism, as he calls it, not a fair Argument. So he proposes it in these very words. *Existence, which is perfection it self, no otherwise constituted the Essence of any thing absolutely perfect (to which, it is plain, all perfections per se do belong) than Rationality does the Essence of man. Therefore as it must be acknowledged impossible for man to be without Reason, so likewise that there is not any thing absolutely perfect. Because as Man, unless he were rational, could in no wise be such; so unless there were perfection, there could be nothing absolutely perfect suppos'd, because it would be more perfect if it existed. And a little further, A thing absolutely perfect wants no Perfection; but whatsoever does not exist, is destitute of any perfection: Therefore he that denies an Existence absolutely perfect, at the same time denies a thing absolutely perfect to be absolutely perfect, which is a contradiction; by which means from the Nature of a thing absolutely perfect we conclude its Existence.*

Here I can scarce forbear using the same words to this witty Gentleman, which he uses to Cartes, merrily, wittily, and finely, and *that's all!* Pray Sir, Is this my Argument, or your own? I believe it's yours; for I am satisfied it's none of mine. For I do not, from the *Existence* of the Nature of a Being absolutely perfect, argue its *Existence*; but I discover its *Existence* simply from the *Essence*, or *Nature* of a Being absolutely perfect. For since the Nature of a Being absolutely perfect is so order'd, that when other things in their own Ideas or Natures perceived by us, have a habitude or disposition either of *Contingency* or *Impossibility* towards existence, but that it only has a disposition of *Necessity*; we may truly and safely conclude (if the Faculties of our minds be true) from this disposition necessary to existence, *That there is indeed a Being absolutely perfect.* Which is not proving *Existence* from supposed *Existence*, but to discover its *Existence* from a *suppos'd Idea*, or the *true Nature* of a Being absolutely perfect *conceiv'd in our minds.*

And here I dare appeal even to the very knowledge and judgment of this ingenious Gentleman, that granting that a *Being absolutely perfect* does exist (as the Mathematicians sometimes find out the solution of a Problem by supposing it solv'd) whether or no he would not freely grant, that *it did not necessarily exist contingently, or by chance*, but by the *privilege* or prerogative of its own *most perfect Nature*, whose *most perfect Nature* might be a sufficient, nay, necessary reason why it does exist. But now by the same reason that he declares *why* the Existent should exist; I plainly demonstrate that it doth exist. For as he, by the *privilege* of his *most perfect Nature*, gives the reason *why* it exists, supposing it to exist; so I from the same original, namely, from the Perfection of its Nature or Essence, shew that it does exist. For the perfection of that Essence is a sufficient reason that it does exist, and why it should exist. And the Reason is on both sides in like manner distinct from existence.

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Add to this, that nothing can *contingently* exist, except a *Free Agent* be granted; and what *Hobbs* in another place unadvisedly allows, may here very justly and opportunely be allowed; to wit, That in the Essence of a *Being absolutely perfect*, there may be a *sufficient* reason why it exists, because there may be the same *necessary* reason of its *Existence*, so that it is *impossible* it should not exist, and that its Existence is not altogether *necessary*. But to assert, that all things which do exist, exist *contingently*, is the same as to assert, that they exist without reason or *sufficient* cause. For if it were *sufficient*, they would necessarily exist; if *insufficient*, they would not exist at all. Therefore nothing can exist of it self, except that which in it self hath a *sufficient* reason of its own Existence. Which, unless you would throw off all Faculties of humane Nature, can be competible with nothing except a *Being absolutely perfect*, nor can it truly be competible with it. This is the force and meaning of our Argument, not wittily or archly feign'd, to amuse withal, and seem to gain a victory where there is no enemy or adversary to oppose.

But besides this general Defence of our demonstration, I shall observe some particular subtilties of this smart Writer, by which it will appear more clearly, that they no way affect our Argument. This Structure thus lamely founded, he complains to fail by a double Sophism. The First is, He supposes to *Be*, (that is, to exist) a *Being absolutely perfect*. For when I say a *Being absolutely perfect*, says he, *the Thing absolutely perfect is join'd to the Being as an Attribute*, as if we should say, a *Being which is absolutely perfect*, (that is, which exists absolutely perfect) for so he understands it. Whenas without doubt a *Being* that is absolutely perfect, signifies no more in this place than a *Being absolutely perfect*, denoting not the *Existence*, but the *Nature* of the Thing. Which is the most common acceptance of the Word. But when he, with such assurance, adds, *It ought to be taken for a certain and stated Maxim, That the Complex Subject of any Proposition, is always a Hypothetick Assertion*, and he adds an Example, as, *a necessary Being exists*, that is, says he, *if it be a necessary Being, it exists*; here again, unless the word [*is*, or *it be*] signify the *Nature*, not the *Existence*, the Proposition will be ludicrous and trifling. For the meaning is plain, if a necessary Being exists, it exists. But what *Logician*, though of the meanest capacity, could have given such a meaning of this Proposition? And how widely different is it from Logick it self, that a necessary Being should be called a Subject complex, or a Term complex, when, as *Aristotle* says, it has no *Connexion*?

But he pretends to demonstrate this more plainly from that Sophism, as he imagines, *viz. Whatsoever exists is real, but the Griffon existing doth exist*. Whereupon he presently crys out, the Conclusion, which he recites, is absurd! Which nevertheless, without doubt, is this, or nothing: Therefore a Griffon existing is a real Being. Which is a true Axiom: For he affirms neither Existence nor Reality of the Griffon; but only affirms, the Griffon which exists is a real Being. As likewise the Assumption, The Griffon which exists, does exist. But whereas he neither affirms nor denies any thing, it is plain, that
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the Griffon is no complex Term, but incomplex. And although the Conclusion were to be granted, yet he that grants it, is at liberty to deny that it is the Griffon that exists, for the Conclusion does not affirm it.

But this Sophism which he imagines, though it is plain, 'tis nothing to the purpose, ought thus to be apply'd to the present purpose. Whatsoever exists, is a real Being; but a Being absolutely perfect existing, doth exist, *Ergo*, This is a frivolous way of arguing, and far from being to be impos'd on the *Cartesians*, nay, not on my self, who in the beginning have so plainly shewed my Argument to demonstrate, not Existence by *Existence*; but Existence by *Essence*, truly and rightly perceived in the Mind. So little do these sophistical Quirks help to enervate the force of our demonstration. Moreover, I shall add to the present Fetch, that a Being *absolutely necessary*, for the same Reason that it is absolutely necessary in its Nature, that is, rightly thus perceived by our Faculties, does most certainly exist; supposing that our Faculties are true when we have this most certain Knowledge of its Existence: And that a Being *absolutely perfect* is such, by the same clearness, is plain to our Faculties. But it were mere madness to affix this necessary Disposition of existing to Matter, when its Essence is so vile and contemptible. Therefore what he adds besides, in the Explanation of the first Sophism about the necessary Existence to be annex'd to the Matter, whereby it necessarily exists, is all so weak and incoherent, that I think it not worth while to dwell any longer on it.

The other Sophism, in this Argument drawn from the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect, he imagines to arise from the ignorance of the Use or Signification of *Names*, which denote nothing in their own Nature, besides a bare notion of the thing, without any pre-signification of *existing*, so that even its *actual Existence*, which is included in the formal Reason of a Being *absolutely perfect*, does not demonstrate its real *Existence*. Therefore, says he, *from the aforesaid Argument we draw this Consequence, that the notion of a thing every way perfect cannot be suppos'd, unless the Notion of Existence be compriz'd with it: But whether those Notions exist in deed, or in imagination, remains still to be prov'd.* But let this ingenious Person take care least he make the *Cartesians*, as silly and dull as he will have them, his Adversaries, that from thence only, because a thing cannot be supposed absolutely perfect, except *Existence* be superadded to the rest of the Attributes, or because, by the Addition of this Existence in the Idea to the rest of the Perfections, a Being absolutely perfect is concluded *necessarily to exist*. To speak Truth, they do not argue so, at least I do not, as I have already shewn. For, as I have complain'd of before, this cunning Spark, very lamely and depravedly proposes the *Cartesian's* Argument, as if because *actual Existence* is necessary to the Consummation of a Being absolutely perfect, (though it is as much necessary in the finishing a pair of Bellows, or a pair of Tongs) that therefore they conclude it really to exist. But the Argument taken from the *Idea of a Being absolutely perfect* rightly dispos'd, is quite another Thing. For no body supposing any thing concerning *actual Existence* by

by which a Being absolutely perfect may be complete, only contemplating the *true* and *genuine Idea* of a Being absolutely perfect (at the same time doubting its actual Existence, or at least suspending his Assent) and observing in it the *disposition necessary* to Existence, (though in other Ideas he only observes the *Contingency* or *Impossibility*) from this *disposition* afterwards of the *Necessity* to Existence, he concludes it really to exist. For what, I would feign know, can exist, but that which in its own *Nature* or *Idea*, hath a *Disposition* of *Necessity* to Existence, not of *Contingency* or *Impossibility*?

But here to suspect any Fallacy or Sophism couched in arguing from an *Existence* to *Existing*, is poor and ridiculous. For to what *Existence* belongs by an *inviolable* and *unavoidable* right, (whether *Metaphysical* or *Logical*) undoubtedly to the same belongs *Existing*, nor can we depart from it, if we appeal to the proper Faculties of our Mind. And this is too unskillfully urged by this Person, in other things ingenious enough; for in these Cavils he confounds *Existence* and *Essence*, which ought to be taken in a distinct manner, and not hastily, lest they mix with a Being absolutely perfect. For, I say, *Existence* is not contain'd in its *Essence*, properly so called, but a *Disposition* only necessary to *Existence*. Which indeed since the very precise *Essence* of a *Being absolutely perfect* does plainly include, from thence by a most certain Inference we conclude it to *exist*. Which we cannot conclude from a pair of Bellows, a pair of Tongs, or any Thing else.

Lastly, to omit nothing that may seem of Moment, let us observe that Argument of *Anselm* against the Fool, who said in his heart, *There is no God*, namely, *God is that, than which nothing greater can be imagined, which he that well understands, certainly understands that so to be, that in Imagination or Thought he cannot not be. He therefore that understands God so to be, cannot think him not to be.* I must confess, if any one will candidly interpret *Anselm*, he will find that he has done no more than what we have before more elaborately and distinctly described, and from the *precise Essence* of a *Being absolutely perfect*, represented to our Mind, will conclude its Existence. But he has no sooner produced this Argument of *Anselm*, than he says, *it is confuted by a certain Learned and Ingenious Man*, as *Carthusianus* says, and wittily reprimanded by him, among other things, adding, *I know not who is the greater Fool, he that takes this to be the Consequence; or the Fool that said in his Heart, There is no God.* Here is noise indeed, but I do not see the Wit. But in my opinion this ingenious Gentleman childishly blabs those things which do not become a learned or witty Man. Indeed it looks like some lewd and profane Fellow, too much inclining to Atheism, that with so rude and barbarous a Scoff would abuse the sacred Meaning of the divine *Anselm*. But how accomplished a Wit this poor Wretch is, let the *Scotists* judge, who are reputed the most acute of all the School-men, and who ever defended the Argument of *Anselm* against the heavy *Thomists* with invincible Courage.

Nay, I appeal to this *S. P.* himself, in whose Treatise, though there be many ingenious and learned things, yet there are none among them so bright and true, as those which he hath in *Lib. 2. Cap. 4. Of the Divine Substance and Essence*, pag. 306, 307, & seqq.
From

From whence we will transcribe some passages, to shew how vastly different they are from the profane Genius and spurious Wit of the aforefaid Rascal. Besides what he says in Pag. 303. *He makes the necessity of existing the principal and chief Perfection of all Things; and in the same Page, he adds further, All other Things, besides God himself, or the Divine Essence, as Things which do not subsist by an intrinsic necessity of Nature, are such as want some Cause, by whose power and help they must subsist; and he repeats the same in the following page, namely, Those things which exist not, by the virtue and perfection of a proper Essence, want some real influence whereby they may exist, &c.* Besides these, he more plainly and largely philosophizes on this Theme, Pag. 306. where he asserts, *So great is the Actuality of the Divine Essence, that it would be the greatest contradiction and impossibility for it not to be; from whence he makes it appear, That the Infinitude of a bare and only Divine Essence, setting aside all other Attributes, is plac'd in a most absolute necessity of Being, by which, as by infinite Intervals, it is different from a No-Being. The same which the School-men mean, when they teach God to be a pure Act, &c.* And pag. 307. *But the Divine Essence is by such innumerable intervals different from a No-being, and does so exclude all Potentiality, that it directly opposes it, &c.*

Again, pag. 308. *Although we only say, God is of himself negatively, yet it is necessary that his positive foundation be assign'd; namely, the Immensity of Divine Perfection, the Root, Cause, or Foundation, which hath no Cause; for although he cannot produce himself, yet he is of that Exuperance alone of Perfection, because he cannot be produced. And he adds, Although God be not properly from himself, yet he is owing to himself, because he is not from another, nor doth he want another's Help, so far as by the immense Exuperance of his own Perfection it comes to pass, that he requires no Cause from whence he should be produced. And pag. 309. For that which is of so immense perfection that it can give it self immense Essence, (for so we may safely say) how much more can he give all other perfection whatsoever, since there are no Attributes of a more ample Perfection than the immense and inexhaustible Essence of God, &c.* And he adds, pag. 310. *Which reason, although it may seem more fine than usual, and therefore cannot be fully expressed in Words; yet I do not question but it will be solid to any one that seriously weighs it. And in the same page, Since therefore whatsoever belongs to the Nature of God, either by manner of Essence, or by manner of Attribute, can depend on no Cause; I do not see after what manner he could prescribe any certain Module of Perfection to himself, unless he were produc'd of himself, &c.*

All which Passages, if we seriously consider and diligently compare them one with another, the Result will be this: *That the Divine Essence being most perfect in all respects, or of an unbounded and infinite perfection, as being producible of no other thing, nor of it self, by the immediate virtue and perfection of its own bare Essence alone, without any productive Cause, it necessarily exists.* This is what he in so many words and sentences so laboriously and copiously seems in this Chapter to inculcate, contrary to what he hath done *Lib. 1. Cap. 5.* where he takes as much pains to destroy this very Argument.

*How is that Hector chang'd, who oft return'd
With proud Achilles's rich spoil'd adorn'd.*

How unlike is he to that S. P. who in his first Book having refuted and destroy'd not only the *Greeks*, especially the *Platonicks*, but all the *Cartesians*, and at last even himself, and what is more ancient than the *Cartesians*, with a more than *Hectorian* pride had insulted over the holy *Anselm*, and too vain-gloriously triumph'd over them all; yet here at last changing his mind for the better, for which I heartily congratulate him, at last, as it were of his own accord, being convinced by the very evidence of the thing, he submits; and by a certain noble and unexpected *Enthusiasm*, and lucid inspiration of mind, returns to that Truth, which he not only seem'd to fly from, but endeavour'd to destroy by the most subtil Sophisms, and cunning far-fetch'd Quirks. *Thus it is with sublime Wits, they had rather be instructed by themselves than by others.*

In the mean time it is a most pleasing sight to me; after so sharp a dispute and the infestuous shafts of the accurate and sharp Wits so fiercely darted against the *Platonicks*, *Cartesians*, the most worthy *Stillingfleet*, and the most Reverend *Anselm*, formerly honoured with the Archiepiscopal Mitre of *Canterbury*, to see this renowned Champion turn his Arms upon himself, and not only attack himself, but bravely and successfully assault others.

For who but Ajax, Ajax could o'ecome?

and plainly agreeing with all of us in this, that from the infinite Perfection of the divine Essence, its existence may be demonstrated. So that at last that arch Wag, who with his witty jests so brutishly and uncivilly ridiculed that solid argument of the Reverend *Anselm*, may battle the *Thomists* by himself, and be hereafter deservedly hiss'd and laughed at by the witty and ingenious. This is the wish'd for end of this Tragicomedy, and Truth triumphs in safety.

Sect. 8. p. 23. l. 44. *And then six such will equalize him, &c.* This Assertion depends upon this Hypothesis, namely; Since every part of an Infinite is infinite, there may be supposed something more infinite than an Infinite, least any one should think a Spirit of six times less power than God, not to have infinite power. There is a very great subtilty in this, which many years since I have canvass'd in a Poem, entituled, *Democritus Platonissans*, or the *Infinitude of Worlds*; To which I refer the Reader that understands *English*.

Sect. 9. p. 24. l. 4. *Is rather my Mind's than my Thought's:* That is, the thought of the mind, rather than the mind's own.

Sect. 10. p. 24. l. 8. *And so neither of them would be God, &c.* Because God is a Being absolutely perfect, such as no Being can be which does not in it self, partly formally, partly effectively contain all things, so that whatsoever perfection there be in the Universe, (which the *Greeks* call $\tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$) that is within the compass of all real Beings, both in respect of *Generals* and all *Individuals*, either this very Being must be absolutely perfect, or at least proceed from it. So that it is as incongruous to imagine a most absolute $\tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, which may contain

all and every thing, and yet at the same time to acknowledge something besides it, or without it, as to suppose a Being *absolutely* perfect, and yet to allow something besides it, and independent of it. For it is one thing to be a Horse absolutely perfect, or a Man absolute in all respects, and another thing to be a *Being absolutely perfect*. For those perfections are finite and limited, and therefore there may be more Horses or Men of that sort conceived. Nor can that witty answer of *Æsop* be allowed here, who hearing a Slave, that was offer'd to Sale, answer one that asked him what he could do, he boasting said, he could do every thing, and the same Person asking him what he could do, he answered, he could do nothing, for there was nothing left for him to do; I say, this witty jest would not be allowed here, because although specifick perfections of things finite may be repeated and communicated to more subjects than one; yet in a Being compleatly and absolutely perfect, and restrained by no limitation, this jest would prove a solid argument, if any one should immediately conclude that there is nothing left which either is, or can be any Being independently of this Being compleatly and absolutely perfect, which either *formally* or *effectively* contains in it self whatsoever is, or can be imagined to be specifick or individual. Wherefore to acknowledge any thing independent of it, is a most plain contradiction. So certainly may we conclude the Unity of the Deity, from the Nature or Idea of it.

SCHOLIA

On Book I. CHAP. 9. Sect. 3. p. 26. l. 33.

IF we consult our own Faculties, and the Idea of God, utterly impossible, &c. The Idea of a God, or of a Being compleatly and absolutely perfect, plainly argues his Existence. And his Existence doth altogether take away, or prevent the Existence of any thing which is not dependent of it self as the original of all things.

SCHOLIA

On Book I. CHAP. 10. Sect. 8. Pag. 31. l. 14.

YET many of them worship but Stocks and Stones, &c. This is not altogether true, that most Nations want the knowledge of one omnipotent God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth. Nay, those two most learned Men Dr. *Ralph Cudworth*, and Dr. *Edward Stillingfleet*, in their late Treatises, have substantially and largely demonstrated,

ted, that most, if not all Nations, have acknowledged one God and Father of all things.

Ibid. Sect. 10. pag. 32. l. 5. *have been stupid Idolaters, &c.* That truly cannot be denied. Yet it no way hinders their retaining a knowledge of the one God, from whom all things are, as the two foresaid great Men have shewn in their Treatises.

SCHOLIA

On Book II. CHAP. I. pag. 39. l. 23.

WHETHER simply spermatical, or sensitive also and intellectual, &c. It is very difficult to prove that the *Spirit of Nature*, or *spermatick spirit of the World* is void of all sense. But that it wants Understanding and Free-will, we have abundantly shewn in our *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*.

Ibid. Sect. 6. pag. 40. l. 2. *And cancelled the Laws thereof.* These Laws of Matter I found to be fewer afterwards, than when I wrote these things. For I do not think the Union of the parts of Matter ought to be referr'd to its quiet, but to the *vital* constriction of the *spirit of Nature*. But there are two other fountains of the Mechanick Laws of Matter, which I think is to our advantage to observe here, and they are *Impenetrability*, and its *Moveableness* from the *external impulse* of Bodies, that no body may wonder that the *Earth* being plac'd in a Vortex, is moved about the *Sun*.

Ibid. Lin. 9. *As in little pieces of wood naturally bowed, &c.* When I wrote these things, as I have a little before intimated, the prejudices of the *Cartesian Philosophy* stuck a little too close to my mind. But when these clouds were dispersed, I presently perceiv'd the motion of the World to be no ways mechanick, much less the *union* of the parts of Matter, but that both were *vital*. Nor that the *Phenomenons* of the world were produc'd by one certain univertial impression of motion made at once, but by a certain *vital energy* of the *spirit of Nature*, perpetuated by the *vital Ideas* planted in it by God, to this very day. See *Preface to Enchirid. Ethic.* sect. 14, 15, 16, & seq.


SCHOLIA

On Book II. CHAP. 2. Sect. 1. pag. 41. l. 21.

WAS establisht by a Principle of Wisdom and Counsel, or at least approved of it. I added this because then I suspected many things might be made by mere mechanick reasons, from that general impression of motion. But now I perceive all things, which are made in the free course of Nature, are not only approv'd of by the Divine

Wisdom, but that their Laws were implanted in the *spirit of Nature*, by the help of God.

Ibid. Sect. 3. l. 38. *A coincident position of the Axis of the Earth, &c.* This *coincident* Position must be suppos'd to be always parallel to it self; For a Parallelism is suppos'd in every one of the three Positions. But for the more easily understanding the difficulties of this second Position, I have taken care to subjoin a Scheme in which the Earth is moved about the Sun in this Position.



AB is the Axis of the Earth always parallel to it self, lying on the Plain of the Ecliptick C D E F. B is the North Pole, A is the South Pole. In C and E is the Equinox throughout the whole Earth. But as the Earth moves from C towards D, the dark Hemisphere A K L M about the south Pole A goes back a little from A to K, and about the north Pole it goes as much from B to G, and then from K to L, and from G to H, and lastly from L to M, and from H to I; where the dark Hemisphere almost terminates in the *Æquinoctial* line. Whence it plainly appears, which we have said, that they who live under the Artick Circle are dark more than 130 days. For there are 67 degrees between G and I, through which the dark Hemisphere passes as it moves from G to I; which degrees it measures over again when it goes back from M to H, and from H to G, and at last to B. As it is in E, where the Earth is in another *Æquinoctial* Point. And the same reason serves for the rest of the inhabitants of the Earth between G and H, nay, and between H and I, except that being the less distant

distant from the *Æquator*, the Night is shorter. As for any thing else which we have hinted, either in relation to this *coincident* Position, or to the Perpendicular, it may easily be understood, by observing the Scheme, so that we need dwell no longer on these things.

Ibid. Sect. 13. pag. 46. l. 33. *As cross and violent a breach of that universal Law of Gravity, &c.* The nature of Gravity is to force a Body downwards; but when it is suppos'd in liquid Bodies by this pressure downwards to lift up the lower parts of the liquid matter, suppose in the mouth of a Bottle inverted, stopp'd and thrown into the Sea. Which Instance doth not much differ from the Experiment of the *Air-Pump*; for the Pump with the Sucker, answers to the Bottle with the stopper, the external Air to the Sea-water, and the Air inclos'd in the Bottle, to the subtil matter in the Pump. Yet it would be impossible for this to be done without the gravitation of some parts into others, if it can be suppos'd to be done so. But since this actual gravitation of some parts into others doth not only contradict reason, but also common sense and experience, it is plain, this Phænomenon cannot be performed mechanically, that is, not by the portrusion of some parts into others, but by the vital conduct and disposition of the *spirit of Nature*.

Ibid. l. 44. *That does tug so stoutly and resolutely against the mechanick Laws of Matter, &c.* This must undoubtedly be so expressed for the more distinct perception and understanding of things. But if we would more seriously and accurately philosophize, we ought to remember that the *spirit of Nature* does not so much struggle with the mechanick Laws of matter, as prevent them, and that the motion of worldly matter, except by accident, is no where *mechanical*, but *vital*.

Ibid. Sect. 14. pag. 47. l. 12. *To meet him at his house in Gotham, &c.* Gotham is a Town in England, famous for the ridiculous jests and blunders of the inhabitants. Among which are recounted these two of the Cheeses and Iron Trevet.

Ibid. l. 19. *Hard and soft, rigid and fluid, &c.* Which thing the simple mechanick motion and matter cannot do, as I have often inculcated in these Scholia's. Because the parts of matter, which nevertheless is necessary to sensible fluidity, cannot hold together without the *spirit of Nature*.

Ibid. l. 23. *The wise-men above-mentioned, &c.* For the aforesaid Fools are commonly called the Wise-men of Gotham.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK II. CHAP. V. Sect. 2. pag. 52. l. 30.

MAY so equally compress, or bear against, &c. But how little this conjecture prevails, may be easily seen in these simple Phænomenons, *Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 10.*

Sect 3. ibid. pag. 53. l. 12. *Nor is it any botch or gap at all, &c.* My too great esteem of the *Cartesian* Philosophy was the cause of my philosophizing after this manner here; But for what reasons I have

changed my mind, you may see *Pref. Enchirid. Ethic. sect. 16.* and *Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 9. sect. 6. & 12.*

Ibid. l. 15. For such are the λόγοι σπέρματικοί, or *seminal Reasons*, &c. As concerning these seminal Reasons, whether they are distinct particular Substances or one common spirit of Nature; See the Treatise of the *Immortality of the Soul, lib. 3. cap. 12, & 13.*

SCHOLIA

On BOOK II. CHAP. 8. Sect 3. pag. 63. l. 37.

WHERE you fright away the Bird, and then seize the empty Nest, &c. Which I would have to be thus understood; that they in no wise animate men more fiercely to the readier destruction of brute Animals; but make their minds more gentle and benign, and mollify their grief conceiv'd by such too frequent spectacles, and preserve the Reverence of divine Providence free from the unjust suspicions and reproaches of profane men.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK II. CHAP. 9. Sect. 10. pag. 61. l. 8.

LIKE those Ovens in Egypt *Diodorus* speaks of, *Bibliothec. Histor. lib. 1. pag. 47.* where speaking in praise of the industry and art of the nourishers of Birds, and feeders of Geese in Egypt, he says, they do not assist the birds, but they themselves working after a wonderful manner, according to their understanding and art, are not destitute of a natural energy. Here is no mention of Ovens, but I believe I may understand *Diodorus* according to what occurs in *Julius Scaliger de Subtil. Exercit. 23.* For at Cairo in Egypt they build Ovens one over another, in the Center of which there is a hole; through which the force of the fire, which otherwise would be mischievous, exhales: In the bottom they make a moderate fire. In the upper floor of the arches they lay many hundreds of Eggs, which in due time being hatch'd, they sell by tale, not by measure. Then they take a pale or bucket, which as they fill, they dispose of. And thus I think *Diodorus* may be expounded by *Scaliger.* See *Cardan de Subtil. lib. 12.*

Ibid. Sect. 11. l. 26. Nature does as it were wipe clean the Table-book first, &c. Nothing is more often inculcated by that excellent physical Investigator of Nature *G. Harvey* than this observation. In his Treatise de *Generatione Animalium, Exercit. 15.* that part of the Egg, which they call the Eye, and the white colliquament out of which the young one is form'd, and in which the *punctum saliens* is first conceiv'd, he describes as a liquor most clearly resurgent, and finer than any crystalline moisture. Though this happens not only to *Oviparous*, but also to *Viviparous*

viparous Animals. For he concludes that Exercitation with this pretty story; Not long since, says he, I shew'd our most gracious King and Queen, a *fœtus* taken from a Deer, about the bigness of a long Pease, perfect in all its members. A curiosity of Nature very grateful. Which *fœtus* exact and consummate floated in this white, lucid, crystalline liquor (as it were in a most clear Vessel) which was about the bigness of a Pigeon's egg, and was cloath'd with a proper pellucid Tunicle. Which liquor he asserts to be the nourishment of the *fœtus*. For whatsoever begins the *fœtus* from a pure homogeneous mass, finishes it from the like matter. This he determines *primogenious moisture*, (*Exercitat. 7.*) that is, the crystalline colliquament by which, as the *fœtus* is made, so it is nourish'd by it to extreme old Age; that is, by this Dew, (as, according to *Harvy*, the *Arabians* call it) by which all parts of the body are moistened, the very aliment it self which is taken, doth not nourish before it is converted into this homogeneous liquor. Therefore this homogeneity and fluidity is always necessary to matter, that the plastick power of the Soul, which is as well discern'd in the preserving the living body, as in the forming it, should preserve its parts intire.

Which may be easily conceiv'd to be done in the generation of Animals, by the Seed compos'd of particles, which proceed from all parts of the Animal, as well because it is not to be suppos'd but that the moisture will be more foul and cloudy, than clear and transparent; as also that some particles would be wanting, which should constitute the parts proper to the Male, because, according to *Harvy*, the *coitus* of the male contributes nothing material to the *fœtus* after it is conceiv'd, except only a certain *vivifick contagium*. For he lays it down for certain, that the effusion of seed from the Cock never enters the womb of the Hen, nor that if the stag remains in the womb of the Deer, but that it comes to nothing before conception.

Ibid. 39. Being incompetent to the liquid matter it self, &c. The learned *Gliffon* is of another opinion, whose opinion I have examined in my Scholia upon *Enchirid. Metaphysic. cap. 5. Sect. 8.*

SCHOLIA

On BOOK II. CHAP. II. Sect. 4. pag. 73. l. 33.

TO an Angle-rod, and their long bills to the Line and Hook, &c. These are *Aristotle's* words, καὶ ὡς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν ἀνδρῶνα αἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν οἷον ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ἀνδρῶνα. That is, the neck of these creatures is like to a fishing-rod, and their Bill to a line and hook. And therefore they use their neck for a fishing-rod, and their long bill for a line and hook, as *Theodorus Gaza* renders it, *Aristot. de part. animal. lib. 4. sect. 12.*

Ibid. Sect. 6. pag. 75. l. 3. As that Copper-ring, with a Greek Inscription upon it, &c. Take the whole matter thus from *Gesner*. A Pike was taken in a lake near *Haylprun*, an imperial City of Sweden, in the year

year 1497. about the Gills of which under the skin, there appear'd a Copper-ring, with this Inscription, *Εἰμὶ ἐνταῦθα ἰχθύς παύτη λίμνη παρὶσπρω-
τος ἀνδρὶς διὰ τοῦ κοσμητοῦ Φεδερίου β. τὰς χεῖρας ἐν τῇ ε. ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ Ὀκτωβρίου, α. σ. λ.* that is, I am that Fish that was first put into this lake, by the hands of the Emperour Frederick II. the fifth day of October 1230. Gesner. *Nomenclat. Aquatil. Animal. part 2.* These words (as Joannes Dalburgus, Bishop of Wormes, interprets them) found too much of the Latin. But the story depends upon the credit of the Author.

Ibid. Sect. 11. pag. 77. l. 18. *That there is not any Bird that only flies, as the Fish only swims.* I do not in the least question but that Aristotle has rightly conjectur'd on this thing. For that so celebrated story of the *Manucodiata* does not in the least prejudice his conjecture; which story, some years after the publishing this last Edition of the *Antidote*, I found plainly to be so. For a certain friend of mine, one J. Mallet, a very civil and ingenious Person, who had made several Voyages to the *East-Indies*, among other foreign rarities, presented me with a Bird of *Paradise*, and withal told me almost the same that mariners are said to tell to *Clusius* and *Pighafetta*; namely, That the legs of them were generally pull'd off by those that took them. But the bird which he gave me, was intire with legs on, in all respects like to that which *Cardan* describes; except that it had no cavity, such as *Cardan* imagin'd, (the want of which he would not have wonder'd at, if he had seen the feet, which are a span in length, such as this bird of mine hath) and not only one, string but two, and those two growing not out of the Tail, as he says, but out of the back, and almost of the same length as he describes. This honest ingenuous man was the first that extricated me from that vulgar mistake of the *Manucodiata* having no feet. Whose name I thought my self bound in gratitude to mention here.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK II. CHAP. 12. Sect. 1. pag. 79. l. 4.

BUT adjudge the honour of an Hymn to the wise Creator of it. Not that *Galen* compos'd any Verse or poetick Hymn, but only compares his own Dissertation of the Use of the parts, to an Hymn sung at the Altar. *Galen's* words are these; *Ὡς ἂν καὶ μελικοῖς ποιηταῖς, &c.* As with the harmonious Poets there is the strophe, and Antistrophe, so is the third the Epode, which, one standing at the Altar, sings, as they say, in praise of the Gods. To which likening this expression, we have transpos'd its appellation. He certainly here likens his Treatise of the Use of the parts in the humane Body, to an Epod sung at the Altars of the Gods.

Ibid. Sect. 3. pag. 79. l. 35. *It is evident that this Organ is so exquisitely framed for that purpose, &c.* See the figure of the Eye, and the Illustration thereof, *Enchirid. Metaphysic. cap. 24. sect. 9.*


Ibid. Sect. 5. pag. 80. l. 40. *The tendons of the second joynts both of Fingers and Toes, &c.* See again *Enchirid. Metaphysic. cap. 28. sect. 10.*

Ibid.

Ibid. Sect. 6. pag. 80. l. 43. You may add to these the notable contrivance of the Heart, &c. As to the Fabrick of the Valves and Veins of the Heart, we have briefly taken notice of them, in our *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, but without any Figures, as we here explain them by. Therefore suppose the Heart cut in two transversely A A. In which appears the right Ventricle B B. The left C C. The Coat of the Heart D D. The Vena Cava, with its Auricle E F. The Vena Arteriosa G. The Arteria venosa, with its Auricle A. The Aorta I. Moreover let the Vena Cava be dissected with the right Ventricle K, where are likewise the Tricuspidæ Valvulæ L. But the Vena Arteriosa must be dissected with the Ventricle M. and the Valvulæ Sigmoïdes N. The great Artery or Aorta dissected with the left Ven-

Tom. 2.

P. 92.



tricle of the Heart O. The Valvulæ Semilunares P. And the Arteria venosa with the Ventricle Q. The two Valvulæ Mitrales R. To all which add the figure of the Vein S. With its Valvulæ as well singly in T, as doubly in U. Which are so form'd, that they may transmit the blood ascending from the Body towards the Heart, and prevent its going back. All the Blood therefore from all parts of the body

body is let into the right ventricle B. through the passage of the Vena Cava, nor can it return by reason of the Valvulæ Tricuspidæ L L L. which belonging to the ventricle of the Heart, easily let in the Blood, but do not let it pass back; therefore it goes out thorough the passage of the Vena Arteriosa into the Lungs, nor does it regurgitate into the same Ventricle, by reason of the Valvulæ Sigmoides N N N. which belong to the entrance, and hinder its return. Therefore it goes through the Lungs into the left Ventricle of the Heart, which the Valvulæ Mitrales R R easily transmit thither, nor suffer it to return, because they incline to the entrance within. Therefore it is at last refunded into the Body by the left Ventricle of the Heart, through the entrance of the Aorta, nor can it regurgitate by reason of the formation of the semilunary Valvulæ P P P. which on the left Ventricle belong to the entrance. And by this Artifice of Nature is the Circulation of the Blood performed.

Ibid. Sect. 13. pag. 82. l. 44. *In that Antipathy between the Ape and the Snail, &c.* The thing which I here hint is very pleasantly related by *Erasmus*. And likewise *Johnston* briefly, and as it were *passant*, tells the same story, adding, that if an Ape were to be inclosed in a ring or Circle of Snails, she would not dare to touch them. Whence by the Snail put upon a Boy's head, which *Erasmus* also relates, may be meant the Cockle; but it is more probable that *Erasmus* means the Snail properly so called, which being ty'd to the chains, he says, the Ape endeavours to beat off with his hind feet. Nor does it contradict what he says of the Snail put upon the Boy's head, and cover'd with his Cap; for a Snail is so small, that it may easily be covered with a Cap. And truly the Antipathy is ridiculous enough, though the Story may relate to the Snail, and not to the Cockle; but it is all one to me of which it is understood. See *Erasmi Amicitiam*, and *Johnston. Histor. Natur. de Quadruped. lib. 3. Titul. 2. Chap. 2.*

SCHOLIA

ON BOOK III. CHAP. I. Sect 2. pag. 86. l. 39.

THAT he was pay'd home, and punish'd in his Son, &c. according to *Valerius Maximus*. Who although, says he, he did not suffer those punishments he deserv'd, yet after his death was punish'd in the disgrace of his Son, though he escap'd whilst living. For the Son, after a luxurious life, which had brought upon him so great a weakness of sight that he could not endure the Sun, nor any light, being banish'd *Syracuse*, and deprived of his Kingdom, led the most sordid life, and was forced to teach School for Subsistence. On which *Ovid* says thus,

Ille Syracusia modò formidatus in Urbe,
Vix humili diram reppulit arte famem.

He,

*He, whom at Syracusia all men did dread,
Is forc'd by little Arts to get his Bread.*

Of whose most abject condition if the Father were sensible, which might be according to *Aristotle*, if I mistake not, in his *Ethicks* to *Nicomachus*, the Soul of *Dionysius* was afflicted at the calamities of his Son. But this supposing the Immortality of Souls, I confess the argument is not very proper here.

Ibid. Sect. 4. pag. 88. l. 29. *Who had no end or interest, &c.* To which add, nor were suborned by those who propos'd any such end to themselves.

Ibid. l. 33. *Leave any sensible effect behind them.* Add to this, It is certain that these things were not invented by the Narrator, or any things done by him, or another, and imputed to a *Demon* or *Spirit*: Which in things of this nature cannot be done, as for Example, A Boy bewitched on a sudden, crys out, that he saw a Witch upon the wall, pointing his finger to the very place, and one of the company with a knife striking the same place, the boy crys out that the Witch's hand look'd wounded, and bloody; the company go to the house of the said Witch, and find her fresh wounded in that very part. It is plain, this thing could not be invented, nor be suppos'd to be done by the Witch.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 2. Sect. 4. pag. 90. l. 2.

FROM one Mrs. Dark concerning her own Husband, &c. Nor did she only tell me the Story, but two other eye-witnesses (her daughter, if I mistake not, and her maid) affirm'd the same thing.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 3. Sect. 4. pag. 92. l. 30.

SHE was discharged upon the top of the Oak at that last Thunder-clap, &c. The words of *Remigius* are: On a sudden, as soon as the Clap of Thunder was heard, a Woman appear'd hung on the top of an Oak, which was in the neighbourhood, of whom the Cloud (as is believ'd) had with so much force discharg'd it self. Which words are not so to be understood as if the Cloud had violently cast her towards the Earth, but that some Dæmon had carried her thither to the Clap of Thunder. For it is in the Title of this very Chapter, That Sorcerers are carried through the Air by Damons, and at last sliding easily and gently, are set down on the ground without any hurt, just like the lighting of Birds.

Ibid.

Ibid. Sect. 7. pag. 93. l. 41. *Boxes carefully lock'd, unlocking themselves, &c.* This, and other subsequent events, with certain other things, being carefully examined by a learned and wise man, very incredulous of things of this nature, did so convince him of the existence of *Demons* and *Witches*, that he could not forbear acknowledging the same to his Friend, by Letters written with his own hand.

Ibid. Sect. 8. pag. 94. l. 5. *is of prime use.* Nor is the story of the *Demon of Tedworth* less useful, being very like it, which the ingenious and learned *Jos. Glanvil*, a very diligent enquirer into things of this nature, not long since wrote of and publish'd, he being an Eye-witness of several Pranks which this *Dæmon* play'd. This *Dæmon* scarce ever appear'd in any visible shape, though he gave many and most evident Proofs of his presence, as this *Demon of Mascon* did, tho' he was not so talkative. But with the noise of his Drum, (from which he was commonly called the *Drummer of Tedworth*) he very frequently filled the houses. But to pass by his knocking at Doors and Walls, the hollow and blustering noises over houses in the Air, the chinking of money in houses, the purring of Cats, the ruffling of Silks, as of a Woman walking, the noise of cabinets walking on the floor, and going up stairs, also of a dog breathing very hard and frequently; of a Smith shoeing a horse, and attempting to catch one by the nose lying in bed, the noise of scratching the Bedsted, as it were with iron talons, and the sound of a Drum a little way up in the Air. These noises and sounds being made without the appearance of any one that should make them.

Besides, the visible motions were wonderful and unusual. The shaking of the Posts of the Bedsteds and the Bed, and of the Chamber-windows, the sudden opening of doors, and the lifting up of the bed with people in it, the tables moving of themselves, and the walking of chairs, Girls shoes thrown over their heads, pulling them by the hair of the head, and the tumbling about of all the goods in the house. Add to these the struggling about a sword, and throwing it several ways, the wresting a Bed-staff out of a man's hand, and throwing it violently against the ground; the taking away of candles alight, and carrying them up the Chimney into the Air, blazes of fire like lamps going cross a room, emptying Chamberpots into beds, and sprinkling ashes, and sharp bits of Iron and knives thrown here. These were the tokens of the *Demon of Tedworth's* being there, though he never appear'd in a visible shape but once in a house, and that was so very obscurely, being in the shape of a Body of a vast bigness, and very terrible, with two eyes large, red, and fiery.

These few instances I could not forbear cursorily and briefly to excerpt from the aforesaid relation, because I think there can be nothing found more certain, or better attested and proved, for whilst these disturbances lasted (which was above two years) there were some *robust Wits*, (as they love to be call'd) who, I remember, were forc'd to confess, that there were some such things as *Aiery Men*, but that there was no immaterial substance in their bodies. But a few years after that these *Dæmoniack Tumults* had ceas'd, these *Wits* being afraid

fraild least from these *Aiery men* they must necessarily infer the knowledge of Spirits properly so call'd, thought it more advisable confidently to deny the whole matter, adding moreover, that Mr. *Mompesson* himself (for that was his name, in whose house these magick tumults happened) own'd it was an Imposture, and that Mr. *Glanvil* was of the same mind. Both which are utterly false, as appears very plainly by Mr. *Mompesson's* Letters to Mr. *Glanvil*: And Mr. *Glanvil* was so far from changing his mind about these transactions, that lately he openly declared he would publish a new Edition of this Narrative. But to say no more, the things themselves are such, as they cannot suppress the truth of them, though they would ever so fain, nor so much as call them in question: As any one may be sufficiently satisfied, if he will carefully read Mr. *Glanvil's* Narrative, and the Letter which he wrote to me annex'd to it; where he ingeniously and substantially answers all the Objections which I or any one else could urge: Which would be too tedious here to insert, since I have made a digression longer than I intended.

Ibid. l. 36. *But without hurt, as in the former Narration, &c.* Which same thing was done by the *Demon* of *Tedworth*: For he threw a Bed-staff at the Minister, which hit him on the calf of the leg, but he felt it no more than if a lock of wool had fallen upon him: And after it was on the ground, it lay still; which is a Sign it was rather brought thither by the *Demon*, than thrown at him.

Ibid. Sect. 9. pag. 95. l. 5. *Being made not by one solitary person, &c.* nor written by one pen; for *Marcellinus*, the Preacher of *Mascon*, hath written the same History; and *Tornus*, who was an Eye-witness, and a constant spectator of this *Demon's* Pranks, hath written a Narrative, sign'd with his own hand, which *Perreand* kept in his own custody.

Ibid. l. 20. *The silence of the dog gives also a further suffrage, &c.* The same thing is also observed in the tumults of *Tedworth*; for when the noise was at the loudest, and the sudden and surprizing violence at the highest, no dog offer'd to bark.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 4. Sect. 2. p. 96. l. 39.

BUT is wholly that *Stranger's* that hath got into them, &c. From the foresaid Instances in the foregoing Section, it is easily understood, how any one may speak foreign languages, though he does not understand them, nor remember them after he hath done speaking. And there is the same reason in reading and interpreting foreign Writings. These are done by the help of some certain Genius's, and cannot be imputed to any faculty of the mind of man.

Ibid. Sect. 6. pag. 98. l. 12. *Now what credit or advantage there can be, &c.* Truly this is so far from gaining any honour or credit to the *Roman Religion*, that it rather makes it, and all their other Miracles, suspected,

suspected, and if at any time there be truth in their stories, that these are the delusions of the Devil, by which they impose their gross superstition on the minds of the People.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 5. Sect. 5. pag. 99. l. 48.

AND at last was pull'd out thence by a Chirurgeon. You may see the shape and length of the Knife describ'd by *Wierus*. Whence it is plain it was seven inches long: And therefore it is impossible the Girl could naturally swallow it; and yet less possible still, that the Girl should do it unknowingly, because the difficulty and pain would make her sensible what she did.

Ibid. Sect. 6. pag. 100. l. 4. *That spoke Greek*. How that can be done, we have before shewn in *Schol. on Cap. 4. Sect. 2*. But there are more Instances to be met with in *Fernelius*, *Pfellus*, and others.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 6. Sect. 2. pag. 100. l. 38.

HATH so evident proof of it in the Town of Hammel, &c. To confirm this the more, *Wierus* not only sets down the year, which was one thousand two hundred eighty four, but likewise the day, which was the twenty sixth of July; nay, and the very hour too, it being about seven in the morning; and he not only mentions the City, namely *Hammel*, in the Dutchy of *Brunswick*, but likewise the very street that the Children went out at. In which, for the perpetual memory of the thing, he says, they never do admit of the sound of a pipe, nor dancing, if there happen to be a Wedding there: And the street hath from thence taken the name of *Burgelosestras*. Nor is it a wonder that he is so particular in his account; for living at *Hammel*, he had the greater opportunity of enquiring into this thing of the inhabitants. He says thus; *These things are written in their Annals, and are most religiously preserved in the Archives of Hammel: They are likewise among their Books in the Church, and are seen painted in the glass windows of the same. Of which thing I am an Eye-witness*: He likewise says, they shew'd him the hole of the Hill into which all the Children went, adding this *Epiphonema*, *Diabolical bloody Piper!* Thus he, which I have transcrib'd for this reason, that no body should think I took this wonderful story rashly upon Trust.

SCHOLIA

S C H O L I A

On BOOK III. CHAP. 7. Sect. 13. Pag. 110. l. 8.

B*T* that of one forced to walk all Night, with a bundle of Pales on his back, in a pond of Water, &c. As to the Magician that did this, that the Witch might satisfy him asking about *Spirits*, they frankly invited him to go, and in her name desire him to shew him a Spirit, which he promis'd he would certainly do, and she told him the name of the Magician, and the place of his habitation. The enquirer having more grace than curiosity, declin'd the proffer'd civility. This Magician being some years after convicted by a cloud of witnesses, and those most evident ones, suffer'd the like punishment. So exactly do all things concur to prove the truth of *Ann Styles's* narration of *Anne Bodenham*.

Ibid. Sect. 14. pag. 110. l. 35. *Is most certainly true.* And yet notwithstanding all this, a few years after *Anne Bodenham* was hang'd, a certain Physician of *Salisbury* (strange impudence!) denies the truth of this Narration, whereas there could not be found or desir'd in humane affairs a more evident proof than this. I think wise men should be cautious how they lessen the credit of narrations so authentic, and duly publish'd, for the sake of insipid carpers and deriders of them, when the opportunity of examining into them is pass'd. But it is the way of such Fellows, who either are Atheists, or would be thought so, that they may be esteem'd more skilful in Nature, to blab any thing, though without sense or reason, which they think may make for their cause. But they that are Atheists indeed, or very much inclin'd that way, and are wholly given up to worldly pleasure, earnestly desire that narrations of this kind should be false. For which reason these dissolute *Rakes* endeavour to extinguish the memory of the narrations, not only of *Ann Bodenham*, but of the *Demon of Tedworth*; as if by extinguishing the memory of the *Demon*, the Devil himself would be extinct or dead, and that they might securely sing in their lewd *Debauchies* that vulgar

*Ho, Jack, the Devil's dead,
T'other Pipe and t'other Pot,
And all will then be well.*

English Song. In the mean time whilst they are so solicitous to have all things of this nature false, they give not the least credit to things of much greater moment; but all prudent and sober men will easily understand the use of such most certain narrations, and observe the wonderful force of them, even in the opinion of the Atheists themselves, to confirm the belief of the *Immortality of the Soul*, and a *future life*, and the Truth of the whole *Christian Religion*.

S C H O L I A

On BOOK III. CHAP. 8. Sect 6. pag. 113. l. 28.

WHO appear'd within eight days after her death to her Fellow-servant, &c. The Soul therefore (if this was the Soul of the Maid) does not stay so long with the body after death, as some do imagine. For if it be true that I have heard, the Soul sometimes, either at the departure of the breath, or soon after, is seen in the same shape of the man whilst he was alive, or sometimes like a thin light shadow. Which we shall not expatiate on here.

S C H O L I A

On BOOK III. CHAP. 9. Sect. 2. pag. 114. l. 23.

Johannes Cuntius, a Citizen of Pentsch, &c. In the Ortelian Records it is called *Bentsch*. But P. and B. are letters very near a kin in sound and shape. This *Bentsch* or *Pentsch* is a Town of *Silesia*, about four miles distant from *Jegersdorf*, of which mention is made in Sect. 5.

Ibid. Sect. 4. pag. 115. l. 24. *He had not been dead a day or two, &c.* This moreover confirms what we observed in the foregoing Chapter, That it is not long before the Soul is loosed from the Body after death, especially if it be pure and clean, and the body wasted with diseases; but a foul Soul soon leaves a robust sound Body.

Ibid. Sect. 5. pag. 115. l. 50. *And bids them be of good courage, &c.* Whether this was the voice of a *Dæmon*, or of *Cuntius*, any body may judge. But it is plain that the person of *Cuntius* was made use of here.

Ibid. pag. 116. l. 8. *Where he walked so stoutly, &c.* This looks as if he had assumed his body again. But the *Statick* or *Systaltick* power of the Soul in an airy Vehicle can imitate and plainly equalize any force, weight, or earthly solidity. And it is better known than here to be hinted what the Wind, join'd with no statick power but loose and diffusive, can do in shaking houses.

Ibid. Sect. 10. pag. 118. l. 30. *And a staff being put into his hand, he grasped it with his fingers very fast, &c.* Whether this was the soul of *Cuntius*, or some *Dæmon*; yet it may be an instance, that a *Dæmon* (since the Soul separated from the Body is a sort of a *Dæmon*) may possess a living Body, and actuate it for a time.

Ibid. Sect. 13. pag. 119. l. 12. *I must confess, I am so slow-witted myself, that I cannot so much as imagine what the Atheist will excogitate, &c.* There is a certain modern Writer, who, by taking upon him the Defence of *Witches*, would seem to acquire the reputation of not being reputed an Atheist; who, being not able to solve this difficulty after his heavy way of arguing, endeavours to cut through it by force,
by

by denying these stories of the Cobler *Uratiflaus*, and *Johannes Cuntius* to be possible: I believe upon account chiefly, that the Cobler and *Cuntius* were suppos'd to have made a bargain with the Devil, because this new Author, and sworn *Advocate of Witches*, argues that Magicians and Witches have no more to do with the Devil than other wicked men; but that whatsoever wonders are done by them, are performed by natural causes. Upon what ground he thus philosophizes, let him look to, whether to persuade people into an opinion that he is a Magician, not a Caco-Magician, and that he has nothing to do with the Devil, since the Witches have not; or whether among the Northern people he would be esteemed, *The great power of Nature*, as *Simon Magus* among the *Samaritans* was call'd, *The great power of God*; or lastly, whether as *Montanus* impiously would be thought the true *Paraclete*, so this person would assume the Title of *Paraclete of Witches and Sorceresses*. Which of these is the cause, truly I cannot tell; or for what end he falls so foul on me and my argument, being no where that I know provoked by me, except his malice proceed from this, that he is the filthy servant of other mens Envy, as the familiar Spirits are of Sorceresses.

But that which, he says, he wonders at is, that I, *an old man, who had lived so many years in the most flourishing University*, should give credit to these stories of the Shoemaker and *Cuntius*; I would have this Pretender know, that I have not spent my time in this flourishing University to no purpose, but that leisure, which by the Divine Providence I have there enjoy'd, I have faithfully employ'd in cultivating my reason with the most solid arguments of those Truths which it is our greatest Interest to know; and after a liberal as well a elaborate examination of things, by the blessing of God on my endeavours, I have found out such Principles, so exact and demonstrably true, that no Philosopher, however experienced, nor any pert saucy Quack-Theologist can any way enervate. And this I know for certain from those Principles, that there is nothing in these two narrations repugnant to right reason, and true Philosophy, provided all things are rightly taken. For we are not to imagine that *Cuntius's* body was so heavy that his horse could not draw it, *Sect. 11.* Nor that milk was turned into blood, *Sect. 8.* or that *Cuntius* turned himself into a long staff, and the like; but that these were the tricks and pranks of Demons or Hobgoblins, who stopt the Cart in which the body of *Cuntius* was, with such strength that exceeded that of the Horse, and this was imputed to the weight of *Cuntius's* Body. After the same manner either Blood was put in the room of Milk, or perhaps Milk ting'd with red by some trick, and so by reason of the colour, it was called Blood. And when in the room of *Cuntius* the shape of a staff was set, hereupon they concluded *Cuntius* was turned into a staff. If this caution were allow'd in explaining these stories, it's most certain, that nothing would occur therein contrary to sound Philosophy. And, truly, to speak ingenuously in this matter, I do not so much admire as deride the supercilious ignorance and stupidity of this Quack-Theologist, who thinks these stories to be impossible.

And as I turned over his Book, in which he shews neither reason nor judgment, I not only wonder'd, but stood amaz'd that he should so insult the credulity of others, and at the same time espouse so incredible opinions, and which are in some things impossible. Of which sort is that most absurd fiction of the *Spiritus Astralis* endued with corporeal mortal sense and memory, (of which in another place.) And those ridiculous stories of Spectres and images of men appearing by virtue of distillation from humane blood, and sometimes roaring out. That opinion of the Devil, that he can do nothing to any thing by his own proper personal power, except by the help of matter fetch'd from something else. And that the humane Soul is far and wide extended beyond its body. To which add, that although the Devils drove the swine of the *Gadarens* headlong into the sea, yet they could not gather the Serpents together. That the *Verses* which are called *Magick*, operate by their own natural power, especially if the composition of the words be made under proper configurations of the Stars. The same thing he affirms of Images and Characters. At length he breaks out into such a fury, that he concludes with *Paracelsus*, and in his own words; *All things that are in Nature are known to the Stars, whence a wise man will govern by the Stars; namely, that wise man who can constrain those virtues to the obedience of himself.* Of which sort he affirms the *Egyptian Magi* to be, who oppos'd *Moses*, and that not by any diabolical Art, but natural *Magick*; namely, by glittering Plates made under certain constellations, and engrav'd with certain figures, they perform'd strange things, and would cause several shapes or images of things to appear to the sight. Lastly, for it would be endless to rake up all; to these you may add, The Bell made of *Paracelsus's* Electre, (or a mixture of Gold and Silver, whereof the fifth part was Silver) which having certain words and characters written on the inward Superficies, and being rung, would naturally shew several Visions, or Apparitions of Spirits, or, as the Magician pleas'd, would by the ringing of it drive away Spirits and Ghosts, and even Men and Beasts. And all these only by natural *Magick*, without any help of Dæmons. What can be more ridiculous and incredible to men of sense than these fooleries? And surely they must be strangely possess'd, who deny solid and useful Truths, and give credit to the most absurd Fables and Fictions. Matters of fact seen by numbers of People, and related by an eminent and grave Physician, are rejected as impossibilities, whilst the most trifling imaginations or inventions, and disagreeable to all reason, are receiv'd as Oracles.

But he produces nothing of any moment against these stories, except that the life of *Martin Weinrich* was not written by *Melchior Adam*, who wrote the Lives of the *German* Physicians that liv'd in the last Age, and to the year 1620. As if no credit were to be given to any Physician, but to those that were mentioned in Books, or were publick Professors. And besides (which plainly shews how careless and inadvertent an Author this *Patron of Witches* is) since the Lives of the *German* Physicians were brought no further than the year 1620. and that none of their Lives were written by *Adam* till they were dead,

dead, it is highly probable that *Weinrich's* Life was left out, because at that time he was alive. For the sad story of the Shoemaker of *Uratiflaus* did not happen before the year 1591. between which and the year 1620. there are about thirty years. And besides *Weinrich* might be a young man, when those Dæmoniack Tumults happen'd at *Uratiflaus*, and he might live above forty years after that time. So that the argument drawn from hence by the *Paraclete* of the *Sorceresses* signifies nothing at all; as certainly all his arguments in this case are very heavy and frivolous, and void of all force and sting, except that of Malice. But whatever he may think of *Martin Weinrich*, I look upon him not only a skilful Physician, but an excellent natural Philosopher, and that it was by his advice that the Shoemaker of *Uratiflaus's* body was burnt; for he was at that time an Inhabitant and Physician of that Town. Which example the People of *Pentsch* after imitated, in burning the body of *Cuntius*.

But since this importunate *Patron* of *Sorceresses* appeals to the Tribunal of *Melchior Adam*, *De Medicorum Præcellentia*, and since he so heartily espouses Magick superstitions, as the Plates made under certain Constellations, and engrav'd with Characters, and other Magical whimsies of this sort, and chiefly recommended by *Paracelsus*, as acting by the power of Nature, I would advise him to read the Life of *Paracelsus*, written by *Melchior Adam*, and let him tell me what is the meaning of that sentence which so often occurs in *Paracelsus*; *It is allow'd from above to a Christian, barring the wrong done to Religion, to make use of the help and advice of the Devil.* *Melchior Adam* affirms that he often uses this expression in his Writings. Likewise when he taught at *Basil*, treating of Inchantments and Magical Exorcisms of Diseases, and several learned and pious people resenting it, he burst out into this expression, *If God will not help, the Devil must.* And exactly agreeable to this, is what *Oporinus* his *Amanuensis* writes in the same place; to wit, *That he was often used when he was drunk at night, with a naked sword to fight with Hob-goblins for near half an hour, not without hazard to his Amanuensis, who lay by him; and then he would raise him, (viz. his Amanuensis) to write down his dictates, which he reported so expeditiously, that without doubt they were suggested to him by the instinct of Demons.* Thus says *Oporinus*. And certainly *Paracelsus* philosophizing thus must either be a *Demoniack*, or a Mad-man. But as to what relates to Medicines, I allow both Old-women and *Demons* may have good ones. But what's all this to Philosophy? Which how delirious it may be with those, who are nevertheless Masters of good Medicines from this one of *Paracelsus* alone, I abundantly shew in my *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*, Sect. 45. In the mean time it is plain that *Paracelsus* us'd the conversation of impure *Demons*; and moreover since he owns he could really perform things by his *magick Plates*; who but a mad-man would impute any thing to the power of the Stars, and not to the assistance of *Demons*, by whom he was seduced? But how unfair is it for this *Patron* of *Witches* and *Sorcerers* to detract from this grave and sober man, such as undoubtedly *Martin Weinrich* was, and very skilful both in Physick and true Philosophy, and to question things certain, and receiv'd by all people in those times, and yet

yet at the same time blindly and superstitiously believe and recommend to every one, a man that was a fott, mad, and a Dæmoniack in things merely phantastical and devis'd, and not only wanting the proof of experience, but even profane and impious. But as I have said before, they that will not credit solid, useful, and experimented Truths, deserve to be impos'd on by ridiculous impostures and lies.

But he does not treat contemptibly *Weinrich* alone, and that because he wrote nothing besides these two narrations about the *Cobler* and *Cuntius*, but with the same pertness and impudence he likewise spurns at those two most ingenious and learned men *Johannes Bodinus*, and *Nicholaus Remigius*, making them far inferiour to any that wrote of things of this nature. Which aspersions must proceed either from his ignorance or malice. Perhaps he rails against *Bodinus*, because in his Preface to his *Dæmonomania*, he speaks of one *Peter de Apono*, who was wont to perswade people, that there were no Spirits, though afterwards he was plainly prov'd to be the greatest Magician that *Italy* produc'd. And that one *Gulielmus Linensis* a Divine, but a Magician, was oblig'd by contract with the Devil, as he himself own'd, publickly to preach, (and which this our *Quack-Theologue* publish'd) that whatsoever was said concerning Magicians and Witches was a Fable, and could not be, &c. But certainly this Scribler had no reason to take these things so heinously, since no body, that I know, ever took him for a Conjuror, as we say in *England*; though he may seem to affect the name of a *Paracelsian* Magician from this very Treatise, but upon the most ridiculous reasons imaginable, as I have before hinted, that he might seem to maintain and support his tottering reputation by such phantastical whimsies as these. And as for his railing against *Remigius*, it may be, because *Remigius* for the space of fifteen years, sat as an Inquisitor and Judge at *Lorrain*, in causes of Old-women accused of Witch-craft. I cannot truly but wonder how any man, except one of the most hardened front, can refute the Testimony of two such learned and experienced men, as unfit Authors in this Cause.

As to *Bodinus*, to omit the Book it self, the Preface alone, and the Confutation of *Wierus*, setting aside his Learning, do sufficiently demonstrate that he was not only a great Wit, but a man of a most penetrating and exact Judgment; and that he did not take up his opinion rashly or by hear-say, but upon matter of fact, and plain confessions, as appears in his Judgment against *Joan Havilleria*, to which, he says, he was call'd the day before the Calends of *May* 1578. And surely if this Patron of Sorcerers had read the Confutation of *Wierus*, annex'd to *Bodinus's* *Dæmonomania*, he would have been ashamed of undertaking their Defence, since there are none of his trifling arguments, which he offers in favour of Witches, but what *Wierus* had before made use of, and which *Bodinus* in that Confutation, clearly answers; so that this Champion of Witches seems to me to be a man either of no judgment, or no conscience; and that by a sort of blind and rash levity, he impudently determines concerning things and persons he was utterly ignorant of. No man can charge *Bodinus* with being over-credulous in any thing, except in the Transformation of
men

men into Wolves, and other Animals: Though in this case he doth not defend himself idly or unskilfully. But in this thing I had declar'd my opinion in my *Scholia cap. 11. lib. 3.* before the publication of this Book of the *Lamiarum Paracleti*.

But *Remigius* is so cautious and diffident, that he not only denies the Transformation of men, but the Emigration of humane Souls from the bodies by Ecstasy. And yet so modest and considerate a man as this, is us'd very disrespectfully by this uncivil and unmannerly Champion of Witches and Sorcerers; who impudently affirms, that Witches have no more to do with the Devil than other wicked peoples. Whenas *Remigius*, who for the space of fifteen years was conversant with these matters, does not stick to declare openly in his Preface: *There are some, says he, will call me vain and opinionated, to talk of Witches moving clouds, flying through the Air, passing through little holes, junketing, dancing, and lying with Devils, and performing many wonderful and strange things of this sort: But I would have such to know, that I do not relate things taken upon common report, but confirm'd by the concurring separate testimonies of many.* And in the end of the Preface, he says, *I am very well satisfied in my conscience, that I have written nothing for the sake of Controversy, nor offer'd any new argument to gain applause, or ingratiate my self with any man; but have made Truth the mark of my aim, which many others may have done, though perhaps not so well furnish'd as my self.* To these we may add that which occurs in *Lib. 1. Cap. 14.* about the story of *Nicholas Langbernhard*. Behold, matter of fact, says he, not a Dream, what I saw with my Eyes, not taken by hear-say, confirm'd by the concurring testimonies of several, not publish'd by the imagination or device of a single person. Which if any one will not believe, let him enjoy his thought; only let him know, that I have invented or devis'd nothing, but rather that I have forgotten to insert many instances of this kind, which I read in the examinations of Witches.

Who therefore can be a more proper Author for us to appeal to in things of this kind than *Remigius*, a man of the most lively and sprightly Wit, of the most exact honour and integrity, and a publick Inquisitor of innumerable Causes of this Nature, for 15 years in *Lorraine*? The certainty of whose repeated experience has so confirm'd his Judgment concerning the Truth of these things, that though he was very averse to the notion of the Transformation of men into Wolves, and other Animals; yet he plainly affirms, *Lib. 2. Cap. 4.* that *Catharine of Metz*, *Henezelius a young man*, *James Wecher*, *Gaspar Hafner*, *Margaret Jenin*, *Margaret Luodman*, *Sennel Armentaria*, and almost all that were found guilty in *Lorraine* did unanimously affirm, that that power of passing through houses was given them by Demons, (provided they had serv'd them some years) that they could make their way through any hole with ease, contracting themselves into the shape of Cats, Mice, Locusts, or any little creature, as occasion requir'd; and being got in, could, if they pleas'd, resume their own shape, &c. And although in the next Chapter he argues against the Transmutation of men into Beasts being real, yet he judiciously affirms, that in this there is a real operation of prestigious Demons; because they seem to be thus transformed, (speaking of Wolves and Cats) and have in them that swiftness in running, that
strength

strength in conquering, that ferity in tearing, that greediness in devouring, that facility of penetrating, and the like, which far exceed the strength of humane nature. Which, says he, there is no reason for any man to look upon as a Cheat or Trick, because after the action they leave their footsteps behind them, besides the taking them in the fact, their flight, pursuit, wounding them, and the mischiefs they do, and, which is agreeable to all this, their frequent and voluntary Confession of the Fact; so that it may truly be said, these things did really happen so as they appear, but by the assistance of Demons, &c. Thus we may see how the certainty of matter of Fact will carry a man even against his own opinion.

Which indeed does very much confirm, and plainly evince, that there are Transformations of this nature, and that Demons do assist the Witch or Magician. And this may be done in the Terrestrial body of them in the fields and open places, the Devil both really actuating the body, and covering it with a prestigious shape, whereby the eyes of the Spectators are so deluded as to take it for a Wolf or Cat. But in the Vehicles of the souls of Witches or Magicians going out of Terrestrial Bodies, there may be a sudden transfiguration of an airy Body, (as in the vehicles of Demons themselves) the force of the Demon actuating it, the will and imagination of the departed Soul of the Witch or Magician at the same time conspiring with it; for otherwise there would be a penetration of dimensions, unless the souls of Witches should pass through little holes of Houses in their airy Vehicles, not terrestrial Bodies. Which temporaneous emigration of the Soul since *Remigius* deny'd, nothing but the evidence of witnesses and experience could make him give credit to such facts as these. Whence in every respect we see, that *Remigius*, above all that I know, is the most proper Author in these things, which relate to the feats of Witches. Therefore I cannot see for what this *Advocate of Sorcerers* cavils at *Remigius*, except that the matters of Fact which he urges, do not please him, or whether it proceed from his own stupidity, or that he would curry favour with those rough *Genius's*, who scarce allow there is a God, much less Angels, Spirits, or Witches; if he has a mind to be reckoned in the number of those, he may for me, I shall not envy him.

Lastly, And which I shall observe in favour of *Remigius*; from what hath been said the Reader may observe, with how many plausible *Lies* and *Æquivocations* the *Frontispice* of this Book of the Patron of Sorcerers is adorn'd: 1. There is nothing to be found in this matter of Witches and Magicians besides *Melancholy* and *Imagination*, and certain crafty *Collusions* of Knaves. 2. That there is no Contract between the Devil and a Witch. 3. That there is no *Concubitus*. 4. That there are no Teats in the Bodies of Witches. 5. No Transformation into Cats or Dogs. 6. No *Raising* of Storms. 7. But that in *Magick Charms* there is a natural power, and that there are such things as *Astral Spirits*.

As to the first, it is so void of reason and experience, that his Partner *Wierus* would have been ashamed to assert it; nay he very often expressly affirms, that the Devil is in an especial manner conversant with the Witches. 2. Besides the many instances of Contracts which

Remigius

Remigius knew, this same *Patron of Sorceresses Wierus*, owns the Contract between *Magdalena Crucia* and the *Æthiopian Devil*, and does not in the least question that *memorable Story*, as he calls it, which many reputable and learned *Spaniards* confirm. 3. As to the *Concubitus*, which confirms the Authority of *Remigius*, it is so notorious, that *Wierus*, modestly calling it a *witty jest*, owns it in the story of *Magdalena Crucia* with her *Æthiopian Dæmon*. There are many instances of these obscenities of Dæmons with women in the same Author; namely, that the Devil would so manage himself by the motion or vehicle of his body, which by this *Systaltick* power he could make tangible and palpable, that he could give them both pleasure and pain. But that this cannot be called *Concubitus*, because the Devil hath neither *Flesh* nor *Seed*, is a wretched *Æquivocation* and *Evasion*. 4. And that they have not *Teats*, because the Devils have no carnal lips; this is another *Æquivocation*. But since they can turn themselves into *Animal-shapes*, and by their *Statick* or *Systaltick* power, make the *Vehicle* tangible and palpable, by applying their mouths to the skin of a *Witch*, they can do what they please. I my self, in my younger years, being curious in things of this kind, very well remember I heard from a *Maid-servant* of a *Cambridge Witch*, that was sadly afflicted in this manner, that she saw a familiar Spirit sucking her *Mistress's Leg*; and this *Patron of Sorceresses* cannot deny, but that *Witches* themselves have owned this. But to pass by, that all Spirits have not only a *Plastick* figure, but that very *Plastick* figure naturally hath a *humane* shape in *Rational Spirits*, is an opinion very probable, and may be drawn into less and less compass, and may be transformed into almost any animal shape for a time as the Spirit pleases. But the mouth is wanting in none of them, by which they may suck from the bodies of *Witches*. 5. As to the Transformation into *Cats*, *Dogs*, and *Wolves*, *Remigius* in this matter agrees with the *Patron of Witches*; viz. that the transformation is not real; but that, by the help of the Devil operating with the *Witch* or *Magician*, a prestigious shape is offer'd to the sight, this he most confidently affirms, which nevertheless this Advocate denies; for he either ignorantly or impudently contends, that his good old women have no peculiar converse at all with the Devil. But I shall add from an approv'd experiment in *Remigius*, that sometimes *real* Transformation may be (nay, ought to be acknowledged) temporary in the airy vehicles of the Souls of *Magicians* and *Witches*, gone out of their earthly Bodies. 6. That *Tempests* are not raised by *Witches*: Here also an *Æquivocation* lurks; to wit, that they are not done by the help of their ceremonies, which is most certain; but that ceremonies are performed either by the precognition or operation of the Devil, his most faithful Partner *Wierus* does not deny, any more than that *Witches* can be corporeally carried in the Air by the Devil. But this is the most importunate and impudent Advocate of them that I ever yet met with. 7. And lastly, though he affirms there is a natural vertue in *Charms*, lest the Devil should be thought to intrude himself into the affairs of his good old women; yet *Wierus*, in things of this Nature the most skilful of any, openly declares,
nothing

nothing can be done by such means. How much ignorance, and what mistakes there are in that Comment on the *Astral Spirit*, I have in another place hinted. I shall only briefly conclude, That in all those Titles with which he would have the *Frontispiece* of his Book adorn'd, I say, in the defending and proving them, (I speak experimentally) *John Webster* hath added a parcel of mere Quibbles and childish Sophisms; and although he professes himself a *Medico-Theologue*, yet in this his Defence of Witches he hath shewn himself no better than a Spinner of Spiders Webs, which every thing can break through.

What relates to my self, as in all other things, so in this I have taken the greatest care to set down nothing but what has been certainly known and proved, nor have I written it till after a strict examination of many Witches; who have freely confess'd, that they not only had *Familiar Spirits*, but likewise the cause of associating with them; and have moreover told the shapes and names of them, and the places where they visited them, and many other circumstances so firmly and distinctly have been told me by them, both young and old, without the least species or shadow of deliriousness, that I cannot but look upon all those, who, in the case of Witches, affirm there is nothing in it, but *melancholy Imagination* and knavish *Collusion*, to be but half witted, and of a very light and superficial judgment. And as a Friend I would advise our *Webster*, who, by the inspiration of his Old-women, like a man distracted, hath expressed himself in such rude and uncivil terms against men eminent for piety and learning, for the future to endeavour to repair his credit with more honest reasons; and that he would compose his mind into a Christian humility, lest he fall into the snares of the Devil, and, together with his Old-women, be snatched away into that very same *Daimonomania*, which *Bodinus* and *Remigius* have so learnedly and truly described.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. II. Sect. 2. pag. 122. l. 5.

SHALL not trouble you with any Histories of them, &c. See the History of *Olaus Magnus de Gentibus septentrionalibus*, lib. 18. cap. 45, & 46. *Bodin. Demonoman.* l. 2. cap. 6. *Wierus de Praestig. Dam.* lib. 6. cap. 13. *Henning. Gros. Mag. de Spectris*, lib. 1. Sect. 220. 295, 296, 297, 298, 299.

Ibid. Sect. 34. pag. 122. l. 43. That they find themselves exceeding weary, and sometimes wounded, &c. But here it may be further enquired, whether this cannot happen to Bodies tarrying at home, and to Souls or Spirits rambling abroad by themselves. For neither is it to be believ'd that *Jane Brooks* the Witch was corporeally present on the Wall, whom the Child that was bewitch'd said, he saw, when none of the company besides could see her; and yet the place of the wall, on which she seem'd to the Child to stand, being struck with

with a knife by *Gibson*, and the hand of the Apparition being wounded and bloody, as the Child cry'd out immediately after the stroke, it was plainly made appear, that that woman was wounded at the same time, and in the same part of the Body, as that learned and understanding Person Mr. *Joseph Glanvil* hath sufficiently testified in his *Dæmon of Tedworth*. There are many instances of this kind, which I omit, and content my self with this only, being the latest. See *Grosius de Spectris*, lib. 1. Sect. 298, 299. But in what cases this Phænomenon ought to be solv'd, See the Treatise of the *Immortality of the Soul*, lib. 3. cap. 12. Sect. 4.

Ibid. pag. 122. l. 44. *And it is more natural to conclude they were really thus transformed, &c.* That is either in their terrestrial Bodies, or in their airy Vehicles, their bodies lying half dead at home, but by reason of the *Spirit of Nature* they retain the *Plastick* life, and with their airy vehicle partake of whatsoever happens to it.

Ibid. pag. 123. l. 1. *Melts the yielding compages of the Body to such a consistency, &c.* This certainly may be done in Transformations of this kind, where the Animal, into which the Witch is transform'd, is not much less than the Witch her self, or if it be larger it is not much matter. But that the Body of a Witch should be turn'd into the Body of a Cat, as is said in the story of *Ann Bodenham*, in the presence of *Anne Styles*, there is nothing in the whole story of Witches more incredible. Not that I in the least doubt but that it appear'd fact to *Anne Styles*, but I suppose it done by delusion and deception of sight. Nor does it look probable, that the Witch entire with her Cloaths on, could be contain'd within the form and bulk of a Cat, though a very large one; or that only part of her should be assum'd, and the rest of her body with her cloaths chang'd into invisible Air. And it is much less credible that the same thing should be done in Witches turn'd into Hares, and exposing themselves to the pursuit of Dogs and Huntsmen in the open fields. For it is very ridiculous and incredible, that one part of a Witch being turn'd into a Hare, the other part being chang'd into invisible Air, should always accompany it. Therefore in these kinds of hunting it is much more credible, that the *Hare* is the *Soul* of the *Witch*, with the airy Vehicle chang'd into that shape, except it happen that the Witch at last being encompass'd by the Dogs is found out of breath, and torn by them in the bushes; which I must own I have heard sometimes to be done. For then it is a sign that the corporeal *Witch* her self hath by the Devil been carried in this course, but by delusion conceal'd from the sight of the Hunters, and instead of her, shewn the shape of the *Hare*, either form'd into this likeness by the airy vehicle of the Devil, or impress'd on the imagination of the Dogs and Hunters by the help of Dæmons.

Ibid. pag. 123. l. 5. *Nor is it any more difficulty for him to soften what is hard, &c.* In that there is certainly less difficulty. But after the greatest part of the Body of the Witch is turned into loose Air, it seems more incredible that it can be reduc'd at last to a solid composition of a humane body. To say nothing of the Cloaths of the Witch, which would make the difficulty still greater, as being artificial things.

For that part of the body being reduc'd to the former solidity of its composure, (especially if there be any *specifick Vitality* granted in the body which shall last for a time) so as it may be retain'd in that state, partly by the plastick quality of the Soul, partly by the *spirit* of Nature, it carries some likelihood with it.

Ibid. Sect. 5. pag. 123. l. 7. *We can never stick to give him that which is lesser.* Therefore I would say thus to those, who own the real Transformation, and yet deny that real separation of the soul from the body; which nevertheless in some Transformations, which are mention'd, is far more easy to be imagin'd.

Ibid. Sect. 8. pag. 124. l. 15. *In those excellent inventions of the causes of those more general Phenomenons of Nature, &c.* Suppose the immediate causes to be material, that is, the figures of the particles to be commodious. But whilst he argues those figures to be made by a motion merely mechanical; and that they are actuated by such a motion as this, and not *vital*, I must own I think him very much mistaken in that matter.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 14. Sect. 4. pag. 131. l. 37.

I Think is easily applicable to other Genii or Spirits, &c. It is own'd by almost all Philosphers, who hold the Immortality of the Soul, that the Soul divested of the terrestrial body, and the Genii or Angels are very much alike. But they differ very much whether they be naturally in an humane shape, or in no certain, but at pleasure. But since it is plain from Philosophy, that part of the Soul is *Plastick*, and that inseparable from it, and that blessed Souls of the Christian Faith shall at length have celestial Bodies endued with humane shape; finally, our Saviour himself affirms, that in the Resurrection men shall be like Angels; and for my own part I do believe that Angels have naturally both a *plastick* and *humane* shape, and which I take from the Vision of Ezekiel, to have been the Doctrine of the ancient Cabbala.

Ibid. Sect. 6. pag. 132. l. 33. *For he that is so highly in favour with the Prince, &c.* The same which our Saviour seems to hint in the Epistle to the Church at Sardis, Revel. cap. 3. ver. 5. *But I will confess his name before my Father, and before his Angels.*

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 15. Sect. 4. Pag. 134. l. 30.

WHICH are first in ordine naturæ, though infinity of Time, &c. This argument hath certainly an invincible force with all honest men. And that time it self cannot be infinite, I have sufficiently demonstrated in my *Enchirid. Metaphys.* cap. 10. Ibid.

Ibid. Sect. 6. pag. 134. l. 49. *That Boots, and Shoes, and Stockins, &c.* And I would certainly ask those, who will have humane shape to be from eternity, whether they think *Boots and Shoes and Stockins to have been from eternity?* But if they have not, let them tell me how long it is since the invention of them, or how many thousands of years have pass'd before they were invented; it is most certainly true, that not many pass'd before such other things of that sort were invented, and from thence it is manifest, that they had been some time, since the world and humane form had not lasted many thousands of years. See *Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 10. Sect. 4.*

Ibid. pag. 135. l. 10. *And he was never to seek for power or skill, &c.* And hereupon I own that nothing could be wanting on the part of God, whereby the world should less have been from eternity; but the nature of the world, according to the true Idea of it, is found to be such, that it cannot be altogether capable of so great a perfection. See *Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 10. Sect. 5.*

Ibid. Sect. 8. pag. 136. l. 11. *As in the Scotch Barnacles, &c.* For I rather chose to call them *Barnacles* from the *English* original, than *Che-lonolopices*, or other monsters of that sort.

Ibid. pag. 136. l. 28. *As is seen in Frogs and Mice, &c.* Yea, it is more apparent by these instances, than that nature should always be the same. Which as in the beginning, so always as often as it produces any Animals out of the Earth, produces them *Male* and *Female*. Because the perpetual propagation of species is better thus provided for.

SCHOLIA

On BOOK III. CHAP. 16. Sect. 9. pag. 140. l. 2.

AND that so accurately as that we may see their swords, &c. This seems to me to be so distinct and exact in every part, as I have receiv'd it from Eye-witnesses of very good repute, and several others, that there is no occasion for producing more Instances here.

Ibid. Sect 12. pag. 140. l. 44. *determinately to this or that City, &c.* See *Enchirid. Metaphys. Cap. 26. Sect. 6.*

Ibid. Sect. 17. pag. 142. l. 4. *if I have something more fully insisted, &c.* Which when I had done, I on purpose omitted more narrations of stories in the *Scholia*, because it would be tedious to those whose Genius is averse to things of this nature, and not very useful to others, since there are so many already offer'd in the Treatise, as impartial Judges of things would certainly retain.

A N
A P P E N D I X
To the foregoing
A N T I D O T E
A G A I N S T
A T H E I S M:

Wherein is contained
An Answer to certain Objections made
against several Passages thereof.

B Y
HENRY MORE, D. D.
Fellow of Christ's-College in Cambridge.

Aristot.

Πρὸς τὸν ἕξω λόγον αἰεὶ ὅτι ἐνσησται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἔσω λόγον οὐκ αἰεὶ.

L O N D O N,
Printed by Joseph Downing in Bartholomew-Close near
West-Smithfield, MDCCXII.

APPENDIX

To the foregoing

ANTIDOTE

A GAINST

ATHEISM

Which is contained

An Answer to certain Objections made
against several Tracts therein

HENRY MORE

Fellow of Christ-Church in Cambridge

ALSO

THE MYSTERY OF THE HOLY TRINITY


OF THE

TRINITY OF GOD

A N
A P P E N D I X
To the foregoing
A N T I D O T E
A G A I N S T
A T H E I S M.

C H A P. I.

1. *The Author's reason of adding this Appendix to his Antidote.* 2. *An Enumeration of the chief Objections made against the First Book thereof.*

1.  *Unsuspected Innocency* and *misdoubted Truth* can win no greater credit than by strictest examination: For the world is thereby *more fully* ascertain'd of the *unblameableness* of the one, and of the *solidity* of the other, than it can be possibly without so publick a Trial. Wherefore that so great an advantage may not be wanting to that weighty Cause we have in hand, I was not contented only to set down such *Reasons* for the *Existence of God*, which in my own judgment I conceiv'd to be irrefutably firm; but that the firmness of them may appear more conspicuous to all men, I have brought into view the chiefest and most material *Objections* I could meet with, whether rais'd by those that of themselves have excepted against any Argument I have made use of, or by such as have been invited more curiously to search and discover, where they could find any weakness or inconsequency in any Argumentation throughout the whole Treatise. And the chiefest *Exceptions* and *Objections* against the First Book, are these:

2. *First*, That the Ground of our Demonstration of the *Existence of God* from his *Idea* is, That there are *Innate Ideas* in the Mind of Man; which, say they, is false.

Secondly, That there is no such *Idea* of God at all as we have describ'd, neither *Innate*, nor *Acquisitious*, or *Transcriptitious*; because it in-

involves in it the Notion of a *Spirit*, which again consists of such particular Notions as are utterly unconceivable.

Thirdly, That *Existence* is no Term of *Perfection*, and therefore is not so inseparably involv'd in the Notion of a *Being absolutely perfect*, or of *God*.

Fourthly, That though *Necessary Existence* be included in the *Idea* of *God*, yet our inferring from thence that he does *exist*, is but a *Sophism*; because a *Being absolutely Evil*, as well as *absolutely Perfect*, includes *necessary Existence* in the *Idea* thereof.

Fifthly, That if there be any *necessary Existent*, it is plain that it is *Matter*, which we unadvisedly call *Space*, which we cannot imagine but did ever, and will ever *necessarily exist*.

Sixthly, That *God* did not put this *Idea* of himself into the *Mind* of *Man*, but the subtler sort of *Politicians*, that have always used *Religion* as a mere *Engine of State*.

Seventhly, That *Fear* and *Hopes* of *natural Conscience* are nothing indeed but these *Passions* rais'd upon a belief of a *God* which men have had by *Tradition* or *Education*.

Lastly, That these *Arguments*, whereby we prove the *Incorporeity* of the *Soul* of *Man*, will also conclude the *Incorporeity* of the *Soul* of a *Beast*, and that therefore they are *Sophistical*.

To these I shall answer in order with as little *Pomp* and *Luxuriancy* of words, and as much *Plainness* and *Perspicuity*, as I may in so subtle and difficult a matter.

CHAP. II.

1. That the force of his Argument for the existence of *God* from his *Idea*, does not lie in this, that there are *Innate Ideas* in the *Mind* of *man*.
2. That the force of arguing from the *Idea* of a thing, be it *innate*, or not *innate*, is the same proved by several instances.
3. The reason why he contends for *Innate Ideas*.
4. The seeming accuracy of a *Triangle* to outward sense no disproof but that the exact *Idea* thereof is from the *Soul* her self.
5. That it doth not follow that, if there be *Innate Ideas*, a *Blind man* may discourse of *Colours*.
6. That the *Brutes* have not the *Knowledge* of any *Logical* or *Mathematical Notions*.
7. *Zeno's Ass* goes in a right line to the bottle of *Hay*.
8. That those actions and motions in things that are according to *Reason* and *Mathematicks*, do not prove any *Logical* or *Mathematical Notions* in the things thus acting or moving.

1. **T**HAT some have excepted against our Demonstration of the *Existence* of *God* from his *Idea*, in that they conceived that it is founded upon this Principle, That there are *Innate Ideas* in the *Soul* of *Man*; I can impute the mistake not so much to *Ignorance* as *Inadvertency*. For no man's parts can be so weak, but that if he attend to what we have written, he must plainly see that the stress of our Argument is not laid upon this Notion of *Innate Ideas*, but upon that confessed Truth, That there are some things so plain, that how

however the Soul came to the knowledge of them, she cannot but assent to them, and acknowledge them to be undeniably true.

2. Now the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect*, being such, that it must needs be acknowledged, according to the light of nature, to be indeed the true *Idea* of such a Being, call it *Innate* or not, it is all one, the Demonstration will as inevitably follow as if it were acknowledged an *Innate Idea*; as we shall more plainly discern, if we instance in other *Ideas*; as for example, in the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, or of a *regular Geometrical body*, and of a *round Solid*. For the nature of these *Ideas* is such, that the Mind of man cannot possibly deny but that they are such and such distinct *Ideas*, and that such and such affections belong unto them. As for example, That every *Triangle* is either *Isopleuron*, *Isoceles*, or *Scalenum*; so that there are just *Three kinds* of them in reference to their sides, and no more: That there are *Five regular Bodies* in Geometry, neither more nor less, viz. the *Cube*, the *Tetraedrum*, the *Octaedrum*, the *Dodecaedrum*, and the *Eicosaedrum*: That there is one only kind of *round Solid*, viz. the *Sphere* or *Globe*. And so contemplating the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect*, (be the *Idea innate*, or *not innate*, it is all one) we cannot but conclude that there can be *but one only* such in number; and that *That one* also cannot fail to be, as we have demonstrated at large.

3. But however, though we need no such Principle for the carrying on of our Demonstration as this of *Innate Ideas*, yet because I thought it true, and of concernment to animate the Reader to attend the *Notions* of his own Mind, and relish the excellency of that Judge we are to appeal to, I held it not unfit to insist something upon it: And I am ready now to make it good, that this Principle is true, notwithstanding any thing that I find alledged against it.

4. For what I contend for in the sixth Chapter of this first Book, That the exact *Idea* of a *Circle* or a *Triangle* is rather hinted to us from those describ'd in *Matter*, than taught us by them, is still true, notwithstanding that Objection, that they seem exact to our *outward Senses* carelessly perusing them, though they be not so. For we plainly afterward correct our selves, not only by occasion of the *figure*, which we may ever discern imperfect, but by our *Innate knowledge*, which tells us, that the *outward Senses* cannot see an exact *Triangle*, because that an indivisible point, in which the Angles are to be terminated, is to the *outward Sense* utterly invisible.

Besides, it is to be considered, that though we should admit that a *Triangle* could be so drawn that to our *outward Sense*, look on it as narrowly as we could, even through Microscopes, it would never seem exact; yet they that never saw, or took notice of any such delineation, do of themselves, upon the intimation of ruder draughts, frame to themselves the exact *Idea* of a *Triangle*, which they having not learned from any outward Object, must needs be the inward representation of their own Minds.

5. But now for other Objections, That a *Blind* man would be able to discourse of *Colours*, if there be any *Innate Ideas* in his Soul; I say, it does not at all follow; because these *Ideas* that I contend to be in the

the Soul, are not *Sensible*, but *intellectual*, such as are those many *Logical, Metaphysical, Mathematical*, and some *Moral* Notions. All which we imploy as our own *Modes* of considering sensible Objects, but are not the sensible Objects themselves, of which we have no *Idea*, but only a capacity, by reason of the Organs of our Body, to be affected by them. The reason therefore of a *blind* man's inability of discoursing of *Colours*, is only that he has no *Substratum* or *Phantasm* of the Subject of the discourse, upon which he would use these *innate* Modes or frame of Notions that are naturally in his Mind, and which he can make use of in the speculation of sundry other sensible Objects.

See Book 1. ch. 6. sect. 3. 6. And whereas it is further objected, That these *Logical and Mathematical* Notions came in also at the *Senses*, because *Brutes* have the knowledge of them, upon whom we will not bestow so rich an inward furniture as these *Innate Ideas*; I answer, that *Brutes* have not the knowledge of any such *Notion*, but what they act is from a mere concatenation of *sensible Phantasms*, representing things *grateful* or *ungrateful* to the *Sense*: as to instance in those particulars that are objected, That a *Dog* will bark at one noise, suppose the knocking at the Door, and not at another, as the falling of a stool, or of a dish from off a shelf; that he will follow one scent, as that of the Hare, and neglect another, and the like; these are all done, not that he has any *Notion* of *Effect* and *Cause*, but by mere *Concatenation of Phantasms*, representing things as *grateful* or *ungrateful*, or neither grateful nor ungrateful to his *Sense*, in which case he is not mov'd at all. And if a *Dog* chop at the bigger morsel, it is not that he considers the *notion* of *inequality*; but because that sensible Object does more powerfully move his appetite. So if he take one single side of a *Triangle*, to come to the corner of it, where a piece of bread may be placed, it is not because he considers that a *straight line* is the shortest betwixt the same terms, but he sensibly feels that going directly to it he shall be sooner at it than if he went about: as *Zeno* instances well in an *Ass* at one corner of a Pasture, and the fodder in the other, that he would go directly to that corner the fodder lay in; which, as he thought, was a marvellous witty jeer to *Euclide* his Demonstration, that *any two sides of a Triangle is bigger than the third*, as being so plain a Truth that no *Ass* could miss of it.

7. But by the favour of so *Critical* a Philosopher, we may very well suspect that neither *Dog* nor *Ass*, that makes toward any Object, goes directly in a straight line to it; because he considers that a crooked one is further about, but because the visual line guides him straight to the Objects he looks at, in which he goes as naturally, without any reflexion upon *Mathematical* notions, as a stone cast out of a sling of it self endeavours to steer its course with a Motion rectilinear: which having not so much as *Sense*, we can in no wise suspect to be capable of the rudest *Notion* in *Geometry*.

8. Wherefore it is a mere fallacy to argue that *Brutes*, because they do such things as are Reasonable or Mathematical, therefore they do them from *Notions* of *Logick* or *Mathematicks*; whereas in creatures inanimate, that can think of nothing, we may read the footsteps of
Reason

Reason and Geometry in their Motions and Figurations; as in the drops of Rain that fall downwards in the form of Hailstones, and in the beauty and symmetry of the leaves and flowers of Herbs and Plants: Which Objects, while we contemplate, we apply to them the innate modes of our own Mind, which she uses in the speculation even of those things that themselves are dead and thoughtless.

C H A P. III.

1. That considering the lapse of Man's Soul into Matter, it is no wonder she is so much puzzled in speculating things Immaterial.
2. That all Extension does not imply Physical Divisibility or Separability of Parts.
3. That the Emanation of the Secondary substance from the Central in a Spirit is not properly Creation.
4. How it comes to pass that the Soul cannot withdraw her self from pain by her Self-contracting faculty.
5. That the Soul's extension does not imply as many Wills and Understandings as imaginable Parts, by reason of the special Unity and Indivisibility of her substance.
6. Several Instances of the puzzledness of Phantasy in the firm conclusions of Sense, and of Reason.
7. The unconceivableness of the manner of that strong union some parts of the Matter have one with another.
8. What is meant by Hylopathy, and how a Spirit, though not impenetrable, may be the Impellent of Matter.
9. That the unexplicableness of a Spirit's moving Matter is no greater argument against the truth thereof, than the unconceivableness of that line that is produced by the Motion of a Globe on a Plane, is an argument against the Mobility thereof.
10. That the strength of this last Answer consists in the Assurance that there are such Phænomena in the World, as utterly exceed the Powers of mere Matter; of which several Examples are hinted out of the foregoing Treatise.

1. **T**HAT the Souls of Men, the lowest dregs of all the Intellectual Orders, should be plunged and puzzled in the more close and accurate Speculation of things *Spiritual* and *Intellectual*, is but reasonable; especially considering that even *Matter* it self, in which they tumble and wallow, which they feel with their hands, and usurp with all their *Senses*, if they once offer to contemplate it in an Intellectual and Rational manner, their Phantasies are so clouded in this dark state of incarceration in these earthly Bodies, that the *Notion* thereof seems unimaginable and contradictory, as I have largely enough already insisted upon.

But that the *Notion* of a *Spirit*, which seems so to obscure the clearness of the *Idea* of God, is no such inconsistent and unconceivable *Notion*, as some would have it, I hope I shall sufficiently evince, by answering the shrewdest Objections that I think can be made against it.

Antidote
Book I. ch. 4.
sect. 2.

2. Where-

2. Whereas therefore we have defined a *Spirit* (I mean chiefly a created one) as well from those more *absolute powers* of *Self-contraction* and *dilatation*, as also from those *relative faculties* of *penetrating, moving and altering of the Matter*; we will now set down the Objections made against them both.

And against the first it is objected, That it is impossible for the Mind of Man to imagine any Substance having a power of *Self-dilatation* and *Contraction* to be *unextended*, and that *Extension* cannot be imagined without *diversity of parts*, nor *diversity of parts* without a *possibility of division*, or separation of them; because *diversity of parts* in any Substance supposes *diversity of substances*, and *diversity of Substances* supposes *independency of one another*: from whence it will follow, that *Indivisibility* is incompatible to a *Spirit*, which notwithstanding we have added in the Definition thereof.

I confess the Objection is very ingenious, and set on home; but withal conceive that the difficulty is easily taken off, if we acknowledge some such thing to be in the nature of a *Spirit* as has been by thousands acknowledged in the nature of *Intentional Species*. We will therefore represent the property of a *Spirit* in this *Symbole* or *Hieroglyphick*.

Suppose a *Point of light* from which rays out a *luminous Orb*, according to the known principles of *Opticks*: This *Orb of light* does very much resemble the *nature of a Spirit*, which is diffus'd and *extended*, and yet *indivisible*. For we'll suppose in this *Spirit* the Center of life to be indivisible, and yet to diffuse it self by a kind of *circumscrib'd Omnipresency*, as the *Point of light* is discernible in every point of the *Luminous Sphere*. And yet supposing that Central lucid Point *indivisible*, there is nothing divisible in all that Sphere of light. For it is ridiculous to think by any Engine or Art whatsoever to separate the luminous rays from the shining Center, and keep them apart by themselves; as any man will acknowledge that does but carefully consider the nature of the thing we speak of.

Now there is no difficulty to imagine such an *Orb* as this a *Substance* as well as a *Quality*. And indeed this *Sphere of light* it self, it not inhering in any Subject in the space it occupies, looks far more like a Substance than any Accident. And what we fancy unadvisedly to befall *Light* and *Colours*, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in *spiritual substances*, whose central essence spreads out into a *Secondary substance*, as the luminous rays are conceiv'd to shoot out from a lucid Point. From whence we are enabled to return an Answer to the greatest difficulty in the foregoing Objection, *viz.* That the conceived parts in a *Spirit* have an inseparable dependence upon the central Essence thereof, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an *Extension* of this whole substantial power, yet one part is not separable or discernible from another, but the intire Substance as well *Secondary* as *Primary* or *Central*, is *indivisible*.

3. But

3. But let us again cast our eye upon this *lucid Point* and radiant *Orb* we have made use of; It is manifest that those rays that are hinder'd from shooting out so far as they would, need not lose their virtue or Being, but only be reflected back toward the shining Center; and the obstacle being removed, they may shoot out to their full length again: so that there is no generation of a new ray, but an emission of what was actually before. Whereby we are well furnished with an Answer to a further Objection, that would insinuate that this Emanation or Efflux of the *Secondary Substance* from the *Centralis Creation* properly so called, which is deemed incompetent to any creature.

But we answer, that both the *Central* and *Secondary Substance* of a *Spirit* were created at once by God, and that these free active *Spirits* have only a power in them of contracting their vital rays, and dilating of them, not of annihilating or creating of them: For we also added in the Definition of a *Spirit*, *Self-penetration*, or the running of one part into another, if we may call them parts. And this Answer I think so satisfactory, that I think it needless to alledge the opinion of *Durandus*, who contends that *Creation* is not incompetent unto a creature, provided that it be acknowledged to be done by virtue of donation from the first Creator, and in an inevitable observance to his Laws. We might also further scruple whether any *Emanation* may be properly call'd *Creation*; but enough has been already said to satisfy this Objection.

4. But we are further yet urged concerning this *Self-contraction* and *Dilatation*; for it is demanded why the *Soul* of Man, which we acknowledge a *Spirit*, does not contract it self, or withdraw it self from those parts which are pained, or why she does not dilate her self beyond the bounds of the *Body*. To which is answered, That the *Placental faculty* of the *Soul*, whereby she is unitable to this terrestrial *Body*, is not arbitrary, but fatal or natural; which union cannot be dissolved, unless the bond of Life be loosened, and that *vital congruity* (which is in the *Body*, and does necessarily hold the *Soul* there) be either for a time hinder'd, or utterly destroy'd.

5. The last Objection against the *Self-extension* of a *Spirit* is, That there will be as many *Wills* and *Understandings* as *Parts*. But I have, in that *Symbolical* representation I have made use of, so represented the *Extension* of a *Spirit*, that it is also acknowledged *Indivisible*; whereby the Objection is no sooner propounded than answered, that engine lying in readiness to receive all such assaults.

6. Now for the Objections made against the *Relative faculties* of a *Spirit*, to wit, *The power of penetrating, moving, and altering the Matter*; there is mainly this one, That *Matter* cannot be alter'd but by *Motion*, nor *Motion* be communicated but by *Impulse*, nor *Impulse* without *Impenetrability* in the *Impulsor*, and that therefore how a *Spirit* should move *Matter* which does penetrate it, is not to be imagined.

But I answer, first, what our *Imagination* is baffled in, either our outward *Senses*, or inward *Reason* often prove to be true. As for example, our *Reason* attending to the nature of an exact *Globe* and

See my Im-
mortality of
the Soul,
Book 2. chap.
11. sect. 10.
also Book 3.
chap. 2. sect.
3. 4.
See also this
Append. chap.
10. sect. 9.
10.

Book I. chap.
4. sect. 2.

Plane, will undoubtedly pronounce that they will touch in a point, and that they may be moved one upon another: But our *Imagination* cannot but make this exception, That the *Globe* thus drawn upon the *Plane* describes a *line* which must necessarily consist of points, point perpetually following point in the whole description; which how monstrous it is to be admitted, I have already intimated in the foregoing Discourse.

So likewise the *Angle of a Contact* included betwixt the *Periphery* and a *Perpendicular* falling at the end of the *Diameter* of a *Circle*, Geometricians demonstrate by *Reason* to be no less than any *acute Angle* whatsoever, inasmuch that a *line* cannot fall betwixt the *Periphery* and the *Perpendicular*: whence the *Phancy* cannot but imagine this *Angle* to be indivisible; which is a perfect contradiction, and against the definition of an *Angle*, which is not the coincidence, but the inclination of two lines. Besides, a lesser *Circle* inscrib'd in a greater, so that it touches in one point, through which let there be drawn the common *Diameter* of them both, and then let fall a *Perpendicular* on that end of the *Diameter* where the *Circles* touch; it will be evident that one *Angle of the Contact* is bigger than the other, when yet they are both indivisible, as was acknowledged by our *Imagination* before: So that one and the same *Angle* will be both divisible and indivisible, which is again a plain contradiction.

And as *Imagination* is puzzled in things we are sure of by *Reason*, so is it also in things we are certain of by *Sense*; for who can imagine how it comes about that we see our image behind the Looking-glass? for it is more easy to fancy that we should deprehend our faces either in the very surface of the glass, or else in the place where they are: For if the reflected rays might serve the turn, then we should find the distance of our image no greater than that of the glass; but if we be affected also by the direct rays, methinks we should be led by them to the first place whence they came, and find our faces in that real situation they are.

7. But to instance in things that will come more near to our purpose. We see in some kinds of Matter almost an invincible union of parts, as in *Steel*, *Adamant*, and the like; what is it that holds them so fast together? If you'll say, some inward Substantial form; we have what we look'd for, a Substance distinct from Matter. If you say it is the quality of Hardness in the Matter that makes it thus hard; that is no more than to say, it is so because it is so. If you say, it is a more perfect rest of parts one by another, than there is in other Matter; if that be true, it is yet a thing utterly unimaginable: as for example, That upon Matter exactly plain, more plain and solid than a Table of Marble, if a man laid a little *Cube* upon it of like plainness and solidity, that this *Cube*, by mere immediate touching of the Table, should have as firm union therewith, as the parts of the *Cube* have one with another, is a thing that the Phancy of man cannot tell how to admit. For suppose at first you drew along this *Cube* on the Table, as it would easily go, both surfaces being so exactly smooth, and that then you left drawing of it; that these two smooth Bodies should presently stick so fast together, that a Hammer and a Chisel would scarce sever them, is a thing utterly unimaginable.

Where-

Wherefore the *union* betwixt the Parts of the Matter being so strong, and yet so unimaginable how it comes to pass to be so, why should we not admit as strong or stronger union betwixt a *Spirit* and a *Body*, though our *Phancy* suggest it will pass through, as well as it does that smooth bodies will ever lie loose, unless there be some cement to hold them together? And this *union* once admitted, *Motion*, *Activity*, and *Agitation* being so easy and prone a conception of the property of a *Spirit*, it will as easily and naturally follow that it does move or agitate the Matter it is thus united to.

8. But again to answer more closely, I say this present Objection is nothing else but a Sophism of the *Phancy*, conceiving a *Spirit* as a *Body* going through some previous hole or passage too wide and patent for it, in which therefore it cannot stick, or be firmly settled in it. To which *Imagination* we will oppose, that though *Spirits* do penetrate *Bodies*, yet they are not such thin and lank things that they must of necessity run through them, or be unable to take hold of them, or be united with them, but that they may fill up the capacity of a *Body* penetrable by *Spirits*: which penetrability of a *Body* or *Matter* when it is satiated or fill'd, that *Spirit* that thus fills it is more strongly riveted in, or united with the *Body* or *Matter*, than one part of the *Matter* can be with another.

And therefore we will acknowledge one special faculty of a *Spirit*, which after *penetration* it doth either naturally or arbitrarily exert, which is this, to fill the *Receptivity* or *Capacity* of a *Body* or *Matter* so far forth as it is capable or receptive of a *Soul* or *Spirit*.

And this affection of a *Spirit* we will make bold to call, for more compendiousness, by one Greek term *ὑπομίσησις* which, that there may be no suspicion of any fraud or affected foolery in words, we will as plainly as we can define thus, *A power in a Spirit of offering so near to a corporeal emanation from the Center of life, that it will so perfectly fill the receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impossible for any other Spirit to possess the same; and therefore of becoming hereby so firmly and closely united to a Body, as both to actuate, and to be acted upon, to affect, and be affected thereby.*

And now let us appeal to *Imagination* her self, if *Matter* does not fit as close, nay closer, to a *Spirit* than any one part of *Matter* can do to another: For here *union* pervades through all, but there conjunction is only in a common Superficies, as is usually fancied and acknowledged. And this *Hylopathia* which we thus suppose in a finite *Spirit* or *Soul*, I further add, may well answer in Analogy to that power of creating *Matter* which is necessarily included in the *Idea* of God.

9. But lastly, if the manner how a *Spirit* acts upon a *Body*, or is affected by a *Body*, seems so intricate that it must be given up for unexplicable; yet as the mobility of an exact *Globe* upon a *Plane* is admitted as an evident and undeniable property thereof by our *Understanding*, though we cannot *imagine* how it always touching in a *point*, should by its motion describe a continued *line*, (and the like may be urged from the other following intricacy and perplexedness :) so supposing such manifest operations in Nature, that *Reason* can demon-

strate not to be from the *Matter* it self, we must acknowledge there is some other Substance besides the *Matter* that acts in it and upon it, which is *Spiritual*, though we know not how *Motion* can be communicated to *Matter* from a *Spirit*.

10. And the strength of this our third and last Answer consists in this, that there are indeed several such operations apparently transcending the power of *Matter*, of which we will only here briefly repeat the heads, having more fully discoursed of them in the foregoing Treatise.

And first, I instance in what is more general, and acknowledged by *Des-Cartes* himself, who yet has intituled the Laws of *Matter* to the highest Effects that ever any man could rationally do: and 'tis this: That that *Matter* out of which all things are, is of it self *uniform*, and of one kind. From whence I infer, that of it self therefore it *all* either *rests* or *moves*. If it *all rests*, there is something besides *Matter* that *moves* it, which necessarily is a *Spirit*. If it *all move*, there could not be possibly the coalition of any thing, but every imaginable particle would be actually loose from another. Wherefore there is required a Substance besides *Matter* that must bind what we find fix'd and bound.

The second Instance is in that admirable *Wisdom* discoverable in all the works of Nature, which I have largely insisted on in my Second Book, which do manifestly evince that all things are contriv'd by a *wise* Principle: But who but a fool will say that the *Matter* is *wise*, and yet notwithstanding out of the putrified parts even of the Earth it self, as also out of the drops of dew, rotten pieces of wood, and such like jeer, the bodies of Animals do arise so artificially and exquisitely well framed, that the Reason of Man cannot contemplate them but with the greatest pleasure and admiration?

Thirdly, Those many and undeniable Stories of *Apparitions* do clearly evince, that an Understanding lodges in sundry *Aiery* bodies, when it is utterly impossible that *Air* should be so arbitrarily changed into shapes, and yet held together as an actuated vehicle of life, if there were not something besides the *Air* it self that did thus possess it and moderate it, and could dilate, contract, and guide it as it pleased; otherwise it would be no better figured, nor more steddily kept together than the fume of Tobacco, or the reek of Chimneys.

Fourthly and lastly, It is manifest that that which in us *understands*, *remembers*, and *perceives*, is that which *moves* our bodies, and that those *Cognitive* Faculties can be no operation of the bare *Matter*. From whence it is evident that there is in our *Bodies* an *Intellectual* Spirit that *moves* them as it pleases; as I have largely enough prov'd in the last Chapter of the First Book of my *Antidote*, and shall yet further confirm when we come to the Objections made against it.

C H A P. IV.

1. *That Existence is a Perfection, verified from vulgar Instances.* 2. *Further proved from Metaphysical Principles.* 3. *An Appeal to ordinary Reason.* 4. *That at least Necessary Existence is a Perfection, if bare Existence be not.* 5. *An Illustration of that last Conclusion.*

1. **T**O avoid the Necessity and Evidence of our Demonstration of the *Existence of a God*, drawn from the inseparable connexion of the Notion thereof with his *Idea*, (we urging, *That necessary Existence must needs be included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect*) there are some that stick not to affirm, that *Existence* is no Term of intrinsecal *Perfection* to any thing. For, say they, imagine two pieces of Gold equal in weight, purity, and all other respects, but only duration, or necessity of *Existence*; we cannot justly without being humourous or phansiful, attribute pre-eminence to one more than to the other. To which I answer, That as two pieces of Gold are better than one, so one piece of Gold that will last twice as long as another, is twice as good as the other, or at least much better than the other; which I think so evident, that it wants no further proof.

But further, that we may not only apply our selves to answer Objections, but absolutely to ratify the present Truth, *That Existence is a Perfection*: First, it is palpably plain, according to that sensible Aphorism of Solomon, *Better is a living Dog than a dead Lion*.

2. But then again to argue more generally, The *Metaphysicians*, as it is very well known, look upon *Existence* as the formal and actual part of a Being; and Form or Act is acknowledged the more noble and perfect Principle in every Essence; and therefore if they can be distinguish'd in God, is so there also: if they cannot, then it is thereby confess'd, that we cannot think of the *Idea* of God, but it immediately informs us that he doth *Exist*. And I recommend it to the inquiry of the *Hebrew Criticks*, whether הוה, from whence is יהוה, does not rather signify *Existence* than *Essence*.

3. Thirdly, Let the *Metaphysicians* conclude what they please, it is evident to ordinary Reason that if there be one conception better than another, that implies no imperfection in it, it must be cast upon what is most perfect: But *Existence* is better than non-existence, and implies no imperfection in it; therefore it must be cast upon an *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect*.

4. But fourthly and lastly, Though it were possible to cavil at the single Notion of *Existence*, that it neither argued *Perfection* nor *Imperfection*, nor belong'd to either; yet there can be no shew of exception against the highest and most perfect manner of existing, but that that is naturally and undeniably included in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*; and that therefore we do but rightfully contend that *necessary Existence* is inseparably contained in the *notion* of God.

5. For as for example, while it is confess'd that *Matter* is finite, and cannot be otherwise, for a *Body* to be *figured* implies neither Perfection, nor Imperfection; but is a natural and necessary affection thereof; yet to be *ordinately figured*, is an undoubted *Perfection* of a *Body*: so in like manner, though it were confessed that mere *Existence* is neither Perfection nor Imperfection, yet so noble a Mode thereof as *necessarily to Exist*, must without all tergiversation be acknowledged a notion of *Perfection*, and therefore to accrue naturally to the *Idea* of a Being absolutely perfect.

CHAP. V.

1. That there is a vast difference betwixt arguing from forced Figments or Fancies, and from the natural Ideas of our own Minds. 2. That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil does not imply necessary Existence, whether it signify a Being absolutely Imperfect, 3. Or absolutely Wicked, 4. Or absolutely Miserable, 5. Or absolutely Mischievous. 6. That if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant only the Infinite power of doing hurt, this is God, whose absolute Goodness prevents the execution thereof. 7. That the right Method of using our Reason is to proceed from what is plain and unsuspected to what is more obscure and suspicious. 8. That according to this Method, being assured first of the Existence of a Being absolutely Perfect from his Idea, we are therewithall enabled to return answer, that Impossibility of Existence belongs to a Being either absolutely Miserable, or absolutely Mischievous. 9. That the Phenomena of the World further prove the impossibility of the Existence of a Being absolutely Mischievous. 10. And that the Counsels and Works of God are not to be measured by the vain opinions of Men.

1. **A**S for those that admit *necessary Existence* to be included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, but would shew that our Inference from thence, viz. That this perfect Being doth exist, is false and sophistical, because *necessary Existence* is contained in the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, which notwithstanding we will not admit to Exist, (for, say they, that which is absolutely Evil is immutably, and ever unavoidably such, and cannot but be so, and therefore it cannot but Exist, and ever has Existed :) To these we answer, That we shall easily discover the grand difference betwixt such arbitrary and forced Figments and Fancies as these, and the natural and consistent Ideas of our own Mind, if we look more carefully and curiously into the Nature of what these Objectors have ventured to utter, and sift out what either themselves mean, or what must necessarily be understood by this Idea of a Being absolutely Evil; which they have thus forged.

2. By the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil must be meant either the Idea of a Being absolutely Imperfect, or absolutely Wicked, or absolutely Miserable, or absolutely Mischievous.

Now

Now the *Idea* of what is *absolutely Imperfect* removes from it whatever sounds *Perfection*; as if all Perfectness were 1000, then this *Idea* removes from this *absolute Imperfect* every unite of these 1000, allowing not so much as an unite, or fraction of an unite; no, not the possibility of them, to what is thus *absolutely Imperfect*. So that what is *absolutely imperfect* is impossible to *Exist*. But *necessary Existence* is a Term of *Perfection*, as was plainly demonstrated before.

3. The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Wicked* removes from it all manner of Goodness, Equity, Decorum, Righteousness; and implies a firm and immutable averſation of the Will from all these, and a settled and unchangeable purpose of doing things wickedly: but intimates nothing either of the *Necessity* or *Contingency* of the *Existence* of the Substance of this Being; that being neither here nor there to the moral deformity thereof, as is evidently plain at first sight.

4. The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Miserable* is the *Idea* of a Being that sustains the fullest and compleatest torments that are conceivable; and this must be in a knowing, passive, and reflexive Subject. Now, I say, this torture arising partly from the sense of present smart, and partly out of reflexion of what it has suffered, and a full belief that it shall suffer thus externally; this *miserable Being*, though but a Creature, is as perfectly tormented as it could possibly be if it necessarily existed of it self. For if it were always, though but contingently and dependently of another, the torture is equally perfect; and therefore *necessary Existence* is not included in the *Idea* thereof.

Again, the Objector is to prove that a Being wholly Immaterial can suffer any torture: which till he do, it seeming more reasonable that it cannot, I shall flatly deny that it can; and therefore do assert, that a torturable Being is a Spirit incorporate; and affirm also, as a thing most rational, that this Spirit, if very great pain was upon it, such as that it were better for him not to be at all, than to be in it, that anguish by continuance would be so increased, (pain infinitely overpowering the vital vigour, and overpoising the contents of life and sense,) that it would die to the Body in which it is thus tormented. But if it be not in so ill a plight as to change its state of conjunction, but that the torture proves tolerable; then *necessary Existence* would not be its misery, but some part of happiness: so that there can be no such thing as a Being *absolutely Miserable* in the world. For *Misery* rack'd up to the highest would make the thing cease to be. A man cannot say an *absolute big Triangle*; for a Circle will be always bigger: or rather no Figure can be *absolutely big*, because the nature of it is to be limited.

Thirdly, The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Perfect* is compos'd of *Notions* of the same denomination, all of them of themselves sounding absolute Perfection; but the *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Miserable* is not compiled of *Notions* that sound absolute Misery of themselves. For what Misery, but rather good, is there in *necessary Existence*? Wherefore if we should contend that an inference from the *Idea* of a thing to its *necessary Existence*, is only warrantable there where the *Idea* consists of *Notions* of one denomination, the Objector is to take off the distinction.

Or,

Or, to speak more plainly, Absolutely necessary Existence, and Self-existence is one and the same Notion: But Self-existence is the most high and perfect mode of Existence that is conceivable, and therefore proper to what is most absolutely Perfect. Wherefore to transplant Self-existence to so pitiful an Idea as the Idea of a Being absolutely Miserable, is as absonous and prodigious as to clap the head of a Lion to the body of a Snail. Nay, indeed it seems more contradictory, that being but the misplacing of Body and Figure, but this the implantation of an inward Property into a wrong Subject; nay, infinitely contrary properties in the same Subject.

5. Fourthly and lastly, As for a Being absolutely Mischievous, it seems indeed to include necessary and unavoidable Existence as well as Omnipotency and Omniscieny, or else this Sovereign Mischief is not so full and absolute as our apprehension can conceive. These added to a peremptory and immutable desire or will of doing all mischief possible for Mischief sake, do fully complete the Notion of this absolute Mischievous Being.

But how spurious and unnatural this Idea is, is evident in that it does again forcedly tie together Notions of a quite contrary nature, the greatest Imperfection with the highest Perfections, joyning the incommunicable Attributes of God with that which is haply worse than we can demonstrate to be in any Devil; nay, such as seem a contradiction in any Subject whatsoever.

Wherefore, as I intimated before, if any man pretend our Argument to be a Sophism, and in imitating it would discover the fallacy in some other Matter, he is exactly to observe the Laws thereof in his imitation, and constitute an Idea of Notions that agree with the same Title, as they exquisitely do in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect; for there is no notion there but what sounds highest Perfection.

But in this Idea of a Being absolutely Mischievous there is nothing that of its own nature signifies Mischief, but that wicked and malicious desire of doing mischief merely for mischief's sake. Which is a degree of Imperfection sunk into the borders of Inconsistency and Contradiction. But yet to be able accurately to destroy all good whatsoever, implies again an Omnipotency in Power, and an Omniscieny. But what is omnipotently and absolutely mischievous, must also destroy it self, as an infinitely-big Triangle implies no Triangle at all. So that this Idea is not free from the intanglement of multifarious Contradictions in the conception thereof.

6. But if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant, a Being that has the power and skill of doing all mischief imaginable, and indeed far above all the Imagination and conceit of man, and that so effectually and universally that nothing possibly can prevent him, this is indeed the Eternal God, who is necessarily of himself, and prevents all things, and can be limited in his actions by none, but by himself: but he being that absolute and immutable Good, and full and pure Perfection, he cannot but include in his Idea that precious Attribute of Benignity; and therefore acting according to his entire Nature, he is not only Good himself, but, by the Prerogative of his own Being,

Being, keeps out such *mischievous Sovereignities* as have been here pleaded for, from ever having any Existence in the World.

7. Wherefore to bring our Answer to a head, I say we are to use that natural Method in this Speculation that men that know the use of their Faculties observe in all others, *viz.* to assent to what is most simple, easie, and plain first, and of which there can be no doubt but that the Notion is congruous and consistent; and such is the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, no arbitrary or fortuitous figment, or forced complement of Notions that jarr one with another, or may be justly suspected, if not demonstrated, to be incoherent and repugnant; such, as for example, would be a *walking Tree*, or an *intelligent Stone*, or the like: but such as wherein the Notions naturally and necessarily come together to compleat the conception of some one single Title, as being homogeneous and essential thereunto.

8. And then what I contend for is this, That attending to this Natural *Idea* of God, or a *Being absolutely Perfect*, we unavoidably discover the necessity of *actual Existence*, as inseparable from him, it being necessarily included in this *Idea* of *absolute Perfection*: which is still more undeniably set on in the last push of my Argument, where I urge that either *Impossibility*, *Contingency*, or *Necessity* of *actual Existence*, must needs belong to a *Being absolutely Perfect*; but not *Impossibility* nor *Contingency*, therefore *Necessity* of *actual Existence*.

And therefore being so well assured of this Truth, I require the Objector to bring up his Argument to this last and clearest frame, and let him also urge that either *Impossibility*, *Contingency*, or *Necessity* of *actual Existence*, belongs either to a *Being absolutely Miserable*, or *absolutely Mischievous*; and I shall confidently answer, *Impossibility* of *Existence*, and give him a further Reason, besides what I intimated before of the incongruity of the Notions themselves, that it is also repugnant with the *Existence* of God, whom, without any rub or scruple, attending to the natural and undistorted suggestions of our own Faculties, we have already demonstrated to *exist*.

9. And still to make our Answer more certain concerning a *Being absolutely Mischievous*, it is most evident He is not, and therefore sith he must be of himself if he be at all, it is impossible he should be: And that he is not, is plain, because things would be then infinitely worse than they are, or not at all; whenas I dare say they are now as well as it is fit or possible for them to be, if we had but the wisdom to conceive or comprehend the whole counsel and purpose of *Providence*, and knew clearly and particularly what is past, and what is to come.

10. But if we take up, out of our own blindness or rashness, Principles concerning the *Providence* of God, that are inconsistent with his *Idea*, (such as the *Ptolemaical* System of the Heavens, which (as some say) *Alphonso* looked upon (though others tell the story of the misplacement of certain Mountains on the Earth) as so perplex'd a Bungle, that, transported with zeal against that fond Hypothesis, he did scoffingly and audaciously profess, that if he had stood by whilst God made the World, he could have directed the Frame of it better)

we

we shall indeed then have occasion to quarrel, but not with either the *Counsels* or *Works* of God, but rather with the *Opinions* of ignorant and mistaken men.

CHAP. VI.

1. That the sense of his Argument from the Idea of God in the first posture, is not simply, That the Idea is true, and if God were, his Existence were necessary; but, That this Idea being true, does exhibit to our Mind an absolute necessary Existence as belonging to Him.
2. That the Idea of the God of the Manichees does not include in it necessary existence.
3. That to say, that necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect is but conditional, is a Contradiction.
4. The second posture of his Argument made good, and that, by virtue of the form thereof, the Existence of the Manichean God is not concludible.
5. The invincible Evidence of the third posture of his Argument in the judgment of his Antagonist himself.
6. That the force of his Argument in the fourth and last posture is not, That we conceive the Idea of Matter without necessary Existence; but that, look as near as we can, we find no necessary existence included therein, as we do in the Idea of God.
7. That the Faculties of our Mind, to which he perpetually appeals, are to be suppos'd, not prov'd to be true.

1. **A**ND now having thus clearly satisfied the Objection taken from the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, it will be easy to turn back the edge of any Argument of the like nature, be it never so skilfully and cunningly directed against us. As that which I had from an ingenious hand, which, because it seems very witty to me, as well as invincible to the Objector, I shall propound it in his own words; the tenour whereof runs thus:

If a man may have a true Idea or Notion of that which is not; yea, and of that which is not, and yet would necessarily be, if it were, then your Argument for the Existence of God, from necessary Existence being comprehended in his Idea or Notion, is unconcluding. How you can deny this Argument, I cannot possibly conceive, the substance of your first Argument from the Idea of God being contained therein in the first posture of it.

But a man may have a true Notion of that which is not; yea, and of that which is not, and yet would necessarily be, if it were; as for Instance, of the Evil God of the Manichees.

But I answer briefly to the Proposition thus, That it does not reach our Case: because we argue that God does exist, not because the Idea of him is true, and, if he did exist, he would necessarily exist; for conditional necessary Existence, as being less perfect than absolute necessary Existence, cannot belong to a Being absolutely Perfect: but because this true Idea, without any *If* or *And*, does suggest to our natural Faculties, That necessary Existence being involved in his Idea alone, the like not happening in any other Idea beside, without any more a-do, he doth of himself absolutely and really exist.

To

To the Assumption I answer, That the *Manichees* God, if he could exist at all, would do so necessarily; and my Reason is, because God would never create so foul a Monster.

2. But if you still urge, that the *Idea* of this *Evil God* of the *Manichees* includes *necessary Existence* in it, it being the Notion of a God, and yet he is not existent; and that therefore the true God cannot be proved to exist, because *necessary Existence* is involv'd in his *Idea*: I further answer, That the Notion of the *Manichees* God does not naturally include *necessary Existence* in it, because it is not the Notion of a Being *absolutely Perfect*; and that the Notion of an *Evil God* is a mere forced or fortuitous Figment, and no better sense than a *Wooden God*, whose *Idea* implies not *necessary Existence*, but an Impossibility thereof.

3. But the Objector proceeds, and we must attend his motions; only before he comes to the second posture of our Argument, he takes notice of my charging of all those with self-contradiction that acknowledge that *necessary Existence* is contained in the *Idea* of God, or a Being *absolutely Perfect*, and that thereby is signified that *necessary Existence* belongs unto him, and yet unsay it again, by adding, *If he do at all exist*. But I answer, my charge is true: For to say, *necessary Existence* belongs to a Being, which we notwithstanding profess may not be for all that, is to admit a contradiction; for thus the same thing by our Faculties is acknowledged both *necessary* and *contingent*, that is, that it cannot but be, and yet that it may not be; which if it be not a Contradiction in this case, I know not what is: for no less than *absolutely necessary Existence* must be comprised in the *Idea* of a Being *absolutely perfect*.

Antidote
Book 1. ch. 8.
sect. 3.

4. But the Argument will still appear more plain in the second posture. For if there be any fraud or fallacy, it lies in this term, *Necessary*, which I have truly explain'd (and it is not deny'd) to signify nothing else but an inseparable connexion betwixt the *Subject* and the *Predicate*. Wherefore *Existence* having an inseparable connexion with God, it must needs follow that this Axiom, *God does exist*, is eternally and immutably true. But here to reply, *If he did exist*, is to insinuate that for all this, he may not exist, which is to say, that what is immutably true is not immutably true; which is a palpable Contradiction.

Antidote,
Book 1. ch. 8.
sect. 4.

But the Objector here flies for aid to the God of the *Manichees*, desiring me to put the *Manichean* God in stead of the God whose *Existence* I would prove, whereby I may discern my own Sophism. Well, if it be not Idolatry, let us place him there; but how shrimpish he is, and unfit to fill this place, you may understand out of what I said before, That the *Manichean* God does no more imply in the Notion thereof *necessary Existence* than a *Wooden God* does; nay, it rather implies *Impossibility of Existence*. For the Notion of God is the same, that is, of a Being *absolutely Perfect*, which must involve in it the most absolute Goodness that may be. Now bring the *Manichean* God into sight, and let us view his inscription: *He is an evil absolutely good*; which, as I said before, is far worse sense in my conceit than a *Wooden*

Wooden God, and therefore *Impossibility*, and not *Necessity of Existence* is contained in his *Idea*.

5. The third posture of my Argument is formidable even to the Objector himself: for whereas I urge, That either *Impossibility*, *Contingency*, or *Necessity of actual Existence* belongs to a *Being absolutely Perfect*, he confesses here that the *Manichean God* will succour him no longer; but, as a man left in distress, he complains, that it is an hard case that we must be put to prove the *Existence* of God impossible, or else we must be forced to admit that he is. But afterwards being better advised, he takes notice that if he be not, it is impossible for him to be; and therefore, say I, it is but just that we expect of him that will deny that he is, to prove his *Being* impossible, especially the force of our Argument so necessarily casting him upon it. But in my conceit he had better save his pains, than venture upon so frustraneous an undertaking: for he may remember that the *Idea* of this *Being absolutely Perfect* is so fram'd, that, in the judgment of any man that has the use of his Faculties, there is no inconsistency nor impossibility therein, nor the least shadow for suspicion or shyness. And besides since *Impossibility* of existing is the most imperfect *mode* that any *Being* can bear to *Existence*, it must needs be an outrageous incongruity to attribute it to a *Being absolutely Perfect*, it so naturally and undeniably belonging to a *Being absolutely Imperfect*, as hath been noted before.

ch. 5. sect. 2.

Wherefore if either the doubting or obdurate Atheist will say, the *Existence* of God is impossible, that will not argue any weakness or vanity in my Argument, but rash boldness and blind impudency in him that shall return so irrational an Answer.

Antidote,

Book 1. ch. 8.

sect. 6, 7, 8,

9, 10, 11.

6 But the Objector has arriv'd now to the fourth and last posture of our Argumentation, of which he conceives this is the utmost sum, That either there is a God, or *Matter* is of it self, because *necessary Existence* is not included in the *Idea* thereof. Against which he alledges, that as thousands have the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, and yet have not any knowledge of that property of having the three Angles equal to two right ones; so a man may have the *Idea* of *Matter*, and yet know nothing of the necessity of its *Existence*, though it have that property in it.

But I answer, This does not reach the force of our Argument; for look as curiously and skilfully as you will into the *Idea* of *Matter*, and you can discover no such property as *necessity of Existence* therein. And then again, the weight of my reasoning lieth in this, That *necessity of Self-existence* being so plainly and unavoidably discoverable in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, but not at all discernible in the *Idea* of *Matter*; that we do manifest violence to our Faculties while we acknowledge *Self-existence* in *Matter*, no Faculty informing us so, and deny it in God, the *Idea* of God so conspicuously informing us, that *necessary Self-existence* belongs unto him. So that all I contend for is this, That he that denies a God, runs counter to the light of his natural Faculties, to which I perpetually appeal.

7. But if you will say, It may be our Faculties are false; I say so too, that it might be so, if there were no God by whom we were made:

made: for then we were such as we find our selves, and could seek no further, nor assure our selves but that we might be of that nature, as to be then mistaken most when we think we are most sure, and have used the greatest caution and circumspection we could to avoid error. But it is sufficient for us that we ask no more than what is granted to them that pretend to the most undeniable Methods of Demonstration, and which Geometry her self cannot prove, but supposes; to wit, *That our Faculties are true.*

C H A P. VII.

1. That that necessity of Existence that seems to be included in the Idea of Space is but the same that offers it self to our Mind in that more full and perfect Idea of God.
2. That there is the same reason of Eternal Duration, whose immediate subject is God, not Matter.
3. That Space is but the possibility of Matter, measurable only as so many several possible Species of things are numerable.
4. That Distance is no Physical affection of any thing, but only Notional.
5. That Distance of Bodies is but privation of actual union, measurable by parts, as other Privations of qualities by degrees.
6. That if distant Space, after the removal of Matter be any real thing, it is that necessary Being represented by the Idea of God.
7. That Self-existence and Contingency are terms inconsistent one with another.

1. **O** THERS there are that seem to come nearer the mark, *Antidote, Book. I. ch. 8. sect. 11.* while they alledge against the fourth posture of our Argument, that necessary Existence is plainly involved in the Idea of Matter. For, say they, a man cannot possibly imagine a Space running out in infinitum every way, whether there be a God or no. And this Space being extended thus, and measurable by Yards, Poles, or the like, it must needs be something, in that it is thus extended and measurable; for Non-entity can have no affection or property. And if it be an Entity, what can it be but corporeal Matter?

But I answer, If there were no Matter, but the Immensity of the Divine Essence only, occupying all by his Ubiquity, that the Replication, as I may so speak, of his indivisible substance, whereby he presents himself intirely every where, would be the Subject of that Diffusion and Mensurability. And I add further, That the perpetual observation of this infinite Amplitude and Mensurability, which we cannot disimagine in our Phancy, but will necessarily be, may be a more rude and obscure Notion offered to our Mind of that necessary and self-existent Essence which the Idea of God does with greater fullness and distinctness represent to us. For it is plain that not so much as our Imagination is engaged to an approbation of this Idea of Space to corporeal Matter, in that it does not naturally conceive any impenetrability or tangibility in the Notion thereof; and therefore it may as well belong to a Spirit as a Body. Whence, as I said before, the Idea of God being such as it is, it will both justly and necessarily

farly cast this ruder notion of *Space* upon that Infinite and Eternal Spirit which is God.

2. Now there is the same reason for *Time* (by *Time* I mean *Duration*) as for *Space*. For we cannot imagine but that there has been such a continued *Duration* as could have no beginning nor interruption. And any one will say, it is non-sense that there should be such a necessary duration; when there is no real Essence that must of it self thus be always, and for ever so endure. What, or who is it then that this eternal, uninterrupted, and never-fading duration must belong to? No Philosopher can answer more appositely than the holy Psalmist, *From everlasting to everlasting thou art God*. Wherefore I say, that those unavoidable imaginations of the necessity of an infinite *Space* as they call it, and *Eternal duration*, are no proofs of a *Self-existent Matter*, but rather obscure sub-indications of the necessary *Existence* of God.

3. There is also another way of answering this Objection, which is this; That this Imagination of *Space* is not the imagination of any real thing, but only of the large and immense capacity of the potentiality of the *Matter*, which we cannot free our Minds from, but must necessarily acknowledge, that there is indeed such a possibility of *Matter* to be measured upward, downward, every way *in infinitum*, whether this corporeal *Matter* were actually there or no; and that though this potentiality of *Matter* or *Space* be measured by furlongs, miles, or the like, that it implies no more any real Essence or Being, than when a man recounts so many orders or kinds of the Possibilities of things, the compute or number of them will infer the reality of their Existence.

4. But if they urge us further, That there will be a real distance even in *Space* devoid of *Matter*; as if, for example, Three Balls of brass or steel were put together in this empty *Space*, it is utterly unimaginable but that there should be a Triangular distance in the midst of them: it may be answered, That *Distance* is no real or *Physical* property of a thing, but only *notional*; because more or less of it may accrue to a thing, whenas yet there has been nothing at all done to that to which it does accrue. As suppose one of these Balls mentioned were first an inch distant from another; this distance betwixt them may be made many miles, and yet one of them not so much as touched or stirr'd, though it become as distant as the other.

5. But if they urge us still further, and contend, That this *distance* must be some *real* thing, because it keeps off those Balls so one from another, that supposing two of them two miles distant in empty *Space*, and one of them to lie in the mid-way, if that two miles distant would come to the other so soon as that but one mile distant, it must have double celerity of motion to perform its race: I answer briefly, that *Distance* is nothing else but the privation of actual union, and the greater *distance*, the greater privation; and the greater privation, the more to do to regain the former positive condition; and that this privation of actual union is measur'd by *parts*, as other privations of qualities are by *degrees*; and that *parts* and *degrees*, and such like notions, are not *real* things themselves any where, but our mode
of

of conceiving them, and therefore we can bestow them upon Non-entities, as well as Entities, as I have discover'd elsewhere more at large.

6. But if this will not satisfy, 'tis no detriment to our cause: For if, after the removal of corporeal Matter out of the world, there will be still Space and Distance in which this very Matter, while it was there, was also conceiv'd to lie, and this distant Space cannot but be something, and yet not corporeal, because neither impenetrable nor tangible; it must of necessity be a Substance Incorporeal necessarily and eternally existent of it self: which the clearer Idea of a Being absolutely perfect will more fully and punctually inform us to be the Self-subsisting God.

7. But that we may omit nothing that may seem at all worth the answering, There are that endeavour to decline the stroke of our Argument in the third and fourth posture thereof, by saying that Contingency is not incompetent to God, or any thing else: for all things that exist in the world, happen so to do, though they might have done otherwise. But no man would answer thus, if he attended to what he answered, or to the light of his own Reason, that would instruct him better. For, for example, if Matter did exist of it self, it is evident that it does necessarily exist, and could not have done otherwise: for Self-existence prevents all impediments whatsoever, whereby a thing may seem to have been in danger possibly to have fallen short of actually existing.

And as for God, it is as evident, that it is either impossible for him to be, or else that he is of himself; and if of himself, his Existence is unpreventable and necessary; as any man must needs acknowledge that understands the terms he ventures to pronounce.

CHAP. VIII.

1. That the Idea of God is a natural and indelible Notion in the Soul of Man.
2. That if there were some small obscurity in the Notion, it hinders not but that it may be natural.
3. That the Politicians abuse of the notion of God and Religion argues them no more to be his Contrivance, than natural Affection, love of Honour and Liberty are; which he in like manner abuses.
4. A twofold Answer to an Objection touching God's implanting his Idea in us upon counsel or design.

1. **T**HAT the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect is a Notion natural to the Soul, and such as she cannot deny but it is exactly representative of such a Being, without any clashing of one part against another, all the Attributes thereof being homogeneous to the general Title of Perfection to which they belong, is a thing so plain, that I dare appeal to any man that has the use of his Faculties, whether it be not undoubtedly and immutably true.

Nor can what is objected make it at all suspected of falsity: for whereas it is supposed, that the Atheist will pretend that the thou-

andth part of the world never had any such *Idea*; and that those that have had it, have blotted it out of their Souls; and those that have it most deeply imprinted upon them, are not so sure of it as two and two make four; I briefly answer, That all men ever had, and have this *Idea* in their Souls, nor is it in their power to blot it out, no more than to blow out the Sun with a pair of bellows. Interest, diversion of their Minds to other matters, distemper of Body by Sensuality or Melancholy may hinder the actual contemplation or discovery of this *Idea* in the Mind, but it cannot radically obliterate it.

2. For the last alledgment, That it is not so clear as two and two make four; suppose it were true, yet it does not invalidate our position, That this Truth we contend for is natural and undeniable. For many Truths on this side of that easiness at least, if not clearness, cannot but be acknowledged naturally and undeniably true.

3. But now to come more near to the business, and that grand suspicion of *Atheists*, That this Notion of a God is only a crafty Figment of *Politicians*, whereby they would contain the People in Obedience, and that it is they by their cunning and power have impress'd this Character upon the minds of men; I answer, That what is naturally in man already, they cannot put there. They may, I confess, make a *Politick* use of it; as indeed it is not so true as dreadful and detestable, That mere States-men make no conscience of prostituting the most Sacred things that are, to their own base and trivial Designs. But to argue therefore that there is no such thing as *Religion*, or a *God*, because they do so abominably abuse the acknowledgment of them to *Political* purposes, is as irrationally inferred as if we should contend that there is not naturally any Self-love, love of Wife and Children, desire of Liberty, Riches or Honour, but what *Politicians* and States-men have conveyed into the hearts of men: because by applying themselves skilfully to these affections, they carry and wind about the people as they please; and by the inflaming of their spirits by their plausible Orations, hurry them many times into an hazard of losing the very capacity of the enjoyment of those hopes that they so fairly and fully spread out before them.

4. The most material Objection that I can conceive can be made against our second Argument from the *Idea* of God, as it is subjected in our Soul, is this, That this *Idea* is so plain and conspicuous a Truth, that it cannot but be in an *intellectual* Subject, and therefore we cannot well argue as we do in the ninth Chapter of our first Book, That this *Idea* in our Soul was put there, that we might come to the knowledge of our Maker; for it is necessarily there, and what is necessary is not of counsel or purpose.

But to this I answer, first, That our Bodies might have been of such a frame that our Minds thereby had been ever hinder'd or diverted from attending this *Idea*, though it could not possibly but be there.

And in the second place, That it is not any inconvenience to us to acknowledge, that the *Idea* of God is such, that no *intellectual* Being can be conceived without it, that is, can be imagined of an *intellectual* nature, and yet so necessarily acknowledge upon due proposal that this

Idea

Idea is undeniably true: for hereby it is more manifest how absurd and irrational they are that will pretend to Reason and Understanding, and yet excuse themselves from the acknowledging of so plain a Truth.

CHAP. IX.

1. *That the natural frame of Conscience is such, that it suggests such Fears and Hopes that imply that there is a God.* 2. *That the ridiculousness of sundry Religions is not any proof, that to be affected with Religion is no Innate faculty of the Soul of man.*

1. **T**HE strength of my Argument from *Natural Conscience* is this, That men naturally *fear* Misfortunes, and *hope* for Success, accordingly as they behave themselves. But I must confess that this proof or reason is the most lubricous and unmanageable of any that I have made use of, it being so plainly obnoxious to that cavil or evasion, That the *Fears* and *Hopes* of *Conscience* are not from any *natural* knowledge of God, but from the power of *Education*, which is another Nature.

Now there scarce being any Nation that hath not aw'd their Children by some rudiments or other of Religion, we are not able to give a sincere instance that will set off the validity of our Argument, and we do not know how to help our selves but by a Supposition.

We will therefore suppose a man of an ordinary stamp, (for I do profess that some men are born so enormously deformed for their ingeny or inward nature, that a man can no more judge of what is the Intellectual or Moral property of a man by them, than what is the genuine shape of his body by a *Mole* or *Monster*) not to have inculcated into him any Principles of Religion, or explicit or Catechistical doctrine of a God, but to be of such a temper only, (whether by Nature or Education, 'tis all one) as to deem some things *fit* and *right* to be done, and others *unfit* and *unjust*. For what is *just* and *unjust*, *good* and *evil*, *amiable* and *execrable*, is more palpable and plain, according to the judgment of some, than the *Existence* of a Deity. I say, suppose such a man should commit some things that he held very heinous and abominable crimes, as *Murder of Father* or *Mother*, *Incest with his Sister*, *betraying of his truest Friends*, or the like, and should after not by the hand of the Magistrate be punished, (he doing these things so cunningly that they escap'd his cognizance) but should immediately thereupon be continually *unfortunate*, his Barns and Stacks of Corn burnt by Lightning from heaven, his Cattle die in his grounds, himself afterward tormented with most noisome and grievous Diseases; all which notwithstanding befall many in the course of nature; I appeal to any one, whether he can think it at all probable but that this man will naturally and unavoidably be so touch'd in Conscience, as to suspect that these *Misfortunes* are fallen upon him as a *punishment* from some invisible Power or Divine hand that orders all things justly.

2. What is alledged against our Argument from the *Universality of Religious veneration*, viz. The manifold ridiculous Religions in the world; from whence it is inferr'd, that the Mind of man has no Innate principle of Religion at all in it, it being mouldable into any shape or form of Worship that it pleases the Supreme Power in every Country to propose: I answer to this,

First, That if every Religionist would look upon extraneous Religions with the same venerable candor and awful sobriety that he does upon his own, he might rather find them worthy to be pitied for their falseness, than laughed at for their ridiculousness. But it no more follows that all Religions are false, because so many are, than that no Philosophick opinions are true, because so many are false.

But, Secondly, The multitude of *various* and, if you will, *fond* Religions in the world, into which the Nations of the Earth are mouldable, the more ridiculous, the never the worse for our purpose, who contend that Religion is a *natural property* of man. For the necessity of its adherence to our nature is more manifestly evidenced thereby, who can no more be without Religion than Matter without Figure, though few parts of it have the happiness to be framed into what is Regular or Ordinate, or to have any beauty or proportion in their shape; and yet break the Matter as you will, it will be in some shape or other.

CHAP. X.

1. That though the Conarion might be the Seat of Common Sense, yet it cannot be the Common Percipient; 2. As being capable of Sensation, 3. Of Memory, 4. Of Imagination, 5. Of Reason, 6. And of Spontaneous Motion. 7. That these Arguments do not equally prove an Incorporeal Substance in Brutes; nor, if they did, were their Souls straightway immortal. 8. That we cannot admit Perception in Matter as well as Divisibility, upon pretence the one is no more perplex'd than the other; because both Sense and Reason averr the one, but no Faculty gives witness to the other. 9. In what sense the Soul is both divisible and extended. 10. A Symbolical representation how she may receive multitudes of distinct figurations into one indivisible Principle of perception. 11. That the manifest incapacity in the Matter of the Functions of a Soul assures us of the existence thereof, be we never so much puzzled in the speculation of her Essence.

1. **W**E have in the last Chapter of our first Book largely and evidently enough demonstrated, That neither the Animal Spirits, nor the Brain are the first Principle of Spontaneous motion in us; we touch'd also upon the Conarion: but because our Opposers will not be so slightly put off, we shall here more fully and particularly shew the impossibility of that part proving any such Principle of Motion, tho' I confess it bids very fair to be the Organical seat of Common sense, because

because it is so conveniently placed near the Center of the *Brain*; and if the transmission of Motions which act upon the Organs had not some such one part to terminate in, it is conceiv'd by some (but I suspect more wittily than solidly) that these outward Organs of Sense being two, the Objects would seem two also; which is contrary to experience.

But though the *Conarion* may be the Organ of fundry perceptions from corporeal Objects, and the Tent or Pavilion wherein the Soul is chiefly seated; yet we utterly deny that without an *Immaterial* inhabitant this *arbitrarious Motion* which we are conscious to our selves of, can be at all performed in us, or by us: for if we attend to the condition of our own natures, we cannot but acknowledge that that which moves our Body thus *arbitrariouly*, does not only perceive sensible Objects, but also *remembers*, has a power of *free Imagination* and of *Reason*.

2. And to begin with the first of these; I say that mere *Perception* of extenal Objects seems incompatible to the *Conarion*. For it being of like nature with the rest of the *Brain*, it is not only divisible, but in a sort actually divided one particle from another; else it could not be so soft as it is, though it be something harder than the rest of the *Brain*. Now I say, the Images of sensible Objects, they spreading to some space in the surface of the *Conarion* against which they hit, one part of the *Conarion* has the *perception*, suppose of the *head* of a man, the other of a *leg*, the third of an *arm*, the fourth of his *breast*; and therefore though we should admit that every particle of such a space of the *Conarion* may perceive such a *part* of a man, yet there is nothing to perceive the *whole man*, unless you'll say, they communicate their *perceptions* one to another. But this communication seems impossible; for if *Perception* be by impression from the external Object, no particle in the *Conarion* shall *perceive* any part of the Object but what it receives an impress from. But if you will yet say, that every part of the Object impresses upon every part of the *Conarion* wherein the Image is, it will be utterly impossible but that the whole Image will be confus'd, and the distinctness of *Colours* lost, especially in lesser Objects.

3. Now for the Faculty of *remembering of things*, that it cannot be in the *Conarion*, we prove thus: For that *Memory* which is the standing seal or impression of external Objects, is not there is plain; for if it were, it would spoil the representation of things present, or rather after-Objects would be sure to deface all former impressions whatsoever. But if you'll say that *Memory* is in the *Brain*, but *Reminiscency* in the *Conarion*; I answer, That these Impresses or signatures made by outward Objects in the *Brain*, must also of necessity be obliterated by superadvenient Impressions. For whether these Images or Impresses consist in a certain posture or motion of the *Plicatile Fibres*, or subtil threds of which the *Brain* consists, it is evident that they cannot but be cancelled and obliterated by occasion of thousands of Objects that invade our Senses daily, which must needs displace them, or give them a new motion from what they had before.

But

But suppose *Memory* were thus seal'd upon the *Brain*, and transmitted its Image through the *Animal Spirits* in the ventricles, as an outward Object does its *Species* through the Air to the Eye; being that *perception* is by impression, and that the impression was lost in the *Conarion*, though retain'd in the *Brain*, how can the *Conarion* ever say that it had any such impression before? for the impression once wip'd out, it is as if it never had any, and therefore can never *remember* that it had. Besides, the *perception* of this image in the *Brain* is as incompatible to the *Conarion*, as the *perception* of any external Object, upon which we have already insist'd.

4. And thirdly, For the power of *free Imagination*, whereby the *Conarion* is suppos'd to excogitate the several forms or shapes of things which it never saw; I enquire, whether it be the thin Membrane, or the inward and something soft and fuzzy Pulp it contains, that raises and represents to it self these arbitrary Figments and Chimeras; and then, what part or particle of either of them can perform these fine feats; and (what is most material) whether the representations being corporeal, there be not a necessity of the *Conarion's* being so affected or impressed as in external corporeal Objects: and then I demand how this passive soft substance should be able to impress or sign it self, or how one part of this body should be able to act upon another for this purpose; and there being a *memory* also of these figmental impressions, how they can be sealed upon the *Brain*, the seat of *Memory*. For admitting the *Conarion* to imitate the manner of impression of outward Objects, in inventing Images of her own, she then impressing these Images upon the *Brain*, it will be like as if we should make use of the impression of a Seal upon some hard matter to seal some softer matter with; in which case the two impressions will be notoriously different, those parts that give out in the one, in the other giving in.

5. Fourthly, As concerning *Reason*, besides that it is manifest in the use thereof, that we comprehend at once the Images or Phantasms of not only different, but contrary things in the very same part or particle of the *Conarion*, (for if they be in different parts, what shall judge of them both?) as when, for example, we conclude hot is not cold, or a crooked line is not a straight line, which cannot be conceived without a conclusion of both impressions: there is also another consideration of *Notions plainly immaterial*, which do not impress themselves upon the *Conarion*, nor any part of the *Brain*, or on the outward Organs from sensible Objects, but are our own *innate conceptions* in the speculation of things; and such are sundry *Logical*, *Metaphysical*, and *Mathematical* Notions, as I have elsewhere made good. Wherefore it seems altogether incredible that the *Conarion*, being so gross and palpable a body as it is, should have any *Notions* or *Conceptions* that are not corporeal, and convey'd to it from material Objects from without.

6. But fifthly and lastly, It is very hardly conceivable how the *Conarion*, if it were capable of Sense and Perception, should, being thus but a mere pulposus protuberant knob, by its nods or jogs drive the *Animal spirits* so curiously, as not to miss the key that leads to the motion of the least joint of our body, or to drive them in so forcibly and smartly, as to enable us to strike so fierce strokes as we see men do, especially

cially these *Animal spirits* being so very thin and fluid, and the *Conarion* so broad and blunt: For the one gives us to conceive, That the *Spirits*, especially being so faintly struck as they are likely to be by the *Conarion*, and certainly sometimes are, will gently wheel about all over the ventricles of the *Brain*, and be determinated to no key thereof that leads to the *Muscle*, or this or that particular joint of the body; and the other, That if this impulse of the *Conarion* will forcibly enough drive forward the *Spirits* in the ventricles of the *Brain*, that that wind will fling open more doors than one, whenas yet we see we can with a very considerable force move a finger or a toe, the rest of our body remaining unmoved. We might add also, That it is hard to conceive how this *Pineal Glandula* can move it self thus spontaneously without *Muscles* and *Spirits*, or some equivalent mechanical contrivance; and if it do, to what purpose is that great care in the Nature of *Muscles* and *Animal spirits* in the frame of *Animals*? if it do not, we shall further inquire concerning the *Spring of Motion*, and demand what moves the *Animal Spirits* that must be imagined to move the *Conarion*. For in *Motion corporeal* it is an acknowledged Maxim, *Whatever is moved, is moved by another*. So demonstrable it is every way, that the first principle of our *spontaneous motion* is not, nor can be seated in any part of our *Body*, but in a Substance really distinct from it, which men ordinarily call the *Soul*.

7. Nor does that at all invalidate the force of our Demonstration which some alledge, that our Arguments are Sophistical, because they as certainly conclude that there is an *Incorporeal* substance in *Beasts*, as they do that there is one in *Men*.

For I answer, first, That they conclude absolutely concerning *Men*, that there is an *Incorporeal Soul* in them, because we are certain there be in them such Operations that evidently argue such a nature; but we are not so certain of what is in *Beasts*: and very knowing men, but of a more mechanical *Genius*, have at least doubted whether *Beasts* have any *Cogitation* or no, though in the mean time they have professed themselves sure, that if they had, they could not but have also *Immaterial Souls* really distinct from their *Bodies*.

Secondly, Admit our Argument proved that there were *Souls* in *Brutes* really distinct from their *Bodies*, is it any thing more than what all Philosophers and School-men, that have held *Substantial forms*, have either expressly or implicitly acknowledged to be true? But if they be *Incorporeal*, say they, they will be also *Immortal*, which is ridiculous. If they mean by *Immortal*, unperishable, as *Matter* is, why should they not be so as well as *Matter* it self; this active substance of the *Soul*, though but of a *Brute*, being a more noble Essence, and partaking more of its Maker's perfection, than the dull and dissipable *Matter*? But if they mean by *Immortality*, a capacity of eternal life and bliss after the dissolution of their *Bodies*, that's a ridiculous consequence of their own, which we give the Authors of free leave to laugh at; it concerns not us, nor our present Argument. For we conceive that the *Soul* of a *Brute* may be of that nature as to be vitally affected only in a *Terrestrial Body*, and that out of it, it may have neither *sense* nor *perception* of any thing; so as to it self it utterly perishes.

8. That

8. That seems an Objection of more moment, Being there are *Properties* that cannot but be acknowledged to be in a *Body* or *Matter*, and yet such as imply strange repugnancies in the conception thereof, (as suppose that perplexed property of *Divisibility*, which must be into points, or *in infinitum*, either of which confounds our Imagination to think of them) why we may not acknowledge that a *Body* may also have *Sense* and *Understanding*, though it seem never so contradictory in the more close consideration thereof. But I answer, This arguing is very Sophistical, because by the same reason we should admit that the Head of an *Onion* understands and perceives as well as the *Conarion* in a Man. For you can bring no greater Argument against it, than that it is contradictory and repugnant that it should so be. But you'll reply, That we plainly see that some part of the *Body* of man must have *Sense* and *Understanding* in it, but we discern no such thing in an *Onion*. But I demand, By what Faculty do we discern this? If you answer, *Our own Sense* tells us so; I say, *our own Sense*, if we did not correct it, would confidently suggest to us, that our *Finger feels*, and our *Eye sees*; whenas 'tis plain they do not, for the very same thing that *feels* and *sees*, *moves* also our *Body*: but neither our *Eye* nor our *Finger* move the *Body*, and therefore they neither *feel* nor *see*.

And yet without our *Eye* we cannot *see* in this state of conjunction, as without the due frame and temper of our *Brain* we cannot well *understand*: but it no more follows from thence that the *Brain understands*, and not something distinct from it, than that the *Eye sees*. Wherefore it is apparent that there is no Faculty in us that can clearly inform us that any part of our *Body* is indued with *Sense* and *Understanding*.

From whence we see the great disparity betwixt admitting of *Divisibility* in *Matter*, (though the Notion be never so perplex'd) and of *Sense* and *Understanding* in a *Body*, (which indeed brings on more perplexity than the other, if it be very accurately look'd into;) because we are fully ascertain'd by *Sense*, and I may say by *Reason* too, that *Matter is divisible*, but no Faculty at all can pretend to ascertain us that a *Body* is capable of either *Sense* or *Reason*.

9. But there seems to be a worse Objection than this still behind, which is this: That though we have evidently proved the impossibility of there being either *Sense*, *Understanding*, or *spontaneous Motion* in *Matter* or a *Body*, yet we are never the nearer; for the like difficulties may be urged against there being any *Sense* or *Understanding* in a *Spirit*, sith a *Spirit* cannot but be *extended*, nor *extended* but *divisible*, nor *divisible* but *incapable of Sense* or *Understanding*, as we have argu'd before against *Matter*.

But to this I answer, If by *Extension* be meant a *Juxta-position* of *parts*, or placing of them one by another, as it is in *Matter*, I utterly deny that a *Spirit* is at all in this sense *extended*. But if you mean only a certain *Amplitude of presence*, that it can be at every part of so much *Matter* at once, I say it is *extended*; but that this kind of *Extension* does not imply any *divisibility* in the substance thus *extended*; for *Juxta-position of parts*, *Impenetrability* and *Divisibility* go together, and therefore where the two former are wanting, *Extension* implies not the third.

But

But when I speak of *Indivisibility*, that Imagination create not new troubles to her self, I mean not such an *Indivisibility* as is fancied in a Mathematical point; but as we conceive in a *Sphere of light* made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that *Sphere* or *Orb of light*, though it be in some sense *extended*, yet is truly *indivisible*, supposing the Center such: For there is no means imaginable to discern or separate any one ray of this *Orb*, and keep it apart by it self disjoyned from the Center.

10. Now a little to invert the property of this *luminous Orb* when we would apply it to a *Soul* or *Spirit*: As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is necessarily in every part of the *Orb*, as suppose it were redder, all would be redder; if dimmer, all dimmer, and the like: so there is also that unity and indivisibility of the exterior parts, if I may so call them, of a *Spirit* or *Soul* with their inmost Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of life is also thereby necessarily affected; and these exterior parts of the *Soul* being affected by the parts of the Object with such circumstances as they are in, the inward Center receives all so circumstantiated, that it has necessarily the intire and unconfused images of things without, though they be contrived into so small a compass, and are in the very center of this spiritual Substance.

This *Symbolical* representation I used before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better set off the *nature of a Spirit*, wherein is implied a power of receiving multitudes of particular figurations into one indivisible Principle of Sense, where all are exactly united into one Subject, and yet distinctly represented; which cannot be performed by the *Conarion* it self, as I have demonstrated, and therefore it remains that it must refer to a *Soul*, whose chief seat may haply be there as to the act of *perception*.

11. But if any shall abuse our Courtesy of endeavouring to help his Imagination, (or at least to gratify it) in this *Symbolical* representation we have made, by conceiving of this *Center of the Soul*, but as some divisible point in *Matter*, and of no great efficacy, and of the vital or arbitrary *extension* of it, as grossly as if it would necessarily argue as real a *divisibility* and *separability* of the parts, as in a *Body*; to prevent all such cavils, we shall omit those spinosities of the *extension* or *indivisibility* of a *Soul* or *Spirit*, and conclude briefly thus:

That the manifold contradictions and repugnancies we find in the nature of *Matter*, to be able to either *think*, or *spontaneously to move* it self, do well assure us, that these operations belong not to it, but to some other Substance: wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an *Immaterial Being* really distinct from the *Body*, which we ordinarily call a *Soul*. The speculation of whose bare *Essence*, though it may well puzzle us, yet those *Properties* that we find incompetent to a *Body*, do sufficiently inform us of the different nature of her; for it is plain she is a Substance indued with the power of *cogitation*, (that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects) as also of *penetrating* and *spontaneously moving* of a *Body*: which *Properties* are as immediate to her, as *impenetrability* and *separability of parts* to the *Matter*; and we are not to demand the cause of the one no more than of the other.

CHAP.

C H A P. XI.

1. That Subtilty is not inconsistent with the strongest Truth.
2. That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world, are in the things themselves, not merely in our Phansy.
3. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence than against it.
4. That Beauty is no necessary Result from the mere Motion of the Matter.
5. That it is an intellectual Object, not taken notice of by Brutes.
6. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well consistent with the Goodness of the First Cause.
7. As also the Creation of offensive Animals, there being curbs and correctives to their increase.
8. That the immediate Matter of the Foetus is homogeneous.
9. That the notion of the Archei or Seminal Forms is no such intricate Speculation.

1. **W**E have now gone through all the Objections against the First Book of our *Antidote*; whereat if the more coarsely complexion'd, that they may still seem to have something further to object, shall scoffingly cavil, as if we had used over-much subtilty in the management of our Arguments, I can only advertize them of this, That Subtilty is as consistent with Truth as the most gross Theories; as is manifest in manifold Mathematical Speculations, than which there is nothing more certain nor undeniable to the Reason of Man. But that the coherence of Notions that are subtile in themselves should be as easily plain and conspicuous as the broad Objects of sense, is a very incongruous conceit, and can be the expectation of none but those that are utterly unskilful in the nature of such like contemplations.

But the defence of our Second Book will be not only more short, but less obscure, our Arguments there for the most part being such, that even the unlearned can judge of them, and few of them but so evidently convictive, that there can be nothing material alledged against them. But such Objections as there are, I shall briefly set down and answer.

2. And the first is made against our reasoning for Providence from the excellent *Usefulness* of Stones, Timber, Metals, the Magnet, &c. For those long and subordinate concatenations of instrumental serviceableness of such things, say they, is but our fancy, no design of any First Cause. And how easy a thing is it for the wit of man to bring things together that are of a distant nature in themselves, and to imagine many Series of means and ends in matters that have no dependence one of another, but what himself makes? But I answer, that the several *useful dependencies* of sundry matters of this kind, we only find them, not make them. For whether we think of it or no, it is, for example, manifest that *Fewel* is good to continue *Fire*, and *Fire* to melt *Metals*, and *Metals* to make *Instruments* to build ships or houses, and so on. Wherefore it being true that there is such a subordinate *Usefulness* in the things themselves that are made to our hand, it is but reason in us to impute it to such a Cause, as was aware of the *Usefulness* and *Serviceableness* of its own works.

3. Nor

3. Nor are we to cavil because these *Useful* things, such as *Stones*, *Metals*, *Coals*, and the like, are to be had with so much labour, whenas Men were better released from all such drudgery, that they may have the more time to contemplate the World, and seek after God, and exercise those better Faculties of the humane Nature: For we see plainly that the lapsed condition of Man is such, that *Idleness* is no spur to Virtue or Piety, but rather a Nurse to all *Beastliness* and *Sensuality*. Besides that few Mens Minds are of so *Speculative* a temper that they can with any great pleasure attend such Meditations as will prove worth their leaving of a more practical and laborious Life, which does not exclude Men from being pious and honest, as certainly no Calling at all does. Wherefore that to the generality of Men all *Useful* things come hardly, is indeed rather an Argument of *Providence*, and that that Cause that framed the Earth, knew well aforehand what the disposition of the terrestrial Man would be.

4. The second Objection is against our Argument from the *Beauty* of *Plants*, which I contend to have its first original from an *Intellectual* Cause, *Beauty* it self being such an *Intellectual* Object. But to this are objected two things. First, That *Beauty* is a necessary result of the mere motion of the *Matter*. Secondly, That it is no *intellectual* Object, sith *Women* and *Children* seem to be more taken with it than *Men*, and *Brutes* as well as either.

The former they will prove thus; That *Colour*, which is one part of *Beauty*, is the result of mere *Matter*, is, say they, plain from the *Rainbow*, which is assuredly such a mere natural result: And for *Symmetry*, which is the other part of *Beauty*, and in *Plants* consists in their *leaves* and *branches* parallelly answering one another, as also the several parts of the same *leaf*; there is, say they, a kind of Natural necessity that there should be such an uniform Correspondency as this is in these *branches* and *leaves*, because the nourishment must follow the tract of the Vessels of the Seed, which being regular in their first conformation, the *branches* and *leaves* which sprout out must also be regular. Now this regular conformation of the Seed came from the uniform motion of particles in the *Mother-plant*; and lastly, the first *Mother-plant* of any kind from the regular motion of the *Matter*.

But I answer, That though the *Positure* as well as the *Colours* themselves of the *Rain-bow* be necessary results of the mere *Matter*, and are nothing but the Reflexion and Refraction of the light of the Sun in the round drops of a rorid Cloud, as *Cartesius* has admirably demonstrated; and that there is nothing at all further required hereunto saving the position of our Eyes in a line drawn from the Sun, and continued to this rorid Cloud spread out so that the coloured circle may have for its *Radius* either about forty two or fifty one Degrees, for then this Effect will necessarily follow; and if this rorid Cloud extend it self so far every way, that there will be at fifty one Degrees distance from the aforesaid line, as well as at forty two, this dewy temper of the Air, there will necessarily appear two *Rain-bows* at once, as has been frequently seen; and so, I confess, some things being put, the *Colours* of *Flowers* will be a necessary result of the *Matter* in such a motion or posture: Yet for all this, the variety of the placing of these *Colours* of *Flowers* cannot but shew that it is a thing either *fortuitous* or *arbitrarious*; but being that they ever some

way gratifie the beholder, it is a sign that it is not *fortuitous*, and therefore it must be *arbitrarious*, and from some Counsel that contriv'd them thus.

But that I insist upon most and contend to proceed from an *Intellectual* principle is their *Symmetry*, against which the Objection seems very invalid, the reason of it being thus, as you plainly see, That the regular Motion of the *Matter* made the *first Plant* of every kind: For we demand, What regulated the Motion of it so as to guide it to form it self into such a state that at last it appears a very pleasant *Intellectual* spectacle, and exceeding hard (if not impossible) to be hit upon without some other Director distinct from the blind *Matter*? As a Man will easily believe, if he do not think so much upon the *Trunks* and *Branches* of *Trees* (whose shooting out of the ground, and then having arms again shooting out of the trunk, and branching themselves into a many subdivisions, is not so difficult to conceive) as upon their *Blossoms*, *Fruits*, and *Leaves*: As in the *Leaf* of the *Oak* and of *Holly*, and abundance of leaves of *Herbs* and their *Flowers*, as in *Monks-hood*, *Snap-dragon*, sundry sorts of *Flie-flower* properly so called, the *Butterfly-Satyrion*, the *Gnat-Satyrion*, to which add the *Wasp-Orchis*, the *Bee-flower*, and the like. The *Matter* could never have hit upon such hard and yet regular shapes, had it not been regulated by something besides it self; the concinnity of which figures gratifying us that are Rational, we ought in all reason to conclude that they came from a Principle *Intellectual*.

5. But it was objected in the second place, That *Beauty* is no *Intellectual* Object, because *Women* and *Children* are more taken with it than *Men*, and *Beasts* as well as either. To which I answer, That *Children* are not so much taken with the *Symmetry* as the *gayness* of colours in things that are counted beautiful, as *Larks* are mightily pleased at the shining of the *Glass* the *Lark-catcher* exposes to their view. But if they can also discover a want of *Symmetry* and correspondency, as supposing a *Flower* which has some leaves cropt off, that Spirit which is in them being *Intellectual*, it is not at all unreasonable it should exercise it self upon such easy Objects as these betimes. But that *They* or *Women* are taken more with *outward Beauty* than *Men*, is because *Men* imploy their *Intellectuals* about *harder* tasks, and so cannot mind these smaller matters. Otherwise there is no question but that if they could be idle from other imployments, they would be as devout admirers of *Beauty* as *Women* themselves, and be as well pleased with theirs, if they have any, as they themselves are with it.

But as for *Brutes*, I deny that they have any sense of so noble an Object as *Beauty* is, or take any notice of the chief requisite in it, which is *Symmetry* and concinnity of parts or of any order of colours, but only of the colours themselves. And it is no wonder that as the sight of red Stockings will inflame the Spirits of a *Turkey-cock* with anger, as also the sight of the blood of grapes or mulberries provoke the *Elephant* to fight; so other fresh colours of sundry sorts may please and exhilarate the spirits of Animals, as *Light* does of most. And therefore if the *Horse* prance and carry himself proudly when he has gay and glittering furniture, it is from

no

no other reason than what we have already declared. And if a *Dog* bark at a ragged Beggar more than at a handsomely-clad Gentleman, it is to be inquired into, whether a Beggar's *Curr* will not bark more at a Gentleman than at a Beggar, the sense of *Beauty* neither pleasing nor provoking this Animal, but the unusualness of the Object stirring up his choler. And that *Birds* prune their feathers, is not any delight in decency and comeliness, but to rid themselves of that more uncouth and harsh sense they feel in their skins by the incomposure of their ruffled plumes. So for the choice of their *Mates* in either *Birds* or *Beasts* for copulation; it is very hard to prove that they are guided so much by *sight* as *scent*; and then if by *sight*, whether it be not *colour* rather than exact *symmetry* of parts that moves them.

And lastly, if we should admit at any time that *Brutes* may be more pleased with a *beautiful* Object (taking *Beauty* in the entire Notion thereof) than with one less beautiful, it is but a confused delight, nor do they any more relish it as *Intellectual*, than *Children* (that are ordinarily well pleased to see *Geometrical* instruments that are made of *Brass* or *Ivory*, or such like materials) do the exact cuttings and carvings of the Characters and lines thereof as they are rational and Mathematical. And therefore we may very well conclude, that the *Beauty* of Bodies is naturally intended no more for *Brutes* than such *Mathematical* Instruments for *Children*: But all such Objects are directed to *Creatures Intellectual* from that *Eternal Intellectual Principle* that made them.

6. The third Objection is against *Animals preying* one upon another, and *Man* upon them all. For this, say they, is inconsistent with that *Eternal Goodness* that we profess to have created and ordered all things. To which I answer, That it is not at all inconsistent: For the nature of that *Absolute Universal and Eternal Goodness* is not to dote upon *any one particular*, as we do, (whose complexions haply may make us more than ordinarily compassionate, (though most Men have too little of that natural Benignity) and whose short sight plungeth us too much into the sense of what is present) but taking a full and free view of the capacities of *Happiness* in such kind of *Creatures*, contriv'd their condition to be such as was best for the generality of them, though the *necessity* and *impossibility* of things would be sure to load some particular *Creatures* with greater inconveniency than the rest.

And therefore that several kinds of terrestrial *Creatures* more exactly might be *happy* in their animal nature, this *Sovereign Goodness* was content to let it be so, that ever and anon something that by the Animal sense would be necessarily accounted Tragical and miserable should light upon some few; the *Species* of things in the mean time being still copiously enough preserved, and marching on safely in this Theatre of the World in their several successions.

Now it is evident that the *main powers* of the *Animal life* are *natural craft*, *strength* and *activity* of *Body*, and that any purchase by these is far more pleasant to a living *Creature* than what easily comes without them. Wherefore what can be more grateful to a terrestrial Animal, than to hunt his prey and to obtain it? But all kinds of *Creatures* are

not capable of this special happiness. Some therefore are made to feed on the fruits of the Earth, that they may thus not only enjoy themselves, but occasionally afford game and food to other Creatures. In which notwithstanding the *Wisdom* of God as well as his *Goodness* is manifest, in that while they are thus a sport and prey to others, yet they are abundantly preserved in their several generations. But I have so fully and methodically treated of all such scruples against Providence in my *Enquiry into the Causes and Occasions of Atheism*, that we will content ourselves with this short intimation of an Answer in this place.

Only we will add, That if the *Souls of Brutes* prove *immortal*, (which the best of Philosophers have not been averse from) the Tragedy is still less horrid: But yet that ought not to animate us causelessly and petulantly to dislodge them, because we know not how long it will be till they have an opportunity to frame to themselves other *Bodies*; and the interval of time betwixt, is as to them a perfect death, wherein they have not the sense nor enjoyment of any thing. And for my own part, I think that he that flights the life or welfare of a brute Creature, is naturally so *unjust*, that if outward Laws did not restrain him, he would be as cruel to Man.

7. The fourth Objection is against our Argument for *Divine Providence* drawn from the consideration of that happy *Mitigation* of the trouble and *offensiveness* of some Animals by others that bear an *enmity* to them, and feed upon them as their prey, as the *Cat* for example does on the *Mouse*. Now, say they, it were a more exact sign of *Providence* if there were no such *offensive* Creatures in the World to trouble us, than to bring on the trouble by making these Animals, and then to take it off again by making others to correct the mischief that would follow.

But no Man would argue thus, if it were not that he had over-carelessly taken up this *false Principle*, That the World was made for Man alone, whenas assuredly the Blessed and Benign Maker of all things intended that other *living Creatures* should enjoy themselves as well as Men, which they could not if they had no existence: Therefore *Providence* is more exact, in that she can thus spread out her *Goodness* further, even to the enjoyments of the more inferior ranks of Creatures, without any considerable inconvenience to the more noble and superior.

Besides, all these Creatures that are thus a prey to others are their sport and sustenance, and so pleasure others by their death, as well as enjoy themselves while they are yet in life and free from their enemy. To say nothing how they are both in some sort or other *useful* to Man himself, and therefore sometimes would be missed if they were wanting.

8. The fifth and last Objection is against our concluding a *Substance distinct from Body*, from the *Homogeneity* of that immediate *Crystalline Matter* out of which the *Fœtus* is efformed, suppose in an *Egg*, the same being also observable in other generations. To avoid the force of which Argument, it is denied that there is any such *Homogeneity* of parts, but that there are several *Heterogeneous* particles, though to us invisible, which being put upon Motion by the heat of the *Hen*, or some equivalent warmth, like particles will be driven to their like, and so the *Chicken* will be efformed: But that to acknowledge any other *Archeus*, brings inextricable difficulties along with it. For where, say they, were all the

the *Archei* which shap'd the *Wasps* out of an Horse's Carcase? Are they parts of the Horse's Soul, or new intruding guests upon the old ones being ejected? If the former, then the Soul of an Horse is divisible, and consequently material, or, if you will, truly *Matter*: If the latter, where were those little Intruders before? Or be they so many sprigs or branches of the common Soul of the World? But if so, why have they not one common Sense of pain and pleasure amongst them all? But to all these I answer in order.

And to the first part of this Objection I say, that it cannot but be a very strong presumption, that Nature intends an utter *Homogeneity* of *Matter* before she fall upon her work of efformation; she so constantly bringing it to as perfect *Homogeneity* as we can possibly discern with our Senses. And there being no conceivable convenience at all in the *Heterogeneity* of parts, I think the conclusion is not rash, if we averr that the *immediate Matter* of efformation of the *Fetus* is either accurately *Homogeneous*, or if there be any *Heterogeneity* of parts in it, that it is only by accident; and that it makes no more to the first work of efformation or organization of the *Matter*, than those Atomes of dust that light on the limners colours make to the better drawing of the Picture. For to say that those sundry sorts of particles put upon motion by external warmth do gather together by virtue of similitude one with another, is to avouch a thing without any ground at all, against all grounds of Reason.

For what can this *Similitude of Parts* consist in, if not either in the likeness of figure, or in the equality of agitation or magnitude? Now Bodies of the like figure being put upon motion, will not direct their courses one towards another any thing the more for being alike in shape. Indeed Bodies of like figure of equal agitation and magnitude in a confused agitation may very likely go together, as we see done (where yet we cannot promise our selves so exact similitude of the particles in their figure) in the thinner Spirit of distilled liquors, that all mount upward; in the tartarous parts of Wine, that are driven outward to the sides of the vessel; in the feculency of urine, that sinks to the bottom of the glass; in the subsidency of this dreggish part of the World, the *Earth*, if it may so properly be said to subside and be at the bottom, as in the midst of the more refined and subtile Elements. And so in like manner the *Fermentation* of the matter which precedes the efformation of Creatures may haply arrive to some such rude effect as is seen in the forenamed instances: but it can never amount to such an artificial contrivance of Organs as are in living Creatures.

But if by *likeness of parts* they mean only *fitness of Parts* for *figure* and *motion*, they both being so framed and moderated, that upon external warmth, their agitation will necessarily cast them to lock one with another, and to be linked into this admirable and useful frame of the Body of an Animal; that Artifice would be so particularly nice and curious, that it is utterly unconceivable but that it must imply either the attendance, or at least first contrivance of a *Knowing Principle*, that put the *Matter* into so wonderful an order, as to be able by such precise laws of *Figure* and *Motion* to

exhibit so noble Objects to our Sense and Understandings: And thus our Adversaries will gain nothing by this supposal.

† See my
Treatise of
the Immorta-
lity of the Soul,
Book 3. ch.
12, and 13.

But though this may seem barely possible, yet I conceive it is very improbable that such an infinite number of particles that must concur to make up a *Fœtus*, should have such a particular figuring and law of Motion impress'd upon each of them, as to enable it to take its right station or posture in the structure of a living Creature. † For methinks this is going about the bush, whenas the more compendious way would be to make some *Immaterial Substance*, such as are conceived to be the *Seminal Forms* of Plants and Animals, or the *Archei*, as others call them. For this *Form* or *Archeus* is a thing more simple and plain, and requires a more simple and plain qualification of the subject it works upon, to wit, that it be only *homogeneous*, and ductile, or yielding to the tender assaults of that Substantial power of life that resides in it.

9. Nor is this opinion of the *Archei* or *Seminal Forms* intangled in any such difficulties, but may be easily answered.

For as for those many pretended intricacies in the instance of the efformation of *Wasps* out of the Carcase of an Horse, I say, the *Archei* that framed them are no parts of the Horse's Soul that is dead, but several distinct *Archei*, that do as naturally join with the *Matter* of his Body so putrefied and prepared, as the Crows come to eat his flesh.

But you demand where these *Archei* were before. To which I answer, Can there want room for so small pieces of *Spirituality* in so vast a compass as the comprehension of the Universe? I shall rather reply, Where were they not? The *World of Life* being excluded out of no place, and the sundry sorts of Souls being as plentiful and as obvious there, as those *Magnetick* particles are in this corporeal World; and you can scarce place your *Loadstone* and *Iron* any where, but you will find their presence by the sensible effects of them: Or if you will have a grosser comparison, they are as cheap and common as dust flying in the Air in a dry and windy Summer.

† This is the
usual phrase
of the Anci-
ents, but how
far justifiable,
see *Immortal*.
Book 3. ch.
16, lect. 8.

To the last puzzle propounded, whether these *Archei* be so many sprigs of the *common Soul of the World*, or particular subsistences of themselves; there is no great inconvenience in acknowledging that it may be either way. For it does not follow that if they be so many *branches* or distinct † *rayes* of the great *Soul of the World*, that therefore they are that very Soul it self; and if they be not, they may have their pleasures and pains apart distinct from one another: And what is pleasure and pain to them, may haply be *neither* to their Original, moving her no more than the chirping of a Cricket does those that are attentive to a full Consort of loud Musick, or the biting of a Flea does a Man tortured on a Rack.

But suppose we say, They are so many Substances as independent on the *Soul of the World* as the *Matter* it self is, (though all depend on God) there is no difficulty at all nor inconvenience in that position; nor need we trouble our selves where they are, or what becomes of them then, either before they actuate this or that part of the *Matter*, or after they have done actuating the same, no more than of
the

the parts of the *Matter* actuated by them. For as every particle of the *Matter* is safely kept within the compass of the corporeal World, whether it be acted upon by any *Soul* or *Archeus* or not; so every *Archeus* or *Soul* is as safe in the *World of Life*, and as secure from being exterminated out of the comprehension of *Immaterial* Beings, whether it act upon any part of the material World or no. For *Substance*, be it of what nature it will, cannot perish without a Miracle. And why God should annihilate that which in succession of Time may again have opportunity to act its part, and prove serviceable to the World, no Man, I think, can excogitate any Reason.

CHAP. XII.

1. *Objections against the story of the Charmer of Saltzburg, 2. And of the betwitched Children at Amsterdam, with some others of that kind; 3. As also against that of John of Hembach and John Michael Pipers to the Antick dancings of Devils. 4. Also against the disappearing of the Conventicle of Witches at the naming of God; 5. And against a certain passage of that Story of the Guardian Genius which Bodinus relates.*

1. **T**HE Passages excepted against in my Third Book are either *Historical* or *Philosophical*. The *Historical* are chiefly these: First, against the Narration concerning the Charmer of Saltzburg it is objected, That that *last* and greatest *Serpent* might not be the *Devil*, but a mere *Serpent*. To which I answer, that it is very probable that that *Serpent* (he reserving himself so for the *last*, and bringing so sad a fate upon the Charmer, as if he would either imitate a revenge of the death of so many of his own kind, or spitefully slur the glory and victory of their now almost triumphant enemy) had more in it than an ordinary natural *Serpent*; that is, that it was either the *Devil* so transformed, or a *Serpent* actuated and guided by him; which we shall the easier believe, if we consider that the whole business of *Charming* is of no natural efficacy, but supernatural, if it take any effect at all.

2. The second Objection is against those Stories of several possessed parties that have seemed to have vomited strange stuff out of their stomachs, as if it might be done by some flight and cunning, only to get money. In answer whereto I must needs confess, that there are no real strange effects or events in the World but some or other, if it be possible, either out of design of gain or in waggery, may attempt the imitating of them. But this fraud might easily be discovered by prudent spectators, such as I suppose those two Physicians were, *Cardan* and *Wierus*, who, if there had been nothing in the business but the sleight of a *Jugler*, could not have been deceived by that Imposture.

And as for the Children at *Amsterdam*, the spectacle was so miserable, and their torture by report so great, and then the parties so many, and all attempts of Art and Religion so frustraneous, that it
seems

seems very incredible that there should be either *fraud* or *foolery* in the matter. As for the *Maid of Saxony* her speaking *Greek*, it were a ridiculous thing indeed to look upon it as supernatural, unless it were known that no body taught her that language; and therefore in such cases the judgment and sagacity of the first Relators is to be supposed, as in that Story that *Fernelius* tells us of a *Demoniacal* in his time that spake *Greek*, and discovered the secrets of the Physicians, deriding their ignorance, in that they had half kill'd a Man by administering Physick upon a false supposal of a natural disease.

3. The third Objection is against the *Mirth* of some of the Stories recorded, as that of *John of Hembach* and *John Michael* the Pipers. But these Narrations are to seem never the more incredible for those passages of *mirth*, if we consider that those Apostate Spirits that have their haunts near this lower Air and Earth, are variously laps'd into the enormous love and liking of the *Animal Life*, having utterly forsaken the *Divine*; and that there are such Passions and affections in them as are in wicked Men and Beasts; and that some of them especially bear the same Analogy to an unfallen Angel that an Ape or Monkey does to a sober Man, so that all their pleasure is in unlucky ridiculous tricks; and that even those that are more ferocious, if they ever relaxate into *mirth*, that it is foolishly *antick* and *deformed*, as is manifest in all those stories of their dancings and nocturnal Revellings: For they bear a secret hatred to whatever is comely and decorous, and in a perpetual scorn to it distort all their actions to the contrary Mode, applauding themselves only in an unlimited liberty, and of doing whatever either their fond or foul Imagination suggests to them; affecting nothing but the lust of their own wills, and a power to make themselves wondred at and terrible.

4. The fourth Objection is against those Passages of the Nocturnal Conventicles of Witches, *disappearing* at the the naming of God or *Jesus*. For the Devils (say they) are not at all afraid of these *Names*, but can name them by way of scorn or abuse themselves, and apply them to their own Persons. But the Exception is easily satisfied, if we do but distinguish betwixt the minds of the speakers of these words. Therefore I say it does not follow, because they can stand the pronouncing of these words amongst themselves, that they can also when they are named with an honest heart and due devotion.

Besides, it is not irrational (though they could withstand the power of these *Names*, and the devotion of them that use them) that it may be an indispensable ceremony amongst them not to continue their Conventicles if any be near or present that make an open and serious profession of fear of God. And it is also evident how burthensome the presence of a truly religious person is to wicked Men, especially at that time they have a mind more freely to indulge to their own wickedness.

5. The fifth and last Objection is against a Vision or Dream, wherein he that had for so many years the society of a *Guardian Genius* or *Good Angel*, seem'd to hear these Words: *I will save thy Soul*; *I am he that before appeared unto thee*; as if this *Genius* or *Angel* had been himself the Eternal God. But this need breed no scruple. For first, there being no
shape

shape of any Person represented to him in this Vision, it may go only for a Divine suggestion of the Spirit of God assuring him of his love and providence over him now, as heretofore he had done in like Visions or Dreams.

And then secondly, if we should admit that the *Angel* should speak so unto him, the *Angel* in this case is not properly said to speak as a *Person*, but as an *Instrument*, so as a *Man's Tongue* speaks, whereas yet a *Man's Soul* or himself more properly speaks than the *Tongue*. Wherefore if God take so full possession of all the powers and Faculties of an *Angel*, that for a time he loses the sense of his own personality, and becomes a mere passive Instrument of the Deity, being as it were the *Eye* or *Mouth of God*; what in this case he speaks is to be understood of God, and not of himself.

Thus I have, I hope, satisfied the difficulties concerning all the *Historical* passages of this Third Book, that are still remaining in it. For I must confess that I have expunged some, that seemed not accurately agreeable with those laws I set my self, upon my closer view. Not that I know any thing of them whereby I can discover them to be false, but because wanting that conformity, they must be acknowledged by me not so convincingly true.

C H A P. XIII.

1. That the Transformation of an humane body into another shape may be done without pain.
2. That there may be an actual separation of Soul and Body without Death properly so called.
3. That the Bodies of Spirits may be hot, or cold, or warm, and the manner how they become so.
4. In what sense we may acknowledge a First in an infinite succession of generations.
5. That the story of Tree-Geese in Gerard is certainly true.
6. That God must be a Spirit properly so called.
7. That Spirits ordinarily so called are not Fire nor Air, but Essences properly Spiritual, demonstrated from the solute Arenosity (as I may so speak) of Air and Fire.
8. That this soluteness makes those Aereal Compages incapable of Personality, spontaneous Motion, and Sensation:
9. As also of transfiguring their vehicle into those compleat shapes of Animals they appear in;
10. And of holding it together in winds and storms;
11. And lastly, of transporting Men and Cattle in the Air.
12. That if Spirits or Dæmons be nothing but mere complements of Aiery or Fiery Atoms, every Devil is many Millions of Devils.
13. The preeminence of Arguments fetch'd from the History of Spirits above those from the Operations of the Soul in the Body for the proving of a Substance Immaterial.

1. **T**HE first Philosophical Objection is against the Transformation of an humane body into the shape, suppose, of a *Wolf* or any such like creature: For it is conceived that it cannot be done without a great deal of pain to the transformed. To which I answer,
That

That though this *Transformation* be made in a very short time, yet it may be performed without any *pain* at all. For *that part in the Head*, which is the seat of *Common Sense*, I conceive is very small (supppose it to be the *Conarion*, it is not very big :) Wherefore the Devil getting into the Body of a Man, and possessing *that part* with the rest, can intercept and keep off all the transmissions of motion from other parts of the Body, that, let him do what he will with them, the Party shall feel no *pain* at all; so that he may *soften* all the parts of the Body besides into what consistency he please, and work it into any form he can his own Vehicle of Air, and the Party not be sensible thereof all the time. And there is the same reason of reducing the Body into its own shape again, which is as *painless* to the Party that suffers it. Nor is there any fear that the Body once loosned thus, will ever after be in this loose melting condition; for it is acknowledged even by them that oppose *Bodinus*, whose cause I undertake, that a *Spirit* can as well *stop* and *fix* a Body as *move* it. Wherefore I say, when the Devil has *fixed* again the Body in its pristine shape, it will, according to the undeniable laws of Nature, remain in that state he left it, till something more powerful disettle and change it: And every Body is overpowered at last, and we must all yield to death.

2. The second Objection is against our acknowledging an *actual separation* of Soul and Body without death, death being properly, as we define it, a disjunction of the Soul from the Body by reason of the *Bodies unfitness* any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of diseases, by outward violence or old age. Now, say they, What is *violence*, if this be not, for the Devil to take the Soul out of the Body? But the Answer is easie, That any separation by violence is not *death*, but such a violence in separation as makes the Body *unfit* to entertain the Soul again; as it is in letting the Blood run out by wounding the Body, and in hindring the course of the spirits by strangling it, or drowning it, or the like. For to revive such a Body as this would be a miracle indeed, in such cases as these, *death* having seized upon the Body in a true and proper sense; and then none but God himself can thus kill and make alive.

3. The third Objection is against the notable *coldness* of the Bodies of Devils. For at the great trial of Witches at St. *Edmonds-Bury* Assizes in *August* 1645. I heard some of them openly confess at the Bar, says the Objector, that when the Devil lay with them, he was *warm*. To which I might answer, if I had a mind rather to shuffle than precisely to satisfy the exceptions made against what we have wrote, that it may be some warm young Man had got into the place of the cold Devil: for who knows what juggles there might be in these things?

But to answer more home to the purpose, I confess that the *Bodies of Devils* may be not only *warm*, but findgingly *hot*, as it was in him that took one of *Melancthon's* relations by the hand, and so *scorcht* her, that she bare the mark of it to her dying day.

But

But the examples of *cold* are more frequent, as in that famous story of * *Cuntius*, when he toucht the arm of a certain woman of *Pentseh* ^{* Antidote, Book 3. ch. 9. sect. 8.} as she lay in her bed, he felt as *cold* as ice; and so did the Spirits claw to * *Anne Styles*: and many other stories there are of that nature. But I will not deny but their bodies may be also *warm*, else it is not intelligible how those two execrable *Magi* should reap such unexpressible pleasure, the one from his *Armellina*, the other from his *Florina*, as they profess themselves to have done, in a certain Dialogue of *Franciscus Picus* his, which he has entituled *Strix*, or *De Ludificatione Demonum*; and assures us in his Epistle before it, that it is a true history, and that he sets down but such things as he has either seen with his Eyes, or else heard from the confession of Witches themselves.

The force therefore of the Objection is levelled against what we do not assert, that the Bodies of Devils are found *only cold*: But what we would intimate is only this, that their *Bodies* being nothing but *coagulated* or constringed *Air*, when they put them in such a posture as to constringe their vehicles in a greater measure by far then agitate the single particles of it, that it will then seem not only *cold* as congealed water does, but more piercingly and stingingly cold, by reason of the subtilty of the parts.

But when they not only strongly *constringe* their vehicle in the whole, but also fiercely *agitate* the single particles thereof, their Body will become findgingly *hot*, and imitate in some measure heated brass or iron, wherein the particles keep close together, and yet every one is smartly moved in it self. As is plain to us if we spit upon those metals so heated; for they will make the spittle hizzle and bubble, the particles of the metals communicating their motion to the spittle that lies upon them; and will turn all liquor into vapours, as we ordinarily see in the burning of Vinegar and Rose-water in a chamber to perfume the room. For what is this perfuming but the setting of the Aqueous separable parts of the liquor on motion so strongly, as to the mounting of them into the Air and dispersing of them into fume, by the fierce and strong agitation of the inseparable parts of the heated fire-shovel?

But lastly, If a Spirit use his *Agitative* power moderately and his *Constrictive* forcibly enough to feel solid or palpable to that Man or Woman he has to deal withal, he may not only feel warm, but more pleasantly and gratefully warm than any earthly or fleshly body that is; for the subtilty of the *Matter* will more punctually hit, and more powerfully reach the Organs of Sense, and more exquisitely and enravishingly move the Nerves, than any terrestrial Body can possibly. But in the mean time the *Spirit* himself is neither hot, nor warm, nor cold, nor any thing else that belongs to a Body, but a Substance specifically distinct from all corporeal Matter whatsoever, as I have * already intimated in the place we now defend. ^{* Antidote, Book 3. chap. 12. sect. 2, 3, 4.}

4. The fourth Objection is against our asserting, That it is an incongruous and self-contradicting position to hold, † That there never was any Man but was born of a Woman, though we should admit the *successions* of Mankind infinite. For, say they, the contradiction ^{† See Antidote, Book 3. ch. 15. sect. 5.}

dition is only if you can find out a *First*: But in *infinite succession* there can be no *First* in any sense at all; for if a *First*, then a *Second*, and so on to our own times, and thus the *Series* would be numerable, and consequently finite; which is a contradiction, for then the *succession* would be both *finite* and *infinite*.

But I answer, First, that I can demonstrate, That there is a *First* in *infinite succession* out of such principles as the *Atheist* does or is necessarily to grant, and that is, that *Matter* is *ab Aeterno*, and that some part thereof at least moved *ab Aeterno*. Now it is plain that this *Matter* that moved *ab Aeterno* either moved of it self, or was moved by another. If the latter, then we have a *First* in an *infinite succession* of motions: for that which moved this *Matter* moved *ab Aeterno*, is first in order of causality, as is undeniably plain to any one that understands Sense.

But you'll say that this *Matter* that moved *ab Aeterno* was moved of it self. Be it so, yet no part of it can move in this full Ocean of *Matter* that is excluded out of no space, but it must hit some other part of *Matter* so soon as it moves, and that another, and so on. And thus there might be a *Succession* of *Motions ab Aeterno* or *infinite*, and yet a *first* in order of causality. For that primordial Motion of the *Matter* is plainly *first* and the cause of all the rest: And our Understanding can never be quiet till it has penetrated to some such *first* in the order of Causes.

And then Secondly, to that subtile Argumentation that would prove that this *infinite Succession* would be both *finite* and *infinite*, I answer, That it is a mere Sophism from the ambiguity of the term *first*, which signifies either Priority of *Succession* or Priority of *Causality*. In the first Sense if we admit a *first*, the *succession* will be *finite* according to our own Faculties, for we cannot but run beyond, we finding the *succession* bounded in that *first*. But in the other Sense, *first* sets no bounds to *Succession*, but leaves it free and infinite.

Or we may answer thus, That beginning from this moment and going on to the *first* primordial Motion, and calling this present moment *first*, and the next before it the *second*, that it will amount to a number truly *infinite*, and that our Understanding can never go through it: But, though God's Understanding can, that it does not follow that the number is therefore *finite*; for an *infinite mind* may well comprehend an *infinite number*. But for us, whose capacities are *finite*, if we would venture to name a *first* in *infinite succession*, we should call it *πρῶτον ἀπείροσδον*, the *first infinitesimal*, and acknowledge our selves unable to go through, our Understandings being finite.

5. The fifth and last Objection is against that Story out of Gerard of the *Tree-geese* in the Island of the *Pile of Foulders*. For it is objected by one that inquired of some that lived near the place, that it was not confirmed to him, but that they told him only that at the time of the year it was a notable place for Birds-nests, and that one can scarce walk in the Island but he will tread on a nest of Eggs. But to this may be answered, either that those parties that were consulted were Men that looked not after such curiosities as these; or that the rotten pieces of ships or trunks of Trees that were washed up

up thither by the Sea, have been a long time ago washed away again, and so the examples of this rarity being not freshly renewed, that the memory of it may be lost with many of those Parts: For it is nigh threescore years since *Gerard* wrote, but while he was living, he offered to make his narration good by sufficient witnesses; and he professes he declares but what his eyes had seen, and his hands had touched.

And he also adds a Story of another sort of *Tree-geese*, which he gathered in their shells from an old rotten tree upon the shore of our *English* Coast betwixt *Dover* and *Rumney*: He brought a many of them with him to *London*, and opening the shells, which were something like *Muscles*, he found these Birds in several degrees of maturation; in some shapeless lumps only, in others the form of Birds, but bare, in others the same form and shape, and with down also upon them, their shells gaping, and they ready to fall out.

I might add a third kind describ'd to me by a Gentleman out of *Ireland*, which he has often observed upon those Coasts; but it is not material to insist upon the description thereof. All that I aim at is this, That this truth of *Birds being bred of putrefaction* is very certain, of which I am so well assured by this Gentleman's information, as well as that narration of *Gerard*, that I must confess for my own part I cannot doubt of it at all. And it might countenance my credulity, if I could be here justly suspected of that fault, that the Objector himself upon further enquiry is at length fully satisfied concerning the same truth.

6. We have now answered all the Objections, as well *Philosophical* as *Historical*, made against those particular passages in my Third Book. There remains only one of a more universal nature, and indeed of such importance, that if I do not satisfy it, it does utterly subvert the main design of our whole Third Book against *Atheism*, wherein we would fetch off men to an easier belief of a God, from the History of *Spirits*. For admitting all those Stories be true, yet, say they, it does not at all follow that there are *Spirits* in that sense that I define *Spirits*, and in such a notion as is understood in my explication of the *Idea* of God, viz. *That there should be an immaterial or Incorporeal Substance that can penetrate and actuate the Matter*; for they themselves are but a *thinner* kind of *Body*, such as *Fire* or *Air*, or some such like subtle Element, and not *pure Spirits*, according to our Definition thereof.

If this were true, I must confess that our last Book against *Atheism* is of no efficacy at all, and can do nothing towards the end it was intended for. For if there be a *God*, of necessity he must be a *Spirit properly so called*; otherwise he cannot be *Infinite*. Nor can he be this *Universal Matter* in the world, though we suppose it *boundless*; because he could not then be *perfect*. But he must be an *Essence* of which this *Matter* depends, and in which he is, penetrating and possessing all things. Which any one will easily believe, if he were assured that there are particular *Spirits* that penetrate and actuate this or that part of the *Matter*, which I contend that those Stories which I have related do evidently evince.

7. For I appeal to any one that knows what *Fire* and *Air* is, whether they be not as truly a mere aggregation of loosen'd particles of the *Matter* as an *heap of sand*; only they are so little, that they are invisible and insensible in their distinct particularities, but as truly *disjoin'd Atoms* (if we may so call what is still divisible) as the *grains of sand* we speak of.

8. Now this being supposed, which nothing but Ignorance can deny, we shall plainly discover that such things are done by *Spirits*, as we usually call them, as are altogether incompatible to any *compages* of these *small grains* or *Atoms* of *Matter*, of which *Air* and *Fire* do consist. For first, Either all these *Grains* or *Atoms* have *Sense*, *Imagination*, and *Understanding* in them, or but some few, or but one only. If all, or some few, it is plain that they are so many distinct intelligent Beings, and a distinct intelligent Being is a *Person*; so that this one person is many persons; which is plainly contradictory, at least foolishly ridiculous. But if the residence of *Sense*, *Imagination*, and *Understanding* be plac'd in one, how is it possible that that one Atom should be able *spontaneously to move* all the rest? And the same reason would be if we should seat *Sense* and *Reason* in some few inward *Atoms*. For how could they bring away those behind them, or carry on those on the side of them, or drive them before them, so as that they would not divide and be left behind? And yet it is a shrewd presumption that the *Seat of Sense* is confined to some small compass in the *Vehicle of a Spirit*, it being so in the *Body of a Man*. For if it were not, but that every part of the *Vehicle* had *Sense* in it self, the external Object would seem in God knows how many places at once, and the Images of things would be either utterly confounded, or the *Atoms*, when they put themselves upon their march, would mistake their mark, and following directly their sense, would of necessity break one from another, and destroy the whole.

9. Again it is manifest that that which has the power of *Sensation* in a *Spirit*, has also the power of *Memory*, else they could not remember the Objects of sense, if it were not one and the same thing in them that had both *Sense* and *Memory*: and that which remembers, does also *imagine*; and that which *imagines*, by the power of imagination *transforms* the *Vehicle* into various shapes and figures, and holds it there in that shape so long as it thinks good.

Now I demand, how can this possibly be done by either one or a few Particles or Atoms residing in any part of the *Vehicle*? How can they either hold together the other, or lay hold upon them, to restrain them and constringe them into this or that form, suppose of a *Dog*, *Colt*, or *Man*? But to say that *Imagination* is in every part of the *Vehicle*, and to admit those particles to *imagine* that have not so much as *Sense*, (as the far greater part seem not to have from what even now was intimated) is altogether unreasonable.

10. Thirdly, That which *Lucretius* alledges against the *Immortality* of the Soul, supposing it such a congeries of little *Atoms* as here *Spirits* are supposed, is as strong an Argument against the Existence of such kind of *Spirits*. For they would be blown out like a candle, and

or *torn* in pieces with the winds, and be *dissipated* like smoke or clouds.

11. Fourthly and lastly, The Transportation of Cattel, and of Witches themselves to their Nocturnal Conventicles through the Air, if *Spirits* or *Devils* be but a *mere congestion of subtil Atoms Aiery or Fiery*, without an inward *Immaterial* Principle that has a power to hold fast the particles together, is a thing altogether impossible. For it is evident that the weight of a *Man* or *Beast* will sink through the *Air*, and never rest till they reach the *Earth*; and so they would do thro' the Vehicle of a *Spirit*, that is as subtile, fluid, and yielding as the *Air* it self is, were there not an internal essence and principle that was able to constringe and hold together this fluid body or vehicle of the *Spirit*, and so make it to sustain the weight. For all Bodies hard or fluid are equally impenetrable; and therefore if any power should hold the Air together so as to restrain it near within one compass or space, and yet not change the usual consistency of it, it would be as wind in a bladder; and a man might lie upon it as safely as upon a soft bed, and never fear sinking through.

But in this *loose composure of Atoms* which they say is all that is in a *Spirit*, (though we should admit of that ridiculous supposition, that every *Atom* can *imagine* and apply it self to one joint design of holding all close together) yet it is hard to conceive, that this actual division of the whole into so many subtile, exile, invisible particles does not so enfeeble the spontaneous offers toward the sustaining and carrying away of the burden, that their endeavours would ever prove fruitaneous.

12. But I need not insist upon that which, it may be, may seem a point something more lubricous, whenas we have what is more palpably incongruous presenting it self to our view. For this *compilement of Aiery or Fiery particles* being the only substance acknowledged in a *Spirit*, every *Atom* having *Imagination* and *Reason* in it to apply it self to one joint design, they must be, as I have intimated heretofore, as properly so many *distinct persons* as the *grains of sand* are so many distinct individuals of Matter, and therefore every one Devil is indeed 5000 millions of Devils and more; a thing that a man would little dream of, or admit to be any more than a dream, if he thinks of it waking. But if such things as these will not be acknowledged as absurd, but shamelessly admitted, and swallowed down for true; I must confess there is no Demonstration against impudence and pertinacity, and that I am not able to prove to such, that either Brutes have Life, or that the moats that play in the beams of the Sun are devoid of *Sense* and *Reason*.

13. The substance of these Arguments, as the Reader may remember, I have made use of elsewhere for the proving of an *Incorporeal Principle* residing and acting in the *Body* of man; but the frame and management of them in this place is not a little different, and their force far more conspicuous and apparent, the fixt consistency and Mechanical fabrick of an humane Body being able to perform many things that the fluid and unorganiz'd Vehicle of *Fire* and *Air* cannot

possibly do, unless we admit an *immaterial* essence to be in it, and so throughly to possess it all over, as to have the power to constringe it, and transform it into those various shapes it does appear in. And therefore though our Argumentations for an *Immaterial Soul* in the *Body* of man be solid and irrefutable; yet because the truth is more palpably and undeniably demonstrable in the Fiery or A fiery *Vehicles* of what we ordinarily call *Spirits*, I conceive that our Third Book against *Atheism* is very convenient, if not necessary, not at all needless nor unprofitable.

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ON THE

APPENDIX

TO THE

Antidote against Atheism.

ON CHAP. III. Sect. 2. pag. 186. l. 1.

THEREFORE we have defined a Spirit, (I mean chiefly a created one) &c. In this place we do not so much defend the notion of a Spirit in general, as of a Spirit created, as well because the incredulity about the existence of created Spirits is the chief occasion that some do not believe there is any Spirit at all; as because there can be no difficulty in general in the notion of a Spirit, which difficulty does not occur in the defence of the notion of a created Spirit, because it solves those difficulties which properly respect a Spirit in general, as well as those which respect the species, according as it shall appear to any one that shall run over all Solutions.

Ibid. pag. 186. l. 21. Suppose a point of Light, from which rays out a luminous Orb, &c. I would not therefore be so understood to say this, as if I thought the very Essence of the Soul and its Indivisibility consisted of these reasons; but only to make way for a more easy conception in general, that extension may consist with Indivisibility. Which we shall more largely discuss in the Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul.

Ibid. Sect. 3. pag. 187. l. 22. Whether any Emanation may be properly called Creation, &c. For there can be no Creation properly so called, but where the Creator and the Creature really differ in themselves, so that the first may be without the latter. Whence it is plain, that neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost are Creatures.

Ibid. Sect. 4. pag. 187. l. 34. Be either for a Time hinder'd, &c. As it is in the real ablations of Witches and Magicians, when they happen. Of which see more in our Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul.

Ibid. Sect. 5. pag. 187. l. 36. That there will be as many Wills and Understandings as Parts, &c. See the Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul,

Soul, lib. 2. cap. 11. sect. 10. and lib. 3. cap. 2. sect. 3, 4. and this Appendix, cap. 10. sect. 9, 10.

Ibid. sect. 6. pag. 188. l. 25. *That we see our Image behind the Looking-glass, &c.* This always seems to me a difficult question, nor has Cartes himself satisfied me in this thing. But having said so much concerning this difficulty in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, and the *Scholia* thereof, it would be superfluous to add any more in this place.

Ibid. Sect. 7. pag. 188. l. 42. *That upon Matter exactly plain, &c.* See *Enchirid. Metaphys.* cap. 28. sect. 18. and the Treatise of the *Immortality of the Soul*, lib. 1. cap. 7. sect. 5.

Ibid. sect 8. pag. 189. l. 24. *To fill the Receptivity or Capacity of a Body or Matter so far forth as it is, &c.* But this Impletion of the Capacity may be gradual. Nor does any one Spirit so fill a Body, that it can exclude all other Spirits. For God and the Spirit of Nature pass through the universal Matter of the world, except the Souls of all animate bodies, which pervade or overspread their own bodies. But that a Body should admit any other particular Souls to possess it, except in the case of Magicians and Dæmoniacks, seems to me not very probable.

Ibid. pag. 189. l. 30. *That it will so perfectly fill the Receptivity of Matter, &c.* Namely *vital Receptivity*, so far as it cleaves so close to any one Soul in so strict a conjunction, that no other Soul can be join'd with it, so as to constitute one *compositum* or *suppositum*; or that we can, in the voluntary exertion of this *Hylopathy*, suppose it at any time to arrive to that degree, that it should be very difficult for any Spirit to thrust it self into the same matter which another Spirit by so full a *Hylopathy* had possessed. But the reason why I define this *Hylopathy* as an emanation from the center of life, is with respect to the description of a Spirit (sect. 2.) emitting its rays into the Orb by the *lucidum punctum*. Of which I have spoken more at large in the Treatise of the *Immortality of the Soul*. In the mean while I think the use of this faculty in Spirits ought not to be despis'd, that a heap of Souls in generation cannot be crowded into one body, nor that separate Spirits can penetrate and possess each others vehicles. But whether in mere Spirits themselves any arbitrary impenetrability cannot be a part of this *Hylopathetick* faculty, I leave others to discuss.

Ibid. sect. 10. pag. 190 l. 24. *But who but a Fool will say, that the Matter is wise, &c.* And yet every one that denies spiritual substance is of this mind. For there are infinite Phænomenons in the world, which seem to be the plain effects of Counsel and Wisdom. And all Philosophy is the fruit of Matter alone, if there be no Spirit. But how small a share of reason instructs us why we attribute perception and wisdom to Matter, we have sufficiently shewn in our *Scholia* on the *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, where *Glisson's Hypothesis* is examined.

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ON CHAP. V. Sect. 4. pag. 139. l. 38.

FOR *Misery rack'd up to the highest, &c.* Besides, since this misery or intolerable pain can be in no subject, (as I have already hinted) but where the Spirit is compounded with the Body; according to that of *Galen*, as I remember, in *Macrobius*, *Εἰ ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐκ ἀνῆλθεν, ἀλγεῖ ὃ ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἐν ὅτιν.* That is, If a man be one, (*scil.* single) he cannot be sensible of pain, for he cannot feel pain being single) and since pain cannot otherwise proceed than from an incommodious or adverse motion of particles, or at least not without it, and that that motion cannot be eternal, as being successive; hence also it is manifest that nothing can be perfectly and absolutely miserable, that is, infinitely; for infinite duration cannot be competent to it *a parte ante*: nor is it therefore unreasonable that necessary existence does so exist, but the contrary.

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ON CHAP. VI. Sect. 7. pag. 199. l. 7.

AND *which Geometry her self cannot prove; to wit,* That our Faculties are true. But if any one shall here presume to think that Mathematical notions, and the like, are certain, and cannot be otherwise, let him enjoy his thought for me; but at the same time let him consider, that this very *Persentiscency* is one of our faculties. And if he further presumes this *Persentiscency* to be true and certain, the second *Persentiscency* must be incontrovertible; which therefore we must suppose to be true and certain, and so *in infinitum*: Though nothing but the Divine Mind, which is the original Prototype of Truth, and that essential and uncreate, can be absolutely and simply certain; but this internal *Persentiscency* may in some measure, though at a great distance, imitate that Divine and Uncreate Certitude, yet so that unless we force the Faculties, the *Cartesians* may plainly be thought to doat, and among the rest *Spinozius* and *Poirett*, who will have all Truths, even common Mathematical notions, as that the *Whole is greater than its part*, &c. not to depend on the Divine Mind, but on the Will; so that if God would, that would be equally true, that the *Part is greater than the Whole*, &c. But such Figments as these are ridiculous and impossible, if we will stand by the dictates of our own Faculties.

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On CHAP. VII. Sect. 1. pag. 199. l. 44.

BOTH justly and necessarily cast this ruder notion of Space upon that Infinite and Eternal Spirit, which is God. How agreeable this is, I have at large demonstrated in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, cap. 6, 7, 8. to which I refer the Reader.

Ibid. sect. 3. pag. 200. l. 18. *But only of the large and immense capacity of the potentiality of the Matter, &c.* That this Reply is not so solid as it ought to be, I have sufficiently shewn in the foresaid Treatise, cap. 7. sect. 12, 13, 14.

Ibid. Sect. 4. pag. 200. l. 32. *That Distance is no real or Physical property of a thing, but only notional, &c.* But here may truly be oppos'd what I have offer'd in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, That although Notional Distance be only a propriety, so far as the relation of distant things is mutual; yet the real Ens, as lying between or being mix'd with Extension, is the foundation which causes the distance. See *Enchirid. Metaphys.* cap. 8. Sect. 5.

Ibid. Sect. 5. pag. 200. l. 45. *That Distance is nothing else but the privation of actual Union, &c.* This distance indeed may be so far as it is the mutual relation of distant things, that is, a mutual want or privation of Unity with one another, which may be greater or less, according to the greater or less Space by which they are separated. But this doth in no wise prove that Space is not a real something, or may be not real, no more than a Peach cannot be real, to the measure of which there is the distance of two Walls.

Ibid. Sect. 7. pag. 201. l. 16. *That Contingency is not incompatible to God or any thing else, &c.* Namely, that they should exist of themselves contingently, or so exist of themselves, that they might not exist. Which thing how absurd it is, I have already shewn. For whatsoever is said to exist of it self, either hath in it self or in its own nature a sufficient reason why it doth exist, or it hath not in it self a sufficient reason why it doth exist. If it hath not, it is impossible it should ever exist, if we lay aside all prejudice, and consult the proper Faculties of the Soul; if it hath, (*scil.* sufficient Reason, &c.) it can never not exist, and therefore it exists necessarily, and not contingently. But there is nothing besides God alone, that hath sufficient reason it self why it should so exist.

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On CHAP. IX. Sect. 2. pag. 204. l. 21.

BREAK the Matter as you will, it will be in some shape or other. And certainly with whatever gross Idolatries and Superstitions the Religion of the Heathens in all parts of the world may be defil'd and mask'd over, yet the knowledge of an One True God is no where
so

so absurd and extinct, but that there are some footsteps of it remaining in the minds of men in every Country, as we may see in the most elaborate of those two most learned Men Dr. R. Cudworth, and Dr. E. Stillingfleet, to which I would advise the Reader to recur, if he doubts any thing in this.

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On CHAP. X. Sect. 10. pag. 205. l. 3.

BUT I suspect more wittily than solidly, &c. For though there be two Eyes, that these two Representations of the Object should represent it in the same place, the Object will necessarily appear but one, it being brought to its perception in the very same circumstances in which it is represented in the Eyes, by the vital power of the Soul, not by any Mechanick reason.

Ibid. sect. 7. pag. 207. l. 48. *May be of that Nature, as to be vitally affected only in a terrestrial Body, &c.* So truly it may be. And in this state of the Souls of Brutes a greater absurdity could not be, than that they should be like so many strings of a Lute, silent for the present, whilst others are struck, and do sound; yet by and by being touch'd in their turns do sound. But whether all Airy Regions are destitute of all sorts of Animals, except rational ones, I leave to be discuss'd by those that are more at leisure.

Ibid. sect. 9. pag. 209. l. 4. *For that Sphere or Orb of Light, &c.* I have made use of this Symbol for Illustration sake of the possibility of indivisible extension; but we philosophize more strictly and accurately in our *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, where in proper philosophical Terms we describe a Spirit, and shew it to be an *Ens unum per se*, and not *per aliud*, with other things of that nature, which we have no occasion to repeat here. See *Enchirid. Metaphys.* cap. 2. sect. 11. & cap. 28. sect. 3.

Ibid. sect. 10. pag. 209. l. 9. *Now a little to invert the property of this luminous Orb, &c.* For no corporeal Being can fully and perfectly represent the nature of the Soul, which is life it self, and acts according to certain vital, not Mechanical Laws, as in the diffusion of Light. Therefore by vertue of the perfect union, and consent of the Soul, it happens in life, that that, which suffers the exterior parts of the Soul in the Organs of the body, can in the same circumstances penetrate to its Perception.

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On CHAP. XI. Sect. 4. pag. 211. l. 36.

THE Colours themselves of the Rainbow, be necessary results of the mere Matter, &c. How very easily these things are understood, I have abundantly shewn in my *Enchiridion Metaphys.* See Chap. 21.

Ibid.

Ibid. pag. 212. l. 12. *If he does not think so much upon the Trunks and Branches of Trees, &c.* Nay with how great Artifice are the Bodies and Boughs of Trees and Plants formed, the Philosophers of this Age have very laudibly shewn. *Theophrastus* truly of old, and others have reckon'd the parts of Plants, viz. The Root, the Stalk, the Twig, the Bough, all which, they tell us, consist of these three, the Bark, the Matrix, (which is called the Heart and Pith) and the Wood; and these again from the moisture, the fibre, the vein, and the body. Moreover they reckon the heat and moisture of Plants as analagous to the innate heat and moisture of Animals; but whether with so certain and distinct a notion as the modern Philosophers, I will not affirm, who have not only observ'd the succiferous but also airiferous vessels of Plants, assigning to these the heat, to those the moisture of Plants; not to mention other organick formations with their uses. But whether the veins and the fibres of *Theophrastus* can be the vehicles of moisture and heat, let others determine, for it does appear plain enough to me. See *Theophrastus de Plantis*, cap. 1. and that ingenious Phylologist *N. Grew*, in *Truncorum Anatomia comparativa*.

Ibid. pag. 212. l. 17. *as in Monk's-hood*; This we call so in *Latin* from the *English* word *Monk's-hood*. But there is a sort of *Wolf-bane*, which is somewhat like *Monk's-hood* or *Soldier's-cap*.

Ibid. l. 18. *Snap-dragon*. Again this description is taken from the *English* word *Snap-dragon*, called by the Herbalists *Antirrhinon*.

Ibid. *The Butterfly-Satyrion*, and the *Gnat-Satyrion*. Which by the Greek Herbalist are called *Satyrion Psychodes*, and, if I mistake not, *Satyrion Conopodes*. But our business was to observe the *Latin* Version, not the Greek; for otherwise the *Orchis Vespiformis*, and the *Orchis* which bears the shape of a Bee, must be called *Orchis Psygodes* and *Orchis Melittias*, as the Herbalists use.

Ibid. l. 19. *and the like*. As *Orchis Arachnitis*, *Batrachitis*, *Ornitrophora*, besides the divers sorts before-mentioned.

Ibid. sect. 6. pag. 214. l. 8. *In my Enquiry into the Causes and Occasions of Atheism, &c.* I must confess I drew the first Lineaments of this sort of Treatise, part of which is in the *Mystery of Godliness*, part in the *Divine Dialogues*, the rest of it I committed to the Flames.

Ibid. sect. 8. pag. 215. l. 33. *In the feculency of Urine that sinks to the bottom of the Glass, &c.* But that these neither can be without the help of the *Spirit of Nature*, I have at large shew'd in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, and the *Annotations*, besides other places.

Ibid. pag. 216. l. 1. *And thus our Adversaries will gain nothing by this supposal*. And so it certainly is, if it be at all. But now since it is so clearly manifest, that even the most simple Phenomenons of Nature are not produc'd by Mechanick reason, but by virtue of the *Spirit of Nature*, as I have sufficiently demonstrated in the aforesaid Treatises, it is down-right incredible, that the disposition of the Parts of Matter in the Formation of the Fœtus can be by Mechanick motion, and not by the *Plastick* power rather of a particular *Archæus*, or of the *Archæus* of the Universe, or of both; since in the *Ru-*
diments

diments of Animals of this sort, all things are so tender and loose, that they seem to stand in need of some immaterial Director and Co-unitor. See the Treatise of the *Immortality of the Soul*, lib. 3. cap. 12, & 13.

Ibid. sect. 9. pag. 216. l. 21. *But several distinct Archei, &c.* That is, distinct Souls endued with a *Plastick* vertue. For I do not believe there are any *Archeus's* distinct from the *Archeus* of the Universe, besides particular Souls. Which may be more properly called Souls than *Archeus's*, which have a *Plastick* as well as *Perceptive* faculty.

Ibid. pag. 216. l. 34. *Whether these Archei be so many sprigs of the common Soul of the World, &c.* That does in no wise seem probable to me; let others see how they can defend it, and extricate themselves out of those difficulties which I propose in the *Immortality of the Soul*, lib. 3. cap. 16.

Ibid. pag. 217. l. 8. *That which in succession of time may again have opportunity to act its part, &c.* Just as if a Musician should desire to have all those strings cut off from his Lute, which in the present Songhe has no occasion for, but which if he did not touch would make no noise, and to have new ones put on for every new Song. See what is said in chap. 10. sect. 7.

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On CHAP. XII. Sect. 3. pag. 218. l. 24.

DISTORT all their Actions to a contrary mode, &c. And thus these Demons are egregious instances of the fallen state of *Jetzar*. Of which sort there are many of such distorted and derisive dispositions, that they had rather elude the most solid reasons by their perverse and far-fetch'd Cavils and Sophisms, and value themselves upon their quibbling Scepticisms, than soberly to endeavour to arrive at the salutary Light of Truth. See the *Mercavean* Explanation.

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On CHAP. XIII. Sect. 1. pag. 220. l. 16.

THAT a Spirit can as well stop and fix a Body as move it, &c. But we must consider besides, whether that fixation be lasting after the Spirit hath withdrawn himself. And if it doth last, whether it be not rather done by virtue of the *Plastick* Soul of the Witch or Magician, or by the power of the Spirit of Nature, or of both, (and that then only when the Transfiguration hath not corrupted the due Temper of the particles of the Body) than by the fixation alone of the Dæmon, who rather seems by temporaneous constriction to keep the parts together, than to join them by any permanent Symphyfy, which

which is the peculiar work either of a proper or universal Archæus.

Ibid. l. 17. *It will, according to the undeniable Laws of Nature, remain in the state he left it, &c.* And this truly would be so, if the Devil, by a true Symphyfy, could co-unite the parts; but if he only holds them together, it will necessarily follow, that when that holding together ceases, the parts of the body are no more coherent than a handful of sand, which upon opening the fist drops away. And so I believe it would be in this case, unless the proper *Archæus* and *Spirit of Nature* did their parts, and that the natural Temper of the Parts were not corrupted. From whence we may believe that there scarce can be a true transformation of the body, (for as for the airy vehicles there is another reason) unless there be no great inequality of Stature between a natural and artificial species.

Ibid. sect. 4. pag. 222. l. 20. *For that primordial Motion of the Matter is plainly first, &c.* This truly seems plain, if the succession of Motions of this sort were infinite, and that the Matter could, by an innate power, move it self. For in the order of Causality I doubt not but Motion was the first of all things. But that succession should be eternal, I have sufficiently shewn to be impossible in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*. So that there is no room for the Subterfuges of our Adversaries, but their Objections fail in every part.

Ibid. pag. 222. l. 30. *But in the other sense, first sets no bounds to succession, but leaves it free and infinite.* Namely, when the Primum only signifies Priority of Casualty. For unless this be, it would be impossible that the World should be from Eternity, or that it existed of God, or of it self. But we need not be so curious in this matter now, since I have so plainly demonstrated in my *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, that no successive duration can be from eternity. Which Demonstrations if the Atheist denies, yet what we have before us are such as he can never extricate himself out of. Not to say any thing of spontaneous Generations, or of Putrefaction, and Comets turn'd into Planets, which are inhabited by certain Animals, to which opinion our modern Philosophers are inclin'd.

Ibid. sect. 12. pag. 225. l. 27. *Which, it may be, may seem a point more lubricous, &c.* From thence because the winds are sometimes seen to lift up very great burdens. But whether they are not mov'd and enforc'd by the Spirit of Nature, is a Dispute worthy a Philosophical Wit.

Ibid. sect. 13. pag. 226. l. 7. *I conceive that our third Book against Atheism is very convenient, if not, &c.* And hence it is plain of what excellent use a *Pneumatological History* would be, if it were well perform'd, and that no Examples were inserted, but such as were well attested. In the mean time, I hope these few, which I have introduced, will sufficiently answer the pretent purpose.

T H E C O N T E N T S O F T H E Antidote against Atheism.

The PREFACE.

1. **T**H E Author's Apologie for writing this Treatise, there being so many already on the same Subject. fol. 1
2. That what he has wrote, are the proper Emanations of his own Mind, and may have their peculiar serviceableness for men of the like Genius. *ibid.*
3. That he affects not Rhetorick, nor Philology, nor the pompous numerosity of more popular Arguments, but solid and unresistible Reason, in a perspicuous Method. 2
4. That he has undeniably demonstrated the Existence of God, this one Postulate being but admitted, That our Faculties are true. 3
5. His peculiar Management of the first Argument of Des-Cartes. *ibid.*
6. And the Reasons of his Rejection of the rest. 4
7. His caution and choiceness in the managing such Arguments as are fetch'd from the more general Phænomena of Nature. 5
8. As also in those from Animals. 5
9. His careful choice in such Histories as tend to the proving of Spirits. 6
10. His assuredness of that kind of Argument. *ibid.*
11. The reason of his declining the recital of the miraculous Stories of Holy Writ. *ibid.*
12. His studied Condescension and Compliance with the Atheist, to win him from his Atheism. 7

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- Chap. I. 1. **T**H A T the Proneness of these Ages of the World to wind themselves from under the awe of Superstition, makes the attempt seasonable of endeavouring to steer them off from Atheism. 2. That they, that adhere to Religion in a mere superstitious and accustomary way, if that eye once fail, easily turn Atheists. 3. The usefulness of this present Treatise even to them that are seriously Religious. f. 9
- Chap. II. 1. That there is nothing so demonstrable, that the Mind of man can rationally conclude, that it is impossible to be otherwise. 2. That the Soul of man may give full Assent to that, which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise, made good by several Examples. 3. A like Example of Dissent. 4. The Reasons why he has so sedulously made good this point. 5. That the Atheist has no advantage from the Author's free confession, that his Arguments are not so convictive, but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise. 10
- Chap. III. 1. That we are first to have a settled notion, What God is, before we go about to demonstrate, That he is. 2. The Definition of God. 3. That there is an Idea of a Being absolutely perfect in our Mind, whether the Atheist will allow it to be the Idea of God or not. 4. That it is no prejudice to the Naturality of this Idea, that it
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Enthusiasmus



Enthusiasmus Triumphatus;
O R, A
B R I E F D I S C O U R S E
O F T H E
Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure
O F
E N T H U S I A S M.

B Y
H E N R Y M O R E, D. D.
Fellow of Christ's-College in Cambridge.

Πολλοὶ μὲν παρ' ἐκκορύβει, πάντες δὲ τῇ Βάκχῃ.

L O N D O N,
Printed by Joseph Downing in Bartholomew-Close near
West-Smithfield, MDCCXII.

THE HISTORY OF THE

PROGRESS OF THE

ARTS AND MANUFACTURES

IN GREAT BRITAIN

BY HENRY MORE

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



Printed by J. G. & Co. in the Strand

By the Bookseller, in Pall Mall

A BRIEF DISCOURSE OF THE Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure

OF ENTHUSIASM.

SECTION I.

The great Affinity and Correspondency betwixt Enthusiasm and Atheism.



Theism and *Enthusiasm*, though they seem so extremely opposite one to another, yet in many things they do very nearly agree. For, to say nothing of their joint conspiracy against the true knowledge of God and Religion, they are commonly entertain'd, though successively, in the same Complexion. For that Temper that disposes a Man to listen to the Magisterial Dictates of an overbearing *Phancy* more than to the calm and cautious insinuations of free *Reason*, is a subject that by turns does very easily lodge and give harbour to these mischievous Guests.

For as *Dreams* are the *Fancies* of those that *sleep*, so *Fancies* are but the *Dreams* of Men *awake*. And these *Fancies* by day, as those *Dreams* by night, will vary and change with the weather and present temper of the Body: So those that have only a fiery *Enthusiastick* acknowledgment of God; change of diet, feculent old age, or some present damps of *Melancholy*, will as confidently represent to their *Fancy* that there is no God, as ever it was represented that there is one. And then having lost the use of their more noble Faculties of *Reason* and *Understanding*, they must, according to the course of Nature, be as bold *Atheists* now, as they were before confident *Enthusiasts*.

Nor do these two unruly Guests only serve themselves by turns on the same party, but also send mutual supplies one to another, being lodg'd in several Persons. For the *Atheist's* pretence to Wit and natural Reason (though the foulness of his Mind makes him stumble very dotingly in the use thereof) makes the *Enthusiast* secure that *Reason* is no guide to God: And the *Enthusiast's* boldly dictating the care-

less ravings of his own tumultuous *Fancy* for undeniable Principles of Divine Knowledge confirms the *Atheist* that the whole business of Religion and Notion of a God is nothing but a troublesome fit of over-curious *Melancholy*.

Wherefore there being that *near alliance and mutual correspondence* betwixt these two enormous distempers of the Mind, *Atheism* and *Enthusiasm*; I hold it very suitable and convenient, having treated of the former, to add this brief Discourse of the *Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure* of this latter Disease.

S E C T. II.

What Inspiration is, and what Enthusiasm.

THE Etymology and variety of the significations of this word *Enthusiasm* I leave to *Criticks* and *Grammarians*; but what we mean by it here, you shall fully understand after we have defined what *Inspiration* is: For *Enthusiasm* is nothing else but a misconceit of being *inspired*. Now to be *inspired* is, to be moved in an extraordinary manner by the power or Spirit of God to act, speak, or think what is holy, just and true. From hence it will be easily understood what *Enthusiasm* is, viz. *A full, but false persuasion in a Man that he is inspir'd.*

S E C T. III.

A search of the Causes of Enthusiasm in the Faculties of the Soul.

WE shall now enquire into the *Causes* of this Distemper, how it comes to pass that a Man should be thus befooled in his own conceit. And truly unless we should offer less satisfaction than the thing is capable of, we must not only treat here of *Melancholy*, but of the *Faculties of the Soul* of Man, whereby it may the better be understood how she may become obnoxious to such disturbances of *Melancholy*, in which she has quite lost her own Judgment and freedom, and can neither keep out nor distinguish betwixt her own Faculties and real Truths.

S E C T. IV.

The several Degrees and Natures of her Faculties.

WE are therefore to take notice of the several *Degrees and Natures* of the *Faculties of the Soul*, the lowest whereof she exercises without so much as any *Perception* of what she does; and these Operations are fatal

fatal and natural to her so long as she is in the *Body*; and a Man differs in them little from a *Plant*, which therefore you may call the *Vegetative* or *Plantal* Faculties of the Soul.

The *lowest* of those Faculties, of whose present operations we have any *Perception*, are the *Outward Senses*, which upon the pertingency of the Object to the Sensitive Organ cannot fail to act, that is, the Soul cannot fail to be affected thereby, nor is it in her power to suspend her *Perception*, or at least very hardly in her power.

From whence it is plain, that the Soul is of that nature, that she sometimes may awake fatally and necessarily into *Phantasmes* and *Perceptions*, without any will or consent of her own.

Which is found true also in *Imagination*, though that Faculty be freer than the former. For what are *Dreams* but the Imaginations and Perceptions of one asleep? which notwithstanding steal upon the Soul, or rise out of her without any consent of hers; as is most manifest in such as torment us, and put us to extream pain till we awake out of them.

And the like obreptions or unavoidable importunities of *Thoughts*, which offer or force themselves upon the *Mind*, may be observed even in the day-time, according to the nature or strength of the complexion of our Bodies; though how the Body doth engage the Mind in *Thoughts* or *Imaginations*, is most manifest in *Sleep*. For according as *Choler*, *Sanguine*, *Phlegm*, or *Melancholy* are predominant, will the Scene of our *Dreams* be, and that without any check or curb of dubitation concerning the truth and existence of the things that then appear.

Of which we can conceive no other reason than this, that the *Inmost seat of Sense* is very fully and vigorously affected, as it is by Objects in the day, of whose real existence the ordinary assurance is, that they so strongly strike or affect our *Sensitive* Faculty; which resides not in the external Organs, no more than the Artificer's skill in his instruments, but in some more inward *Recesses* of the Brain: And therefore the *true* and *real* seat of Sense being affected in our *sleep*, as well as when we are awake, 'tis the less marvel the Soul conceits her *dreams*, while she is a dreaming, to be no dreams, but real transactions.

S E C T. V.

Why Dreams, till we awake, seem real transactions.

NOW that the Inward sense is so vigorously affected in these *Dreams* proceeds, as I conceive, from hence; because the *Brains*, *Animal Spirits*, or whatever the Soul works upon within in her Imaginative operations, are not considerably moved, altered or agitated from any external motion, but keep intirely and fully that figuration or modification which the Soul *necessarily* and *naturally* moulds them into in our *sleep*: So that the opinion of the Truth of what is represented to us in our *Dreams* is from hence, that *Imagination* then (that is, the inward figuration of our *Brain* or *Spirits* into this or that representation) is far *stronger* than any motion or agitation from *without*, which to them that are awake

dimms and obscures their inward Imagination, as the light of the Sun doth the light of a Candle in a room; and yet in this case also according to *Aristotle* Fancy is *αἰσθησις ἡ ἀδύναμις*, a kind of sense, though weak.

But if it were so strong as to bear it self against all the occurrences and impulses of outward Objects, so as not to be broken, but to keep it self entire and in equal splendour and vigour with what is represented from without, and this not arbitrarily, but necessarily and unavoidably, as has been already intimated, the party thus affected would not fail to take his own Imagination for a real Object of Sense: As it fell out in one that *Cartesius* mentions, (and there are several other Examples of that kind) that had his arm cut off, who being hoodwinkt, complained of a pain in this and the other finger, when he had lost his whole arm.

And a further Instance may be in mad or melancholy Men, who have confidently affirmed that they have met with the Devil, or conversed with Angels, when it has been nothing but an encounter with their own fancy.

S E C T. VI.

The enormous strength of Imagination the Cause of Enthusiasm.

Wherefore it is the enormous strength of *Imagination* (which is yet the Soul's weakness, or unwieldiness, whereby she so far sinks into Phantasmes of *Reason* and *Understanding*) that thus peremptorily engages a Man to believe a lie.

And if it be so strong as to assure us of the presence of some external Object which yet is not there, why may it not be as effectual in the begetting of the belief of some more internal apprehensions, such as have been reported of mad and fanatical Men, who have so firmly and immutably fancied themselves to be *God the Father*, the *Messias*, the *Holy Ghost*, the *Angel Gabriel*, the *last and chiefest Prophet* that God would send into the World, and the like?

For their conceptions are not so pure or immaterial, nor solid or rational, but that these words to them are always accompanied with some strong Phantasm or full Imagination; the fulness and clearness whereof, as in the case immediately before named, does naturally bear down the Soul into a belief of the truth and existence of what she thus vigorously apprehends: And being so wholly and entirely immersed in this conceit, and so vehemently touched therewith, she has either not the patience to consider any thing alledged against it, or if she do consider and find her self intangled, she will look upon it as a piece of humane sophistry, and prefer her own infallibility or the infallibility of the Spirit before all carnal reasonings whatsoever; as those whose Fancies are fortified by long use and education in any absurd point of a false Religion, though wise enough in other things, will firmly hold the Conclusion, notwithstanding the clearest Demonstration to the contrary.

Now what *Custom* and *Education* do by degrees, distempered *Fancy* may do in a shorter time. But the case in both is much like that
in

in *Dreams*, where that which is represented is necessarily taken for true, because nothing stronger enervates the perception. For as the ligation of the outward Organs of Sense keeps off such fluctuations or undulations of motion from without as might break or obscure these representations in sleep; so prejudice and confidence in a conceit, when a Man is awake, keeps his fond imagination vigorous and entire from all the assaults of Reason that would cause any dubitation.

Nor is it any more wonder that his Intellectuals should be found in other things, though he be thus delirous in some one point, no more than that he that thinks he sees the devil in a wood, should not be at all mistaken in the circumstance of Place, but see the very same path, flowers and grafs that another in his wits sees there as well as himself.

To be short therefore, The Original of such peremptory delusions as mankind are obnoxious to, is the enormous strength and vigour of the *Imagination*; which Faculty though it be in some sort in our power, as *Respiration* is, yet it will also work without our leave, as I have already demonstrated: And hence Men become mad and fanatical whether they will or no.

S E C T. VII.

Sundry natural and corporeal Causes that necessarily work on the Imagination.

NOW what it is in us that thus captivates our *Imagination*, and carries it wide away out of the reach or hearing of that more free and superior Faculty of *Reason*, is hard particularly to define. But that there are sundry *material* things that do most certainly change our Mind or Fancy, experience doth sufficiently witness.

For our *Imagination* alters as our Blood and Spirits are altered, (as I have above intimated and instanced in our *Dreams*) and indeed very small things will alter them even when we are awake; the mere change of Weather and various tempers of the Air, a little reek or suffumigation, as in those seeds *Pomponius Mela* mentions, which the *Thracians*, who knew not the use of Wine, were wont at their feasts to cast into the fire, whereby they were intoxicated into as high a measure of mirth as they that drink more freely of the blood of the grape: The virtue of which is so great, that, as *Josephus* phrases it, it seems to create a new soul in him that drinks it, *μεταποιεῖ δὲ καὶ Judaic. lib. 11. cap. 4.* *μεταποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ὑποδύσθαι*, It transforms and regenerates the Soul into a new nature.

But it doth most certainly bring a new Scene of *Thoughts* very ordinarily into their Minds that have occasion to meddle with it. Which made the *Persians* undertake no weighty matter nor strike up a bargain of any great consequence, but they would consider of it first both well-nigh fuddled and sober. For if they liked it in all the representations that those two contrary tempers exhibited to their minds, they thought them-

felves

selves well assured that they might proceed safely and successfully therein.

And yet *Wine* doth not always so much change the Thoughts and alter our Temper as heighten it, insomuch that its effect proves sometime contrary only by reason of the diversity of Persons; some being weeping drunk, others laughing, some kind, others raging; as it happens also in those that are stung with the *Tarantula*, *Alii perpetuo rident, alii canunt, alii plorant, &c.* as † *Sennertus* observes out of *Matthiolus*. But that which they both seem most to admire is, That the Fancy of the *Tarantulati* should be so mightily carried away with Musick; for they do not only forget their pain, but dance incessantly. Of which *Epiphanius Ferdinandus* tells a very remarkable story of an old Man ninety four years of Age, that could scarce creep with a staff, who yet being bit by the *Tarantula*, presently upon the hearing of Musick leaped and skipped like a young kid.

† *Medicin. Practic. lib. 1. part. 2. cap. 17.*

A-kin to this is that kind of madness which they call *S. Vitus* his Dance, which disease *Sennertus* rightly affirms to proceed from a certain malignant humour gendred in the body of near cognation with this poyson of the *Tarantula*; which will help us for the explicating of the Causes of stranger workings on the Fancy than has yet been mentioned; as for example, in the *λυκανθρωπία, γαλεανθρωπία, and κυνανθρωπία*, which are distempers of the Mind, whereby Men imagine themselves to be *Wolves, Cats, or Dogs*.

S E C T. VIII.

The power of Meats to change the Imagination.

† *In his Institution. Medic. lib. 2. part. 3. Sect. 2. cap. 4.*

There are several relations in the forenamed † Authour concerning the power that *Nourishment* has to work upon *Imagination*, and to change a Man's disposition into the nature of that creature whose blood or milk doth nourish him.

A Wench at *Breslaw* being struck with an Epilepsie upon the seeing of a Malefactor's Head cut off by the Executioner, when several other remedies failed, was perswaded by some to drink the blood of a *Cat*; which being done, the wench not long after degenerates into the nature and property of that Animal, cries and jumps like a *Cat*, and hunts mice with like silence and watchfulness that they do, pursuing them as close as she could to their very holes. This Narration he transcribes out of *Weinrichius*.

And he has another short glance upon another in the same Writer, of one that being long fed with *Swine's* blood, took a special pleasure in wallowing and tumbling himself in the mire: As also another Girl who, being nourisht up with *Goat's* milk, would skip like a *Goat* and brouze on trees as *Goats* use to do.

We might add a fourth, of one who by eating the brains of a *Bear* became of a *Bear-like* disposition; but we will not insist upon smaller considerations.

S E C T.

SECT. IX.

Baptista Porta his Potion to work upon his Fancy.

Baptista Porta drives on the matter much further, professing that he had acquaintance with one that could, when he pleased, so alter the *Imagination* of a Man, as he would make him fancy himself to be this or that *Bird*, *Beast*, or *Fish*; and that in this madness the party thus deluded would move his Body, as near as it was capable, so as *such Creatures* use to do; and if they were vocal, imitate also their voice. *Magiæ natural. lib. 7. cap. 2.*

This intoxicating *Potion* is made of the extract of certain herbs, as *Solanum manicum*, *Mandrake*, and others, together with the heart, brain, or some other parts of this or that Animal with whose image they would infect the Fancy of the party. And he doth affirm of his own experience, that trying this feat upon some of his comrades when he was young, one that had gormondized much *Beef*, upon the taking the potion, strongly imagined himself to be surrounded with *Bulls*, that would be ever and anon running upon him with their horns.

SECT. X.

The power of Diseases upon the Phancy.

WHAT happens here in these cases where we can trace the *Causes*, sometimes falls out where we cannot so plainly and directly find out the reason. For Physicians take notice of such kind of *Madnesses* as make Men confidently conceit themselves to be *Dogs*, *Wolves* and *Cats*, when they have neither eat the flesh nor drunk the blood of any *Cat*, *Dog*, or *Wolf*, nor taken any such artificial potion as we even now spake of to bring them into these diseases.

The causes of this cannot be better guessed at than has been by *Sennertus* in that of *S. Vitus* his dance. For as there the Body is conceived to be infested by some malignant humour near a-kin to the poyson of the *Tarantula*; so in these distempers we may well conclude that such fumes or vapours arise into the Brain from some foulness in the Body (though the particular causes we do not understand) as have a very near analogie to the noxious humours or exhalations that move up and down and mount up into the *Imagination* of those that have drunk the blood of *Cats*, or have been nourished with the milk of those Animals above named, or taken such intoxicating potions as *Baptista Porta* has described.

S E C T. XI.

Of the power of Melancholy, and how it often sets on some one absurd conceit upon the Mind, the party in other things being sober.

Aristot. Problem. sect. 30.

WE have given several Instances of that mighty power there is in *natural Causes* to work upon and unavoidably to change our *Imagination*. We will name something now more general, whose nature notwithstanding is so various and *Vertumnus*-like, that it will supply the place of almost all particulars, and that is *Melancholy*; of which *Aristotle* gives witness, that according to the several degrees and tempers thereof men vary wonderfully in their constitutions; it making some slow and sottish, others wild, ingenious and amorous, prone to wrath and lust, others it makes more eloquent and full of Discourse, others it raises up even to madness and *Enthusiasm*: And he gives an example of one *Maracus* a Poet of *Syracuse*, who never versified so well as when he was in his distracted fits.

Sennert. Medicin. Practic. l. 1. part. 2. cap. 8.

But it is most observable in *Melancholy* when it reaches to a disease, that it sets on some one particular absurd imagination upon the Mind so fast, that all the evidence of Reason to the contrary cannot remove it, the parties thus affected in other things being as sober and rational as other Men. And this is so notorious and frequent, that *Areteus Sennertus* and other Physicians define *Melancholy* from this very Effect of it.

S E C T. XII.

Several Examples of the foregoing Observation.

A *Aristotle* affords us no Examples of this kind; others do. *Democritus junior*, as he is pleased to style himself, recites several Stories out of Authors to this purpose. As out of *Laurentius*, one concerning a French Poet, who using in a fever *Unguentum populeum* to anoint his Temples to conciliate sleep, took such a conceit against the smell of that ointment, that for many Years after he imagined every one that came near him to scent of it; and therefore would let no Man talk with him but aloof off, nor would he wear any new cloaths, because he fancied they smelt of that ointment: But in all other things he was wise and discreet, and would talk as sensibly as other Men.

Another he has of a Gentleman of *Limosin* (out of *Anthony Verduer*) who was persuaded he had but one leg, affrighted into that conceit by having that part struck by a wild Boar, otherwise a Man well in his Wits.

A third he hath out of *Platerus*, concerning a Countreyman of his, who by chance having fallen into a pit where Frogs and Frogs-spawn was, and having swallowed down a little of the water, was afterward so fully persuaded that there were young Frogs in his belly, that for many years following he could not rectifie his conceit. He betook himself to the study of

of Physick for seven years together to find a cure for his disease: He travelled also in *Italy, France* and *Germany*, to confer with Physicians about it, and meeting with *Platerus* consulted him with the rest. He fancied the crying of his guts to be the croaking of the Frogs; and when *Platerus* would have deceived him by putting live Frogs into his excrements that he might think he had voided them and was cured, his skill in Physick made that trick ineffectual. For saving this one vain conceit, the Man was, as he reports, a learned and prudent Man.

We will add only a fourth out of *Laurentius*, which is of a Nobleman of his time, a Man of reason and discretion in all other things, saving that he did conceit himself made of glafs; and though he loved to be visited by his friends, yet had a special care that they should not come too near him, for fear they should break him.

Not much unlike to this is that of a Baker of *Ferrara*, that thought he was compos'd of Butter, and therefore would not sit in the Sun nor come near a fire, for fear he should be melted.

It would be an infinite task to set down all at large. *Sennertus* has given some hints of the variety of this distemper, remitting us to *Schenckius, Marcell. Donatus, Forestus* and others for more full Narrations. Some, saith he, are vexed and tormented with the fear of Death, as thinking they have committed some crime they never did commit; some fancy they are eternally damned, nay they complain that they are already tormented with hell-fire; others take themselves to be a dying, others imagine themselves quite dead, and therefore will not eat; others fear that the heavens will fall upon them, others dare not clinch their hands for fear of bruising the World betwixt their fists; some fancy themselves Cocks, some Nightingales, some one Animal, some another; some entertain conference with God or his Angels, others conceit themselves bewitched, or that a black Man or Devil perpetually accompanies them; some complain of their poverty, others fancy themselves persons of honour, Dukes, Princes, Kings, Popes, and what not? Much to this purpose may you see in *Sennertus*, and more in *Democritus junior*.

Medicin. Practic. l. 1. part. 2. cap. 8.

SECT. XIII.

A seasonable application of the foregoing Examples for the weakning of the authority of bold Enthusiasts.

THAT which is most observable and most useful for the present matter in hand is, That notwithstanding there is such an enormous lapse of the Fancy and Judgment in some one thing, yet the party should be of a sound mind in all other, according to his natural capacities and abilities; which all Physicians acknowledge to be true, and are ready to make good by innumerable Examples. Which I conceive to be of great moment more thoroughly to consider.

I do not mean *how* it may come to pass, (for that we have already declared) but *what* excellent use it may be of for to prevent that easie and

and ordinary Sophism which imposes upon many, who, if an *Enthusiast* speak *eloquently*, and it may be *rationally* and *piously*, (you may be sure *zealously* and *fervently* enough, and with the greatest *confidence*, can be imagined) are so credulous that, because of this visible dress of such laudable accomplishments, they will believe him even in that which is not only not probable, but vain and foolish, nay sometime very mischievous and impious to believe; as, That the party is immediately and extraordinarily *inspired of God*; That he is a *special Messenger* sent by him, the *last and best Prophet*, the *holy Ghost* come in the flesh, and such like stuff as this: Which has been ever and anon set on foot in all ages by some *Enthusiast* or other.

Amongst whom I do not deny but there may be some who, for the main practical light of Christianity, might have their judgments as consistent, as those *Melancholists* above named had in the ordinary prudential affairs of the World: But as for this one particular, of being *supernaturally inspired*, of being the *last Prophet*, the *last Trumpet*, the *Angel in the midst of Heaven with the Eternal Gospel in his hand*, the *Holy Ghost incorporated*, *God come to judgment*, and the like, this certainly in them is as true, but far worse, dotage, than to fancy a Man's self either a *Cock* or *Bull*, when it is plain to the senses of all that he is a *Man*.

SECT. XIV.

That the causality of Melancholy in this distemper of Enthusiasm is more easily traced than in other Extravagancies.

BUT it being of so weighty a concernment, I shall not satisfy myself in this more general account of *Enthusiasm*, that it may very well be resolved into that property of *Melancholy* whereby Men become to be *delirious* in some one point, their judgment standing untouched in others. For I shall easily further demonstrate that the very nature of *Melancholy* is such, that it may more fairly and plausibly tempt a Man into such conceits of *Inspiration* and supernatural light from God, than it can possibly do into those more extravagant conceits of being *Glass*, *Butter*, a *Bird*, a *Beast*, or any such thing.

SECT. XV.

Melancholy a pertinacious and religious complexion.

FOR besides that which is most general of all, that *Melancholy* inclines a Man very strongly and peremptorily to either believe or misbelieve a thing (as is plain in that passion of *Suspicion* and *Jealousie*, which upon little or no occasion will win so full assent of the Mind, that it will engage a Man to act as vigorously as if he were certain that his jealousies were true) it is very well known that this Complexion

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is the most *Religious* complexion that is, and will be as naturally tampering with Divine matters, (though in no better light than that of her own) as Apes and Monkeys will be imitating the actions and manners of men.

Neither is there any true spiritual *Grace* from God but this mere natural constitution, according to the several tempers and workings of it, will not only *resemble*, but sometimes seem to *outstrip*, by reason of the fury and excess of it, and that not only in *Actions*, but very ordinarily in *Eloquence* and *Expressions*; as if here alone were to be had that lively sense and understanding of all holy things, or at least as if there were no other state to be parallel'd to it.

The event of which must be, if a very great measure of the true *Grace* of God does not intervene, that such a *Melancholist* as this must be very highly puffed up, and not only fancy himself *inspired*, but believe himself such a special piece of *Light* and *Holiness* that God has sent into the world, that he will take upon him to *reform*, or rather *annul* the very *Law* and *Religion* he is born under, and make himself not at all inferiour to either *Moses* or *Christ*, though he have neither any sound *Reason*, nor visible *Miracle* to extort belief.

SECT. XVI.

That men are prone to suspect some special presence of God, or of a Supernatural power, in whatever is Great or Vehement.

BUT this is still too general, we shall yet more particularly point out the *Causes* of this Imposture. Things that are *great* or *vehement*, People are subject to suspect they arise from some *Supernatural* cause, insomuch that the Wind cannot be more than ordinarily high, but they are prone to imagine the Devil raised it; nor any sore Plague or Disease, but God in an extraordinary manner to be the Author of it.

So rude Antiquity conceiv'd a kind of Divinity in almost any thing that was extraordinarily *great*. Whence some have worshipped very tall Trees, others large Rivers, some a great Stone or Rock, others some high and vast Mountains; whence the *Greeks* confound *great* and *holy* in that one word *isēds*, that signifies both, and the *Hebrews* by the *Cedars of God*, the *mountains of God*, the *Spirit of God*, and the like, understand *high Cedars*, *great Mountains*, and a *mighty Spirit* or *Wind*. We may add also what is more familiar, how old Women and Nurses use to tell little Children when they ask concerning the *Moon*, pointing at it with their fingers, that it is *God's Candle*, because it is so great a Light in the night. All which are arguments or intimations that man's nature is very prone to suspect some special presence of God in any thing that is *great* or *vehement*.

Whence it is a strong temptation with the *Melancholist*, when he feels a storm of devotion or zeal come upon him like a mighty wind, his heart being full of affection, his head pregnant with clear and sensible representations, and his mouth flowing and streaming with fit

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and powerful expressions, such as would astonish an ordinary Auditor to hear, it is, I say, a shrewd temptation to him to think that it is the very *Spirit of God*, that *then moves* supernaturally in him; whenas all that excess of zeal, and affection, and fluency of words is most palpably to be resolved into the power of *Melancholy*, which is a kind of *natural inebriation*.

And that there is nothing better than *Nature* in it, it is evident both from the experience of good and discreet men, who have found themselves strangely vary in their zeal, devotion, and elocution, as *Melancholy* has been more or less predominant in them: and also from what all may observe in those that have been wicked, mad, and blasphemous, and yet have surpassed in this mistaken gift of *Prayer*; as is notorious in *Hacket*, who was so besotted with a conceit of his own zeal and eloquence, that he fancied himself *the Holy Ghost*.

SECT. XVII.

The mistake of heated Melancholy for holy Zeal, and the Spirit of God.

AND when men talk so much of the *Spirit*, if they take notice what they ordinarily mean by it, it is nothing else but a strong and impetuous motion whereby they are zealously and fervently carried in matters of Religion: so that *Fervour, Zeal, and Spirit*, is in effect all one. Now no Complexion is so hot as *Melancholy* when it is heated, being like boiling water, as *Aristotle* observes, (Ἐὰν ἱκανῶς θερμασθῇ, οἷον τὸ ζέον, &c.) so that it transcends the flames of fire; or it is like heated stone or iron when they are red hot, for they are then more hot by far than a burning Coal. We shall omit here to play the Grammarian, and to take notice how well *Aristotle's* τὸ ζέον suits with the very word *zeal*, of which we speak; but shall cast our eyes more carefully upon the things themselves, and parallel out of the same Philosopher what they call *Spirit*, to what he affirms to be contained in *Melancholy*. Ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κεφαλή, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐστὶν ἡ καρδιά, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή.

Aristot. Problem. sect. 30.

The *Spirit* then, that wings the *Enthusiast* in such a wonderful manner, is nothing else but that *Flatulency* which is in the *Melancholy* complexion, and rises out of the *Hypochondriacal* humour upon some occasional heat, as *Wind* out of an *Æolipila* applied to the fire. Which fume mounting into the Head, being first actuated and spirited, and somewhat refined by the warmth of the Heat, fills the mind with variety of *Imaginations*, and so quickens and enlarges *Invention*, that it makes the *Enthusiast* to admiration *fluent* and *eloquent*, he being as it were drunk with new wine, drawn from that Cellar of his own that lies in the lowest region of his Body, though he be not aware of it, but takes it to be pure *Nectar*, and those waters of life that spring from above. *Aristotle* makes a long Parallellism betwixt the nature and effects of *Wine* and *Melancholy*, to which both *Fernelius* and *Senertus* do refer.

SECT.

S E C T. XVIII.

The Ebbs and Flows of Melancholy, a further Cause of Enthusiasm.

BUT this is not all the advantage that *Melancholy* affords towards *Enthusiasm*, thus unexpectedly and suddenly to surprise the Mind with such vehement fits of *Zeal*, such streams and torrents of *Eloquence* in either exhorting others to piety, or in devotions towards God; but it adds a greater weight of belief that there is something Supernatural in the business, in that the same Complexion discovers it self to them that lie under it in such *contrary Effects*.

For as it is thus vehemently *hot*, so is it as stupidly *cold*; whence the Melancholick becomes faithless, hopeless, heartless, and almost witless. Which *Ebbs* of his Constitution must needs make the *overflowing* of it seem more miraculous and supernatural. But those *cold* and abject fits of his, make him also very sensibly and winningly *Rhetorical*, when he speaks of *disconsolation*, *desertion*, *humility*, *mortification*, and the like, as if he were truly and voluntarily carried through such things; whenas only the fatal necessity of his Complexion has violently drag'd him through the mere shadows and resemblances of them.

But he finding himself afterward beyond all hope, or any sense or preface of any power in himself lifted aloft again, he does not doubt that any thing less was the cause of this unexpected joy and triumph, than the immediate arm of God from heaven, that has thus exalted him; when it is nothing indeed but a *Paroxysm of Melancholy*, which is like the breaking out of a flame after a long smoaking and reeking of new rubbish laid upon the fire. But because such returns as these come not at set times, nor make men sick, but rather delight them, they think there is something *divine* therein, and that it is not from *Natural* causes.

S E C T. XIX.

The notorious mockery of Melancholy, in reference to Divine Love.

TH E R E is also another notorious Mockery in this Complexion, *Nature* confidently avouching her self to be *God*, whom the Apostle calls *Love*, as if it were his very Essence; whenas indeed it is here nothing else but *Melancholy* that has put on the garments of an Angel of light.

There is nothing more true than that *Love* is the *fulfilling of the Law*, and the *highest Perfection* that is competible to the Soul of man; and that this also is so plain and unavoidable, that a man may be in a very high degree mad, and yet not fail to assent unto it. Nay, I dare say, *Melancholy* it self would be his monitor to remind him of it, if there were any possibility that he should forget so manifest and palpable a Truth.

For the sense of *Love* at large is eminently comprehended in the temper of the Melancholick, *Melancholy* and *Wine* being of so near a na-

Aristot. Problem. sect. 30. *Pro-*ture one to the other. Ποιᾶ δὲ φιλητικὸς ὁ οἶνος, *But Wine makes men amorous*; which the Philosopher proves, in that a man in wine will kiss such persons as a sober man would scarce touch with a pair of tongs, by reason of their age and ugliness. And assuredly it was the fumes of *Melancholy* that infatuated the fancy of a late new-fangled *Religionist*, when he sat so kindly by a Gipsie under an hedge, and put his hand into her bosom in a fit of devotion, and vaunted afterwards of it, as if it had been a very pious and meritorious action.

SECT. XX.

That Melancholy partakes much of the Nature of Wine, and from what complexion Poets and Enthusiasts arise, and what the difference is betwixt them.

Problem.
sect. 30:

BUT now that *Melancholy* partakes much of the nature of *Wine*, he evinces from that it is so *spiritous*; and that it is so *spiritous*, from that it is so *spumeous*: and that *Melancholy* is *flatuous* or *spiritous*, he appeals to the Physicians, οἱ τὰ πνευματώδη πᾶσι καὶ ὑποχόνδρια μελαγχολικὰ φασὶν εἶναι.

Wherefore the Philosopher assigns another companion to *Venus* besides the plump Youth *Bacchus*, which the Poets bestow upon her, who, though more seemingly sad, yet will prove as faithful an attendant as that other, and this is *Melancholy*. Καὶ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι λάγνοι εἰσιν. ὅ, τε καὶ ἀφροδισιασμοῦ πνευματώδης.

Now besides this *Flatulency* that solicits to lust, there may be such a due dash of *Sanguine* in the *Melancholy*, that the Complexion may prove stupendously enravishing. For that more sluggish *Dulcor* of the blood will be sometime so quicken'd and actuated by the fierceness and sharpness of the *Melancholy* humour, (as the fulsomness of Sugar is by the acrimony of Limons) that it will afford far more sensible pleasure; and all the imaginations of *Love*, of what kind soever, will be far more lively and vigorous, more piercing and rapturous, than they can be in pure *Sanguine* it self.

From this Complexion are *Poets*, and the more highly-pretending *Enthusiasts*: Betwixt whom this is the great difference, That a *Poet* is an *Enthusiast* in jest, and an *Enthusiast* is a *Poet* in good earnest; *Melancholy* prevailing so much with him, that he takes his no better than *Poetical* fits and figments for divine Inspiration and real Truth.

S E C T. XXI.

That a certain Dosis of Sanguine mixt with Melancholy is the Spirit that usually inspires Enthusiasts, made good by a large Induction of Examples.

BUT that it is a mere natural *flatuous* and *spiritous* temper, with a proportionable *Dosis* of *Sanguine* added to their *Melancholy*, not the pure *Spirit of God*, that thus inacts them, is plainly to be discovered not only in their language, which is very sweet and melting, as if sugar-plums lay under their tongue, but from notorious circumstances of their lives. And in my apprehension it will be a sufficient pledge of this Truth, if we set before our eyes those that have the most highly pretended to the Spirit, and that have had the greatest power to delude the People.

For that that *Pride* and tumour of mind whereby they are so confidently carried out to profess, as well as to conceive, so highly of themselves, that no less Title must serve their turns than that of *God*, the *Holy Ghost* or *Paraclet*, the *Messias*, the *last and chiefest Prophet*, the *Judge of the quick and the dead*, and the like; that all this comes from *Melancholy* is manifest by a lower kind of working of that Complexion.

For to begin with the first of these Impostures, *Simon Magus*, who gave out that he was *God the Father*, he prov'd himself to be but a wretched lecherous Man by that inseperable companion of his, *Helena*, whom he called *Selene*, and affirmed to be one of the *Divine Powers*, when she was no better than a lewd Strumpet.

There was also one *Menander* a *Samaritan*, that vaunted himself to be the *Saviour of the World*, a maintainer of the same licentious and impure opinions with *Simon*.

Montanus professed himself to be the *Spirit of God*; but that it was the *Spirit of Melancholy* that besotted him, his two Drabs, *Prisca* and *Maximilla*, evidently declare, who are said to leave their own Husbands to follow him. We might add a third, one *Quintilla*, a Woman of no better fame, and an intimate acquaintance of the other two, from whence the *Montanists* were also called *Quintillians*.

Manes also held himself to be the true *Paraclet*, but left a Sect behind him indoctrinated in all licentious and filthy principles.

Mabomet, more successful than any, the last and chiefest Prophet that ever came into the World, (if you will believe him) that he was *Melancholick* his *Epileptical* fits are one argument; and his permission of plurality of Wives and Concubines, his lascivious descriptions of the Joys of Heaven or Paradise, another.

But I must confess I do much doubt whether he took himself to be a *Prophet* or no; for he seems to me rather a pleasant witty companion and shrewd *Politician*, than a mere *Enthusiast*; and so wise, as not to venture his credit or success upon mere conceits of his own, but he builds upon the weightiest principles of the Religion of the Jews and Christians: such as, That *God is the Creator and Governour of the World*, That there are *Angels* and *Spirits*, That the *Soul of Man is Immortal*, and That there is a *Judgment* and

an everlasting Reward to come after the natural Death of the Body. So that indeed *Mahometism* seems but an abuse of certain Principles of the doctrine of *Moses* and *Christ* to a Political design, and therefore in it self far to be preferred before the vain and idle *Enthusiasms* of *David George*; who yet was so highly concerted of his own light, that he hoped to put *Mahomet's* nose out of joint, giving out of himself that he was the last and chiefest Prophet, whereas left to the intoxication of his own *Melancholy* and *Sanguine*, he held neither *Heaven* nor *Hell*, neither *Reward* nor *Punishment* after this life, neither *Devil* nor *Angel*, nor the *Immortality* of the *Soul*; but though born a *Christian*, yet he did *Mahometize* in this, that he also did indulge plurality of *Wives*.

It should seem that so dark and fullsome a dash of Blood there was mixed with his *Melancholy*, that though the one made him a pretended Prophet, yet the other would not suffer him to entertain the least presage of any thing beyond this mortal life.

See my Explanation of
The Mystery of
Godliness,
Book 5. ch. 8.
also Book 6.
chap. 17.

He also that is said to insist in his steps, and talks so magnificently of himself, as if he was come to judge both the quick and the dead, by an injudicious distorting and forcing of such plain substantial passages of Scripture as assure us of the Existence of Angels and Spirits and of a Life to come, bears his condemnation in himself, and proclaims to all the World that he is rather a Priest of *Venus*, or a mere *Sydereal* Preacher out of the sweetness and powerfulness of his own natural Complexion, than a true Prophet of God; or a friend of the mystical Bride-groom *Christ Jesus*; to whose very person, as to her Lord and Sovereign, the Church his Spouse doth owe all reverential love and honour.

But such bloated and high-swollen *Enthusiasts*, that are so big in the conceit of their own inward worth, have little either sense or belief of this duty, but fancy themselves either equal or superiour to *Christ*; whom notwithstanding God has declared *Supream Head* over Men and Angels. And yet they would dethrone him, and set up themselves, though they can shew no Title but an unbound kind of popular Eloquence, a Rhapsodie of flight and soft words, rowling and streaming Tautologies, which if they at any time bear any true sense with them, it is but what every ordinary *Christian* knew before; but what they oft insinuate by the ble, is abominably false, as sure as *Christianity* it self is true.

Yet such sopperies as these seem fine things to the heedless and puffanimous: But surely *Christ* will raise such a discerning Spirit in his Church, that by evidence and conviction of Reason, not by Force or external power, such *Mock-prophets* and false *Messiaes* as these will be discountenanced and hissed off of the stage; nor will there be a Man that knows himself to be a *Christian* that will receive them.

SECT. XXII.

More examples to the same purpose.

WE have, I think, by a sufficient Induction discovered the Condition and Causes of this mysterious mockery of *Enthusiastical Love* in the highest workings of it, and shewn how it is but in effect a *Natural Complexion*, as very often *Religious Zeal* in general is discovered to be; As is also observable from tumultuous *Anabaptists* in *Germany*; for amongst other things that they contended for, this was not the least, to win a freedom to have many Wives. So that it should seem that for the most part this *Religious heat* in Men, as it arises merely from Nature, is like *Aurum fulminans*, which though it flie upward somewhat, the greatest force when it is fired is found to go downward.

This made that religious Sect of the *Beguardi* conceit that it was a sin to kiss a Woman, but none at all to lie with her. The same furnish'd *Carpocrates* and *Apelles*, two busie Sectaries in their time, the one with his *Marcellina*, the other with his *Philumena*, to spend their lust upon.

SECT. XXIII.

Of Enthusiastical Joy.

BUT enough of this. Nearest to this *Enthusiastical* affection of Love is that of Joy and Triumph of Spirit; that *Enthusiasts* are several times actuated withal to their own great admiration. But we have already intimated the near affinity betwixt *Melancholy* and Wine, which cheers the heart of God and Man, as is said in the parable. And assuredly *Melancholy*, that lies at first smothering in the Heart and Blood, when Heat has overcome it (it consisting of such solid particles, which then are put upon motion and agitation) is more strong and vigorous than any thing else that moves in the Blood and Spirits, and comes very near to the nature of the highest *Cordis-Problem. sect. 30.* *als* that are. Which *Aristotle* also witnesses, asserting that *Melancholy* while it is cold causes sadness and despondency of mind, but once heated, *ἐκστασις ἢ τὰς μὲν ὡς ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ*, *Ecstasies* and *Raptures* with triumphant joy and singing.

SECT. XXIV.

Of the mystical Allegories of Enthusiasts.

THere are Three delusions yet behind, which, because they come into my memory, I will not omit to speak of, viz. *Mystical Interpretations of Scripture*, *Quakings*, and *Visions*; all which are easily resolved into *Effects of Melancholy*. For as for the first, we have already shewn that

that *Melancholy*, as well as *Wine*, makes a Man *Rhetorical* or *Poetical*; and that *Genius*, how fanciful it is, and full of Allusions and Metaphors and fine resemblances, every one knows. And what greater matter is there in applying *Moral* and *Spiritual* meanings to the *History of the Bible*, than to the *History of Nature*? and there is no *Rhetorician* nor *Poet* but does that perpetually. Or how much easier is it to make a Story set out a *Moral* meaning, than to apply a *Moral* sense to such Stories as are already a foot? And for the former, *Aesop* was old excellent at it without any suspicion of *Inspiration*; and the latter *Sir Francis Bacon* has admirably well performed in his *Sapientia Veterum*, without any such peculiar or extraordinary illapses of a divine Spirit into him, a business I dare say, he never dreamt of, and any Man that understands him will willingly be his *Compurgator*.

SECT. XXV.
Of Quaking and of Quakers.

AND for *Quaking*, which deluded souls take to be an infallible sign they are inactuated by the Spirit of God, that it may be only an Effect of their *Melancholy* is apparent. For none have so high Passions as *Melancholists*; and that *Fear*, *Love* or *Veneration* in the height will cause great *Trembling*, cannot be denied; and to these Passions none are any thing nigh so obnoxious as those of the *Melancholy* Complexion, because of the deepness of their resentments and apprehensions.

That *Fear* causes *Trembling* there is nothing more obvious: And it is as true of *Love*, which the *Comedian* has judiciously noted in that passage where *Phadria* upon the sight of his *Thais*, speaking to *Parmeno*, *Totus tremo*, saies he, *horreoque postquam aspexi hanc*.

And for *Veneration*, which consists in a manner of these two mixt together, it is a passion that *Melancholy* men are soundly plunged in whether they will or no; when they are to make their addresses to any person of honour or worth, or to go about some solemn or weighty performance in publick, they will quake and tremble like an *Aspin-leaf*; some have been struck silent, others have fallen down to the ground.

And that *Fancy* in other cases will work upon the *Spirits*, and cause a tumultuous and disorderly commotion in them, or so suffocate the *Heart* that motion will be in a manner quite extinct, and the party fall down dead, are things so familiarly known, that it is enough only to mention them.

Wherefore it is no wonder, the *Enthusiast* fancying these natural Paroxisms with which he is surpris'd to be extraordinary Visits of the Deity, and Illapses of the Holy Ghost into his Soul, which he cannot but then receive with the highest *Veneration* imaginable, it is no wonder, I say, that *Fear* and *Joy* and *Love* should make such a confusion in his *Spirits*, as to put him into a fit of *trembling* and *quaking*. In which case the fervour of his *Spirits* and Heat of *Imagination* may be

be wrought up to that pitch that it may amount to a perfect *Epilepsy*; as it often happens in that Sect they call *Quakers*, who undoubtedly are the most *Melancholy Sect* that ever was yet in the world.

SECT. XXVI.

That Melancholy disposes to Apoplexies and Epilepsies.

AND that *Melancholy* it self disposes a man to *Apoplexies* and *Epilepsies*, is acknowledged both by Philosophers and Physicians. For what is *Nercotical*, and deadens the motion of the Spirits, if it be highly such, proves also *Apoplectical*. Besides, gross Vapours stopping the *Arteria Carotides*, and *Plexus Choroides*, and so hindring the recourse and supply of Spirits, may do the same. Some would illustrate the matter from the fumes of Char-coale, that has often made Men fall down dead. But take any or all of these, *Melancholy* is as like to afford such noxious vapours as any other Temper whatsoever. And that an *Epilepsie* may arise from such like Causes, these two diseases being so near a-kin, as *Galen* writes, is very reasonable; and that the morbidick matter is *πνευματική τις ὁσία ὡς αἶμα αἴμα*, as his Master *Pelops* expresses it, it is evident from the sudden and easy discussion of the fit.

Sennert. Institution. Medic. lib. 2. part. 3. sect. 2. cap. 6.

SECT. XXVII.

Of the nature of Enthusiastick Revelations and Visions.

BUT in both these there being a ligation of the outward senses, whatever is then represented to the Mind, is of the nature of a *Dream*. But these fits being not so ordinary as our natural sleep, these *Dreams* the precipitant and unskilful are forward to conceit to be Representations extraordinary and supernatural, which they call *Revelations* or *Visions*; of which there can be no certainty at all, no more than of a *Dream*.

SECT. XXVIII.

Of Ecstasie; the nature and causes thereof.

THE mention of *Dreams* puts me in mind of another *Melancholy* Symptom, which Physicians call *Ecstasie*, which is nothing else but *Somnus præter naturam profundus*: the Causes whereof are none other than those of natural Sleep, but more intense and excessive; the Effect is the deliration of the party after he awakes, for he takes his *Dreams* for true Histories and real Transactions

The reason whereof, I conceive, is the extraordinary clearness and fulness of the representations in his sleep, arising from a more perfect pri-

privation of all communion with this outward world ; and so there being no interfearings or cross-strokes of motion from his body so deeply overwhelmed and bedeaded with sleep, what the *Imagination* then puts forth of her self is as clear as broad day, and the *perception* of the Soul is at least as strong and vigorous as it is at any time in beholding things awake, and therefore *Memory* as thoroughly sealed therewith as from the sense of any external Object.

The vigour and clearness of these *Visions* differ from those in ordinary sleep, as much as the liveliness of the images, let in artificially into a dark room accurately darken'd, differs from those in one carelessly made dark, some chinks or crevices letting in light where they should not.

But strength of perception, is no sure ground of truth ; And such *Visions* as these, let them be never so clear, yet they are still in the nature of *Dreams*. And he that regardeth *Dreams* is like him that catcheth at a shadow, or followeth after the wind, as *Siracides* speaks.

S E C T. XXIX.

Whether it be in man's power to cast himself into an Enthusiastick Apoplexie, Epilepsie, or Ecstasie.

WHETHER it be in any man's power to fall into these *Epilepsies*, *Apoplexies*, or *Ecstasies* when he pleases, is neither an useless nor a desperate question : For we may find a probable solution from what has been already intimated.

For the *Enthusiast* in one of his *Melancholy* intoxications, (which he may accelerate by solemn silence, and intense and earnest meditation) finding himself therein so much beyond himself, may conceit it a sensible presence of God, and a supernatural manifestation of the Divinity, which must needs raise that passion of *Veneration* and most powerful Devotion, which consists of *Love*, *Fear*, and *Joy* : which single Passions have been able to kill men, or cast them into a trance. How can they then (if they be well follow'd by imagination and desire in the *Enthusiast* of a nearer union with this inward Light) fail to cast him into *Tremblings*, *Convulsions*, *Apoplexies*, *Ecstasies*, and what not ? *Melancholy* being so easily changeable into these Symptoms : And it is very probable that this may be the condition of those they call *Quakers*.

But for *St. Austin's* African Presbyter, (who was named *Restitutus*) who, by a lamenting voice or mournful tone, would be cast into such an *Ecstasy*, he is found alone in that, and is hardly imitable, it arising from some proper and peculiar constitution of his own.

In his *Instit. Medicin.* l. 2. part 3. sect. 2. cap. 4. See also Bodin's *Magor. Demon.* lib. 2. cap. 5. That *Cardan* and *Facius* his Father could cast themselves when they would into an *Ecstasy*, I can as easily believe as that the *Lap-landers* could, and do in my own Judgment refer them both to one cause, which *Sennertus* notes that *Cardan* somewhere does intimate concerning his Father, that he had *δαίμονα πᾶσις ποῦ* : which I conceive also to be

be the case of the worser sort of *Quakers*. But this kind of *Enthusiasm* I do not so much aim at as that which is *Natural*.

As for those *Visions* that *Enthusiasts* see waking, we have already referred their Causes to that strength of *Imagination* in a Melancholy Spirit.

SECT. XXX.

Of Enthusiastick Prophecy.

AND for that *Fervour of Mind* whereby they are carried out so confidently to foretel things to come, that there is nothing *Supernatural* in it may be evidenced, in that either some probable grounds that ordinary prudence may discover, might move them to think this or that, (the vehemency of their own *Melancholy* adding that confidence to their presage, as if God himself had set it upon their Spirit;) or else in that they most frequently presage false, and therefore when they foretel true, it is justly imputed to chance. As a man that dreams a-nights, it is a hard case if in so many years dreams he light not on some *εὐθυνομείας*, as they are called, such as are plainly and directly true, καὶ ὥστε οἱ πολλοὶ βάλλοντες ἐν τυγχάνουσιν πολλάκις, as they that shoot oft may sometimes hit the mark, (as *Plutarch* speaks;) but 'tis more by luck than good skill.

SECT. XXXI.

Of the Presage of a man's own heart from a Supernatural impulse sensible to himself, but unexplicable to others, where it may take place, and that it is not properly Enthusiasm.

AND yet notwithstanding I humbly conceive, and I hope may do so without any suspicion of the least tincture of *Fanaticism*, that there may be such a presage in the spirit of a man that is to act in things of very high concernment to † himself, and much more if † See Des-Cartes Letter to the Princess Elizabeth, ou il est parle du Genie de Socrate. * Prov. 16. 10. & 21. 1. Ecclus 37. 14. to the publick, as may be a sure guide to him, especially if he continue constantly sincere, just, and pious. For it is not at all improbable but such as act in very publick affairs, in which Providence has a more special hand, that these * Agents driving on her design, may have a more special assistance and animation from her: Of which as others have not the sense, so neither can they imagine the manner of it. And this is the case, I think, wherein that of *Siracides* may be verified, That a man's own heart will tell him more than seven watchmen on an high Tower. But this is *Enthusiasm* in the better sense, and therefore not so proper for our Discourse, who speak not of that which is true, but of that which is a mistake: the Causes whereof we having so fully laid down, we will now consider the *Kinds* of it, but briefly and only so far forth as suits with our present purpose and design.

Where.

Wherefore laying aside all accuracy, we shall content our selves to distribute it from the condition of the Persons in which it resides, into *Political* and *Philosophical*. For *Enthusiasm* most-what works according to the *natural Genius* of the party it doth surprize.

SECT. XXXII.

Several Examples of Political Enthusiasm.

WHEREFORE those whose Temper carries them most to *Political* affairs, who love rule and honour, and have a strong sense of Civil rights, *Melancholy* heating them, makes them sometimes fancy themselves great Princes (at least by divine assignment) and Deliverers of the People sent from God; such as were in likelihood the false *Messiaes* that deceived the people of the *Jews*, as *Theudas*, and that *Egyptian Impostor*, also *Barchocab*, *Jonathas*, *Dositheus*, and several others, who, 'tis likely, it being the common fame amongst the *Jews*, that the *Messias* the Deliverer was about that time to come, according to the heat and forwardness of their own *Melancholy*, conceited themselves to be him. Which is the easier to believe, there being several Instances in History of those that have fancied themselves Monarchs, Popes, and Emperours, whenas yet they have been but Foot-boys, Grooms, and Serving-men.

Whether there might not be as much of *Villany* and *Melancholy* in some of these false *Messiaes*, if it be suspected, it will be hard to take off the suspicion. But there was a *German*, in whom we may more safely instance, not many years ago here in *England*. He styl'd himself a *Warriour of God*, *David the second*, and in deep compassion of the sufferings of his Country, would very fain have got some few Forces here to carry over; with which, he was confident, he could have silenced the enemy, and settled all *Germany* in peace.

The man seemed to be a very religious man, and a great hater of Tyranny and Oppression, and very well in his wits to other things; only that he was troubled with this infirmity, that he fancied himself that *David* the Prophets foretel of, who should be that peaceable Prince, and great Deliverer of the *Jews*. He published a short writing of his, which I had the opportunity of seeing, which was full of Zeal and Scripture-eloquence: I saw his person in *London*, if he that shewed me him was not mistaken. He was a tall proper man, of a good age, but of a very pale, wasted, *Melancholy* countenance.

Another also of later years I had the hap to meet withal, whose discourse was not only rational, but pious, and he seemed to have his wits very well about him; nor could I discover the least intimation to the contrary, only he had this flaw, that he conceited that he was by God appointed to be that fifth Monarch, of which there is so much noise in this age; which imagination had so possessed him, that he would sometime have his *Servant* to serve him all in plate and upon the knee, as a very learned and religious friend of mine told me afterward.

SECT. XXXIII.

David George his Prophecy of his rising again from the Dead, and after what manner it was fulfilled.

WHEREFORE I do not look upon this man as so sober as the former, nor on either as comparable to that *David* that was born at *Delph*, lived first in lower *Germany*, with those of his *Sett*, after came to *Basil*, Anno 1544. and there dy'd 1556. and was digged up again 1559. Wherein his Prophecy of himself was in an ill-favour'd manner fulfilled, who, to uphold the fluctuating minds of his followers, whom he would have perswaded that he was immortal, told them at his death, that he should rise again within three years, presaging that of himself that he deny'd would ever come to pass in any one else.

SECT. XXXIV.

A Description of the person, manners, and doctrine of David George.

THIS *David George*, a man of very low parentage, was yet, in the judgment of his very enemies, one of notable natural parts, a comely person to look upon, and of a graceful presence. He was also square of body, yellow-bearded, grey-ey'd bright and shining, grave and sedate in speech; in a word, all his motions, gestures, and demeanours were so decent and becoming, as if he had been wholly composed to honesty and godliness. He lived very splendidly and magnificently in his House, and yet without the least stir or disorder. He was a religious frequenter of the Church, a liberal reliever of the poor, a comfortable visiter of the sick, obedient to the Magistrate, kind and affable to all persons, discreet in all things, very cunning in some, as in his closeness and reservedness in his Doctrine to those of *Basil*, where he liv'd, to whom he communicated not one *Iota* of it, but yet he sedulously dispers'd it in the further part of *Germany* both by Books and Letters; the main Heads whereof you shall hear as follows.

1. That the Doctrine hitherto deliver'd by *Moses*, the *Prophets*, *Christ* himself, and his *Apostles*, is maimed and imperfect, publish'd only to keep men in a childish obedience for a time, till the fulness and perfection of *David George* his Doctrine should be communicated to the world, which is the only Doctrine that can make mankind happy, and replenish them with the knowledge of God.

2. That *David George* is the true *Christ* and *Messias*, the dear Son of God, born not of the flesh, but of the Holy Ghost, and Spirit of *Christ*, which God had reserved in a secret place, his body being reduc'd to nothing, and has infus'd it wholly into the Soul of *David George*.

A a

3. That

3. That this *David* the *Messias* is to restore the house of *Israel*, and re-erect the Tabernacle of God, not by the Cross, Afflictions, and Death, as the other *Messias*; but by that sweetness, and love, and grace that is given to him of his Father.

4. That the power of remission of Sins is given to this *David George*, and that it is he that is now come to judge the world with the last Judgment.

5. That the holy Scriptures, the Sayings and Testimonies of the Prophets, of Christ and of his Apostles, do all point, if rightly understood in the true mystery of them, to the glorious coming of *David George*, who is greater than Christ himself, as being born of the Spirit, and not of the flesh.

6. That all sin and blasphemy against the *Father* or the *Son* may be remitted or pardon'd; but the sin against the *Holy Ghost*, that is, against *David George*, is never to be remitted.

7. That the Resurrection of Christ out of the grave, and the Resurrection of the dead, is a mere Mystery or Allegory.

8. That Angels and Devils are only Good men, and Evil men, or their Virtues and Vices.

9. That Matrimony is free, no obligation, and that no man thereby is confined to one woman; but that procreation of Children shall be promiscuous, or in common to all those that are born again, or regenerated by the spirit of *David George*.

These things are recorded in the Life and Doctrine of *David George*, publish'd by the Rector and University of *Basil* 1559.

SECT. XXXV.

The evident Causes of that power of speech in David George.

AS for his own Writings, not a little admired by some, his moving Eloquence, his powerful animations to the great duties of Godliness, I have already laid down such *natural* principles as that they may be easily resolved into, without any recourse to any *supernatural Spirit*. For a man illiterate, as he was, but of good parts, by constant reading of the Bible, will naturally contract a more winning and commanding Rhetorick than those that are learned; the intermixture of Tongues, and of artificial Phrases debasing their style, and making it sound more after the manner of men, though ordinarily there may be more of God in it than in that of the *Enthusiast*.

SECT. XXXVI.

An Account of those seeming Graces in David George.

IF he may with some zeal and commotion of mind recommend to his Reader, *Patience, Peaceableness, Meekness, Brotherly-kindness, Equity, Discretion, Prudence, Self-denial, Mortification*, and the like, there is nothing

nothing in all this but what his own *Sanguine* temper may suggest without any inspiration from God.

For there is no *Christian Virtue* to be named which concerns manners, but *Complexion* will afford a *spurious imitation* of it: And therefore they answering in so near similitude one to another, it will be an easie thing to colour over those mere *Mock-graces* with Scripture Phrases; so that he that has but these *Complexional Virtues* and a *Scriptural stile*, amongst the less skilful will look like an *Apostle* or *Prophet*, but amongst the rude Multitude he may boast himself to be what he will, without suspicion or contradiction.

The most unlikely of all these *imitations* is *Self-denial*, which seems abhorrent from a *Sanguine* temper: But *Enthusiasm* is not without a mixture of *Melancholy*, and we are speaking now of *Enthusiastical Sanguine*, in which the fiercer Passions will also lodge; and therefore this *Self-denial* and *Mortification* may be nothing else but the *Sanguine's conflict and victory over the most harsh and fierce Melancholy*.

And that it is the *Reign of Sanguine*, not the *rule of the Spirit*, is discoverable both from the *Complexion* of the Head of this Sect, as also from the general disposition of his followers, and that tender love they bear to their own dear carkases, who would not, I dare say, suffer the least aching of their little fingers by way of external *Martyrdome* for any Religion; and therefore their prudence and discretion consists most in juglings, equivocations, and slight tergiversations, peaceable compliances with any thing rather than to suffer in Body and Goods: Which is the natural dictate of *Sanguine* triumphant.

Which dominion yet seems far better than the Tyranny of *Choler* and *Melancholy*, whose pragmatistical ferocity can neither prove good to it self nor just to others; being prone to impose, and as forward to avenge the refusal of every frivolous and impertinent foppery or abhorred falsitie, with inhumane and cruel persecutions.

SECT. XXXVII.

That David George was a Man of a *Sanguine Complexion*.

NOW that *Sanguine* was the *Complexion* of David George, the foregoing description of his Person will probably intimate to any *Physiognomer*. For it is very hard to find an healthy body very comely and beautiful, but the same proves more than ordinarily venerous and lustful. We might instance in several both Men and Women, *Helena*, *Lais*, *Faustina*, *Alcibiades*, *Ismael Sophi* of Persia, and *Deme- See Jo. Bapt. trius*, who is said to have been of an admirable countenance and majestic graceful presence, mingled with gravity and benignity, also exceeding full of clemency, justice, piety and liberality; but so libidinous and voluptuous, that no King was ever to be compared to him. tist. Port. de Human. Physogn. lib. 2. cap. 13.

S E C T. XXXVIII.

Further and more sure Proofs that David George was of a Sanguine Temper.

BUT two surer signs are yet behind of this Prophet's natural Constitution, which are, *His denying of a life to come and existence of Angels or Spirits*, and his *allowing of plurality or community of Wives*.

The former whereof I must confess I cannot so much impute to any thing as to a more luscious and fulsome mixture of *Sanguine* in his *Enthusiastick* complexion. For nothing will so flake a Man's desire, or dead his belief of that more *Spiritual* and *Immaterial* state and condition, as this sweet glut of Blood that so thickens and clouds the Spirits, that the Mind cannot imagine or presage any thing beyond the present concernment of this mortal Body.

And of the *latter* I think it is acknowledged by all, that no such genuine cause can be assigned as this same complexion of *Sanguine* that disposes Men so strongly to the love of Women.

S E C T. XXXIX.

That it was a dark fulsome Sanguine that hid the truth of the great Promises of the Gospel from his Eyes.

WHEREFORE this *Enthusiast* being overborn by the power of his own constitution into the misbelief of those great *Promises of Eternal Life* set forth in the Scripture, took the holy Writers thereof either to be mistaken, or only to have intended *Allegories* by what they writ. And that *Fervour* that he found in himself to *Love*, and *Peace*, and *Equity*, and the like, boiling so high as to the driving of him into a perswasion that he was *inspired*, he conceited his misbelief of those precious *Promises of Immortality* and *Glory* in the heavens a special piece of *Illumination* also; and the *Resurrection of the dead* to be nothing else but to be raised into a like ardency towards such things with himself, and to a like misbelief with him of that *celestial Crown* the Apostle speaks of. And therefore he not being able to raise his mind by Faith to Heaven, he brought Heaven to Earth in his imagination: Which was less pains than *Mahomet* took, who was fain to walk to the Mountain, when he saw the Mountain would not move to him.

SECT. XL.

The exact likeness betwixt David George and the Father of the modern Nicolaitans, with the Author's censure of them both.

THIS is a brief account of *David George*, whose error the Father of our modern *Nicolaitans* did drink in so carefully, as if he were loath one drop should spill beside. Never was that in *Solomon* so plainly verified in any as in these two, *As face answers to face, so the heart of man to man.*

Wherefore concerning them both I dare pronounce, That though they equaliz'd themselves to Christ, and made themselves Judges of the quick and the dead, yet they were more devoid of true judgment in matters of Religion than the meanest of sincere Christians: And tho' they have so deify'd, or (as they phrase it) *begodded* themselves all over, I might say, bedaubed themselves with the feigned and counterfeit colours, or paint of high swelling words of vanity to amaze the vulgar; yet they were in truth mere men, of shallow minds and liquorish bodies, cleaving to the pleasures of the flesh, and so deeply relishing the sweet of *this present* Life, that all hope or desire of *that better* was quite extinct in them; and therefore their settled and radicate ignorance made them so *Enthusiastically* confident in their own error.

SECT. XLI.

A seasonable Advertisement in the behalf of them that are unawares taken with such Writers; as also a farther confirmation that Enthusiastick madness may consist with sobriety in other matters.

BUT that my zeal to the Truth may not turn to the injury of any, I cannot pass by this Advertisement; That this poyson we speak of is so subtilly convey'd and silently suppos'd in the reading these writings, that a good man and a true Christian may be easily carried away into an approbation of them without any infection by them, (as not minding what they imply, or drive at) or yet any defection from the main Principles of Christianity: and indeed by how much the heat seems greater toward the highest perfection of Holiness, the Reader is made the more secure of the Writer's soundness in the main Essentials of Religion, though it be far otherwise at the bottom.

For *Madness* and *Melancholy* drive high, and we have prov'd by divers Instances that a man may be most ridiculously and absurdly wild in some one thing, and yet sound and discreet in the rest; as *Gazens* handsomely sets it out in a story of an old man that conceited himself God the Father. And *Acosta* verifies it in a true history of his own knowledge concerning a certain learned and venerable Professor of Divinity in the Kingdom of *Peru*, whom he doth affirm to have been

as perfectly in his senses, as to soundness of brain, as himself was at that time when he wrote the Narration; which being something long, I shall transcribe only what precisely makes to my purpose.

This *Peruvian* Doctor would sadly and soberly affirm that he should be a King, yea, and a Pope too, the Apostolical See being translated to those parts; as also that holiness was granted unto him above all Angels and heavenly Hosts, and above all Apostles; yea, that God made proper unto him of Hypostatical Union, but that he refus'd to accept of it. Moreover, that he was appointed to be the Redeemer of the World, as to matter of Efficacy, which Christ, he said, had been no further than to Sufficiency only. That all Ecclesiastical estate was to be abrogated, and that he would make new Laws, plain and easy, by which the restraint of Clergy-men from Marriage should be taken away, and multitude of Wives allowed, and all necessity of Confession avoided. Which things he did maintain before the Judges of the Inquisition with that earnestness and confidence, with so many, and so large citations out of the Prophets, Apocalyps, Psalms, and other Books, with such unexpected Applications, and Allegorical interpretations of them, that the Auditory knew not whether they should laugh more at his fancy, or admire his memory. But himself was so well assured of the matter, that nothing but death could quit him of the *delirium*. For he dy'd a Martyr to this piece of madness of his, to the eternal infamy of his Judges, who were either so unwise, as not to know that *Melancholy* may make a man delirous as to some one particular thing, though his Intellectuals be sound in others; or else so cruel and barbarous as to murder a poor distracted man. The story you may read more at large in a late † Treatise concerning *Enthusiasm*.

† Dr. Meric, Caufabon's Treatise concerning Enthusiasm, chap. 3.

What I have transplanted hither, is further to evidence the truth of what Physicians say of *Melancholy*, that it may only befool the Understanding in some one point, and leave it sound in the rest; as also to confirm what I did above observe, that *Enthusiasts* for the most part are intoxicated with vapours from the lowest region of their Body, as the *Pythia* of old are conceived to have been inspir'd through the power of certain exhalations breath'd from those caverns they had their recess in. For what means this bold purpose of contriving a new law for plurality of Wives amongst Christians, but that his judgment was overclouded by some venerous fumes and vapours?

SECT. XLII.

Of Philosophical Enthusiasm.

THAT other kind of Enthusiasm I propounded was *Philosophical*, because found in such as are of a more *Speculative* and *Philosophical* complexion. And *Melancholy* here making them prone to Religion and devotion, as well as to the curious Contemplation of things, these natural motions and affections towards God may drive them to

a belief, that he has more than ordinary affection towards them, and that they have so special an assistance and guidance from him, nay, such a mysterious, but intimate and real union with him, that every fine thought or fancy, that steals into their mind, ought to be look'd upon by them as a pledge of the Divine favour, and of a singular illumination from God himself.

Wherein they seem to me to imitate the madness of *Elionora Meliorina*, a Gentlewoman of *Mantua*, who being fully perswaded she was married to a King, would kneel down, and talk with him, as if he had been there present with his retinue; and if she had by chance found a piece of glass in a muck-hill, light upon an oyster-shell, piece of tin, or any such like thing that would glister in the Sun-shine, she would say it was a jewel sent from her Lord and Husband, and upon this account, fill'd her cabinet full of such trash.

In like manner, these inspired *Melancholists* stuff their heads and writings with every flaring fancy that *Melancholy* suggests to them, as if it were a precious Truth bestow'd upon them by the holy Spirit; and with a devotional reverence they entertain the unexpected Paroxysms of their own natural distemper, as if it were the power and presence of God himself in their Souls.

SECT. XLIII.

Sundry Chymists and Theosophists obnoxious to this Disease.

THIS disease many of our *Chymists* and several *Theosophists*, in my judgment, seem very obnoxious to, who dictate their own Conceits and Fancies so magisterially and imperiously, as if they were indeed Authentick messengers from God Almighty. But that they are but Counterfeits, that is, *Enthusiasts*, no infallible illuminated men, the gross fopperies they let drop in their writings, will sufficiently demonstrate to all that are not smitten in some measure with the like Lunacy with themselves. I shall instance in some few things, concealing the names of the Authors, because they are so sacred to some.

SECT. XLIV.

A promiscuous Collection of divers odd conceits out of several Theosophists and Chymists.

LISTEN therefore attentively, for I shall relate very great mysteries. The virtues of the Planets do not ascend, but descend. Experience teaches as much, viz. That of *Venus* or *Copper* is not made *Mars* or *Iron*, but of *Mars* is made *Venus*, as being an inferior sphere. So also *Jupiter* or *Tin* is easily changed into *Mercury* or *Quick-silver*, be-

because *Jupiter* is the second from the firmament, and *Mercury* the second from the Earth, *Saturn* is the first from the Heaven, and *Luna* the first from the Earth. *Sol* mixeth it self with all, but is never bettered by his inferiours. Now know that there is a great agreement betwixt *Saturn* or *Lead*, and *Luna* or *Silver*, *Jupiter* and *Mercury*, *Mars* and *Venus*, because in the midst of these *Sol* is placed.

What can it be but the heaving of the *Hypochondria* that lifts up the Mind to such high comparisons from a supposition so false and foolish? But I have observed generally of *Chymists* and *Theosophists*, as of several other men more palpably mad, that their thoughts are carried much to *Astrology*, it being a fanciful study, built upon very slight grounds, and indeed I do not question, but a relique of the ancient Superstition and Idolatry amongst the rude Heathens, which either their own *Melancholy*, or something worse, instructed them in.

There are other pretty conceits in these Writers concerning those heavenly Bodies: as, That the *Stars* and *Planets*, the *Moon* not excepted, are of the same quality with *precious Stones* that glister here on the earth; and that though they act nothing, yet they are of that nature as that the wandring Spirits of the air see in them, as in a looking-glass, things to come, and thereby are inabled to prophesy.

That the *Stars* are made of the *Sun*, and yet that the *Sun* enlightens them.

That our *Eyes* have their original from the *Stars*, and that this is the reason why we can see the *Stars*.

That our *Eyes* work or act upon all they see, as well as what they see acts on them. That also is a very special mystery for an inspir'd man to utter; That there is only Evening and Morning under the *Sun*.

That the *Stars* kindle heat in this world every where for generation, and that the difference of *Stars* makes the difference of Creatures.

That were the heat of the *Sun* taken away, he were one light with God.

That all is God's self.

That a man's self is God, if he live holily.

That God is nothing but an hearty Loving, friendly Seeing, good Smelling, well Tasting, kindly Feeling, amorous Kissing, &c. Nor the Spirit, say I, that inspires this mystery any thing but *Melancholy* and *Sanguine*.

That God the Father is of himself a dale of darkness, were it not for the light of his Son.

That God could not quell *Lucifer's* rebellion, because the battle was not betwixt God and a Beast, or God and a man, but betwixt God and God, *Lucifer* being so great a share of his own Essence.

That Nature is the Body of God, nay, God the Father, who is also the World, and whatsoever is any way sensible or perceptible.

That the *Star-powers* are Nature, and the *Star-circle* the mother of all things, from which all is, subsists, and moves.

That the Waters of this world are mad, which makes them rave, and run up and down so as they do in the channels of the Earth.

That the blue Orb is the waters above the Firmament.

That

That there be two kinds of Fires, the one cold and the other hot, and that Death is a cold fire.

That *Adam* was an Hermaphrodite.

That the fire would not burn, nor there have been any darkness, but for *Adam's* fall.

That it is a very suspicious matter that *Saturn* before the fall was where *Mercury*, and *Mercury* where *Saturn* is.

That there are three Souls in a Man, *Animal*, *Angelical*, and *Divine*; and that after Death the *Animal* Soul is in the grave, the *Angelical* in *Abraham's* Bosom, and the *Divine* Soul in Paradise.

That God has Eyes, Ears, Nose, and other corporeal Parts.

That every thing has Sense, Imagination, and a fiducial Knowledge of God in it, *Metals*, *Meteors* and *Plants* not excepted.

That this Earth at last shall be calcined into Crystal.

That at the Center of the Earth is the Fire of hell, which is caused and kindled by the *Primum mobile* and influences of the Stars.

That the *Arctic* pole draws waters by the Axle-tree, which after they are entered in, break forth again by the Axle-tree of the *Antarctic*.

That the Moon, as well as the Stars, is made of a less pure kind of Fire mixed with Air.

That the pure Blood in Man answers to the Element of Fire in the great World, his Heart to the Earth, his Mouth to the *Arctic* pole, and the opposite Orifice to the *Antarctic* pole.

That the proper seat of the Mind or Understanding is in the mouth of the Stomach or about the Splene.

That Earthquakes and Thunders are not from natural causes, but made by Angels or Devils.

That there were no Rain-bows before *Noah's* Flood.

That the Moon is a conglaciated substance, having a cold light of her own, whereby the light of the Sun, which she receives and casts on us, becomes so cool.

S E C T. XLV.

A particular Collection out of Paracelsus.

Hitherto our Collections have been promiscuous, what follows is out of *Paracelsus* only; as for example:

That the variety of the Altitudes of the Sun does not cause Summer and Winter, because the Sun has the same heat, be he higher or lower; but that there be *Æstival* and *Hybernal* Stars that are the grand causes of these seasons. *Paracels. de Meteoris, c. 3*

That the absence of the Sun is not the cause of Night, forasmuch as his light is so great that it may illuminate the Earth all over at once as clear as broad day; but that Night is brought on by the influence of *dark Stars* that ray out darkness and obscurity upon the Earth, as the Sun does light.

That

Paracels. de Meteor. cap. 4. That the *Gnomi*, *Nymphae*, *Lemures* and *Penates*, Spirits endued with Understanding as much or more than Men, are yet wholly mortal, not having so much as an immortal Soul in them.

De Meteoris cap. 5. That the Stars are as it were the Phials, or Cucurbits, in which Meteorical Sal, Sulphur and Mercury are contained; and that the Winds which are made of these, by the *Aethereal Vulcanes*, are blown forth out of these Emunctories, as when a Man blows or breaths out of his Mouth.

De Meteor. c. 6. That the Stars are as it were the Pots in which the *Archeus* or heavenly *Vulcan* prepares pluvious matter, which exhaled from thence first appears in the form of clouds, after condenses to rain.

De Meteor. c. 7. That Hail and Snow are also the fruits of the Stars, proceeding from them as flowers and blossomes are from herbs and trees.

De Meteor. c. 8. That Thunder is caused by the *Penates*, who taking *Aethereal Sulphur*, *Sal-nitre* and *Mercury*, and putting them into their *Aludel*, that is their Star, after a sufficient preparation there, the Star then pourses them forth into the Air; and so they become the matter of Thunder, whose sound is so great and terrible, because it is re-echoed from the arched roof of Heaven, as when a Gun is let off under an hallow vault.

De Meteor. c. 9. That the Lightnings without Thunder are as it were the deciduous flowers of the *Aestival* Stars.

De Meteor. cap. 10. That the Stars eat and are nourished, and therefore must ease themselves; and that those falling Stars, as some call them, which are found on the earth in the form of a trembling gelly, are their excrement.

That those Meteors called *Dracones volantes* have a brutish understanding and sense in them.

That the *Parelii* and *Paraselenae* are made by the *Penates* as by Artificers, that counterfeit the form and shape of a silver Pot in adulterate metal.

See Paracelsus his Scientia Astronomica. That all humane and natural understanding is in the Stars, and conveyed from thence to Man, and that he must suck it from thence to feed his Soul, as he takes in meat to nourish his Body.

That the reason of *Divination* is this, That a Man has a sydereal body besides this terrestrial which is joined with the Stars; and so when this sydereal body is more free from the Elements, as in sleep, this body and the Stars confabulating together, the Mind is informed of things to come.

That the Stars are struck with a terroure or horroure of the approach of any Man's Death, whence it is that no Man dies without some sign or notice from them, as the *dantes of dead Men*, some noise in the House, or the like.

That as by a *Divine Faith* the dead are raised and mountains cast into the midst of the Sea; so by the *Faith of Nature* the influence of the Stars, who know all the secrets of Nature, is to be commanded, and thereby a Man may know naturally what is to come.

That *Giants*, *Nymphs*, *Gnomi* and *Pygmies* were the conceptions and births of the *Imaginative* power of the influence of the Stars upon Matter prepared by them, and that they had no Souls; as it is most likely the Inhabitants of the more remote parts of the World have none, as not being the offspring of *Adam*.

That

That a Fowler by the help of his Star need not go after Birds, for they will fly after him ; and so Fishes swim to the Fisherman, and wild Beasts follow the Hunter, upon the same account of his Stars.

That the separation of the three parts of the world, *Europe, Asia, Africa*, is a certain representation of the three Chymical principles, *Sal, Sulphur, and Mercury*, of which three the whole World was made.

That there is an artificial way of making an *Homunculus*, and that the *Fairies* of the woods, *Nymphs* and *Giants* themselves had some such original, and that these *Homunculi* thus made will know all manner of secrets and mysteries of art, *themselves receiving their lives, bodies, flesh, bone, and blood from an artificial principle.* Paracels. de Natura rerum, lib. 1.

SECT. XLVI.

That Paracelsus has given occasion to the wildest Philosophick Enthusiasms that ever were yet on foot.

THESE are the rampant and delirious Fancies of that great boaster of Europe *Paracelsus*, whose unbridled Imagination, and bold and confident obtrusion of his uncouth and supine inventions upon the world has, I dare say, given occasion to the wildest *Philosophical Enthusiasms* that ever were broached by any, either Christian or Heathen. That last conceit of his some have endeavoured to *Allegorize*, as the *Persians* do the *Alcoran*, ashamed of the gross sense of it, but in my apprehension, so frigidly and unsuitably, that it would confirm a man the more, that the letter is the intended truth ; and if one compare it with what he writes of *Nymphs, Giants, and Fairies*, in his *Scientia Astronomica*, he will make no further doubt of it.

SECT. XLVII.

That Paracelsus his Philosophy, though himself intended it not, is one of the safest sanctuaries for the Atheist, and the very prop of ancient Paganism.

THERE is some affectation of Religion, I confess, in his Writings, and far more in his Followers, who conceive themselves taught of God ; when I plainly discern their Brains are merely heated and infected by this strong spirit of *Phantast*ry that breaths in *Paracelsus* his Books.

I know it is no part of *Prudence* to speak slightly of those that others admire ; but that *Prudence* is but *Craft* that commands an unfaithful silence. And I know not how an honest man can discharge his conscience in prudentially conniving at such falsities as he sees ensnare the Minds of men, while they do not only abuse their Intellectuals by foppish

foppish and ridiculous conceptions, but insinuate such dangerous and mischievous Opinions, as supplant and destroy the very Fundamentals of Christian Religion.

For I appeal to any man, What is nearer to ancient *Paganism* than what this bold writer has uttered concerning the *Stars*? or what Sanctuary so safe for the Atheist that derides and eludes all Religion, as such a *miraculous influence* of the Heavens, as *Paracelsus* describes in his *Scientia Astronomica*? Wherefore I should be very much amaz'd at the Madness and Inconsistency of him and his Followers, who have ever and anon a fling against *Heathen Philosophy*, when themselves take into their writings the very dregs of it, *viz.* the gross Principles of the ancient *Pagan Superstition* and *Idolatry*, did I not remember that they are *Enthusiasts*, and follow not the guidance of *Reason*, but the strength of *Phancy*.

Jupiter est quodcunque vides, &c.

This taken in the courtest sense, I make no question but it was the grand Principle from whence did flow so many Varieties and Impurities of the *Pagan Superstition*, they fancying they met God in every object of their senses; and our exorbitant *Enthusiasts* profess, That every thing is God, in love or wrath: Which, if I understand any thing, is no better than *Atheism*. For it implies that God is nothing else but the *Universal Matter* of the World, dressed up in several shapes and forms, in sundry properties and qualities; some grateful, some ungrateful; some holy, some profane; some wise, some senseless; some weak, some strong, and the like. But to slice God into so many parts, is to wound him and kill him, and to make no God at all.

SECT. XLVIII.

How the Paracelsian Philosophy justifies the Heathens worshipping of the Stars, derogates from the Authority of the Miracles of our Saviour, makes the Gospel ineffectual for the establishing of the belief of a God, and a particular Providence, and gratifies that profest Atheist Vaninus in what he most of all triumphs in, as serving his turn the best to elude all Religion whatsoever.

A GAIN, how does *Paracelsus* justify the Heathens worshipping the Stars, he making them such knowing, powerful, and compassionate spectators of humane affairs! And why might they not pray to them, as *Anne Bodenham* the Witch did to the Planet *Jupiter* for the curing diseases, if they have so much power and knowledge as to generate men here below, and confer gifts upon them? For it would be no more than asking a man's Father or God-father blessing. For if it be admitted that any one Nation is begot by the Stars, the Atheist will assuredly assume that they are all so.

Moreover, how shall we repair the loss and damage done to the Authority of our blessed Saviour his Miracles? whereby not only Christianity, but the first Fundamentals of all true Religion are eminently established, *viz.* The Discovery of a Special and Particular Providence

dence of God, and an hope of a life to come. For if the Stars can make such living creatures of prepared Matter that have sense and understanding, which yet have no immortal Souls, but wholly return into dead Matter again, why is it not so with men as well as them? And if they can contribute the power of such wonder-working wisdom as was in Moses and in Christ, or what is so very nigh to it, what footsteps do there remain of proof that there is any God or Spirits? for all is thus resolvable into the power of the Stars. A thing that that zealous and industrious Atheist *Cesar Vaninus* triumphs in exceedingly, in his *Amphitheatrum aterne Providentia*; where he cites several *Astrological* passages out of *Cardan*, under pretence to refute them, in which he fetches the Original of those eminent Law-givers, *Moses*, *Christ*, and *Mahomet*, from the influence of the Stars.

The Law of *Moses* is from *Saturn*, says *Cardan*; that of *Christ* from *Jupiter* and *Mercury*, that of *Mahomet* from *Sol* and *Mars*; the Law of the Idolaters from the *Moon* and *Mars*.

And in another place *Cardan* imputes that sweetness, and meekness, and wisdom, and eloquence that was in our Saviour, whereby he was able to dispute in the Temple at twelve years of age, to the influence of *Jupiter*.

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* But how fanciful and confounded an account there is of *Astrology*, let any Man that has patience, as well as sobriety of reason, judge.

*See my Explan. of the Mystery of Godliness, Book 7. chap. 15, 16, 17.

SECT. XLIX.

That *Paracelsus* and his followers are neither *Atheistical* nor *Diabolical*; and what makes the *Chymist* ordinarily so pitiful a *Philosopher*.

I Do not speak these things as if I thought either *Paracelsus* or his followers thus *Atheistical*, but to shew their *Phantastry* and *Enthusiasm*, they so hotly pretending to matters of Christianity and Religion, and yet handling them so grossly and indiscreetly, blurring out any garish foolery that comes into their mind, though it be quite contrary to the Analogie of Faith, nor has any shew of ground in solid Reason, only to make themselves to be stared upon and wondred at by the World.

But the Event of it is, that as some admire them, so others execrate them, as Men of an impious and diabolical Spirit. Which I confess I think too harsh a censure, well-meaning Men being lyable to *Melancholy* and *Lunacies* as well as to *Agues* and burning Fevers. Yet a Man should be so far off from thinking the better of any discovery of Truth by an *Enthusiastick* spirit, that he should rather for that very cause suspect it; because that Temper that makes men *Enthusiastical* is the greatest enemy to Reason, it being more thick and muddy, and therefore once

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heated, intoxicates them like *Wine* in the muste, and is more likely to fill their Brains full of odd fancies, than with any true notions of Philosophy.

But men of a purer blood and finer spirits are not so obnoxious to this distemper: For this is the most natural seat of sublimer Reason; whereas that more Mechanical kind of *Genius* that loves to be tumbling off, and trying tricks with the *Matter*, (which they call *making Experiments*) when desire of knowledge has so heated it, that it takes upon it to become *Architectonical*, and fly above its sphere, it commits the wildest hallucinations imaginable, that material or corporeal fancy egregiously fumbling in more subtle and spiritual speculations.

This is that that commonly makes the *Chymist* so pitiful a *Philosopher*, who, from the narrow inspection of some few toys in his own art, conceives himself able to give a reason of all things in *Divinity* and *Nature*; as ridiculous a project in my judgment, as that of his, that finding a piece of a broken Oar on the sand, busied his brains above all measure to contrive it into an entire Ship.

SECT. L.

The Writer of this Discourse no foe to either Theosophist or Chymist, only he excuses himself from being over-credulous in regard of either.

WHAT I have hitherto spoken I would have so understood, as coming from one that neither contemns the well-meaning of the *Theosophist*, nor disallows of the industry of the *Chymist*; but I shall ever excuse my self from giving any credit to either, any further than some lusty Miracle, transcendent Medicine, or solid Reason shall extort from me.

SECT. LI.

The Cure of Enthusiasm by Temperance, Humility, and Reason.

WE have spoken of the *Kinds of Enthusiasm* so far as we held it serviceable for our design, we shall now touch upon the *Cure of this Disease*. Where having all pretence to the knowledge of *Physick*, or acquaintance with the *Apothecary's shop*, we shall set down only such things as fall under a *Moral* or *Theological* consideration, giving only instructions for the guidance of a man's life, in reference to this grand error of *Enthusiasm*: which a sober man cannot well determine whether it be more ridiculous, or deplorable and mischievous.

Now the most sovereign Medicine that I know against it, is this *Dia-trion*, or Composition of Three excellent Ingredients, to wit, *Temperance*, *Humility*, and *Reason*; which as I do not despair but that it may recover those that are somewhat far gone in this *Enthusiastick* di-

distemper, so I am confident that it will not fail to prevent it in them that are not as yet considerably smitten.

S E C T. LII.

What is meant by Temperance.

BY *Temperance* I understand a measurable Abstinence from all hot or heightning meats or drinks, as also from all venerous pleasures and tactual delights of the Body, from all softness and effeminacy; a constant and peremptory adhesion to the perfectest degree of *Chastity* in the single life, and of *Continency* in wedlock, that can be attain'd to. For it is plain in sundry examples of *Enthusiasm* above-named, that the more hidden and lurking fumes of *Lust* had tainted the Phancies of those Pretenders to *Prophecy* and *Inspiration*.

We will add also to these, moderate exercise of Body, and seasonable taking of the fresh air, and due and discreet use of Devotion, whereby the Blood is ventilated and purged from dark oppressing vapours; which a temperate diet, if not fasting, must also accompany: or else the more hot and zealous our addresses are, the more likely they are to bring mischief upon our own heads, they raising the feculency of our intemperance into those more precious parts of the Body, the *Brains* and *Animal Spirits*, and so intoxicating the Mind with fury and wildness.

S E C T. LIII.

What is meant by Humility, and the great advantage thereof for Wisdom and Knowledge.

BY *Humility* I understand an entire Submission to the will of God in all things, a deadness to all self-excellency and pre-eminency before others, a perfect Privation of all desire of singularity, or attracting of the eyes of men upon a man's own person, as little to relish a man's own praise or glory in the world as if he had never been born into it; but to be wholly contented with this one thing, that his Will is a subduing to the Will of God, and that with thankfulness and reverence he doth receive whatever Divine Providence brings upon him, be it sweet or sour, with the hair, or against it, it is all one to him; for what he cannot avoid, it is the gift of God to the world, in order to a greater good.

But here I must confess, that he that is thus affected, as he seeks no knowledge to please himself, so he cannot avoid being the *most knowing man* that is. For he is surrounded with the beams of Divine Wisdom, as the low depressed Earth with the rays of the Stars; his deeply and profoundly *humbled* Soul being as it were the Centre of all heavenly illuminations, as this little globe of the Earth is of those celestial influences. I profess I stand amaz'd while I consider the ineffable

advantages of a Mind thus submitted to the Divine Will, how calm, how comprehensive, how quick and sensible she is, how free, how sagacious, of how tender a touch and judgment she is in all things. Whenas *Pride* and strong desire ruffles the Mind into uneven waves and boisterous fluctuations, that the eternal light of *Reason* concerning either *Nature* or *Life*, cannot imprint its perfect and distinct image or character there; nor can so subtil and delicate motions and impressions be sensible to the Understanding disturbed and agitated in so violent a storm.

That man therefore who has got this *Humble frame of Spirit*, which is of so mighty concernment for acquiring all manner of *Wisdom*, as well *Natural* as *Divine*, cannot possibly be so foolish as to be mistaken in that which is the genuine result of a contrary temper; and such is that of *Enthusiasm*, that puffs up men into an opinion that they have a more than ordinary influence from God that acts upon their Spirits, and that he designs them by special appointment to be *new Prophets*, *new Law-givers*, *new Davids*, *new Messiahs*, and what not? when it is nothing but the working of the *Old man* in them in a fanatical manner.

S E C T. LIV.

What meant by Reason, and what the danger of leaving that Guide; as also the mistake of them that expect the Spirit should not suggest such things as are rational.

BY *Reason* I understand so settled and cautious a Composure of Mind as will suspect every high-flown and forward Fancy that endeavours to carry away the assent before deliberate examination; she not enduring to be gulled by the vigour or garishness of the representation, nor at all to be born down by the weight or strength of it; but patiently to try it by the known Faculties of the Soul, which are either the *Common notions* that all men in their wits agree upon, or the *Evidence of outward Sense*, or else a *clear and distinct Deduction from these*.

Whatever is not agreeable to these three is *Fancy*, which testifies nothing of the *Truth* or *Existence* of any thing, and therefore ought not, nor cannot be assented to by any but mad-men or fools.

And those that talk so loud of that higher Principle, *The Spirit*, with exclusion of these, betray their own ignorance; and while they would, by their wild Rhetorick, dissuade men from the use of their *Rational* faculties, under pretence of expectation of an higher and more glorious Light, do as madly, in my mind, as if, a company of men travailing by night with links, torches, and lanthorns, some furious Orator amongst them should, by his wonderful strain of Eloquence, so befool them into a misconceit of their present condition, comparing of it with the sweet and chearful splendor of the day, as thereby to cause them, through impatience and indignation, to beat out their links and torches, and break a-pieces their lanthorns against the ground,
and

and so chuse rather to foot it in the dark, with hazard of knocking their noses against the next Tree they meet, and tumbling into the next ditch, than to continue the use of those convenient lights, that they had in their sober temper prepared for the safety of their journey,

But the *Enthusiast's* mistake is not only in leaving his present Guide before he has a better, but in having a false notion of him he does expect. For assuredly that *Spirit of Illumination* which resides in the Souls of the faithful, is a Principle of the *purest Reason* that is communicable to the humane Nature. And what *this Spirit* has, he has from Christ, (as Christ himself witnesseth) who is the Eternal $\alpha\beta\gamma\omega$, the all-comprehending Wisdom and Reason of God, wherein he sees through the Natures and *Ideas* of all things, with all their respects of Dependency and Independency, Congruity and Incongruity, or whatever Habitude they have one to another, with one continued glance at once.

Whatever of *Intellectual light* is communicated to us, is derived from hence, and is in us *Particular Reason*, or *Reason in Succession*, or by *piecemeal*. Nor is there any thing the *holy Spirit* did ever suggest to any man but it was agreeable to, if not demonstrable from what we call *Reason*. And to be thus perswaded, how powerful a Curb it will be upon the exorbitant impressions and motions of *Melancholy* and *Enthusiasm*, I leave it to any man to judge.

SECT. LV. ;

Farther Helps against Enthusiasm.

TO these three notable and more general Helps, we might add some particular Considerations whereby we may keep off this *Enthusiastical* pertinacity from our selves, or discover it when it has taken hold upon others. As for example; if any man shall pretend to the discovery of a Truth by *Inspiration*, that is of no good use or consequence to the Church of God, it is to me little less than a Demonstration that he is *Fanatical*. If he heaps up *Falshoods* as well as *Truths*, and pretends to be *inspired in all*, it is to me an Evidence he is *inspired in none* of those Mysteries he offers to the world.

SECT. LVI.

Of the raised language of Enthusiasts, and of what may extraordinarily fall from them.

THERE are certain advantages also that *Enthusiasts* have, which are to be taken notice of, whereby they have imposed upon many; as, That they have spoken very *raisedly* and *divinely*, which most certainly has happen'd to sundry persons a little before they have grown stark mad; and that they may hit of something extraordinary is no pledge of the truth of the rest.

For this unquiet and tumultuous spirit of *Melancholy* shaking their whole bodily frame, is like an Earthquake to one in a dungeon, which for a small moment makes the very walls gape and cleave, and so lets in light for a while at those chinks; but all closes up again suddenly, and the prisoner is confined to his wonted darkness. This therefore was a chance in Nature, not a gracious visit of the Spirit of God.

S E C T. LVII.

Of *Enthusiastick* Prophecy that ordinarily happens to fools and mad-men, and the reason why; as also why *Ecstatical* men foresee things to come, and of the uncertainty of such Predictions.

Hereunto you may also join the luck of Prophecy, be it sleeping or waking; for such things have happen'd to mad-men and fools, and *Aristotle* offers a pretty reason that may reach both. Ἡ δὲ δαίμονια τῶν τοιούτων ἐφροντιστική, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ἐξήμῃ καὶ κινή πάντων, καὶ κινήδωκα καὶ τὸ κινεῖν αὐτῶν. To which he also adds why *Ecstatical* men foresee future things, Ὅτι αἱ οἰκτεῖται κινήσεις ἐκ ἐναχλῶν, ἀλλ' ὑπορρατίζονται τῇ ξενικῶν ζωῇ καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. All which intimates thus much, That an alienation of mind, and rest from our own motions, fits us for a reception of impressions from something else, and so by a quick sense and touch we may be advertis'd, through a communication of motion from the Spirit of the world, what is done at a distance, or what Causes are conspiring to bring this or that to pass; which turning off again, make the Prediction false: For every thing that offers to be, does not come into actual Being. Wherefore all these Presages are not δόγματα, but may be only δαίμονια. Ἡ δὲ φύσις δαίμονια, καὶ δαίμων they are the words of *Aristotle*, but such as some skilful *Platonist* will most easily explain.

All that I aim at is this, That Prophecy may arise from on this side of the pure and infallible Deity, and it is our mistake that we think that what Predictions fall out true, are certainly foreknown by the Foreteller. For the present conspiracy of Causes that shoot into the vacant mind may corrupt and alter, and be blown away like clouds, that at first seem to assure the husbandman of a following rain.

S E C T. LVIII.

That if an Enthusiast should cure some diseases by touching or stroaking the party diseas'd, yet it might be no true Miracle.

BUT there is yet a stronger allurements than Prophecy to draw on belief to the Enthusiast, which is a semblance of doing some Miracle, as the curing some desperate disease; as it happen'd very lately in this Nation. For it is very credibly reported, and I think cannot be deny'd, That one, by the stroaking of a man's arm that was dead and

and useless to him, recover'd it to life and strength. When I heard of it, and read some few pages of that miraculous Physician's writing, my judgment was, that the cure was *natural*, but that his Blood and Spirits were boil'd to that height, that it would hazard his Brain: which proved true, for he was stark mad not very long after.

There may be very well a fanative and healing Contagion as well as morbid and venomous. And the Spirits of *Melancholy* men being more massy and ponderous, when they are so highly refined and actuated by a more than ordinary heat and vigour of the Body, may prove a very powerful *Elixir*, Nature having out-done the usual pretences of *Chymistry* in this case.

S E C T. LIX.

Of the Willingness and Patience to suffer in Enthusiasts.

THEIR *Willingness* also to suffer, or *Patience* in suffering may seem to give an extraordinary Testimony to some *Enthusiasts*, as if there were something Divine or Supernatural in them. But admiration will abate, if we consider how passionately some abhor from the sense of *Pleasure*, accounting it the *Summum malum*, the greatest evil. For which Paradox *Antisthenes* is noted in * *Aulus Gellius*, as also for his suitable Motto, *Μακρὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡδύτατον*, as if down-right *Madness* were more tolerable than it. Others there are who, according to mere *Complexion*, love to conflict with troubles and dangers: such as those are who undergo *Warfares* and *Sea-voyages* with a natural delight. Others make it their study, and pride themselves in it, to become insensible of pain, or to bear it as if they were not at all affected by it; insomuch that the Condition has passed into a term of Art amongst the *Stoicks*, who call this power *Ἀπάθεια* and *Ἀναλγησία*. * Noct. Attic. lib. 9. cap. 5.

But this is nothing but a *Spartan* obfirmation of Mind, back'd with the sense of shame, a desire of glory, or the contentment of being conscious to themselves of their own Stoutness and tolerance. Of which a notorious Instance is that of the *Lacedaemonian* Lad, who, having conceal'd a Fox under his coat, would not cry out, though he was a gnawing of his very entrails.

Anaxarchus his pain, though it seems not so sharp, yet his courage appears as great; in that he could Philosophize so freely while he was, by the cruelty of *Archelaus*, braying in a mortar; whence he cry'd out in the midst of their thumpings upon him, *Πῶς, πῶς Ἀναξάρχου δούλον*, Nonnus in his Synagog. Hist. upon Greg. Nazianzen's Invektives against Julian the Apostate. adding therein wit to his philosophy, and comparing his Body to the Sack, but making his Soul as good as absent, and the Sack empty, by her professed insensibleness of the strokes, and unconcernedness in what befel the Body: Which yet notwithstanding, setting aside his natural surmise of the Soul's Immortality, was nothing but fullen and inconsiderate *Stoicism*; for his Body had then more reason to defy their blows than his Soul, she alone being capable of sense and pain. So that the special support of his Mind was but an inveterate error and fancy. How

How *Wrath* and *Indignation* will also hold up the Spirits against *Fear* and *Pain*, is seen in that brief Instance of *Theano*, who being forcibly urged to betray the secrets of her Country, bit out her tongue, and spit it at the face of the Tyrant. These are examples evident enough of that affected, and not altogether unattainable power of *Indolency* amongst the Heathen.

Noët. Attic.
c. 12. l. 15.

What to call that which *Gellius* reports of a certain Gladiator of *Cæsar's*, who would laugh when his wounds were a drying and cleansing, I know not: for it seems more than a simple *Ἀναισθησία*, or *Indolentia*. But out of these Examples and Considerations it is manifest, That there is no such divinity or supernatural holiness in the stoutly and peremptorily bearing of pain, nor any necessity of a Divine assistance therein. Either simple Resolution of mind upon some imbibed *Dogma*, or the power of some concealed Passion may enable them to bear up against all.

And yet these are but small things in comparison of what the *Enthusiast* is armed with, upon the account of his peculiar condition. For besides that his very *Complexion* makes him stiff, inflexible, and unyielding, (for there is no Temper so sturdy and peremptory as *Melancholy* is, even in cases more dispensable) there is yet a further force added thereto from the strong conceit he has of being *inspired*, and consequently of his Cause being infallibly good: For this tends naturally to the making of him invincible in his Sufferings, he being conscious to himself both of the firm goodness of his Cause, as he conceives, and of the indispensableness of his duty in adhering thereto. To which you may add the certain expectation of future glory and happiness for his Martyrdom. So plain it is that there is nothing supernatural or miraculous in the case.

SECT. LX.

That the resolved Sufferings for mistaken points in Religion is no good Argument against the truth of all Religion.

I Must confess that an ordinary reflexion upon this *resolvedness* of suffering to the utmost extremity in persons that are thus mistaken in the points they suffer for, cannot but make such as are *Atheistically* inclined, subject to think, That there is no Truth nor Certainty at all in Religion; since that where men seem to themselves so certain, that they dare, and do actually pawn their lives upon it, yet they are so grossly mistaken. And it is plain they are so, in that persons of contrary persuasions suffer with the like confidence, and to the like extremity, chusing rather to leave their lives than their Opinions and Party. Which is found true both in *Jews*, *Mahometans*, *Papists*, and *Protestants*.

This indeed at first sight bears no small shew of Reason; but if more nearly look'd into, will prove but a weak and sorry Sophism. For if this Ratiocination were solid, it would follow, That there were nothing true
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in Philosophy neither. For assuredly Men are as firmly persuaded contrary ways in the same points there, as they are in Religion; and there can be but one part true. But that they are not so persuaded of the matter that they will die for it, is not because they do not as firmly believe their Opinions in Philosophy, but because there is no obligation of Conscience and an Eternal interest founded in them as there is in Religion. Otherwise if it were a conscientious point of Religion to be a *Copernican*, *Tychonist*, or *Aristotelean*, in reference to the System of the World; I think there is no question to be made but there would be Martyrs for them all, at least for two of them; the one being so exquisitely consonant to *Reason*, the other so grossly accommodated to *Sense*.

Besides, I cannot but note, That it is very low and unphilosophical in these *Atheistical* Wits, to make their Appeal concerning these noble Theoremes of the *Existence of God and the Truth of Religion* to so petty a Court of Judicature as mere *Humane Testimony*. For such in their arguing do they make their Sufferings of Martyrs in opposite Religions, and fancy their laying down their lives but as the laying of great wagers. Which *Topick* some have Sarcastically called the Argument of Fools.

But whatever force *Humane Testimony* hath in these Cases, it is so far from serving the Atheist's turn, that it makes against him. For admit that these *Anti-Martyrs* (as I may so call them) give witness singly one against another, yet they jointly give witness against the Atheist, sealing it with their Blood, *That there is a God, and a Life to come*. Which I take not to be only the Effect of Education, but of a natural Sagacity in the better sort of Men, and a proneness in them to think so: Which being further strengthened by the institutes of Religion, especially so clear and convictive as Christianity, may very well get the power of engaging a Man's Conscience to lay down his life even for such things as mere Education has impressed upon him, or some *Melancholy* conceit. But the firm bottom and support of all, and that without which they would not suffer for any thing, is the sincere and unshaken belief *That there is a God, and an Happiness to be expected after this Life*. Whereupon the Conscience being scrupulous, and not daring to act or assent to such things as it may be she only strongly suspects to be evil or false, chuses the safer way for her main interest, namely, rather to suffer than to sin.

So that it is not so much the firm belief of these things they suffer for (suppose either Papist or Protestant) as the care of doing nothing that they suspect is sinful, which makes them undergo *Martyrdom*.

Whence the very ground of the Atheist's *Paralogism* is also found invalid. Nor is it plain from their suffering that they are so firm and determinate in the points they suffer for that are false. But admit the *Enthusiast* be, *Fanaticism* is but a disease of Religion, and implies no more that there is no Religion, than *Madness* that there is no Reason, or any Corporeal Disease, that there is no such thing as Health, or an humane Body in the world.

SECT. LXI.

Of the remote Notions, mysterious Style, and moving Eloquence of Enthusiasts.

Whatever credit the *Enthusiast* may conciliate to himself from his *moving Eloquence*, his *mysterious Style*, and *unexpected notions*, they are easily to be resolved into that Principle of *Melancholy* above-named, the sense of which Complexion is so deep and vigorous, that it cannot fail to inable the Tongue to tell her story with a great deal of life and affection; and the *Imagination* is so extravagant, that it is far easier for her to ramble abroad, and fetch in some odd skue conceit from a remote obscure corner, than to think of what is nearer, and more ordinarily intelligible.

But these things are so fully and plainly comprehended in those *General Causes of Enthusiasm* we have already declared, besides what we have particularly touch'd upon before, that it will not be worth our labour to insist any longer upon them. When we have satisfy'd a Scruple or two concerning what we have said of *Melancholy* and *Enthusiasm*, I think we shall have omitted nothing materially pertinent to this present Speculation.

SECT. LXII.

How we shall distinguish betwixt pure Religion and Complexion.

AND the first is, How we can distinguish betwixt *Religion* and *Melancholy*, we having attributed so notable Effects thereunto. The second is, Whether we have not revis'd and vilified all *Enthusiasm* whatsoever, and invited men to a cold *Pharisaical* stupidity and acting, merely according to an outward letter, without an inward testimony of life.

The meaning of the first Scruple must be restrain'd to such things as in their externals are laudable and approvable, viz. whether such as they be out of a *Divine* or *Natural* principle? whether from *God* or *Complexion*? For in those things that are at their very first view discern'd to be culpable, it is plain that they are not from *God*.

I answer therefore, That there are three main discriminations betwixt the *Spirit* and the most *Specious Complexion*. The first is, That that *Piety* or *Goodness* which is from the *Spirit of God* is *universal*, extirpating every vice, and omitting nothing that is truly a divine virtue.

The second is, A belief of those holy Oracles comprehended in the Old and New Testament, they being rightly interpreted; and particularly of that Article, That *Jesus Christ*, even he that died on the Cross at *Jerusalem* betwixt two thieves, is the *Son of God*, *Sovereign of men and Angels*, that he in his own person shall come again to judge the quick and the dead.

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The third and last is An *universal Prudence*, whereby a man neither admits nor acts any thing but what is solidly rational at the bottom, and of which he can give a good account, let the success be what it will. He that finds himself thus affected, may be sure it is the *Spirit of God*, not the power of *Complexion* or *Nature* that rules in him. But this man to others, if they be unbelieving, and so rude and unprepared as not to be capable of *Reason*, he is nothing to them, unless he can do a *Miracle*. How vain then is the *Enthusiast* that is destitute of both? But those ancient Records of *Miracles*, done in the behalf of Christianity, are a sufficient Testimony of the Truth of our Religion to those whose hearts are rightly fitted for it.

SECT. LXIII.

That the devotional Enthusiasm of holy and sincere Souls has not at all been taxed in all this Discourse.

TO the Second scruple I answer, That there has not one word all this time been spoken against that *true* and *warrantable Enthusiasm* of devout and holy Souls, who are so strangely transported in that vehement *Love* they bear towards God, and that unexpressible *Joy* and *Peace* they find in him. For they are modest enough and sober in all this, they witnessing no other thing to the world than what others may experience in themselves, and what is plainly set down in the holy Scriptures, That the *Kingdom of God is Righteousness, and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Ghost*.

But in none of these things do they pretend to equalize themselves to Christ, whom God has exalted above Men and Angels, but do profess the efficacy of his Spirit in them, to the praise and glory of God, and the comfort and encouragement of their drooping Neighbour. But what is above this, without evident *Reason* or a *Miracle*, is most justly deemed to proceed from no *Supernatural* assistance, but from some *Hypochondriacal* distemper.

And what I have said in behalf of Christians, is in its measure due to those diviner sort of Philosophers, such as *Plato* and *Plotinus*, whom you shall find, upon the more than ordinary sensible visits of the divine Love and Beauty descending into their enraptured Souls profess themselves no less moved than the sense of such expressions as these will bear, ἀναμειβόμενοι, ἐκκαυχόμενοι, ἐνθεοῦσαν, or ἐνθεοῦσάντων. To such Enthusiasm as this, which is but the triumph of the Soul of man inebriated, as it were, with the delicious sense of the divine life, that blessed Root and Original of all holy wisdom and virtue, I must declare myself as much a friend, as I am to the vulgar fanatical Enthusiasm a professed enemy. And eternal shame stop his mouth that will dare to deny, but that the fervent love of God, and of the pulchritude of virtue, will afford the spirit of man more joy and triumph than ever was tasted in any lustful pleasure, which the pen of unclean Wits do so highly magnify both in Verse and Prose.

SECT.

S E C T. LXIV.

That the Fewel of Devotion even in warrantable and sincere Enthusiasm, is usually Melancholy.

Moreover, for those Rapturous and Enthusiastical affections even in them that are truly good and pious, it cannot be deny'd but that the fewel of them is usually natural or contracted Melancholy; which any man may perceive that is Religious, unless his Soul and Body be blended together, and there be a confusion of all; as it is in mistaken Enthusiasts, that impute that to God which is proper to Nature.

But Melancholy usually disposes, and the Mind perfects the action through the power of the Spirit. And a wise and holy man knows how to make use of his opportunity, according to that Monition of the Apostle, *If a man be sad, let him pray; if chearful, let him sing Psalms.*

James ch. 5.
v. 13.

S E C T. LXV.

That there is a peculiar advantage in Melancholy for Divine speculations, with a prevention of the Atheist's Objection thereupon.

BUT there is also a peculiar advantage in Melancholy for Divine Speculations; And yet the Mysteries that result from thence are no more to be suspected of proving mere Fancies, because they may occasionally spring from such a Constitution, than Mathematical Truths are, who owe their birth to a Mathematical Complexion; which is as truly a complexion, as the Religious complexion is, and yet no sober man will deny the truth of her Theorems. And as it would be a fond and improper thing to affirm that such a Complexion teaches a man Mathematicks, so it would also be to affirm that Melancholy is the only mother of Religion.

S E C T. LXVI.

How it comes to pass that men are so nimble and dexterous in finding the truth in some things, and so slow and heavy in other some; and that the dulness of the Atheist's perception in Divine matters is no argument against the truth of Religion.

BUT most certain it is, and Observation will make it good, That the Souls of men, while they are in these mortal Bodies, are as so many Prisoners immured in several prisons, with their single loopholes looking into several quarters, and therefore are able to pronounce no further than their proper prospect will give them leave. So the several Complexions of mens Bodies dispose or invite them to an easy
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and happy discovery of some things, when yet notwithstanding if you confer with them concerning other-some, that lie not within their prospect, or the limits of their natural *Genius*, they will be enforced either to acknowledge their ignorance; or, if they will take upon them to judge, (which is the more frequent) they will abundantly discover their error and mistake.

Which sometimes seem so gross and invincible, that a man may justly suspect that they want not only the patience, but even the power of contemplating of some Objects, as being not able to frame any conception of what they are requir'd to think of: And such are the duller sort of *Atheists*, that rank the notion of a *Spirit*, and consequently of a *God*, in the list of *Inconsistencies* and ridiculous *Non-sense*. Wherein though they seek to reproach *Religion*, they seem to me mainly to shame *themselves*, their *Atheism* being very easie to be parallel'd with *Enthusiasm* in this regard. For as some *Enthusiasts* being found plainly mad in some one thing, have approved themselves sober enough in the rest; so these *Atheists*, though they shew a tolerable wit and acuteness in other matters, yet approve themselves sufficiently slow and heavy in this.

S E C T. LXVII.

That the Enthusiast, though he be necessarily assaulted by his own Complexion, yet not irresistibly; and that therefore the guilt of his extravagancies lies at his own door.

I Have now, with that briefness I intended, run through the *Nature*, *Causes*, *Kinds*, and *Cure* of *Enthusiasm*, and looking considerately back on the Stage I have gone, fancy all my steps perfect, unless in that part that concerns the *Causes* of this Distemper, whose enumeration may seem defectuous, in that I have omitted the activity of the Devil, and the wilful wickedness of the Mind of man, but resolved all into Complexion, or present temper, or rather distemper of the body arising from natural causes that necessarily act thereupon. Whence men may judge my Discourse as well an excuse for, as a discovery of this Disease of *Enthusiasm*.

But I answer, That though these causes do act necessarily upon the body, and the body necessarily upon the Mind, yet they do not act irresistibly, unless a man have brought himself to such a weakness by his own fault; as he that by his intemperance has cast himself into a Fever, who then fatally becomes subject to the laws thereof. And though the Devil of himself may do much, yet he can do no more than God permits, who will suffer no man to be tempted above what he can bear, provided he be sincere and faithful, and gives not himself to some fanatick fits, either from Pride, or for some sinister projects in the world. For to such as these *Enthusiasm* may prove *Bal-neum diaboli*, as is vulgarly said of Melancholy; whenas, on the contrary,

trary, it may be the laver of Regeneration to them that unfeignedly love and fear God, and endeavour to be simple and true of heart in all things. So plainly unexcusable are those that have so notoriously miscarry'd in this *fanatick Distemper*.

See *Mystery of
Godliness*,
Book 6.
ch. 13, sect. 17.

And further touching the Defectuousness in my *Enumeration* of the *Causes* of *Enthusiasm*, in that I omitted the Agency of the Devil, I answer, that his *Causality* is more vagrant, more lax and general than to be brought in here, where my aim was to indigitate the more proper and constant causes of that *Disease*. I might add also less philosophical for this present search, which was only into the *natural* principles of the said Distemper. And for that of the *vitiosity* of *man's will*, it is evidently supposed in my prescription of the *Cure* of *Enthusiasm*, the neglect whereof is plainly a man's own fault. For it is his own fault that he is not *temperate*, *humble*, and *attentive to Reason*: without recourse to which indispensable virtues he can never be freed from that foulness and uncleanness of his Astral Spirit, (which is the inmost lodge and harbour of all imposturous fancies and Enthusiastick dreams) nor can ever arrive to that secure state of the Soul, where the importunities of deceitful Imagination are always declin'd and eluded by the safe Guidance and Conduct of the *Intellectual powers*.

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Enthusiasmus Triumphatus.

SECT. XVI. pag. 12. l. 5. *Is most probably to be resolv'd into the power of Melancholy, &c.* These, and other Things in this Section, are written with no other design than to perswade people not too hastily to suppose or imagine themselves inspir'd, for the sake of these effects, which may proceed from natural causes, as without doubt they do, unless Humility, Charity, and Purity attend them. See the *Mystery of Godliness*, lib. 2. cap. 11.

SECT. XLIV. pag. 30. l. 33. *That all is God's self. That a Man's self is God, if he live holily.* These are the opinions of that egregious Enthusiast J. B. who, although otherwise he seems to be a good man, yet has given occasion to the Enthusiasts of this Nation in our late troublesome times to run into many ridiculous errors and absurdities. From hence, and the vain boasting of the *Familiists*, who will have their inspir'd Elders to be Deify'd, that is, Gods with God, and Christs with Christ, sprang those two enormous Sects of *Ranters* and *Quakers*, (some of which I hope will return to a more sound mind) both of which, I do not in the least doubt, took their original from *Behemenism* and *Familiism*. But both of them affecting a certain sort of Divinity knowing all things, and that the Being of a God was constituted in *Love* or *Anger*, the *Ranters* pursu'd a most licentious and ungovernable sort of Divinity, securely indulging themselves in all manner of enormities, as knowing that under whatever form they appeared, they were nevertheless God or Gods, and that therein they only us'd the right and privilege of the Divinity, and that they could be guilty of no Sin, being perswaded that they only exercis'd their own right; but that in others it would be Sin, by reason of their ignorance. But the better sort of *Quakers* affected a certain sanctity in their Divinity, according to that of J. B. *Every one that lives holily is God, much more Christ.* Being therefore puffed up with this opinion, they despis'd the person of Christ, and all his Offices; nor did they allow the Soul of Christ, join'd with the eternal *Logos*, to be our High-Priest and Mediator in Heaven with the Father, or any other Christ, but what was in themselves, or as they were Gods and Christs, and equally capable of Divine Honours as that Christ that was crucified in *Judea*. As for any thing else besides what is common to all men, they reckon it a mere Type and Shadow, as belonging only to the outward Christ. And therefore they have added this *Luciferian Pride* to their Superstition, which has so far prevail'd with *James Naylor*, the

chief of the *Quakers* in his time, as to accept of Divine Honours, as if (according to the opinion of the *Familists* of the chief Elder of their Family) he was Christ himself just descended from Heaven, and come to judge the quick and dead. For when he enter'd *Bristol*, two women wading through the mire, led a Horse by the bridle in a triumphant manner, the Fanatical Mob at the same time crying, Holy, Holy, Holy, and Hosannah, strowing their garments in several places. This is the effect of that Enthusiastick Doctrine and Fury, which teaches them, that *whoever lives holily, he is the Christ, and consequently God*. Whence any body may plainly see, I have not spent my time amiss in detecting the madness and impostures of Enthusiasm in this Treatise.

Ibid. pag. 31. l. 8. *That there are three Souls in a man, Animal, Angelical, and Divine.* That there were three or more Souls in the humane Body was the opinion of the *Jews*. As in MOSES CORDU-ERUS *de Anima*, cap. 2. There met OPHAN, (ASIAH ob SENDALPHON, *who is call'd OPHAN*, and ANGELUS (METATRON or Mundus JETZIRAH) and THRONUS (or Mundus BRIAH) and they said, *Let us make man. For in our Composition NESCHAMAH is from THRONUS, and RUACH from ANGELUS, and NEPHESH from OPHAN, &c.* And in *Emek Hammelek*, or of the Royal Vally, they reckon five Persons of the Soul. In a TETRAGRAMMATON there are five Parts, four Letters, and the Tittle Jod, from which come Nephesh, Ruach, Neschamah, Chajah, and Jachidah, five Persons of the Soul, and of these it is said, *These are the Generations of Heaven and Earth*, and Prov. 20. 27. The light of the Lord is the breath of man, and searcheth all the bowels of the Belly. Light ירה is the Soul of man; and it is this Light that shineth over the head of the Infant in its Mother's bowels. Which Light, if they had determined immediately to enter after the *πνευματικὸς* of the Spirit of Nature would have been the more probable way of Philosophizing. In the mean time it is very certain that the *Jews* held a plurality of Souls in one man.

SECT. XLVII. pag. 34. l. 19. *That every Thing is God in Love or Wrath.* I have already observ'd how silly, absurd, and vain men grow from this opinion, which so egregiously sins against the Holiness of the Divine Essence; and all those arguments which demonstrate the Immateriality of God, and of our Souls, plainly shew how false that opinion is. Many of which frequently occur in my writings.

SECT. XLIX. pag. 35. l. 39. *As men of an impious and Diabolical Spirit, &c.* Certainly as what relates to Paracelsus himself, those things which are to be form'd in his life, written by Melchior Adam, do deservedly encrease our suspicion, that the Principles which he embrac'd were so wild and extravagant, (and which I have *passant* mentioned in the Scholia on the Antidote against Atheism) that he might easily, though ignorantly, lay himself open to the delusion of the Devil.

SECT. LVII. pag. 40. l. 25. *But such as some skilful Platonist will most easily explain.* But I shall not pretend to so much skill as to give a true sense of that passage in Aristotle. However we will guess at it, ἡ δὲ φύσις δαμνῶν ἐστὶν θεῖα. Aristotle, in his Books *de Cælo*, calls the matter

ter of the Heavens τὸ θεῖον σῶμα, a divine Body; nor do I in the least question, but that he determin'd all the inhabitants of them to be properly called Gods. What therefore can he mean by this πνεῦμα δαιμονία but the whole sublunary Region, or that part of the *Spirit of Nature*, which, if I mistake not, the *Cabbalists* call *Sandalphon*, comprehending the Airy Spirits that wander there, which the *Greeks* call δαίμονας? But *Aristotle* seems to insinuate, that though these Dæmons be infallible Gods, yet sometimes they are liable to be deceiv'd themselves, and to deceive others. Moreover we may further inquire, whether by this πνεῦμα the Philosopher did not understand or mean the *Spirit of Nature*, extended along the sublunary Region, which by vital consent sometimes immits certain Visions or Phantoms into vacant minds. For there are wonderful things performed in nature by the Co-operation and Sympathy of this Spirit. But in this place this πνεῦμα or spirit is called δαιμονία, not that it is properly μέγας εἰς δαίμον, but (it enjoying life and some sort of sense, though at the same time it wants all manner of thought and understanding, and therefore cannot be called θεῖα) because he thought to make use of the next word in a loose and improper sense; and therefore, since he could not call it θεῖα, he would call it δαιμονία. And certainly though this Spirit be merely *Plastick*, yet it is not to be wonder'd at, if it fills our imagination with lively Images; whenas without dispute the proper *Plastick* quality of the Soul doth as well when awake as asleep transmit images of this sort to its *Perceptive* quality. But when those signs are fallible, I have hinted in that very Section.

SECT. LVIII. pag. 41. l. 6. *There may be very well a sanative and healing Contagion, as well as as a morbid and venomous.* This very place I shew'd to that excellent Person, Mr. Boyle at London, as I was was talking with him in a Bookseller's shop, being ask'd by him what I thought of the Cures of *Valentine Gretrakes*, with the fame of which all places rung at that time, I told him my opinion was fix'd about those Cures some years before they were perform'd: For that one *Coker* (for that was the name of the person whose remarkable way of Curing or Healing I now mention) by a very gentle chafing or rubbing of his hand, cured Diseases ten years ago, to the best of my remembrance, as *Gretrakes* did, though not so many and various. For this cur'd Cancers, Scrofula's, Deafness, King's-Evil, Epilepsie, Fevers though Quartan ones, Leprosy, Palsy, Tympany, Head-ach, Lameness, Numbness of Limbs, Stone, Convulsions, Ptytick, Sciatica, Ulcers, Pains of the Body, nay, Blind and Dumb in some measure, and I know not but he cur'd the Gout. Of all which Cures *Gretrakes* wrote a Book, attested by good Hands, to which, for brevity's sake, I refer the Reader. But it is in general to be observ'd, that although he cur'd all those diseases, yet he did not succeed in all his applications, nor were his Cures always lasting. Moreover it was not only his Hand that had this healing quality, but even his Spittle and his Urine, whereby you may the more easily discover that Cures have relation to the Temperament of the Body. Besides, it was well known, that his Body as well as his Hand and Urine had a sort of Herbous Aromatick Scent: Though that may be no certain sign of a

fanative Faculty. This I can speak by experience of my self, especially when I was young, that every night when going to bed I unbutton'd my Doublet, my Breast would emit a sweet aromack smell, and every year after about the end of Winter, or approaching of the Spring, I had usually sweet Herbous Scents in my Nostrils, no external object appearing from whence they came. Nay, my Urine would smell like Violets, which made me very much to wonder at the mistake of that famous Physician and Philosopher *Henricus Regius*, That no body's Urine smelt sweet but from some Medicine taken inwardly; whereas I know the contrary to happen in my own certain knowledge. Besides I remember above forty years ago, that one Winter pulling off my shoes, and setting them to the Fire, my Chamber-fellow coming into the room at the same time presently cry'd out, What a mighty smell of Musk or Civet is here! At which I smiling desiring him to draw near, and smell to my Shoes, which he did, but soon found a different smell there. But I know not how I thus insensibly run into this humour of talking of my self. Let us return to *Gretrakes* and his Cures, which it is manifestly plain may be within the bounds of Nature, (though perhaps not a little purified and defecated by the help of Religion) because he could only relieve or ease afflicted Nature, but not restore it when decaying. But that which to me seems wonderful above all the rest is, that subtil morbifick matter, which, by the application of his hand, would become volatil, and remove from the part griev'd, and then like lightning disperse it self by the same application of the hand, into several parts of the body, till at last he would drive it into some extreme part, suppose the fingers, and especially the Toes, or the Nose or Tongue; into which parts when he had forc'd it, it would make them so cold and insensible, that the Patient could not feel the deepest prick of a Pin; but as soon as his hand should touch those parts, or gently rub them, the whole distemper vanish'd, and life and sense immediately return'd to those parts. So subtil a thing is the Matter of most, or all Diseases, and yet at the same time so stupid and deadly, that it is, as it were, the first-fruits of Death.

As to the Constitution of these two, *Coker* was a very Melancholick man, as I have been inform'd by those that convers'd with him, *Gretrakes* was quite the contrary, being of a sanguine Temper, very civil and humane, and really pious, without founess or superstition. (For I my self have often convers'd with him at *Ragley*, when I us'd to be at my Lord Vicount *Conway's*.) Whence I plainly saw, by the accension of Blood and Spirits, his Brain was in no danger, nor was I mistaken in my Conjecture.

But I would not be understood in what I have said of these sorts of Cures, as if I despis'd them; for they may be the special Gift of God in Nature, especially in regenerate Nature. Of which sort it is likely these Cures of *Gretrakes* were, as any one may collect from the account of his forepasts'd Life, for he gave himself up wholly to the study of Godliness and sincere mortification, and through the whole course of his life, shew'd all manner of specimens of a Christian disposition. But, besides the innocence of his private Life, and his
most

most effusive Charity and Humanity, in the management of publick Offices, whether military or civil, (for he was a man not only of a pious and liberal Education, but of an Estate and Capacity fit to serve the publick) he did nothing but what carried an Air of Justice and Equity in it, and a general good will towards all; infomuch that, though he did most heartily embrace the Reformed Religion, yet he would persecute no Sect upon the Score of Religion, not even the *Papists*, and that in *Ireland* too, where they had, through their cruelty and perfidy, made such horrible havock of the *Protestants*. This, and other things of this nature, certainly shew us, that we ought to impute this gift of his curing diseases not to simple, but regenerate Nature, since we find so many, and manifest steps and marks of the Regenerate man in him; nor could I ever discover any thing in him that was contemptuous or immoral towards the spiritual or secular Magistrate. And truly he seems to me such an Exemplar of candid and sincere Christianity, without any pride, deceit, souness, or superstition; to which let me add his working such wonderful at least, if not properly called Miracles, as the Church of *Rome* in no age could ever produce for their Religion. For what *Gretrakes* did, was done in the face of the world, seen and attested by Physicians, Philosophers, and Divines of the most penetrating and accurate judgment. But what ridiculous shams and cheats the Miracles of the *Roman* Church are, is too well known to the world to spend any time on them here.

SECT. LIX. pag. 42. l. 1. *How wrath and indignation will also hold up the Spirits against Fear and Pain, &c.* Inveterate hatred, confirm'd contempt of Ministers and Magistrates easily do the same among the Fanaticks, who imagine themselves to be the judges of the world, and I appeal to their own Consciences, whether this thing is not the chief support and prop of their patience, and not that Christian humility and meekness of spirit, that sincerity of mind that flourish'd in the days of the Apostles.

SECT. LXII. pag. 44. l. 35. *Extirpating every Vice, and omitting nothing that is truly a Divine virtue.* For Regeneration doth not beget Monsters,

Semibovemque virum, semivirumque bovem.
The man half-ox, and the ox half a man.

but one uniform Animal, Divine in all its parts, See *Seet. XXXVII*. If there be any member of another kind, know for certain, what seem virtues are not the fruits of Regeneration, but of the Temperament of the body. So hard it is to enter in at the straight gate, and in this pressure to leave the old man behind us.

Ibid. l. 39. *Even he that dy'd on the Cross at Jerusalem between two Thieves, &c.* Truly they that fall from the belief of this, however they may boast of their illuminations and inspirations, are very miserable Creatures indeed, and blinder than the very moles; and whilst they impudently brag of the Spirit, do most apparently contradict the Oracles that were really dictated by the Holy Ghost. Let the *Familiists* and *Quakers* excuse themselves in this as well as they can. For
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in vain do they pretend to acknowledge the death of Christ a propitiatory Sacrifice, whilst, under the pretence of the inward Christ, they deny and explode the eternal Priesthood and intercession of Christ with the Father, that is, the Soul of the *Messiah* join'd with the *Word*, and disown his Principality over Men and Angels; and being puffed up with a sort of Enthusiastick Infidelity in this thing, as if by this very name they were far more wise than all other mortals, they despise and curse them, (O impudent and execrable Blindness!) as if they were followers only of Types and Shadows.

SECT. LXIII. pag. 45. l. 15. *There has not one word all this while been spoken against that true and warrantable Enthusiasm, &c.* And indeed they very ill deserve the name of Christians, who so indulge a sort of dry and hungry Reason, as wholly to exclude all manner of Enthusiasm. But I look upon such as mere strangers in the mysteries of *Regeneration*. For that *new Life*, which by the power of Christ is bred in us, has its pleasures, its triumphs, its delights and bitternefs, just as the *Natural Life*, which does not always pass on in one continu'd course, but ebbs and flows at times, which no man can be so sottish and stupid, but he must perceive in the natural Life. And indeed he must be very stupid, and not the regenerate man, and true child of God, who hath not experienced this in the supernatural and divine life. They that deny this true Enthusiasm, do confirm those wild delirious Fanaticks in their false Enthusiasm, and expose their own profession of Religion to Scorn and contempt.

Ibid. l. 22. *Righteousness, and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Ghost.* This is that true and innocent Enthusiasm, which a Christian may safely indulge. This is that eternal and immoveable Kingdom of Righteousness, into which he that enters, throws off from the neck of his Conscience the true yoke of Slavery, readily serves God, and obeys the publick Magistrate in things indifferent, that is, neither commanded nor forbidden; nor is he ensnar'd with silly or impertinent scruples and superstitions, least he should offend in the performance of those duties, which both Nature and the holy Scriptures demand of him, as if any one's Conscience should decline or refuse them, by the inspiration or direction of the divine Spirit, which expressly commands that we should honour all men, much more that we pay a due reverence and respect to the Magistrate, and above all to Jesus Christ, the supreme Prince of Men and Angels. And therefore I confidently declare, that that Spirit which is opposite to these things, is the Spirit of the old Serpent, and even of that very *Lucifer*, who from the beginning was an implacable enemy of the Principality of the Soul of the *Messiah*, and always endeavour'd to subvert his Kingdoms: Nor is there any Divine Spirit in them that are thus affected, whatever specious pretences of virtues they may have, but a plain diabolical one, and that it is merely through the malice of the Devil that they run contrariwise: For whosoever shall make himself equal to Jesus Christ crucified on the Cross at *Jerusalem*, is a most execrable Impostor, and all that shall believe on such, are the slaves of infernal darkness.

SECT.

SECT. LXIV. pag. 46. l. 10. But Melancholy usually disposes, and the mind perfects the action, &c. Therefore they act very inconsiderately who use all manner of arts, as Play, Drinking, and the like, to drive away Melancholy as a most dangerous enemy. For though there are many great things cry'd up concerning the Free-will of the Soul, yet I cannot think they have much weight or force, unless by severe discipline and afflictions, or at least by some force or pressure the Will, distinct from the Soul, be reduc'd to its *Æquilibrium*. Whence calamities and misfortunes are taken by wise men for special Gifts of God, and Symbols of his great good-will and fidelity. And yet what these things do, Melancholy performs with less loss and damage: For it rouses the Soul from its slothful Lethargy; teaches that its state is doubtful, instructs it more diligently to try and examine its life and manners, to guard it self against all manner of Sin, and not to be easily led away with vain pleasure, but to be circumspect and wary in all its actions. So useful fruits hath Melancholy, if the mind will attend its suggestions and accusations, and at the same time breath and pant after God. For although all salutary sadness be not supernatural, yet by the force even of the Light of natural conscience, unless we will be wanting to our selves, it will lead us directly to God, since the Light of natural conscience is the Law of God himself, even before Regeneration, so that this Melancholy and the natural Law can, as it were, supply the previous offices of the Divine Spirit and Body in the Regenerate. But no body ought so suddenly to imagine himself really inspir'd, before he has well experienc'd, and been conversant in this external discipline. And this is the introduction of the faithful and obedient into the same Regeneration and Inspiration, that is, to the real influences and operations of the Holy Spirit, by which we must attain to the divine Nature and new Birth. But it is very dangerous to attribute to the divine Seed of Regeneration and the Holy Spirit, bitterness of mind, zeal, heat, and scrupulosity of Conscience, which is the original and incendiary of that intolerable Confusion in the Church by the Fanaticks. But in the mean time it cannot be deny'd but the light of natural conscience, (which also is the inviolable Law of God) being by the acrimony or tartness of Melancholy, more fresh and lively, and being more impatient of the more gross sins against the light of nature, as it happens in any one so affected, is in no wise to be slighted; so it is by no means to be despis'd by others, against whom it may boil or rage, and break out into bitter increpations, by reason of their scandalous life and wicked morals, they having, by thus sinning against the light of nature, render'd themselves obnoxious and liable to such sort of reprehensions; who, although they have no Prophetick right of flying thus upon men, and chiding them; yet by that common humane Law, by which every one is bound, as much as in him lies, to avert any impending danger that may threaten his Neighbour, though they are not really inspir'd, yet it is very justifiable and lawful for them to admonish those that live in conspicuous and notorious errors. For they urge nothing against them but the express Laws and Decrees of God: Which thing, as often as it shall happen, nay, if at any time we see but a bare emotion,

tion, or disturbance of mind wherever the Law of God is mention'd, it is our business to give God the Glory, and to obey him, and pity the infirmities of others, rather than to despise and be angry with them. But notwithstanding this, let no body here rashly cry out, O happy Melancholy! O holy Madness! which seems to take more care, and be more solicitous about the indispensable Laws of Life and Morals than all the humane prudence and literature; for he ought to remember that it has not that effect, but rather begets in all a certain Cynick pride and insolence of manners. The Spirit alone promis'd by the common Mediator of all mankind Christ to them, that truly believe on him, and the heavenly Manna, that divine Matter, the true Seed of the new Birth, not Melancholy and natural light can restore man and set him right: The rest only serve divine Regeneration, as certain external aids. This is that pure and holy seed, altogether pure, altogether holy, by which, except every one be renew'd, he will never arrive to, and obtain the perfect and absolute integrity of life and morals, nor see the Kingdom of Heaven.

SUPPLEMENT

To the end of the LXVIth SECTION.

— *And confirm'd, as it were, in a sort of Fanatical Confidence.*

SCHOLIA.

WHICH Confidence being void of all reason, and yet in some is so perverse and hot, deservedly ought to be reckon'd a sort of wild and sordid Fanaticism, and such as must proceed from an afflation of an unclean complexion or habit of body, if not of some malignant Dæmon. And the Reason is almost the same of the blind and assuming incredulity of some arrogant Wits concerning the Truth of the Christian Religion. Which incredulity indeed, since it wants all manner of solid Reason, and yet is so obstinately retain'd, is equally ridiculous; but much more detestable than all vulgar *Enthusiasm*, which these lofty and exalted Wits, as they imagine themselves, ridicule and expose.

THE

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HENRICI MORI
EPISTOLÆ
QUATUOR

A D

Renatum Des-Cartes :

C U M

Responsis Clarissimi Philosophi ad duas Priores,

Cumque aliis aliquot

EPISTOLIS,

Q U A R U M

Occasiones, Argumenta, Ordinem versa
Pagina tibi commonstrabit.

Aristot.

Τοῖς ἀπορῆσαι βυλομήθοις πρῆγυε ἐστὶ τὴ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς.

L O N D I N I,

Typis, & venales prostant apud J. Downing in vico vulgo
vocato Bartholomew-Close, prope West-Smithfield, 1712.

Continentur in hac parte,

1. **E**pistola Claudii Clerfelier ad H. Morum, qua veniam ab eo petit publicandi literas ejus ad Cartesium.
2. Responsum H. Mori.
3. Epistola prima H. Mori ad R. Des-Cartes, ubi præcipue agitur de Natura Corporis & Vacui, de Mundi extensione, deque sensu Brutorum.
4. Responsum R. Cartesii.
5. Epistola secunda H. Mori ad R. Cartesium, ubi Responfa ad priores Objectiones novis, ut plurimum, Instantiis diluit, variasque proponit Quæstiones de Mundi extensione, de natura Motus, de particulis striatis, de Animæ unione cum Corpore, ipsiusq; in corpus imperio, de conversione globulorum æthereorum in elementum primum, de flexibilitate particularum aquearum, & de Materiæ denique αὐτοκίνησις.
6. Responsum Cartesii ad dictas Instantias & Quæstiones.
7. H. Mori Epistola tertia ad R. Cartesium, qua quæ hætenus disputata sunt breviter recognoscit, dein varia e Principiis Philosophiæ nunc probanda nunc explicanda proponit.
8. Henrici Mori Epistola quarta ad R. Cartesium, quæ varia item tum e Dioptrice tum e Meteoris proponit aut probanda aut dilucidanda.
9. Fragmentum Responsi R. Des-Cartes ad Epistolam tertiam H. Mori, ubi agitur de sensu Angelorum Mentisque separatæ, de contractione & dilatatione Spiritus, de Dei amplitudine, de quiete motuque Materiæ, &c.
10. Responsum H. Mori ad dictum Fragmentum.
11. Epistola H. Mori ad V. C. quæ Apologiam complectitur pro Cartesio, quæque Introductionis loco esse poterit ad universam Philosophiam Cartesianam.

CONTRIBUTION IN THE FUTURE

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have contributed to the work of the Society in the future.

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Clarissimo Viro

HENRICO MORO.

LEGI, vir eximie, & perlegi summa cum voluptate tuas ad D. Cartesium difficultates, quas ei tertio Idus Decembris 1648. tertio nonas Martii, 10 Calendas Augusti, & duodecimo Calendas Novembris 1649. proposuisti; miratusque sum ingenium tuum, & summam humanitatem, quâ fretus ausus sum hæc ad te confidenter rescribere, ut de iis quæ facere instituo te certiores faciam, & a te impetrem ea quæ mihi necessaria sunt, ut opus quod suscepi ad finem perducam. Scies igitur me habere præ manibus præcipua Autographa quæ incomparabilis Philosophus D. Cartesius, D. Chanuto, olim apud Serenissimam Sueciæ Reginam, nunc vero apud Batavos legato meritissimo, affini meo, apud quem Sueciæ vitâ functus est, reliquit: Inter quæ sunt & illa literarum quas pluribus ex amicis suis rescripsit, ex quibus præcipuas colligo, quæ vel Philosophiam suam tangunt, vel ea quæ perficienda susceperat respiciunt, vel difficultates a plerisque summis viris, inter quos non minimum tenes locum, ipsi propositas solvunt, ut eas omnes publici juris faciam, quod spero me brevi peracturum. Sed quia literæ illæ quæ difficultatibus respondent vix possunt intelligi, nisi etiam eæ quæ occasionem ipsi dederunt tale quid respondendi simul in lucem edantur, nec tamen mihi honestum visum fuerit hoc exequi absque venia & licentia eorum qui ipsi rescripserunt, a quibusdam petii & impetravi, ut illud mihi concederent, quod etiam spero a te, pro summa tua humanitate & incredibili erga Cartesium studio, mihi concessum iri. Sed præterea cuperem ut mihi exemplaria mitteres earum omnium quas a D. Cartesio accepisti epistolarum; duas enim tantum præ manibus habeo, quarum prior respondet tuis tertio Idus Decembris datis; altera, iis quæ tertio nonas Martii scriptæ sunt. Superest igitur tertia, quæ mihi deest, quæque tuis 10 Calendas Augusti & 12 Calendas Novembris datis satisfacere debet: quæ profecto non potest non esse pulcherrima, & continere plura scitu dignissima, cum tot tuis tantisque difficultatibus & quæstionibus, cum ex principiis Philosophiæ tum ex Dioptrice excerptis, respondere debeat, cujus tamen duas duntaxat paginas inveni; quæ tantum instantiis tuis satisfacere tentant, nec ullum verbum ad quæsitâ tua super Principiis & Dioptrice continent. Quare summopere exopto & enixe precor, ut & mihi licentiam concedas literas duas simul cum responsis imprimendi, & ut simul ad me mittas quas habes a D. Cartesio, ut & posteritatis utilitati, & Amici nostri famæ ac memoriæ consulamus. Præter hæc autem literarum Autographa, plura adhuc habeo celeberrimi Viri præclara monumenta, quæ singula suo tempore lucem videbunt, & quæ non parum jucunditatis puto tibi fore allatura, utpote qui in evolvendis Cartesianis scriptis tam impiger videris. Si mihi vernaculâ linguâ uti licuisset, aptius atque ornatius sententiam
meam

meam explicuisssem: sed nè in varios errores inciderem, stylum contraxi, &, ut potui, non ut volui, mentem meam tibi aperui; quod rogo ut mihi condones, & scias me tuæ semper humanitatis & sapientiæ laudatorem & cultorem fore.

Parisiis 12 Dec.
1654.

CLAUDIUS CLERSELIER.

Responsio
HENRICI MORI.

Literæ tuæ, Vir Clarissime, datæ Lutetiæ Parisiorum pridie Idus Decembris, anno 1654. non pervenerunt ad manus meas ante decimum septimum Calendarum Maii. Miror tantum temporis interfluxisse. Granthamiæ tunc agebam in agro Lincolnensi. Rus enim concesseram cum aliis de causis, tum ad confirmandum valetudinem. Vehementer equidem gaudebam postquam intellexi præclarum tuum institutum edendi omnia Cartesii scripta quæ apud te sunt, quo non solum nobillissimi Philosophi famæ ac memoriæ, verum etiam communi omnium literatorum utilitati optimè consules. In neminem enim aptius quadrat, quàm in divinum illum virum, Horatianum illud,

— *Qui nil molitur inepte.*

Quam ob causam si ego tibi à consiliis essem, nihil quicquam eorum supprimeretur quæ vel ille tentavit ullo modo in rebus Philosophicis, vel feliciter ad exitum perduxit; sed lucem viderent omnia, in majus Reipub. Literariæ commodum. Ac proinde, ut nullum impedimentum esset tam utili ac generoso proposito, vel ultrò tibi concederem copiam edendi primas meas secundasque literas ad Cartesium conscriptas; quippe quòd absque eis, ut rectè mones, responsa ejus tam commodè intelligi non possint: nec multum abs re fore diffiteor, si tertias meas simul edideris, cum per eas responsum sit alteris illis Cartesianis. Sed cum quartæ meæ nullis illius literis respondeant, nec illis ab ipso responsum sit quicquam, utpote inopinatâ morte prærepto, de iis aliquantùm hæsito an publici juris facerem. Cætetum omnem scrupulum eximeret, si quis ex amicis ipsius aut familiaribus, qui frequentius eum inviserunt, & collocti sunt, vel cum eo vixerunt conjunctius, respondendi vices suppleret; tunc enim parùm dubito quin operæ esset pretium illas etiam in lucem dare. Quòd si hoc in præsens impetrari non possit, modò probabile esset quòd literæ illæ meæ, tertiarum quartarumque, editæ allicerent aliquem ex peritioribus Philosophiæ Cartesianæ sectatoribus ad respondendum omnibus difficultatibus inibi Cartesio ipsi propositis, ex illa saltem spe facilius animum inducerem ut jus tibi concedam eas in publicum proferendi. Quid autem futurum sit in hac re ipse forsan opportuniùs quàm ego conjecturam capies. Nè multis igitur te morer, totum hoc negotium judicio tuo ac candori permitto, ut, quod factò opus sit, facias. Incredibile quanto mœrore sum affectus, audito præmaturo Cartesii fato, quippe

quippe qui ingenium virtutesque incomparabilis viri impense amavi & miratus sum. Præterea, accessit ingens desiderium perlegendi responsa ejus, quæ expectavi, ad tertias quartasque meas literas, quæ universam illius Philosophiam percurrunt. Inchoasse integrum responsum ad meas datas 10. Cal. Aug. ex te intelligo. Quod fragmentum scripsisse eum conjicio cum Egmondæ esset in Hollandia. Destitit autem, ut per amicos suos certior me fecit, ab incepto, quod animus occupatissimus paratu ad iter Suecicum non potuit vacare tam subtilibus tantique, uti ipse dixit, momenti difficultatibus & disquisitionibus; sed constanter pollicitus est suis, se proximo vere reversurum, & tunc mihi copiose & perspicue omnia explicaturum. Sed cum invida mors cætera nobis præripuerit, nollem vel illud Fragmentum duarum paginarum quarum mentionem facis, interire. Quod ad solidiora illa Cartesii monumenta attinet, quæ proferis te habere, quæque, uti promittis, lucem visura sunt suo tempore, gestit profecto animus ad tam lætum gratumque nuncium; avidèque interim cupio, si tibi non sit molestum, ut argumenta titulosve singulorum librorum recenseas in proximis tuis literis. Revixit enim in me, ex quo nuperas tuas accepi, pristinus ille ardor erga Philosophiam Cartesianam, qui aliquantulum ab obitu desideratissimi nostri Amici deferbuerat, cum nova legendi materies non suppeteret. Sed, ut ingenuè fatear quod res est, illud solum in causa non fuit, sed peculiaris quædam studia quæ alio animum avocarent. Est enim illud rerum pondus, veritatis pulchritudo, amplitudo ingenii & acumen, Theorematum denique omnium admirabilis ille ordo & consensus in scriptis Cartesianis, ut vel millies lecta non sordescant: non magis quam lux Solis, cujus ortum singulis diebus aves, pecudes, ipsique adeo homines gratulabundi contemplantur.

Nec certè solum lectu jucunda est hæc Cartesiana Philosophia, sed apprimè utilis, quicquid aut mustitent aut deblaterent alii, ad summum illum omnis Philosophiæ finem, putà Religionem. Cum enim Peripatetici formas quasdam contendunt esse substantiales, quæ è potentia materiæ oriuntur, quæque cum materia ita coalescunt, ut absque illo subsistere non possint, ac proinde necessariò demum redeunt in potentiam materæ (cui ordini accensent viventium fere omnium animas, etiam eas quibus sensum cogitationemque tribuunt;) Epicurei autem, explosis illis substantialibus formis, ipsi vim sentiendi cogitandique inesse statuunt; solus, quod sciò, inter Physiologos, extitit Cartesius, qui substantiales illas formas, animasve materiâ exortas, e Philosophia sustulit, materiamque ipsam omni sentiendi cogitandique facultate planè spoliavit. Unde, si principiis staretur Cartesianis, certissima esset ratio ac Methodus demonstrandi, & quòd Deus sit, & quòd anima humana mortalis esse non possit. Quæ sunt illa duo solidissima fundamenta ac fulcra omnis veræ Religionis. Hæc breviter noto, cum possim & alia bene multa huc adjicere, quæ eodem spectant. Sed summatim dicam, nullam extare Philosophiam, nisi Platoniam fortè exceperis, quæ tam firmiter Atheis viam præcludit ad perversas istas cavillas & subterfugia quo se solent recipere, quàm hæc Cartesiana, si penitiùs intelligatur. Unde spero, quòd omnes boni clementiùs ferent amplissimas illas laudes quibus incomparabilem Virum cumulo, in iis
quas

quas ad eum scripsi literis; credoque, quicquid hæc præsens ætas fenderit de Cartesio (nam ut nunquam vivis, ita rarò recenti defunctorum memoriæ parcat invidia) quòd posteritas eum omni cum laude & veneratione sit exceptura, optimùmque illius Philosophiæ usum sit agnitura. Quod lubentiùs prædico, ut majorem in modum tibi animos accendam ad pergendum in nobili illo instituto, edendi omnia quæ habes Cartesii scripta Philosophica; quo pacto cum alios multos tum me præter cæteros, devincies, qui in illis evolvendis tantam percipere soleo voluptatem.

Si tibi visum fuerit meas ad Cartesium literas publicare, vehementer hoc abs te efflagito, ut nè fiat juxta illa exemplaria quæ jam habes, quia multò correctiora tibi paro. Deprehendi enim, postquam attentius legeram, non pauca corrigenda, quæ imprudenti mihi exciderunt præ nimio animi fervore ac festinatione cum ad Cartesium scriberem. Expunxi etiam quædam ex Quæsitis in tertiis quartisque meis literis; sed primæ secundæque integræ sunt.

Quòd mensis ferè jam elapsus est ex quo tuas accepi literas, nec tamen ad te rescripsi, id profectò factum est per nullam negligentiam aut incuriam. Non possum enim non magni te æstimare, tum propter eximium tuum ingenium, ad omnem, quod satis ex literis tuis perspexi, æquitatem & humanitatem compositum ac conformatum, tum propter honorificam Clarissimi fratris tui Chanuti, olim apud Suecos, nunc verò, uti narras, apud Batavos Legati meritissimi, in Cartesium defunctum pietatem. Sed totum id temporis quod effluxit partim negotiis, quibus eram ruri districtus, partim meis ad Cartesium literis castigandis transcribendisque, postquam ad Academiam rediissem, impensum est; nec putabam fore operæ pretium ad te rescribere, prius quàm ista perfecissem. Jam verò in parato sunt omnia, tam mearum quàm Cartesianarum literarum exemplaria: neutra tamen ad te mitto hæc vice, quippe quòd experiundum putavi prius, quàm tutò hæc, quas jam scripsi, literæ ad manus tuas pervenerint: postquam id intellexerim, mittam ad te continuò. Perlubenter interim ex te audire vellem, quò usque deveneris in nobili illo negotio quod scribis te suscepisse. Rem fanè mihi pergratam præstabis, si per proximas tuas literas ea de re certior me feceris. Vale, Vir Clarissime, & generosum illud opus quod moliris feliciter exequere. Sic optat,

Tibi Cartesianisque

*Cantabrigiæ, è Collegio Christi,
pridie Idus Maii, 1655.*

omnibus addictissimus

HENRICUS MORUS.

Clarissimo

Clarissimo Viro

RENATO DE S-CARTES

HENRICUS MORUS ANGLUS.

Quantâ voluptate perfusus est animus meus, Vir clarissime, scriptis tuis legendis, nemo quisquam præter te unum potest conjectare.

Equidem ausim asseverare me haud minùs exultâsse in recognoscendis intelligendisque præclaris tuis Theorematis, quàm ipse in inveniendis, æquèque charos habere atque deamare pulcherrimos illos ingenii tui fœtus, ac si proprius eos enixus esset animus. Quod & certè fecisse aliquo modo mihi videtur, exerendo sese atque expediendo in eisdem sensus ac cogitationes, quos generosa tua mens præconcepit & præmonstravit. Qui sanè istiusmodi sunt, ut, cùm intellectui judicioque meo adeo sint congeneres, ut non sperem fore ut incidam in quicquam conjunctum magis ac consanguineum, ità sanè à nullius ingenio alieni esse possint, cujus itidem ingenium non sit à recta ratione alienum.

Libère dicam quod sentio: Omnes quotquot extiterunt, aut etiamnum existunt, Arcanorum Naturæ Antistites, si ad Magnificam tuam indolem comparentur, Pumilos planè videri ac Pygmæos: meque, cùm vel unicâ vice evolvissem Lucubrationes tuas Philosophicas, suspicatum esse, illustrissimam tuam discipulam, Serenissimam Principem Elizabetham, universis Europæis, non sœminis solum, sed viris, etiam Philosophis, longè evasisse sapientiozem. Quod mox evidentius deprehendi, cùm inceperim scripta tua paulò penitiùs rimari & intelligere.

Tandem enim clarè mihi affulsit Cartesiana Lux, (i. e.) libera, distincta, sibi que constans Ratio, quæ Naturam pariter ac paginas tuas mirificè collustravit; ità ut aut nullæ aut paucissimæ supersint latebræ, & loci quos non patefecit nobilis illa fax, aut saltem vel levissimo negotio, mihi cùm libitum fuerit, mox sit patefactura. Omnia profectò tam concinna in tuis Philosophiæ Principiis, Dioptricis & Meteoris, tamque pulchrè sibi ipsis naturæque consona sunt, ut mens Ratiòque humana jucundius vix optaret lætiùsve spectaculum.

In Methodo tua, lusorio quodam, sed eleganti lanè, modestiæ genere, talem te exhibes virum ut nihil indole geniòque tuo suavius & amabilius, nihil excelsius & generosius vel fingi possit, vel expeti.

Quorsum autem hæc? Non quod putarem, Vir Clarissime, aut tuâ interesse aut Reipublicæ Literariæ ut hæc conscriberem; sed quòd mirabilis illius voluptatis ac fructûs quem ex scriptis tuis percepi conscientia extorqueret hoc qualecunque est animi in te grati testimonium. Præterea, ut certum te facerem, etiam apud Anglos esse qui te tuæque magni æstimant, divinæque animi tui dotes vehementer suspiciunt & admirantur: Neminem autem hominem meipso impeniùs te amare posse, eximiàmque tuam Philosophiam arctiùs implexari.

Sed

Sed revera illustrissime Cartesi, ut nihil dissimulem ; quamvis pulcherrimum illud Philosophiæ tuæ corpus ac essentiam valde depeream, fateor tamen paucula excidisse in secunda Principiorum parte, quæ certè animus meus aut paulò habetior est quàm ut capiat, aut ut admittat, averfator.

Sed præclaræ tuæ Philosophiæ Summa nihil indè periclitatur, cùm hujusmodi ista sint, ut cùm aut falsa meritò aut incerta judicari possint, ità nihil ad essentiam Philosophiæ tuæ ac fundamenta pertinere, illaque sine istis optimè possit constare. Quæ verò ea sint, si tibi non sit tædio, breviter nunc exponam.

Primò, definitionem Materiæ seu Corporis instituis multò quàm par est latiore. Res enim extensa Deus videtur esse, atque Angelus, imò verò res quælibet per se subsistens ; ità ut eisdem finibus claudi videatur extensio atque essentia rerum absoluta, quæ tamen variari potest pro essentiarum ipsarum varietate. Atq; equidem quòd Deus extenditur suo modo, hinc arbitror patere, nempe quòd sit omnipræsens, & universam mundi machinam singulâsque ejus particulas intimè occupet. Quomodo enim motum imprimeret materiæ, quod fecisse aliquando, & etiamnum facere, ipse fateris, nisi proximè quasi attingeret materiam universi, aut saltem aliquando attigisset ? Quod certè nunquam fecisset nisi adfuisset ubique, singulâsque plagas occupavisset. Deus igitur suo modo extenditur atque expanditur, ac proindè est res extensa.

Neque tamen ille corpus istud est, five materia, quam ingeniosa illa Artifex, Mens scilicet tua, in globulos striatâsque particulas tam affabrè tornavit. Quamobrem res extensa latior corpore est.

Animûmque mihi ulterius addit ut à te hac in re dissentiam, quòd ad confirmationem hujusce tuæ definitionis *tam scævum adhibes argumentum, & ferme Sophisticum*. Quòd utique corpus possit esse corpus sine mollitie, vel duritie, vel pondere, vel levitate, &c. illis enim aliisque omnibus qualitatibus quæ in materia corporea sentiuntur ex ea sublatis, ipsam integram remanere. Quod perinde est ac si dixeris, libram Ceræ, cùm possit esse libra ceræ, quamvis spoliatur figurâ sphericâ, vel cubicâ, vel pyramidalî, &c. sub nulla figura posse remanere integram ceræ libram. Quod tamen impossibile est. Quamvis enim hæc vel illa figura non tam arctè cohæreat cum cera quin illam exuere possit, ut tamen cera semper sit figurata necessitas summa est & arctissima. Ità quamvis materia non sit necessariò mollis, nec dura, nec calida, nec frigida, ut tamen sit *sensibilis* est summè necessarium ; vel, si malles, *tangibilis*, prout optimè definit Lucretius,

Tangere enim, & tangi, nisi corpus potest nulla res.

Quæ certè notio minùs debet à tua mente abhorrere, cùm Philosophia tua omnem sensum, cum antiquis illis apud Theophrastum *αἰσθήσεις*, tactum planissimè constituat. Quod vero verius esse ipse facillimè admittam. Sed si minùs placet *Corpus definire ab habitudine ad sensus nostros*, Tangibilitas hæc latior sit ac diffusior, & significet mutuum illum contactum tangendique potentiam inter corpora quælibet, five animata five inanimata fuerint, estoque superficierum duorum pluriûmve corporum immediata juxtapositio. Quod & aliam innuit
materie

materiae five corporis conditionem, quam appellare poteris *impenetrabilitatem*; nempe quod nec penetrare alia corpora, nec ab illis penetrari possit. Unde manifestissimum est discrimen inter Naturam divinam ac corpoream, cum illa hanc penetrare, hæc verò se ipsam penetrare non possit. Unde sanè felicius mihi videtur cum Platonice suis Virgilius philosophari, quàm Cartesius ipse, cum ex illorum sententia sic cecinerit,

—— Totamque infusa per artus

Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.

Mitto alias insigniores Divinae extensionis conditiones, cum non opus sit hoc loco explicare. Vel hæc pauca suffecerint ad demonstrandum multò tutius fuisse materiam definivisse substantiam *tangibilem*, vel modo supra explicato *impenetrabilem*, quàm Rem extensam. Dicta enim vel *Tangibilitas*, vel *Impenetrabilitas*, competit corpori adæquatè; tua autem definitio peccat in legem καθόλου πρώτον, neque enim est reciproca cum definito.

Secundò, Quando innuis *ne virtute quidem divinâ fieri posse ut propriè dictum existat vacuum*, & si omne corpus ex vase tolleretur, quod latera necessariò coirent; ista profectò mihi videntur non solum falsa, sed minùs consona antecedentibus. Si enim Deus motum materiae imprimit, quod supra docuisti, annon ille potest contrà obniti, & inhibere ne coeant vasis latera? Sed contradictio est distare vasis latera, & tamen nihil interjacere. Idem non sensit literata Antiquitas, Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, alique. Sed ut leviusculum illud argumenti genus missum faciam; divinam contendo interjacere extensionem, tuumque hîc suppositum esse infirmum, materiam solummodo extendi: Latera tamen ut antea coitura non necessitate Logicâ sed naturali; Deumque solum hanc coitionem inhibere posse. Cum enim particulae, primi præsertim secundique Elementi, tam furibundo motu agitentur, necesse est quâ ceditur, eò ruant præcipites, aliasque sibi contiguas secum abripiant.

Infeliciter igitur successit, quod tam bellum Theorema de modo Rarefactionis & Condensationis, quod certè ego aliis de causis verissimum esse senso, tam lubrico suffulcias fundamento.

Tertiò, Singularem illam subtilitatem non capio, quâ atomos, id est, particulas suâ naturâ indivisibiles, non dari evincas. Ut enim, inquis effecerit Deus eas particulas à nullis creaturis dividi posse, non certè sibi ipsi easdem dividendi facultatem potuit adimere, quia fieri non potest ut propriam suam potentiam imminuat. Eodem argumento probaveris, Deum nunquam fecisse ut hesternus oriretur Sol, quoniam potentia ejus jam efficere non potest ut Sol hesternus non esset ortus; nec vilissimam posse muscam occidere,

Si modo qui periit, non periisse potest,

quod scitè de seipso Ovidius; materiam non creâsse, cum sit divisibilis in semper divisibilia, ac proinde Deus nunquam posset absolvere ac perficere hanc divisionem. Pars enim restat indivisa, quamvis divisibilis, atque ità perpetuò eluditur potentia divina, nec plenè se exèrere potest, finemque fortiri.

Quartò, Indefinitam tuam mundi extensionem non intelligo. Extensio enim illa indefinita vel simpliciter infinita est, vel tantum quoad

nos. Si intelligis extensionem infinitam simpliciter, cur mentem tuam obscuras vocabulis nimium suppressis ac modestis? Si tantum quoad nos infinitam, revera erit finita extensio; neque enim mens nostra aut rerum aut veritatis mensura est. Ac proinde, cum alia sit simpliciter infinita expansio, divinæ utique essentiae, materia tuorum vorticum à centrīs suis recedet, totaque mundi machina in dissipatas atomos vagosque abibit pulvisculos.

Atque sanè eò magis hīc admiror modestiam tuam atque metum, quod adeò tibi caves à materiae infinitudine, cum particulas actu & infinitas & divisas ipse agnoveris Art. 34, & 35. Quod certè si non fecisses, extorqueri tamen posse videtur hoc modo. Nam cum quantum sit in infinitum divisibile, partes actu infinitas habere oportet. Ut enim cultello aliòve quovis instrumento corpus in partes palpabiles, quæ non actu sunt tales, mechanicè diffecare prorsus est ἀμύχαρον, sive impossibile; ita vel mente quantitatem dividere in partes toti realiter actuque non inexistentes, planè ἀλογον est ac rationi absolum.

Quibus insuper adjungi potest, hypothesin hanc, quod mundus simpliciter ac revera sit infinitus, æqualem vim habere ad explicandam juxta ad confirmandam rationem rarefactionis & condensationis, quam supra proposuisti Art. 6, 7. atque istud principium, *solius corporis esse extensionem, & nihilum non posse extendi*. Quod enim ibi præstat Logica seu contradictoria necessitas, idem hīc necessitas Physica vel Mechanica certissimè præstabit.

Cum enim omnia in infinitum usque materiâ seu corporibus sint plena ac referta, penetrationis lex impediet ne fiat ulla distantia in rarefactione corporibus nuda, aut accessio partium ad se invicem in condensatione, sine interjacentium particularum expulsionē.

Atque hætenus quæ à me dicta sunt rationi mentique meæ maxime videntur perspicua, tuisque placitis longè longèque certiora.

Cæterum à nulla tuarum opinionum animus meus, pro ea quæ est mollitie ac teneritudine, æquè abhorret, ac ab internecina illa & jugulatrice sententia, quam in Methodo tulisti, brutis omnibus vitam sensumque eripiens, dicam, an potius præripiens? neque enim vixisse unquam pateris. Hīc non tam suspicio rutilantem tui ingenii aciem, quam reformido, utpote de animantium fato te sollicitus, acumēque tuum non subtile solum agnosco, sed chalybis instar rigidum ac crudele, quod uno quasi ictu universum ferme animantium genus vitâ auferit sensuque spoliare in marmora & machinas vertendo.

Sed videamus obsecro quid in causa est quod in brutas animantes quicquam tam severiter statuas. Loqui utique non possunt, causamque suam apud judicem dicere, & quod crimen aggravat, cum ad loquelam organis satis sint instructæ, uti patet in Picis & Psittacis. Hinc vitâ sensuque mulctandæ sunt.

Verum enimvero quomodo fieri possit ut aut Psittaci aut Picæ voces nostras imitentur, nisi audirent, sensuque perciperent quid loquimur? Sed non intelligunt, inquis, quid sibi volunt istæ voces quas effutiant imitando. Quidni tamen ipsi quid volunt satis intelligant, cibum scilicet quem à Dominis hoc artificio acquirunt? putant igitur se cibum mendicare, quod istâ loquacitate toties voti compotes fiunt.

Et

Et quorsum, quæso, illa attentio est & auscultatio in avibus cantatoriis, quam præ se ferunt, si nullus sit in ipsis sensus nec animadversio? Unde illa vulpium canumque astutia & sagacitas? Quæ sit ut minæ & verba ferocientes cohibeant belluas? Canis famelicus cum furtim quid abstulit, cur quasi facti conscius clam se furripit, & meticolosè ac diffidenter incedens nemini occurrenti gratulatur, sed averso pronoque rostro suam ad distans pergit viam, suspiciosè cautus nè ob patratum scelus pœnas luat? Quomodo ista fieri possunt sine interna facti conscientia? Copiosa ista historiolarum congeries, quibus nonnulli conantur demonstrare rationem inesse animalibus brutis, hoc saltem evincet, sensum ipsis memoriàmque inesse. Sed infinitum esset tales narratiunculas hîc attexere. E quibus scio bene multas istius modi esse, ut earum vim vel subtilissimum acumen haud possit eludere.

Sed video planè quid te huc adegit, ut bruta pro machinis habeas; Immortalitatis utique animarum nostrarum demonstrandæ ratio, quæ cum supponat corpus nullo modo cogitare posse, concludit, ubicumque est cogitatio, substantiam à corpore realiter distinctam adesse oportere, adeoque immortalem. Unde sequitur, bruta, si cogitent, substantias immortales sibi annexas habere.

Atqui obsecro te, Vir perspicacissime, cum ex ista demonstrandi ratione necesse esset bruta animantia aut sensu spoliare, aut donare immortalitate, cur ipsa malles inanimes machinas statuere quàm corpora animabus immortalibus actuata? præsertim cum illud ut naturæ phænomenis minimè consonum, ita planè sit inauditum hætenus; hoc verò apud sapientissimos veterum ratum sit ac comprobatum, Pythagoram putà, Platonem, aliòsque. Et certè animos hoc adderet Platoniceis omnibus persistendi in sua de brutorum immortalitate sententia, cum tam insigne ingenium eò augustiarum redactum sit, ut si animas brutorum immortales esse non concedatur, universa bruta insensatas machinas necessariò statuatur.

Hæc sunt paucula illa (magne Cartesi) in quibus mihi fas esse putabam à te dissentire. Cætera mihi adeò arrident atque adblandiuntur, ut nihil illis habeam magis in deliciis; adeoque intimis animi mei sensibus consona sunt atque cognata, ut non solum tardioribus commodè explicare, sed etiam contra pugnacissimos quosque feliciter, si opus esset, defendere me posse confidam.

Quod reliquum est, exorandus es, Vir illustrissime, ut hæc nostra boni consulas, nec me ullius levitatis vanæque ambitionis suspectum habeas, quasi affectarem Clarissimorum virorum familiaritates ac amicitias, cum & ipse si possem, haud cuperem, inclarescere, rem turbulentam famam judicans, privatoque otio valde inimicam.

Neque profectò quamvis animo sim in te admodum pronus ac proclivi, id unquam tibi significâsem, nisi ab aliis instigatus; sed te tuæque amore latenti tacitæque veneratione prosequi contentus fuisssem.

Nec obnixè à te esflagito ut rescribas, utpote quem contemplationibus summè arduis, vel experimentis faciundis maxime utilibus pariter ac difficilibus, occupatissimum autumo.

Permitto igitur hîc tibi tuo jure uti, nè sim in publicum injurius. Quòd si tamen hæc nostra, qualia qualia fuerint, responsione quâlibet-
cunque cohonestare dignatus fueris, rem sanè non ingratam præsta-
bis,

Cantabrigiæ, è Collegio Christi,
Idus Decembris, anno 1648.

Singularis tuæ sapientiæ
cultori devotissimo,

HENRICO MORO.

SCHOLIA

IN EPIST. I. H. MORI.

Difficult. 4. Nam cùm quantum sit in infinitum divisibile, &c. Satis
argutus equidem hic gryphus est, sed minùs solidus, Facile enim ex-
tricare te poteris si negaveris quantum Physicè esse divisibile in infinitum,
partesve infinitas Physicas toti realiter actuque inexistere, sed Materiam con-
tenderis interim ex Monadibus, quas vocant, Physicis constare, in easque Di-
vinâ Virtute posse dissolvi; nec mente in has partes jure dividi, nisi Divinâ
saltem virtute sic possent discesci. Mathematicam vero Divisibilitatem, quæ
ad has Monadas etiam pertinere possit, ad hunc locum non spectare.

Doctissimo & Humanissimo Viro

HENRICO MORO

RENATUS DES-CARTES.

LAUDES quas in me congeris, Vir humanissime, non tam ullius
mei meriti, utpote quòd eas æquare nullum potest, quàm tuæ
erga me benevolentia testes sunt. Benevolentia autem ex sola scrip-
torum meorum lectione contracta candorem & generositatem animi
tui tam apertè ostendit, ut totum me tibi, quamvis antehac non noto,
devinciat. Ideoque perlibenter iis qui ex me quæris respondebo.

1. Primum est, cur ad corpus definiendum dicam illud esse substan-
tiam extensam potius quàm sensibilem, tangibilem, vel impenetrabi-
lem. At res te monet, si dicatur substantia sensibilis, tunc *definiri ab*
habitudine ad sensus nostros, quâ ratione quædam ejus proprietas duntax-
at explicatur, non intègra natura, quæ cùm possit existere, *quamvis*
nulli homines existant, certè à sensibus nostris non pendet. Nec pro-
inde video cur dicas, esse summè necessarium ut omnis materia sit
sensibilis. Nam contrà, nulla est quæ non sit planè insensibilis, si tan-
tùm in partes *nervorum nostrorum particulis multò minores*, & singulas
seorsim satîs celeriter agitas, sit divisa. Meum-

Meumque illud argumentum quod scævum & ferme Sophisticum appellas, adhibui tantum ad eorum opinionem refutandam, qui tecum existimant omne corpus esse sensibile, quam, meo iudicio, aperte & demonstrative refutat. Potest enim corpus retinere omnem suam corporis naturam, *quamvis non sit ad sensum molle*, nec durum, nec frigidum, nec calidum, nec denique habeat ullam sensibilem qualitatem.

Ut verò inciderem in eum errorem quem videris mihi velle tribuere, per comparisonem ceræ, quæ quamvis possit non esse quadrata, nec rotunda, non potest tamen non habere aliquam figuram, debuissim, ex eo quod iuxta mea principia omnes sensibiles qualitates in eo solo consistant quod particulæ corporis certis modis moveantur, vel quiescant, debuissim inquam, concludere, corpus posse existere, quamvis nullæ ejus particulæ moveantur, nec quiescant; quod mihi nunquam in mentem venit. Corpus itaque non rectè definitur substantia sensibilis.

Videamus nunc an fortè aptius dici possit substantia impenetrabilis, vel tangibilis, eo sensu quem explicuisti.

Sed rursus ista tangibilitas & impenetrabilitas in corpore, est tantum *ut in homine Risibilitas, proprium quarto modo*, juxta vulgares Logicæ leges, non vera & essentialis differentia, quam in extensione consistere contendo; atque idcirco, ut homo non definitur animal risibile, sed rationale, ita corpus non definivi per impenetrabilitatem, sed per extensionem. Quod confirmatur ex eo, quod tangibilitas & impenetrabilitas habeant relationem ad partes, & præsupponant conceptum divisionis vel terminationis. Possimus autem concipere corpus continuum indeterminatæ magnitudinis sive indefinitum, in quo nihil præter extensionem consideretur.

Sed, inquis, Deus etiam & Angelus, resque alia quælibet per se subsistens est extensa, ideoque latius patet definitio tua quàm definitum. Ego verò non soleo quidem de nominibus disputare, atque ideo si ex eo quod Deus sit ubique, dicat aliquis eum esse quodammodo extensum, per me licet. *Atqui nego veram extensionem*, qualis ab omnibus vulgò concipitur, vel in Deo, vel in Angelis, vel in mente nostra, vel denique in ulla substantia quæ non sit corpus, reperiri. Quippe per ens extensum, communiter omnes intelligunt aliquid imaginabile, (sive sit ens rationis, sive reale, hoc enim jam in medium relinquo;) atqui in hoc ente varias partes determinatæ magnitudinis & figuræ, quarum una nullo modo alia sit, possunt imaginatione distinguere, unâque in locum aliarum possunt etiam imaginatione transferre, sed non duas simul in uno & eodem loco imaginari: Atqui de Deo, ac etiam de mente nostra, nihil tale dicere licet; neque enim est imaginabilis, sed intelligibilis duntaxat, nec etiam in partes distinguibilis, præsertim in partes quæ habeant determinatas magnitudines & figuras. Denique, facile intelligimus & mentem humanam, & Deum, & simul plures Angelos in uno & eodem loco esse posse. Unde manifestè concluditur, nullas substantias incorporeas propriè esse extensas; sed eas intelligo tanquam virtutes aut vires quasdam, quæ quamvis se applicent rebus extensis, non idcirco sunt extensæ; ut quamvis in ferro candenti sit ignis, non ideo ignis ille est ferrum. Quod verò nonnulli substantiæ motionem cum rei extensæ notione confundant, hoc fit ex falso præjudicio,

judicio, quia nihil putant existere, vel esse intelligibile, nisi sit etiam imaginabile, ac revera nihil sub imaginationem cadit, quod non sit aliquo modo extensum. Jam verò quemadmodum dicere licet sanitatem soli homini competere, quamvis per analogiam & Medicina, & aer temperatus, & alia multa dicantur etiam sana; ita illud solum quod est imaginabile, ut habens partes extra partes, quæ sint determinatæ magnitudinis & figuræ, dico esse extensum, quamvis alia per analogiam etiam extensa dicantur.

2. Ut autem transeamus ad secundam tuam difficultatem; si examinemus quodnam sit ens extensum à me descriptum, inveniemus plane idem esse cum spatio, quod vulgus aliquando plenum, aliquando vacuum, aliquando reale, aliquando imaginarium esse putat. In spatio enim, quantumvis imaginario & vacuo, facile omnes imaginantur varias partes determinatæ magnitudinis & figuræ, possuntque *unas in locum aliarum imaginatione transferre*; sed nullo modo duas simul se mutuo penetrantes in uno & eodem loco concipere, quoniam implicat contradictionem ut hoc fiat, & spatii pars nulla tollatur. Cum autem ego considerarem tam reales proprietates non nisi in reali corpore esse posse, ausus sum affirmare, nullum dari spatium prorsus vacuum, atque omne ens extensum esse verum corpus: nec dubitavi à magnis viris, Epicuro, Democrito, Lucretio hac in re dissentire; vidi enim illos non firmam aliquam rationem esse secutos, sed falsum præjudicium, quo omnes ab ineunte ætate fuimus imbuti. Quippe quamvis sensus nostri non semper nobis exhibeant corpora externa qualia sunt omni ex parte, sed tantum quatenus ad nos referuntur, & prodesse possunt aut nocere, ut in Art. 3. partis 2. præmonui; judicavimus tamen omnes, cum essemus adhuc pueri, nihil aliud in mundo esse quam quod à sensibus exhibebatur, ac proinde nullum esse corpus nisi sensibile, locaque omnia in quibus nihil sentiebamus vacua esse. Quod præjudicium cum ab Epicuro, Democrito, Lucretio non fuerit unquam rejectum, illorum Authoritatem sequi non debeo.

Miror autem virum cætera perspicacissimum, cum videat se negare non posse *quin aliqua in omni spatio substantia sit*, quoniam in eo omnes proprietates extensionis revera reperiuntur, malle tamen dicere divinam extensionem implere spatium in quo nullum est corpus, quam fateri nullum omnino spatium sine corpore esse posse. Etenim, ut jam dixi, prætenfa illa Dei extensio nullo modo subjectum esse potest verarum proprietatum, quas in omni spatio distinctissime percipimus. Neque enim Deus est imaginabilis, nec in partes distinguibilis quæ sint mensurabiles & figuratæ.

Sed facile admittis nullum vacuum naturaliter dari. Sollicitus es de potentia divina, quam putas tollere posse id omne quod est in aliquo vase, simulque impedire nè coeant vasis latera. Ego verò cum sciam meum Intellectum esse finitum, & Dei potentiam infinitam, nihil unquam de hac determino, sed considero duntaxat quid possit à me percipi vel non percipi, & caveo diligenter nè iudicium ullum meum à perceptione dissentiat. Quapropter audacter affirmo, Deum posse id omne quod possibile esse percipio; non autem è contra audacter nego, illum posse id quod conceptui meo repugnat, sed dico tantum implicare contradictionem. Sic quia video conceptui meo repugnare ut

omne

omne corpus ex aliquo vase tollatur, & in ipso remaneat extensio, non aliter à me concepta quàm prius concipiebatur corpus in eo contentum; *dico implicare contradictionem, ut talis extensio ibi remaneat post sublatum corpus, ideòque debere vasis latera coire: Quod omnino consonum est meis cæteris opinionibus.* Dico enim alibi *nullum motum dari nisi quodammodo circularem*; unde sequitur non intelligi distinctè, Deum alquod corpus ex vase tollere, quin simul intelligatur, in ejus locum aliud corpus, vel ipsa vasis latera motu circulari succedere.

3. Eodem modo etiam dico implicare contradictionem, ut aliquæ dentur atomi, *quæ concipiantur extensæ ac simul indivisibiles*; quia quamvis Deus eas tales efficere potuerit ut à nulla creatura dividantur, certè non possumus intelligere ipsum se facultate eas dividendi privare potuisse. Nec valet tua comparatio de iis quæ facta sunt, quòd nequeant infecta esse. Neque enim pro nota impotentiae sumimus, quòd quis non possit facere id quod non intelligimus esse possibile; sed tantum quòd non possit aliquid facere ex iis quæ tanquam possibilia distinctè percipimus. At sanè percipimus esse possibile ut atomus dividatur, quandoquidem eam extensam esse supponimus; atque ideo si judicemus eam à Deo dividi non posse, judicabimus Deum aliquid non posse facere, quod tamen possibile esse percipimus. Non autem eodem modo percipimus fieri posse, ut quod factum est sit infectum, sed è contrà, percipimus hoc fieri planè non posse; ac proinde non esse ullum potentiae defectum in Deo, quòd istud non faciat. Quantum autem ad divisibilitatem materiæ, non eadem ratio est: etsi enim non possim numerare omnes partes in quas est divisibilis, earumque idcirco numerum dicam esse indefinitum; non tamen possum affirmare illarum divisionem à Deo nunquam absolvi, quia scio Deum plura posse facere quàm ego cogitatione meâ complecti; atque istam indefinitam quarundam partium materiæ divisionem revera fieri solere in Artic. 34. concessi.

4. Neque verò affectatæ modestiæ est, sed cautelæ, meo judicio, necessariæ, quòd quædam dicam esse indefinita potius quàm infinita; solus enim Deus quem positivè intelligo esse infinitum: de reliquis, ut de mundi extensione, de numero partium in quas materia est divisibilis, & similibus, *an sint simpliciter infinita necne, profiteor me nescire*; scio tantum me in illis nullum finem agnoscere, atque idcirco respectu mei dico esse indefinita.

Et quamvis mens nostra non sit rerum vel veritatis mensura, certè debet esse mensura eorum quæ affirmamus aut negamus. Quid enim est absurdius, quid inconsideratius, quàm velle judicium ferre de iis ad quorum perceptionem mentem nostram attingere non posse confitemur?

Miror autem te non modò id velle facere videri, cùm ais, *si tantum quoad nos sit infinita, revera erit finita, extensio, &c.* sed præterea etiam divinam quandam extensionem imaginari, quæ latius pateat quàm corporum extensio, *atque ità supponere Deam partes habere extra partes, & esse divisibilem omnemque prorsus rei corporeæ essentiam illi tribuere.*

Nè verò quis scrupulus hîc superfit; Cùm dico extensionem materiæ esse indefinitam, sufficere hoc puto ad impediendum nè quis extra illam locus fingi queat, in quem meorum vorticum particulae abire possint. *Ubicumque enim locus ille concipiatur, ibi, jam juxta meam opinionem, aliqua materia est*; quia dicendo eam esse indefinite extensam, dico ipsam latius extendi quàm omne id quod ab homine concipi potest.

Sed nihilominus existimo maximam esse differentiam inter amplitudinem istius corporeæ extensionis, & amplitudinem divinæ, non dicam extensionis, utpote quæ propriè loquendo nulla est, sed substantiæ vel essentiæ; ideoque hanc simpliciter infinitam, illam autem indefinitam appello.

Cæterum non admitto quod pro singulari tua humanitate concedis, nempe reliquas meas opiniones posse constare, quamvis id quod de materiæ extensione scripsi refutetur: *unum enim est ex præcipuis, meoque judicio certissimis, Physicæ meæ fundamentis, profiteorque mihi nullas rationes satisfacere in ipsa Physica, nisi quæ necessitatem illam, quam vocas Logicam sive contradictoriam, involvant*; modò tantum ea excipias quæ per solam experientiam cognosci possunt, ut quod circa hanc terram unicus sit Sol vel unica Luna, & similia. Cùmque in reliquis à meo sensu non abhorreas, spero etiam his te faciliè assensurum, si modò consideres præjudicium esse quòd multi existiment ens extensum, in quo nihil est quod moveat sensus, non esse veram substantiam corpoream, sed spatium vacuum duntaxat; quòdque nullum sit sensibile, atque nulla substantia nisi quæ sub imaginationem cadat, ac proinde sit extensa.

5. *Sed nulli præjudicio magis omnes assuevimus* quàm ei, quod nobis ab ineunte ætate persuasit bruta animantia cogitare. Quippe nulla ratio nos movit ad hoc credendum, nisi quòd videntes pleraque brutorum membra in figura externa & motibus à nostris non multum differe, unicùmque in nobis esse credentes istorum motuum principium, animam scilicet, quæ eadem moveret corpus & cogitaret, non dubitavimus quin aliqua talis anima in illis reperiretur.

Postquam autem ego advertissem distinguenda esse duo diversa motuum nostrorum principia, unum scilicet planè mechanicum & corporeum, quod à sola spirituum vi & membrorum conformatione dependet, potestque *anima corporea* appellari; aliud incorporeum, *mentem* scilicet, sive animam illam quam definis substantiam cogitantem; quaesivi diligentius an ab his duobus principiis orirentur animalium motus, an ab uno duntaxat. Cùmque clarè perspexerim posse omnes oriri ab eo solo quod corporeum est & mechanicum, pro certo ac demonstrato habui, nullo pacto à nobis probari posse, aliquam esse in brutis animam cogitantem. Nec moror astutias & sagacitates canum & vulpium, nec quæcunque alia quæ propter cibum, venerem, vel metum à brutis fiunt. *Prosteor enim me posse perfacile illa omnia ut à sola membrorum confirmatione profecta explicare.*

Quamvis autem pro demonstrato habeam, probari non posse aliquam esse in brutis cogitationem; non ideo puto posse demonstrari nullam esse, quia mens humana illorum corda non pervadit. Sed examinando quidnam sit hac de re maximè probabile nullam video rationem

rationem pro brutorum cogitatione militare *præter hanc unam quod cum habeant oculos, aures, linguam, & reliqua sensuum organa sicut nos, verisimile sit illa sentire sicut nos; & quia in nostro sentiendi modo cogitatio includitur, similem etiam illis cogitationem esse tribuendam.* Quæ ratio cum sit maximè obvia, mentes omnium hominum à prima ætate occupavit. Sunt autem aliæ rationes multò plures & fortiores, sed non omnibus ità obviæ, quæ contrarium planè persuadent. Inter quas suum quidem locum obtinet, *quod non sit tam probabile omnes vermes, culices, erucas, & reliqua animalia immortali animâ prædita esse, quam machinarum instar se movere.*

Primò, quia certum est in corporibus animalium, ut etiam in nostris, esse ossa, nervos, musculos, sanguinem, spiritus animales, & reliqua organa ita disposita, ut se solis absque ulla cogitatione omnes motus quos in brutis observamus ciere possint. Quod patet in convulsionibus, cum mente invitâ machinamentum corporis vehementius sæpe ac magis diversis modis solum se movet, quàm ope voluntatis soleat moveri.

Deinde, quia rationi consantaneum videtur, cum ars sit naturæ imitatrix, possintque homines varia fabricare automata in quibus sine ulla cogitatione est motus, ut Natura etiam sua automata, sed arte factis longè præstantiora, nempe bruta omnia, producat, præsertim cum nullam agnoscamus rationem propter quam, ubi est talis membrorum conformatio qualem in animalibus videmus, cogitatio etiam debeat adesse; atque ideo majori admiratione dignum sit, quod mens aliqua reperiatur in unoquoque humano corpore, quàm quod nulla sit in ullis brutis.

Sed rationum omnium quæ bestias cogitatione destitutas esse persuadent meo iudicio præcipua est, quod quamvis inter illas unæ aliis ejusdem speciei sint perfectiores, non secus quàm inter homines, ut videre licet in equis & canibus, quorum aliqui cæteris multò felicius quæ docentur addiscunt; & quamvis omnes perfacilè nobis impetus suos naturales, ut iras, metus, famem, & similia, voce vel aliis corporis motibus significant; nunquam tamen hætenus fuerit observatum, ullum brutum animal eò perfectionis devenisse ut verâ loquelâ uteretur, hoc est, *ut aliquid vel voce vel nutibus indicaret, quod ad solam cogitationem, non autem ad impetum naturalem, posset referri.* Hæc enim loquela unicum est cogitationis in corpore latentis signum certum, atque ipsâ utuntur omnes homines, etiam *quàm maximè stupidi & mente capti, & linguâ vocisque organis destituti, non autem ullum brutum;* eamque idcirco pro vera inter homines & bruta differentia sumere licet.

Reliquas rationes cogitationem brutis adimentes brevitatis causâ hîc omitto. Velim tamen notari me loqui de cogitatione, non de vita vel sensu: vitam enim nulli animali denego, utpote quam in solo cordis calore consistere statuo; nec denego etiam sensum quatenus ab organo corporeo dependet. Sicque hæc mea opinio non tam crudelis est erga belluas, quàm pia erga homines, *Pythagoreorum* superstitioni non addictos, quos nempe à criminis suspitione absolvit quoties animalia comedunt vel occidunt.

Hæc

Hæc autem omnia fortasse prolixius scripsi quàm acumen ingenii tui requirebat; volui enim hoc pacto testari paucissimorum objectiones mihi hæcenus æquè gratas fuisse ac tuas, humanitatèque & candorem tuum maximè tibi devinxisse

Egmondæ prope Alchmariam,
Nonis Februarii 1649.

*Omnium veræ sapientiæ studiosorum
cultorem observantissimum,*

RENATUM DES-CARTES.

SCHOLIA

In RESPONSUM ad EPIST. I.

D*ifficult. 1.* Si ex eo quòd Deus sit ubique, dicat aliquis eum esse quodammodo extensum, per me licet. Atqui nego veram extensionem qualis ab omnibus vulgò concipitur, &c. *Hoc in loco manifestum est Cartesium talem solummodo extensionem de Deo negare qualem omnes concipiunt in corpore, hoc est, corpoream. Metaphysicam verò extensionem, qualem in nostro Enchiridio descripsimus, nequaquam repudiare. Unde observare licet quantum Cartesiani Nullibistæ ab Authore suo Cartesio degeneraverint, qui Deum & ubique agnoscit, & aliquo modo extensum, dum illi è contrà nec extensum nec ullibi esse contendunt.*

Nullas substantias incorporeas propriè esse extensas, sed eas intelligo tanquàm *virtutes* aut *vires* quasdam quæ quamvis se applicent rebus extensis, non idcirco sunt extensæ; ut quamvis in ferro candenti sit ignis, non ideo ignis ille est ferrum. At verò per ferrum ignis extensus est tamen. Quod mihi satis est. Sed ingenuè fateor locum hunc esse paulò obscuriorem, nec sat scio quid hic subinsinuare velit Philosophus ubi ait, sed eas intelligo tanquàm *virtutes* ac *vires* quasdam, cum Ignis non solum per ferrum extensus sit, sed illius etiam sit *Modificatio*. Nollem enim id subindicari quod tam aperte profitetur in Posthumis suis Operibus, ille Cartesiani discipulus Spinozius, Deum nempe, Angelos, Mentis humanas omnesque, quæ vulgò putantur, substantias incorporeas nihil aliud esse nisi *virtutes virèscive* *Materiæ Mundanæ*, quippe unice illius in universo substantiæ.

Difficult. 2. Malle tamen dicere Divinam Extensionem implere spacium in quo nullum est corpus, &c. Equidem illud optimo jure dico, ubicunque scilicet *imaginarium* spacium esse fingitur, illic rectè esse *Divinam Amplitudinem*, nosque in Enchiridio Metaphysico, evidentiâ, si fieri potest, plusquam Mathematicâ, Immobile quoddam Extensum à mobili materia distinctum demonstravimus.

Et in ipso remaneat Extensio non aliter à me concepta quàm priùs concipiebatur corpus in eo contentum, &c. At enim falsam hanc esse conceptionem ex eis quæ in dicto Enchiridio occurrunt clarè constat, ubi demonstratur Extensum quoddam Immobile, à mobili Materia distinctum & cui Attributa competunt Materiæ Attributis contraria. Vide Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 6, 7, 8.

Difficult.

Difficult. 4. Solus enim Deus est, quem positivè intelligo esse infinitum, &c. *Hac de re, modò seriò hic agat Cartesius, optimè inter nos convenit. Et certè mihi videor in dicto Enchiridio Mundum, quantumlibet indefinitus sit, satìs solidè demonstràsse non posse esse Infinitum, adeò ut nuda Divinitas extra Mundi limites (ut corpus Aaronis extra Stalam sacerdotalem, quantum ad caput, manus pedèsque) extendatur. Vide Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 10. sect. 8, 9, &c.*

Dico ipsam latius extendi quàm omne id quod ab homine concipi potest, &c. *Et paulò post, Amplitudinem Divinae Essentiae simpliciter Infinitam, corpoream autem extensionem Indefinitam appellat. Quae quidem indefinita Mundi corporei Extensio, si sic intelligatur acsi Imaginatio humana eam exhaurire vel comprehendere non possit, rationi satìs consentanea est. Ratio verò recta necessariò nobis dictabit Divinam Amplitudinem infinito eam excedere & circumcingere quasi vel coronare; unde & Kether apud Cabbalistas dicitur.*

Clarissimo Viro, Nobilissimoq; Philosopho,
RENATO DE S-CARTES,
HENRICUS MORUS ANGLUS.

OPINIONIS quam de te concepi, nuperisque meis literis apud te testatus sum, quanta quanta sit (Vir illustrissime) me non poenitet, nec unquam, sat scio, poterit poenitere. Quin & adauget plurimùm tui apud me existimationem, quòd ad stupendam illam mentis tuae amplitudinem divinùmque acumen, suavitas tanta morum accesserit & humanitas. Quam certè ut nunquam suspectam habui, ità nunc sanè eruditissimas tuas literas habeo pro certissimo illius argumento. Cæterùm nè tanti favoris te poeniteat, quasi in servum caput collati, nève vilescat meum erga te studium, atque amor, tanquam ab abjecto jacentique animo profectus, quo tandem modo responsa tua mihi satisfecerint, palam, uti hominem liberum decet, apertèque profitebor. Quod tamen nè nimium tibi vel mihi ipsi negotium facessat, fusiores orationis texturas missas faciens, rem totam in Instantias quasdam breves, aut saltem notatiunculas super singulis responsorum tuorum particulis, compingam.

Ad Responsum circa primam Difficultatem

Instantia I.

Definiri ab habitudine ad sensus nostros, &c.

Hic regeri potest; Cùm radix rerum omnium ac essentia in æternas defossa lateat tenebras, rem quamlibet necessariò definiri ab habitudine aliqua. Quæ habitudo proprietas dici potest in substantiis, cùm non sit substantia; quamvis agnoscam libenter *proprietates alias aliis esse*

esse priores ; hoc autem tantum me voluisse, Satius nimirum esse per adæquatam quamlibet proprietatem, quam per formam, quam vocant, definito latiore, rem definivisse. Porro, cum ipse corpus definis rem extensam, ipsam illam extensionem insuper adnoto consistere in habitudine quadam partium ad se invicem, quatenus aliæ extra alias productæ sunt. Quam habitudinem non esse rem absolutam manifestum est.

II.

Quamvis nulli homines existant.

Si omnes mortales conniverent, Sol tamen non exueret suam videnti aptitudinem, quamprimùm oculos aperuerint denuò ; ut neque fecuris, secandi, quamprimùm ligna aut lapides oblatis fuerint.

III.

Nervorum nostrorum particulis multò minores.

Deum tamen artificem adaptare posse credo nervos satis exiguos exiguis istis materiæ particulis, ac proinde sensibilitatem materiæ hoc modo comminutæ integram manere. Porro, hæ particulæ à motu cessare possunt, atque coalescere, nostrisque hoc modo nervis sensibiles denuò evadere, quod de substantia incorporea nullo modo verum est.

IV.

Quamvis non sit ad sensum molle, &c.

Certum est ad nervos nostros sensorios durum fore vel molle, &c. aut saltem ad istiusmodi nervos, quales, si vellet, Deus fabricare poterit, ut modò monuimus ; atque hoc satis est, quamvis Deus nunquam fabricaturus sit istiusmodi nervos. Ut revera partes terræ versus centrum sunt ex se visibiles, quamvis nunquam extrahendæ sint in Solis conspectum, nec eò descensurus sit quisquam cum lychno vel lampade.

V.

Est tantum, ut in homine Risibilitas, proprium quarto modo.

Quod si ratio etiam aliis competeret animalibus, rectius definiretur homo animal risibile quàm rationale. Nondum autem à quopiam demonstratum est tangibilitatem aut impenetrabilitatem proprias esse substantiæ extensæ affectiones, quamvis corporis esse meritò quivis agnoverit. Equidem possum clarè concipere substantiam extensam quæ nullam ullo modo habeat tangibilitatem vel impenetrabilitatem. Igitur tangibilitas vel impenetrabilitas non immediatè substantiam extensam consequitur, quatenus extensa est.

VI.

Atqui nego veram extensionem, &c.

Per veram extensionem intelligis quam tangibilitas & impenetrabilitas comitatur. Hanc ipse etiam nego in Deo, nudisve vel mente vel Angelo repiriri. Interea tamen assero aliam esse extensionem æquè veram, quamvis non æquè vulgarem Scholisque tritam, quæ in Angelis mentisque humana ut terminos, ita & figuram habet, sed pro imperio Angeli mentisque variabilem ; Mentisque sive animas nostras atque Angelos, eadem prorsus manente substantiâ, contrahere se posse, & certos denuò ad limites se expandere.

VII.

VII.

Nihil esse intelligibile, nisi sit etiam imaginabile, &c.

Equidem aliquantò sum pronior in illam Aristotelis sententiam, *ὅτι ἀνὰ τῆς φαντασμάτων ἐκ ἐστὶ νοῦσαι.* Sed hîc quisque mentis suæ vires experiatur.

Ad Responsum circa secundam Difficultatem.

Instantia I.

Unas in locum aliarum imaginatione transferre.

Mea quidem imaginatio non potest, nec concipere si transferantur, quin *una vacui spatii partes absorbeant alteras*, penitusque coincidant & penetrent se invicem.

II.

Nec dubitavi à magnis viris, Epicuro, Democrito, &c.

Nullus dubito quin optimo jure dissentias, cum non solum istis, sed universis Naturæ interpretibus longè major sis (meâ sententiâ) longèque angustior.

III.

Quin aliqua in omni spatio substantia sit, &c.

Id fanè concessi pacis ergô. Sed clarè mihi non constat. Nam si Deus hanc mundi universitatem annihilaret, & multò post aliam crearet de nihilo, *Intermundium illud*, seu absentia mundi, *suam haberet durationem* quam tot dies, anni, vel secula mensurâssent. Non exist-entis igitur est duratio, quæ extensio quædam est. Ac proinde Amplitudo Nihili, putà Vacui, per ulnas vel orgyas mensurari potest, ut Non-existentis in sua non existentia duratio per horas, dies mensûsque mensuratur. Sed concedo, quamvis nondum vi coactus, in omni spatio aliquam substantiam inesse; neque tamen sequi eam esse corpoream, cum extensio sive præsentia divina possit esse subjectum mensurabilitatis, v. g. Præsentiam sive extensionem divinam occupare assero unam alteramque orgyam in hoc vel illo vacuo; nec tamen omnino sequi Deum esse corporeum, ut patet ex suprà dictis, Instantiâ 5. Sed super hac re est agendum alibi.

IV.

Dico implicare contradictionem, ut talis extensio, &c.

Sed hîc libenter quærerem, numquid necesse sit ut aut talis extensio sit qualem in corpore concipis, aut nulla. Deinde, cum & alias res præter corpora extendi suo modo concesseris, annon analogica illa extensio quam vocas, vices obeat extensionis corporeæ, atque ità illam vim contradictoriam retundat. Præsertim cum analogica hæc extensio ad propriè dictam tam propè accedat, ut sit mensurabilis, certòsque pedum ulnarumve numeros occupet.

V.

Nullum motum dari, nisi quodammodo circularem.

Hoc necessariò consequi concedo, necessitate putà Physicâ, supponendo duntaxat omnia corporibus plena, nullamque extensionem aliam integram mundi extensionem excedere: qua in parte ego satis sum

securus ; sed inexpugnabilem hanc contradictionis vim fateor me nondum satis deprehendisse.

Ad Responsum circa tertiam Difficultatem.

Quæ concipiantur extensa ac simul indivisibiles.

Cum mentem tuam sic explicueris, nulla inter nos est controversia.

Ad Responsum circa quartam Difficultatem.

Instantia I.

An sint simpliciter infinita necne, profiteor me nescire.

Haud tamen latere te potest, quin sint vel simpliciter infinita, vel revera finita, quamvis utrum horum sint tam facile statuere non possis. Quod autem vortices tui non disrumpantur & fatiscant, non obscurum videatur indicium mundum revera esse infinitum. Ipse tamen interea libere profiteor, quamvis audacter possim assentire huic axiomati, *Mundus finitus est, aut non finitus*, vel, quod idem hic est, *infinitus*, me tamen non posse plenè animo complecti rei cujusvis infinitudinem ; sed illud imaginationi meæ hic accidere, quod *Julius Scaliger* alicubi scribit de dilatatione & contractione Angelorum, non posse scilicet se in infinitum extendere, nec in puncti *idevōrta* coangustare. Qui autem Deum positivè infinitum agnoscit (i. e. ubique existentem) quod tu meritò facis, non video, si liberæ rationi permittatur, quod hæsitet, quin continuo etiam admittat nullibi otiosum, sed eodem jure, eâdemque facilitate quâ hanc nostram, ubi nos degimus, vel quousque oculi, animusque noster pervadit, materiam ubique produxisse. Sed fusiùs acturus eram quàm institui ; hunc impetum supprimo, nè tibi sim molestior.

II.

Cum ais, si tantum quoad nos sit infinita, revera erit finita.

Aio, addoque insuper consequentiam esse manifestissimam, quoniam particula (*tantum*) planè excludit omnem infinitatem à re quæ tantum quoad nos dicitur infinita, ac proinde revera erit finita extensio ; Mentem autem meam hic attingere ea de quibus pronuncio, cum planissimè mihi constet, mundum aut finitum esse aut infinitum, ut paulò antè insinuavi.

III.

Atque ità supponere Deum habere partes extra partes, & esse divisibilem, omnemque prorsus rei corporea essentiam illi tribuere.

Nullam tribuo. Nego enim extensionem corpori competere quatenus corpus est, sed quatenus ens, aut saltem substantia est. Præterea cum Deus, quantum mens humana Deum capit, sit totus ubique, integræque sua essentia omnibus locis sive spatiis spationumque punctis adsit, non sequitur quod partes haberet extra partes, aut, quod consequens est, quod sit divisibilis, quamvis arctè confertimque loca omnia occupet, nullis relictis intervallis. Unde præsentiam, seu amplitudinem, ut ipse vocas, divinam, mensurabilem agnoscam, Deum autem ipsum divisibilem nullo modo.

Quodd

Quòd autem Deus singula mundi puncta occupet, fatentur ad unum omnes tam Idiotæ quàm Philosophi, ipsèque clarè & distinctè animo percipio & complector. Jam verò eodem modo se habeat essentia divina intra atque extra mundum, ita ut si fingamus mundum claudi cœlo stellato visibili, centrum divinæ essentiæ, totalisque ejus præsentia, eodem modo repeteretur extra cœlum stellatum, quo intra clarè concipimus repeti atque reiterari. Hanc autem repetitionem centri divini, quæ mundum occupat, ulterius productam, infinita par est extra cœlum visibile spatia secum expandere; quam nisi comitetur materia tua indefinita, actum erit de tuis vorticibus. Atque ut hæc molliora videantur, experiamur assensus nostros in successiva Dei duratione.

Deus est æternus, *h. e.* vita divina omnes seculorum evolutiones rerumque rationes, præteritarum, futurarum & præsentium, simul comprehendit. Hæc tamen vita æterna singulis etiam temporis infidet quasi atque inequitat momentis; ita ut rectè verèque dicamus Deum per tot dies, menses, horasve suâ æternitate fretum. Exempli causâ, si supponamus mundum ante centum annos conditum, annon integra illa omniâque complectens Dei æternitas per horas, dies, menses & annos, (puta centum) succedentes ad hunc usque diem duravit? At verò nihilo aliter est Deus à mundo condito ac fuit ante mundum conditum.

Manifestum igitur est, præter æternitatem infinitam, in Deum etiam cadere durationis successionem. Quod si admittimus, cur non extensionem etiam infinita spatia adimplentem pariter ac infinitam durationis successionem illi tribuamus?

Imò verò quoties altiùs & anquisitiùs istis de rebus mecum cogito, ea sum in sententia, quòd utraque extensio, tam spatii quàm temporis, Non-entibus juxta atque Entibus competere possit; suspicorque æquè ex præjudicio fieri posse, cum omnia ea quæ sensu manibusque usurpamus, utpote crassa & corporea, semper sint extensa, quòd è contra omnia extensa protinus concludimus corporea, quàm quòd ullum sensûs præjudicium facit ut putemus aliqua quæ non sunt corporea extendi.

Quòd autem extensio cadat in non-ens, ex eo conjecturam capimus quòd *extendi* nihil aliud innuit nisi *partes extare extra partes*. Pars autem & totum, *subjectum & adjunctum, causa & effectum, adversa & relata, contradicentia & privantia*, & id genus universa, notiones Logicæ sunt, easque tam non entibus quàm entibus applicamus: Unde non sequitur, quòd quicquid concipimus partes habere extra partes, ens sit reale concipiendum.

Sed quoties hîc colluctantur mentes humanæ cum propriis umbris, aut, lascivientium catulorum instar, propriis ludunt cum caudis? Nam istiusmodi profectò pugnae atque lusus sibi instituuntur à mente nostra, dum rationes modosque Logicos, juxta quos res externas considerat, non advertit suos duntaxat esse cogitandi modos, sed putans eos esse aliquid in rebus ipsis a se distinctum, suam captando quasi caudam, ad lassitudinem usque luditur miserèque illaqueatur. Sed plura quàm vellem imprudens hîc effutii: Ad reliqua propero.

IV.

Ubi cumque enim locus ille concipiatur, ibi aliqua materia est.

Næ tu hîc cautus homo es, & eleganter modestus; admittis tamen tandem mundum esse infinitum, si *Aristoteles* infinitum rectè definivit, *Phys. l. 3. τὸ δὲ τι ἐξω ὅτιν, cuius aliquid semper est extra.* Nihil tunc est ulterius quod dissideamus.

V.

Sed nihilominus existimo maximam esse differentiam inter amplitudinem istius corporeæ extensionis, &c.

Et ipse pariter existimo immane quantum differre divinam amplitudinem & corpoream. Primò, quod illa sub sensum cadere non possit, hæc possit sub sensum cadere. Deinde, quod illa sit increata & independens, hæc dependens & creata. Illa porrò penetrabilis, per omnia pervadens, hæc crassa & impenetrabilis. Denique, quod illa ex totalis & integræ essentiae repetitione ubiquitaria, hæc ab externa, sed immediata, partium applicatione & juxtapositione orta sit; ita ut nemo, nisi plumbeus planè sit atque insigniter hebes, suspicari possit,

*Impia nos rationis inire elementa, viamque
Indogredi sceleris, (ut & ille loquitur.)*

Præsertim cùm ex Theologis sint, iisque aliàs fortasse sat scrupulosi, qui tamen agnoscunt Deum, si voluisset, potuisse mundum ab æterno creare. Et tamen æquè absurdum videtur infinitam durationem, ac magnitudinem infinitam mundo tribuere.

VI.

Unum enim est ex præcipuis, meoque iudicio certissimis, Physicæ meæ fundamentis.

Quod sit materia indefinitè saltem extensa, nullumque vacuum, fundamentum esse Physicæ tuæ apprimè necessarium sat intelligo, & certè nullus dubito quin verum sit; sed an veram demonstrandi rationem insequutus sis, id equidem ambigo: Cùm principium illius demonstrationis sit, *omne extensum esse reale ac corporeum*; quod mihi fateor nondum constare, ob rationes à me suprà datas. Imò verò, ut ingenuè fatear quod mihi jam in mentem venit, si neque nudum spatium, prout postulat tua demonstratio, nec Deus omnino extenditur, nè indefinitâ quidem materiâ opus est tuæ Philosophiæ, *certus finitusque stadiorum numerus suffecerit.* Mundi enim hujus finiti latera non habebunt quò recedant, nec dehiscere poterunt medii vortices, nè intermedium spatium extendatur, novâsque non-ens induat dimensiones. Sed tamen naturalis impetus aliò me præcipitat, in hanc utique fidem, fecunditatem nempe divinam, cùm nullibi sit otiosa, ubique locorum materiam produxisse, nullis vel augustissimis prætermiſſis intervallis.

Quæ tam facilè cùm admitto, Philosophia tua apud me non corrueſcit ob defectum dicti fundamenti. Planèque video Physicæ tuæ veritatem non tam apertè & ostensivè se exerere in hoc vel illo articulo, quàm ex universo omnium filo & textura elucescere, ut ipse rectissime mones *Part. 4. Artic. 225.* Quod si quis integram tuæ Philosophiæ faciem simul contuetur, tam concinna est, sibi que juxtà ac rerum phaenomenis

nomenis consona, ut meritò imaginetur, se Naturam ipsam opificem vidisse ab hoc polito speculo enitentem.

Ad Responsum circa Difficultatem ultimam.

Instantia I.

Sed nulli præjudicio magis omnes assuevimus, &c.

Quod mihi de me ipso constat plus quàm fati, ab hujusce enim præjudicii laqueis sentio me expediri non posse ullo modo.

II.

Profiteor enim me posse perfacile illa omnia ut à sola membrorum conformatione profecta explicare.

Læta sane & jucunda Provincia! *Hoc si præstiteris*, (& credo quantum ingenium humanum poterit te hac in re præstiturum in quinta sextave parte Physices tuæ; quas, ut audio ferè à te perfectas jam esse & absolutas, ità avidè expecto efflictimque rogo, ut quamprimùm possit fieri lucem videant, vel potius ut nos in ipsis ulteriorem naturæ lucem videamus: sed ad rem redeo) Hoc, inquam, si præstiteris, agnosco te demonstrasse in brutis animantibus inesse animam, neminem demonstrare posse: Sed interea loci, quod & ipse submones, quod non sit anima in brutis, te nec dum demonstrasse, nec demonstrare posse ullo modo.

III.

Præter hanc unam, quod cum habeant oculos, aures, &c.

Maximum, meo judicio, argumentum est, quod tam subtiliter sibi præcaveant & prospiciant; ut narratiunculis veris pariter ac mirandis, si otium esset, demonstrare possem. Sed credo te in consimiles historias incidisse, meæ autem in nullis extant libris.

IV.

Quod non sit tam probabile omnes vermes, culices, erucas, &c.

Nisi sortè imaginemur istiusmodi animas, *Mundi Vita*, quem appellat *Ficinus*, arenam quasi esse ac pulverem, & infinita ferè ex isto penario animarum agmina fatali quodam impetu in præparatam materiam semper prolabi. Sed concedo hæc citius dici posse quàm demonstrari.

V.

Ut aliquid voce vel nutibus indicaret, &c.

Annon canes annuunt caudis, ut nos capitibus? annon brevibus latratibus cibum sæpius ad mensam mendicant? Imò verò aliquando Domini cubitum pede, qua possunt cum reverentia, tangentes, quasi sui oblitum, blando hoc eum signo commonefaciunt.

VI.

Quàm maximè stupidi ac mente capiti, &c. non autem ullum brutum, &c.

Nec infantes ulli per aliquàm multa saltem mensium spatia, quamvis plorent, rideant, irascantur, &c. Nec diffidis tamen, opinor, quin infantes sint animati, animamque habeant cogitantem.

Responſa hæc ſunt (Vir illuſtriſſime) quæ tuis præclaris Reſponſis mihi viſum eſt reponere. Quæ an æquè grata futura ſint ac nuperæ meæ objectiones, ſanè præſagire non poſſum.

Humanitas tua quam verſus iſtas perſpexi, & diuturnior cum ſcriptis tuis conſuetudo, audentiorem me fecerunt; vereor ne fuerim prolixus nimium ac moleſtus.

Equidem ferme oblitus eram potiffimi mei inſtituti, quod non fuit æternas tecum altercationes reciprocare; ſed cùm hanc opportunitatem ſim naſtus, tanti viri de rebus quæ ſe obtulerint Philoſophicis iudicium placidè experiri, & præcipuè ſi qua difficultas emerſerit inter legendos tuos libros, teipſum audire interpretantem. Quam proſectò gratiam ſi lubens facilisque conceſſeris, ſummopere me tibi devincies.

Et ſanè quàm lubenter eximiæ tuæ artis ac peritiæ mihi copiam feceris, certum eſt jam nunc in paucis quibuſdam periculum facere.

Primò igitur quæro, An à Deo ita ſtatui, aut alio quovis modo fieri potuiſſet, ut mundus eſſet finitus, id eſt, certo aliquo milliarium numero circumſcriptus. Non leve enim argumentum videtur mundum poſſe eſſe finitum, quòd plerique omnes impoſſibile putent eſſe infinitum.

Secundò, Siquis mundi hujus finibus propè aſſideret, quæro an poſſit gladium per mundi latera ad capulum uſque transmittere, ita ut totus ferè gladius extra mundi mœnia emineret. Quòd enim nihil extra mundum ſit quod reſiſtat, videtur factu facile; quòd autem nihil extenſum ſit extra mundum quod recipiat, videtur ex ea parte impoſſibile.

Tertiò, (*ad Artic. 29. Part. 2.*) Si A B corpus transferatur à corpore C D, quæro quæ conſtat translationem eſſe reciprocā. Putemus enim C D turrim eſſe, & A B ventum occidentalem per latera turris tranſeuntem. Turris C D aut quieſcit, aut ſaltem non recedit à vento A B. Si recedit, vel, quod ais, motu tranſfertur, utique verſus occidentem movetur. Sed non fertur verſus occidentem, cùm & terra & ventus ferantur verſus orientem. Videtur igitur reſpectu venti quieſcere, cùm nullum motum ap ipſo ſuſpiciat. Dicis tamen translationem (quæ quidem translatio motus eſt) ipſius turris & venti eſſe reciprocā. Turris igitur reſpectu ejuſdem venti & moveretur & quieſceret, quod maximè abeſt à contradictione. Signum autem eſt, cùm ille qui à me ſedente receſſit ambulando, putà mille paſſus, rubuerit vel laſſus fuerit, ego verò ſedens nec ruborem contraxerim nec laſſitudinem, illum ſolum motum fuiſſe, me verò per id temporis quieviſſe. Notionalem igitur duntaxat variatæ diſtantiæ reſpectum illius motu ſuſcipio, nullum motum realem & Phyſicum.

Quartò, *Artic. 149. Part. 3.* Sicque etiam efficiet ut terra circa ſuum axem gyret, &c. Quomodo efficiet Luna ut terra uno die gyros ſuos abſolvat, cùm ipſa 30 ferè dies in ſuas abſumat periodos? Quæ vero ſcribuntur *Artic. 151* hanc quæſtionem, opinor, non attingunt.

Quintò, de particulis iſtis contortis, quas ſtriatas vocas, Quomodo ita contorqueri potuerunt, & eo ipſo in infinita fragmina & atomos non diſjungi? Quem lentorem, quam tenacitatem in prima illa materia, ſibi ubique ſimili & homogœnea, imaginari poſſumus? Unde molleſcebant iſtæ particulæ primùm, indèque obduruerunt?

Sexto.

Sexto, Artic. 189. Part. 4. *Animam sive mentem intimè cerebro conjunctam.* Perlubenter equidem hîc audirem sententiam tuam de conjunctione animæ cum corpore: An cum toto corpore jungatur, an cum cerebro solo, an verò in solum conarium, tanquam in parvulum aliquod ergastulum, compingatur. Id enim sedem sùs communem, animæque ἀνρόπολιν, à te monitus agnosco. Dubito tamen annon per universum corpus anima pervadat. Deinde quæro ex te, cum anima nullas habeat, nec ramosas nec hamatas particulas, quomodo tam arctè unitur cum corpore. Sciscitorque subindè, annon aliquid exerit se in natura, cujus nulla ratio Mechanica reddi potest. Illud αἰτεξέσιον, cujus in nobis conscii sumus, quo oritur modo? Quæque ratio sit imperii animæ nostræ in spiritus animales, quâ potest eos amandare in quamlibet corporis partem? Quomodo sagarum spiritus, quos vocant familiares, materiam tam aptè sibi adaptant atque constringunt, ut visibiles & palpabiles se exhibeant execrandis vetulis? Hoc autem fieri non solum vetulæ, sed juvenes sagæ, nullâ vi coactæ, sponte mihi falsæ sunt non paucæ. Porro, annon & ipsi hoc ipsum aliquo modo in animabus nostris experimur, dum pro arbitrio nostro spiritus nostros animales ciere & sistere, exerere & revocare possumus? Quæro igitur, numquid decederet hominem Philosophum in rerum universitate substantiam aliquam agnoscere incorpoream, quæ tamen possit aut omnes, aut saltem plurimas, affectiones corporeas, non secus ac ipsa corpora in se mutuo, in corpus aliquod imprimere, quales sunt motus, figura, situs partium? &c. Imò verò, cum fermè constet de motu; sine mora superaddere etiam quæ motûs consequentia sunt, ut dividere, conjungere, dissipare, vincere, figurare particulas, figuratas disponere, dispositas rotare, vel quovis modo movere, rotatas continere, & id genus alia; unde lumen, colores, & reliqua sensûs objecta prodire necesse est, juxta eximiam tuam Philosophiam.

Præterea, cum nihil nec corporeum neque incorporeum potest agere in aliud nisi per applicationem suæ essentiæ, necesse insuper ducere, ut, sive Angelus sit, sive Dæmon, sive anima, sive Deus, qui agat prædictis modis in materiam, essentia cujuslibet inequiter quasi illis materiæ partibus in quas agit, ut aliquibus aliis quæ in has ipsas agant per motûs transmissionem, imò ut integræ aliquando adsit materiæ quam gubernat & modificat; ut constat in Geniis, sive bonis sive malignis, qui se humanis oculis patefecerunt: Aliter enim quî poterant constringere materiam, & in hac vel illa figura continere?

Postremò, Cum tam stupendam virtutem habeat substantia incorporea, ut per nudam sui applicationem, sine funiculis aut uncis, sine fundis aut cuneis, materiam constringat, explicet, dividat, projiciat, & simul retineat, annon verisimile videatur ut in seipsam se possit colligere, cum nulla obstat impenetrabilitas, & diffundere se denuò & similia?

Hæc abs te peto, Vir doctissime, quantum per otium licebit, ut digneris exponere, utpote quem scio tam intima quàm extima Naturæ mysteria rimatum esse, commodèque interpretari posse.

Septimò, de globulis æthereis quæro; Si Deus mundum ab æterno condidisset, annon multis abhinc annis comminuti & confracti fuissent isti globuli in partes indifinitè subtiles, mutuis collisionibus vel attritionibus,

tionibus, primique Elementi faciem jam olim induissent, ita ut universus mundus in unam immensam flammam multa ante secula abisset?

Octavò, de particulis tuis aqueis, longis, teretibus, & flexibilibus, Numquid habent poros? Id sanè mihi non videtur probabile, cum sint simplicia corpora, particulæque primæ ex nullis aliis particulis complicatæ, sed fragmina ex integra primæque materia elisa, ac proinde planè homogenea. Hinc dubito, quæ poterunt flecti sine penetratione dimensionum. Putemus enim aliquando ad annuli instar incurvari; Superficies concava minor erit convexa, &c. Rem probè tenes. Non est quod hic immorer.

Nec tamen si poros habere contenderes, quod nunquam opinor facies, difficultatem tollet. Quippe quod quæstio tunc institueretur de pororum labris vel lateribus: Necessario enim aliquid flectetur quod non habet poros.

Atque hæc difficultas pertinet non solum ad oblongas tuas particulas, sed etiam ad ramosas illas, aliasque ferme omnes, quas flecti necesse est, & tamen non disrumpi.

Nonò, & ultimò, Utrum materia, si æternam fingamus sive hesternò die creatam, sibi liberè permessa, nullumque aliunde impulsus suscipiens, moveretur, an quiesceret. Deinde, an quies sit modus corporis privativus, an verò positivus. Et si positivum malles sive privativum, unde constet utrumlibet. An denique ulla res affectionem ullam habere possit naturaliter & à se, quæ penitus potest destitui, vel quam aliunde potest adsciscere.

Hactenus ferè circa generalia præclaræ tuæ Physices fundamenta lusi, dicam, an potius laboravi? progressurus posthac ad specialiora, si facilitas tua atque comitas eò me invitaverit, aut salem permiserit. Et æquiori sanè animo feres, cum hic de primis agatur principiis, si superstitiosè omnia examinavi, viamque quasi palpatando, singulaque curiosius contractando, lentè me promovi & testudineo gradu. Video enim ingenium humanum ita comparatum esse, ut facilius longè quid consequens sit dispiciat, quàm quid in natura primò verum; nostramque omnium conditionem non multum ab illa Archimedis *ὁς πρῶτον, καὶ κινῆσαι τὸ γῶν*. Ubi primùm figamus pedem invenire multò magis satagimus, quàm ubi invenimus ulterius progredi.

Quod ad mirificas illas structuras attinet quas ex illis principiis generalibus erexisti, quamvis primâ fronte adeò sublimes & ab aspectu nostro remotæ viderentur, ut omnia apparerent nubibus tenebrisque obvoluta, dies tamen difficultates comminuit, paulatimque evanuerunt istæ obscuritates, adeò ut perpauca, præ quod tum factum est, in conspectum jam veniant.

Hoc autem necesse duxi ut profiterer, nè æternum à me expectes tibi creatum iri negotium, sed lubentiùs mihi rescribas, parique humanitate hæc sciscitationes meas accipias quæ primas quas misi objectiones. Quod si feceris (clarissime Cartesi) suprâ quàm dici potest tibi obstrictum dabis

Cantabrigiæ, è Christi Collegio,
3 Nonarum Martii, 1649.

*Humanitatis tuæ ac Sapientiæ
admiratorem religiosissimum,*
HEN. MORUM.
SCHOLIA

S C H O L I A

IN EPIST. II. H. MORI

Difficult. 1. Instant. 5. Equidem possum clarè concipere substantiam extensam, &c. Immo verò necessariò & inevitabiliter talem concipio dum mentis aciem conjicio in Immobile illud extensum à mobili materia distinctum, quod simul concipio nullam habere tangibilitatem aut impenetrabilitatem.

Difficult. 2. Instant. 3. Intermundium aliud sive Absentia Mundi suam haberet durationem, &c. Multò rectius concluditur Durationem illam quam non possumus non concipere existere, ut & Amplitudinem immensam eternamque ac necessariam, ad Divinam Essentiam esse referendam, (quemadmodum in Scholiis in Enchiridium Metaphysicum monuimus) Illiusque Axiomatis Authoritatem ubique sartam tectam esse conservandam, Nihili nullam esse affectionem.

Sed concedo, quamvis nondum vi coactus, in omni spatio aliquam substantiam inesse, Immo ipsum illud quod vulgus Philosophorum, spacium imaginarium esse fingunt, in Enchiridio Metaphysico substantiam incorpoream esse demonstro, cap. 6, 7, 8.

Instant. 5. Qua in parte ego satis sum securus, &c. Equidem tunc fui hac in parte nimis quam securus. Quæ autem rationes hanc mihi securitatem excusserint, Vide Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 10. sect. 6, 7, &c.

Difficult. 4. Instant. 1. Nec obscurum videatur indicium Mundum reverà esse infinitum, &c. Sic certè videretur si motus Materiae Mundanae esset Mechanicus, nunc verò cum Vitalis sit & à Spiritu Naturæ profectus, Mundus licet finitus sit, Vortices non disrumpentur nec fatiscunt.

Materiam ubique produxisse. Id quod valde rationi consentaneum est dum Divinam Omnipotentiam & Fecunditatem respicimus; naturam verò Creaturae dum consideramus, & hujus Infinitudinis quam incapax sit, admodum absolum videtur & ab omni ratione alienum: quemadmodum videre est in dicto Enchiridio, cap. 10.

Instant. 3. Præterea cum Deus, quantum mens humana Deum capit, sit totus ubique, &c. Sic certè solet Philosophorum vulgus loqui. Quantum verò ad me, cum Deus partes Physicas & propriè dictas non habeat, equidem valde impropriè existimo Deum dici posse totum esse ubique: sed præsentiam illius agnosco ubique aequè efficacem esse ac si totus intelligatur ubique adesse. Et quæ mox occurrit Centri Divini Repetitio symbolicè tantum intelligenda est & negativè, quatenus Essentiam Divinam innuit ubique homogeneam esse & ætèrnam, nec aliunde derivatam, sed unam quasi infinitam esse Lucem sive Solem.

Præter Æternitatem infinitam in Deum etiam cadere Durationis successionem, &c. Non quòd successiva Duratio formaliter Deo competat, sed quòd eminenter in illius stabili Duratione cõtineatur; qua de re vide Dialogos Divinos, Dialog. 1. Sect. 15, 16, 17. Ut verò Æternitas Divina singulis cujusvis Durationis successivæ momentis præsens est, ita & infinita Divine Essentiæ plenitudo & Exuberantia singulis cujusvis corporea Extensionis punctis adesse intelligitur.

Quod

Quòd utraque Extensio tam Spacii quàm Temporis Non-Entibus juxta atque Entibus competere possit, &c. Multo verò nunc consultius existimo, quod & supra innui, Spacium illud immensum & Tempus infinitum, quæ mentibus nostris tam importunè obversantur, ad Divinam Essentiam & Aeternitatem, tanquam umbras quasdam earum obscuriusculas, referre. Vide Scholia in Enchiridium Metaphysicum.

Notiones Logicæ sunt, easque tam Non-Entibus quàm Entibus applicamus, &c. Esto, sed applicando eas Non-Entibus, eadem Entia non efficiamus. Adeò ut, quando Non-Enti alicui partes attribuimus, cum partes istæ etiamnum Non-Entia sunt, aut Non-Entibus tribui possunt, Non-Ens cui istæ attribuuntur, adhuc reverà nullas partes habeat, ac proinde reverà sit Non-Extensum; nec hinc constare possit, Extensionem cadere in Non-Ens.

Instant. 5. Immane quantum differre Divinam Amplitudinem & corpoream. Hic tantum obiter, contra Cartesianos Nullibistas Divine Essentie Amplitudinem à suo Cartesio admitti, quamvis Extensio repudietur, ut videre est hoc in loco illius Epistola.

Instant. 6. Et certè nullus dubito quin verum sit, &c. Vide quæ diximus in Instantiam primam.

Fœcunditatem nempe Divinam, cum nullibi otiosa sit, ubique locorum Materiam produxisse, &c. Vide quæ notavimus in Instantiam primam eodem in loco.

Clarissimo Doctissimoque Viro,
HENRICO MORO,
RENATUS DES-CARTES.

VIR clarissime, gratissimas tuas literas 3 Non. Mart. datas eo tempore accipio quo tam multis aliis occupationibus distrahor, ut cogar vel hâc ipsâ horâ festinantissimè rescribere, vel responsum in multas hebdomadas differre. Sed vincet ea pars quæ festinationem persuadet; malo enim minùs peritus quàm minùs officiosus videri.

Ad Instantias primas.

Proprietates alias aliis esse priores, &c. Sensibilitas nihil mihi videtur esse in re sensibili, nisi denominatio extrinseca. Nec etiam rei est adæquata: nam si referatur ad sensus nostros, non convenit tenuissimis materiæ particulis: si ad alios imaginarios, quales vis à Deo posse fabricari, forsan etiam Angelis & Animabus conveniet; non enim faciliùs intelligo nervos sensorios adeò subtiles, ut à quam minutissimis materiæ particulis moveri possint, quàm aliquam facultatem cujus ope mens nostra possit alias mentes immediatè sentire sive percipere. Quamvis autem in extensione habitudinem partium ad invicem facile comprehendamus, videor tamen extensionem optimè percipere, quamvis de habitudine partium ad invicem planè non cogitem: Quod debes

bes etiam potiori jure quam ego admittere, quia extensionem ita concipis ut Deo conveniat, & tamen in eo nullas partes admittis.

Nondum demonstratum Tangibilitatem aut Impenetrabilitatem proprias esse substantiæ extensæ affectiones. Si concipis extensionem per habitudinem partium ad invicem, non videris negare posse quin unaquæque ejus pars alias vicinas tangat, hæcque tangibilitas est vera proprietas, & rei intrinseca, non autem ea quæ à sensu tactûs denominatur.

Non potest etiam intelligi unam partem rei extensæ aliam sibi æqualem penetrare, quin hoc ipso intelligatur mediam partem ejus extensionis tolli vel annihilari; quod autem annihilatur aliud non penetrat: sicque meo judicio demonstratur impenetrabilitatem ad essentiam extensionis, non autem ullius alterius rei, pertinere.

Affero aliam esse extensionem æquè veram. Tandem igitur de re convenimus superest quæstio de nomine, an hæc posterior extensio æquè vera sit dicenda. Quantum autem ad me, nullam intelligo nec in Deo nec in Angelis vel mente nostra extensionem substantiæ, sed potentiæ duntaxat; ita scilicet ut possit Angelus potentiam suam exerere nunc in majorem nunc in minorem substantiæ corporeæ partem: nam si nullum esset corpus, nullum etiam spatium intelligerim cui Angelus vel Deus esset coextensus. Quod autem quis extensionem, quæ solius potentiæ est, tribuat substantiæ, ejus præjudicii esse puto, quo omnem substantiam, & ipsum Deum, supponit imaginabilem.

Ad secundas Instantias.

Una vacui spatii partes absorbeant alteras, &c. Hic repeto, si absorbeantur, ergo media pars spatii tollitur & esse definit; quod autem esse definit aliud non penetrat; ergo impenetrabilitas in omni spatio est admittenda.

Intermundium illud suam haberet durationem, &c. Puto implicare contradictionem, ut concipiamus aliquam durationem intercedere inter destructionem prioris mundi & novi creationem. Nam si durationem istam ad successionem cogitationum divinarum vel quid simile referamus, erit error intellectûs, non vera ullius rei perceptio. Ad sequentia jam respondi, notando extensionem quæ rebus incorporeis tribuitur esse potentiæ duntaxat, non substantiæ; quæ potentia cum sit tantum modus in re ad quam applicatur, sublato extenso cui coexistat, non potest intelligi esse extensa.

Ad penultimas Instantias.

Deum positivè infinitum, id est, ubique existentem, &c. Hoc ubique non admitto. Videris enim hic infinitatem Dei in eo ponere, quod ubique existat: cui opinioni non assentior; sed puto Deum ratione suæ potentiæ ubique esse, ratione autem suæ essentiæ nullam planè habere relationem ad locum. Cum autem in Deo potentia & essentia non distinguantur, satius esse puto in talibus de mente nostra vel Angelis, tanquam perceptioni nostræ magis adæquatis, quàm de Deo, ratiocinari. Sequentes difficultates ex eo præjudicio mihi videntur omnes ortæ, quod nimis assueverimus quaslibet substantias, etiam in eas quas
cor-

corpora esse negamus, tanquam extensas imaginari, & de entibus rationis intemperanter Philosophari, *entis* sive *rei* proprietates *non enti* tribuendo. Sed rectè meminisse oportet, non entis nulla esse posse vera attributa, nec de eo posse ullo modo intelligi *partem & totum, subjectum, adjunctum*, &c. Ideoque optimè concludis cum propriis umbris mentem ludere, cum entia Logica considerat.

Certus finitusque stadiorum numerus suffecerit, &c. Sed repugnat meo conceptui ut mundo aliquem terminum tribuam, nec aliam habeo mensuram eorum quæ affirmare debeo vel negare quam propriam perceptionem. Dico idcirco mundum esse indeterminatum vel infinitum, quia nullos in eo terminos agnosco; sed non ausim vocare infinitum, quia percipio Deum esse mundo majorem, non ratione extensionis, quàm, ut sæpe dixi, nullam propriam in Deo intelligo, sed ratione perfectionis.

Ad ultimas Instantias.

Hoc si præstiteris, &c. Non certus sum meæ Philosophiæ continuationem unquam in lucem prodituram, quia pendet à multis experimentis, quorum faciendorum nescio an copiam sim unquam habiturus; sed spero me hâc ætate brevem tractatum de Affectibus editurum, ex quo apparebit quo pacto in nobis ipsis omnes motus membrorum, qui affectus nostros comitantur, non ab anima, sed a sola corporis machinatione peragi existimem. Quod autem *Canes annuant caudis*, &c. Sunt tantum motus qui comitantur affectus, eosque accuratè distinguendos puto à loquela, quæ sola cogitationem in corpore latentem demonstrat. *Nec infantes ulli*, &c. Dispar est ratio infantum & brutorum: Nec judicarem infantes esse mente præditos, nisi viderem eos esse ejusdem naturæ cum adultis: bruta autem eousque nunquam adolescunt, ut aliqua in iis cogitationis non certa deprehendatur.

Ad Quæstiones.

Ad primam. Repugnat conceptui meo, sive, quod idem est, puto implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit finitus vel terminatus, quia non possum non concipere spatium ultra quolibet præsuppositos mundi finales; tale autem spatium apud me est verum corpus: nec moror quod ab aliis imaginarium vocetur, & ideo mundus finitus existimetur; novi enim ex quibus præjudiciis error iste profectus sit.

Ad secundam. Imaginando gladium trajicii ultra mundi fines, ostendis te etiam non concipere mundum finitum, omnem enim locum ad quem gladius pertingit revera concipis ut mundi partem, quamvis illud quod concipis vacuum voces.

Ad tertiam. Non melius possum explicare vim reciprocam in mutua duorum corporum ab invicem separatione, quàm si tibi ponam ob oculos navigiolum aliquod hærens in luto juxta fluminis ripam, & duos homines, quorum unus stans in ripa navigiolum manibus pellat, ut illud à terra removeat, eodémque prorsus modo alius stans in navigio ripam manibus pellat, ut illud idem à terra removeat. Si enim horum hominum vires sint æquales, conatus ejus qui terræ insistit, terræ-

terræque idcirco conjunctus est, non minus confert ad motum navigii quàm conatus alterius qui cum navigio transfertur. Unde patet actionem quâ navigium à terra recedit non minorem esse in ipsa terra quàm in navigio. Nec est difficultas de eo qui à te sedente recessit; cum enim de translatione hîc loquor, intelligo tantum eam quæ fit per separationem duorum corporum se immediatè tangentium.

Ad quartam. Motus Lunæ determinat materiam cœlestem, & ex consequenti etiam terram in ea contentam, ut versùs unam partem potius quàm versùs aliam, nempe in figura ibi posita, ut ab A versùs B, potius quàm versùs D, flectatur; non autem dat ei celeritatem motûs: & quia hæc celeritas pendet à materia cœlesti, quæ præter propter eadem est juxta Terram ac juxta Lunam, deberet Terra duplo celerius convolvi quàm convolvitur, ut circiter sexagies circulum suum absolveret eo tempore quo Luna semel percurrit suum sexagies majorem, nisi obstaret magnitudo, ut in *Artic. 151. p. 3.* dictum est.

Ad quintam. Nullum suppono esse lentorem nullamque tenacitatem in minimis materiæ particulis, nisi quemadmodum in sensibilibus & magnis, quæ nempe ex motu & quiete partium dependet. Sed notandum est, ipsas particulas striatas formari ex materia subtilissima, & divisa in minutias innumerabiles vel numero indefinitas, quæ ad ipsas componendas simul junguntur, adeò ut plures diversas minutias in unaquaque particula striata concipiam quàm vulgus hominum in aliis corporibus valde magnis.

Ad sextam. Conatus sum explicare maximam partem eorum quæ hîc petis in tractatu de Affectibus. Addo tantum, nihil mihi hæcenus occurrisse circa naturam rerum materialium cujus rationem mechanicam non facillimè possim excogitare. Atque ut non dedecet hominem Philosophum putare Deum posse corpus movere, quamvis non putet Deum esse corporeum; ita etiam eum non dedecet aliquid simile de aliis substantiis incorporeis judicare. Et quamvis existimem nullum agendi modum Deo & creaturis univocè convenire; fateor tamen me nullam in mente mea ideam reperire quæ repræsentet modum quo Deus vel Angelus materiam potest movere, diversam ab ea quæ mihi exhibet modum quo ego per meam cogitationem corpus meum movere me posse mihi conscius sum.

Nec verò mens mea potest se modò extendere, modò colligere, in ordine ad locum, ratione substantiæ suæ, sed tantum ratione potentiae, quam potest ad majora vel minora corpora applicare.

Ad septimam. Si mundus ab æterno fuisset, proculdubio hæc Terra non mansisset ab æterno, sed aliæ alibi productæ fuissent, nec omnis materia abiisset in primum Elementum: ut enim quædam ejus partes uno in loco comminuuntur, ita aliæ in alio loco simul coalescunt; nec plus est motûs sive agitationis in tota rerum universitate uno tempore quàm alio.

Ad octavam. Particulas aquæ, aliasque omnes quæ sunt in terra, poros habere sequitur evidenter ex modo quo terræ productionem descripsi, nempe à particulis materiæ primi elementi simul coalescentibus: cum enim hoc primum Elementum nullis constet particulis nisi indefinite divisis, hinc sequitur concipiendos esse poros usque ad ultimam possibilem divisionem in omniibus corporibus ex eo conflatis.

Ad nonam. Ex iis quæ paulò antè dixi de duobus hominibus, quorum unus movetur unà cum navigio, alius in ripa stat immotus, satis ostendi me putare nihil esse in unius motu magis positivum quàm in alterius quiete.

Quid sibi velint hæc tua ultima verba, *An ulla res affectionem habere potest naturaliter & à se, quàm penitus potest destitui, vel quam aliunde potest adsciscere*, non satis percipio.

Cæterùm velim ut pro certo existimes mihi semper fore gratissimum ea accipere, quæ de scriptis meis vel quæres vel objicies, & pro viribus responsurum esse.

Egmondæ, 17 Kalendis
Maii, 1649.

Tibi addictissimum

RENATUM DES-CARTES.

SCHOLIA

In RESPONSUM ad EPIST. II.

INSTANT. 1. Sicque meo iudicio demonstratur Impenetrabilitatem ad Essentiam Extensionis, &c. *Quia scilicet illa pars Extensionis quæ penetrat, tolleretur vel annihilaretur. At nulla pars substantiæ extensa hac penetratione perit. Alioquin omnes Spiritus, qui Spiritum Universi putà, penetrant, eo ipso perirent. Ipsæque Materia extensa in Extenso immobili aut periret, aut Extensi immobilis partes eis in locis ubi est, annihilaret. Si verò sit Essentia in Essentiâ, manifestum est esse Extensionem in Extensione, cum omnis Essentia sit aliquo modo extensa. Vide Enchirid. Metaphys. c. 28. sect. 6, 7.*

Quod autem quis extensionem quæ solius potentiae est, &c. *Quod solas potentias substantiarum Incorporearum extensas asserit Cartesius, hinc Nullibistis rursus favere non immeritò censeri potest eorūque esse Coryphaeus.*

Instant. 2. Extensionem quæ rebus incorporeis tribuitur, esse Potentiae duntaxat, non Substantiæ; Quæ Potentia cum sit tantum Modus in re ad quam applicatur, sublato extenso cui coexistit, non potest intelligi esse coextensa. *Quod modò fecit, expressius profectò hic facit, apertius scilicet Nullibismo favet; quinimò & nullitati fortean rerum incorporearum, dum potentiam, quam nos supponimus in Spiritibus, Materiae extensa modum esse subinsinuat, quemadmodum facit Spinozius. Vide quæ adnotavimus in Scholiis in Respons. ad Epist. 1. Difficult. 1.*

Instant. 4. Hoc ubique non admitto. Videris enim hîc Infinitatem Dei in eo ponere quod ubique existit, cui opinioni non assentior; sed puto Deum ratione suæ potentiae ubique esse, ratione autem suæ essentiae nullam planè habere relationem ad locum. *Expressissimus hic Nullibismus est; unde me non immeritò Cartesium Nullibistarum Principem agnovisse, Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 27. satis manifestum est. Sed malè in-*

terim

terim sibi constare videtur, si hæc cum eis comparaveris quæ occurrunt in Responso ad Epistolam meam primam Difficult. 1. Vide Scholia eum in locum.

Quest. 1. Quia non possem non concipere spatium ultra quolibet præsuppositos Mundi fines. Tale autem spatium apud me est verum corpus, &c. Id verò quod non possumus non concipere quin existat, necessario, si proprias consulamus facultates, existit. Cum autem necessario & à se sic concipitur existere, (neque enim illius Idea cum cujusquam alius rei Idea in hac conceptione conjungitur) hæc conceptio si in corpus desinit, Existentiam Entis absolutè perfecti planè subvertit. Qua de re conquestus sum in Præfatione ad Enchiridium Metaphysicum, Sect. 4.

Illustrissimo Viro, Principique Philosopho,
RENATO DE S-CARTES,
HENRICUS MORUS.

VIX me abstinebam (Vir Clarissime) quin ab acceptis tuis literis continuò ad te rescriberem: quamvis profectò id à me factum fuisset incivilius; quippe quòd satis ex iisdem intelligerem te per septimanas bene multas negotiis fore districtissimum. Quin & mihi ipsi tunc temporis à patris obitu acciderunt multa quæ me aliò avocârunt, impediveruntque adeò ut quod voluissem maximè præstare, haud commodè potuissem. Jam verò ad te tuæque reversus, satisque nactus otii, rescribo, gratiasque ago maximas, quòd quærendi de tuis scriptis quod lubet objiciendique plenum mihi jus tam liberè benignèque concesseris.

Cæterum, nè abuti videar hâc summâ humanitate tuâ ad prolixiores altercationes (nam hætenus eo in loco Philosophiæ versati sumus qui λογισμαχίαις lubricisq; subtilitatibus opportunior extitit, in confiniis utique Physices, Metaphysicæ & Logicæ) ad ea propero quæ certum magis firmumque judicium capiunt.

Obiter tantum notabo, atque primò ad Responsonem ad Instantias primas; Quantum ad Angelos animasque separatas, si immediatè suas invicem deprehendant essentias, id non dici posse sensum propriè, si ipsos singas penitus incorporeos. Me verò lubentem cum Platonice, antiquis Patribus, Magisque ferme omnibus, & animas & genios omnes, tam bonos quàm malos, planè corporeos agnoscere, ac proinde sensum habere propriè dictum (i. e.) mediante corpore, quo induuntur, exortum. Et profectò cum nihil non magnum de tuo ingenio mihi pollicear, perquam gratissimum esset, si conjecturas tuas, quas credo pro ea qua polles sagacitate ac acumine fore ingeniosissimas, mecum breviter communices super hac re. Nam quòd quidam magnificè se efferunt in non admittendo substantias ullas quas vocant separatas, ut Dæmonas, Angelos, Animasque post mortem superstites, & maximopere hîc sibi applaudunt, quasi re bene gestâ, & tanquam eo ipso longè sapientiores

evasisent cæteris mortalibus, id ego non hujus æstimo. Nam quod sæpius observavi, hi sunt, ut plurimum, aut Taurini sanguinis homines, perditeque melancholici, aut immane quantum sensibus & voluptatibus dediti, Athei denique, saltem si permetteret religio, quâ solâ superstitiosè freti Deum esse agnoscunt. Me verò non pudet palàm profiteri, me vel semoto omni Religionis imperio, meâ sponte agnoscere gentios esse atque Deum; nec ullum alium tamen me posse admittere, nisi qualem optimus quisque ac sapientissimus exoptaret, si deesset, existere. Unde semper suspicatus sum, profligatissimæ improbitatis summæque stupiditatis triumphum esse Atheismum; Atheorumque gloriationem perinde esse ac si stultissimus populus de sapientissimi benignissimique Principis cadê ovariant inter se & gratularentur. Sed nescio quo impetu huc excursus est. Redeo,

Secundò, Quod ad demonstrationem illam tuam attinet, quâ concludis ~~omnem~~ substantiam ~~extensam~~ esse tangibilem & impenetrabilem; videor mihi hæc posse regerere: in aliqua scilicet substantia extensa partes extra partes esse posse, sine ulla ~~aversione~~, seu mutua resistentia; atque hinc perit proprie dicta Tangibilitas. Deinde, extensionem simul cum substantia in reliquam replicari extensionem & substantiam, nec deperdi magis quam illam substantiæ partem quæ retrahitur in alteram; atque hinc cadit illa Impenetrabilitas: quæ profiteor me clare & distincte animo concipere. Quòd autem *aliquod reale claudi possit* (sine ulla sui diminutione) *minoribus majoribusque terminis constat in motu*, ex tuis ipsius principiis. Nam idem numero motus tunc majus nunc minus subjectum occupat, juxta tuam etiam sententiam. Ego verò pari facilitate & perspicuitate concipio dari posse substantiam quæ sine ulla sui imminutione dilatari & contrahi possit, sive per se id fiat, sive aliunde.

Postremò igitur; Et demiror equidem quòd nè intellectum tuum cadere possit, quòd aut mens humana aut Angelus hoc ferme modo sint extensi, quasi implicaret contradictionem. Cum ego potius putarem implicare contradictionem quòd potentia mentis sit extensa, cum mens ipsa non sit extensa ullo modo. Cum enim potentia mentis sit modus mentis intrinsecus, non est extra mentem ipsam, ut patet. Et consimilis ratio est de Deo: unde me consimilis ferit admiratio, quòd in Responsione ad penultimas Instantias *concedis cum ubique esse ratione potentie, non ratione essentie*; quasi potentia Divina, quæ Dei modus est, extra Deum esset sita, cum modus realis quilibet intimè semper insit rei cujus est modus: Unde necesse est Deum esse ubique, si potentia ejus ubique sit.

Neque suspicari possum per potentiam Dei intelligi te velle effectum in materiam transmissum. Quòd si hoc intelligas, non video tamen quin eodem res recitat. Nam hic effectus non transmittitur nisi per potentiam Divinam, quæ attingit materiam suscipientem, hoc est, modo aliquo reali unitur cum ea, ac proinde extenditur, nec tamen interea separatur ab ipsa Divina Essentia. Videtur enim, ut dixi, conspicua contradictio. Sed hisce statui non immorandum.

Ad Quæstiones transvolo, postquam monuerim, quàm contristat animum continuationis tuæ Philosophiæ desperatio: Sed æque resocillat
tamen

tamen certa spes Tractatûs illius desideratissimi quem hæc æstas parturit; citò & feliciter in lucem prodeat exopto.

Ad Respons. ad Quæstiones.

Ad primam & secundam respondes sanè constanter & convenienter tuis principiis, quod à quolibet, nisi sententia vicerit melior, & expecto, & laudo.

Ad tertiam; Ex navigiolo illo tuo has mihi comparavi merces. 1. In motu esse mutuum eorum quæ moveri dicuntur renixum. 2. *Quietem esse actionem, nempe renixum quandam, sive resistantiam.* 3. *Moveri duo corpora, esse immediatè separari.* 4. Immediatam illam separationem esse motum illum, sive translationem, præcisè sumptum.

Cùm verò duo corpora se expediunt à se invicem, nisi vim in utroque expeditricem, & avulsoriam adjeceris notioni translationis, seu motûs, *motus hic erit extrinsecus tantum respectus, aut aliquid fortasse levius.* Separari enim vel significat, superficies corporum quæ se modò mutuò tangebant distare à se invicem, (distantia autem corporum extrinsecus tantum est respectus;) vel significat non tangere quæ modò tangebant, quæ privatio duntaxat est, vel negatio. Certè de sententia tua hac in re non satis clarè mihi constat.

Ego verò, si mihi ipsi permitterer, judicarem motum esse vim illam vel actionem quâ se à se invicem mutuò expediunt corpora quæ dicis moveri; immediatam autem illam separationem eorundem esse effectum dictorum motuum, quamvis sit vel nudus duntaxat respectus, vel privatio. Sed aliter tibi visum est Philosophari in explicatione definitionis Motûs, *Artic. 25. Part. 2.* ubi equidem mentem tuam non plenè capio.

Ad reliquas Quæstiones omnes quas proposui respondisti perspicuè & appositè. Sed ad pleniorè intelligentiam eorum quæ ad sextam accumulavi, expecto dum prodeat exoptatissimus tuus libellus de Affectibus.

Cæterum, quantum ad verba illa mea ultima, *An ulla res, &c.* parturibat profectò mihi mens evanidam aliquam subtilitatem, quæ jam effugit, nec meâ interest revocare.

Hoc tantum quæram denuò, *Utrum materia sibi liberè permissa, i. e. nullum aliundè impulsus suspiciens, moveretur, an quiesceret?* Si movetur à se naturaliter, cùm materia sit homogenea, & ea propter motus ubique esset æqualis, sequitur quòd tota materia simulac fuerit, disjceretur in partes tam infinitè exiles, ut nihil ullo modo ulterius abradi posset ab ulla particula. Quicquid enim abradendum imaginariis, jam disjectum est ac dissolutum, ob intimam vim motûs per universam materiam pervadentis, vel, si malles, insiti. Nec partium aliæ aliis magis mutuò adhærescent, aliòve cursu flectent quàm aliæ, cùm sint omnes prorsus consimiles juxta quamlibet rationem imaginabilem. Nulla enim figuræ asperitas vel angulositas fingi potest, quæ non jam contusa sit ad ultimum quod motus poterit præstare; nec ulla motûs in æqualitas in ullis particulis ponenda est, cùm materia supponatur perfectè homogenea. Si naturaliter igitur moveretur materia, nec Sol, nec Cælum, nec Terra esset, nec vortices ulli, nec heterogeneum quicquam,

sive sensibile sive imaginabile, in rerum natura. Ideoque periret tuum condendi cœlos terrâsque, cæteraque sensibilia, mirificum artificium.

Quod si materiam quiescere dicis ex se nisi aliunde movetur, quodque hæc quies sit positivum quid, vim inde materia æternum pateretur, affectio naturalis destrueretur in perpetuum, ut contraria dominaretur: quod videtur durissimum. Nec tamen tutius forsan esset quietem statuere motus privationem, sive negationem; caderet enim omnis resistendi actio in materia quiescente, quam tamen agnoscis: Quamvis & id ipsum intellectui meo nonnihil negotii facebat. Dum enim quietem actionem statuis materiæ, motum etiam eandem esse statuas necesse est; siquidem materia non agit nisi movendo, aut saltem conando motum. Male profecto me habent isti scrupuli, quos quam primum eximere mihi poteris, obsecro ut eximas.

Quinetiam adeo superstitiosè hæc prima principia pensito, ut nova jam mihi ingeratur difficultas de natura motus. Cum scilicet motus corporis modus sit, ut figura, situs partium, &c. quâ fieri posset, ut transeat ab uno corpore in aliud, magis quàm alii modi corporei? Et universim imaginatio mea non capit, quâ possit fieri ut quicquam quod extra subjectum esse non potest (cujusmodi sunt modi omnes) in aliud migret subjectum. Deinde quæram, cum unum corpus in aliud minus, sed quiescens, impingit, secumque deferat, annon quies quiescentis corporis similiter transmigrat in deferens, æquè ac motus moventis in quiescens? Videtur enim quies res adeo otiosa ac pigra, ut eam taderet itineris. Cum tamen æquè realis sit ac motus, ratio coget eam transire. Postremo, obstupefco planè, dum confidero quod tam levicula ac vilis res ac motus, solubilis etiam à subjecto & transmigrabilis, adeoque debilis ac evanidæ naturæ ut periret protinus nisi sustentaretur à subjecto, tam potenter tamen contorqueret subjectum, & hæc vel illac tam fortiter impelleret. Equidem pronior sum in hanc sententiam, quod nullus prorsum sit motuum transitus, sed quod ex impulsu unius corporis aliud corpus in motum quasi expergiscatur, ut anima in cogitationem ex hac vel illa occasione; quodque corpus non tam suscipiat motum, quàm se in motum exerat à corpore alio commonefactum; &, quod paulò antè dixi, eodem modo se habere motum ad corpus ac cogitatio se habet ad mentem, nimirum neutrum recipi, sed oriri utrosque ex subjecto in quo inveniuntur; atque omne hoc quod corpus dicitur, *stupidè & remulente esse vivum, utpote quod ultimam infimamque Divine essentie*, quam perfectissimam vitam autumo, *umbram esse statuo* ac indolum, veruntamen sensu ac animadversione destitutam.

Cæterum transitus ille tuus motuum à subjecto in subjectum, idque à majori in minus, & vicissim, ut supra monui, optime representat naturam meorum Spirituum extensorum, qui contrahere se possunt, & rursus expandere; penetrare facillimè materiam, & non implere; agitare quovis modo ac movere, & tamen sine machinis ullis & uncorum nexu. Verùm diutius in hoc loco hæsi quàm putàram: sed ad institutum propero, hoc est, ad novas Quæstiones proponendas, super singulis illis Articulis Principiorum tuæ Philosophiæ, quorum vim nondum satis intelligo.

Ad

Ad Partis primæ Artic. 8.

Perspicuè videmus, &c. Nec perspicuè videmus extensionem, figuram, & motum localem, ad naturam nostram pertinere, nec videmus perspicuè non pertinere. Utinam hîc breviter demonstrares, nullum corpus posse cogitare.

Ad Artic. 37.

Annon major perfectio est id solum velle posse hominem quod sibi optimum esset, quàm posse etiam contrarium; cum melius sit semper felicem esse quàm vel summis aliquando efferri laudibus, vel etiam semper?

Ad Artic. 54.

Hîc rursus repeto, quod oportebat demonstrare, nihil extensum cogitare, aut, quod videbitur facilius, nullum corpus posse cogitare. Est enim dignum ingenio tuo argumentum.

Ad Artic. 60.

Quamvis mens possit contemplari seipsam ut rem cogitantem, exclusâ omni corporeâ extensione in hoc conceptu, non tamen evincit quicquam aliud nisi quod mens possit esse corporea vel incorporea, non quod sit de facto incorporea. Iterum igitur rogandus es ut demonstrares, ex aliquibus operationibus mentis humanæ quæ corporeæ naturæ competere non possunt, hanc mentem nostram esse incorpoream.

Ad Partis secundæ Artic. 25.

Non vim vel actionem quæ transfert, ut ostendam illum semper esse in mobili, &c. Annon igitur vis ipsa atque actio motus est in re mota?

Ad Artic. 26.

Estne igitur in quiescentibus perpetua quædam vis statoria, vel actio sistendi se, & corroborandi contra impetus omnes, quibus partes eorum divelli possint & disjici, vel totum corpus aliò abripi & transferri? Adeo ut Quies rectè definiri possit, Vis quædam vel actio interna corporis, quâ corporis partes arctè constringuntur ad se invicem & comprimuntur, adeoque à divisione vel dimotione per impulsu alieni corporis defenduntur? Hinc enim illud consurgeret, quod à meo intellectu minimè alienum est, Materiam utique vitam esse quandam obscuram (utpote quam ultimam Dei umbram existimo) nec in sola extensione partium consistere, sed in aliquali semper actione, hoc est, vel in quiete vel in motu, quorum utrumque revera actionem esse ipse concedis.

Ad

Ad Artic. 30.

Hic articulus videtur continere demonstrationem evidentissimam, quod translatio sive motus localis (nisi extrinsecus sit corporum respectus duntaxat) non sit reciprocus ullo modo.

Ad Artic. 36.

Quæro, annon mens humana dum spiritus accendit attentius diutiusque cogitando, corpusque insuper ipsum calefacit, motum auget universi?

Ad Artic. 55.

Numquid igitur cubus perfectè durus perfectèque planus motus super mensa, putà perfectè dura perfectèque plana, eo ipso instanti quo à motu sistitur æquè firmiter coalescit cum mensa ac cubi vel mensæ partes cum seipsis; an manet divisus à mensa semper, aut ad tempus saltem, post quietem? Nulla enim est compressura cubi in mensam, cum hunc motum tanquam in vacuo factum imaginemur super mensam extra mundi parietes, si fieri posset, sitam, (ac proinde ubi nullus locus est gravitati vel levitati) motumque sisti ex ea parte ad quam tendit cubus. Videntur igitur ex lege naturæ, cum jam divisa sint cubus & mensa, & nulla actio realis detur quâ conjungantur, mansura semper actu divisa.

Ad Artic. 56, & 57.

Non video quid sit opus ut tam amplos particularum gyros ac lusus circa corpus B describas. Videtur enim satis, si putemus singulas æquæ particulas simili impetu moveri a materia subtili, & æquales esse particularum magnitudines. Hinc enim, cum B à quolibet latere brevissimis gyris vel semigyris, (vel aliâ quacunque ratione) motus proximè adjacentium particularum contunditur, necessario quiescet, nec in unam partem magis quàm in aliam promovebitur.

Ad Artic. 57. linea 19.

Nec incedent per lineas tam rectas, &c. Quid? quod jam ad circula-rem magis accedunt, cum antea ovalem magis referebant figuram? Non plenè capio.

Ad Artic. 60.

Sed ipsas quatenus celerius aguntur in quolibet alias partes ferri. Possuntne igitur celeritas motus & ejusdem determinatio divortium pati? Perinde enim videtur ac si fingamus viatorem currentem, cursum quidem dirigere Londinum versus, sed celeritatem cursus nihilominus ferri Cantabrigiam versus, vel Oxonium. Subtilitas quam neutra Universitas capiet, nisi fortè intelligas per ferri, motum moliri, vei niti ut aliquorsum fiat motus.

Ad

Ad Partis tertiæ Articulum 16.

Annon juxta *Ptolemaicam* hypothefin Veneris lumen, ad modum Lunæ, nunc decreferet, nunc creferet, quamvis non eisdem menfuris & legibus?

Ad Artic. 35.

Quî fit ut Planetæ omnes in eodem non circumgyrentur Plano, videlicet in Plano Eclipticæ, maculæque adeò Solares, aut faltem in planis Eclipticæ parallelis, ipsæque Luna; aut in Æquatore, aut in Plano Æquatori parallelo, cum à nulla interna vi dirigantur, sed externo tantum ferantur impetu?

Ad Artic. 36, 37.

Vellem etiam mihi subindices rationem Apheliorum & Periheliorum Planetarum, & quam ob causam locum subindè mutant singula: tum maximè cum in eodem sint vortice omnia, cur non iisdem in locis inveniuntur Planetarum omnium Primariorum Aphelia & Perihelia? Præcessio etiam Æquinoctiorum quomodo ex tuis oriatur Principiis? Hic enim tu veras & naturales horum Phænomenorum causas explicare poteris, cum alii fictitias tantum exponant Hypotheses.

Ad Artic. 55.

Quæ in orbem aguntur. Sed quomodo primùm inceperunt tam immania materiæ spatia in gyros convolvi, vorticésque fieri?

Ad Artic. 57.

Ejus partem quæ à funda impeditur, &c. Videtur perceptu difficilius, quod lapis A impediatur à motu in D, cum nec de facto illuc unquam feratur, nec si impedimentum tolleretur illuc naturaliter pergeret; pergeret enim omnino versus C.

Ad Artic. 59.

Novam vim motûs acquiri, & tamen conatum renovari hîc dicis: Nescio quàm bene coherent. Nam si nova vis acquiritur & superadditur, non est renovatio motûs, sed augmentatio. Quod si globulus A movendo motum auget in eodem puncto baculi existens, (nam vorticis globulos hoc exemplum respicit) cur non semper motus seipsum movendo accendit & auget? Hoc autem modo jam pridem omnia in flammam abiissent.

Ad Artic. 62.

Hîc quæro, cum conatus globulorum, in quo lux & lumen consistit, fiat per integram vorticis amplitudinem, ita ut basis trianguli BFD multo major esse possit quàm DB, & ab utrisque productæ diametri DB,

D B, decies putà vel centies majoris factæ, extremitatibus globuli obliquo conatu in cuspidem aliquam ad F, oculum cujuslibet intuentis, reprimantur, cur lux, putà Solis, non major videtur quàm que sit intra circulum D C B?

Ad Artic. 72.

Non penitus hoc artificium contorquendi materiam primi elementi in spirales sive cochleares formas intelligo; præsertim in locis ab axe paulò remotioribus. Nisi hoc fiat, non tam quòd globuli torqueantur circa particulas primi elementi, quàm quòd ipsum primum elementum, ab ipsis fortasse globulis leviter in gyrationem determinatum, se ipsum inter triangularia illa spatia contorqueat, lineasque spirales in se describat. Oro te, ut hîc mentem plenius explices. Sed & alia subindè hîc oritur dubitatio. Cùm particulæ hæ contortæ constent ex minutissimis particulis & rapidissimè agitis, quomodo illæ minutissimæ particulæ in ullam formam vel magnitudinem majorem coalescant, præsertim cùm in formandis hisce particulis striatis distortio illa sit motûsque obliquitas.

Ad Artic. 82.

Tam supremi quàm infimi, &c. Prodigii instar mihi videtur rapidus hic globulorum supremorum cursus, (præsertim si cum mediorum comparetur) & qui causas quas in subsequenti Articulo profers longè excedat. Si quid ulteriùs adinvenire possis, quo mollius hoc dogma redatur, gratum profectò esset audire.

Ad Artic. 84.

Cur cometarum caudæ, &c. Primam quamque impatienter tibi obtrudo occasionem explicandi quodlibet: Rogo ut hanc rem etiam hoc in loco breviter expedias.

Ad Artic. 108.

Per partes vicinas Eclipticæ QH in cælum abire coguntur. Quî fit ut non omnes ferè illuc abeant, potiùs quàm à polo ad polum migrando vorticem, quem vocas, componant?

Ad Artic. 121. lin. ult.

A variis causis assiduè potest mutari, &c. A quibus?

Ad Artic. 129. lin. 15.

Non priùs apparere quàm, &c. Cur circumfluxus illius materiæ, cùm sit adeò transparens, impedit Cometam nè videatur? Circumfluens enim materia Jovem Planetam non abdit ab oculis nostris. Et cur necesse est ut non nisi obvolutus materiâ relictî vorticis Cometa inde egrediatur?

Ad

Ad Artic. 130. lin. 21.

Minuitur quidem, &c. Cur non deletur penitus, si vortex A E I O fortius, vel æquè fortiter, urget vicinos vortices, quàm ille ab ipsis urgetur?

Ad Artic. 149.

Brevi accedet ad A, &c. Cur non ad T usque pergit, impingitque in ipsam terram?

Quia sic à recta linea minùs deflectet. Non solum constat lineam N A continuatam cum A B, lineam magis rectam constituere quàm eandem N A cum A D continuatam; sed cum Luna à centro S recedat ad modum globulorum cœlestium, magis naturaliter videtur consurgere versus B, quàm versus D descendere.

Ad Partis quartæ Artic. 22.

Nec Terra proprio motu cieatur, &c. Non video quid refert unde sit motus ille circularis, modò sit in Terra; nec deprehendo quin illi celerissimi gyri Telluris imposita omnia rejicerent versus cœlos, quamvis motus non esset proprius, sed ab interna materia cœlesti profectus, nisi agitatio circumjacentis ætheris, quam supponis multò celeriore, fatum illud præverteret. Nec videtur Terra habere rationem corporis quiescentis, quoad conatum partium recedendi à centro; (Videtur enim illud necessarium in omni corpore circulariter moto:) sed quòd simul circumvolvitur cum ambiente æthere, nec separantur superficies, hâc forsân ratione dicatur Terra quiescere. Hæc autem dico ut ex te intelligam, annon ratio quòd partes Terræ non diffiliant ad solam celeritatem motûs particularum Ætheris referenda sit.

Ad Artic. 25.

Propter suarum Particularum motum inest levitas. Quid igitur existimas de frigido & candenti ferro? Utrum præponderat? Præterea, quomodo moles aquæ levior fit ob motum partium, cum motus harum partium tandem à globulis determinatur deorsum. Hinc enim videtur magis accelerari descensus corporis, unde major æstimabitur gravitas. Atque hoc modo aqua auro præponderabit.

Ad Artic. 27.

Nisi fortè aliqua exterior causa, &c. Quænam sint illæ causæ, paucis obsecro ut innuas.

Ad Artic. 133. lin. 12.

Axi parallelus. Parallelismi mentio hîc me monet de difficultatibus quibusdam ferè inextricabilibus. Primò, cur tui vortices non fiant in modum columnæ, seu cylindri, potius quam ellipsis, cum quodlibet punctum axis sit quasi centrum à quo materia cœlestis recedat, &
quantum

quantum video, æquali prorsus impetu. Deinde, Primum elementum (cùm ubique ab axe oporteat globulos æquali vi recedere) cur non æqualiter per axem totum in cylindri formam productum jacet, sed in sphæricam figuram congestum ad medium ferè axis relegatur? Nam occurfus hujus elementi primi ab utroque polo vorticis nihil impedit quo minùs totus axis productâ flammâ luceret. Cùm enim ubique cujuslibet axis æquali vi recedant globuli, faciliùs præterlabentur se invicem, rectâque pergent ad oppositos polos Materiæ subtilissimæ irruentia fluentia, quàm excavabunt vel distudent sibi in aliqua axis parte spatium majus quàm præsens & æquabilis vorticis circumvolutio lubens admitteret, vel sponte suâ offeret. Tertiò denique, Cùm globuli cælestes circa axem vorticis ferantur ὁμαλῶς & axi & sibi invicem, nec parallelismum perdant dum locum aliquatenus inter seipsos mutant, impossibile videtur ut ulla omnino fiat particularum striatarum intortio, nisi ipsæ particulæ striatæ in triangularibus illis spatiis circa proprios axes circumrotentur; quod quàm commodè fieri possit non video, quemadmodum suprâ monui.

Ad Artic. 187.

Nulla sympathia vel antipathia miracula, &c. Utinam igitur hîc explices si breviter fieri possit, quâ ratione mechanicâ evenit ut in duabus chordis, etiam diversorum instrumentorum, vel unisonis, vel ad illud intervallum Musicum quod διαπασών dicitur attemperatis, si una percutiatur, altera in altero instrumento subsiliat, cùm quæ propiores & laxiores etiam sint, imò & in eodem instrumento in quo chorda percussa tensæ, non omnino moveantur. Experimentum vulgare est & notissimum. Nulla verò sympathia mihi videtur magis rationes mechanicas fugere quàm hic chordarum consensus.

Ad Artic. 188.

Ac sextam de homine effem, &c. Perge, Divine Vir, in isthoc opere excolendo & perficiendo. Pro certissimo enim habeo, nihil unquam Reipub. literariæ aut gratius aut utilius in lucem proditurum. Nec est quòd experimentorum defectum hîc causeris. Nam quantum ad corpus nostrum, accepi à dignis fide authoribus, te, quæ ad humani corporis Anatomem spectant, accuratissimè universa explorâsse. Quod autem ad animam, cùm talem ipse nactus sis, quæ in maximè sublimes amplissimâsque operationes evigilavit, spiritûsque habeas agillimos & subtilissimos, generosa tua mens, innatâ suâ vi cœlestique vigore, tanquam igni Chymicorum alicui, freta, ità excutiet se, variâsque in formas transmutabit, ut ipsa sibi facile esse possit infinitorum experimentorum officina.

Ad Artic. 195.

Et Meteoris explicui, &c. Pulcherrimam fanè colorum rationem in Meteoris explicuisti. Est tamen ea de re improba quædam difficultas, quæ magnum imaginationi meæ negotium faceffit. Quippe quòd cùm colorum varietatem statuas ex proportionem quam habet globulorum
motus

motus circularis ad rectilineam oriri, eveniet necessario ut aliquando etiam in iisdem globulis & motus circularis rectilineam, & rectilinearis circularem eodem tempore superet. Verbi gratia, In duobus parietibus oppositis, quorum unus rubro, alter cæruleo colore obductus est, interjacentes globuli ob rubrum parietem celerius movebuntur in circulum quam in lineam rectam, ob parietem tamen cæruleum celerius in lineam rectam movebuntur quam in circulum, & eodem prorsus tempore; quæ sunt planè *ἀνύστα*. Vel sic, In eodem pariete cujus pars, putà dextra, rubet, media nigra est, sinistra cærulea, cum ad oculum semper fiat decussatio, omnes globuli ob radiorum concursum singulorum globulorum motus proportionem, circularis nimirum ad rectum suscipient; adeò ut necesse sit colores omnes in imo oculi permisceri & confundi. Neque ullam rationem solvendi hunc nodum excogitare possum, nisi fortè supponendum sit, motum hunc circularem esse duntaxat breves quosdam & celeres conatus ad circulationem, non plenum motum, ut revera fit in motu recto dictorum globulorum. Et ad plerisque omnes alias difficultates quas tibi jam proposui, aliquales saltem solutiones vel proprio Marte eruere forsan potuero. Sed cum humanitas tua hanc veniam mihi concesserit, cumque singularis tua dexteritas in solvendis hujusmodi nodis, quam in nuperis tuis literis perspexi, me insuper invitaverit, (quamvis enim breviter, pro angustiis temporis in quas conjectus tunc eras, egisse te video; tam plenè tamen mihi satisfacis, tamque fortiter animi sensus mihi moves, ac si præsens digitum digito premeres;) cum denique majorem præ se laturæ sint auctoritatem elucidationes tuæ, tum apud me ipsum, tum apud alios, si usus fuerit; è re nostra putavi fore, hasce omnes difficultates tibi ipsi proponere, quas cum solveris, nisi magnopere fallor, penitissimè tuæ Philosophiæ Principia intelligam universa. Quod equidem quanti facio vix credibile est. Hosce autem præsentès gryphos mihi cum expediveris (quod quanto citius fit, propter impotentem illum amorem quo in tua rapior, èo gratius futurum est) quaestiones alias è *Dioptrice* tua petitas mox accipies à

Philosophiæ tuæ studiosissimo,

HENRICO MORO.

Clarissimo Viro, Summoque Philosopho,

RENATO DES-CARTES,

HENRICUS MORUS.

EQUIDEM impensè doleo, vir Clarissimè, quòd tam subito à vicinia nostra abreptus sis, & in tam longinquas abductus oras. Habeo tamen, ut nihil dissimulem, quo hanc animi ægritudinem ac molestiam mitigare possim, meque ipsum consolari. Et certè non


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minimum est, quòd is honor tibi optimè merenti habitus sit, etiam apud gentes remotissimas, nominisque tui claritudo ad Septentrionales usque spissitudines crassaque nebulas tam potenter penetraverit; neque id (quod caput rei est) frustra: cum tantus literarum & literatorum amor generosum pectus Illustrissimæ Heroinæ, Serenissimæ Reginae Suecorum, inceserit, ut famâ librisque tuis non contenta, à scribendo ad te, ut eam inviseres, nunquam destiterit, donec voti facta sit compos. Quod cessurum credo in magnum illius regni commodum & ornamentum. Quas ob causas fateor me minùs inclementer tulisse tuum ab hisce regionibus nostris abcessum, jacturamque itidem exoptatissimæ illius Epistolæ quam, prout promisisti, ante abitum tuum à te expectabam: cujus jam recuperandæ spem omnem tantum abest ut abjiciam, ut è contrà fortiter confidam te non solum illis quas antè scripsi, sed & præsentibus literis, cum ad manus tuas pervenerint, brevi responsurum. Quâ fretus confidentiâ ad *Dioptricen* tuam pergo; mox ad *Meteora*, si quid fortè ibi occurrerit difficultatis, profecturus; ut tandem animam meam iis omnibus exonerare possim quæ in rem nostram putabam fore tibi plenius proponere. Spero enim hoc modo me, cum omnia ex mea parte perfectæ sint quæ præstare oportebat, molliorem animæ meæ conciliaturum quietem, minùsque in posterum me anxie habiturum.

Ad Dioptrices Cap. 2. Artic. 4. lin. 21.

Nullò modo illi oppositum. Linteum CE videtur opponi B pilæ, aliquo saltem modo, etiam quatenus pila dextrorsum fertur. Quod sic patebit.



Nam GH plenè opponitur pilæ B, perfectèque impedit cursum ejus, tam versùs HE quàm versùs CE. seu deorsum. Cum igitur tam propè accedat CE, ad posituram GH, ut desit tantum angulus HBE, sive GBC ad perfectam oppositionem tendentiæ versùs HE, CE etiam suam servans posituram, aliqua-

tenus opponetur pilæ B, etiam quatenus cursum tendit versùs HE. Quod insuper manifestius apparebit, si fingamus CE udæ argillæ planitiem, & pilam, putà æneam, ab A ferri ad B, ubi aliquò usque penetrabit, sed statim suffocabitur vis cursùs tam versùs HE quàm versùs CE; quod tamen non fieret, si pila ferretur secundum lineam CBE, sed sine impedimento pergeret versùs HE, præsertim si nulla inesset pilæ gravitas: unde patet planitiem CE opponi pilæ B descendentì ab A, etiam quatenus fertur versùs HE, quod oportebat demonstrare.

Dimidiam sive velocitatis partem amittat, lin. 27. Partem hîc aliquam velocitatis amissam esse lubens concedam; sed quòd & in hoc Articulo & in proximè sequenti supponis hanc partem velocitatis deperdi tantum versùs CE, non versùs FE, nullus capio. Cum enim unicus
realis

realis motus sit pilæ, (quamvis varias imaginari possimus pro libitu tendentias hujus motus, sive metas,) si minuitur hic motus quacunque pergere fingis pilam, tardiùs incedet quàm ante motum minutum. Causa igitur tendentiæ pilæ ad I potiùs quàm ad D, non pendenda est à tarditate vel celeritate motus, sed à resistantia magni illius anguli C B D, & à debilitate minoris illius anguli E B D, cujus acies ob exilitatem suam & materiæ fluiditatem faciliùs cedit pilæ projectæ quàm obtusus angulus D B D: Alioqui si causa referenda esset ad celeritatem vel tarditatem, pila descendens ab H in B cursum etiam deflecteret. Hic schema tuum consule, si opus est, pag. 84.

Ad Artic. 6. lin. 7.

Tam obliquè incumbat, ut linea FE ducta, &c. Perpetua hæc tua demonstrandi ratio, quò pila profectua sit, lepidam profectò in se habet subtilitatem, sed quæ causam rei non videtur attingere. Vera enim & realis causa intelligenda est ex amplitudine anguli C B D, & exilitate E B D anguli, & ex magnitudine etiam pilæ, quæ quo major est, eò minorem depressionem lineæ A B versus C E requirit, ad resiliendum versus aerem L. Major enim pila non tam commodè levat atque aperit cuspidem acutioris anguli, quo intret in ipsam putà aquam, sed contundendo potiùs transvolat reflexa.

Quod vim ejus motus augeat, lin. 22. Augmentum motus nihil efficiet ad detorquendum cursum pilæ inceptum, nisi sit positura alicujus corporis quod dictum cursum pilæ versus partem aliam determinet. Quod ego hoc modo fieri auguror in mediis illis quæ tu fingis radium faciliùs admittere, qualia sunt crystallus, vitrum, &c. Nempe cum acies anguli E B D in istiusmodi substantiis adeò dura sit & pervicax, ut nihil cedat, radius impingens in constipam & inclinantem anguli aciem nonnihil avertitur ab incepto cursu, & introrsum perpendiculum versus abigitur. Utraque igitur refractione reflexio quædam mihi videtur, vel saltem reflexionis quædam inchoatio. Atque quemadmodum in plena & libera reflexione determinatio tollebatur sine ulla retardatione cursus pilæ, ità hîc ad minuendam vel mutandam determinationem nova tarditas vel celeritas non videtur necessaria. Sola igitur determinatio minuta vel aucta sufficit ad utramvis refractionem. Neque enim A cum ad C E superficiem pervenerit, quatenus celerior vel tardior cursum flectit, sed quatenus impingit in corpus determinationem mutans. Alioqui, si nuda duntaxat accesserit celeritas vel tarditas, A semper pergeret à B in D.

In priori igitur refractione, videlicet à perpendiculo, determinatio deorsum minuitur necessario, pila autem retardatur per accidens, ob mollitiem cursum immutantis. In posteriori determinatio deorsum augetur; pila autem si acceleratur, acceleratur per accidens, ob novi medii faciliorem transitum. Determinationis igitur mutatio ejusque causa ad refractiones juxta ac reflectionem sunt planè necessariae; velocitas & tarditas ipsius motus sunt duntaxat accessoriae, vel potiùs planè supervacaneæ. Imò verò, novam quod pilæ seu globuli accelerationem attinet in medio faciliore, videtur quidem illa perceptu perquam difficilis; propterea quòd novum illud medium non suppeditat

novos gradus motûs, sed tantum permittit pilæ quos etiamnum habet superstites sine ulteriori ulla diminutione integros possidere, cum nullos ad se arripiat, vel imbibat. Æquæque absurdum videtur, novos, vel, si malles, pristinos motûs gradus restitui pilæ medium facilius intranti, ac concedere in puncto reflectionis pilam aliquo momento hæere priusquam resiliat, quod meritò explodis *Art. 2. hujus cap.*

Caput. 6. ad Artic. 9.

Sed ex solo situ exiguarum partium cerebri, &c. Sûntne igitur istiusmodi in cerebri dissectione particulæ visibiles, an ratione duntaxat colligis istiusmodi esse oportere in hunc usum destinatas? Mihi verò nihil opus harum esse videtur, sed eadam organa quæ motum transmittunt, animam etiam commonescere necessario, unde illa fiat motûs transmissio, si nullum interjacet impedimentum.


Ad Artic. 13.

Similem illi, quâ Geometræ per duas stationes, &c. Duriuscula hæc videtur obscuriorque comparatio, in nihiloque consentiens, nisi quod utrobiquæ binæ sumuntur stationes. Geometræ enim, vel, si malles, Geodætæ, stationes sumunt, in linea ab arbore putà vel turri rectâ producta; Oculus locum mutans in linea transversa, & ferme objecto parallela, si rectè rem capio.

Ad Artic. 16.

Ex cognitione seu opinione quam de distantia habemus, &c. Adæquatas fortasse causas apparentis corporum magnitudinis explicare perquam difficile esset. Sed in uno hoc maximè consistere opinor, nimirum in magnitudine & parvitate decussationis anguli. Ille enim quò major est, major apparebit ejusdem corporis magnitudo; quò minor, minor. Deinde, quod observatu dignissimum est, cum objectum aliquod, pollicem puta tuum, intra grani unius distantiam oculo admoveris, hic decussationis angulus quater aut quinquies major erit quam ille qui fit ad oculum a pollice distantem decem ferme grana; & si adhuc amovebitur pollex ab oculo per aliquot dena grana, semper angustior reddetur angulus decussationis, sed minori semper proportionem, per dena quæque grana, & minori; semper tamen aliquantò angustior evadit quàm antea, donec tandem fiat tam angustus, ut rationem unius lineæ rectæ habere intelligatur. Hinc nemo mirabitur, si multò majorem pollicem deprehendat unico grano ab oculo distantem, quam cum decem abest ab oculo, & postea per multa dena grana remotum, ad singula grana dena, non multum magnitudinis deperdere; tam longinquè tamen removeri posse, ut prorsus desinat ulterius apparere. Distantia enim crurum interni decussationis anguli minor esse poterit quàm unius capillamenti nervi optici diameter. Quid autem hîc facit opinio de distantia cum imaginis magnitudine comparata, parùm intelligo. Neque certò scio quomodo aut oculus aut anima istam com-
pa-

parationem secum instituat. Deprehensionem autem magnitudinis ex dicto angulo quo modo oriri concipio, sic videor mihi posse explicare.



HI & KL sint fundi duorum oculorum, majoris scilicet & minoris. CD sit objectum majus & remotius, EF objectum minus, sed propinquius, EGF vel KGL Angulus decussationis.

Primum, hinc statuo esse visum quendam, seu transmissionem motus ab E in L & à D in K. Et animadversionem meam rectè excurrentem per lineam KGF D offendere unam extremitatem objecti CD, videlicet D, eo revera quo inest loco, & per lineam LGE C offendere alteram extremitatem objecti CD, videlicet C, in suo itidem loco; & sic de ceteris partibus tam extremis quàm intermediis objecti CD. Recto igitur excursu hoc animadversionis meæ, obversam objecti magnitudinem deprehendo; cujus diametri apparentis mensura est angulus EGF. Servatis igitur eisdem rectis lineis per quas excurrat mea animadversio, & eadem anguli magnitudine in oculo HI, quæ modò in KL; dico objectum DC æquè magnum apparere ac in oculo KL. Unde postea colligo, magnitudinem objecti apparentem ad anguli decussationis magnitudinem, non ad magnitudinem imaginis, referri. Postremò, ut magnitudo apparens objecti non fit ex magnitudine imaginis in oculi fundo (utì porrò patet ex eo, quòd eadem sit imaginis magnitudo objecti minoris EF quæ majoris CD, tam in HI oculo quàm in KL) ità neque simpliciter ex magnitudine anguli decussationis: alioquin objectum EF æquè magnum appareret ac objectum CD, cum idem sit decussationis angulus. Sed amoto EF minore objecto, objectum CD revera multò majus apparebit quàm apparebat modò objectum EF, cum tamen utraque cernerentur sub eodem decussationis angulo. Unde meritò concludi potest, apparentem cujusque objecti magnitudinem partim ex anguli decussationis, partimque ex reali corporis magnitudine oriri. Neque mirum est animadversionem meam per lineas rectas visus illius sive motus transmissi pergentem eò usque penetrare, ibique se sistere ubi motus hic primum incipit, videlicet ad C & D; ut neque eas (cum revera magis distant quàm EF, nec sub minori angulo videntur) apparere etiam magis distantes quàm E & F, totumque adeo objectum CD majus simpliciter apparere quàm objectum totum EF.

Ad Artic. 19.

Quoniam sumus assueti judicare, &c. Quid igitur censes de cæco illo à nativitate sua quem sanavit Christus, si speculum planum ipsi ob-

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jectum

jectum fuisset antequam consuetudo iudicium depravasset? Numquid ille vultum suum citra speculum, non ultra, vel pone speculum, deprehendisset? Mirificè torfit & fatigavit imaginationem meam hic imaginis pone speculum lusus, 'cujus causas nondum me satis percepisse fateor. Neque enim mihi ullo modo satisfacit hæc depravata iudicandi consuetudo. Si rationes reales magis magisque mechanicas excogitare poteris, & nobiscum communicare, rem sanè gratissimam præstabis.

Ad Artic. 20. lin. ult.

Indè sequitur diametrum illorum, &c. Cur non diameter Solis vel Lunæ videatur pedalis vel bipedalis, ob angulum decussatorium ad eam rationem diminutum, quæ apta sit corpora ejusdem realis magnitudinis, cujus sunt Sol & Luna, sub hanc pedalem vel bipedalem magnitudinem apparentem, ad istas distantias, repræsentare?

Ad Artic. 21.

Quia tam versùs Horizontem quàm versùs verticem, &c. Igitur majores Sol & Luna ad Horizontem apparent quàm pro distantia oportet apparere. Et ea potius est dicenda vera magnitudo apparens, sive non fallax, quæ certæ legi subjicitur, quàm quæ externis aliquibus adjunctis alteratur.

Ad Caput 7. Artic. 22.

Quâ arte ob alias causas, &c. Quam invertendi artem hîc intelligis? Et quas ob causas ab ipsa abstines?

Ad Caput 8. Artic. 20.

Aut diversis partibus parallelos. Quid sibi hinc velint radii diversis partibus paralleli, nullo modo intelligo. Nihil enim hujusmodi quicquam exhibetur in schemate hoc, pag. 172. depicto. Ut mentem hîc apertius explices oro. Obscurissimum etiam illud est, nisi ego sum tardissimus, quod habetur ad calcem hujus Articuli, de decussatione radorum duo vitra convexa, DBQ & dbq, permeantium. Sed ad marginem hujus loci in editione tua Gallica relegas nos ad paginam 108. id est, ad figuram illam quæ in Latina editione habetur paginâ 164. Ego verò ibi in vitris illis nullam omnino video radorum decussationem, sed tantum inter vitra, ad communem focum I. Nulli enim ibi radii apparent nisi paralleli, qui parallelismum servant donec ad convexitates vitrorum BD, & bd, pervenerint, ubi demum ita incipiunt inflecti, ut omnium tandem fiat decussatio in foco I, non alibi. Hîc autem dicis radios etiam in illis vitris DBQ, dbq, primò decussari in superficie prioris, putà DBQ, deinde in altera posterioris, putà dbq. Quam autem intelligis superficiem? Planam, aut convexam? & an eandem in utraque? Pergis porrò, *Si saltem qui ex diversis partibus allabuntur.* Quid est *ex diversis partibus allabi*? Numquid intelligis ex adversis sive oppositis? Nam paralleli etiam qui
ab

ab eodem objecto emanant rectè dici possunt allabi ex diversis partibus. Hic prorsus in luto hæreo.

Ad Caput 9. Artic. 5. pag. 185. lin. 10.

Quò magis hæc perspicilla objectorum imagines augment, eò pauciora simul repræsentant. Cum perfectiora hæc perspicilla aperturam vitri exterioris majorem habent, eaque plures proinde parallelos radios ab objecto suscipit quàm imperfectiorum minor apertura, omnesque illi radii ad fundum oculi à convexa dicti vitri superficie contorquentur, cur non plura etiam objecta, æquè ac majores imagines, in oculo poterunt depingere?

Ad Caput 10. Artic. 4 lin. 17.

Hyperbole omnino similis & æqualis priori deprehendetur. Supponis igitur Hyperbolas omnes, quarum foci æquidistant à verticibus, quamvis hæ per conum, illæ per funem & regulam describantur, per *ἰσαρμολογῶν* coincidere: quod ut falsum non video, ita puto tamen veritatem illius, cum fundamentum sit totius quam mox expositurus es machinæ, fuisse operæ pretium demonstrasse, aut saltem rationem levi aliquo indicio innuisse.

Ad Artic. 6. pag. 202. lin. 27.

Habebit enim & aciem & cuspidem. Aciem habeat, sed quam cuspidem habere poterit non video, præsertim cum acies hujus instrumenti fabricanda sit recta, nam concava, sic enim esset sphærica; quæ si contingat extremos circulos latitudinis Rotæ, ad interiores tamen non adaptabitur; major enim erit quàm ut cum illis conveniat. Unde nec tanget instrumenti hujus cuspis circumductam Rotam in mediis latitudinis spatiis.

Ad Artic. 7. lin. 17.

Tantam esse debere ut ejus semidiameter, distantia quæ erit inter lineas 12 & 55. &c. Hujusce rei rationem autumo, quòd tunc concava vitri superficies sphærica fieret, non Hyperbolica.

Ad Artic. 10.

Ut nonnullos ex maximè industriis & curiosis, &c. Lubenter ex te audirem numquis ex peritioribus illis artificibus periculum fecerit adhuc in ingeniosissimo hoc tuo invento, & quo successu. Nam quod quidam hic mussitant, aliquos tentasse, operamque lusisse, id aut falsum arbitror, aut opifices illos qui tentarunt ex peritioribus non fuisse.

Quod ad Meteora attinet, difficultates quæ ibi occurrunt pauciores sunt, & levioris, opinor, momenti. Quales autem sint mox audies.

Meteororum Cap. 1. Artic. 4. pag. 210. lin. 7.

Et denique prope terram quàm prope nubes. Hoc asseris de radiis tam rectis quàm reflexis. Qui autem fieri possit ut recti, nisi quatenus
re-

reflectuntur & replicantur iterum in se prope Terram, vim caloris au-
geant, non video. Tum verò non sunt simpliciter recti, sed recti cum
reflexis conjuncti. Imò verò potius minui videtur vis caloris in aere
terræ vicino, cum nonnihil sui motus ætherei globuli communicent
cum particulis terrestribus, unde prope terram tardior erit motus e-
orum & languentior quàm in superioribus aeris regionibus. Non igi-
tur abs re esset si hic explices, cur caleseat aer prope Terram magis
quàm prope nubes. Et annon fieri possit, ut quamvis motus minor
sit prope terram quàm in supernis aeris partibus, major tamen calor
sentiatur, ob inæqualitatem hujusce motus.

Caput 7. Artic. 6. pag. 283. lin. 4.

Sed etiam inferiores adeò raras atque extensas, &c. At cum tam raræ
sint, quæ possunt alias in se cadentes nubes excipere, ibique sistere? Vi-
dentur potius præ sua tenuitate ad Terram transmissuræ, si eò, alias,
profecturæ essent.

Ad Artic. 7. lin. 2.

Ob aeris circumquaque positi resonantiam, &c. Ità sanè fingit Paracelsus
tonitru tam immaniter boare & mugire, ob arcuata cœli templa, non
absimili ratione atque si quis æneam machinam nitrato pulvere onust-
am disploderet sub Tecto testudineato. Tu verò, sat scio, nullis la-
quearibus ætherem claudi sustines, ac proinde videatur verisimilius,
quòd quò magis ictus distat à Terra, eò debilior futurus sit sonitus;
cum nec tam commodè fiat resonantia, quòd quò reverberetur sonus,
tam longè absit ab allisis corporibus.

Caput 9. Artic. 2. lin. 19.

Pauci quippe tantummodo radii, &c. Numquid igitur radiorum pau-
citas cæruleum colorem generat? Videtur hoc haud ità consonum præ-
cedentibus. Quippe quòd cum supra statueris, colores oriri ex varia
proportionem rotationis sphæricularum ad motum earundem rectum, &
particulatim cæruleum ex rotatione minore quàm progressu proficisci,
quasi in eo ipso constaret ipsa cærulei coloris ratio; nunc tamen cau-
sam refers non tam ad rotationis defectum, quàm paucitatem radio-
rum resilientium a superficie maris. Hic igitur quæro utrùm sentias
nullam aliam esse colorum rationem præter eam quam ipse tam sub-
tiliter & ingeniosè exposuisti; an & aliis modis colores oriri possint,
nullâ habitâ ratione rotationis globulorum motusque rectilinei: præ-
sertim cum & ipse innuis aquam marinam cæruleam videri ob pau-
citatem duntaxat radiorum. Et certè explicatu haud facile est, cum
globuli in æquoris superficiem impingunt, cur non aut albescat mare
aut rubescat, cum fortius impingunt, aut illis resistitur fortius in super-
ficie maris, quàm in cœlo præ vaporibus albescente.

Proposui jam omnia quæ in scriptis tuis Physicis mihi visa sunt in-
tellectu difficilia, aut intellectu difficulter vera. In quibus legendis
mirari non immeritò tibi subeat ingenii mei conditionem & fatum;
qui cum profiteri ausim me cætera omnia in tuis scriptis satis intime
in-

ntelligere, (ubi plurima tamen reperiuntur, quæ multò difficiliora videri possint quàm de quibus sæpius hæc) ista tamen quæ tibi proposui explicanda aut munienda, non æque ac illa cætera intelligerem. Ego verò hanc naturam meam atque indolem, quam à puero usque in me ipso observavi, (quâ nempe maxima sæpenumero feliciter vinco, victus interim à minimis) ad hunc usque diem emendare non potui. Humanitatis tuæ erit ignoscere quod nefas est corrigere, nulloque pacto aut affectatæ ignorantiae aut disputandi prurigini imputare, quòd tam multa congesserim. Feci enim non ex effræni aliquo disputandi desiderio, sed potius ex religioso quodam erga tua studio,

*Non tam certandi cupidus, quàm propter amorem,
Quòd te imitari aueo :*

Quod scitè quidem ille ; Ego vero hac in causa verissimè. Quod reliquum est, Clarissime Cartesi, exorandus es, ut ista omnia quæ scripsi æqui bonique consulas, & cum primo tuo otio rescribas. Quod si dignatus fueris, peritissimum illum tandem efficies, qui semper fuit hæctenus

Cantabrigiæ, è Christi Collegio,
12 Calend. Novemb. 1649.

Philosophia tuæ studiosissimus,

HEN. MORUS.

*Ce qui suit a esté trouvé parmy les Papiers de
Monsieur Des-Cartes, comme vn projet ou commencement de la
reponse qu'il preparoit aux deux precedentes Lettres de Monsieur
More.*

CUM tuam Epistolam decimo Calendas Augusti datam accepi, parabam me ad navigandam Sueciam versùs, &c.

1. *An sensus Angelorum sit propriè dictus, & an sint corporei, necne.*

Resp. Mentis humanas à corpore separatas sensum propriè dictum non habere ; de Angelis autem non constare ex sola ratione naturali an creati sint instar mentium à corpore distinctarum, an verò instar earundem corpori unitarum ; nec me unquam de iis de quibus nullam habeo certam rationem quicquam determinare, & conjecturis locum dare. Quòd Deum dicas non esse considerandum nisi qualem omnes boni esse cuperent, si deesset, probo.

2. Ingeniosa instantia est de acceleratione motûs, ad probandam eandem substantiam nunc maiorem nunc minorem locum posse occupare ; sed tamen est magna disparitas, in eo quòd motus non sit substantia, sed modus, & quidem talis modus, ut intimè concipiamus quo pacto minui vel augeri possit in eodem loco. Singulorum autem entium quædam

quædam sunt propriæ notiones, de quibus ex iis ipsis tantum, non autem ex comparatione aliorum, est judicandum: Ità figuræ non competit quod motui, nec utrique quod rei extensæ. * Qui autem semel bene perspexit nihili nullas esse proprietates, atque ideo illud quod vulgò vocatur spatium vacuum non esse nihil, sed verum corpus, omnibus suis accedentibus (sive iis quæ possunt adesse & abesse sine subjecti corruptione) exutum, notaveritque quomodo unaquæque pars istius sive spatii sive corporis sit ab omnibus aliis diversa & impenetrabilis, facile percipiet nulli alteri rei eandem divisibilitatem, & tangibilitatem, & impenetrabilitatem, posse competere.

3. Dixi Deum extensum ratione Potentiæ, quod scilicet illa Potentia se exferat, vel exferere possit, in re extensa. * Certumque est Dei essentiam debere ubique esse præsentem, ut ejus potentia illi possit se exferere; sed nego illam ibi esse per modum rei extensæ, hoc est, eo modo quo paulò antè rem extensam descripsi.

4. Inter merces quas ais te ex navigiolo meo tibi comparasse, duæ mihi videntur adulteratæ. Una est, quod quies sit actio sive renixus quidam; etsi enim res quiescens, & hoc ipso quod quiescat, habeat illum renixum, non ideo ille renixus est quies. Altera est, quod moveri duo corpora sit immediatè separari; sæpe enim ex iis quæ ita separantur unum dicitur moveri, & aliud quiescere, ut in *Art. 25, & 30. partis 2. explicui.*

5. Translatio illa, quam motum voco, non est res minoris entitatis quàm sit figura, nempe est modus in corpore. Vis autem movens potest esse ipsius Dei conservantis tantumdem translationis in materia, quantum à primo creationis momento in ea posuit; vel etiam substantiæ creatæ, ut mentis nostræ; vel cujusvis alterius rei, cui vim dederit corpus movendi. Et quidem illa vis in substantia creata est ejus modus, non autem in Deo; quod quia non ità facilè ab omnibus potest intelligi, nolui de ista re in scriptis meis agere, * nè viderer favere eorum sententiæ qui Deum tanquam animam mundi materiæ unitam considerant.

6. Considero materiam sibi liberè permissam, & nullum aliunde impulsus suscipientem, ut planè quiescentem; illa autem impellitur à Deo, tantumdem motus sive translationis in ea conservante quantum ab initio posuit; neque ista translatio magis violenta est materiæ quàm quies: Quippe nomen violenti non refertur nisi ad nostram voluntatem, quæ vim pati dicitur, cum aliquid sit quod ei repugnat. In natura autem nihil est violentum, sed æquè naturale est corporibus quod se mutuò impellant, vel elidant, quando ità contingit, quàm quod quiescant. Tibi autem puto ea in re parare difficultatem, quod concipias vim quandam in corpore quiescente per quam motui resistit, tanquam si vis illa esset positivum quid, nempe actio quædam, ab ipsa quiete distinctum; cum tamen nihil planè sit à modali entitate diversum.

7. Rectè advertis motum, quatenus est modus corporis, non posse transire ex uno in aliud; sed neque etiam hoc scripsi; quinimo puto motum, quatenus est talis modus, assidue mutari. Alius est enim modus in primo puncto corporis A, quod à primo puncto corporis B separetur, & alius quod separetur à secundo puncto, & alius quod a
tertio,

tertio, &c. Cùm autem dixi tantumdem motûs in materia semper manere, hoc intellexi de vi ejus partes impellente, quæ vis nunc ad unas partes materiæ, nunc ad alias se applicat, juxta leges in *Artic. 45.* & sequentibus partis secundæ propositas. Non itaque opus est ut sis sollicitus de transmigratione quietis ex uno subjecto in aliud, cùm nè quidem motus, quatenus est modus quieti oppositus, ita transmigraret.

8. Quæ addis, nempe tibi videri corpus stupidè & temulentè esse vivum, &c. tanquam suavia considero: & pro libertate quam mihi concedis, hîc semel dicam, nihil magis nos a veritate invenienda revocare, quam si quædam vera esse statuamus, quæ nulla positiva ratio, sed sola voluntas nostra, nobis persuadet, quando scilicet aliquid commentati sive imaginati sumus, & postea nobis Commentum placet; ut tibi, de Angelis corporeis, de umbra Divinæ essentia, & similibus; quale nihil quisquam debet amplecti, quia hoc ipso viam ad veritatem sibi præcludat.

SCHOLIA

In Fragment. RESPONS. R. C.

SECT. 2. Qui autem semel verè perspexit Nihili nullas esse proprietates, atque ideo illud quod vulgò vocatur Spacium vacuum non esse nihil, &c. *Certè si hisce Principiis stetur apud Cartesianos, ut apud ipsum Spinozium inculcatissimum est, Nihili utique nullam esse proprietatem sive affectionem, substantiam esse Incorpoream à Materia distinctam eamque aliquo modo extensam manifestò potest demonstrari: Quemadmodum abundè probavi in Enchiridio Metaphysico, Cap. 6, 7, 8.*

SECT. 3. Certumque est Dei Essentiam debere ubique esse præsentem ut ejus potentia ibi possit se exerere, &c. *Et tamen in suo Responso ad Epistolam meam secundam apertè ait (Instant. 1.) Hoc ubique non admitto, &c. Sed si sententiam, uti spero, mutaverit, gaudeo. Cartesiani interim priori illius sententiæ adhærent, quò eum Nullibismi sui constituent Authorem, ac Nullibistarum Principem.*

SECT. 5. Nè viderer favere eorum sententiæ, qui Deum tanquam Animam Mundi Materiæ unitam considerant. *Si substantiam aliquam creatam, cujus vi Materia Mundana moveretur, agnosceret, nihil indè periculè impendere video, nè videatur Deum tanquam Animam mundi Materiæ unitam considerare, sed potius illud Incommodum à se amoliretur, si substantiam creatam Mundanæ Materiæ motricem, qualem Spiritum Naturæ suppono, vellet admittere. Equidem admodum obscurus est hic locus, nec quid sibi velit heic Cartesius, satis video.*

Responsio

*Responsio ad Fragmentum Cartesii, ex Epistola
Henrici Mori ad Claudium Clerfelier.*

QUOD tantopere tibi placuerunt nuperæ meæ literæ (Vir Clarissime) id profectò nulli earum lepori aut acumini, sed singulari tuæ humanitati imputandum est. Cujus & locupletius adhuc argumentum dedisti, quòd ad me nec rogantem nec expectantem gratissimum illud misisti Epistolæ *Cartesiana* Fragmentum; ultròque nonnullis earum difficultatum quas *Cartesio* proposui, ipse tam benignè tentasti satisfacere. Quòd quidem officium aut hâc aut nullâ possum ratione compensare, nempe si eis omnibus quæ uterque vestrûm scripsistis breviter respondeam.

1. Primò igitur, quantum ad *Cartesiana* illa attinet; De animarum separatarum Angelorûmque sensu, dum omni penitus corpore destituntur, inter nos convenit, neutros nempe habere sensum propriè dictum. Quòd vero Angeli subtilissimis semper corporibus induti fuerint, indicio est, quòd nonnulli ex ipsis propriâ voluntate mali evaserunt. Spiritus autem purè ac perfectè immaterialis nulli labi aut lapsui obnoxius esse videtur; non est enim, cum adeo simplex sit, unde possit tentari stationemque suam deferere.

2. Nullo modo eludi potest instantia mea de eodem numero motu qui nunc majus nunc minus subjectum occupat, ni malè mentem explicaverit suam, aut sententiam à me monitus retrectaverit. Nam motum à corpore in corpus transferri ipse docet disertis verbis, discipulusque ejus ac interpretes * *Henricus Regius* eodem modo transire affirmat ac hæreditas à *Sticho* pervenit ad *Seium*. Nec disparitas illa quicquam huc facit, quòd motus sit tantum modus, spiritus autem substantia, cum utrumque quid reale sit; imo verò causæ nostræ magis favet, cum impossibile sit ut idem numero modus nunc hoc, nunc illud subjectum, subjective partem occupet, idem autem numero spiritus sat commodè possit. Miror igitur infelicitatem *Regiani* ingenii, qui cum eundem numero motum tam liberè à corpore ad corpus vagari passus sit, animam tamen humanam foetulento cadaveri tam inhumaniter incarceraverit, nec exesis sive absumptis Naturæ vinculis foràs evolare permiserit. Quòd ad ideam spatii attinet, illumque toties inculcatum Aphorismum, *Nihili nullam esse Affectionem*, tam fuse & copiosè ad ista respondi in superioribus meis literis ad *Cartesium*, ut planè supervacaneum ducam quicquam hîc adjicere.

3. De Dei etiam, quam vocant, Omnipræsentia nullum superest inter nos dissidium, cum ubique eum esse agnoscat, vimque suam in subjectam materiam exerere; extensionem porrò aliqualem ei competere, sed longè diversam ab ea divisibili ac impenetrabili corpori competit.

4. Nullas ego merces in *Cartesiano* navigio adulteravi; nam quòd conqueritur me ità permiscere ac confundere illum corporis quiescentis renixum cum quiete, ut nullam inter ipsa distinctionem admittam, id contendo optimo jure esse factum. Quid enim est, si non sit quies, quo se corpus quiescens ab abreptione seu translatione, quam ille motum

* *philos. natural. l. 1. c. 5.*

tum vocat, defendit? Est igitur renixus ille nihil aliud nisi ipsissima quies, rem quiescentem conservans in statu quietis; hoc est, res perseverat in eo statu quo est juxta leges Naturæ, donec fortior aliqua causa eum mutaverit. Quod si renixus hic, sive constantia, quietis actio aliqua esset, cum omnis actio corporea sit motus, quietis etiam motus aliquis esset; quod videtur valde rationi absolum. Ego igitur potius suspicor incomparabilem Philosophum aliorum culpâ, qui satis pro imperio omnia agunt, rationem motûs adulterasse, nè videretur, quod superstitiosa Peripateticorum schola pro piaculo ferè habet, telluris motum asserere, dum eam communi omnium Planetarum vortice agnoscit circa Solem circumferri.

Pari etiam facilitate adulteratio illa altera diluitur. Nam cum ipse *Cartesius* motum seu translationem reciprocâ esse statuât, nec tamen eam vim ullam esse vel actionem in corporibus divulsis ac translatis, quid, quæso, potest esse nisi immediata corporum separatio? Quod si motus sit immediata corporum separatio. continuò sequitur, quod moveri duo corpora sit immediatè separari. Quod autem unum ex istis sæpius dicatur quiescere, id profectò gratis dictum est, cum sit impossibile. At verò nisi quiescat terra E F G H, dum corpus A B transfertur ab E versus F, ac C D ab H versus G, terra uno eodémque tempore in contrarias partes movebitur. Unde iterum constat ipsum *Cartesium* genuinam motûs notionem adulterasse. Vide *Part. 2. Art. 30.*

5. Videtur Translatio minus habere entitatis quàm Figura, quoniam hæc est magis absoluta affectio corporis in quo est, illa ad aliud duntaxat relatio. Quod ad vim motricem spectat sive in Deo sive in Mente Divina sive in Anima Mundi cum *Platonicis* statuât; præclare tamen factum est quod tam egregius Philosophus hanc virtutem materiæ ipsi non tribuerit, sed alii alicui subjecto, quod proinde non potest non esse immateriale seu incorporeum. Videbat enim proculdubio Vir perspicacissimus, nisi quis licentiam sibi arriperet quidlibet temerè & precariò affirmandi vel negandi, quod necesse esset agnoscere universam materiam suâ naturâ esse homogeneam, juxta ideam ejus animo nostro obversantem, præsertim cum nulla causa fingi possit ullius in ea diversitatis. Hinc sequitur mundanam materiam totam suâ naturâ aut moveri aut quiescere. Quod si tota per se moveatur, nullius rei esset, nè ad momentum quidem, permanens compages, diffluentibus statim suâ sponte à se invicem particulis, vel potius nunquam in unum coalescentibus; quod abundè satis probavi in Literis meis ad *Cartesium*.

6. Apertè igitur profitetur *Cartesius* se, cum Ficino reliquisque *Platonicis*, materiam sibi liberè permissam, nullumque aliunde impulsus fuscipientem, considerare ut planè quiescentem. Quod verò impulsus hic ipsi non sit violentus, juxta cum illo sentio: non solum quod nomen violenti propriè non referatur nisi ad nostram voluntatem, quæ vim pati dicitur cum aliquid sit quod ei repugnat; sed quod materia quodammodo motu hoc vel impulsu perficiatur. Ne quicquam obstat renixus ille qui fingitur in materia quiescente, cum non propriè actio sit, sed tantum rei quiescentis in sua quiete persistentia, ut ipse innuit hoc in loco *Cartesius*.

Rectè me hîc dicit advertere motum, quatenus est modus corporis, non posse transire ex uno in aliud, neque se ullubi hoc scripsisse. *Regius* verò datâ operâ rem sic explicat ac si error esset aliter sentire, prout suprà monui. Quin & ipsius *Cartesii* verba hunc sensum præ se planissime ferre videntur, *Part. 2. Art. 40.* ubi asserit corpus majorem vim habens ad pergendum alterum corpus secum movere, ac quantum ei dat de suo motu tantundem perdere. Imò verò & vis illa quâ de hîc agit idem mihi videtur atque motus iste. Sed cuilibet Authori sua scripta interpretandi, jus esto.

8. Mea illa *suavia* quæ vocat si miscerentur cum ejus severis, optimum crederem indè factum iri temperamentum. Ego tamen interim venustum *Cartesiani* ingenii rigorem non retrectanter suavior ac deosculor, quamvis hoc sæpius notaverim, nempe eos qui Mathematicam certitudinem in rebus omnibus tam pertinaciter affectant, infelicissime omnium in quibusdam vacilasse. Ea enim argumentandi ratio quæ demonstrationis speciem præ se fert, simul atque deprehensa fit non esse legitima demonstratio, nullius loci argumentum meritò judicatur.

Præterea, in adhibendo allusiones quasdam & similitudines nulla fraus subesse potest, modò meminerimus, res propriis nominibus non appellari, sed tralatitiis, nec materiam sive universum mundi corpus ideo esse umbram, quòd quasi umbram esse divinæ essentiae indigita-verim. Hæc enim allusio non docet corpus ravera esse umbram, sed à Deo pendere ut umbra à corpore. Deinde, ut umbra aliqualem corporis imaginem refert, sed obscurissimam maximèque degenerem; sic in corpore sive materia cæca quædam ac evanida esse Divinæ essentiae vestigia, quæ cum, uti dixi, vita sit perfectissima, ipsa analogia postulat, ut omni prorsus vitæ imagine materia non destituatur. Aliqualem autem vitæ speciem mentitur in eo, quòd dum duo corpora occurrunt, ita motus eorum attemperari possit, ut mutuò quasi monita, alterum de acceleratione motûs, de retardatione alterum, utraque tandem in eundem motûs tenorem conspirent. Eadèmq; est ratio in reliquis translationis legibus. Nam motum illum qui in uno corpore est transire in aliud, ipse vix audet affirmare *Cartesius*.

Quòd verò addit externam aliquam esse vim, sive à Deo sit, sive à substantia aliqua incorporea à Deo creata, quâ materia in motum excitatur, id etiam laudo, cum proculdubio in genere sit verissimum. Quòd si ita rem intellexerit ac si Divina illa vis singula corpora immediate impelleret quæ moventur, magna erit difficultas; frustra enim essent mutui corporum impulsus. Experientiâ autem constat unum corpus alterum impellere, ut videre est in projectis manu lapidibus, globisque ferreis è machina bellica explosis. Quòd si quasdam materiæ partes exuscitet illa vis, alias verò immediate exuscitet, partes illæ divinitus excitatæ alias impulsu suo in motum excitabunt. Cum verò nullus motus transeat ab uno corpore in aliud, manifestum est, unum alterum quasi è fornino expergefacerè, atque hoc pacto expergefacta corpora de loco in locum se suâ vi transferre; quam corporis proprietatem ego tanquam umbram vitæ aliquam ac imaginem considero. Quamobrem tandem liquet cassas nos non captare umbras,

bras, sed quæ usum suum habent, optimèque veritatem illustrant feveriori argumentandi genere demonstrabilem.

Alterum illud *suave* quod spectat, Angelos scilicet corporeos; eorum sanè existentiam testantur sexcentæ amplius non fabulæ, sed verissimæ de Dæmonibus historiæ. Vanos autem illos vagulósque genios corporeos esse oportere, hoc est, vehiculis indui corporeis, ipse mihi videor satis suprà demonstrasse.

Epistola H. M O R I ad V. C.

1. Non omnia se Cartesiana sine delectu amplecti. 2. Ad tria ferè genera revocari quicquid uspiam lapsus est Cartesius. 3. Primi generis exempla. 4. Exempla secundi. 5. Tertii exempla. 6. Cur tantopere sibi indulget lectionem Philosophiæ Cartesianæ; Prima Ratio. 7. Ratio secunda. 8. Tertia Ratio. 9. Quarta. 10. Quinta Ratio. 11. Ratio ultima. 12. Cartesium injustè ab imperito vulgo Atheismi insimulari. 13. Quæ sunt quæ potissimum hujus criminis eum suspectum reddunt. 14. Quòd Existentiam Dei demonstratione perfectissimâ probavit. 15. Quòd in demonstranda Animæ immortalitate tam prope scopum attigit, ut certum sit illum firmiter eam credidisse immortalem. 16. Huic consonare dicta ejus pia ac generosa supremo instanti fato. 17. Multa occurrere in ejus Philosophia quæ Dei existentiam Animæque immortalitatem necessariò inferunt. 18. Tredecim loca in Epistolis eòdem spectantia. 19. Insignem solummodo Naturæ peritiam eum Atheismi reddidisse suspectum. 20. Ridicula quorundam obtrectatio, qui eum tanquam vertiginosum mentisque malè compotem considerant. 21. Inventa ejus maximè paradoxa cum nuperis Philosophorum observationibus arctissime coherere. 22. Quomodo ex Tyconica cæli fluiditate primum suum secundumque Elementum collegit. 23. Quomodo ex Hypothesi Copernicana detexerit Materiam cælestem circa Solem, ad modum Vorticis, circumrotari. 24. Quomodo ex raptu hujus Vorticis Solis Stellarumque generationem intellexerit. 25. Quomodo hinc Luminis ac Colorum intima natura illi enotuerit. 26. Quæ Philosophorum Observationes eum invitaverint ad credendum Terram olim fuisse Solem Stellamve fixam. 27. Enumeratio quarundam Magnetis proprietatum, generalisque ex eis Conclusio; Quòd, si Terra magnes sit, in axe aticujus Vorticis eam olim sitam esse oportuerit. 28. Eadem conclusio particulatim tum è Duritie Terræ Magnetica, 29. Tum è subtilitate particularum & foraminulorum magneticorum illata. 30. Cartesii indoles modesta ac sobria. 31. Nimiùm tamen illum indulgisse suo Genio Mechanico, sed in immensum Reipublice literariæ commodum. 32. Qui nihil sciri posse conqueruntur, non tam opprobrio Philosophiam afficere quàm suam excusare ignaviam. 33. Aliquid sciri posse in rebus naturalibus Cartesium clarè edocuisse. 34. Qui ea quæ ad mentem excolendam inserviunt nihil ad vitam humanam conferre statuunt, apertè profiteri se degere belluinam.

1. **R** E M magnam à me postulas, V. C. nempe ut de Philosophorum Triumviratu hujus seculi maximè insignium sententiam feram. Quorum quidem de duobus nihil planè statuere possum, ut-

pote quos nondum perlegi; nec è re credo fore mea eos unquam perlegere. Miror equidem quòd ex me quæras quid de tertio illo sentiam, cum præclaram illam opinionem quam de eo concepi plus semel publicè testatus sim. Sed dum porrò sciscitaris, quas potissimum ob causas illius Philosophiam tam avidè sim amplexus, uberius Responsi argumentum mihi suppeditat importunior illa interrogatio. Neque enim quæstio est una atque simplex, sed accusatiunculæ cujusdam aculeo præarmata, quasi *Cartesiana* omnia sine delectu admitterem & foverem.

Verùm multò aliter se res habet ac suspicaris. Quamvis enim incomparabilis Philosophus in Inventis suis ac Ratiociniis plerisque omnibus adeò supra humanam sortem felix sit ac ingeniosus ut, quod ubique ferè præstat, id nullibi eum non præstitisse credere cogi videamur; me tamen Natura tam tardo ac hæsitabundo ingenio finxit, ut nullius mortalis autoritas mentis aciem ità potuerit unquam perstringere, ut hoc fascino devinctus eis Theorematis fidem haberem quorum veritas satis solidis argumentis non sit suffulta, multò minùs eis quæ propriis animi sensibus ac rationi repugnant. Itaque breviter dicam; Tantum abest ut tam avidè *Cartesiana* omnia cruda cocta perinde devorem, ut liberè apud te profitendum censuerim, me in illius Scriptis observasse nonnulla quæ nullo pacto deglutire possem. Quæ operæ pretium fore existimo tibi recensere, ut postquam *Cartesium* perlegeris, quod brevi te facturum scribis, judicium tuum experiri possim, an de eisdem Theorematis juxtà mecum sentias.

2. Ad tria causarum genera revocare possumus quicquid uspiam lapsus est *Cartesius*. Nimirum vel ad simplicem nudamve inadvertentiam, qualis in omnes ferè mortales cadere solet: Vel ad nimium sive prudentiæ sive honestæ cujusdam astutiæ studium, cujus haud adeò multi rei sunt: Vel denique ad enormem quandam Mathematicæ certitudinis ac necessitatis in singulis suis conclusionibus affectationem; quò certè perpauci adhuc aspirârunt in rebus naturalibus, nemo prorsus eò usque pervenit, nec fortassis unquam est perventurus.

3. Ad primum genus referri potest modus ille quem explicat Refractionis, *Dioptric.* cap. 2. & ratio sitûs imaginum in Reflexione, *cap.* 6. cum paucis aliis, de quibus forsân mox plura dicemus.

4. Secundi generis duo insignia occurrunt exempla. Primum est, explicatio naturæ Motûs, quem dicit semper esse reciprocum. Quæ quidem notio manifestis contradictionibus mihi semper visa est involvi. Maluit tamen hoc modo obscurare verbis scientiam, quàm non videri minus motûs tribuere terræ quàm aut Copernicus tribuit aut Tycho; imò omnem motum illi adimere, ut majorem gratiam Philosophiæ suæ conciliaret, sibi que melius caveret ab eis hominibus apud quos inveterata consuetudo cæcæque autoritas plus valet quàm luculentissima quævis demonstratio. Manebat enim proculdubio altæ menti infixum durum illud *Galilei* fatum, qui tam liberos circuitus terræ tribuendo circa Solem, libertatem sibi ademit suam, gressûsque proprios intra carceris limites circumscripsit.

Alterum exemplum est de brutis animantibus, quas inanimas Machinas insensatasque Automata esse fingit. Quod lepidum commentum ipsi fuit necesse comminisci, nè brutorum animas pariter ac nostras

ex sua Philosophandi ratione concluderet immortales. Cùm enim firmiter teneret nè vilissimum quidem cogitandi actum cadere in Materiam qualitercunque modificatam, si agnovisset sensum inesse brutis, debuisset etiam concedere substantiam ipsis inesse realiter à materia distinctam, hoc est, animam immortalem. Sensu igitur maluit bruta privare, quàm se finire insensatorum & captiosorum hominum odiosis quæstiunculis de brutorum statu post mortem irretiri & torqueri.

Huic generi accenseri debet quod obiter profert *Princip. part. 3. Art. 2.* de non investigandis finibus earum rerum quas in Naturæ complexu videmus. Quo monito proculdubio sibi præcavit ab importunis illis sciscitationibus quas malè feriat homines urgere possent; de universo genere tam Cometarum quàm Planetarum, uti etiam de Stellis, quas totidem quasi Soles esse ipse planè agnoscit. Admodum enim proclive erat porro interrogare, in quem finem tot Soles creasset Deus, quibûsve lucerent. Et, cùm in Planetis omnibus (utpote qui eandem ferè originem, ab incrustatis scilicet solibus, eundemque productionis modum, habuerint) sit terra, mare, aer, magnetes, aurifodinæ, &c. quærere insuper, annon etiam tum bruta animalia, tum nobiliores illi incolæ, homines, singulis inessent. Transcurrentes denique Planetas hospitiumque sibi in aliquo vortice quærentes, annon credibile sit novorum ipsos Terrarum orbium esse jacta rudimenta. E quibus spinosis quæstionibus facillimè se expedire posse sperabat *Cartesius*, maturè præmonendo tam profundum esse Dei consilium in naturæ operibus, ut summæ sit temeritatis fines eorum investigare. Novit enim homo nasutissimus potiore multò esse ignorantiae simulationem, quàm intempestivæ venditationem scientiæ.

5. Ad tertium genus spectat id quod adhibet ad demonstrandum Rarefactionem & Condensationem fieri ad modum spongiæ: nempe Distantiam, sive spatium, ac corpus idem esse realiter, nec ullam ullubi fingi posse extensionem quæ non sit realis affectio alicujus corporis. Quod fundamentum magnopere *Cartesio* placuit, quoniam certitudine, si fieri potest, plusquam Mathematicâ suum Rarefactionis & Condensationis modum confirmat, ac præterea totam doctrinam de immensis numero ac magnitudine Vorticibus, deque particulis primi elementi in infinitum divis, mirifice suffulcit. Mihi verò Fundamentum illud non arridet ullo modo. Tum quòd rationes illæ quas pro eo adducit *Cartesius* non satis validæ sunt, prout fusè in literis meis probavi; tum quòd innuit Materiam aut per se independentem existere, aut saltem ab omni æternitate simul cum Deo extitisse, necessariò ab ipso productam eique coævam. Quorum prius cum vera Dei notione planè ἀσύντακτον est, posterius durum ac temerarium. Quamvis non sit diffitendum fuisse semper, atque etiamnum esse, qui utramvis opinionem cum Dei Existentiâ cultuque religioso seriò conjungunt.


Porro, ad morbum hunc Mathematicum summæque certitudinis pruriginem reducenda est & illa *Cartesii* de conclusionibus ex Mechanica motûs necessitate, per universam suam Philosophiam, perpetuò deducendis magnifica Pollicitatio. Neque enim putabat Vir sagacissimus se satis securum de certitudine eorum modorum quibus Naturæ

Phænomena fieri asserit, si Divina consilia (quæ variis modis eadem Phænomena exhibere possint) cum Materiæ Motûsque legibus misceantur. Sed ingens hic ardor atque studium deducendi singula ex certa hac atque inevitabili Materiæ lege Motûsque, ejusdem mensurâ in universo Mundo semper permanentis, generosum *Cartesii* ingenium ita effascinauit, ut non rarò præproperè nimis imaginatus sit se id præstitisse, quod tam efflictim ubique præstare desiderat. Omissis aliis, unum duntaxat, sed præfulgidum maximique momenti, producam exemplum, nempe de efformatione particularum striatarum, earundemque motu. Tantum enim abest ut necessariò fiant eo modo quo ille rem explicat, ut valde improbabile videatur, imò forsan impossibile, eas ita efformari, aut formatas ejusmodi legibus moveri.

Intorsionem enim particularum striatarum ex motu globulorum Vorticis per quem transeunt oriri asserit, magisque vel minùs intortas esse pro celeritate motûs globulorum circa axem Vorticis circumvolutorum; Eas nempe quæ longius, magis, quæ verò propriis absunt ab Axe, minùs intorqueri; quemadmodum constat ex **Artic. 90, & 91. tertiæ part. Princip. Philosophiæ*. Sed nulla prorsus videtur Mechanica necessitas ut columellæ illæ triangulares communi vorticis raptu in gyrum vertantur circa proprios axes. Idem enim hîc experiri possemus in qualibet materia, præsertim in rotunda pariter ac longa, positâque in tubo vel canali aliquo Telluris axi parallelo. Hanc enim nemo somniaverit ex raptu terræ in circuitum, circa proprium itidem axem in canali suo gyratum iri. Pari igitur, si non potiori, ratione intelligamus triangulares illas particulas in columnæ formam productas communi Vorticis motu circumagi, nec tamen intorqueri sibi ullos proprios gyros acquirere ex hac circumactione. Nam æquè certum est (idque certitudine prorsus mechanicâ) omnes globulos ab axe vorticis illâ circumrotationis vi repelli, quàm gravia omnia crassaque corpora versus centrum terræ remitti; ita ut omne subterfugium hinc præcludi videatur inania responsa comminiscenti. Quibus addas vel ipsam figuram harum columnarum triangularium magno fore impedimento istis propriis ipsarum gyrationibus quas fingit *Cartesius*. Nam simul ac lentor ille materiæ fati sit induratus ad retinendam hanc formam triangularem, anguli columellarum adeò erunt robusti ob crassitiem suam ut haud facillè siverint se intorqueri. Recto igitur sed celerrimo cursu pergent triangulares hæ columnulæ per spatia illa triangularia sine ulla sui intorsione, modò continuâ ferie spatiorum anguli in eisdem ferè reperiantur lineis.

Quòd si anguli horum spatiorum triangularium in eisdem lineis non reperiantur, sed anguli & latera alternatim se mutuò secant (quod sanè factu facilius videtur, globulis eo situ in formam stabiliorem magisque compactam relabentibus) videamus tandem an hoc modo res feliciùs succederit, exstiteritque ulla Mechanica necessitas ut dictæ columnulæ in formam cochlearem torqueantur. Supponamus igitur materiam primi Elementi transeundo per spatium triangulare *A B C* sibi acquisivisse figuram triangularem, ipsi verò hoc modo formatæ proximè occurrere alterum spatium triangulare *D E F*, angulis suis prioris latera secans, si eo nempe situ committerentur. Profecto

* Vide Transl. Gallic. Et que cest trois canaux sont plus ou moins tournez, à proportion de ce qu'elles passent par des endroits qui sont plus ou moins éloignés de cet esieu, à cause que les parties du second élément tournent plus vite en ces endroits plus éloignés qu'aux autres plus proches.



fectò longè abest ut intorqueantur hæ particulæ eis legibus quibus intorqueri contendit *Cartesius*. Nam tametsi Materia subtilissima simul ac satis lentuerit formam necessariò acquirat triangularem transeundo, putá per ABC; præ teneritudine tamen consistentiæ suæ motûsque celeritate vix incredibile est quin, dum impingit hæc columnula in DE, EF, FD, latera trianguli DEF abradat prorsus, & deperdat omnem illam materiam quæ continetur angulis a Aa, b Bb, c Cc, fiatque indè non triangularis, sed sexangularis, penèque rotunda; unde & contorsionis necessitas illa Mechanica planè periret. Et certe si daremus productos illos angulos columnulæ triangularis allisione illâ non abradi, sed protuberantiâ globulorum, qui succedens triangulare spatium claudunt, inverti duntaxat & intorqueri (quod tamen, ut dixi, ob celeritatem transitûs recénsque formatae particulæ teneritudinem nullo modo est probabile) sequeretur tamen nihilominus rem admodum esse fortuitam quas in partes hæ columnulæ intorqueantur, nempe an secundum ordinem Vorticis GH, an verò contrà. Nam cum globuli ætherei proximè sibi adjacentes sint ejusdem magnitudinis, triangularia illa spatia æqualia erunt æqualitèrque se interfecabunt, ità ut angulus A, dum impingit in latus FD, in ipsum medium lateris necessariò cadat; & sic de reliquis. Unde nulla suppetit ratio quare columnæ illæ triangulares intorqueantur versùs H magis quàm versùs G, & vice versâ: Ac proinde meritò concludi possit, particulas striatas nunc hæc nunc illac in efformatione sua torqueri, nec omnes ab eodem polo venientes in easdem partes esse intortas. Quo quidem pacto everterentur penitùs notissimæ illæ Magnetismi leges, Munnique Phænomena mutarentur. Quamobrem necesse est altiore causam & diviniorem quàm Materiam Motûmque purè Mechanicum ad hoc opus adsciscere, si tam affabrè, tam constanti artificio, inque tam utiles fines destinato, cochlearem in formam columnulæ illæ triangulares sint torquendæ.

Idèmq; statuendum est de cursu & tendentia ipsarum hoc modo jam intortarum. Nam ad certas partes lege certâ pergere supponuntur, quæ tamen Mechanica esse non potest. Ut quando transeunt per Materiam subtilem sideris jam [cortice incrustari incipientis, aut jam ferme incrustati; Nisi hîc vis aliqua eirectrix Mechanicâ di-

divinior striatarum cursum regat ac moderetur, impossibile est quin ab axe sideris latera versus rejiciantur, alterâque extremitate eò porrectâ corticem feriant lineâ ad axem sideris non parallelâ, sed ad angulos ferè rectos eum secanti. Incredibile enim est alteram extremitatem striatarum particularum alteri ut plurimum non præponderare magisve solidam esse. Hoc saltem manifestum est, cum hæ striatæ simul cum sidere circumrotentur, necesse fore ut ab axe recedant, confertimque versùs eas sideris partes quæ propius absunt ab Ecliptica retrudantur; unde maxima vis Magnetismi versùs Telluris Æquatorem, nulla ferè versùs Polos reperiretur. Quòd si minùs pura jam evaserit Elementi primi Materia, contractisque sordibus aliquantulum lentuerit, particulæ striatæ tam longo itinere motum suum perderent, viam sibi findendo per hunc Materiæ lentorem crassiorémque consistentiam.

Sed concedamus rectè hîc omnia intùs peragi ac feliciter, videamus quid fiat de his striatis particulis cum integro impetu exsiluerint foras. Certè mihi credibile non est, si nullam aliam vim haberent moderatricem præter legem purè mechanicam, eas tam prospero exitu reditùque cursus suos repetere posse. Nam ut omittam quàm facile sit particulas Australes in foramina Borealia & Boreales in Australia impingere, illisque impactationibus meatus magneticos (præsertim dum teneri sunt recénsque formati) turpiter deformare; id certè mihi videtur supra omnem Mechanicæ legem positum, quòd factis quasi agminibus tam constanti cursu revertantur à Polo ad Polum, & in liberum ætherem non rectâ profiscantur ut iacta spicula vel sagitta. Mechanicis enim legibus magis consonum esset ut viam sibi perforarent per aerem (etiamsi eum fingeremus aliquanto crassiorém) motumque suum ac vim hisce conatibus impendendo perderent, quàm ut, datâ quasi operâ, reditum molirentur, cursumque ad alterum polum tam longè distantem dirigerent. Nam cum semel è partibus Terræ magneticis in aerem se projecerint, clauduntur protinus aeris partibus omnimodè consimilibus, ut quæ proximè sibi invicem adjacent. Unde manifestum est, nihil corporei in causa esse posse cur hæ particulæ homogeneis undique aeris partibus isthoc modo involutæ hâc potius erumperent quàm illâc, aut quòd reverti mallent quam rectâ viam conficere, vel in sublime ferri; sed subesse altius aliquod Principium & divinius quod errantes revocet, quòdque motus cursusque earum in fines certos & destinatos ubique moderetur & gubernet.

Postremò, ad *κρίνον περισταύαν* hanc five *μικρολογίαν* Mathematicam referre poteris cautum illud ac scrupulosum Principium, viz. Quòd nè tantillo quidem plus minùsve motùs sit in rerum Universitate uno tempore quàm alio. Quod nullis, quod sciam, rationibus defendi potest nisi precariis vel fictis. Cujus generis duæ mihi occurrunt. Prima est, nec Genios nec Animas humanas materiam posse movere, sed motus ejus duntaxat versùs hanc vel illam partem determinare; cum planè gratis dictum sit Essentiam ullam activam ac operativam, qualis ab omnibus æstimatur substantia spiritualis, habere vim coercendi, sistendi ac gubernandi materiam motam, & tamen nè minimam quidem vim unquam

unquam habere posse eandem ullatenus movendi. Altera est, Corpus quod alteri corpori motum imprimit, quantum illi motus imprimit, tantumdem de suo semper perdere, partemque quam perdit eandem numero in alterum corpus transire: quod credo me, si vacaret, ex speculatione Potentiarum, quas vocant, Mechanicarum facillime posse refutare. Sed cum hæc de eodem prorsus, tam numero quam mensurâ, motu in Mundo semper permanente opinio ad quosdam *Cartesii* sequaces magis quam ad ipsum pertineat, illis potius quam ipsi impingenda est hæc temeritatis culpa.

Vides tandem quam non omnes illas dapes quibus tam lautè amicos suos excipit *Cartesius*, promiscuâ ingluvie devoro.

6. Postquam igitur hanc suspicionem dilui, libenter quæstioni responderem, si verba sensumque paululum mutaveris. Utique si mihi non exprobaveris tam avidos Inventorum *Cartesianorum* arctosque amplexus, sed interrogaveris solummodo quare profiteor me tanto cum studio & voluptate Philosophiam evolvere *Cartesianam*. Habeo enim in promptu multa quæ respondere possum.

Primo enim, nullus dubito quin omne id quod appellit ad sensus nostros à Mundo sensibili, (hoc est, ab externis objectis, quæ Phænomena vulgò vocantur, quibusque sensus nostri afficiuntur) nihil omnino sit aliud motus corporeus aliter atque aliter ex magnitudine, figura, situmque partium Materiæ modificatus. Quod manifestò patebit omnes sensus ipsorumque objecta percurrenti.

De tactu palàm est, qui non afficitur nisi alicujus corporis pressione, adfrictione, impactione sive illusione, & similibus. Porro, quòd id quod admovetur corpori nostro videatur molle vel durum, calidum vel frigidum, & id genus aliqua, motui tribuendum esse æquè manifestum est. Saccharum enim, saxa & ferrum attritione confracta & in tenues pulvisculos comminuta mollia fiunt; Aqua verò, ex motus privatione partiumque unione ac quiete in glaciem compacta, dura. Unde constat duritiem consistere in firma unione quiescentium partium, mollitiem in earum disjunctione, modò satis tenues sint, majoremque fore mollitiem si motus tenuitati accesserit; quod fusè, si opus esset, demonstrari posset. Eandem etiam esse rationem de calido & frigido ex eo liquet, quòd motu ad hunc vel illum gradum adsurgente calor excitatur, & remisso illo motus gradu vel diminuitur vel tollitur: Quemadmodum clarè videmus in aqua bulliente super ignem in vase posita. Quin & ipsius ignis naturam in vehementissima particularum agitatione consistere ex eo planè deprehendimus, quòd maximam partem pabuli sui in flammam, quæ vehementi motu agilique vibratione sursum fertur, absumit, ipsosque cineres in minutissimas partes disjungit, unde & ipsi molles aliquatenus evadunt. Pari ratione reliquæ qualitates tactiles ex natura motus explicari possent; sed id iusti voluminis, non unius Epistolii, opus esset.

Cum autem de tactu constet, quòd nihil id sit aliud quam motus corporeus quòd ipsum afficit, securi esse possumus idem contingere in gustu, cum & ipse sit tactus quidam (etiam astipulante * *Aristotele*) * *De Anima*, lib. 2. cap. 9. illiusque perceptiones fiant ex Objecti atque Organi contactu corporeo, varienturque ex variis motus effectis in Objecto. Omnes enim cibi

bi ex aliis atque aliis ignis ministeriis (cujus naturam in vehementiori particularum agitatione consistere modò probatum est) alios atque alios sapes sibi adsciscunt, variisque modis gustum afficiunt. Quod æquè verum est de Medicamentorum tam saporibus quàm viribus. Utraque enim ignis arte (qui, ut sæpius dixi, nihil aliud est quàm motus quidam Materiæ modificatus) augentur, minuuntur, variantur. Est autem & ipse Sol ignis, cujus itidem calore fructus terræ omnes maturitatis gradus subeunt.

Et quod ad odoratum attinet, quamvis non videatur hîc esse idem ille organi Objectique contactus, sensationem tamen motu corporeo fieri ex eo constat, quòd odores vento feruntur ad nares, & subindè divertuntur. Unde palàm est eos esse particulas quasdam aeri innatantes & odoratûs organo impingentes. Quòd adhuc manifestiùs apparet in suffumigationibus, ubi agitatione ignis odores majori copiâ excitantur fortiùsque nares feriunt.

Soni etiam ab aere transeunt, deflectuntur corporum obstaculis, & ab adversis ventis impediuntur. Unde planè suam produnt naturam, indicantque se esse certos quosdam motus per aerem transmissos? Quod etiam planiùs apparet ex ipsorum generatione. Nunquam enim auditur sonus nisi ex aliquorum corporum collisione: Quemadmodum palàm est tam in Animalium vocibus & in pulsandis inflandisque instrumentis Musicis quàm in inconditis quibuscumque strepitibus & fragoribus. Ipsa etiam Echo huic veritati accinit, quæ nihil aliud est nisi sonus à corpore aliquo concavo percussus, sive reflexus. Quid autem, quæso, à corpore reflecti potest quod ipsummet non sit corpus? Sonus igitur nihil aliud est quàm motus quidam aeris, Echo autem nihil præter motûs hujus reverbationem.

Quemadmodum verò ex Echo deprehendimus sonum motum esse quendam corporeum, ita pari ratione concludere possumus id quod ad oculos nostros appellit ab Objectis visibilibus nihil esse aliud præter hujusmodi motum distinctis quibusdam legibus modificatum. Nam species illas visibiles, quas vocant, à corporibus reflecti apud omnes est in confesso. Nihil autem à corpore reverbari posse nisi corpus, jam monuimus ex se fati esse manifestum. Universim igitur verum est, Sensationem nihil esse aliud nisi motûs corporei perceptionem.

Cujus quidem Theorematis (quod obiter moneo) insignis est utilitas ad eos refutandos qui specificas nescio quas somniant Materiæ differentias, finguntque certas particularum congeries, omni figuræ, motûs, soliditatis, sitûsque vi sepositâ, ex sola specifica sua natura immediata & immutabili varia illa Mundi Phænomena sensibus nostris exhibere. Nam planè constat ex prædictis, aliisque id genus quamplurimis quæ adjici possint, tum species hujusmodi materiales omnes subindè mutari, tum sensus nostros non aliter ab ipsis affici quàm per certas figuræ, motûs, magnitudinis, sitûsque leges in ipsis particulis.

Et certè quod ad prius attinet, Nemo qui hujusmodi specificas differentias in Materia fingit, nisi temerè & absque omni ratione philosophari velit, negare potest, quin quæ, sensu judice, maxime discrepant,
specie

specie etiam eadem oporteat differre. Jam vero, quæ major, obsecro, differentia sensibus nostris unquam occurrit, quàm quæ Stellam inter & opacam hanc terram, quam calcamus, intercedit? Quod præclarum esset argumentum demonstrandi eandem numero materiam species quàm maximè oppositas subire, ac proinde materiam nullibi specie differre, si Hypothesis *Cartesiana* de mutatione Stellarum in Planetas nuda Hypothesis non esset, sed agnita veritas. Hoc enim pacto constaret, quodlibet corpus terrestre, quantumvis durum & crassum, ex subtilissima omnium materia (quæ ex ramentis globulorum æthereorum, ubique, uti patet ex uniformi luminis perceptione, homogeneorum, originem duxit) conflatum esse, &, si arte quidem non possit, saltem Naturâ & Temporum Fatorumque serie in easdem minutias deteri posse ac dissolvi. Cæterum ut Hypotheses missas faciamus, succedaneam fanè ac ferme æqualem vim habet solida illa macularum Solis observatio, quæ proculdubio ex subtilissimis illis particulis fiunt ipso æthere tenuioribus. Quin & quæ cominùs conspiciuntur idem testantur, ut crassorum corporum, putà sebi, ceræ, ligni in tenues splendentesque flammæ transmutatio; quemadmodum & graminum herbarumque in sanguinem, carnem, ossa, pellésque bovinas vel ovinas conversio. Gramina enim, si sensus nostros consulamus, ab istis animalium partibus immane quantum differunt, ac proinde, juxta suprâ dictum postulatum, specificè.

Quod verò ad alterum illud spectat, de particulis Materiæ specie distinctis, quasi solâ hâc specificâ virtute Phænomenon varietatem sensibus exhiberent, motu, situ, quiete, figurâ, cæterisque Materiæ modificationibus seclusis, abundè mihi refutatum videtur ex prædictis observationibus, quibus clarè constabat, Omne id quod ad sensus nostros appellit motum esse corporeum aliter atq; aliter ex magnitudine, figura & similibus partium Materiæ affectionibus modificatum. Nec opus est quicquam huc adjicere, postquam animadverteris quàm manifesta hujus veritatis instantia è natura luminis & colorum elucescat. Lumen enim oriri ex motu indè patet, quòd, si vehemens sit aut propinquum, calor sensibilis ipsum comitetur. Colores autem non esse específicas quasdam qualitates, sed motum certis legibus modificatum, constat ex Iride & Prismate; quandoquidem nec in roridis illis nubium guttis, nec in ipso prismate, utpote diaphanis, ullus insit color, sed lumen certis modis refractum reflexumve in istam colorum varietatem degenerat. Quod manifestum est indicium nec ullos específicos colores corporibus opacis inesse, sed lumen ab eorum superficie aliter atque aliter, pro situ exteriorum particularum reflecti, quo mutato colores protinus mutantur: uti constat in ære, ferro, aliisque metallis, quorum superficies colorem mutant aquis corrodentibus vel salinis aeris particulis impetitæ & fodicatæ. Quippe quòd necesse sit, quòd particularum situs saltem, si non figuræ, in superficie æris ferrive hâc insulturâ atque impetu mutantur, globulique ætherei aliter ab ære, putà, nitenti, ab ærugineo aliter reflectantur.

Quamobrem cum tam clarè constet omnia mundi Phænomena, quatenus sensibus nostris pateant, motu perfici, certè ille mihi verissimas Philosophiæ leges observare videtur, qui tam accuratè causas horum Phænomenon & tam profundè scrutatur, ut præcisè nobis enarret quo
situ,

situ, quâ tenuitate, quibûsque particularum figuris motûs illi omnes, qui variè sensus nostros afficiunt, modificantur. Hoc autem stupendum in modum nobis præstitit à me nunquam satîs laudatus *Cartesius*.

7. Præterea, nemo quisquam est qui materiæ motûsque naturam vel mediocriter intellexerit, qui non plane viderit ex eo solo quòd Deus certum motûs gradum (eundem putâ quem in Mundo jam experimur) Materiæ impresserit, quòd varia inde Phænomena sint emerfura. Fieri enim non potest quin ea motûs mensura materiam itâ diffingat & in exiles minutias conterat ut, quanquam quædam dura (id enim ex minori motûs gradu alicubi contingeret) alia tamen mollia, quædam sensui frigida, alia calida, alia planè ignea apparerent. Credôque Deum ex destinato duobus hisce simplicissimis rerum Principiis liberos suos vagosque gyros semper permisisse, quamdiu intra illos limites continerentur qui æquè commodi rerum Naturæ forent, atque si ipsorum impetus diviniori quâdam vi ac lege compescerentur; ut eo magis adblandiretur ingenio humano rerum naturalium contemplatio.

Physicum enim puto esse neminem qui, si mentem propositumque suum probè noverit, non agnoscat se causas rimari effectrices rerum corporeas, easque, si fieri potest, longiori serie deductas, nexûque necessario concatenatas. Quales certe nullæ reperirentur, si naturalibus & in se necessariis motûs corporei legibus Deus, intermediente superiori aliquâ virtute, ubique sedulò obsisteret: Nulliusque causæ efficientis investigatio esse posset nisi immaterialis nobisque minimè omnium intelligibilis: qualis est Peripateticorum forma substantialis, quæ eâdem ferè notione pariter ac nomine per res singulas pervagatur, nihilque nobis indicat præter ignorantiam nostram ac nugacitatem, quos non puderet interroganti de Aqua, Igni, & similibus, quid & unde sint, elatis superciliis respondere, Ignem & Aquam Aquam esse & Ignem, ex eò quòd formæ quædam substantiales, quæ Ignem & Aquam constituunt, e gremio Materiæ in nescio quas Materiæ partes proreperint, eoque pacto duo illa elementa Mundo exhibuerint. Apage frivolas istas ac otiosas nænias, quibus omnis humani ingenii industria consopitur & sufflaminatur, omnisque ejus sagacitas & acumen retunditur & inutile redditur! Non tam torpidum naturalis contemplationis objectum nobis proposuit Deus: sed tantum necessariis Motûs ac Materiæ legibus prudenter permisit quantum ad perscrutandas rerum naturalium causas nos excitare, & inventarum voluptate delinire possit. Adeò ut non sit ubique necesse ad cæcum illud ignaviæ & ignorantiae asylum confugere, *internas scilicet formas substantiales*. Quis enim qui inter Philosophos nomen suum profitetur rogatus de Lunæ phasibus, de eclipsibus utriusque luminaris, si omissis apertis illis ac necessariis Matheseos ac Naturæ rationibus, responderet ea omnia proficisci ex internis Lunæ Solisque principiis formisque essentialibus, quæ faciunt ut certis temporibus Sol juxtâ ac Luna lumine privetur, Lunaque stasis vicibus sub hac vel illa phasi videatur, quis, inquam, est è Philosophorum grege qui tam frigide & jejune respondens non altis cachinnis ab omnibus exciperetur?

Quid autem faceret misellus hic homuncio, si de Planetarum stationibus, directionibus, & retrogradationibus fieret quæstio? Neque enim recipere se potest ad Hypothesin *Ptolemaicam*, utpote quæ manifestissimis

mis scatet contradictionibus, uti omnes jam norunt vel qui primoribus labiis rem Astronomicam delibârunt. Succedat igitur Tychonica, ubi in libero æthere Planetæ omnes gyros suos perficiunt; & rogemus hunc nostrum quid in causa sit, cur Mars, Jupiter, & Saturnus, postquam festinantius perrexerint secundum ordinem Signorum, mox tanquam obtutu tacito defixi derepente subsistant, posteaque, quasi jam in memoriam revocâssent rem aliquam cujus obliti fuerant, inopinatò recurrant. Proculdubio eâdem semper oberraret chordâ, diceretque id fieri ex internis horum Planetarum formis quas ipsis à prima creatione indiderat Deus, omnésque eorum lusus, progressus, regressus & stationes eis naturales esse ex principiis suis constitutivis, quemadmodum motus deorsum lapidi motusque sursum igni connatus est. Præclarum quidem Responsum, talisque Responsoris ignaviâ & inscitiâ nequaquam indignum! Dimisso igitur Nugatore hoc nugacissimo, experiamur quomodo huic quæstioni satisfieri possit ex apertis & confessis Materiæ Motusque legibus, quales Naturæ Artique Mechanicæ planè communes esse meritò statuit *Cartesius*.

Venerem citra ultrâque Solem circuitus suos peragere ex ipsius phasibus constat, eadèmq; ratio est de Mercurio. Martem autem, Jovem & Saturnum circa Solem ferri nemo adhuc dubitavit. Hos igitur quinque Planetas circa Solem ire & redire manifestum est. Quærendum est deinceps an moventur viam sibi secando per materiam ætheris, an motu ipsius ætheris circumvehuntur. Primum autem non fieri ex eo liquet, quòd tam celeres Planetarum transitus materiæ cœlestis resistantia impediret, perderentque pauxillo tempore motum suum fluido ipsum ætheri communicando. Reliquum est igitur ut circumvehantur ipsius ætheris motu, totaque materia cœlestis, cui innatant, vorticis instar circa ipsum Solem torqueatur. Investigemus tandem quid de Terra fiat, quæ proculdubio intra limites hujus vorticis invenitur. Stabitne illa in rapido hoc flumine, an movebitur? Quibus autem uncis, quibus funibus & anchoris in profundo hoc mari detinebitur? Sed fingamus eam vi aliquâ supernaturali & immateriali stabilem & defixam. Deus bone! quantas procellas excitabit hoc contra sanctissimas Naturæ leges Admissum? Cœlestis enim Materia rapidissimi Torrentis instar Telluris faciem tanto insultu impetûque affligeret, ut animalia, arbores, turres, omniâque prorsus ædificia dirueret, secumque abriperet, imò universam terram decorticaret, & saltem ad metallicas usque regiones penitus diffringeret, abruptasque partes, ad modum infandi naufragii, secum in vasto hoc ætheris pelago transportaret. Terram igitur oportet permittere, juxta Naturæ motusque leges, cum reliquis Planetis æthere quietè innatantibus circa Solem circumduci.

Et nè fortè interim de Luna sis sollicitus; cum certum sit eam circa terram perpetuò singulis mensibus, tanquam assiduam illius pedissequam circumcurrere, nec id fieri posse nisi ope vorticis, quemadmodum jam demonstratum est; necesse est ut Luna peculiari vortice circa Tellurem circumferatur. Cujus in medio cum sit ipsa Tellus, omnésque illius poros materia cœlestis, quæ in hunc particularem vorticem torquetur, pervadat, fieri non potest per leges Naturæ quin ipsa Tellus hujus vorticis vi in gyros circa proprium axem rapiatur.

Ut summatim igitur dicam, impossibile est, si motûs corporei leges consulamus, quin Terra diurno illo motu annuôque feratur quibus eam ferri olim docuit Ethnicorum sapientissimus *Pythagoras*, cuiusque doctrinam ante seculum unum & alterum *Nicolaus Copernicus* in lucem revocavit.

Vides ex quàm perspicuis simplicibusque Principiis vel inviti ducimur ad eam Hypothesin (si modo Hypothesis illa dicenda sit quæ reali Naturæ compage necessariò continetur) quâ positâ rationes & causæ non possibiles vel probabiles, sed necessariae & ineluctabiles, omnium ferè Phænomenon quæ Astronomorum ingenia per tam multa secula torserant, manifestò deteguntur. Non enim magis necessariò corpus nostrum in Sole umbram projicit, quàm ex hoc rerum, quod demonstravimus, systemate *Pythagorico*, nota illa Planetarum Phænomena omnia, quæ mox ordine breviter recensebimus, consequuntur.

Cujusmodi sunt, motus Saturni, Jovis, Martis, Mercurii, Veneris in Epicyclis suis; quâ tamen interim suppellectile Sol destituetur.

Quòd dicti illi quinque Planetæ sint directi, stationarii, & retrogradi in Epicyclis suis; cùm tamen Luna in suo Epicyclo nec stationaria videbitur, nec retrograda.

Quòd circuitus Epicyclorum Saturni, Jovis & Martis eam habeant ad motum Solis rationem, ut semper perficiantur eo temporis spatio quod elabatur ab una singulorum conjunctione cum Sole ad alteram; quòdque in singulis istis conjunctionibus cum Sole reperiantur in Apogeis Epicyclorum, Oppositionibus verò in eorundem Perigeis.

Præterea, Periodos Epicycli Saturni celeriores fore quàm Jovis, & Jovis quàm Martis; Martis verò Retrogressiones majores fore quàm Jovis, Jovisque quàm Saturni.

Porrò, quòd Venus ac Mercurius nunquam procul distent à Sole, Centrâque Epicyclorum utriusque Soli videantur. *isòdroma.*

Denique, Nodos Lunæ mobiles fieri, Eclipsesque utriusque Luminaris in aliis atque aliis signis Zodiaci posse contingere. Ut nihil dicam de Phænomenis ex motu Terræ diurno emergentibus; Stellâs nempe Planetâsque omnes, quamvis immensis spatiis & à terra & à se invicem distantes viginti tamen quatuor horarum spatio circa terram ineffabili celeritate impetûque contrario retorqueri.

Quorum Phenomenon omnium, nec non aliorum quorundam, simplex hæc *Pythagoræ* Hypothesis (quam veram esse tam certi esse possumus, quàm quòd folia quæ ab arbore in fluvium decidunt secundo, non adverso, flumine feruntur) tam evidentes & necessarias causas exhibet, ut nemo nisi planè stupidus & delirus de eis possit dubitare, nisi Deum datâ operâ Naturæ leges turbare, cùm non opus sit, fingere velle. Quod quàm sit insulsus figmentum satis supra demonstravimus.

Tandem perspicis, V. C. quàm pulchra sit & apprimè grata humano ingenio hæc philosophandi ex immutabilibus & necessariis Naturæ legibus petita ratio: quo in genere cùm *Cartesius* cæteros mortales infinitis parasangis antecelluerit,

*Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit, & omnes
Præstinxit, stellas exortus uti æthereus Sol,*

Lucret. de
rerum natura,
lib. 3.

minimè mirari debes si aliquantò frequentiore scriptorum ipsius lectionem mihi sdeo indulgere.

8. Ve-

8. Veruntamen quamvis admodum certus sim aliquam multa Naturæ Phænomena ex Mechanicis legibus demonstrari posse; nihil tamen æquè persuasum habeo quàm non omnia, imò nè millesimam quidem eorum partem, eo modo posse explicari. Primò enim, si ex eo solo, quòd Deus ad certum aliquem gradum Materiam agitaverit & in motum civerit, totius Mundi fabrica facta fuerit, plantis brutorumque corporibus, imò & hominum, non exceptis; creatio Universi Benignitati solummodo Divinæ ac Omnipotentia, exclusâ illius Sapientiæ, esset tribuenda. Nisi quis fortè putaret, non minoris esse sapientiæ ex consilio talem Mundi Materiam creâsse quæ ex solis Mechanicæ legibus necessariis in hanc rerum formam pulcherrimam emergeret, quàm aliam aliquam quæ innumeris aberrantium motuum correctionibus & castigationibus indigeret.

Deinde, hæc motuum leges adeò simplices sunt idemque ferè ubique præstantes, ut incredibile prorsus videatur miram hanc rerum varietatem inde posse oriri. Quid enim præstat motus ullubi nisi quòd rectà pergat, aut saltem rectà pergere conetur? quòd pars materiæ ab altera parte reflectatur, aut eam secum auferat, partemque sui motûs ipsi communicet? quòd denique ii varias minutias diffingatur magnitudine, figurâ, situ distinctas? Diffringe igitur, si lubet, corpus quodvis durum, & pistillo in pulverem contunde, mox adhibito microscopio singulos pulvisculos contemplant. Videbis, proculdubio, pulvisculorum figuras à rudum fragmentis nihilo differentes, nisi quòd minores sint; nec primi tertique elementi particulas à pulvisculis hisce differre, nisi quòd ipsis adhuc multò sint minores. I nunc & judica quàm bellæ rerum formæ ex cæcis confusorum horum fragminum concursibus, allisionibus & coalitionibus orientur, quali artificio illa depingent aut papilionum alas aut caudas pavonum. Ut nihil dicam de stupendo Divinæ Mentis consilio in formando internas omnium animalium partes: ubi nihil ineptè admissum est, sed singula tam accuratâ arte perfectâ, ut necesse sit agnoscere Principium aliquod Materia motu corporeo longè sanctius ac divinius huic provinciæ invigilare. Quamvis enim concederemus, (quod tamen ego nullo modo concedam) viliora quædam animalcula hoc modo produci posse; tamen omnes animalium species sic esse productas, nullasque interim à tam cæco & fortuito principio ineptè esse formatas, omnino est impossibile; quemadmodum copiosè demonstravi in Tractatu adversus Atheos.

Quamobrem ex eo, quòd quædam Phænomena exhibere possit simplex Materiæ motus, omnia hoc pacto præstari posse confidere, abjectissima quædam *ύλολατρεία*, i. e. ridicula & superstitiosa quædam Materiæ cæcæ adoratio & cultus, mihi videtur, non legitima philosophandi ratio. Qua de re cùm semper fuerim satîs persuasus, certè ex lectione *Cartesii* jam evasi omnium persuasissimus. Neque enim dubito, quantum ingenium humanum præstare possit ex Mechanicis rerum rationibus, incomparabilem hunc Philosophum præstitisse. Deprehendo tamen eum magnis illis pollicitis de perpetua conclusionum certitudine ex necessariis Mechanicæ legibus deducendam sæpiusculè excidisse, idque in reddenda ratione rudiorum generaliorumque Naturæ Phænomenon; neque enim ultra illos limites adhuc processerat.

cefferat. Quid igitur eum fuisse facturum putemus si tentasset humani corporis vel alijs alicujus Animalis generationem ex eis solis principiis demonstrare?

Sive vacillet igitur *Cartesius*, sive firmiter figat pedem, utrumque sanè mihi per jucundum est Spectaculum. Nam si incedit firmiter, speculationem hoc pacto necessariam purèque naturalem nactus sum. Si titubat, id etiam in lucro pono. Hoc enim non parùm facit ad veritatum Metaphysicarum certitudinem, & ad demonstrationem Essentiae à Materia prorsus distinctæ. Nam si istiusmodi in Mundo inveniuntur Phænomena quorum generatio Materiae leges excedit, necesse est ut introducamus Principium immateriale & incorporeum, quem vulgò Spiritum apellitant. Ad quam vocem quàm exhorrescunt, tanquam pueri ad spectrum, barbati quidam ac grandævi hujus seculi Philosophrafti, nemo est qui ignorat.

9. Sed nequa fiat injuria mirando *Cartesii* ingenio, quamvis omnia per universam illius Philosophiam nexu hoc Mechanico planèque necessario non cohæreant, ità ut unam perpetuam ac congenerem catenam exhibere possint; fatendum est tamen, non paucas hujusmodi inveniri catenulas verè aureas affabrèque factas. Ex quibus omnibus, non nūdis quidem Materiae legibus, sed diviniore aliquà vi coarctatis & ligatis, pulchra sanè satisque firma conclusionum omnium fit concatenatio. Verbi causâ, Quamvis certi esse non possimus ex legibus Mechanicis striatas illas particulas solâ vorticis contorsione formari, quemadmodum jam diximus; facile tamen supponere possumus (nisi *ὑπομαρτία* quadam correpti eousque insanire velimus, ut audacter affirmemus omnia prorsus Universi Phænomena, ne stirpibus quidem, necdum animalibus, ea conditione exemptis, solo motu corporeo fieri) facile, inquam, possumus supponere vim aliquam virtuti illi analogam, quâ animales fœtus (sive matrum in utero, sive in Telluris communis omnium parentis matrice) tam admirabili artificio efformantur, in cœlo juxtâ ac in terra regnare, id est, Divinam Providentiam nullis locis aut spatiis excludi, sed ubique præsto esse paratamque ad attenuatæ subactæque Materiae motus ità moderandos, ut nihil ullubi omitteretur aut fiat quod non cedat aut in utilitatem aut in ornatum Universi: atque ex hac vi (sive Animam, cum *Cartesio* illam appellare mallet, sive Spiritum) ubique & omnibus sedulò prospiciente, effectusque suos præcipuos in subtilissimis & fluidissimis Materiae partibus exhibente, cochleares illas particulas (sine quibus Axis terrestris parallelismus, Tempestatum cardines, Magnes, Navigatio, Gentium commercia stare non possint) maturè fuisse efformatas.

Eviçtâ autem earum efformatione, vel suppositâ, cætera omnia quæ tradit egregius Philosophus, usque ad locupletissimas illas de virtutibus magneticis demonstrationes, mirificè inter se consentiunt. Quamvis nollem vel hic fidem dare Universâ Mechanicâ planè necessitate ubique concatenari, prout supra monui. Sed è contrâ, ut dicam summatim, suspicor potiùs in Phænomenis plerisque omnibus producendis, ubi conspicitur satis magna partium multiformitas conspirans in insignem aliquam utilitatem aut pulchritudinem, rudes Materiae impetus cæcâsque propensiones & tentamina a divina illa virtute semper gubernari ac perfici. Nam quòd ad Halones Iridèsque spectat, & id

id genus reliqua quæ suam habent pulchritudinem, à causis simplicissimis fiunt; nec ea partium varietas, quam diximus, ullo modo in eis reperitur. Multò plus meretur admirationis illa quæ vel oculum vel ardentem lampadem referre videtur, Pavonis pluma. Cujus artificium tot distinctis filis, tot & tam amœnis coloribus, nunc intermissis nunc resumptis, tamque scitè attemperatis ad efformandam diversicolorem illam Ellipsin, consistit; ut tam operosum effectum bruto Materiæ motui vel casui, non consilio, tribuere extremi mihi videatur stuporis aut dementiæ.

Eadem igitur rerum series quæ reperitur apud *Cartesium* tuto agnoscitur potest, sed non eadem ubique hujus seriei connexio. Necessè enim est ut subindè se intermisceat Divina illa Mundi rerumque generandarum Gubernatrix Providentia.

10. Quamvis autem id à *Cartesio* non sit præstitum quod a nullo mortali præstari posse pro certissimo habeo, nempe ut causæ rerum omnium naturalium uno tenore congenerique serie à capite ad calcem deducantur, nullâ aliâ interpositâ vi præter mechanicam illam prorsusque corpoream, cujus effectus cognoscere proculdubio pura putata illa Naturæ scientia habenda est: tamen in immensam Gentis Philosophicæ voluptatem pariter ac commodum hoc saltem accuratè perfecit, ut clarè scilicet intelligamus immediatas causas effectrices, easque congeneres semper puræque corporeas, omnium ferè rerum sensibilibum quas tractat. Quæ certè difficilis est provincia, & quam nulli præter eum susceperere quos non meritò pœniteret eam unquam suscepisse. Perseverantis tandem ob quàm multas gravesque causas tanti facio *Cartesium*.

11. Sed ut nihil te celem, una adhuc mihi superest peculiaris ratio, quæ quamvis forsan aliis admodum paradoxa videri possit, apud me tamen non parùm gratiæ consiliat Philosophiæ *Cartesiana*. Est autem illius cum *Mosaica* Mundi creatione conformitas. Rem miram, inquires, narras. Sed, mihi crede, valde verisimilem. Nam, quod nōsti, *Pythagoram* suam sapientiam à *Judæis* mutatum fuisse constans sustinuit fama. Præterea, extiterunt per singula ferè secula qui operam dabant applicandis nunc his nunc illis Philosophiæ Principiis textui *Mosaico*. Quo autem successu mallet alii judicent, quàm ego. Communibus igitur omnium suffragiis expectandus est illic sensus aliquis Philosophicus; addo, *Mosè* Deoque dignus. Neque enim vilia ac puerilia sanctissimo illo Literæ velamine abscondisse credendum est intimum illum Dei sapientissimi Amicum, sed tam ampla, tam augusta & tam fulgida, ut meritò verendum esset vulgi oculos ea ferre non potuisse. *Mosè* tamen ejusque posteros, Prophetas intelligo & Sacerdotes, cum probatissimis quibusque maximèque cordatis tum suæ tum aliarum gentium hominibus ea liberè communicasse.

Hanc Cabbalam à *Judæis* acceptam, numerisque singulorum dierum opera adumbrantibus involutam, magni fecit *Pythagoras*; nec fivit Arcanum in vulgus emanare, quamvis fortè de eo discipuli ejus symbolicis istis numeris sensum regentibus vel apud imperitos aliquando garrire non recusarent. Nucleum igitur sibi servantes, putaminis fragmina ἀμύττω populo projecerunt; quæ alii risu, stomachatione alii, alii suspicaci quadam veneratione exceperunt; indèque

quàm plurimas numerorum & appellationes & virtutes verè *Pythagoricas* literis mandârunt. Quorsum autem ista omnia? inquires. Bre- viter tibi dicam. Equidem mihi videor horum corticis fragminum ope nucleum ipsum invenisse ac recuperâsse. Dum enim *Mosaica* creationis sensum Philosophicum seriò meditabar, oculis hinc indè, nunc in verissima quælibet, quod judicare potui, Philosophiæ prin- cipia, nunc in Textum ipsum conjectis, revera nulla invenire potui quæ tam examussim *Mosaica* paginæ congruerent quàm illa *Cartesiana*.

Tria ejus Elementa, non numero solum sed & naturis eorum haud obscure indigitatis, ibidem contineriprehendi. Tellurem etiam ob- servavi circa Solem circumvolvi, imò verò eam cum reliquis Planetis ejus esse naturæ tanquam si ipsi olim fuissent Soles. Ex materia de- nique cœlesti Terram, Lunam, cæteraque astra universa generari. Quæ omnia, pro tenui illa, quâ polleo, vocum *Hebraicarum* peritia, in Defensione Cabbalæ meæ Philosophicæ *Mosaico* Textui ita convenire demonstravi, ut nemo sit, modò tam certus esset de Philosophiæ *Car- tesianæ* veritate quàm plures se profitentur de Principiis *Aristotelicis*, quin statim agnoscat me verissimum fidissimūque egisse interpretem. Quòd si postea animadverterit quàm exactè *Pythagoricorum* illorum numerorum & nominibus & virtutibus res illæ congruant, quas singu- lis diebus adjudicavi, novum certè argumentum, neque id levissimum ad Philosophiæ *Cartesianæ* fidem faciendam, se reperisse exultanter gaudebit, mirabiturque operosissimum hoc ingenii humani inventum divino calculo tam clarè esse comprobatum. Ipse tamen hujusmodi demonstrationibus non audeo nimium confidere. Conjecturam ma- lui appellari, nihilque prorsus statui; sed maturis sapientissimorum virorum judiciis rem totam permisi.

12. Quod ad vagos illos susurros ac rumores spectat quos spargi ais de *Cartesio*, quasi de Deo non rectè sentiret, nihil eos moror. Novi enim maximorum ac liberrimorum ingeniorum perpetuum ferè fuisse fatum à semidocto vulgo Atheismi esse suspecta. Nec tamen diffiteor in illius scriptis paucula reperiri quæ vel ab invidis, vel imperitis, in eam partem nimis facile possint torqueri: qualia sunt tria illa præci- pue, viz.

13. Primum, Implicare contradictionem Spatium vel Extensionem dari quæ revera non sit corporea; quo tamen morbido dogmate ip- sas etiam Scholas laborare memini me observâsse.

Alterum, Ex Mechanicis motûs materiæ legibus omnia Naturæ Phænomena esse demonstranda.

Postremum, Fines Phænomenon ab ingenio humano non esse inda- gandos.

Quæ tria tam pravo aspectu subdoloque nictu sese mutuò contu- entur, ac si Deum ac Providentiam è Mundo exturbare seriò conspi- rarent. Sed nihil prorsus ab eorum aut consiliis aut viribus est me- tuendum. Primam enim illam opinionem ipsa satis copiosè ac soli- dè refutâsse mihi videor in Literis meis ad *Cartesium*. Alterius verò, Tractatus mei *adversus Atheos* pars secunda perpetua est & inexpug- nabilis confutatio. Sed aliter respondi atque institui. Dico igitur

* *Señ. 2, 3* 5. eum non ex morbo aliquo Atheistico, sed, prout * supra monui, so- lummodo ex effræni quodam pruritu omnia concludendi certudine planè

planè Mathematicà priores illas duas; ex nimio autem prudentiæ studio opinionem tertiam tenuisse: neque opus esse hisce diutiùs immorari; cum ex * suprà dictis ipse tibi possis plenissimum colligere Responsum. * S. 2, & 3.

14. Quòd porrò addis, quosdam submiffitare, eum causam illam quam suscepit, Existentiæ Dei Animæque immortalitatis demonstrandæ, datâ operâ prodidisse, suspicio est omnium injustissima & contumeliosissima. Nam quod ad Dei existentiam attinet, primum illud argumentum quod adhibet non solum omnium optimum est quæ ratio humana excogitare potest, sed revera absoluta perfectæque demonstratio, & cui maximè confusus est *Cartesius*, prout videre est alicubi in Responsibus suis Metaphysicis. Undè palàm est eum duo illa altera (quæ minùs firmiter concludunt, nec tamen suâ probabilitate carent atque acumine) primo huic, nè solum in campo stare videretur, in pompam potissimum, succenturiâsse.

15. In demonstranda autem Animæ immortalitate vix latum quidem pilum aberravit; cumque tam propè scopum attigerit, nullo modo dubitare possum quin constanter crediderit se revera eum attigisse. Cui confidentiæ vim insuper addidit illud ingenii sui fatum, quo ità addictus erat virtutibus Materiæ Mechanicis contemplandis, ut nihil in ea somniare quidem potuerit præter motum localem, situm figuram & similia: unde securus erat cogitationem toto cælo ab eis differentem alii alicui substantiæ esse tribuendam.

16. Porrò, piæ ac generosæ illæ ad animam suam hortationes ac gratulationes paulò ante ejus exitum, quibus eam monebat de ferendo morbo cum patientia, & de expectando liberationem ex hoc corporis ergastulo cum gaudio, abundè testantur eum seriò de Animæ immortalitate fuisse philosophatum.

17. Quibus omnibus adjici potest tam de Dei existentia quàm de conditione Animæ (nisi illum existere, hanc verò substantiam esse crediderit à Materia planè distinctam) quàm plurima in illius scriptis occurrere (ubi tamen absque omni astu fucove eum agere ipsæ circumstantiæ satis arguunt) quibus ipse sibi pugnare manifestò deprehendatur: Cujusmodi sunt,

1. Materiam ubique unam esse perfectæque homogeneam.

2. Ex eo nos certos esse quòd non fallimur ubi clarè ac distinctè rem percipimus, quòd non fortuitò nati sumus, sed à benignissimo Deo creati.

3. Substantiam esse quæ suâ vi existit, ac proinde Deo ac creaturæ non univocè competere. Materiæ tamen mentique nostræ competere univocè.

4. Cogitationem substantiam intelligentem, Extensionem corpus constituere. Et quemadmodum motus localis, situs, figura sunt modi corporis; ità imaginationem, memoriam, voluntatem esse modos substantiæ cogitantis.

5. Imaginationem esse duplicem, corpoream & incorpoream; illam ope cerebri mentem nostram exerere, hanc absque illius ope.

6. Libero nos pollere arbitrio, in ejusque usu legitimo veram consistere generositatem.

7. Per

7. Per imaginem quandam non magnam fanè, sed tamen in varias partes extensam, Conarióque impressam, objectorum nos visibilium perceptionem habere.

8. Menti nostræ inesse quasdam non à sensibus haustas, sed ipsi planè connatas, notiones communes rerúmque ideas.

9. Denique, quòd alio prorsus modo concipimus magnitudines, figuras; alio dolores, colores, & similia.

Quæ omnia partim cum Dei existentia, partim cum Animæ à corpore distinctione reali tam intimè conjuncta sunt, ut nisi planè deliraverit *Cartesius*, impossibile sit quin utrumque ex animo tenuerit.

Nam quòd ad primum attinet, manifestum est ex lumine Naturæ, simplicibus ejusdem speciei substantiis easdem prorsus genere ac gradu proprietates competere. Quemadmodum igitur certi sumus cuiuslibet circulo cujuscunque magnitudinis easdem ubique esse rationem diametri ad peripheriam; ità easdem esse in qualibet Materiæ particula proprietates securi esse possumus. Quamobrem, si Materia immediate ex sua natura movetur, continuò sequetur, Omnem Materiam, saltem si nullâ vi detinetur, eodem motûs gradu agitari. Unde necesse esset ut Terra reliquique Planetæ liquecerent in materiam subtilitate & fluiditate aeri saltem, si non ætheri, parem; vel potius, ut nunquam in tam crassam consistentiam coaluissent. Palàm est igitur Materiam ex se quiescere, quod & apertè mihi professus est perspicacissimus Philosophus in suis ad me Literis. Unde impossibile est quin animitus agnoscat omnipotentem aliquem Materiæ motorem Deum: Imò & animæ nostræ à corpore realem distinctionem, nisi & omnem prorsus Materiam sentire vellet, quod valdè ridiculum esset, tantòque Philosopho indignum.

Deinde, alterum illud principium tanti facit, ut seriò agnoscat ipsum certitudinis illius, quam credit se habere de omnibus suis naturalium rerum demonstrationibus, præcipuum esse fundamentum; prout videre poteris *Princ. Philos.* Part. 4. Art. 206.

Hæc autem si rectè pensitaveris, modumque scribendi distinctum & sobrium quem adhibet (*Part. 1. Art. 51, 62, 53, 54.*) debite observaveris, non suspicaberis eum Theorema tertium quartumque lusu vel joco, sed bonâ fide descripsisse; præsertim si insuper cogitaveris, minime esse probabile eum Metaphysicæ suæ compendium Philosophiæ principiis præattexere voluisse, nisi sensisset hoc pacto universa uno quasi filo, eoque tenacissimo firmissimoque, cohæsura.

Quinta conclusio planè *Platonica* est, quæ est Philosophia omnium religiosissima. Atque reliquæ quatuor ejusdem ferè generis sunt, clarèque arguunt aliquid Materia longè præstantius longèque divinius in nobis habitare.

18. Plurima huc possim accumulare, quæ passim in Epistolis ejus occurrunt, quorum nonnulla operæ esse pretium duco tibi recensere, ut indè perspicere possis quàm ubique sibi constans unusque sit *Cartesius*. Hujusmodi sunt,

1. Animam videre, non oculos.

2. Animam ex unionem cum corpore quædam bona majora sibi representare quàm revera sunt.

3. Liberum nostrum arbitrium nos Deo quodammodo æquiparare. *Ad Reginam Sueciæ*, Epist. 1.

4. Quòd

4. Quòd minus sit damni vitam perdere quàm usum Rationis, quoniam ipsa Philosophia sola, etiam sine Fidei documentis, spem nobis ingenerat melioris statûs post mortem, facitque ut Anima nostra nihil æquè onerosum fore præfagiat quàm tali corpori alligari quod suam prorsus adimat libertatem.

5. Duo esse voluptatum genera, Unum quod ad Animam solam, alterum ad Hominem, *i. e.* ad animam quatenus corpori unitam, spectat. Has fluxas esse & caducas; illas, quemadmodum ipsa Anima, immortales.

6. Quòd tria potissimùm cognitu necessaria sunt ad beatam vitam; Existentia Dei, Animarum nostrarum immortalitas, & immensitas Universi. *Ad Elizab. Princip. Epist. 6.*

7. Animam, quando datâ operâ cogitat de rebus imaginabilibus pariter ac intelligibilibus, novâ signare cerebrum impressione; eamque respectu animæ actionem esse, non passionem, proprièque hanc dici imaginationem.

8. Providentiam Dei omnia complecti, tam minima quàm maxima. *Ad eandem, Epist. 8.*

9. Amorem duplicem esse, vel Intellectualem, vel Corporeum; hunc propriè passionum esse, illum Animæ etiam à corpore separata competere.

10. Deum esse Spiritum, five Rem cogitantem infinitæ perfectionis, nostramque Animam illius esse quasi sub obscuram quandam imaginem. *Ad D. Chanutum, Epist. 35.*

11. Hominem corpore non intelligere. Mentem enim, etsi impediatur à Corpore, ab illo tamen ad intellectionem rerum immaterialium juvari planè non posse, sed tantummodo impediri. *Ad Hen. Regium, Epist. 81.*

12. In rebus corporeis omnem actionem & passionem in solo motu locali consistere, nomina autem illa ad res immateriales extendi posse, quando aliquod motui analogum in ipsis consideratur; atque ita volitionem in mente Actionem dici posse, intellectionem verò & visionem Passionem. *Ad eundem, Epist. 83.*

13. Perceptionem Universalium ad imaginationem non pertinere, sed ad intellectum solum, qui Ideam ex seipsa singularem ad multa refert. *Ad eundem, Epist. 88.*

Supersunt multa alia quæ huc faciunt tum in Epistolis tum in Tractatu de *Affectibus*; quæ tamen lubens prætereo, ne sim infinitus. Addo duntaxat, nullatenus esse verisimile tam purum & defæcatum ingenium, tantâ modestiâ, humanitate, morumque integritate stipatum, in tam sordidam foveam fœtidumque barathrum incidere potuisse.

19. Nihil igitur restat, quod sciam, ob quod *Cartesius* Atheismi suspectus esse possit, nisi quòd meritò audiat omnium Philosophorum præcellentissimus. Est enim fanaticum quoddam genus hominum, qui quantò quis sapientior sit Naturæque consultior, tantò eum semper autumant ab omni Religione alieniorem: quasi quantò quis imperitior sit & stolidior, tantò magis ad Dei cultum foret idoneus.

Gentes olim *Judaos* statuam quandam asinino capite colere finxerunt, magnòque se hoc pacto sperabant eos opprobrio afficere. Pari equidem

dem contumeliâ mihi videntur illi Deum ipsum onerare, qui imaginantur à nullis eum ritè coli posse nisi Onocephalis. Ignorantiam sanè rerùmque inscitiam nihil necesse est ad cultum divinum adhibere, sed Innocentiam omni nive ac luce candidiorem.

20. Cætera quæ sæpenumero objici scribi magis toleranda sunt, sed non minùs ridicula. Mente utique emotum fuisse incomparabilem Philosophum ac vertigine correptum. Alluisse ineptulos illos credo ad doctrinam de Vorticibus. Præclarum quidem jocum, & *Cartesii* obtrectatoribus dignum! Sed urgent seriò tam inopinata, tam vaga, tamque longè petita commenta in Scriptis ejus reperiri, ut in neminem hominem nisi mente captum possint ullo modo cadere. Ecquis enim est, inquiunt, homo sobrius & consideratus qui unquam suscipere ausit rationem condendi Solem, Stellas, Planetasque demonstrare? quibûsque Materiæ figuris Motibûsque lux singulique colores fiunt particulatim definire? duram hanc denique opacamque Terram, quam calcamus, lucidam aliquando fuisse Stellam apertè statuere? Verùm nihil diffido quin facile evincere possim *Democritum* non insanire, sed populum; nec tam ulli *Cartesii* dementiæ tribuendum esse quòd tam mira Paradoxa invenerit, quàm aliorum socordiæ & stupori quòd in consimiles cogitationes non incidissent.

21. Nihil enim in hisce omnibus excogitavit *Cartesius* nisi quod partim ex obviis quibusdam experimentis, partim ex novis & accuratis tam præsentis quàm proximorum sæculorum observationibus & conclusionibus, sagaci animo admodum proclive esset cogitare. Varii enim tum Philosophi tum Astronomi, tanquam inferioris ordinis Operarii, rudera jam sustulerant, materiàmque præparaverant sublimi huic ingenio verèque Architectonico.

Tycho Planetarum orbes solidos è cœlo deturbaverat, totumque eorum spatium in fluidum reduxerat ætherem. Astronomi & Philosophi nobiliores plerique omnes doctrinam veterem de Telluris motu à Copernico renovatam uno ore comprobaverant, ipsamque Terram (quippe quam non solum circa Solem se gyram, sed etiam, Lunæ instar, Solis lumen, idque in ipsam Lunam, Eclipsibus & Noviluniis reflectentem, deprehenderunt) in Planetarum album communi consensu conscripserant. *Galileus* Solem stellam fixam, stellasque fixas tot Soles esse statuerat, Jovemque quatuor Satellitibus eum circumcursantibus, tanquam tot Lunulis, circumstipatum, Tubo suo optico detexerat. *Scheinerus* immenso volumine Doctrinam de Solis maculis earumque generatione, dissipatione, motuque circa Solem, Solisque circa proprium Axem, plenam perfectamque tradiderat. E Stellis fixis quasdam nunc majores, nunc minores videri, imò novas prorsus apparere aliquando, mox evanescere, multi observaverant. Cometas magnitudine terræ pares, vel majores, in Planetarum regione discurrere ipse iterum Tycho aliique certissimis indiciis demonstraverant. *Gilbertus* denique non solum virtutes Magnetis summâ arte & industriâ explicaverat; sed, quod caput rei est, ipsam Terram ingentem quendam esse Magnetem argumentis evidentissimis confirmaverat.

22. Dispicimus, quæso, jam sedulo quam nec vagas nec longè petitas conclusiones hinc deduxerit *Cartesius*, sed obvias & cum dictis probatissimorum Philosophorum Observationibus arctissime conjunctas. Præcipuum verò Fundamentum ejus Philosophiæ in eo jactum videbimus quod Perigeum Martis phasēque Veneris invito Tychoni extorserant, in cœlorum nempe Fluiditate. Quid enim sit esse fluidum optimè intellexerit *Cartesius*. fierique non posse nisi Materia, vehementi motu per omnes ejus partes pervadente, easque quaquaversum agitante & disjungente, in minutissimas particulas diffingatur: quarum pars maxima (quicquid in eis exstat assiduis agitationibus & allisionibus detricto) non possunt tempore procedente non rotundæ evadere, nec earum triangularia intervalla non longè minutioribus materiæ particulis, rotundarum formatione abrasis, impleri; nec denique ramenta hæc tam commensurata esse triangularibus rotundarum intervallis, quin eorum major sit copia quam quæ ad spatia illa implenda suffecerit, ita ut sphericæ illæ particulæ, quas globulos vocat, huic subtilissimæ omnium materiæ laxius possint innatare.

23. Porro, cum in confesso sit apud omnes Cœlum non solum esse fluidum, sed Tellurem cum Planetis circa Solem in liquido hoc cœlo circumferri, cumque legibus Naturæ * repugnet ut aliter vel Tellus *Vide Sect. 7. vel Planetæ circa Solem ferrentur quam ipso motu Materiæ cœlestis devecti, planè constabat *Cartesio*, ingentem hanc cœlestis Materiæ molem, in qua Planetæ Tellusque inveniuntur, necessario circa Solem in gyrum rapi. Cujus adhuc ulterius indicium esse potuit ipsius Solis circa suum axem circumrotatio; quemadmodum & aquarum vortex festucas & folia suo margine circumvehentium familiare quoddam illius exemplum levèque documentum.

24. Postremò, ex hoc raptu Materiæ cœlestis quem jam fieri deprehendimus circa Solem, ipsum Solem olim fuisse generatum, ab obvio illo plumbi fundæ circumacti experimento, non potuit non moneri. Oportebat igitur eum concludere, solidioribus cœli particulis, globulis nempe æthereis, à centro vorticis recedentibus, subtilissimam materiam, quam aliquantulum redundasse diximus, eorum locum occupavisse, totumque illud implevisse spatium ubi Solem nunc conspiciamus; vel, si malles, spatium illud subtilissimâ hæc materiâ isthoc modo repletum nihil aliud esse nisi eum ipsum quem contuemur Solem. Cum verò observasset tantam affinitatem Soli intercedere cum stellis fixis, ut utrique in se lucem habeant, neutri loco dimoveantur, primum erat facileque opus, ad exemplum *Galilei*, Solem hunc nostrum inter fixas stellas numerare, eundemque productionis modum utrisque pariter attribuere, adeoque universam Mundi visibilis materiam, pro Stellarum numero, in infinitos fere vortices dispescere.

25. Quibus evictis, continuo illi enotuit intima lucis luminisque natura Stellis Solique communis: In eo utique illam consistere, quod globuli cœlestes partim suo, partim materiæ subtilissimæ motu protrusi, versus oculos nostros premerentur. Cujus rei certissimus esse potuit ex eo, quod sensum nihil esse aliud nisi * motus corporei, cer- *Vide Sect. 6. tis legibus modificati & in organum ab objecto transmissi, perceptionem ipsi clarè constabat, aliisque omnibus, nisi qui planè stupent, facile potest constare. Luminis autem naturâ penitus perspectâ, colores

lores ipsi se ultrò prodiderunt. Admodum enim illi proclive erat cogitare, si motus per hos globulos transmissi perceptio sit Lux, variato motu hoc ipsam perceptionem variatum iri. Variatio autem nulla occurrebat tam facilis atque obvia quàm rationum circularis motus globulorum ad rectilineum; seque hac in re probè divinasse ex prismatis expetimento tam solide & ingeniosè demonstravit, ut dubitandi in posterum de hujus Theorematis certitudine nullum prorsus locum reliquerit.

26. Et quod ultimum illud spectat maximùmque omnium paradoxon, Tellurem scilicet hanc, quam pedibus calcamus tractamúsque manibus, Solem aliquando fuisse Stellamve fixam; certè non pauca sunt quæ eum non modo invitaverint, sed ferè coegerint, ità cogitare. Nam etiamnum eam Planetam esse omnes, nisi qui sortè infimi subsellii sint philosophi, audacter profitentur. Satellites autem Jovis non obscurè indigitabant eum adinstar Solis, qui tot Planetis jam cingitur, lucido folio olim regnavisse, quémque fulgentem circumluserant fideles comites hunc luce cassum lapsúmque non deseruisse. Unde non levis eum suspicio occupare poterat, Soles Stellásve fixas in Planetas procedentibus seculis mutari posse.

Modum autem quo id possit fieri facillè intelligebat è maculis Solis, quæ illius faciem aliquando ità obtexerunt, ut calor ejus maturandis frugibus vix suffecerit, pavidique mortales supremum Mundi fatum imminere putaverunt. Cujus tristissimi casus etiam *Virgilius* meminit in *Georgicis*,

*Cùm caput obscurâ nitidum ferrugine tinxit,
Impiâque aternam timuerunt secula noctem.*

Sed & de facto stellas solésve aliquando ità obduci & incrustari maculis ut omni luce priventur, multiplicique cortice indurescant, facillimum illi erat augurari ex stellis illis novis in Cassiopea, Cygno, alibique ex improvísò apparentibus, & evanescentibus denuò post aliquem temporis lapsum. Quibus insuper addas *Pleiadum* unam è septem numero elisam.

Quid autem postea hujusmodi incrustatis opacisque globis accidere posset, ex natura Vorticum, quem callebat perfectissimè pari facilitate conjiciebat. Probè enim novit extinctâ stellâ languere vorticem multúmque debilitari, indèque necesse esse eum spoliari & diripi a vicinis vorticibus ad centrum ejus usque inundantibus, incrustatúmque sidus ab ipsorum fortissimo mox abreptum iri: pro soliditate autem sua vel è raptoris manu elapsurum, vel tam propè ad centrum descensurum ut circa Stellam Solémve vorticis circumcurrere cogatur.

Huic autem conjecturæ fidem faciebant tum Planetæ pro diversa sua soliditate intervallis diversis circa Solem circumrotari, præsertim Jupiter, Saturnus, atque Tellus, (quos olim Soles Stellásve fuisse Lunarum suarum subindicabat satellitium) tum Cometarum discursus in summo Solis nostri vortice oberrantium. In promptu enim illi erat divinare ex cometarum mole ac distantia, eos esse fixas incrustatas, five Planetas itinerantes, certámque sedem in vortice aliquo sibi quærentes, & ad nostram Planetarum regionem descendere tentantes. Quid igitur hîc faceret homo ingenio sagaci pariter ac libero? quomodo

modo se tot adblandientibus & verisimilibus indiciis plectum ab assensu cohiberet?

27. Nec tamen adhuc ad rei apicem pervenimus. E longinquo tantum haecenus eum monebant illa Phænomena, fieri posse quod Planetæ omnes olim fuissent Soles: Cum verò Planetam hunc nostrum (Tellurem intelligo) cominus contemplatus fuerit, eumque Magnetem juxta *Gilberti* doctrinam, revera esse deprehenderit, nec tamen eum esse posse nisi ferreis ferræve durioribus corticibus obvolutum; præcipuam verò Magnetis vim in eo consistere, quod particulae quædam insensibiles tali figurâ fuerint formatæ, ut quæ per unum Magnetis polum intrant per alterum intrare non possint, (quod tum ex mutuo Magnetum repulsu polis eorum cognominibus ad invicem admotis, tum ex Magnetici Vorticis vestigiis in ferri limatura signatis, certò illi liquebat;) dictas porro particulas tam subtiles esse ut lignum, vitrum, aurum, & quodlibet aliud corpus quantumvis solidum penetrarent; cumque de cælo etiam illas defluere Polorum Telluris directio ipsi indicârit, maximam verò illarum vim ac copiam circa cælestium Vorticum axes reperiri, tum formatarum magnitudo, tum formarum ratio persuaserit; formari enim debent ubi Materia elementi primi jam lentorem incipit contrahere ob minorem vorticis motum (quod proculdubio contingit propè axes vorticum, maximèque ver- *Vide Sect. 5.* sùs polos,) formatæ verò, si quando ab axibus vorticum multum divagantur (cum majores sint ac seigniores reliquis primi elementi particulis) versùs vorticum axes iterum retrudi: Cum hæc omnia, inquam, tam clarè perspexerit *Cartesius*, res mira fuisset, nisi non tam plectus quàm coactus apud se agnovisset Tellurem olim in axe aliqujus Vorticis positam fuisse, ibique tanquam in loco omnium maxime opportuno magnetismum suum acquisivisse.

28. Sed ut ad reliqua argumentorum capita recurramus: Etiam major adhuc illi ita concludendi incumbere necessitas, quod universam Mundi aspectabilis materiam, idque summo cum judicio, in tot vortices distinxerat, qui duobus tantummodo elementis constarent, materiâ scilicet subtilissimâ & globulis. Globulos autem nullo modo coalescere posse demonstrabat ipsorum figura & glabrities: Materiam verò subtilissimam id posse facillimè luculenter ostendebant illæ toties in Sole observatæ maculæ. Hujus autem Materiæ tantam copiam, quæ ingentem telluris molem componeret, præterquam in aliqujus Vorticis centro reperiri, ipsi singula ad Naturæ leges expendenti videbatur prorsus impossibile.

Neque enim hujus argumenti vim eludere poterat, fingendo durissimos illos terræ cortices magneticos revera non esse obductos cortices, sed terram interiorem jam esse, fuissetque semper partem materiæ ex se solidam & duram, id est, nondum in minutas particulas ab universo illo motu, qui tentat omnia, diffractam. Quippe huic commento repugnat tum Telluris mora circa Solem, tum ipse magnetismus. Si enim tam solida esset, ex hoc Vortice erumperet protinus, & in alterum injecta ab illo continuo evaderet; & ita in æternum à vortice ad vorticem erraret, nec intraret ullum, nisi *Catonis* lege,

lege, ut statim exiret. Sed neque Magnes ullo modo esse posset. Quomodo enim exiles illæ particulæ magneticæ in tam solido corpore foramina sibi excaverant?

29. Molles igitur aliquando fuisse vel interiores Terræ crustas clarissimè illi constabat, id est, ex minutis quibusdam particulis coaluisse; neque id solum, sed omnium minutissimis. Eam enim particularum magneticarum subtilitatem esse ab experimentis ante oculos factis intelligebat, ut planè deprehenderet nullum corpus particulis quàm primi elementi majoribus coagmentatum, capax esse foraminum tam tenui & delicato artificio efformandorum. Intervalla enim nimis laxa esse, particulas autem ipsas nimis duras, nec satis fortasse latas ut in tortilem illam formam terebrarentur; omnemque materiam crassiori filo ac texturâ consistentem quàm sit illa omnium subtilissima, multò ineptiorem esse ad recipiendum minutissima hæc, & distinctissimo tamen artificio excavanda, foraminula, quàm rudem quercum vel fraxinum ad imagines *Cæsarum* pari spatii angustia quâ in gemmis pretiosissimis insculpi solent. Quo pacto iterum magneticos Terræ cortices ex elementi primi materiâ constare manifestò sibi demonstrabat. Cujus cum tantam copiam quæ terræ condendæ sufficeret extra centra Vorticum invenire non posset, necesse erat ut primam Telluris materiam in ipso alicujus Vorticis axe collocaret, ut hoc modo Planeta Terra, vel Magnes esse posset, postquam Sol vel Stella esse desiisset.

30. Si igitur insaniit *Cartesius*, summa fanè cum ratione eum insaniisse dicendum est. Sed nec eò usque insanivit, ut quicquam amplius ex tam luculentis indicationibus statueret, quàm quòd ita Natura rerum comparata sit, ac si Terra hæc, cujus incolæ sumus, olim fuisset Sol vel Stella fixa. Vides *Cartesii* indolem, quàm cauta ac modesta sit, quàm undequaque solida ac sobria.

31. Sed si nullubi magnopere culpandus sit nobilissimus Philosophus, ob illud potissimum eum reprehendendum censeo, quòd Mathematico suo Genio ac Mechanico in Phænomenis Naturæ explicandis nimium quantum indulserit. Eam tamen interim agnosco summorum Ingeniorum felicitatem, ut vel vitia eorum & errores aliquam virtutis speciem habeant atque fructum. Et profectò mihi planè incredibile videtur, nisi ingentem illam spem concepisset demonstrandi omnia ferè Mundi Phænomena ex necessariis Mechanicæ legibus, eum unquam tot tantæque tentare voluisse, aut tentata potuisse perficere. Jam verò tam prosperè res successit, ut non possim non suspicari eum Antiquorum illam scientiam quæ ad Naturam spectat maxima ex parte restaurasse. Qua in re si rectè me conjectasse judicaverat perspicax & pacifica Posteritas, reliquæ meæ Cabbalæ majorem adjungent fidem. Ubi tamen, uti in parte illa altera Physica, deprehendent paucas me tantummodo sive conclusiones, sive principia rerum Metaphysicarum indigitasse; vastas autem & hiantes interjacere lacunas, & è scriptis *Platonicis* potissimum implendas, aut saltem ab aliquo quem ingenio plusquam *Platonico* fera Fata Mundo exhibuerint; qui Dei rerumque aliarum incorporearum naturas penitiùs rimando, quique status earundem innumeros prorsum retrorsumque spectando, immensòsque illarum circuitus

circuitus metiendo, qui denique tum ex summi Numinis attributis, tum ex propriis immaterialium Ordinum facultatibus omnia pensitando, singulos illos griphos nexûsque, quibus nefarii & maleferiati homines devotos Religionis cultores irretire solent, tam facili operâ solverit, ut nihil in posterum nisi misera quædam animi angustia, nisi despicibilis stoliditas, aut impotens quædam & deplorabilis ad omnia flagitia perpetranda proclivitas, & ex perpetratis futuri supplicii anxia & discrucians formido, obicem mortalibus ponere possit, quò minus præcipua Religionis Fundamenta sincero & inconcusso assensu amplectantur. Quam quidem spem non dissimulasse, sed eis de rebus verba fecisse, quas ipsi fortasse nulla ex parte præstare valemus, agnosco quidem non adeò gloriosum quibusdam videri posse: nihil tamen interim dubito quin sit honestum, ardorem suum ac studium promovendi publicum humani generis commodum obiter monstrasse, & aliquo saltem modo succedentibus sæculis facem prætulisse.

32. Quod ad eos attinet quos ob *Aristotelis* nugas universam Philosophiam vilipendere ais, quique nihil earum rerum de quibus scribunt Philosophi sciri posse secure præsumunt, aut, si scirentur, parùm ad communem vitæ usum conferre, non habeo quicquam quod illis reponam aptius aut accomodatius, quàm quod olim hujusmodi farinæ hominibus regeffit *Scaliger*, *Nullam utique majorem ignavis inscitiam parere solere voluptatem quàm expeditum fastidiosumque contemptum.* Quanquam profectò ea non tam voluptas censenda videtur, quàm consolatio quædam ac lenitio doloris quem capere possint ex sensu damni proprii rerumque optimarum jacturæ. Est enim à Natura nobis omnibus inditum satis magnum sciendi desiderium, nec minimam naturalis conscientiae partem complectitur, nos ad pecudum instar stupidos rerumque ignaros esse non debere; nec tamen ad impossibile vel inutilem scientiam teneri. Unde manifestum est eos qui nihil sciri posse tam stridulâ voce conqueruntur, non tam opprobrio afficere Philosophiæ speculationes, quàm sibi honestum quærere prætextum, seseque excusare quòd luxui, avaritiæ, aut ambitioni totam ferè vitam impendant.

33. Aliquid autem in rebus naturalibus sciri posse tam clarè edocuit *Cartesius*, ut nemo sit qui de eo dubitet quin de Mathematicis demonstrationibus eundem necesse sit dubitare. Imò verò, ut liberius dicam, excusâ hac injuriosâ modestiâ ac sepositâ, si intra communes utriusque Philosophiæ limites nos contineamus, tantundem scivisse *Cartesium* statuere oportet in investigandis Naturæ causis quantum ignoravit *Aristoteles*. Neque enim judicandum est quid in Philosophia fieri possit à severo ac sagaci ingenio, ex eo quod jam præstitum sit ab homine arguto sanè, sed parùm solido, ut qui nè prima quidem veræ Philosophiæ principia invenerat.

34. Sed demus, inquit, *Cartesium* vera illa Principia invenisse, causasque effectrices omnium Phænomenon naturales & immediatas, quas nescivit argutus ille Græculus, in lucem eruisse; quid ista ad vitæ usum faciunt? Si per usum vitæ intelligunt honores, opes, corporisque voluptates, non multum eo facere lubens fateor: interim

tamen contendo, in vera philosophandi ratione reperiri aliquid honoribus multò excelsius, pretiosius opibus, & universis denique corporis voluptatibus suavius longè longèque jucundius. Qui autem quæ ad mentem ornandam, pascendam, & divino quodam gaudio exhilarandam conducunt, ad humanam vitam nihil conferre existimant, næ illi mihi videntur se mentem habere penitus obliti, apartèque profiteri vitam se degere prorsus belluinam.

Vale, V. C. & si fortè fusiùs ac liberiùs quàm par erat apud te de his rebus differui, nimium hoc tibi obsequendi studium ignosce, mèque, prout soles, amare perge.

H. M.



T H E

T H E
I M M O R T A L I T Y
O F T H E
S O U L,

So far forth as it is demonstrable from
the K N O W L E D G E of

N A T U R E,
And the L I G H T of
R E A S O N.

B Y
H E N R Y M O R E, D. D.
Fellow of *Christ's-College* in *Cambridge*.

Pythag.

Πάντα τὸν αἶρα ἔμπλεον εἶναι ψυχῶν, ὃ τέτοιοι δαίμονες τε καὶ ἥρωες νομίζονται.

Cardanus.

*Quid jucundius quàm scire quid simus, quid fuerimus, quid erimus;
atque cum his etiam divina atque suprema illa post obitum Mundi-
que vicissitudines?*

L O N D O N,

Printed by *Joseph Downing* in *Bartholomew-Close* near
West-Smithfield, MDCCXIII.



To the Right Honourable
E D W A R D,
Lord Viscount
C O N W A Y and K I L U L T A.

M Y L O R D,

THough I be not ignorant of your Lordship's averseness from all Addresses of this kind, (whether it be that your Lordship has taken Notice of that usual Vanity of those that dedicate Books, in endeavouring to oblige their Patrons by over-lavish Praises, such as much exceed the worth of the Party they thus unmeasurably commend; or whether it be from a natural Modesty that cannot bear, no not so much as a just representation of your own Virtues and Abilities; or lastly, from a most true Observation, That there are very few Treatises writ which are any thing more than mere Transcriptions or Collections out of other Authors, whose Writings have already been consecrated to the Name and Memory of some worthy Persons long since deceased; so that they do but after a manner rob the dead, to furnish themselves with Presents to offer to the living) Yet notwithstanding this your averseness, or whatever grounds there may be furnished thereof, I could not abstain from making this present Dedication. Not so much, I confess, to gratify your Lordship, (though it be none of the best Compliments) as for mine own satisfaction and content. For I do not take so great pleasure in any thing, as in the sense and conscience of the fineness and suitableness of mine own actions; amongst which I can find none more exactly just and befitting than this; there being many Considerations that give you a peculiar right and title to the Patronage of this present Discourse. For besides your skill in Philosophy and real sense
of

The Epistle Dedicatory.

of Piety, two such Endowments as are rarely to be found together (especially in Persons of high quality) and yet without which, matters of this nature can neither be read with any relish nor easily understood; there are also other things still more peculiar, and which naturally do direct and determine me to the choice I have made. For whether I consider the many civilities from your self and nearest Relations, especially from your noble and virtuous Lady, whom I can never think on but with admiration, nor mention without the highest respect: or whether I recollect with my self the first occasion of busying my thoughts upon this Subject, which was then, when I had the honour and pleasure of reading *Des-Cartes* his *Passions* with your Lordship in the Garden of *Luxenburg*, to pass away the time, (in which Treatise, though there be nothing but what is handsome and witty, yet all did not seem so perfectly solid and satisfactory to me, but that I was forced in some principal things to seek satisfaction from my self:) or lastly, call to mind that pleasant retirement I enjoy'd at *Ragley*, during my abode with you there; my civil treatment from that perfect and unexceptionable pattern of a truly Noble and Christian Matron, the Right Honourable your Mother; the solemnness of the Place, those shady Walks, those Hills and Woods, wherein often having lost the sight of the rest of the World, and the World of me, I found out in that hidden solitude the choicest Theories in the following Discourse: I say, whether I considered all these Circumstances, or any of them, I could not but judge them more than enough to determine my choice to so Worthy a Patron.

Nor could the abovementioned surmises beat me from my design, as not at all reaching the present case. For, as for my part, I am so great a Lover of the Truth, and so small an Admirer of vulgar Eloquence, that neither the preface of any gross Advantage could ever make me stoop so low as to expose my self to the vile infamy or suspicion of turning *Flatterer*, nor yet the tickling sense of applause and vain-glory, to affect the puffy name and title of an *Orator*. So that your Lordship might be secure as touching the First surmise.

And

The Epistle Dedicatory.

And verily for the Second, though I confess I might not be at all averse from making a just and true representation of your Virtues and Accomplishments; yet considering the greatness of them, and the meanness of mine own Rhetorick, I found it not so much as within my power, if I would, to entrench upon your Modesty; and therefore I must leave it to some more able Pen to do you and the World that right whether you will or no.

And lastly, for that scruple concerning the theft or petty sacrilege of several *Plagiaries*, who, as it were, rob the Monuments of the dead to adorn the living; it is the only thing that I can without vanity profess, that what I offer to you is properly my own, that is to say, that the invention, application and management of the Reasons and Arguments comprised in this Book, whether for confutation or confirmation, are the genuine result of my own anxious and thoughtful Mind, no old stuff purloined or borrowed from other Writers. What truth and solidity there is in my Principles and Reasonings were too great a piece of arrogance for me to predetermine. This must be left to the judgments of such free and discerning spirits as your Lordship: With whom if what I have writ may find acceptance, or a favourable censure, it will be the greater obligation and encouragement to,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's humbly devoted Servant,

HENRY MORE.

The

The CONTENTS of the PREFACE.

1. The Title of the Discourse, how it is to be understood.
2. The Author's submission of his whole Treatise to the infallible Rule of sacred Writ.
3. A plain and compendious Demonstration that *Matter* consists of parts *indiscernible*.
4. An Answer to an Objection touching his Demonstration against the Sun's superintendency over the affairs of the Earth.
5. A confirmation of Mr. *Hobbs* his Opinion, That Perception is really one with Corporeal Motion and Reaction, if there be nothing but Matter in the World.
6. An Apology for the Vehicles of *Demons* and Souls separate.
7. As also for his so punctually describing the State of the other life, and so curiously defining the nature of a particular *Spirit*.
8. That his *Elysiums* he describes are not at all *Sensual*, but *Divine*.
9. That he has not made the State of the wicked too easy for them in the other world.
10. That it is not *one universal* Soul that hears, sees, and reasons in every man, demonstrated from the Acts of Memory.
11. Of the *Spirit of Nature*; that it is no obscure Principle, nor unseasonably introduc'd.
12. That he has absolutely demonstrated the Existence thereof.
13. That the admission of that Principle need be no hindrance to the progress of *Mechanick* Philosophy.
14. The great pleasure of that study to pious and rational persons.
15. Of what concernment it would be, if *Des-Cartes* were generally read in all the Universities of Christendom.
16. An excuse of the prolixity of his Preface from his earnest desire of gratifying the publick, without the least offence to any rational or ingenuous Spirit.

THAT the present Treatise may pass more freely and smoothly through the hands of men, without any offence or scruple to the good and pious, or any real exception or probable cavil from those whose Pretensions are greater to Reason than Religion; I shall endeavour in this Preface to prevent them, by bringing here into view, and more fully explaining and clearing, whatever I conceive obnoxious to their mistakes and obloquies.

1. And indeed I cannot be well assured but that the very Title of my Discourse may seem liable to both their dislikes. To the dislike of the one, as being confident of the contrary Conclusion, and therefore secure, That that cannot be demonstrated to be true, which they have long since judg'd not worthy to be reckoned in the rank of things probable; it may be not so much as of things possible. To the dislike of the other, as being already persuaded of the truth of our Conclusion upon other and better grounds: which would not be better, if the natural light of Reason could afford Demonstration in this matter. And therefore they may haply pretend, that so ambitious a Title seems to jostle with the high Prerogative of Christianity, which has brought life and immortality to light.

But of the former I demand, By what Faculty they are made so secure of their being wholly mortal. For unless they will ridiculously conceit themselves

* Book 3.
chap. 14.

selves inspired, whenas they almost as little believe there is either God or Spirit, as that they have in them an Immortal Soul, they must either pretend to the experience of Sense, or the clearness of Reason. The former whereof is impossible; because these bold deniers of the Immortality of the Soul have not yet experienced whether we subsist after Death or no. But if they would have us believe they have thus concluded upon rational grounds; I dare appeal unto them, if they can produce any stronger Reasons for their Cause than what I have * set down for them, and if I have not fully and fundamentally answered them. If they will say, their confidence proceeds from the weak arguings of the adverse party; I answer, it is weakly done of them (their own Arguments being as unconcluding as they can fancy their adversaries) to be so secure, that Truth is on their own part rather than on theirs. But this can touch only such managements of this Cause as they have seen already, and censured. But that is nothing to me, who could never think I stood safe but upon my own legs. Wherefore I shall require them only to peruse what I have written, before they venture to judge thereof; and after they have read, if they will declare that I have not demonstrated the Cause I have undertaken, I think it reasonable and just, that they punctually shew in what part or joint of my Demonstration they discern so weak a coherence, as should embolden them still to dissent from the Conclusion.

But to the other I answer with more modesty and submission, That the Title of my Book doth not necessarily imply any promise of so full and perfect a Demonstration, that nothing can be added for the firmer assurance of the Truth; but only that there may be expected as clear a Proof as Natural Reason will afford us. From which they should rather infer, That I do acknowledge a further and a more palpable evidence comprehended in Christian Religion, and more intelligible and convictive to the generality of the World, who have neither leisure nor inclination to deal with the spinosities and anxieties of humane Reason and Philosophy. But I declined the making use of that Argument at this time; partly because I have a design to speak more fully thereof in my Treatise, Of the * Mystery of Christian Religion, if God so permit; and partly because it was unsuitable to the present Title, which pretends to handle the matter only within the bounds of Natural Light, unassisted and unguided by any miraculous Revelation.

*Book 5.ch.1,
2, & 3. Also
Book 6.ch.11.
sect. 13. and
Book 8.c.17.

2. Which will be a pleasant spectacle to such as have a Genius to these kind of Contemplations, and wholly without danger; they still remembering that it is the voice of Reason and Nature, (which being too subject to corruption, may very well be defectuous or erroneous in some things,) and therefore never trusting their dictates and suggestions, where they clash with the Divine Oracles, they must needs be safe from all seduction: though, I profess, I do not know any thing which I assert in this Treatise that doth disagree with them. But if any, quicker-sighted than my self, do discover any thing not according to that Rule, it may be an occasion of humble thankfulness to God, for that great privilege of our being born under an higher and exacter light: whereby those that are the most perfectly exercis'd therein, are inabled as well to rectify what is perverse, as to supply what is defectuous in the light of Nature; and they have my free leave afore-hand to do both thoroughly all along the ensuing Discourse.

And

And this may serve by way of a more general Defence. But that nothing may be wanting, I shall descend to the making good also of certain Particulars, as many, as it is of any consequence, further to clear and confirm.

3. *In the First Book there occur only these Two that I am aware of. The one concerning the Center of a particular Spirit, whose Idea I have described, and demonstrated possible. The other concerns my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Sun's seeing any thing upon Earth, supposing him merely corporeal. In the making good the former, I have taken the boldness to assert, That Matter consists of parts indiscerpible; understanding by indiscerpible parts, particles that have indeed real extension, but so little, that they cannot have less, and be any thing at all, and therefore cannot be actually divided. Which minute Extension, if you will, you may call Essential (as being such that without that measure of it, the very Being of Matter cannot be conserved,) as the extension of any Matter compounded of these you may, if you please, term Integral; these parts of this compounded Matter being actually and really separable one from another. The Assertion, I confess, cannot but seem paradoxical at first sight, even to the ingenious and judicious. But that there are such indiscerpible particles into which Matter is divisible, viz. such as have Essential extension, and yet have parts utterly inseparable, I shall plainly and compendiously here demonstrate (besides what I have said in the Treatise it self) by this short Syllogism.*

That which is actually divisible so far as actual division any way can be made, is divisible into parts indiscerpible.

But Matter (I mean that Integral or Compound Matter) is actually divisible as far as actual division any way can be made.

It were a folly to go to prove either my Proposition or Assumption, they being both so clear, that no common notion in Euclide is more clear, into which all Mathematical Demonstrations are resolved.

It cannot but be confess'd therefore, That Matter consists of indiscerpible particles, and that Physically and really it is not divisible in infinitum, though the parts that constitute an indiscerpible particle are real, but divisible only intellectually; it being the very essence of whatsoever is, to have Parts or Extension in some measure or other. For, to take away all Extension, is to reduce a thing only to a Mathematical point, which is nothing else but pure Negation or Non-entity; and there being no medium betwixt extended and not-extended, no more than there is betwixt Entity and Non-entity, it is plain, that if a thing be at all, it must be extended. And therefore there is an Essential Extension belonging to these indiscerpible particles of Matter; which was the other Property which was to be demonstrated.

I know unruly Fancy will make mad work here, and clamour against the Conclusion as impossible. For Finite Extension (will she say) must needs have Figure, and Figure extuberancy of parts at such a distance, that we cannot but conceive them still actually divisible. But we answer, That when Matter is once actually divided as far as possibly it can, it is a perfect contradiction it should be divided any further; as it is also that it cannot be divided actually as far as it can actually be divided. And no stronger Demonstration than this against them can be brought against us, by

either Fancy or Reason: and therefore supposing we were but equal in our reasoning, this is enough to give me the day, who only contend for the possibility of the thing. For if I bring but fully as good Demonstration that it is, as the other that it is not, none can deny me but that the thing is possible on my side.

But to answer the above-recited Argument, though they can never answer ours; * I say, those indiscerpible particles of Matter have no Figure at all: As infinite Greatness has no Figure, so infinite Littleness has none also. And a Cube infinitely little, in the exactest sense, is as perfect a contradiction as a Cube infinitely great in the same sense of Infinity; for the Angles would be equal in magnitude to the Hedæ thereof. Besides, wise men are assured of many things that their Fancy cannot but play tricks with them in; as in the Infinity of Duration and of Matter, or at least of Space. Of the truth whereof though they are never so certain, yet if they consider this infinite Matter, Space, or Duration, as divided, suppose, into three equal parts, (all which must needs be infinite, or else the whole will not be so) the middle part of each will seem both finite and infinite; for it is bounded at both ends. But every thing has two handles, as Epictetus notes; and he is a fool that will burn his fingers with the hot handle, when he may hold safe by the other that is more tractable and cool.

4. Concerning my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Sun's being a Spectator of our particular affairs upon Earth, there is only this one Objection, viz. That though the Sun indeed, by reason of his great distance, cannot see any particular thing upon Earth, if he kept always in that ordinary shape in which we should suppose that, if he were devoid of sense, he would do; yet he having life and perception, he may change some part of his Body (as we do our Eye in contracting or dilating the pupil thereof) into so advantageous a Figure, that the Earth may be made to appear to him as big as he pleases.

Though some would be more ready to laugh at, than answer to, so odd a surmise, which supposes the Sun blinking and peering so curiously into our affairs, as through a Telescope; yet because it comes into the way of reasoning, I shall have the patience seriously to return this Reply.

First, That this Objection can pretend to no strength at all, unless the Body of the Sun were Organical, as ours is; whenas he is nothing but fluid Light: so that unless he hath a spiritual Being in him, to which this Light should be but the Vehicle, this arbitrary figuring of his fluid Matter cannot be effected. But to grant that there is any such incorporeal Substance in the Sun, is to yield what I contend for, viz. That there are Immaterial Substances in the World.

But that there is no such Divine Principle in him, whereby he can either see us, or aim at the producing any apparition on the Earth in reference to any one of us, by the activity of that Spirit in him, it is apparent from the scum and spots that lie on him: which is as great an Argument that there is no such Divinity in him as some would attribute to him, (such as Pomponatius, Cardan, Vaninus, and others) as the dung of Owls and Sparrows, that is found on the faces and shoulders of Idols in Temples, are clear evidences that they are but dead Images, no true Deities.

Lastly,

Lastly, Though we should suppose he had a particular sentient and intelligent Spirit in him, yet the consideration of the vast distance of the Earth from him, and the thickness of her Atmosphere, with other disadvantages I have already mentioned in my Treatise, makes it incredible that he should be able to frame his Body into any Figure so exquisite; as will compensate these insuperable difficulties.

5. In my Second Book, the first Exception is concerning the 20th Axiome, which, say they, I have not proved, but only brought in the testimony of Mr. Hobbs for the support thereof; which therefore only enables me to argue with him upon his own Principles, wherein others will hold themselves unconcerned. But I answer, first, that it will concern all his followers as well as himself, so that it is no contemptible victory to demonstrate, against all those so confident Exploders of Immaterial Substances, That their own acknowledged Principles will necessarily infer the Existence of them in the World. But in the next place, it will be hard to produce undeniable Reasons to evince the truth of the above-named Axiome, viz. That Sense and Perception in Matter, supposing nothing but Matter in the World, is really the same with Corporeal Motion and Re-action.

For it is plain in Sensation, there being always external motion from Objects when our Senses are affected. And that inward Cogitation is thus performed, appears from the heat that Thinking casts a man into: Wherefore generally all Cogitation is accompanied with motion corporeal. And if there be nothing but Body or Matter in the World, Cogitation it self is really the same thing with Corporeal Motion.

Moreover, as in Sensation the Corporeal Motion is first, and Perception follows; so it is necessary that universally in all internal Cogitations also certain Corporeal Motions immediately precede those Perceptions, though we did admit that Matter moved it self: For no Sense would thence arise without resistance of something it hit against. Inso-much that the subtlest Matter unresisted or not imprest upon, would be no more capable of Cogitation, than a Wedge of Gold, or Pig of Lead. And therefore if we will but confess (what none but mad men will venture to deny,) that a Pig of Lead, or Wedge of Gold, has not any Thought or Perception at all without some knock or allision proportionable to their bigness and solidity, the subtlest Matter must likewise have none without some proportionable impresson or resistance. Whence it is plain, that always corporeal Re-action or Collision precedes Perception, and that every Perception is a kind of feeling, which lasts so long as this resistance or impress of motion lasts; but that ceasing, is extinguished, the Matter being then as stupid as in a Pig of Lead. And that therefore as in general there is always Corporeal motion where there is Cogitation, so the diversification of this motion and collision causes the diversification of cogitations, and so they run hand in hand perpetually; the one never being introduced without the fore-leading of the other, nor lasting longer than the other lasteth. But as heat is lost, (which implies a considerable motion or agitation of some very subtle Matter,) so our Understanding and Imagination decays, and our Senses themselves fail, as not being able to be moved by the impresson of outward Objects, or as not being in a due degree of liquidity and agility, and therefore in death our Bodies become as senseless as a lump of clay.

All Sensation therefore and Perception is really the same with Motion and Re-action of Matter, if there be nothing but Matter in the world.

And that every piece of Matter must perceive according as it self is moved, whether by it self (if it were possible) or by corporeal impress from other parts, is plain, in that Matter has no subtile rays, or any power or efflux streaming beyond it self, like that which the Schools call species intentionales, nor yet any union more mysterious than the mere Juxtaposition of parts.

For hence it is manifest, that there can be no communication of any impress that one part of the Matter receives, or is affected with from another at a distance, but it must be by jogging or crouding the parts interjacent. So that in every regard corporeal Motion or Re-action, with sufficient tenuity of parts and due duration, will be the adequate cause of all perception, if there be nothing but Matter in the world. This I think may suffice to assure any indifferent man of the truth of this part of Mr. Hobbs his Assertion, if himself could make the other part true, That there is nothing existent in Nature but what is properly corporeal. But out of the former part, which is his own acknowledg'd Principle, I have undeniably demonstrated that there is.

6. The other Exception is against that Opinion I seem to embrace touching the Vehicles of Dæmons and Souls separate, as having herein offended against the Authority of the Schools. And this I profess is all the reason I can imagine that they can have against my Assertion. But they may, if they please, remember that the Schools trespass against a more ancient authority than themselves, that is to say, the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Jewish Doctors, and the Fathers of the Church, who hold, That even the purest Angels have corporeal Vehicles. But it will be hard for the Schools to alledge any ancient Authority for their Opinion. For Aristotle, their great Oracle, is utterly silent in this matter, as not so much as believing the Existence of Dæmons in the world (as Pomponatius and Vaninus his sworn disciples have to their great contentment taken notice of:) and therefore being left to their own dry subtilties, they have made all Intellectual Beings that are not grossly terrestrial, as Man is, purely Immaterial. Whereby they make a very hideous Chasme or gaping breach in the order of things, such as no moderate judgment will ever allow of, and have become very obnoxious to be foil'd by Atheistical wits, who are forward and skilful enough to draw forth the absurd consequences that lie hid in false suppositions, as Vaninus does in this. For he does not foolishly collect from the suppos'd pure Immateriality of Dæmons, that they have no knowledge of particular things upon Earth; such purely Incorporeal Essences being incapable of impression from Corporeal Objects, and therefore have not the Species of any particular thing that is corporeal in their mind. Whence he infers, that all Apparitions, Prophecies, Prodigies, and whatsoever miraculous is recorded in ancient History, is not to be attributed to these, but to the influence of the Stars; and so concludes that there are indeed no such things as Dæmons in the Universe.

By which kind of reasoning also it is easy for the Psychopannychites to support their Opinion of the Sleep of the Soul. For the Soul being utterly rescinded from all that is corporeal, and having no vital union therewith at all,

all, they will be very prone to infer, that it is impossible she should know any thing *ad extra*, if she can so much as dream. For even that power also may seem incompetent to her in such a state, she having such an essential aptitude for vital union with Matter. Of so great consequence is it sometimes to desert the opinion of the Schools, when something more rational, and more safe and useful offers it self unto us.

7. These are the main Objections my First and Second Book seem liable unto. My last I cannot but suspect to be more obnoxious. But the most common Exception I foresee that will be against it is, That I have taken upon me to describe the state of the other World so punctually and particularly, as if I had lately been in it: For over-exquisiteness may seem to smell of art and fraud. And as there is a diffidency many times in us when we hear something that is extremely suitable to our desire, being then most ready to think it too good to be true; so also in Notions that seem over-accurately fitted to our Intellectual faculties, and agree the most naturally therewith, we are prone many times to suspect them to be too easy to be true; especially in things that seemed at first to us very obscure and intricate. For which cause also it is very likely that the Notion of a particular Spirit, which I have so accurately describ'd in my First Book, * may seem the less credible to some, because it is now made so clearly intelligible, they thinking it utterly impossible that these things, that have been held always such inextricable perplexities, should be thus of a sudden made manifest and familiar to any that has but a competency of Patience and Reason to peruse the Theory. *Chap. 5. 6. 7.

But for my own part, I shall not assume so much to my self, as peremptorily to affirm, that the Indiscernibility of a Spirit arises that way that I have set down, that is to say, that God has made a particular Spirit just in that manner that I have delineated. For his Wisdom is infinite, and therefore it were an impious piece of boldness to confine him to one certain way of framing the nature of a Being, that is, of endowing it with such Attributes as are essential to it, as Indiscernibility is to the Soul of Man. But only to have said in general, It is possible there may be a particular Essence of its immediate nature penetrable and indiscernible, and not particularly to have described the manner how it may be so; might have seemed to many more slight and unsatisfactory, Deceit in lurking in Universals, as the Proverb has it. And therefore, for the more fully convincing of the adverse Party, I thought fit to pitch upon a punctual description of some one way, how the Soul of Man, or of a Demon, may be conceiv'd necessarily indiscernible, though dilatable; not being very solicitous whether it be just that way or no; but yet well assur'd that it is either that way, or some better. But this one way shews the thing possible at large: (As that mean contrivance of an Indian Canoa might prove the possibility of Navigation.) And that is all that I was to aim at in that place; saving that I had also a Zeal for the credit of the Platonists, whose imaginative presages I have often observed to hold a faithful compliance with the severest Reason. And I think I have here demonstrated, that their Fancy is not at all irrational in so usually comparing Form or Spirit to the radiant Light.

So in my description of the state of the other world, I am not very solicitous whether things be just so as I have set them down: but because

some men utterly misbelieve the thing, because they can frame no particular conceit what the Receptions and Entertainments of those Aerial Inhabitants may be, or how they pass away their time; with many other intricacies which use to entangle this Theory; I thought it of main concernment to take away this Objection against the Life to come, (viz. That no man can conceive what it is, and therefore it is not at all, which is the ordinary Exception also against the Existence of all Incorporeal Substances) by a punctual and rational Description of this future state. Which I exhibit to the world as an intelligible Hypothesis, and such as may very well be, even according to the dictates of our own Faculties, being in the mean time fully assur'd, that things are either thus, or after a better or more exact order. But, as I said, to propound some particular probable way, I thought it of no small Service to those who totally distrust all these things for that reason mainly, as being such as we can make no rational representation of to the Understandings of men.

8. *But there are also particular Objections. The first whereof is against our Aerial and Aethereal Elysiums, which forsooth, to make their reproach more witty, they will parallel with the Mahometan Paradise. But besides that I do, in the very place where I treat of these things, suspend my assent after the description of them, there is nothing there offered in their description, but if it were assented to, might become the most refin'd spirit in the World. For there is nothing more certain, than That the Love of God and our Neighbour is the greatest Happiness that we can arrive unto, either in this life, or that which is to come. And whatever things are there described, are either the Causes, Effects, or Concomitants of that noble and divine Passion. Neither are the External incitements thereto, which I there mention, rightly to be deem'd Sensual, but Intellectual: For even such is also sensible Beauty, whether it shew it self in Feature, Musick, or whatever graceful Deportments and comely Actions, as Plotinus has well defin'd. And those things that are not properly Intellectual, suppose Odours, and Sappours, yet such a Spirit may be transfus'd into the Vehicles of these Aerial Inhabitants thereby, that may more than ordinarily raise into act their Intellectual Faculties. Which he that observes how our Thoughts and Inclinations depend immediately on a certain subtile Matter in our Bodies, will not at all stick to acknowledge to be true. And therefore whatever our Elysiums seem to the rash and injudicious, they are really no other thing than pure Paradises of Intellectual pleasure; Divine Love, and blameless Friendship being the only delight of those places.*

9. *The next Objection is concerning the state of the Wicked, as if I had made their condition too easy for them. But this methinks any man might be kept off from, if he would but consider, that I make the rack of Conscience worse than a perpetually-repeated death. Which is too-too credible to come to pass there, whenas we find what execution Passions will do upon us even in this life; the Sicilian Tyrants having not found out a more exquisite torture than they. And as for those Souls that have lost the sense of Conscience, if any can do so, I have allotted other Punishments that are more corporeal, and little inferiour to the fire of that great Hell that is prophes'd of, as the Portion of the Devils and the damned at the last Day. By which neither then nor before*
could

could they be tortur'd (if we appeal to humane Reason, whom alone we appeal to, as judge, in this Treatise) if they were not vitally united with corporeal Vehicles.

10. The two last Exceptions are, the one touching the Soul of the World, the other the Spirit of Nature. The first is against our over-favourable representation of their Opinion that make but one Soul in the whole Universe, induing her with Sense, Reason, and Understanding: which Soul they will have to act in all Animals, Dæmons themselves not excepted. In all which, say they, it is One and the same Universal Soul that Hears, Sees, Reasons, Understands, &c. This Opinion I think I have * confuted in this Third Book, as sufficiently as any one * Book 3. Error can be confuted in all Natural Philosophy. And that favourable chap. 16. representation I have * made there of it, has that in it, whereby, unless * Chap. 16. a man be very remiss and mindless, he may easily demonstrate the sect. 4. falseness of the Supposition. For though we may well enough imagine how, the Body being unchanged, and this Soul of the Universe exquisitely the same every where, that though the party change place, and shift into another part of the Soul of the World, he may retain the same Opinions, Imaginations, and Reasonings, so far forth as they depend not on Memory (this Universal Soul raising her self into the same Thoughts upon the same Occasions;) yet Memory is incompatible unto that part which has not had the Perception before of what is remembered. For there is necessarily comprehended in Memory a Sense or Perception that we have had a Perception or Sense afore of the thing which we conceive our selves to remember.

To be short therefore, and to strike this Opinion dead at one stroke; They that say there is but one Soul of the World, whose perceptive Power is every where, they must assert, that what one part thereof perceives, all the rest perceives; or else that perceptions in Dæmons, Men and Brutes are confin'd to that part of this Soul that is in them, while they perceive this or that. If the former, they are confutable by Sense and Experience. For though all Animals lie steep'd, as it were, in that subtle Matter which runs through all things, and is the immediate Instrument of Sense and Perception; yet we are not conscious of one anothers thoughts, nor feel one anothers pains, nor the pains and pleasures of Brutes, when they are in them at the highest. Nor yet do the Dæmons feel one anothers affections, or necessarily assent to one anothers opinions, though their Vehicles be exceeding pervious; else they would be all Avenroists, as well as those that appear'd to Facius Cardanus, supposing any were. Wherefore we may generally conclude, that if there were such an Universal Soul, yet the particular perceptions thereof are restrained to this or that part in which they are made: which is contrary to the Unity of a Soul, as I have already said in its due place.

Book 3. chap.
16. sect. 2.

But let us grant the thing (for indeed we have demonstrated it to be so, if there be such an Universal Soul, and none but it) then the grand Absurdity comes in, which I was intimating before, to wit, That that part of the Soul of the World that never perceived a thing, shall notwithstanding remember it, that is to say, that it shall perceive it has perceived that which it never perceiv'd: And yet one at Japan may remember a countryman arriv'd thither that he had not seen nor thought of for
twenty

twenty Years before. Nay, which is more to the purpose, supposing the Earth move, what I write now, the Earth being in the beginning of Aries, I shall remember that I have written when she is in the beginning of Libra, though that part of the Soul of the World that possesses my Body then, will be twice as distant from what does guide my hand to write now, as the Earth is from the Sun.

Nor can the plainness of this Demonstration be eluded by any Evasion whatsoever. For First, if we should admit that there be certain Marks sealed in the Brain upon the seeing or considering this or that Object, whereby the Soul would impress the Memory thereof upon her more deeply; the virtue of remembering by this would be in that she had once joined such a Thought or Representation with such an Impress or Mark, otherwise it would avail nothing. Wherefore the Soul of the World, in B suppose, not having join'd such a Representation with this Mark in the Brain as she did in A, can remember nothing thereby. For it is utterly unconceivable how any Figuration or Motion whatsoever in the Brain can represent to the Soul a Perception as perceiv'd heretofore, if the Soul herself has heretofore had no such Perception. For there can be no Basis of this reflexive and comparative Act, but the foregoing Perception of which the Soul is still conscious: Of which she cannot be conscious, if she never perceiv'd it. Whence it is plain, that these suppos'd Marks have not a capacity in them to impose upon the Soul of the World in B, so as to make her conceit she had a Perception of a thing, when indeed she never had.

*Book 2. ch. 5.
lect. 7. also
ch. 11. lect.
4, 5, 6.

But then again, in the Second place, it is very evident, That the power of Memory does not consist in such Marks or Figures in the Brain, nor in any Vibration or Motion there, as I have sufficiently proved in the following * Discourse. Which further assures us, That Memory is wholly in the Soul herself, and that she is the Repository of all the Perceptions she has had; and that therefore the Soul of the World cannot perceive her self to have perceived a thing when she has not perceiv'd it.

And Thirdly and Lastly, It is hence also manifest, (I mean from Memory, being seated only in the Soul herself, she acting in this, as in all other functions, only by virtue of a fit tenour of Spirits, and due temper of Brain) That the Body changing place from A to B, that part of the Soul of the World in it at B will have the remembrance of such things as were never perceiv'd in A, and forget, or rather have no knowledge of what the Soul perceiv'd there; and that therefore by changing place a man may chance to become in a moment an excellent Physician, Mathematician, or the like, or of a sudden become a Sot, and lose all his learning; which is the likelier of the two: For the Fruits of that Meditation and Study are lost, when once the Body has left that part of the Soul of the World which did thus study and meditate. So impossible is it that every man should not have a particular Soul of his own.

Nor can this Error in the Soul of the World, of perceiving she has perceived when she has not, be argued possible in her from the adherence of that perpetual deem'd mistake in our Outward Senses; as that we feel a pain, suppose in our finger, or white upon the wall; whenas there is neither white in the one, nor pain in the other, but only in our Common Per-

Percipient which is confined within our Brain. For it is apparent if this be an Error, yet there is a plain and necessary Foundation thereof.

For as when we thrust a Cane against the ground, we necessarily feel different feelings; one when against Gravel, another against Stone, and a third against Mud or Earth, and feel them also at the distance of the Cane: So also is it in Colours; the Medium betwixt the Object and the Eye being as the Cane, and the variety of feelings at the end of the Cane like that variety of Colours; of which there is a necessary causality in the variety of the Surfaces of the Objects; which the Common Percipient must needs perceive, and at such a distance as the Medium engages, as it was before in the length of the Cane. So that to perceive such differences at that distance they are, and where they do causally exist, is not so much an Error as a Truth. And there is the same reason in ticklings or prickings in any part of the Body: For it is true that those differences are also causally there; and therefore our Perception is rightly carried thither: For there is there that harshness and dis-harmony to Nature, which the Soul cannot perceive but with an harsh and painful perception, not only by reason of her interest and vital union with the Body, but also from the special nature of the Perception it self.

So that it seems to me an hard Censure to say the Soul does mistake in these Perceptions: and if she do in some sort, yet we can trace the necessary and determinate Cause, and that both very palpable and very intelligible. But for this Error of the Soul of the World perceiving, suppose in B, that she has perceived what notwithstanding she never perceiv'd, it is a thing quite of another kind, and an entire and undoubted mistake, of which no imaginable Cause can be produced that should lead her into it. Whence it follows, that she never commits it; and that therefore the reflexive Act of Memory, which does firmly assure us of a foregoing Perception, (no other Faculty having any power or pretence to evidence the contrary,) does necessarily infer, That every man has a particular Soul of his own, and that such an Universal Soul, as the Avenroists fancy, will not salve all Phænomena.

And yet I dare say, this wild Opinion is more tenable than theirs that make nothing but mere Matter in the world. But I thought it worth the while with all diligence to confute them both; the better of them being but a more refined kind of Atheism, tending to the subversion of all the Fundamentals of Religion and Piety amongst men.

II. As for the Spirit of Nature, the greatest exceptions are, That I have introduc'd an obscure Principle for Ignorance and Sloth to take sanctuary in, and so to enervate or foreslack the useful endeavours of curious Wits, and hinder that expected progress that may be made in the Mechanick Philosophy; and this, to aggravate the crime, before a competent search be made what the Mechanical powers of Matter can do. For what Mechanical solutions the present or foregoing Ages could not light upon, the succeeding may; and therefore it is as yet unseasonable to bring in any such Principle into Natural Philosophy.

To which I answer, That the Principle we speak of is neither obscure nor unseasonable; nor so much introduc'd by me, as forced upon me by inevitable evidence of Reason. That it is no obscure Principle, the clear Description I have given of it in my Treatise will make good. Against which

* See Antid.
Book 2. ch. 10.
lect. 12.

which I know no imaginable exception, unless it may seem harsh to any one that a Substance devoid of all sense and perception, and therefore incapable of premeditated contrivance, should be suppos'd fit to form the Matter into such exquisite organization. But this can appear no difficulty to him that duly considers that what Phantasme is to our Soul, that Fabrick is to the Spirit of Nature: and that as the * tenour of our Spirits, (which are but subtile Matter) will cause the Soul immediately to exert it self into this or that Imagination, no knowledge or premeditation interceding; so such or such a preparation or predisposition of the Matter of the World, will cause the Spirit of Nature to fall upon this or that kind of Fabrication or Organization, no perception or consultation being interposed.

Those that pretend that the introduction of this Principle is unseasonable, I demand of them when they will think it to be seasonable. For this simple surmise, That although all the Mechanical solutions of some Phænomena which have been hitherto offer'd to the world be demonstrably false, yet future Ages may light upon what is true; can be held nothing else by the judicious, but a pitiful subterfuge of fearful Souls, that are very loath to let in any such affrightful Notion as an Immaterial or Spiritual Substance into the world, for fear the next step must be the acknowledgment of a God; from whom they would fain hide themselves by this poor and precarious pretence. But I say, if the introduction of this Principle be not seasonable now, it will never be seasonable. For that admirable Master of Mechanics, Des-Cartes, has improved this way to the highest, I dare say, the Wit of man can reach to, in such Phænomena as he has attempted to render the Causes of. But how in sundry passages he falls short in his account, I have both in the forenamed and following Chapter, as also elsewhere, taken notice. I will instance here only in the Phænomenon of Gravity, wherein I think I have perfectly demonstrated that both He and Mr. Hobbs are quite out of the story, and that the Causes they assign are plainly false. And that I have not mentioned the Opinions of others in this way, it was only because I look'd upon them as less considerable.

12. But you'll say, that though these be all mistaken, yet it does not follow but that there may arise some happy Wit that will give a true Mechanical solution of this Probleme. But I answer, That I have not only confuted their Reasons, but also from Mechanical principles granted on all sides, and confirm'd by Experience, demonstrated that the Descent (suppose) of a Stone, or Bullet, or any such like heavy Body, is enormously contrary to the Laws of Mechanics; and that according to them they would necessarily, if they lie loose, recede from the Earth, and be carry'd away out of our sight into the farthest parts of the Air, if some Power more than Mechanical did not curb that Motion, and force them downwards towards the Earth. So that it is plain that we have not arbitrarily introduc'd a Principle, but that it is forced upon us by the undeniable evidence of Demonstration. From which to suspend our assent till future Ages have improved this Mechanical Philosophy to greater height, is as ridiculous, as to doubt of the truth of any one plain and easy Demonstration in the first Book of Euclide, till we have travelled through the whole field of that immense study of Mathematicks.

13. Nor

13. Nor lastly needs the acknowledgment of this Principle to damp our endeavours in the search of the Mechanical causes of the Phænomena of Nature, but rather make us more circumspect to distinguish what is the result of the mere Mechanical powers of Matter and Motion, and what of an Higher Principle. For questionless this secure presumption in some, That there is nothing but Matter in the world, has embolden'd them too rashly to venture on Mechanical solutions where they would not hold, because they were confident there were no other solutions to be had but those of this kind.

14. Besides that, to the Rational and Religious there is a double Pleasure to carry them on in this way of Philosophy: The one from the observation how far in every thing the concatenation of Mechanical causes will reach; which will wonderfully gratify their Reason: the other from the distinct apprehension where they must needs break off, as not being able alone to reach the Effect; which necessarily leads them to a more confirmed discovery of the Principle we contend for; namely, the Spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon the Matter, * and the first step to the abstrusest Mysteries in Natural Theology; which must needs highly gratify them in point of Religion.

15. And truly for this very cause, I think it is the most sober and faithful advice that can be offered to the Christian World, * that they would encourage the reading of Des-Cartes in all publick Schools or Universities: That the Students of Philosophy may be thoroughly exercis'd in the just extent of the Mechanical powers of Matter, how far they will reach, and where they fall short. Which will be the best assistance to Religion that Reason and the Knowledge of Nature can afford. For by this means such as are intended to serve the Church will be armed betimes with sufficient strength to grapple with their proudest Deriders or Opposers. Whenas for want of it, we see how liable they are to be contemned and born down by every bold, though weak, pretender to the Mechanick Philosophy.

16. These are the main Passages I could any way conceive might be excepted against in the ensuing Discourse: which yet are so innocent and firm in themselves, and so advantageously circumstantiated in the places where they are found, that I fear the Reader may suspect my judgment and discretion in putting my self to the trouble of writing, and him of reading, so long and needless a Preface. Which oversight, though it be an argument of no great Wit, yet it may be of much Humanity, and of an earnest desire of doing a publick good without the least offence or dissatisfaction to any that are but tolerable Retainers to Reason and Ingenuity. But for those that have bid adieu to both, and measure all Truths by their own humourfome fancy, making every thing ridiculous that is not suitable to their own ignorant conceptions; I think no serious man will hold himself bound to take notice of their perverse constructions and misrepresentation of things, more than a religious Eremitic or devout Pilgrim, to heed the ugly mows and grimaces of Apes and Monkies, he may haply meet with in his wearisome passage through the Wilderneys.

N O T E S

U P O N T H E

Immortality of the SOUL.

On the P R E F A C E, Sect. 3.

I Say those indiscerpible Particles of Matter have no Figure at all: As infinite Greatness hath no figure, so, &c. Against this place four things are objected. *First*, That even infinite Littleness, seeing it is extended, and yet not *in infinitum*, must have some bounds unto its Extension: but these Bounds to its Extension must necessarily be figure. *Secondly*, That these indiscerpible Particles, unless they be mere mathematical Points, cannot be infinitely little; because we still conceive those that are less, and acknowledge 'em even yet to be intellectually divisible. *Thirdly*, If they were infinitely little, there would be need of an infinite number to constitute a Body of this or that Bigness; from whence Bodies would both consist of Atoms, or Parts that are indivisible, and yet at the same time would be divisible *in infinitum*: which would be a wonderful sort of reconciling those two so contrary Opinions. *Fourthly*, and lastly, Since these *indiscerpible* Particles are said to have an essential Extension only, not such as is *integral*, viz. an Extension that is not greater than what is necessary to preserve Being, lest they should cease to be *Matter*, or at all to exist; and since all Extension may be conceived as divisible, and God as able to do whatever we can thus conceive: it is here query'd, if God should divide one of these Particles, whether there would from thence follow an Annihilation of that particle of *Matter* or not? For it seems to be absurd, that mere Division should annihilate *Matter*; and, unless it be annihilated, it is manifest, that the said Extension was not *essential* only, since it can subsist under a less. And truly the Subtilty of these Objections is very pretty; but that they are not solid, I hope from my Answers will be very evident.

To the *First* therefore I answer thus: 'Tis deny'd that every material Extension that is bounded hath figure; but only such as is *integral*: but for that which is only *essentially* extended, 'tis manifest that it cannot be *figur'd*; since it can be neither gibbose nor plain, neither a Globe nor a Cube, but equally all of them; and by consequence no one at all of all the Bodies that are *figur'd* of whatsoever kind: as in like manner neither can infinite Greatness be referr'd to any sort of *figur'd* Bodies.

To

To the *Second*, That 'tis as much as if you should object, that a Thing, unless it be reduc'd to nothing, cannot be infinitely little : for as to mathematical Points, I absolutely consider them as *Non-entities*, or as *negative Terms* : but the intellectual divisibility in these indiscerpible Particles doth not at all argue, that they can in reality be made yet less ; for neither doth this intellectual Divisibility, tho' it supposeth Extension, suppose always real Divisibility.

To the *Third*, It doth not at all follow, because they are infinitely little, that therefore there is need of an infinite Number of them for the constituting of any Body : for in this only consists an infinite real littleness, that it is so little that it cannot possibly be less ; and hath put off all manner of determinate figure by the means of its littleness ; as a Body infinitely great through its Immensity : but I deny that there is need of infinite Divisions to reduce any Portion of Matter unto this state ; but contend that God is able to do it by finite ones.

And now to the *Last* I answer briefly thus : After God hath so dissolv'd Matter as that it is divided into these *indiscerpible* Particles, it is plainly repugnant that any of them should, from any whomsoever, be farther divided : God indeed can annihilate them ; but he can by no means divide them, since he hath already divided 'em as long as it was possible for them really to be divided : and that *intellectual* Divisibility doth not always suppose that which is *real*, I have noted above.

And of Matter, or at least of Space, &c. Well is this Correction added : neither is it so likely that Matter is infinite ; as I have, with sufficient clearness, prov'd in my *Enchirid. Metaphysicum*, ch. 10.

Sect. 6. For Aristotle their great Oracle is utterly silent in this Matter, &c. Truly he very rarely, and also very obscurely, intimates the Existence of any *Demons* or *Genii*. There are two principal Places that I have mention'd, the one in my *Preface* to the *Philosophical Collections*, Sect. 7. the other in my *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*, Sect. 57. As to which let the Reader himself judge, how very little they make for the evincing of the Doctrine of Spirits in *Aristotle*, unless we shall interpret him very favourably. I have done that way what I could in that second Place ; nor yet can I greatly satisfy my self in it.

Such purely incorporeal Essences being incapable of Impression from corporeal Objects, &c. And consequently since neither by virtue of the pre-eminency of their Beings, they can contain all their Ideas, with the Scenes of variation they afford ; nor is there any such close connexion between them as there is with God the Creator of all things, all those must of necessity escape their knowledge.

Sect. 7. We are prone many times to suspect them to be too easy to be true, &c. Which is the cause also, why with some, that Demonstration for the Existence of God, fetch'd from his Idea, is suspected of Falsity ; (whenas indeed nothing is solider) namely, because it doth the Business so very easily ; and seems so suddenly and so unexpectedly, as it were, to seize the Mind, and to force its Assent.

Because it is now made so clearly intelligible, &c. viz. the possible Idea of an incorporeal Substance, or of a particular Spirit ; which yet I only affirm to be such as is possible ; as I more at large declare in this

very Section. But what in general is the true Idea of a Spirit, or of an incorporeal Substance, I have distinctly enough shewn in my *Enchirid. Metaphys.* And what is that more particularly of our own Souls, I shall shortly, in my *Scholia* upon this Treatise, more accurately shew.

Sect. 13. *What is the result of the mere mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion, &c.* Not that there is any entire Phænomenon consisting merely of mechanical Causes, but because in every one almost there is that which, so far as it concerns its own Nature, is merely mechanical: as the figure of the saline Particles wherewith they bite, &c.

Sect. 14. *And the first step to the abstrusest Mysteries in Natural Theology, &c.* For from hence we certainly know God not only to be, but that he is also immaterial: and by this Creation of the immaterial *external Word*, (the *Spirit of Nature* I mean) we the more easily understand the eternal Generation of that *inward Word*, which is call'd the *Logos*: and by the natural operation of this *Spirit of Nature* upon the Matter of the World, the Operation of the *Holy Spirit* of God upon the *divine World*, or upon the *divine Element* in the vehicles of holy Souls and Angels.


Sect. 15. *That they would encourage the reading of Des-Cartes in all publick Schools or Universities, &c.* Namely, so it be done with that Faithfulness and Care, that his mechanick Philosophy may be clearly and entirely understood. For they that so understand it, will most undoubtedly be sensible of its notorious Defects; and that in order to the explicating of the *Phænomena* of Nature, 'tis necessary that another Principle be call'd in besides Matter, and mere mechanical Motion. But if through a certain lazy and stupid admiration of so eminent a Philosopher, his writings be recommended only to the Youth of the Universities, or but slightly read to 'em, they will contribute more to Atheism, and the Contempt of Religion, than to any solid knowledge of God or Nature. See *Pref. to my Enchirid. Ethic. Sect. 17, 18, 19, &c.* to the very End of the whole.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

1. *The Usefulness of this present Speculation for the understanding of Providence, and the management of our lives for our greatest Happiness;*
2. *For the moderate bearing the death and disasters of our Friends;*
3. *For the begetting true Magnanimity in us, 4. and Peace and Tranquillity of Mind. 5. That so weighty a Theory is not to be handled perfunctorily.*

1.  F all the Speculations the *Soul* of man can entertain herself withal, there is none of greater moment, or of closer concernment to her, than this of her own *Immortality*, and *Independence* on this *Terrestrial Body*. For hereby not only the intricacies and perplexities of *Providence* are made more easy and smooth to her, and she becomes able, by unravelling this clue from end to end, to pass and repass safe through this Labyrinth, wherein many both anxious and careless Spirits have lost themselves; but also (which touches her own interest more particularly) being once raised into the knowledge and belief of so weighty a Conclusion, she may view from this Prospect the most certain and most compendious way to her own *Happiness*; which is the bearing a very moderate Affection to whatever tempts her, during the time of this her Pilgrimage, and a careful preparing of herself for her future condition, by such Noble actions and Heroical qualifications of Mind, as shall render her most welcome to her own Country.

2. Which Belief and Purpose of hers will put her in an utter incapacity of either *envying* the *life* or *successes* of her most imbitter'd *Enemies*, or of *over-lamenting* the *death* or *misfortunes* of her dearest *Friends*; she having no Friends but such as are Friends to God and

- Virtue, and whose Afflictions will prove advantages for their future Felicity, and their departure hence a passage to present possession thereof.

3. Wherefore being fully grounded and rooted in this so concerning a Perswasion, she is freed from all *poor* and *abject* thoughts and designs; and as little admires him that gets the most of this World, be it by Industry, Fortune, or Policy, as a discreet and serious man does the spoils of School-boys; it being very inconsiderable to him who got the victory at Cocks or Cob-nut, or whose bag returned home the fullest stuffed with Counters or Cherry-stones.

4. She has therefore no *emulation*, unless it be of doing good, and of out-stripping, if it were possible, the noblest examples of either the present or past Ages; nor any *contest*, unless it be with her self, that she has made no greater proficiency towards the scope she aims at: and aiming at nothing but what is not in the power of men to confer upon her, with courage she sets upon the main work; and being still more faithful to her self, and to that Light that assists her, at last tastes the *first fruits* of her future *Harvest*, and does more than presage that *great Happiness* that is accrewing to her. And so quit from the troubles and anxieties of this present world, *stays* in it with *Tranquillity* and *Content*, and at last *leaves* it with *Joy*.

The Knowledge therefore and belief of the *Immortality of the Soul* being of so grand Importance, we are engaged more carefully and punctually to handle this so weighty a Theory: which will not be performed by multiplying of words, but by a more frugal use of them; letting nothing fall from our pen, but what makes closely to the matter, nor omitting any thing material for the evincing the truth thereof.

CHAP. II.

1. That the Soul's Immortality is demonstrable, by the Author's method, to all but mere Scepticks.
2. An Illustration of his First Axiome.
3. A confirmation and example of the Second.
4. An explication of the Third.
5. An explication and proof of the Fourth.
6. A proof of the Fifth.
7. Of the Sixth.
8. An example of the Seventh.
9. A confirmation of the truth of the Eighth.
10. A demonstration and example of the Ninth.
11. Penetrability the immediate Property of Incorporeal Substance.
12. As also Indiscerpibility.
13. A proof and illustration of the Tenth Axiome.

1. **A**ND to stop all Creep-holes, and to leave no place for the subterfuges and evasions of confus'd and cavilling spirits, I shall prefix some few *Axiomes* of that plainness and evidence, that no man in his wits but will be asham'd to deny them, if he will admit any thing at all to be true. But as for perfect *Scepticism*, it is a disease incurable, and a thing rather to be pitied or laugh'd at, than seriously opposed. For when a man is so fugitive and unsettled, that he

he will not stand to the verdict of his own Faculties, one can no more fasten any thing upon him, than he can write in the water, or tie knots of the wind. But for those that are not in such a strange despondency, but that they think they know something already, and may learn more, I do not doubt, but by a seasonable recourse to these few Rules, with others I shall set down in their due place, that they will be perswaded, if not forced, to reckon thir Truth, of *the Immortality of the Soul*, amongst such as must needs appear undeniable to those that have parts and leisure enough accurately to examine, and throughly to understand what I have here written for the demonstration thereof.

A X I O M E I.

What ever things are in themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become known to our Faculties or Cognitive powers.

2. **T**HIS *Axiome* is plain of it self, at the very first proposal. For as nothing, for example, can concern the *Visive* faculty, but so far forth as it is *visible*; so there is nothing that can challenge any stroke to so much as a touching, much less determining, our *Cognitive* powers in general, but so far forth as it is *cognoscible*.

A X I O M E II.

Whatsoever is unknown to us, or is known but as merely possible, is not to move us, or determine us any way, or make us undetermined; but we are to rest in the present light and plain determination of our own Faculties.

3. **T**HIS is an evident Confectary from the foregoing Axiome. For the Existence of that that is *merely possible* is utterly unknown to us to *be*, and therefore is to have no weight against any Conclusion, unless we will condemn our selves to eternal *Scepticism*. As for example. If, after a man has argued for a *God* and *Providence*, from the wise contrivance in the frame of all the Bodies of Animals upon earth, one should reply, That there may be, for all this, Animals in *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, or some other of the Planets, of very inept fabricks; Horses, suppose, and other Creatures, with only one Eye, and one Ear, (and that both on a side, the Eye placed also where the Ear should be,) and with only three Legs; Bulls and Rams with horns on their backs, and such like: Such allegations as these, according to this Axiome, are to be held of no force at all for the enervating the Conclusion.

See Antidote,
Book 1. ch. 2,
& 9.

A X I O M E III.

All our Faculties have not a right of suffrage for determining of Truth, but only Common Notions, External Sense, and evident and undeniable Deductions of Reason.

4. **B**Y *Common Notions* I understand whatever is *Noematically* true, that is to say, true at first sight to all men in their wits, upon a clear perception of the Terms, without any further discourse

or reasoning. (* From *External Sense* I exclude not *Memory*, as it is a faithful Register thereof.) And by *undeniable Deduction of Reason*, I mean such a collection of one Truth from another, that no man can discover any looseness or dis-jointedness in the cohesion of the Argument.

A X I O M E IV.

What is not consonant to all or some of these, is mere Fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of Truth or Falsehood, by either it's Vigour or Perplexiveness.

5. **I** Say *mere Fancy*, in Counter-distinction to such Representations as, although they be not the pure Impresses of some real Object; yet are made by *Rational deduction* from them, or from *Common Notions*, or from both. Those Representations that are not framed upon such grounds, I call *mere Fancies*; which are of no value at all in determining of Truth. For if *Vigour of Fancy* will argue a thing true, then all the dreams of mad-men must go for Oracles: and if the *Perplexiveness of Imagination* may hinder assent, we must not believe Mathematical demonstration, and the 16th Proposition of the 3d Book of *Euclide* will be confidently concluded to contain a contradiction.

See Antidote,
Book I. ch. 4.
sect. 2.

A X I O M E V.

Whatever is clear to any one of these Three Faculties, is to be held undoubtedly true, the other having nothing to evidence to the contrary.

6. **O**R else a man shall not be assured of any sensible Object that he meets with, nor can give firm assent to such Truths as these, *It is impossible the same thing should be, and not be, at once; Whatever is, is either finite, or infinite; and the like.*

A X I O M E VI.

What is rejected by one, none of the other Faculties giving evidence for it, ought to go for a Falsehood.

7. **O**R else a man may let pass such Impossibilities as these for Truth, or doubt whether they be not true or no, viz. *The part is greater than the whole; There is something that is neither finite nor infinite; Socrates is invisible; and the like.*

A X I O M E VII.

What is plainly and manifestly concluded, ought to be held undeniable, when no Difficulties are alledged against it, but such as are acknowledged to be found in other Conclusions held by all men undeniably true.

8. **A**S for example, suppose one should conclude, *That there may be Infinite Matter*, or * *That there is Infinite Space*, by very rational arguments; and that it were objected only, *That then the Tenth part* of

of that *Matter* would be Infinite; it being most certain, That there is *Infinite Duration* of something or other in the world, and that the *Tenth* part of this *Duration* is Infinite; it is no enervating at all of the former Conclusion, it being incumbred with no greater incongruity than is acknowledged to consist with an undeniable Truth.

A X I O M E VIII.

The Subject, or naked Essence or Substance of a thing, is utterly unconceivable to any of our Faculties.

9. **F**OR the evidencing of this Truth, there needs nothing more than a silent appeal to a man's own Mind, if he do not find it so; and that if he take away all *Aptitudes, Operations, Properties, and Modifications* from a *Subject*, that his conception thereof * vanishes into nothing, but into the *Idea* of a mere *Undiversificated Substance*; so that one *Substance* is not then distinguishable from another, but only from *Accidents* or *Modes*, to which properly belongs no subsistence.

A X I O M E IX.

There are some Properties, Powers, and Operations, immediately appertaining to a thing, of which no reasons can be given, nor ought to be demanded, nor the Way or Manner of the cohesion of the Attribute with the Subject can by any means be fancy'd or imagined.

10. **T**HE evidence of this Axiome appears from the former. For if the *naked substance* of a Thing be so utterly unconceivable; there can be nothing deprehended there to be a connexion betwixt it and its first Properties. Such is *Actual Divisibility* and *Impenetrability* in *Matter*. By *Actual Divisibility* I understand *Discerpibility*, gross tearing or cutting one part from another. These are *Immediate Properties of Matter*; but why they should be there, rather than in any other *Subject*, no man can pretend to give, or with any credit ask, the Reason. For *Immediate Attributes* are indemonstrable, otherwise they would not be *Immediate*.

11. So the *Immediate Properties* of a *Spirit*, or *Immaterial Substance*, are *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility*. The necessary cohesion of which Attributes with the *Subject*, is as little demonstrable as the former. For supposing that, which I cannot but assert, to be evidently true, That there is no *Substance* but it has in some sort or other the *Three dimensions*; This *Substance*, which we call *Matter*, might as well have been *penetrable* as *impenetrable*, and yet have been *Substance*: But now that it does so certainly and irresistibly keep one part of it self from *penetrating* another, it is so, we know not why. For there is no necessary connexion discernible betwixt *Substance* with *three dimensions*, and *Impenetrability*. For what some alledge that it implies a contradiction, that *Extended Substance* should run one part into another;
for

for so part of the *Extension*, and consequently of the *Substance*, would be lost; this, I say, (if nearly look'd into) is of no force. For the *Substance* is no more lost in this case, than when a string is doubled and redoubled, or a piece of wax reduced from a long figure to a round: The dimension of *Longitude* is in some part lost, but without detriment to the *Substance* of the wax. In like manner when one part of an *Extended Substance* runs into another, something both of *Longitude*, *Latitude*, and *Profundity*, may be lost, and yet all the *Substance* may be there still; as well as *Longitude* lost in the other case without any loss of the *Substance*.

And as what was lost in *Longitude* was gotten in *Latitude* or *Profundity* before; so what is lost here in all, or any of the two dimensions, is kept safe in *Essential Spissitude*: For so I will call this *Mode* or *Property of a Substance*, that is able to receive one part of it into another. Which *fourth Mode* is as easy and familiar to my Understanding, as that of the *Three dimensions* to my Sense or Phancy. For I mean nothing else by *Spissitude*, but the redoubling or contracting of Substance into less space than it does sometimes occupy. And Analagous to this is the lying of two Substances of several kinds in the same place at once.

To both these may be apply'd the terms of *Reduplication* and *Saturation*: * The former, when Essence or Substance is but once redoubled into it self, or into another; the latter, when so oft, that it will not easily admit any thing more. And that more *Extensions* than one may be commensurate, at the same time, to the same Place, is plain, in that *Motion* is coextended with the Subject wheren it is, and both with *Space*. And *Motion* is not nothing; wherefore two things may commensurate to one Space at once.

12. Now then *Extended Substance* (and all Substances are extended) being of it self indifferent to *Penetrability* or *Impenetrability*, and we finding one kind of Substance so *impenetrable*, that one part will not enter at all into another, which, with as much reason, we might expect to find so irresistibly united one part with another, that nothing in the world could dis sever them: (For this *Indiscerpibility* has as good a connexion with Substance as *Impenetrability* has, they neither falling under the cognoscence of Reason or Demonstration, but being *Immediate Attributes* of such a Subject. For a man can no more argue from the *Extension* of Substance, that it is *Discerpible*, than that it is *Penetrable*; there being as good a capacity in *Extension* for *Penetration* as *Discerption*) I conceive, I say, from hence we may easily admit, that some Substance may be of it self *Indiscerpible*, as well as others *Impenetrable*; and that as there is one kind of Substance, which of its own nature is *Impenetrable* and *Discerpible*, so there may be another *Indiscerpible* and *Penetrable*. Neither of which a man can give any other account of, than that they have the immediate Properties of such a Subject.

AXIOME

A X I O M E X.

The discovery of some Power, Property, or Operation, incompatible to one Subject, is an infallible argument of the Existence of some other to which it must be compatible.

13. **A**S when *Pythagoras* was spoken unto by the River *Nessus*,^{Iamblich. de vita Pythag. cap. 18.} when he passed over it; and a Tree, by the Command of *Thebesion* the chief of the *Gymnosophists*, saluted *Apollonius* in a distinct^{Philostat. de vita Apollon. lib. 6.} and articulate voice, but small as a woman's: it is evident, I say, That there was something there that was neither *River* nor *Tree*, to which these salutations must be attributed, no *Tree* nor *River* having any Faculty of *Reason* nor *Speech*.

N O T E S

On CHAP. II. Sect. 4.

FROM external Sense I exclude not Memory, &c. No, nor History indeed so far forth as it shall appear to Reason to be certainly true.

Sect. 8. *That there is infinite Duration of something or other, &c.* When I wrote this, I suspect I had not wholly put off that Opinion, that all Duration is successive; which I now believe to be false; and have demonstrated it sufficiently in my *Enchirid. Metaphys.* Space itself therefore, whatever it be, would be a more convenient Example, if no one could bring any objections against infinite Matter, but what would hold against Space, &c. But that Matter is really finite, I have demonstrated again by all the Arguments I could in the said *Enchirid.*

Sect. 9. *Vanishes into nothing but into the Idea of a mere undiversified Substance.* Those that will from hence gather, that the Substance both of Body and Spirit is the same, their Properties laid aside, *Discernibility*, suppose, and *Indiscernibility*; *Impenetrability* and *Penetrability*, do it very unskillfully and absurdly: for the genuine sense of the Place is this; That we can have no full or distinct Idea of any specifick Substance; namely, of the very Substance it self, all its Properties set aside: tho' with certain reason we collect, that where such a Diversity, or rather contrariety of Properties is found, and this permanent and essential, there must be a distinct Essence for the Ground of those Properties; tho' we are not able to form any distinct Idea of that Subject of them. So that none, unless they be extremely stupid, will ever doubt, that if any Subject exist of it self *penetrable* and *indiscernible*, but that the very Substance it self from whence these Properties arise, is specifically distinct from a corporeal Substance; (as by many, and those evincible Arguments I have demonstrated in my writings) and that this Substance is *penetrable* and *indiscernible*, as being immediately and specifically opposite unto Body. Which I would have taken as spoken

spoken by way of Answer to the Cavillings of that miserable sort of Philosopher J. W. in his *Defence of Witches*, ch. 10. than which I never stumbled upon any thing more ignorant or contemptible.

Sect. 11. The former, when *Essence or Substance* is but once redoubled into it self, or into another, &c. This I would not have here so understood, as if by *Reduplication* I meant only Duplication; or Substance only once drawn into Substance; but Duplication several times repeated; so it be not to such a degree, that Substance will no longer admit Substance; for then it is to be call'd *Saturation*; but *Reduplication* from the very first Duplication even unto this *Saturation*. From hence it is, I say, that when a Substance is but once doubled into it self, or into another, it is to be call'd *Reduplication*.

CHAP. III.

1. *The general Notions of Body and Spirit.* 2. *That the Notion of Spirit is altogether as intelligible as that of Body.* 3. *Whether there be any Substance, of a mixt nature, betwixt Body and Spirit.*

1. **T**HE greatest and grossest Obstacle to the belief of the *Immortality of the Soul*, is that confident opinion in some, as if the very notion of a *Spirit* were a piece of Non-sense, and perfect incongruity in the conception thereof. Wherefore to proceed by degrees to our main design, and to lay our Foundation low and sure, we will in the first place expose to view the genuine notion of a *Spirit*, in the general acceptation thereof; and afterwards of several kinds of *Spirits*: that it may appear to all, how unjust that cavil is against *Incorporeal Substances*, as if they were mere *Impossibilities* and contradictory *Inconsistencies*. I will define therefore a *Spirit* in general thus, * *A substance penetrable and indiscerpible*. The fitness of which Definition will be better understood, if we divide *Substance* in general into these first kinds, viz. *Body* and *Spirit*, and then define *Body* to be *A Substance impenetrable and discernible*. Whence the contrary kind to this is fitly defined, *A Substance penetrable and indiscerpible*.

2. Now I appeal to any man that can set aside prejudice, and has the free use of his Faculties, whether every term in the Definition of a *Spirit* be not as intelligible and congruous to Reason, as in that of a *Body*. For the precise Notion of *Substance* is the same in both, in which, I conceive, is compris'd *Extension* and *Activity*, either connate or communicated. For *Matter* it self once moved, can move other *Matter*. And it is as easy to understand what *Penetrable* is as *Impenetrable*, and what *Indiscerpible* as *Discerpible*; and *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* being as *immediate* to *Spirit*, as *Impenetrability* and *Discerpibility* to *Body*, there is as much reason to be given for the Attributes of the one as the other, by Axiome 9. And *Substance*, in its precise notion, including no more of *Impenetrability* than *Indiscerpibility*, we may as well wonder how one kind of Substance can so firmly and irresistibly keep out another Substance, (as *Matter*, for example, does the

the parts of *Matter*) as that the parts of another Substance hold so fast together, that they are by no means *Discerpible*, as we have already intimated. And therefore this *holding out* in one being as difficult a business to conceive, as the *holding together* in the other, this can be no prejudice to the notion of a *Spirit*. For there may be very fast union where we cannot at all imagine the cause thereof, as in such Bodies which are exceeding hard, where no man can fancy what holds the parts together so strongly; and there being no greater difficulty here, than that a man cannot imagine what holds the parts of a *Spirit* together, it will follow, by Axiome 7. that the Notion of a *Spirit* is not to be excepted against as an incongruous notion, but is to be admitted for the notion of a thing that may really exist.

3. It may be doubted, whether there may not be Essences of a middle condition betwixt these *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal* Substances we have described, and that of two sorts, the one *Impenetrable and Indiscerpible*, the other *Penetrable and Discerpible*. But concerning the first, if *Impenetrability* be understood in reference to *Matter*, it is plain there can be no such Essence in the world; and in reference to its own parts, though it may then look like a possible *Idea* in it self, yet there are no footsteps of the existence thereof in Nature, the Souls of men and Dæmons implying contradiction and dilatation in them.

As for the latter, it has no privilege for any thing more than *Matter* it self has, or some *Mode of Matter*. For it being *Discerpible*, it is plain, its union is by *Juxtaposition* of parts, and the more *penetrable*, the less likely to convey Sense and Motion to any distance. Besides the ridiculous sequel of this supposition, * that will fill the Universe with an infinite number of shreds and rags of Souls and Spirits, never to be reduc'd again to any use or order. And lastly, the proper Notion of a Substance *Incorporeal*, fully counter-distinct to a *Corporeal* Substance, necessarily including in it so strong and indissoluble union of parts, that it is utterly *Indiscerpible*, whenas yet for all that, in this general notion thereof, neither *Sense* nor *Cogitation* is imply'd, it is most rational to conceive, that that Substance, wherein they are, must assuredly be *Incorporeal* in the strictest Signification; the nature of *Cogitation*, and communion of *Sense*, arguing a more perfect degree of union, than is in mere *Indiscerpibility of parts*.

But all this Scrupulosity might have been saved; for I confidently promise my self, that there are none so perversly given to tergiversations and subterfuges, but that they will acknowledge, wherever I can prove, that there is a Substance distinct from Body or Matter, that it is in the most full and proper sense *Incorporeal*.

NOTES

On CHAP. III. Sect. 1.

A Substance Penetrable and Indiscerpible, &c. None of those that attribute Impenetrability of Parts to Matter, if they be but sound in their Wits, can deny this our Definition of Spirit: but for those that

that think the *species intentionales*, or the Images in Glasses, to be indiscerpible Bodies, they stand more in need of *Hellebore* than an *Answer*, as Persons that dote plainly, and lie under very strange Hallucinations: Since then all corporeal Substance is *impenetrable* and *discerpible*, it necessarily follows, that such a Substance as is *penetrable* and *indiscerpible*, is a Substance incorporeal, that is, a *Spirit*. Who, unless his Brain be very plumbeous or stupid, must not see these things; or, unless his forehead be very hard, will offer to deny them?

That is somewhat more skilfully urged of those, who assign a *Penetrability* of Parts to Matter: for, if that were true, then I confess our Definition of a *Spirit* would be weaken'd: but there are very few Philosophers now a-days of the better sort that explode not the old *Aristotelean* Account of Condensation and Rarefaction: they almost all hold unanimously the *Cartesian*. And indeed that most learned Physician *Johannes Baptista Van-Helmont*, in his Discourse concerning *Materials* that are *Injected*, doth confess ingenuously, that the Penetration of Bodies is not to be effected by any humane Art or Strength: but whereas he pleads, that it may be effected either by the force of Nature in its *seminal* Operations, and in its *Transmissions* of *Things injected*; or by such as is magical or diabolical, none of the Examples that he produceth, though they should be allow'd to be true, seem to me sufficiently to evince it. For as to those things which are too big for the Passage of the Jaws or Fundament, of which sort was that *wooden Horse*, and piece of the *brass Gun*; I doubt not but to affirm with *Wierus* in the like cases, that they were the Mockeries of Dæmons; and only seem'd to be real through their Arts. The same I also think of that Ox Hide as big as the Palm of one Hand, that, according to the Confession of a Witch, (burnt afterwards at *Bruges*) was injected through the Skin while whole, *viz.* that it was præstigiouſly injected by the Dæmon, while the Impostume was opening, not through the sound or whole Skin before the Impostume was made or opened: or that it was some gathering together in the Impostume, resembling very much an Ox's Hide; and bred there by the *Archeus* of the Universe, or by the Man's own, or both of them together; the universal *Archeus*, or *Spirit of Nature*, being excited first by the magical sort of force in some Imagination into that vital or seminal *Idea*; as is common in the Signatures of Women with Child: for there is that magical virtue here of the big Person's Imagination, that it forceth the *Spirit of Nature* to join with it. But that some wicked old Hag, whose Soul is so entirely sunk into this earthly Body, should be endued with that Power of Imagination, as to be able at a distance, and at will, to excite these *vital Ideas* in the *Spirit of Nature*, seems to me not at all improbable. However, it is more likely to be done by the help of the Devil, who is present both as to *Fact* and *Imagination*; and may transmit insensibly through the Pores of the Skin some subtil *seminal* Matter, that he knows how to prepare, from whence such monstrous Appearances may arise. So little necessary is it, that that Hide should ever penetrate the whole or unbroken Skin.

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But as to the Penetration of such *injected Solids* as by chance only, and no evil art, are from the Mouth thrown into the Body; for what concerns, I say, the Penetration of these through the Stomach, Intestines, Womb, Caul, Paunch, Sides, and Bladder, that is to say, through these Membranes, (the Membranes being not in the least hurt, but remaining whole and entire at the same time) I utterly deny that there is any such thing done; but that it is effected through Holes, or Passages that are made by the help of the *Plastick* of the Body, or of the *Spirit of Nature*, and not by any mechanical Power; after some such manner as an Egg is transmitted from its Place, as through a sort of Tunnil into the Out-let of the Womb; bating that here there is a very little Passage for it; but in the other case there is none at all, but what is occasionally made by the *Spirit of Nature*: In the doing of which, since it plainly proceeds in its own way and pace, by its plastical and also sanative virtue, it still timely heals what it had any way broken; as in the case of those Fish-shells that are transmitted to the Foetus through the Womb: Which is abundantly more credible, than that it should be done by any Penetration of Dimensions. And what *Desire* or *Joy* doth in a Woman with Child, the same may Grief and Anxiety perform in almost all the other Instances that *Helmont* produceth. So the Head, the Hand, and the Arm, that in three *Foetus's*, through the strength of Imagination in their Mothers most horribly affrighted, were taken off wholly, and appeared not in the least at their Birth, prove not the Penetration of Dimensions, but the Commintion only, or Dissolution of the said Parts into subtile and invisible Matter, through the Force of the *Spirit of Nature*, strongly set on work by the Mother's Imaginations.

Lastly, Neither is that Supposition of *Helmont's* true, that in the Seeds of things there is a Power in those Bodies for the penetrating mutually of one another: which yet he endeavours thus to prove: For, saith he, *there are many Bodies abundantly heavier than the Matter of which they are compos'd: and he affirms it necessary, that more than fifty Parts of Water should concur together, that so much as one Part of Gold may be produc'd from it; For Weight doth not arise out of nothing; therefore Water naturally penetrates its own Body so many times as Gold is heavier than it self.* This Argument indeed, if Gravity were an innate or intrinsical Property of Matter, and belong'd to it as such, might have its Force; but since it is mov'd by another Substance distinct from it self, and its parts, in the *Cartesian* way, are dispos'd from that Principle, according to its less or greater Solidity, it is of small Value. Now the *Cartesians* will have that Body to be less solid, whose Particles are more thin, porous, and superficial, and have a looser Union amongst them: from whence the Nature of Solidity is also easily understood: Farther, the *Spirit of Nature*, according to the degrees of Solidity in Matter, thrusts it powerfully downwards: And hence it may appear, that Gravity is not out of nothing, or rather from nothing, but from the Solidity of the Matter, and the Impulse of the *Spirit of Nature*: But that Water in this Sense, is not Fifty times less solid than Gold, there's none can demonstrate by any Arguments that I know: From all which it is evident, that there can be nothing

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brought against the Definition of a *Spirit*, which I have defin'd from the *Penetrability* of its Parts, as well as by their *Indiscerpibility*. Such a nothing hath *Webster* done, against this Definition of ours, by all his frivolous Cavils.

Seēt. 3. Be understood in reference to Matter, it is plain there can be no such Essence in the World, &c. an Essence indiscerpible, as well as impenetrable. For it is sufficiently manifest, that all Bodies whatever that we meet with in Nature, are divisible and discernible into Parts: As to the figur'd Atomes of the *Epicureans*, whose Parts they will have to be indiscerpible, I am not in the least solicitous about them; since they belong not properly to this Place, and are also spoken to sufficiently elsewhere.

That will fill the World with an infinite Number of Shreds and Rags, &c. For so they are to be accounted, namely, a Congeries of Spirits, if so be they are vital, and yet discernible: and are not therefore of a middle, but truly of a spiritual Nature. But if they be not vital, but differ only from Matter in their Penetrability, they are so unprofitable for any thing, that it is not credible they should at all exist in Nature. From this spurious kind therefore to make a sort of divine Matter, would be very rash and unwarrantable: as it would be sufficiently again incongruous to call the former Body, and not Spirit.

C H A P. IV.

1. *That the Notions of the several kinds of Immaterial Beings have no Inconsistency nor Incongruity in them.*
2. *That the Nature of God is as intelligible as the Nature of any Being whatsoever.*
3. *The true Notion of his Ubiquity, and how intelligible it is.*
4. *Of the Union of the Divine Essence.*
5. *Of his Power of Creation.*

1. **W**E have shewn that the Notion of a *Spirit* in general is not at all incongruous, nor impossible: And it is as congruous, consistent, and intelligible in the *sundry kinds* thereof; as for example that of God, of Angels, of the Souls of Men and Brutes, and of the *λόγοι σπερματικοί*, or *Seminal Forms* of things.

2. The Notion of God, though the knowledge thereof be much prejudiced by the confoundedness and stupidity of either superstitious or profane men, that please themselves in their large Rhetorickations concerning * the unconceivableness and utter incomprehensibleness of the Deity; the one, by way of a devotional exaltation of the transcendency of his Nature; the other, to make the belief of his Existence ridiculous, and craftily and perversely to intimate, that there is no God at all, the very conception of him being made to appear nothing else but a bundle of inconsistencies and impossibilities. Nevertheless, I shall not at all stick to affirm, * That his *Idea* or Notion is as easy as any Notion whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world. For the *very Essence* or *naked Substance* of nothing can possibly be known, by Axiome 8. But for his

his *Attributes*, they are as conspicuous as the *Attributes* of any Subject or Substance whatever: From which a man may easily define Him thus; *God is a Spirit Eternal, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omniscient, Omnipotent, and of himself necessarily Existent.*

I appeal to any man, if every term in this Definition be not sufficiently intelligible. For as for *Spirit*, that has been already defin'd and explain'd. By *Eternal*, I understand nothing here but Duration without end or beginning: by *Infiniteness of Essence*, that his Essence or Substance has no bounds, no more than his Duration: by *Infinite in Goodness*, such a benign Will in God as is carried out to boundless and innumerable benefactions: by *Omniscience* and *Omnipotency*, the ability of knowing or doing any thing that can be conceiv'd without a plain contradiction: by *Self-Existency*, that he has his Being from none other: and by *necessary Existence*, that he cannot fail to be. What terms of any Definition are more plain than these of this? or what Subject can be more accurately defin'd than this is? For the naked Subject or Substance of any thing is no otherwise to be known than thus. And they that gape after any other speculative knowledge of God, than what is from his *Attributes* and *Operations*, they may have their heads and mouths filled with many hot scalding fancies and words, and run mad with the boisterousness of their own Imagination, but they will never hit upon any sober Truth.

3. Thus have I deliver'd a very explicate and intelligible Notion of the Nature of God; which I might also more compendiously define, *An Essence absolutely Perfect*, in which all the terms of the former Definition are comprehended, and more than I have named, or thought needful to name, much less to insist upon; as his *Power of Creation*, and his *Omnipresence* or *Ubiquity*, which are necessarily included in the *Idea of absolute Perfection*. The latter whereof some ancient Philosophers endeavouring to set out, have defin'd God to be a *Circle whose Centre is every where, and Circumference no where*. By which Description certainly nothing else can be meant, but that the Divine Essence is *every where present* with all those adorable *Attributes of infinite and absolutely-perfect Goodness, Knowledge, and Power*, according to that sense in which I have explain'd them. Which *Ubiquity* or *Omnipresence* of God is every whit as intelligible * as the overspreading of *Matter* into all places.

4. But if here any one demand, How the Parts, as I may so call them, of the Divine Amplitude hold together, that of *Matter* being so discernible; it might be sufficient to remind him of what we have already spoken of the general Notion of a *Spirit*. But besides that, here may be also a peculiar rational account given thereof, it implying a contradiction, that an *Essence absolutely Perfect* should be either limited in presence, or change place in part or whole, they being both notorious Effects or Symptoms of Imperfection, which is inconsistent with the Nature of God. And no better nor more cogent reason can be given of any thing, than that it implies a contradiction to be otherwise.

5. That *Power* also of *creating things of nothing*, there is a very close connexion betwixt it and the *Idea of God*, or of a *Being absolutely Perfect*. For this Being would not be what it is conceiv'd to

be, if it were destitute of the *Power of Creation*; and therefore this Attribute has no less coherence with the Subject, than that it is a contradiction it should not be in it, as was observ'd of the foregoing Attribute of *Indiscernibility* in God. But to alledge that a man cannot imagine how God should create something out of nothing, or how the Divine Essence holds so closely and invincibly together, is to transgress against the 3, 4, and 5 Axiomes, and to appeal to a Faculty that has no right to determine the case.

N O T E S

Upon C H A P. IV. Sect. 2.

THE *Unconceivableness* and utter *Incomprehensibleness* thereof, &c. These Words are taken otherwise by some than I meant them: for by *Comprehend* I understand nothing more here, than *deprehend*, *perceive*, or *conceive*: Nor doth the use of the Word refuse that sense. But those that, from this place, will have me to deny the *Incomprehensibleness* of the *Deity*, taken in a Scholastick or Theological Sense, demean themselves more rashly and unskillfully in it, than becomes either a candid Temper or any good Judgment.

That his Idea or Notion is as easy as any Notion else whatsoever, &c. Namely, as to *Apprehension*, though not as to *Comprehension* properly so call'd; or as to *kind*, tho' not as to *degree*, that is, the Perfections, and Properties of the Divine Nature may be easily understood and perceiv'd, tho' by no means comprehended in suitableness to their Dignity and Infinity.

Sect. 3. As the overspreading of Matter into all Places, &c. And truly very seasonably in this Example made use of by me in this Place: which ought particularly to be esteemed valid with such as hold Matter to be infinite: for they cannot deny, that they sufficiently apprehend or understand the Nature of Matter, tho' at the same time they cannot sufficiently comprehend its Infinity. But the Example will be firmer and more opposite as to others if, for *Matter*, we shall put *Space*. The Infinity of which, we are constrain'd all unanimously to own that we *apprehend*, and yet not *comprehend*.

C H A P. V.

1. The Definition belonging to all Finite and Created Spirits, 2. Of Indiscernibility, a Symbolical representation thereof. 3. An Objection answered against that representation.

1. **W**E have done with the Notion of that *Infinite* and *Uncreated* Spirit, we usually call *God*: we come now to those that are *Created* and *Finite*, as the *Spirits of Angels, Men and Brutes*; we will cast

cast in the *Seminal Forms* also, or *Archei*, as the *Chymists* call them, though haply the world stands in no * need of them. The *Proper-* * See Book 3: ties of a *Spirit*, as it is a Notion common to all these, I have already ch. 12, & 13. enumerated in my *Antitode*, *Self-motion*, *Self-penetration*, *Self-contraction* and *dilatation*, and *Indivisibility*, by which I mean *Indiscerpibility*: Book 1. ch. 4. sect. 3. to which I added, *Penetrating*, *Moving*, and *Altering the Matter*. We may therefore define, *This kind of Spirit we speak of, to be A Substance Indiscerpible, that can move it self, that can penetrate, contract, and dilate it self, and can also penetrate, move, and alter the Matter*. We will now examine every term of this Definition, from whence it shall appear, that it is as congruous and intelligible, as those Definitions that are made of such things as all men, without any scruple, acknowledge to exist.

2. Of the *Indiscerpibility* of a *Spirit* we have already given rational grounds to evince it not impossible, it being an *immediate Attribute* thereof, as *Impenetrability* is of a *Body*; and as conceivable or imaginable, that one *Substance* of its own nature may invincibly hold its parts together, so that they cannot be disunited nor dissever'd, as that another may keep out so stoutly and irresistibly another Substance from entering into the same space or place with it self. For this *ἀντιτιμία* or *Impenetrability* is not at all contained in the precise conception of a *Substance as Substance*, as I have already signified.

But besides that *Reason* may thus easily apprehend that it may be so, I shall a little gratify *Imagination*, and it may be *Reason* too, in offering the manner how it is so, in this kind of *Spirit* we now speak of. That ancient notion of *Light* and *Intentional species* is so far from a plain Impossibility, that it has been heretofore generally, and is still by very many persons look'd upon as a Truth, that is, that *Light* and *Colour* do ray in such fort as they are described in the *Peripatetical Philosophy*. Now it is observable in *Light*, that it is most vigorous towards its fountain, and fainter by degrees. But we will reduce the matter to one *lucid point*, which, according to the acknowledged Principles of Opticks, will fill a distance of space with its rays of light: Which rays may indeed be reverberated back towards their Centre, by interposing some opaque body, and so this *Orb of light* contracted; but, according to the *Aristotelean Hypothesis*, it was always accounted impossible that they should be clipt off, or cut from this *lucid point*, and be kept apart by themselves. * Those whom dry Reason will not satisfy, may, if they please, entertain their Phan- * See further cy with such a Representation as this, which may a little ease the an- in my *Antitode*, Book 1. xious importunity of their Mind, when it too eagerly would com- ch. 4. sect. 3. prehend the manner how this *Spirit* we speak of may be said to be Also the *Append. chap. 3,* *indiscerpible*. For think of any ray of this *Orb of light*, it does suffi- ad 10. ciently set out to the *Imagination* how *Extension* and *Indiscerpibility* may consist together.

3. But if any object, That the *lucid Centre of this Orb*, or the *Primary Substance*, as I * elsewhere call it, is either *divisible*, or *absolutely* * *Append. cap. indivisible*; and if it be *divisible*, that as concerning that *Inmost* of a 13. sect. 2. *Spirit*, this Representation is not at all serviceable to set off the nature thereof, by shewing how the parts there may hold together so

indiscerpibly; but if *absolutely indivisible*, that it seems to be nothing: To this I answer, what Scaliger has somewhere noted, *That what is infinitely great, or infinitely small, the Imagination of man is at a loss to conceive it.* Which certainly is the ground of the perplexedness of that Probleme concerning Matter, whether it consists of points, or only of particles divisible *in infinitum*.

But to come more closely to the business; I say, that though we should acknowledge the *Inmost Centre of Life*, or the very first point, as I may so call it, of the *Primary Substance*, (for this *Primary Substance* is in some sort gradual) to be *purely indivisible*, it does not at all follow, no not according to *Imagination* it self, that it must be nothing. For let us imagine a perfect *Plane*, and on this *Plane* a perfect *Globe*, we cannot conceive but this *Globe* touches the *Plane*, and that in what we ordinarily call a *point*, else the one would not be a *Globe*, or the other not a *Plane*. Now it is impossible that one Body should touch another, and yet touch one another in nothing. This *inmost Centre* therefore of *life* is something, and something so full of essential vigour and virtue, that though gradually it diminish, yet can fill a certain Sphere of Space with its own presence and activity, as a spark of light illuminates the dusky air.

Wherefore there being no greater perplexity nor subtilty in the consideration of this *Centre of Life* or *Inmost of a Spirit*, than there is in the *Atoms of Matter*, we may, by Axiome 7. rightly conclude, That *Indiscerpibility* has nothing in the notion thereof, but what may well consist with the possibility of the existence of the Subject whereunto it belongs.

CHAP. VI.

1. *Axiomes that tend to the demonstrating how the Centre or First point of the Primary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible.* 2. *Several others that demonstrate how the Secondary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible.* 3. *An application of these Principles.* 4. *Of the union of the Secondary Substance considered transversly.* 5. *That the Notion of a Spirit has less difficulty in it than that of Matter.* 6. *An Answer to an Objection from the Rational faculty.* 7. *Answers to Objections suggested from Fancy.* 8. *A more compendious satisfaction concerning the Notion of a Spirit.*

1. **A**ND thus we have fairly well gratify'd the *Fancy* of the Curious concerning the *Extension* and *Indiscerpibility* of a *Spirit*; but we shall advance yet higher, and demonstrate the possibility of this Notion to the severest Reason, out of these following Principles.

AXIOME XI.

A Globe touches a Plane in something, though in the least that is conceivable to be real.

AXIOME

A X I O M E XII.

The least that is conceivable is so little, that it cannot be conceived to be discernible into less.

A X I O M E XIII.

As little as this is, the repetition of it will amount to considerable magnitudes.

AS for example, if this Globe be drawn upon a Plane, it constitutes a *Line*; and a *Cylinder* drawn upon a Plane, or this same *Line* described by the Globe multiplied into it self, constitutes a *superficies*, &c. This a man cannot deny, but the more he thinks of it, the more certainly true he will find it.

A X I O M E XIV.

Magnitude cannot arise out of mere Non-Magnitudes.

FOR multiply *Nothing* ten thousand millions of times into nothing, the Product will be still *Nothing*. Besides, if that where in the Globe touches a Plane were more than *Indiscernible*, that is, purely *Indivisible*, it is manifest that a *Line* will consist of *Points* Mathematically so called, that is, purely *Indivisible*; which is the grandest absurdity that can be admitted into Philosophy, and the most contradictory thing imaginable.

A X I O M E XV.

The same thing, by reason of its extreme littleness, may be utterly Indiscernible, though intellectually Divisible.

THIS plainly arises out of the foregoing Principles: For every Quantity is *intellectually* divisible; but something Indiscernible was afore demonstrated to be Quantity, and consequently divisible, otherwise Magnitude would consist of Mathematical points. Thus have I found a possibility for the Notion of the *Center of a Spirit*, which is not a Mathematical point, but Substance, in Magnitude so little, that it is *Indiscernible*; but in virtue so great, that it can send forth out of it self so large a Sphere of *Secondary Substance*, as I may so call it, that it is able to actuate grand Proportions of *Matter*, this whole Sphere of life and activity being in the mean time utterly *Indiscernible*.

2. This I have said, and shall now prove it by adding a few more Principles of that evidence, as the most rigorous Reason shall not be able to deny them.

A X I O M E

A X I O M E XVI.

An Emanative Cause is the Notion of a thing possible

See Append.
to the Anti-
dote, chap. 13.
sect. 4.

BY an *Emanative Cause* is understood such a Cause as meerly by Being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect. That this is possible is manifest, it being demonstrable that there is *de facto* some such Cause in the world; because something must move it self. Now if there be no *Spirit*, *Matter* must of necessity move it self, where you cannot imagine any activity or causality, but the bare essence of the *Matter* from whence this motion comes. For if you would suppose some former motion that might be the cause of this, then we might with as good reason suppose some former to be the cause of that, and so *in infinitum*.

A X I O M E XVII.

An Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very Substance of that which is said to be the Cause thereof.

THIS must needs be true, because that very Substance which is said to be the Cause, is the adequate and immediate Cause, and wants nothing to be adjoin'd to its bare essence for the production of the Effect; and * therefore by the same reason the Effect is at any time, it must be at all times, or so long as that Substance does exist.

A X I O M E XVIII.

* *No Emanative Effect, that exceeds not the virtues and powers of the Cause, can be said to be impossible to be produc'd by it.*

THIS is so plain, that nothing need be added for either explanation or proof.

A X I O M E XIX.

* *There may be a Substance of that high Virtue and Excellency, that it may produce another Substance by Emanative causality, provided that Substance produced be in due gradual proportions inferiour to that which causes it.*

THIS is plain out of the foregoing Principle. For there is no contradiction nor impossibility of a Cause producing an Effect less noble than it self, for thereby we are the better assured that it does not exceed the capacity of its own powers: Nor is there any incongruity, that one Substance should cause something else which we may in some sense call Substance, though but *Secondary* or *Emanatory*; acknowledging the *Primary Substance* to be the more adequate Object of Divine Creation, but the *Secondary* to be referrible also to the *Primary* or *Central Substance* by way of causal relation. For suppose God created the *Matter* with an immediate power of moving it self,

self, God indeed is the Prime Cause as well of the *Motion* as of the *Matter*, and yet nevertheless the *Matter* is rightly said *to move it self*. Finally, this *Secondary* or *Emanatory* Substance may be rightly called *Substance*, because it is a Subject endued with certain powers and activities, and that it does not inhere as an *Accident* in any other Substance or Matter, but could maintain its place, though all Matter, or what other Substance soever were removed out of that space it is extended through, provided its *Primary Substance* be but safe.

3. From these four Principles I have here added, we may have not an imaginative but rational apprehension of that part of a *Spirit* which we call the *Secondary Substance* thereof. Whose *Extension* arising by gradual *Emanation* from the First and Primest Essence, which we call the *Centre of the Spirit* (which is no impossible supposition by the 16, 18, and 19 Axiomes) we are led from hence to a necessary acknowledgment of perfect *Indiscernibility* of parts, though not intellectual Indivisibility, by Axiome 17. For it implies a contradiction that an *Emanative* effect should be disjoin'd from its original.

4. Thus have I demonstrated how a *Spirit* considering the lineaments of it (as I may so call them) from the Centre to the Circumference, is utterly *indiscernible*. But now if any be so curious as to ask, how the parts thereof hold together in a line drawn cross to these from the Centre, (for *Imagination*, it may be, will suggest they lie all loose;) I answer, that the conjecture of *Imagination* is here partly true, and partly false, or is true or false as she shall be interpreted. For if she mean by loose, actually disunited, it is false and ridiculous: but if only so discernible, that one part may be disunited from another, that may not only be true, * but, upon supposition the essential rays are not fully enough redoubled within, plainly necessary; otherwise a *Spirit* could not contract one part and extend another, which is yet an Hypothesis necessary to be admitted. Wherefore this Objection is so far from weakning the possibility of this Notion, that it gives occasion more fully to declare the exact concinnity thereof.

To be brief therefore, a *Spirit* from the Centre to the Circumference is utterly *indiscernible*, but in lines cross to this it is closely coherent, but need not be indiscernibly; which cohesion may consist in an immediate union of these parts, and transverse penetration and transcurfion of *Secondary Substance* through this whole Sphere of life which we call a *Spirit*.

Nor need we wonder that so full an Orb should swell out from so subtil and small a point as the *Centre of this Spirit* is supposed. *Εἰς ὃ καὶ ὁ γὰρ μικρὸν εἶναι, δύναται καὶ τιμωτέρῃ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὑπερέχει πάντων*, as Aristotle *Ethic. ad Nicomach. l. 10. cap. 7.* speaks of the Mind of man. And besides, it is but what is seen in some sort to the very eye in light, how large a sphere of Air a little spark will illuminate.

5. This is the pure *Idea* of a *created Spirit* in general, concerning which if there be yet any cavil to be made, it can be none other than what is perfectly common to it and to *Matter*, that is, the unimaginenableness of points and smallest particles, and how what is discernible or divisible can at all hang together: but this not hindering *Matter* from

from actual existence, there is no reason that it should any way pretend to the inferring of the impossibility of the existence of a *Spirit*, by Axiome 7.

But the most lubricous supposition that we go upon here, is not altogether so intricate as those difficulties in *Matter*. For if that be but granted, in which I find no absurdity, That a particle of *Matter* may be so little that it is utterly incapable it should be made less, it is plain that one and the same thing, though intellectually divisible, may yet be really indiscerpible. And indeed it is not only possible, but it seems necessary that this should be true: For though we should acknowledge that *Matter* were discernible *in infinitum*, yet supposing a Cause of Infinite distinct perception and as Infinite power, (and God is such) this Cause can reduce this capacity of infinite discernibleness of *Matter* into act, that is to say, actually and at once discern or disjoin it into so many particles as it is discernible into. From whence it will follow, that one of these particles reduced to this perfect Parvitude is then utterly indiscerpible, and yet intellectually divisible, otherwise Magnitude would consist of mere points, which would imply a contradiction.

We have therefore plainly demonstrated by reason, that *Matter* consists of parts indiscerpible; and therefore there being no other Faculty to give suffrage against it, for neither Sense nor any Common Notion can contradict it, it remains by Axiome 5. that the Conclusion is true.

6. What some would object from Reason, that these perfect *Parvitudes* being acknowledged still intellectually divisible, must still have parts into which they are divisible, and therefore be still discernible; To this it is answer'd, That *division into parts* does not imply any *discerpibility*, because the parts conceiv'd in one of these *Minima Corporalia* (as I may so call them) are rather *essential* or *formal* parts than *integral*, and can no more actually be dis sever'd, than Sense and Reason from the Soul of a man. For it is of the very Essence of *Matter* to be *divisible*, but it is not at all included in the essence thereof to be *discerpible*; and therefore where *discerpibility* fails, there is no necessity that *divisibility* should fail also. See the *Preface*, Sect. 3.

7. As for the trouble of spurious suggestions or representations from the *Phancy*, as if these perfect *Parvitudes* were Round bodies, and that therefore there would be *Triangular intervals betwixt*, void of *Matter*; they are of no moment in this case, she always representing a *Discerpible* magnitude instead of an *Indiscerpible* one. Wherefore she bringing in a false evidence, her testimony is to be rejected; nay, if she could perplex the cause far worse, she was not to be heard, by Axiome 4.

Wherefore *Phancy* being unable to exhibit the Object we consider, in its due advantages, for ought we know, these perfect *Parvitudes* may lie so close together, that they have no *Intervals betwixt*: nay, it seems necessary to be so; For if there were any such *Intervals*, they were capable of particles less than these least of all; which is a contradiction in Reason, and a thing utterly impossible.

But

But if we should gratify *Phancy* so far as to admit of these *intervals*, the greatest absurdity would be, that we must admit an insensible *Vacuum*, which no Faculty will be able ever to confute. * But it is most rational to admit none, and more consonant to our determination concerning these *Minima Corporalia*, as I call them, whose largeness is to be limited to the least real touch of either a Globe on a Plane, or a Cone on a Plane, or a Globe on a Globe: if you conceive any real touch less than another, let that be the measure of these *Minute realities* in *Matter*. From whence it will follow, they must touch a whole side at once, and therefore can never leave any empty *intervals*.

Nor can we imagine any Angulosities or Round protuberancies in a quantity infinitely little, more than we can in one infinitely great, as I have already declared in my *Preface*. I must confess, a man's *Reason* in this speculation is mounted far beyond his *Imagination*; but there being worse intricacies in Theories acknowledged constantly to be true, it can be no prejudice to the present Conclusion, by the 4, and 7 Axiomes.

8. * Thus have we cleared up a full and distinct Notion of a Spirit, with so unexceptionable accuracy, that no Reason can pretend to assert it impossible nor unintelligible. But if the Theory thereof may seem more operose and tedious to impatient wits, and the punctuality of the Description the more hazardous and incredible, as if it were beyond our Faculties to make so precise a Conclusion in a Subject so obscure, they may ease their Understanding by contenting themselves with what we have set down *Chap. 2. Sect. 11, 12.* and remember that that Wisdom and Power that created all things, can make them of what nature He pleases; and that if God will that there shall be a Creature that is *penetrable* and *indiscerpible*, that it is as easy a thing for him to make one so of its own nature, as one *impenetrable* and *discerpible*, and indue it with what other Properties he pleases, according to his own will and purpose: which indowments being immediately united with the Subject they are in, Reason can make no further demand how they are there by the 9. Axiome.

N O T E S

On CHAP. VI. Sect. 2.

AND therefore by the same reason the Effect is at any time, it must be at all times, &c. This indeed is most true in emanative Causes that are created, and begin with time: but as to God, if he may properly be said to be the *Emanative Cause* of the Creation, this Axiome hath no place: because it is repugnant to the very Nature of the World, that it should be from all Eternity, either by *Emanation*, or any other way: as I have largely shewn in my *Enchirid. Metaphys. chap. 10.*

Axiome 18th and 19th. It is objected against these two Axiomes, that they seem to prove it equally possible, that the Soul of the Parent may, without all Division of it self, produce the Soul of the Son, as that


that this primary Substance of the Soul may produce a Secondary: For, *First*, the things which are here spoken concerning *emanative* Causes and Effects, are true of all Causes and Effects in general: And, next, if there be a Substance that can produce another Substance inferior, in a due degree, to that which produc'd it, it is not impossible but it may produce one equal to it self: and so the Soul of the Parent produce the Soul of the Son, *i. e.* create it; when yet Creation can never be competible to a Creature.

But to the *First* Part I answer, that I do not assert any created Substance to be of so great Virtue or Excellency as to be able to produce another Substance, unless in the way of an *emanative* Causality: and that the Objector himself doth only affirm, not prove, that it holds good in other Causes and Effects that are not *emanative*.

To the *Second* I answer, That if a created Substance can produce another Substance in a due degree inferior to it self, it doth by no means follow, that it can an equal one: for from less to greater, the Consequence is very invalid. To all which add, that there is a vast difference between *Emanation* and *Creation*: For in *Emanation* that which *emanates*, as I may so speak, is the same in reality with its *emanative* Cause: but in *Creation*, the thing *Creating* and *Created* are really distinguished; for the former may be without the latter. The *emanative* Effect therefore is in reality the very Cause it self emaning, more largely unfolded by, and within it self; nor is it any more than one and the same Substance, as it is in the Divine Trinity it self; nor is it repeated, but remains one. Whereas on the contrary, if the Soul of the Parent produce the Soul of the Son, it produceth it both really distinct from it self, and it is also often repeated: for a person may have many Children, as ten, suppose, fifteen, nay twenty. Who, since they have all Souls, equal or like to the Soul of the Parent, they would all taken together be twenty times greater and more considerable than the Father's Soul. But it is repugnant that even God himself, who hath the most perfect Power of creating, should be able to create one or more Substances, really distinct from himself, greater and more excellent than himself. From whence it is most manifest, that there is a mighty Difference, as I said, between *Emanation* and *Creation*: and that the Objection against these two Axiomes is very weak.

Señ. 4. But upon supposition, that the essential Rays are not fully enough redoubled within, &c. This Place is a little harder than ordinary to be explain'd. But I will do what I can for the making it to be fully understood. The essential Rays are the *secondary* Essence it self; which is conceiv'd as *Radious*, because it is suppos'd to emanate as from a single Center. But here this Essence, which is call'd *radious*, is not conceiv'd to consist of an innumerable Company of Rays, as of so many loose Threds to be join'd together afterwards by the cross-passing of the Woof, but to be immediately all round already join'd, or rather simply one: but to contain much more Substance or Essence than for the Space it at present occupies: 'Tis what I call elsewhere *essential Spissitude*; and do here intimate by the *being fully enough redoubled within*. For as in a Paper Circle, or one of single Cloth, the
Edge,

Edge or Circumference in a certain Part cannot be drawn towards the Center, but the other bordering Parts must be drawn with it; as in the Circle B C D, the part C cannot be drawn towards the Center A, but the parts between CB and CD will be drawn with it, if the Circle B C D consists of single Cloth or Paper. But if it be made with a sufficient Number of large Doublings or Folds, it is easily conceiv'd that the part C may be drawn towards the Center A, and yet all the Parts between CB and CD not be remov'd or drawn with it; but still remain or stand out as they did, but leaving an Angle like to that of E A F. But what these Folds do in the Circle, the same doth this essential Spissitude, or this being fully enough redoubled within, in the Orb or Sphere of Life, and Essence belonging to a Spirit: For by the Advantage of this she can accommodate her self to any Form; so that none need to wonder at the *Hiatus*, or parting of the Body and of the Soul between the Legs, between the Arms, and the Sides, and between the Fingers of the Hands; I say from this sufficient Reduplication of the radious Essence, this may easily be done: but take away this reduplicated Fulness of the Essence, unless you will have the Soul to be of humane Form, (of which I shall speak more presently) it must necessarily be suppos'd by us to be *Cross-ways discernible*; which is the genuine sense of this Place.



In an immediate union of these parts, &c. Not that they are immediately, or of themselves one, for then they could not be divided, but without any third *Coagulum* or Tie: but there is notwithstanding that close and intimate Cohesion of them amongst themselves (although at the same time, by virtue of their own nature, upon occasion they can easily be parted) that there is a more perfect union by almost infinite degrees amongst them, than there is between any Parts of Matter. Which I speak to this end, that no one may undervalue my Notion of a Spirit for the looseness of its Parts.

Señt. 5. This is the pure Idea of a Created Spirit in general, &c. It is indeed the possible Idea of a particular created Spirit in general: But I look upon it as no fit Idea of the Spirit of Nature at all.

Señt. 7. But it is most rational to admit none, &c. viz. To admit of none as the effect of any Figuration in the *minima Corporalia*: but upon no account whatever, to admit of any *vacuum*, tho' never so little, seems not to me to be so reasonable.

Señt. 8. Thus have we clear'd up a full and distinct Notion of a Spirit, &c. That is to say, the Idea of a particular created Spirit, as I but now noted; add also a possible one: for I have now often made Profession, that I frame or endeavour only the Description of a possible Idea of a Spirit; for their sakes alone who so often cry out, that there's no Notion of a Spirit but what's impossible: but that I have made choice of this Idea before all others, was from hence; that I had not yet clear'd my self of all *Cartesian* Prepossessions, much less *Platonical*:

For the *Platonists* so often comparing spiritual Substances unto Light, I hop'd for that very Reason also this Idea of mine might appear more specious and probable, as so handsomely resembling their *lucid Point*. *Cartesius* also with his Followers so much affecting some one thing in every Subject, to which all others, as by way of necessary Consequence, may refer; as to *Extension* in Matter, from which they think Division, Mobility, Figure, and Impenetrability, necessarily and adequately to ensue: I after this manner form'd my Notion of a Spirit; where this *emanative substantial Point* being once fix'd, other things follow plainly of their own selves according to one's Will.

But after all this, what my sense is of this way of Philosophizing, I have so appositely and explicitly declar'd in the Preface to my *Enchirid. Ethicum*, viz. That the essential Attributes of any Subject do not so closely adhere together, by virtue of any one Attribute in the same Subject, but from the immediate Nature of the Essence it self, created after the Idea conceiv'd or contain'd in the divine Mind, &c. that 'tis superfluous to add any more here. To that Preface therefore I refer the Reader, *Seet. 13.* who the mean while, if he desires to know what I take in reality to be the true Idea of a particular Spirit, as suppose, of a humane Soul, setting aside all those Circumstances or Similitudes of a Center and its Rays, I answer roundly thus: That it is a Substance of it self one, and not from any thing else; and therefore that all its parts are by the most immediate Means that are possible one; or may rather be call'd some one thing absolutely, than said to be united; as the Parts which we may imagine to be in God himself are one. And thus God hath created humane Souls after his own Likeness; for he can do whatever implies not a contradiction: The Soul of man therefore is a Substance one of it self, endued with a Power both Plastick and Perceptive, comprehending both Sense and Reason in it.

But now since every thing whatever is after some manner extended, and in particular the Soul it self, (as I have at large demonstrated in my *Enchirid. Metaphys.*) and yet is not extended infinitely, it necessarily follows, that it hath some Figure; since Figure is nothing else but a certain Bounding of that which is so extended; and be it regular or irregular, the matter is not much: But since then it is necessary that the Soul it self must have some Figure, and is made every way fit for the actuating and informing a Humane Body, it seems to me ridiculous in a fort, and not a little incongruous, that if it hath any natural Figure, it should not have a humane one: For that this is the most useful of all others, the present temporary State of the Soul, sufficiently witnesseth unto all Philosophers; and even the eternal State of the Resurrection unto all Christians; when we shall be *ισάγγελοι*, like unto the Angels: which both argues our own Souls to be certainly of the humane Figure, and perhaps the Angelical ones. For what can be the certain and natural figure of the Soul, if not that in which it is to remain for ever in its glorified Body? And this I suppose to be that very Likeness which the *Cabbalists* call *Zel* or *Zelem*, and which, they say, is prepar'd for Man before he comes into the World; and that when he comes forth, he grows up in that likeness, and walks about in the same: but before this Image approaches, which God lets down
upon

upon his Head, there is no Procreation of Man. Which is a strange Saying, unless we suppose a certain Prædelineation of the humane Body, from the Spirit of Nature: Otherwise how would Man have a Head, to which Zelem, or his own proper Plastick should be join'd? Lastly, this Zelem, as it antecedes the perfect Conformation of Parts, so it departs also before the Consummation of Death: Which things, if they be not candidly interpreted, are very ridiculous. But that the Soul with its Form or Plastick, may pass out of the Body in the very Pangs of Death, is not perhaps so impossible; the Body as yet yielding some Appearances of Life from the Strength of the Spirit of Nature. But that there is any Form or Image of the Soul, distinct from the Soul itself, or its Plastick, seems to me but the Dream of the later Cabbalists.

Not rashly therefore did those holy Fathers, Irenæus, Origen, and others, make the Soul it self to be of humane Figure: For so those Words found ὁμοιότητι εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα, that the Soul is of the same Form with the Body, as Photius hath in his Excerptions out of the Book of St. Methodius. And these things should from hence appear the sounder and solider, since 'tis so very manifest that the greatest Part of the Soul is Plastical; which by extending it self by degrees, extends and forms the Matter also into the Members and Organs of a humane Body: So every way agreeable is this Opinion concerning the Figure of the Soul: Which Plastick again in Photius I take to be indigitated in those Words, τὸ εἶδος τὸ τὴν σάρκα καὶ νῦν κατεκτείνει, The Form that even now shapes the Flesh. And again, τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατεκτείνει τὴν μορφήν ὡς καὶ συνεκτείνεται τὸ σχῆμα, The Form fashioning the Shape in which also the Figure is contain'd: Which indeed is a very exact Description of the Plastick: For it is the Plastical Power of the Soul which keeps the Body in a humane Figure, lest it should dissolve in its Parts, as it doth after Death. Lastly, those Words also look this way, τὸ εἶδος τὸ τὴν ταυτότητα τῶν μελῶν ἐν τῇ κατεκτείνει τῆς μορφῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφαίνει, The Form representing the Identity of Members in the Figure of every Shape; This, namely, is the Office of the Plastick, appointed for the maintaining and preserving the personal visible Character both of Men and Angels. And these things have I spoken concerning the true Idea of those particular Spirits, which are call'd humane Souls: as to which the very Treatise shews that I ought to be chiefly solicitous.

Which Induements being immediately united with the Subject they are in, Reason can make no further Demand, &c. These here are very highly consentaneous to the things I have said above. See Pref. to Enchirid. Ethic. Sect. 13.

CHAP. VII.

1. Of the Self-motion of a Spirit. 2. Of Self-penetration. 3. Of Self-contraction and dilation. 4. The power of penetrating of Matter. 5. The power of moving, 6. And of altering the Matter.

1. **W**E have proved the Indiscernibility of a Spirit as well in Center as Circumference, as well in the Primary as Secondary Substance thereof, to be a very consistent and congruous Notion. The next Property

perty is *Self-motion*, which must of necessity be an Attribute of something or other; For by *Self-motion* I understand nothing else but *Self-activity*, which must appertain to a Subject active of it self. * Now what is simply active of it self, can no more cease to be active than to Be; which is a sign that *Matter* is not active of it self, * because it is reducible to Rest: Which is an Argument not only that *Self-activity* belongs to a *Spirit*, but that there is such a thing as a *Spirit* in the world, from which *activity* is communicated to *Matter*. And indeed if *Matter* as *Matter* had motion, nothing would hold together; but Flints, Adamant, Brass, Iron, yea this whole Earth, would suddenly melt into a thinner Substance than the subtile Air, or rather, it never had been condensed together to this consistency we find it. But this is to anticipate my future purpose of proving, That there are Spirits existing in the world: It had been sufficient here to have asserted, That *Self-motion* or *Self-activity* is as conceivable to appertain to *Spirit* as to *Body*, which is plain at first sight to any man that appeals to his own Faculties. Nor is it at all to be scrupl'd at, that any thing should be allowed to *move it self*; because our Adversaries that say, there is nothing but *Matter* in the world, must of necessity (as I have intimated already) confess, that *this Matter moves it self*, though it be very incongruous so to affirm.

2. The congruity and possibility of *Self-penetration* in a created *Spirit* is to be conceiv'd, partly from the limitableness of the Subject, and partly from the foregoing Attributes of *Indiscerpibility* and *Self-motion*. For *Self-penetration* cannot belong to God, because it is impossible any thing should belong to him that implies imperfection, and *Self-penetration* cannot be without the lessening the presence of that which does penetrate it self, or the implication that some parts of that Essence are not so well as they may be; which is a contradiction in a Being which is *absolutely Perfect*. From the Attributes of *Indiscerpibility* and *Self-motion*, (to which you may add *Penetrability* from the general notion of a *Spirit*) it is plain that such a *Spirit* as we define, having the power of Motion upon the whole extent of its essence, may also determine this Motion according to the Property of its own nature: and therefore if it determine the motion of the exterior parts inward, they will return inward towards the Centre of essential power; which they may easily do without resistance, the whole Subject being *penetrable*, and without damage, it being also *indiscerpible*.


3. From this *Self-penetration* we do not only easily, but necessarily, understand *Self-contraction* and *dilatation* to arise. For this *Self-moving Substance*, which we call a *Spirit*, cannot penetrate it self, but it must needs therewith contract it self; nor restore it self again to its former state, but it does thereby dilate it self: so that we need not at all insist upon these Terms.

4. That power which a *Spirit* has to *penetrate Matter* we may easily understand, if we consider a *Spirit* only as a Substance, whose immediate property is *Activity*. For then it is not harder to imagine this Active Substance to pervade this or the other part of *Matter*, than it is to conceive the pervading or disspreading of motion it self therein.

5. The

5. The greatest difficulty is to fancy how this *Spirit*, being so *Incorporeal*, can be able to move the *Matter*, though it be in it. For it seems so subtle, that it will pass through, leaving no more footsteps of its being there, than the Lightning does in the Scabbard, though it may haply melt the Sword, because it there finds resistance. But a *Spirit* can find no resistance any where, the closest *Matter* being easily penetrable and pervious to an *Incorporeal* Substance. The ground of this difficulty is founded upon the unconceivableness of any *Union* that can be betwixt the *Matter*, and a Substance that can so easily pass through it. For if we could but once imagine an *Union* betwixt *Matter* and a *Spirit*, the activity then of the *Spirit* would certainly have influence upon *Matter*, either for *begetting*, or *increasing*, or *directing* the *motion* thereof.

But notwithstanding the *Penetrability* and easy passage of a *Spirit* through *Matter*, there is yet for all that a capacity of a strong union betwixt them, and every whit as conceivable as betwixt the parts of *Matter* themselves. For what Glue or Cement holds the parts of hard matter in stones and metals together, or, if you will, of what is absolutely hard, that has no pores or particles, but is one continued and perfectly homogeneous body, not only to Sense, but according to the exact *Idea* of Reason? what Cement holds together the parts of such a Body as this? Certainly nothing but *immediate Union and Rest*. Now for *Union*, there is no comparison betwixt that of *Matter* with *Matter*, and this of *Spirit* with *Matter*. For the first is only superficial; in this latter the very inward parts are united point to point throughout. Nor is there any fear it will not take hold, because it has a capacity of passing through. For in this absolutely solid hard Body, which let be A, in which let us conceive some inward superficies, suppose E A C, this superficies is so smooth as nothing can be conceived smoother: why does not therefore the upper E D C slide upon the neather part E F C upon the least motion imaginable, especially E F C being suppos'd to be held fast whilst the other is thrust against? This facility therefore of one Body passing upon another without any sticking, seeming as necessary to our Phancy as a *Spirit's* passing through all Bodies without taking hold of them, it is plain, by Axiome 7. That a firm union of *Spirit* and *Matter* is very possible, though we cannot conceive the manner thereof.



And as for *Rest*, it is competible also to this conjunction of *Matter* with *Spirit*, as well as of *Matter* with *Matter*. For suppose the whole body A moved with like swiftness in every part, the parts of A then are * according to that sense of *Rest*, by which they would explain the adhesion of the parts of *Matter* one with another, truly quiescent. So say I that in the *Union* of *Matter* and *Spirit*, the parts of the *Matter* receiving from the *Spirit* just such a velocity of motion as the *Spirit* exerts, and no more, they both rest in firm *Union* one with another. That which comes to pass even then when there is far less immediate *Union* than we speak of. For if we do but lay a

Chap. 3.
Sect. 7, & 8.

Book on our Hand, provided our Hand be not moved with a swifter motion than it communicates to the Book, nor the Book be push'd on faster than the swiftness of our Hand; the Book and our Hand will most certainly retain their Union, and go together. So natural and easy is it to conceive how a *Spirit* may move a *Body* without any more perplexity or contradiction than is found in the *Union* and *Motion* of the parts of *Matter* it self. See the *Appendix* to my *Antidote*.

6. The last Term I put in the Definition of a *Spirit* is, *the power of altering the Matter*; which will necessarily follow from its *power of moving it, or directing its motion*. For *Alteration* is nothing else but the varying of either the *Figures*, or *postures*, or the degrees of motion in the particles; all which are nothing else but the results of *Local motion*. Thus have we cleared the *Intelligibility* and *possibility* of all the Terms that belong to the Notion of a *created Spirit* in general, at least of such as may be rationally conceived to be the causes of any visible *Phænomena* in the world: We will now descend to the defining of the chief *Species* thereof.

N O T E S

ON CHAP. VII. Sect. 1.

NOW *what is simply active of it self, &c.* That I understand to be simply active of it self, which wants no other thing to give occasion for its Acting, or for the exercising of its Activity: but when I affirm that all Spirits are active of themselves, I would not be so understood as if I should assert that they are all simply active of themselves; for so not so much as the Souls of Brutes could ever be in a State of Silence: I pass therefore here as by the by from the general Notion of Spirits to what is more special, in order to demonstrate their Existence: which yet I own to be done something preposterously of me.

Because it is reducible to rest, &c. From hence it plainly appears, that it is not simply active of it self, when yet it is necessary that something in the World be so; and consequently that there is some Substance distinct from Matter. According to this sense take the other Things contain'd in this Paragraph.

Sect. 5. *According to that sense of Rest by which they would explain the adhesion of the Parts of Matter one with another, &c.* This is certainly a way of arguing which ought to be esteem'd sufficiently valid with the *Cartesians*. But for what concerns my self, I take my self to have explain'd this matter, as well more truly as elaborately, in my *Appendix* to the *Antidote*, Ch. 3. Sect. 8.

CHAP.

C H A P. VIII.

1. Four main Species of Spirits. 2. How they are to be defined. 3. The definition of a Seminal Form; 4. Of the Soul of a Brute; 5. Of the Soul of a man. 6. The difference betwixt the Soul of an Angel and an Humane Soul. 7. The definition of an Angelical Soul. 8. Of the Platonical *Nées* and *Évades*. 9. That Des-Cartes his Demonstration of the Existence of the humane Soul does at least conclude the possibility of a Spirit.

1. **W**E have enumerated Four kinds of Spirits, viz. The *λόγοι σπερματικοί*, or Seminal Forms, the Souls of Brutes, the Humane Soul, and that Soul or Spirit which actuates or informs the vehicles of Angels: For I look upon Angels to be as truly a compound Being, consisting of Soul and Body, as that of Men and Brutes. Their Existence we shall not now go about to prove, for that belongs to another place. My present design is only to expound or define the notion of these things, so far forth as is needful for the evincing that they are the *Ideas* or Notions of things which imply no contradiction or impossibility in their conception; which will be very easy for us to perform: the chief difficulty lying in that more General notion of a Spirit, which we have so fully explained in the foregoing Chapters.

2. Now this General notion can be contracted into Kinds, by no other Differences than such as may be call'd peculiar Powers or Properties, belonging to one Spirit, and excluded from another, by the 8 Axiome. From whence it will follow, that if we describe these several kinds of Spirits by immediate and intrinsecal Properties, we have given as good Definitions of them as any one can give of any thing in the world.

3. We will begin with what is most simple, the Seminal Forms of things which, for the present, deciding nothing of their existence, according to their *idea possibilis*, we define thus; A Seminal Form is a created Spirit organizing duly-prepar'd Matter into life and vegetation, proper to this or the other kind of Plant. It is beyond my imagination what can be excepted against this Description, it containing nothing but what is very coherent and intelligible. For in that it is a Spirit, it can move Matter intrinsecally, or at least direct the motion thereof: But in that it is not an Omnipotent Spirit, but Finite and Created, its power may well be restrained to duly-prepar'd Matter, both for vital union and motion; He that has made these Particular Spirits, varying their Faculties of Vital Union, according to the diversity of the preparation of Matter, and so limiting the whole comprehension of them all, that none of them may be able to be vitally join'd with any Matter whatever: And the same first Cause of all things that gives them a power of uniting with, and moving of Matter duly prepared, may also set such laws to this motion, that when it lights on matter fit for it, it will produce such and such a Plant, that is to say, it will shape the matter into such Figure, Colour, and other properties, as we discover in them by our Senses.

4. This

* See Book 3.
ch. 12, and
13.

4. This is the First degree of *Particular Life* in the world, * if there be any purely of this degree Particular. But now, as *Aristotle* has somewhere noted, the *Essences* of things are like Numbers, whose *Species* are changed by adding or taking away an Unite: add therefore another *Intrinsic* power to this of *Vegetation*, viz. *Sensation*, and it becomes the *Soul of a Beast*. For in truth the bare Substance it self is not to be computed in explicate knowledge, it being utterly in it self unconceivable, and therefore we will only reckon upon the Powers. A Subject therefore from whence is both *Vegetation* and *Sensation*, * is the general notion of the *Soul of a Brute*. Which is distributed into a number of kinds, the effect of every *Intrinsic* power being discernible in the constant shape and properties of every distinct kind of Brute Creatures.

5. If we add to *Vegetation* and *Sensation* *Reason* properly so call'd, * we have then a settled notion of the *Soul of Man*; which we may more compleatly describe thus: A created Spirit endued with Sense and Reason, and a power of organizing terrestrial Matter into humane shape by vital union therewith.

6. And herein alone, I conceive, does the *Spirit* or *Soul* of an *Angel* (for I take the boldness to call that *Soul*, whatever it is, that has a power of vitally actuating the Matter) differ from the *Soul* of a *Man*, in that the *Soul* of an *Angel* may vitally actuate an *Aereal* or *Æthereal* Body, * but cannot be born in this *Terrestrial* one.

7. To make an end therefore of our Definitions: an *Angelical* *Soul* is very intelligibly described thus; A created Spirit indued with Reason, Sensation, and a power of being vitally united with, and actuating of a Body of Air or *Æther* only. Which power over an *Aereal* or *Æthereal* Body is very easily to be understood out of that general notion of a Spirit in the foregoing Chapters. For it being there made good, that union with Matter is not incompetent to a Spirit, and consequently nor moving of it, nor that kind of motion in a Spirit which we call *Contraction* and *Dilatation*; these Powers, if carefully considered, will necessarily infer the possibility of the Actuation and Union of an *Angelical* *Soul* with an *Æthereal* or *Aiery* Body.

8. The *Platonists* write of other Orders of *Spirits* or *Immaterial Substances*, * as the *Nôes* and *Évêdes*. But there being more Subtily than either usefulness or assurance in such like Speculations, I shall pass them over at this time; having already, I think, irrefutably made good, That there is no incongruity nor impossibility compris'd in the Notion of Spirit, or *Incorporeal Substance*.

9. But there is yet another way of inferring the same, and it is the Argument of *Des-Cartes*, whereby he would conclude that there is, *de facto*, a Substance in us distinct from Matter, viz. our own Mind. For every real Affection or Property being the Mode of some Substance or other, and real Modes being unconceivable without their Subject, he infers that, seeing we can doubt whether there be any such thing as Body in the world, (by which doubting we exclude Cogitation from Body) there must be some other Substance distinct from the Body, to which Cogitation belongs.

But

But I must confess this Argument will not reach home to *Des-Cartes* his purpose, who would prove in Man a *Substance distinct from his Body*. For being there may be *Modes* common to more Subjects than one, and this of *Cogitation* may be pretended * to be such as is compatible as well to Substance *Corporeal* as *Incorporeal*, it may be conceived apart from either, though not from both. And therefore his Argument does not prove, That that in us, which does *think* or *perceive*, is a Substance distinct from our Body, but only, That there may be such a Substance which has the power of *thinking* or *perceiving*, which yet is not a *Body*. For it being impossible that there should be any *real Mode* which is in no Subject, and we clearly conceiving * *Cogitation* independent for existence on *Corporeal Substance*; it is necessary, That there may be some other Substance on which it may depend; which must needs be a Substance *Incorporeal*.

N O T E S

On CHAP. VIII. Sect. 4.

IS the general Notion of the Soul of a Brute, &c. If therefore there be any Sense as well as Plastick Life to be acknowledg'd in the Spirit of Nature, a Scruple may arise, whether this Spirit may not be called, the Soul of a Brute; and so the world it self a Brute. And truly whether they will restrain this Word to particular Animals only, or extend it unto the World, to me is very indifferent: in this let 'em do as they please. Nor if it be call'd a Brute, am I extremely against it; since it may be a means to shame them, who are captivated over-much by this Spirit of the world, when they take notice that on this account also, they are not undeservedly to be esteem'd as so many mere Brutes or Beasts.

Sect. 5. We have then a settled Notion of the Soul of a Man, &c. Unless the Signification of the Word *Man* be taken somewhat largely, so as to include *Angels*, (as indeed the Similitude of Nature may in a sort extend it self so far) this is not the adequate Notion of a Man, since it reacheth up however even to the Angelical Orders, who, without all question, are indued with reason. The Definition therefore of a humane Soul, properly so called, follows more completely in the next Words.

Sect. 6. But cannot be born into this World in a terrestrial one, &c. There are some of the *Cabbalists* that think otherwise: but I see no Cause to change my Opinion in this Matter. See *Myst. of Godlin. B. 5. Ch. 6. Sect. 4.*

Sect. 8. As the *Nóes* and *Évades*, &c. See *Proclus* his *Theological Institutions*: The Place is remarkable, Chap. 21. *Μετὰ τὸ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πρῶτοις, ἐν ἅπασι, &c.* After therefore the first One are the Unities; and after the first Mind, the Minds; and after the first Soul, the Souls; and after that universal Nature, the Natures. Where, by that universal Nature, the Spirit of Nature may be rightly understood: by Natures the particular Seminal Forms,

Forms, if there were any such; for I think that there are none besides the *Plasticks* of particular Souls. But as to these *Ἑνάδες* and *Νόες*, they very frequently occur in *Proclus* in the Tract aforesaid, and are call'd *πλῆθος ἐνάδων*, καὶ *πλῆθος νόων*, a *Multitude of Unities*, and a *Multitude of Minds*. But that these *Unities*, as well as *Minds*, are certain Essences, not Operations or Affections, plainly appears from *Chap. 62.* where he saith, *ὅτι πλείους μὲν αἱ σωματικαὶ φύσεις τῶν ψυχῶν, πλείους δὲ αὐταὶ τῶν νοερῶν, οἱ δὲ νόες τῶν θείων ἐνάδων.* Where, from the Comparison of *Souls*, *Minds*, and *Unities* amongst themselves, 'tis manifest, that they are all spiritual Essences: The *Unities* of which kind he calls, *αὐτοτελεῖς ἐνάδας*, *self-sufficient Unities*; and the *Minds*, *substantial Minds*, *νόες ὑσιώδεις*, *Chap. 64.* And *Chap. 14.* *Πᾶς θεὸς ἐνὰς ἐστὶν αὐτοτελής, καὶ πᾶσα αὐτοτελής Ἑνὰς θεός.* Every God is a *self-sufficient Unity*, and every *self-sufficient Unity* a God. See also *Chap. 111.* Like to which is that which occurs *Chap. 133.* *Πᾶς μὲν θεὸς ἐνὰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθουργὸς ἢ ἀγαθότης ἐνοποιὸς*, &c. As if it were all one whether we call these most simple Essences which answer to the *first one*, or to the *τ' ἀγαθῶν*, the *Good*, *Unities* or *Deities*.

Sect. 9. To be such as is *competible* as well to *Substance corporeal* as *incorporeal*, &c. And truly by an equally specious Sophism, might that so celebrated Philosopher *Cartesius* have prov'd Thinking to belong to a corporeal Substance, as he hath prov'd it to belong to an incorporeal one: Infomuch that I can scarce sufficiently admire his either Carelessness or Unfaithfulness in Matters of Religion, and in his metaphysical Speculations. For who can be so slow or regardless in his Temper, as not to see the equal force of his Arguments for the proving it *incompetible* to Spirit also? For there are more that doubt concerning the Existence of Spirits, or of an incorporeal Substance, than of the Existence of Matter; from whence it would follow, that Thinking should be *competible* to Matter. But these are the Sports and Toyings of the *Cartesian* Philosophy in things of this nature, tho' of the greatest moment; as cannot but appear to any one that will seriously and deliberately speak his Mind as to these Controversies.

Cogitation independent for Existence on corporeal Substance, &c. Namely, so as the animal nature is independent on the nature of a Brute; for it might be preserv'd in the humane Nature, tho' there were no Brutes in Being.

C H A P. IX.

1. That it is of no small consequence to have proved the Possibility of the Existence of a Spirit.
2. The necessity of examining of Mr. Hobbs his Reasons to the contrary.
3. The first Excerption out of Mr. Hobbs.
4. The second Excerption.
5. The third.
6. The fourth.
7. The fifth.
8. The sixth.
9. The seventh.
10. The eighth, and last Excerption.

I have been, I believe, to admiration curious and solicitous to make good, That the Existence of a Spirit or Incorporeal Substance is possible. But there is no reason any one should wonder that

I have spent so much pains to make so small and inconsiderable a progress, as to bring the thing only to a bare possibility. For though I may seem to have gained little to my self, yet I have thereby given a very signal overthrow to the adverse party, whose strongest hold seems to be an unshaken confidence, That the very Notion of a *Spirit*, or *Substance Immaterial*, is a perfect Impossibility and pure Non-sence. From whence are insinuated, no better Consequences than these: That it is impossible that there should be any God, or Soul, or Angel, Good or Bad; or any Immortality, or Life to come. That there is no Religion, no Piety nor Impiety, no Virtue nor Vice, Justice nor Injustice, but what it pleases him that has the longest Sword to call so. That there is no Freedom of Will, nor consequently any rational remorse of Conscience in any Being whatsoever, but that all that is, is nothing but *Matter* and *corporeal Motion*; and that therefore every trace of man's life is as necessary as the tracts of Lightning, and the fallings of Thunder, the blind *impetus* of the *Matter* breaking through or being stopt every where, with as certain and determinate necessity as the course of a Torrent after mighty storms and showers of Rain.

2. And verily considering of what exceeding great consequence it is to root out this fullen conceit that some have taken up concerning *Incorporeal Substance*, as if it bore a contradiction in the very terms, I think I shall be wanting to so weighty a Cause, if I shall content my self with a bare recitation of the Reasons whereby I prove it possible, and not produce their Arguments that seem most able to maintain the contrary. And truly I do not remember that I ever met with any one yet that may justly be suspected to be more able to make good this Province than our Countryman Mr. *Hobbs*, whose inexuperable confidence of the truth of the Conclusion may well assure any man, that duly considers the excellency of his natural Wit and Parts, that he has made choice of the most Demonstrative Arguments that humane Invention can search out for the eviction thereof.

3. And that I may not incur the suspicion of mistaking his Assertion, or misrepresenting the force of his Reasons, I shall here punctually set them down in the same words I find them in his own Writings, that any man may judge if I do him any wrong. The first place I shall take notice of is in his * *Leviathan*. The word *Body*, in the* Chap. 34. most general acceptation, signifies that which filleth or occupieth some certain room or imagined place; and dependeth not on the Imagination, but is a real part of that we call the Universe. For the Universe being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe. The same also, because Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living Creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, subject to various Accidents; as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our Senses, sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smell, Taste, or Sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming, (produc'd by the diversity of the operation of Bodies on the Organs of our Sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate, and call them Accidents of those Bodies.

And

And according to this acceptation of the word, Substance and Body signify the same thing; and therefore Substance Incorporeal are words which, when they are join'd together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an Incorporeal Body.

Part 4. chap.
25. Article 9.

4. The second Place is his Physicks. But it is here to be observed, that certain Dreams, especeally such as some men have when they are betwixt sleeping and waking, and such as happen to those that have no knowledge of the nature of Dreams, and are withal superstitious, were not heretofore, nor are now accounted Dreams. For the Apparitions men thought they saw, and the voices they thought they heard in sleep, were not believ'd to be Phantasms, but things subsisting of themselves, and Objects without those that Dreamed. For to some men, as well sleeping as waking, but especially to guilty men, and in the night, and in hallow'd places, Fear alone, help'd a little with the stories of such Apparitions, hath raised in their minds terrible Phantasms, which have been, and are still, deceitfully receiv'd for things really true, under the names of Ghosts and Incorporeal Substances.

Part 1. chap.
5. Article 4.

5. We will add a third out of the same Book. For seeing Ghosts, sensible species, a shadow, light, colour, sound, space, &c. appear to us no less sleeping than waking, they cannot be things without us, but only Phantasms of the mind that imagines them.

Chap. 11.
Article 4.

6. And a fourth out of his Humane Nature. But Spirits supernatural commonly signify some Substance without dimension, which two words do flatly contradict one another. And Artic. 5. Nor I think is that word Incorporeal at all in the Bible, but it is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in men, sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh, and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers; all which do imply Locality, and Locality is Dimension, and whatsoever hath dimension is Body, be it never so subtle.

Leviathan,
chap. 12.

7. The fifth Excerption shall be again out of his Leviathan. And for the Matter or Substance of the invisible agents so fancy'd, they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soul of Man, and that the Soul of Man was of the same Substance with that which appeareth in a Dream to one that sleepeth, or in a Looking-glass to one that is awake: Which, men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be real and external Substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latins called them Imagines and Umbræ; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them, save that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeal or Immaterial could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory Signification, as Spirit and Incorporeal, yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them.

Chap. 11.
Article 5.

We will help out this further from what he also writes in his Humane Nature. To know that a Spirit is, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is impossible. For all evidence is conception, and all conception is imagination, and proceedeth from Sense; and Spirits we suppose to be those Substances which work upon the Sense, and therefore are not conceivable.

8. The

8. The sixth, out of Chap. 45. where he writes thus: *This nature of Leviathan, Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to Natural knowledge, much less by those that consider things not so remote (as that Knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy and in the Sense, otherwise than of things really without us. Which some (because they vanish away they know not whither nor how) will have to be absolutely Incorporeal, that is to say, Immaterial, or Forms without Matter, Colour, and Figure, without any coloured or figured Body; and that they can put on airy bodies, (as a garment) to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and others say, are Bodies and living Creatures, but made of Air, or other more subtle and aethereal matter, which is then, when they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, Demons. As if the dead of whom they dream'd were not the Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven or Hell, not Phantasms but Ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say, he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-glass, or the Ghosts of the stars in a River, or call the ordinary Apparition of the Sun of the quantity of about a foot, the Demon or Ghost of that great Sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world.* Leviathan, chap. 45.

9. The seventh is out of the next Chapter of the same Book. *Where he again taking to task that Jargon, as he calls it, of Abstract Essences and Substantial Forms, writes thus: The world (I mean not the Earth only, but the Universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is Corporeal, that is to say, Body, and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth, and Depth; also every part of Body is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently no where.* Leviathan, chap. 46.

10. The eighth and last, we have a little after in the same Chapter, which runs thus; *Being once fallen into this error of separated Essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them Incorporeal without all dimension of Quantity, and all men know that place is Dimension, and not to be filled but by that which is corporeal, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where Circumscriptive, but Definitive. Which terms, being mere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latin, that the vanity of them might be concealed. For the circumscription of a thing is nothing else but the determination or defining of its place, and so both the terms of distinction are the same. And in particular of the essence of a man, which they say is his Soul, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part (how small soever) of his Body, and yet no more Soul in the whole Body, than in any one of these parts. Can any man think that God is served with such Absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe to those that will believe the existence of an Incorporeal Soul separated from the Body.*

C H A P. X.

1. *An Answer to the first Excerption.* 2. *To the second.* 3. *An Answer to the third.* 4. *To the fourth Excerption.* 5. *An Answer to the fifth.* 6. *To the sixth.* 7. *To the seventh.* 8. *An Answer to the eighth and last.* 9. *A brief Recapitulation of what has been said hitherto.*

1. **W**E have set down the chiefest passages in the Writings of Mr. Hobbs, that confident Exploder of *Immaterial Substances* out of the world. It remains now that we examine them, and see whether the force of his Arguments bears any proportion to the firmness of his belief, or rather misbelief, concerning these things. To strip therefore the first Excerption of that long *Ambages* of words, and to reduce it to a more plain and compendious form of reasoning, the force of his Argument lies thus: *That seeing every thing in the Universe is Body, (the Universe being nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies) Body and Substance are but names of one and the same thing; it being called Body as it fills a place, and Substance as it is the Subject of several Alterations and Accidents. Wherefore Body and Substance being all one, Incorporeal Substance is no better sense than an Incorporeal Body, which is a contradiction in the very terms.* But it is plain to all the world, that this is not to prove, but to suppose what is to be proved, That the Universe is nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies: When he has proved that, we will acknowledge the sequel; till then, he has proved nothing, and therefore this first argumentation must pass for nought.

2. Let us examine the strength of the second, which certainly must be this, if any at all; *That which has its original merely from Dreams, Fears, and Superstitious Fancies, has no real existence in the world: But Incorporeal Substances have no other Original.* The Proposition is a Truth indubitable, but the Assumption is as weak as the other is strong; whether you understand it of the real Original of these Substances, or of the Principles of our knowledge, That they are. And be their Original what it will, it is nothing to us, but so far forth as it is cognoscible to us, by Axiome first. And therefore when he says, they have no other Original than that of our own Phancy, he must be understood to affirm, that there is no other Principle of the knowledge of their Existence, than that we vainly imagine them to be; which is grossly false.

For it is not the *Dreams* and *Fears* of Melancholick and Superstitious persons, from which Philosophers and Christians have argued the Existence of *Spirits* and *Immaterial Substances*; but from the evidence of * *External Objects* of Sense, that is, the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature, in which there is discoverable so profound Wisdom and Counsel, that they could not but conclude that the Order of things in the world was from a higher Principle, than the blind motions and jumbings of Matter and mere Corporeal Beings.

To which you may add what usually they call * *Apparitions*, which are so far from being merely the *Dreams* and *Fancies* of the Superstitious,

* See my *Antidote against Atheism*, the whole second Book.

* See my *Antidote*, the whole third Book.

ous, that they are acknowledged by such as cannot but be deem'd by most men over-Atheistical, I mean Pomponatius and Cardan, nay, by Vaninus himself, though so devoted to Atheism, that out of a perfect mad zeal to that despicable cause he dy'd for it. I omit to name the *Operations of the * Soul*, which ever appeared to the wisest of all Ages of such a transcendent condition, that they could not judge them to spring from so contemptible a Principle as *bare Body or Matter*. Wherefore to decline all these, and to make representation only of *Dreams and Fancies* to be the occasions of the world's concluding that there are *Incorporeal Substances*, is to fancy his Reader a mere fool, and publickly to profess that he has a mind to impose upon him.

* *Antid. Book*
1. Chap. 11.

3. The third argumentation is this: *That which appears to us as well sleeping as waking, is nothing without us: But Ghosts, that is, Immaterial Substances, appear to us as well sleeping as waking.* This is the weakest Argument that has been yet produc'd: for both the Proposition and Assumption are false. For if the Proposition were true, the Sun, Moon, Stars, Clouds, Rivers, Meadows, Men, Women, and other living Creatures, were nothing without us: For all these appear to us as well when we are *sleeping* as *waking*. For the Notion of an *Incorporeal Substance* is so subtile and refined, that it leaving little or no impression on the *Phancy*, its representation is merely supported by the free power of *Reason*, which seldom exercises it self in *sleep*, unless upon easy imaginable Phantasms.

4. The force of the fourth Argument is briefly this: *Every Substance has dimensions; but a Spirit has no dimensions.* Here I confidently deny the Assumption. For it is not the Characteristick of a *Body* to have *Dimensions*, but to be *Impenetrable*. All Substance has *Dimensions*, that is, Length, Breadth, and Depth: But all has not *Impenetrability*. See my Letters to Monsieur Des-Cartes, besides what I have here writ in this present Treatise.

Book 1. ch. 2,
and 3.

5. In the Excerptions belonging to the fifth place, these Arguments are compris'd. 1. *That we have no principle of knowledge of any Immaterial Being, but such as a Dream, or a Looking-glass furnisheth us withal.* 2. *That the word Spirit, or Incorporeal, implies a contradiction, and cannot be contain'd to be sense by a natural Understanding.* 3. *That nothing is conceived by the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, and therefore Spirits not acting upon the Senses, must remain unknown and unconceivable.*

We have already answered to the first, in what we have returned to his second Argument in the second Excerption.

To the second I answer, That *Spirit* or *Incorporeal* implies no contradiction, there being nothing understood thereby but *Extended Substance* with *Activity* and *Indiscerpibility*, leaving out *Impenetrability*: Which I have above demonstrated to be the Notion of a thing possible, and need not repeat what I have already written.

To the third I answer, That *Spirits* do act really upon the *Senses*, by acting upon *Matter* that affects the *Senses*, and some of these Operations being such, that they cannot be rationally attributed to the *Matter* alone, *Reason*, by the information of the *Senses*, concludes, that there is some other more noble Principle distinct from the *Matter*.

ter. And as for that part of the Argument that asserts, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, I * have, and shall again, in its || due place, demonstrate it to be a very gross Error.

* Antidote,
Book 1. ch. 6.
Append. ch. 2.
sect. 4, 5, 6,
Etc.
|| Book 2. ch. 2.
sect. 9, 10, 11.

But in the mean time I conclude, that the Substance of every thing being utterly unconceivable, by Axiome 8. and it being only the *Immediate Properties* by which a man conceives every thing, and the Properties of *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* being as easy to conceive, as of *Discerpibility* and *Impenetrability*, and the power of communicating of motion to *Matter*, as easy as the *Matter's* reception of it, and the Union of *Matter* with *Spirit*, as of *Matter* with *Matter*; it plainly follows, that the Notion of a *Spirit* is as naturally conceivable as the Notion of a *Body*.

6. In his sixth Excerption he is very copious in jeering and making ridiculous the opinion of *Ghosts* and *Demons*; but the strength of his Argument, if it have any, is this, viz. *If there be any such things as Ghosts or Demons, then they are (according to them that hold this opinion) either those Images reflected from Water or Looking-glasses, cloathing themselves in airy garments, and so wandring up and down; or else they are living Creatures made of nothing but Air, or some more subtile and Aethereal Matter.* One might well be amaz'd to observe such slight and vain arguing come from so grave a Philosopher, were not a man well aware that his peculiar eminency, as himself somewhere professes, lies in *Politicks*, to which the Humours and Bravadoes of Eloquence, especially among the simple, is a very effectual and serviceable instrument. And certainly such Rhetoricians as this cannot be intended for any, but such as are of the very weakest capacity.

Those two groundless conceits that he would obtrude upon the sober Assertors of *Spirits* and *Demons* belong not to them, but are the genuine issue of his own Brain. For, for the former of them, it is most justly adjudged to him, as the first Author thereof; it being a Rarity, which neither my self nor (I dare say) any else ever met with out of Mr. *Hobbs* his Writings. And the latter, he does not only go about to confute here, but makes a shew of allowing it, for fear he should seem to deny Scripture, in Chap. 34. of his *Leviathan*. But those that assert the Existence of *Spirits*, will not stand to Mr. *Hobbs* his choice for defining of them, but will make use of their own Reason and Judgment for the settling of so concerning a Notion.

7. In his seventh Excerption is contained the same Argument that was found in the first; but to deal fairly and candidly, I must confess it is better back'd than before. For there he supposes, but does not prove, the chief ground of his Argument; but here he offers at a proof of it, couch'd, as I conceive, in these words, [*and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth, and Depth*] for hence he would infer, that the whole Universe is *Corporeal*, that is to say, every thing in the Universe, because there is nothing but has *Length, Breadth, and Depth*. This therefore is the very last ground his Argument is to be resolved into. But how weak it is, I have already intimated, it being not *Trinal Dimension*, but *Impenetrability*, that constitutes a *Body*.

8. This

8. This last Excerption seems more considerable than any of the former, or all of them put together: but when the force of the Arguments therein contained is duly weigh'd, they will be found of as little efficacy to make good the Conclusion as the rest. The first Argument runs thus; *Whatsoever is real, must have some place: But Spirits can have no place.* But this is very easily answered. For if nothing else be understood by *Place*, but *Imaginary Space*, Spirits and Bodies may be in the same *Imaginary Space*, and so the Assumption is false. But if by *Place* be meant the *Concave Superficies of one Body immediately environing another Body*, so that it be conceiv'd to be of the very Formality of a *Place*, immediately to environ the *Corporeal Superficies* of that Substance which is said to be plac'd; then it is impossible that a *Spirit* should be properly said to be in a *Place*, and so the Proposition will be false. Wherefore there being these two acceptations of *Place*, that Distinction of being there *Circumscriptive* and *Definitive*, is an allowable Distinction, and the terms may not signify one and the same thing. But if we will, with Mr. Hobbs, (and I know no great hurt if we should do so) confine the Notion of *Place* to *Imaginary Space*, this distinction of the Schools will be needless here, and we may, without any more ado, assert, That *Spirits* are as truly in *Place* as *Bodies*.

His second Argument is drawn from the Scholastick Riddle, which, I must confess, seems to verge too near to profound Non-sense, That the Soul of man is *tota in toto*, and *tota in qualibet parte corporis*. This mad Jingle it seems has so frightened Mr. Hobbs sometime or other, that he never since could endure to come near the Notion of a *Spirit* again, not so much as to consider whether it were a mere Bug-bear, or some real Being. But if Passion had not surpriz'd his better Faculties, he might have found a true settled meaning thereof, and yet secluded these wild intricacies, that the heedless Schools seem to have charged it with: For the *Immediate Properties* of a *Spirit* are very well intelligible without these *Ænigmatical flourishes*, viz. That it is a *Substance Penetrable and indiscerpible*, as I have already shewn at large.

Nor is that Scholastick *Ænigme* necessary to be believed by all those that would believe the Existence of an *Incorporeal Soul*; nor do I believe Mr. Hobbs his interpretation of this Riddle to be so necessary. And it had been but fair play to have been assured, that the Schools held such a perfect contradiction, before he pronounced the belief thereof necessary to all those that would hold the Soul of Man an *Immaterial Substance, separable from the Body*. I suppose they may mean nothing by it but what Plato did by his making the Soul to consist *ἐν μετέωρῳ καὶ ἀμετέωρῳ τόλῳ*: nor Plato any thing more by that *divisible and indivisible Substance*, than an Essence that is intellectually divisible, but really indiscerpible.

9. We have now firmly made good, that the Notion of a *Spirit* implies no contradiction nor impossibility in it; but is the Notion or *Idea* of a thing that may possibly be. Which I have done so punctually and particularly, that I have cleared every *Species* of *Substances Incorporeal* from the imputation of either obscurity or inconsistency.

ency. And that I might not seem to take advantage in pleading their cause in the absence of the adverse party, I have brought in the most able Advocate, and the most assured that I have hitherto ever met withal; and dare now appeal to any indifferent Judge, whether I have not demonstrated all his Allegations to be weak and inconclusive. Wherefore having so clearly evinced the possibility of the Existence of a Spirit, we shall now make a step further, and prove, That it is not only a thing possible, but that it is really and actually in Nature.

CHAP. XI.

1. Three grounds to prove the Existence of an Immaterial Substance, whereof the first is fetch'd from the Nature of God. 2. The second from the Phenomenon of Motion in the World. 3. That the Matter is not Self-moveable. 4. An Objection that the Matter may be part Self-moved, part not. 5. The first Answer to the Objection. 6. The second Answer. 7. Other Evasions answered. 8. The last Evasion of all answered. 9. The Conclusion, That no Matter is Self-moved, but that a certain quantity of motion was impressed upon it at its first Creation by God.

1. **T**HERE be three main Grounds from whence a man may be assured of the Existence of Spiritual or Immaterial Substance. The one is, the consideration of the transcendent excellency of the Nature of God; who being, according to the true *Idea* of him, an *Essence absolutely Perfect*, cannot possibly be *Body*, and consequently must be something *Incorporeal*: and seeing that there is no contradiction in the Notion of a *Spirit in general*, nor in any of those kinds of *Spirits* which we have defin'd, (where the Notion of God was set down amongst the rest) and that in the very Notion of him there is contained the reason of his Existence, as you may see at large in my * *Antidote*; certainly if we find any thing at all to be, we may safely conclude, that He is much more. For there is nothing besides Him of which one can give a reason why it is, unless we suppose him to be the Author of it. Wherefore though God be neither *Visible* nor *Tangible*, yet his very *Idea* representing to our Intellectual Faculties the necessary reason of his Existence, we are, by Axiome 5. (though we had no other Argument drawn from our Senses) confidently to conclude, That He is.

2. The second ground is, the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature, the most general whereof is *Motion*. Now it seems to me demonstrable from hence, That there is some Being in the World distinct from *Matter*. * For *Matter* being of one simple homogeneous nature, and not distinguishable by specific differences, as the Schools speak, it must have every where the very same Essential properties; and therefore of it self it must all of it be either without motion, or else be self-moving, and that in such or such a tenor, or measure of motion; there being no reason imaginable, why one part of the *Matter* should

move

* Book I.
chap. 7, 8.

move of it self less than another; and therefore if there be any such thing, it can only arise from external Impediment.

3. Now I say, if *Matter* be utterly devoid of motion in it self, it is plain, it had its motion from some other Substance, which is necessarily a Substance that is not *Matter*, that is to say, a *Substance Incorporeal*. But if it be moved of it self, in such or such a measure, the effect here being an *Emanative effect*, cannot possibly fail to be wherever *Matter* is, by Axiome 17. especially if there be no external impediment: And there is no impediment at all, but that the Terrestrial parts might regain an activity very nigh equal to the *Æthereal*, or rather, never have lost it. For if the Planets had but a common *Dividend* of all the motion which themselves, and the Sun and Stars, and all the *Æthereal* matter possess, (the matter of the Planets being so little, in comparison of that of the *Sun*, *Stars*, and *Æther*) the proportion of motion that will fall due to them, would be exceeding much above what they have. For it would be as if four or five poor men in a very rich and populous City should, by giving up that estate they have, in a levelling way, get equal share with all the rest. Wherefore every Planet could not fail of melting it self into little less finer Substance than the purest *Æther*. But they not doing so, it is a sign they have not that Motion nor Agitation of themselves, and therefore rest content with what has extrinsically accrued to them, be it less or more.

4. But the pugnacious, to evade the stroke of our *Dilemma*, will make any bold shift; and though they affront their own Faculties in saying so, yet they will say, and must say, That part of the *Matter* is self-moving, part without motion of it self.

5. To this I answer, That first, this Evasion of theirs is not so agreeable to Experience; but, so far as either our Sense or Reason can reach, there is the same *Matter* every where. For consider the *subtilest parts of Matter* discoverable here below, those which for their Subtility are invisible, and for their Activity wonderful, I mean those particles that cause that vehement agitation we feel in *Winds*: They in time lose their motion, become of a visible vaporous consistency, and turn to Clouds, then to Snow or Rain, after haply to Ice it self; but then in process of time, first melted into Water, then exhaled into Vapours, after more fiercely agitated, do become *Wind* again. And that we may not think that this Reciprocation into *Motion* and *Rest* belongs only to *Terrestrial* particles; that the *Heavens* themselves be of the same *Matter*, is apparent from the Ejections of *Comets* into our *Vortex*, and the perpetual rising of those Spots and Scum upon the Face of the Sun.

6. But Secondly, to return to what is still more pungent. This *Matter* that is *Self-moved*, in the impressing of Motion upon other *Matter*, either loses of its own motion, or retains it still entire. If the first, it may be despoiled of all its motion: and so that whose immediate nature is to *move*, shall *rest*, the entire cause of its motion still remaining, *viz.* it self: which is a plain contradiction by Axiome 17. If the second, no meaner an inconvenience than this will follow, That the whole world had been turned into pure *Æther* by this time, if not into

into a perfect flame, or at least will be in the conclusion, to the utter destruction of all corporeal Consistencies. For, that these *Self-moving parts of Matter* are of a considerable copiousness, the event does testify, they having melted almost all the world already into *Suns, Stars, and Aether*; nothing remaining but *Planets* and *Comets* to be dissolved: Which, all put together, scarce bear so great a proportion to the rest of the Matter of the Universe, as an ordinary grain of sand to the whole ball of the Earth. Wherefore so potent a Principle of Motion still adding new motion to *Matter*, and no motion once communicated being lost, (for, according to the laws of Motion, no Body loses any more motion than it communicates to another) it plainly follows, that either the World had been utterly burnt up 'ere now, or will be at least in an infinite less time than it has existed, nay, I may say absolutely, in a very little time, and will never return to any frame of things again; which though it possibly may be, yet none but a mad-man will assert, by Axiome 2. And that it has not yet been since the first *Epoches* of History, seems a Demonstration that this second Hypothesis is false.

7. There is yet another Evasion or two, which, when they are answered, there will be no Scruple remaining touching this point. The *First* is, That the *Matter* is all of it homogeneous, or of the like nature every where, and that it is the common Property of it all to be of it self indifferent to *Motion* or *Rest*; and therefore that it is no wonder that some of it *moves*, and other-some of it *rests*, or *moves less* than other-some. To which I answer, That *this Indifferency* of the *Matter* to *Motion* or *Rest*, may be understood two ways: Either *privatively*, that is to say, That it has not any real or active propension to *Rest*, more than to *Motion*, or *vice versâ*, but is merely passive and susceptible of what *Motion* or *Fixation* some other Agent confers upon it, and keeps that modification exactly and perpetually, till again some other Agent change it; (in which sense I allow the Assertion to be true, but it makes nothing against us, but for us, it plainly implying, That there is an *Incorporeal Substance*, distinct from the *Matter*, from whence the *Matter* both is, and must be *moved*.) Or else, *this Indifferency* is to be understood *positively*, that is to say, That the *Matter* has a real and active propension as well to *Motion* as to *Rest*, so that it *moveth* it self, and *fixeth* it self from its own immediate nature. From whence there are but these two Absurdities that follow: the *First*: That two absolutely contrary properties are *immediately* seated in one simple Subject; than which nothing can seem more harsh and unhandsome to our Logical faculties; unless the *Second*, which is, That *Motion* and *Rest* being thus the *Emanative* effects of this one simple Subject, the *Matter* will both *move* and *rest at once*; or, if they do not understand by *Rest*, Fixation, but a mere absence of Motion, That it will both move, and not move at once. For what is *immediate* to any Subject will not cease to be, the Subject not being destroy'd, by Axiome 17.

Nor will they much help themselves by fancying, that *Matter* necessarily exerting both these *immediate* powers or properties at once of *Motion* and *Rest*, moves her self to such a measure, and no swifter. For this position is but coincident with the second member of the *Dilemma*.

lemma, Sect. 3. of this Chapter, and therefore the same Argument will serve for both places.

The other Evasion is, by supposing part of the *Matter* to be *Self-moving*, and part of it *self-resting*, in a positive sense, or *Self-fixing*: Which is particularly directed against what we have argued, Sect. 6. For thus they would avoid that hasty and universal Conflagration there inferred. But that this Supposition is false, is manifest from Experience. For if there be any such *Self-fixing* parts of *Matter*, they are certainly in Gold and Lead, and such like Metals; but it is plain, that they are not there. For what is *Self-fixing*, will immediately be reduc'd to *Rest*, so soon as external violence is taken off, by Axiome 17. Whence it will follow, that though these *Self-fixing* parts of *Matter* may be carried by other *Matter*, while they are made fast to it, yet left free, they will suddenly *rest*, they having the immediate cause of *Fixation* in themselves. Nor can any one distrust that the change will be so sudden, if he consider how suddenly an external force puts *Matter* upon motion. But a Bullet of gold or lead put thus upon motion, swift or slow, does not suddenly reduce it self to *rest*. Whence it plainly appears, that this other Evasion contradicts Experience, and therefore has no force against our former Arguments.

8. The utmost Evasion the Wit of man can possibly excogitate, is that Figment of a certain *Divine Matter* dispersed in the World, which some conceit the only *Numen* thereof, whose motions they make not necessary, but voluntary; where they would decline * that exorbitant inconvenience, mentioned in the sixth Section of this Chapter. But the opinion seems to me very harsh and prodigious for these reasons following.

First, They seem very absurd in imagining this to be the *Numen* of the World, or God himself, it being so inconsistent with *Personality*, and the *Unity* of the Godhead to be made up of an infinite number of interspersed *Atoms* amidst the *Matter* of the World: For this cannot be one God in any sense; nor a single *Divine* Atome an entire Deity. From whence it would follow, that there is no God at all.

And then in the second place, They acknowledging this *Divine Matter* to be *Matter*, acknowledge therewith *Impenetrability* and *Juxtaposition* of parts, diversity also of figure, and, where there are no pores at all, absolute *Solidity* and *Hardness*. Whence it is manifest, that whatsoever Reasonings are strong against *Ordinary Matter*, for making it incapable of *Perception* and *free Action*, from the *Nature* and *Idea* thereof, they are as strong against this, on which they have conferred the title of *Divine*.

See Book 2.
ch. 2. sect. 8.

And thirdly and lastly, That there is no such *Divine Matter* interspersed amongst the *subtile Matter* of the World, that can act freely and knowingly, *Effects* also and *Experiments* plainly declare, as I have abundantly noted in my *Antidote against Atheism*.

9. Wherefore it is most rational to conclude, That no *Matter* whatsoever of its own Nature has any active Principle of *Motion*, though it be receptive thereof; * but that when God created it, he superadded an impress of *Motion* upon it, such a measure and proportion to all
of

of it, which remains still much-what the same for quantity in the whole, though the parts of *Matter*, in their various occursion of one to another, have not always the same proportion of it. Nor is there any more necessity, that God should reiterate this impress of *Motion* on the *Matter* created, than that he should perpetually create the *Matter*. Neither does his conservation of this quantity of *Motion* any thing more imply either a repetition or an augmentation of it, than the conservation of the *Matter* does the superaddition of new *Matter* thereunto. Indeed he need but conserve the *Matter*, and the *Matter* thus conserved will faithfully retain one part with another, the whole summe of *Motion* first communicated to it, some small moments excepted, which are not worth the mentioning in this place.

N O T E S

On C H A P. XI. Sect. 2.

FOR *Matter being of one simple homogeneous nature, &c.* So indeed say all the *Cartesians* with one Voice; although I do not remember any of them to have demonstrated the Point, or so much as to have attempted it. As to my self, I will acknowledge it very readily to be true, of all the natural *Matter* of the World: In which notwithstanding, I have no great need to be very solicitous; since the things I have advanced in this Chapter, will conveniently enough meet with whatsoever Hypothesis, let it be as tergiverfious as it will.

Sect. 8. *That exorbitant Inconvenience, mentioned in the 6th Section of this Chapter, &c.* That huge Inconvenience is the dissolution of the Planets or Earths into Æther. The voluntary Motions therefore of this divine *Matter* may be so temper'd, as they suppose, that this mischief may be prevented: But that there is no such divine *Matter* in the Universe, I clearly enough shew here in this Section. But as to divine *Matter* of another sort, such as may answer some way to the *πρῶτον στοιχεῖον*, or *πρῶτη οὐσία*, the *fifth Element*, or the *fifth Essence* of *Aristotle*, since it hath in it self neither local Motion, nor Fixation, but is suppos'd to be the Transmitter only of the Operations of the *τῆς θείας ψυχῆς*, the *divine Soul*, and is the Mirror, as it were, of its Irradiations, it will not in the least trouble or confound our Accounts, as to the Motion of the natural *Matter* of the World.

Sect. 9. *But that when God created it, he superadded an Impress of Motion upon it, &c.* This is spoken after the way of *Des-Cartes*: As if in a certain manner, not much differing from a mechanical Impulse, God at first impress'd Motion on the *Matter*, and did it also immediately himself. Whereas it is much more likely, that God immediately imparted Motion, and that not *mechanical*, but *vital*, to the *Spirit of Nature*; and that this Life created and implanted in this *Spirit of Nature* by God, from the Beginning mov'd and enliven'd, as it were, the *Matter* of the World in such a beautiful and regular manner as we see.

CHAP.

C H A P. XII.

1. That the Order and Nature of things in the Universe, argue an Essence Spiritual or Incorporeal. 2. The Evasion of this Argument. 3. A preparation out of Mr. Hobbs to answer the Evasion. 4. The first Answer. 5. The second Answer. 6. Mr. Hobbs his mistake, of making the Ignorance of Second Causes the only Seed of Religion.

1. **W**E have discovered out of the simple Phenomenon of Motion, the necessity of the Existence of some Incorporeal Essence distinct from the Matter: But there is a further assurance of this Truth, from the consideration of the Order and admirable Effect of this Motion in the world. Suppose Matter could move it self, would mere Matter, with Self-motion, amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the World? Can a blind *impetus* produce such Effects, with that accuracy and constancy, that the more wise a man is, the more he will be assured, That no Wisdom can add, take away, or alter any thing in the works of Nature, whereby they may be better'd? How can that therefore that has not so much as Sense, arise to the Effects of the highest pitch of Reason or Intellect? But of this I have spoke so fully and convincingly in the second Book of my *Antidote*, that it will be but a needless repetition to proceed any further on this Subject.

2. All the Evasion that I can imagine our Adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of Sense, and the finest and most subtile of the most refined Sense, and consequently of Imagination too, yea haply, of Reason and Understanding. For Sense being nothing else, as some conceit, but Motion, or rather Re-action of a Body pressed upon by another Body, it will follow, that all the Matter in the World has, in some manner or other, the power of Sensation.

3. Let us now see what this Position will amount to. Those that make Motion and Sensation thus really the same, must of necessity acknowledge, That no longer Motion, no longer Sensation, (as Mr. Hobbs has ingenuously confessed in his * *Elements of Philosophy* :) And that every Motion or Re-action must be a new Sensation, as well as every ceasing of Re-action, a ceasing of Sensation. Chap. 25.

4. Now let us give these busie active particles of the Matter that play up and down every where the advantage of Sense, and let us see if all their heads laid together can contrive the Anatomical fabrick of any Creature that lives. Assuredly when all is summ'd up that can be imagin'd, they will fall short of their account. For I demand, Has every one of these particles that must have an hand in the framing of the Body of an Animal, the whole design of the work by the impress of some Phantasm upon it, or, as they have several offices, so have they several parts of the design? If the first, it being most certain, even according to their opinion whom we oppose, that there can be no knowledge or perception in the Matter, but what arises out of the Re-action of one part against another, how is it conceivable that any

any one particle of *Matter*, or many together, (there not existing yet in Nature any Animal) can have the *Idea* impressed of that Creature they are to frame? Or if one, or some few particles, have the sense of one part of the Animal, (they seeming more capable of this, the parts being far more simple than the whole *Compages* and contrivement) and other some few of other parts, how can they confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their counsel one to another? Wherefore that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible than that so many men, blind and dumb from their nativity, should join their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or carve a statue of such a Creature as none of them knew any more of in several, than some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole.

5. Besides this, *Sense* being really the same with *Corporeal Motion*, it must change upon new impresses of Motion; so that if a particle by Sense were carried in this line, it meeting with a counterbuffe in the way, must have quite another Impress and Sense, and so forget what it was going about, and divert its course another way. Nay, though it escaped free, *Sense* being *Re-action*, when that which it bears against is removed, Sense must needs cease, and perfect Oblivion succeed. For it is not with these particles, as with the Spring of a Watch, or a bent Cross-bow, that they should for a considerable time retain the same *Re-action*, and so consequently the same Sense. And lastly, if they could, it is still nothing to the purpose; for let their Sense be what it will, their motion is necessary, it being merely corporeal, and therefore the result of their motion cannot be from any kind of knowledge. For the corporeal motion is first, and is only felt, not directed by feeling. And therefore whether the *Matter* have any Sense or no, what is made out of it is nothing, but what results from the wild jumbings and knockings of one part thereof against another, without any purpose, counsel, or direction. Wherefore the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature being guided according to the most Exquisite Wisdom imaginable, it is plain, that they are not the Effects of the mere motion of *Matter*, but of some *Immaterial Principle*, by Axiome 10.

6. And therefore the *Ignorance of the Second Causes* is not so rightly said to be the *Seed of Religion*, (as Mr *Hobbs* would have it) as of *Irreligion* and *Atheism*. For if we did more punctually and particularly search into their natures, we should clearly discern their insufficiency for such effects as we discover to be in the world. But when we have looked so closely and carefully into the nature of *Corporeal Beings*, and can find no causality in them proportionable to these Effects we speak of, still to implead our selves rather of Ignorance, than the *Matter* and *Corporeal motion* of Insufficiency, is to hold an opinion upon humour, and to transgress against our first and second Axiomes.

C H A P. XIII.

1. *The last proof of Incorporeal Substances, from Apparitions.* 2. *The first Evasion of the force of such Arguings.* 3. *An Answer to that Evasion.* 4. *The second Evasion.* 5. *The first kind of the second Evasion.* 6. *A description out of Virgil of that Genius that suggests the dictates of the Epicurean Philosophy.* 7. *The more full and refined sense of that Philosophy now-a-days.* 8. *The great Efficacy of the Stars, (which they suppose to consist of nothing but Motion and Matter) for production of all manner of Creatures in the world.*

1. **T**HE Third and last ground which I would make use of, for evincing the Existence of *Incorporeal Substances*, is such extraordinary Effects as we cannot well imagine any natural, but must needs conceive some free or spontaneous Agent to be the Cause thereof, whenas yet it is clear that they are from neither Man nor Beast. Such are speakings, knockings, opening of Doors when they were fast shut, sudden lights in the midst of a room floating in the air, and then passing and vanishing; nay, shapes of Men and several sorts of Brutes, that, after speech and converse, have suddenly disappeared. These, and many such like extraordinary Effects (which, if you please, you may call by one general term of *Apparitions*) seem to be an undeniable Argument, that there be such things as *Spirits* or *Incorporeal Substances* in the world; and I have demonstrated the sequel to be necessary, in the last Chapter of the *Appendix to my Treatise against Atheism*; and, in the third Book of that Treatise, have produced so many and so unexceptionable Stories concerning *Apparitions*, that I hold it superfluous to add any thing here of that kind, taking far more pleasure in exercising of my Reason, than in registering of History. Besides that I have made so careful choice there already, that I cannot hope to cull out any that may prove more pertinent and convictive; I having penn'd down none but such as I had compar'd with those severe laws I set my self in the first Chapter of that third Book, to prevent all tergiversations and evasions of gain-sayers.

2. But, partly from my own observation, and partly by information from others, I am well assured there are but two ways whereby they escape the force of such evident Narrations. The first is a firm perswasion that the very *Notion* of a *Spirit* or *Immaterial Substance* is an *Impossibility*, or a *Contradiction* in the very terms. And therefore such stories implying that which they are confident is *impossible*, the Narration at the very first hearing must needs be judged to be false, and therefore they think it more reasonable to conclude all those that profess they have seen such or such things, to be mad-men or cheats, than to give credit to what implies a *Contradiction*.

3. But this Evasion I have quite taken away, by so clearly demonstrating that the *Notion* of a *Spirit* implies no more *contradiction* than the *Notion* of *Matter*; and that its Attributes are as conceivable as the Attributes of *Matter*: so that I hope this creep-hole is stopt for ever.

4. The second Evasion is not properly an Evasion of the truth of these stories concerning *Apparitions*, but of our deduction therefrom. For they willingly admit of these *Apparitions* and *Prodigies* recorded in History, but they deny that they are any Arguments of a truly *Spiritual* and *Incorporeal Substance* distinct from the *Matter* thus chang'd into this or that shape, that can walk and speak, &c. but that they are special Effects of the influence of the Heavenly Bodies upon this region of Generation and Corruption.

5. And these that answer thus, are of two sorts. The one have great Affinity with *Aristotle* and *Avenroes*, who look not upon the heavenly Bodies as mere corporeal Substances, but as actuated with Intelligencies, which are Essences separate and Immaterial. But this Supposition hurts not us at all in our present design; they granting that which I am arguing for, viz. a *Substance Incorporeal*. The use of this perverse Hypothesis is only to shuffle off all Arguments that are drawn from *Apparitions*, to prove that the Souls of men subsist after death, or that there are any such things as *Dæmons* or *Genii* of a nature permanent and immortal. But I look upon this Supposition as confutable enough, were it worth the while to encounter it.

That of the *Sadducees* is far more firm, they supposing their *Suppositum* to be nothing else but the efficacy of the presence of God altering *Matter* into this or the other Apparition or Manifestation; as if there were but one Soul in all things, and God were that Soul variously working in the Matter. But this I have already confuted in my Philosophical Poems, and shall again in this present Treatise.

Book 3, ch. 16.

6. The other *Influenciaries* hold the same power of the Heavens as these; though they do not suppose so high a Principle in them, yet they think it sufficient for the salving of all Sublunary *Phænomena*, as well ordinary as extraordinary. Truly it is a very venerable Secret, and not to be uttered or communicated but by some old *Silenus* lying in his obscure Grot or Cave, nor that neither but upon due circumstances, and in a right humour, when one may find him with his veins swell'd out with wine, and his Garland fallen off from his head through his heedless drowsiness: Then if some young *Chromis* and *Mnasylus*, especially assisted by a fair and forward *Ægle*, that, by way of a love-frolick, will leave the tracts of her fingers in the blood of Mulberries on the temples and forehead of this aged Satyr, while he sleeps dog-sleep, and will not seem to see, for fear he forfeit the pleasure of his feeling; then, I say, if these young lads importune him enough, he will again sing that old song of the *Epicurean* Philosophy in an higher strain than ever, which I profess I should abhor to recite, were it not to confute; it is so monstrous and impious. But because no sore can be cured that is conceal'd, I must bring this *Hypothesis* into view also, which the Poet has briefly compris'd in this summary.

Virgil. Eclog.
6.

Namque canebat, uti magnum per inane coëta
Semina terrarumque animæque marisque fuissent,
Et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis
Omnia, & ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.

7. The

7. The fuller and more refined sense whereof now-a-days is this; That *Matter* and *Motion* are the Principles of all things whatsoever; and that by *Motion* some *Atoms* or particles are more subtile than others, and of more nimbleness and activity. That motion of one Body against another does every where necessarily produce Sense, Sense being nothing else but the *Re-action* of parts of the *Matter*. That the *subtiler* the *Matter* is, the *Sense* is more subtile. That the *subtilest Matter* of all is that which constitutes the *Sun* and *Stars*, from whence they must needs have the purest and *subtilest Sense*. That what has the most perfect *Sense*, has the most perfect *Imagination* and *Memory*; because *Memory* and *Imagination* are but the same with *Sense* in reality, the latter being but certain *Modes* of the former. That what has the *perfectest Imagination*, has the *highest Reason* and *Providence*; *Providence* and *Reason* being nothing else but an exacter train of *Phantasms*, *Sensations*, or *Imaginations*. Wherefore the *Sun* and the *Stars* are the *most Intellectual Beings* in the world, and in them is that *Knowledge*, *Counsel*, and *Wisdom*, by which all sublunary things are framed and governed.

8. These, by their several impresses and impregnations, have filled the whole Earth with vital Motion, raising innumerable sorts of Flowers, Herbs, and Trees out of the ground. These have also generated the several Kinds of living Creatures. These have filled the Seas with Fishes, the Fields with Beasts, and the Air with Fowls; the Terrestrial matter being as easily formed into the living shapes of these several *Animals*, by the powerful impress of the *Imagination* of the Sun and Stars, as the *Embryo* in the womb is mark'd by the strong fancy of his Mother that bears him. And therefore these *Celestial powers* being able to frame living shapes of Earthly matter, by the impress of their *Imagination*, it will be more easy for them to change the vaporous Air into like transfigurations.

So that admitting all these Stories of *Apparitions* to be true that are recorded in Writers, it is no Argument of the Existence of any *Incorporeal Principle* in the world. For the piercing Foresight of these glorious Bodies, the *Sun* and *Stars*, is able to raise what *Apparitions* or *Prodigies* they please, to usher in the *Births*, or fore-signify the *Deaths* of the most considerable persons that appear in the world; of which * *Pomponatius* himself does acknowledge, that there are many * *De Immortalitate Animæ*, true examples both in *Greek* and *Latin History*. This is the deepest *Secret* that old *Silenus* could ever sing to ensnare the ears of deceivable *cap. 14.* Youth. And it is indeed *περικλυτὸν μυστήριον*, in the very worst sense, *Horrendum mysterium*, a very dreadful and dangerous Mystery, saving that there is no small hope that it may not prove true. Let us therefore now examine it.

C H A P. XIV.

1. That the Splendor of the Celestial Bodies proves no Fore-sight nor Sovereignty that they have over us.
2. That the Stars can have no knowledge of us, Mathematically demonstrated.
3. The same Conclusion again demonstrated more familiarly.
4. That the Stars cannot communicate Thoughts, neither with the Sun, nor with one another.
5. That the Sun has no knowledge of our affairs.
6. Principles laid down for the inferring that Conclusion.
7. A demonstration that he cannot see us.
8. That he can have no other kind of knowledge of us, nor of the frame of any Animal on Earth.
9. That though the Sun had the knowledge of the right frame of an Animal, he could not transmit it into Terrestrial matter.
10. An Answer to that Instance of the Signature of the Fœtus.
- 11, 12. Further Answers thereto.
13. A short Incredation of the confident Exploders of Incorporeal Substance out of the world.

* See Enthusiasm. Triumphat. sect. 45.

1. **T**HAT the Light is a very glorious thing, and the lustre of the Stars very lovely to look upon, and that the Body of the Sun is so full of Splendor and Majesty, that without flattery we may profess our selves constrained to look aside, as not being able to bear the brightness of his aspect; all this must be acknowledged for Truth: but that these are as so many Eyes of Heaven to watch over the Earth, so many kind and careful Spectators and Intermeddlers also in humane affairs, as that phansiful Chymist * Paracelsus conceits, who writeth that not only Princes and Nobles, or men of great and singular worth, but even almost every one, near his death, has some prognostick sign or other, (as knocking in the house, the dances of dead men, and the like) from these compassionate Fore-seers of his approaching Fate; this I must confess I am not so paganly superstitious as to believe one Syllable of; but think it may be demonstrated to be a mere fancy, especially upon this present Hypothesis, That the Sun and Stars have no immaterial Being residing in them, but are mere Matter, consisting of the subtilest Particles, and most vehemently agitated. For then we cannot but be assured, That there is nothing in them more Divine than what is seen in other things that shine in the dark, suppose rotten wood, glo-worms, or the flame of a rush-candle.

2. This at least we will demonstrate, That let the Sun and Stars have what knowledge they will of other things, they have just none at all of us, nor of our affairs; which will quite take away this last Evasion. That the Stars can have no knowledge of us is exceeding evident: For whenas the *Magnus Orbis* of the Earth is but as a Point, compared with the distance thereof to a fixed Star, that is to say, whenas that Angle which we may imagine to be drawn from a Star, and to be subtended by the Diameter of the *Magnus Orbis*, it is to Sense no Angle at all, but as a mere Line; how little then is the Earth it self? and how utterly invisible to any Star, whenas her Diameter is above 1100 times less than that of her *Magnus Orbis*? From whence it is clear, that it is perfectly impossible that the Stars, though they

they were endued with sight, could so much as see the *Earth* it self, (much less the inhabitants thereof) to be *Spectators* and *Intermedlers* in the affairs for good or evil; and there being no higher Principle to inspire them with the knowledge of these things, it is evident that they remain utterly ignorant of them.

3. Or if this Demonstration (though undeniably true in it self) be not so intelligible to every one, we may add what is more easy and familiar, *viz.* That the *Stars* being lucid Bodies, and those of the first magnitude near an hundred times bigger than the *Earth*, and yet appearing so small things to us, hence any one may collect, that the opake *Earth* will either be quite invisible to the *Stars*, or else at least appear so little, that it will be impossible that they should see any distinct Countries, much less Cities, Houses, or Inhabitants.

4. Wherefore we have plainly swept away this numerous Company of the celestial Senators from having any thing to do to consult about, or any way to oversee the affairs of Mankind; and therefore let them seem to wink and twinkle as cogitabundly as they will, we may rest in assurance, that they have no plot concerning us, either for good or evil, as having no knowledge of us. Nor if they had, could they *communicate their thoughts* to that great deemed Sovereign of the world, the *Sun*; they being ever as invisible to him, as they are to us in the day-time. For it is nothing but his light that hinders us from seeing so feeble Objects, and this hindrance consisteth in nothing else but this, That that motion, which by his Rays is caus'd in the Organ, is so fierce and violent, that the gentle vibration of the light of the *Stars* cannot master it, nor indeed bear any considerable proportion to it: What then can it do in reference to the very Body of the *Sun* himself, the matter whereof has the most furious motion of any thing in the world?

5. There is nothing now therefore left but the *Sun* alone, that can possibly be conceived to have any knowledge of, or any superintendency over our terrestrial affairs. And how incapable he is also of this office, I hold it no difficult thing to demonstrate. Whence it will plainly appear, that those *Apparitions* that are seen, whether in the Air, or on Earth, (which are rightly look'd upon as an Argument of Providence and Existence of some *Incorporeal Essence* in the world) cannot be attributed to the power and prevision of the *Sun*, supposing him purely corporeal.

6. For it is a thing agreed upon by all sides, That *mere Matter* has no *connate Ideas* in it of such things as we see in the world; but that upon *Re-action* of one part moved by another arises a kind of *Sense*, or *Perception*. Which opinion, as it is most rational in it self to conceive, (supposing *Matter* has any sense in it at all) so it is most consonant to experience, we seeing plainly that *Sense* is ever caused by some outward corporeal motion upon our Organs, which are also corporeal. For that *Light* is from a corporeal motion, is plain from the reflexion of the rays thereof; and no Sound is heard but from the motion of the Air, or some other intermediate Body; no Voice, but there is first a moving of the Tongue: no Musick, but there must either be

the blowing of wind, or the striking upon strings, or something Analogical to these; and so in the other Sense.

Wherefore if there be nothing but *Body* in the world, it is evident that *Sense* arises merely from the *motion* of one part of *Matter* against another, and that *Motion* is ever first, and *Perception* follows, and that therefore *Perception* must necessarily follow the laws of *Motion*, and that no *Percipient* can have any thing more to conceive than what is convey'd by Corporeal motion. Now from these Principles it will be easy to prove that, though we should acknowledge a power of *Perception* in the *Sun*, yet it will not amount to any ability of his being either a *Spectator* or *Governor* of our affairs here on Earth.

7. According to the Computation of *Astronomers*, even of those that speak more modestly, the *Sun* is bigger than the *Earth* above an hundred and fifty times. But how little he appears to us, every eye is able to judge. How little then must the *Earth* appear to him? If he see her at all, he will be so far from being able to take notice of any Persons or Families, that he cannot have any distinct discerning of Streets, nor Cities, no not of Fields nor Countries; but whole Regions, though of very great Extent, will vanish here, as *Alcibiades* his Patrimony in that Map of the world *Socrates* shew'd him, to repress the pride of the young Heir. The *Earth* must appear considerably less to him than the *Moon* does to us, because the *Sun* appears to us less than the *Moon*. It were easy to demonstrate, that her *discus* would appear to the *Sun* near thirty, nay sixty times less than the *Moon* does to us, according to *Lansbergius* his computation.

Now consider how little we can discern in that broader Object of sight, the *Moon*, when she is the highest, notwithstanding we be placed in the dark, under the shadow of the *Earth*, whereby our sight is more passive and impressible. How little then must the fiery eye of that *Cyclops* the *Sun*, which is all Flame and Light, discern in this lesser Object the *Earth*, his vigour and motion being so vehemently strong and unyielding? What effect it will have upon him, we may in some sort judge by our selves: For though our Organ be but moved or agitated with the reflexion of his Rays, we hardly see the *Moon* when she is above the Horizon by day: What impress then can our *Earth*, a less Object to him than the *Moon* is to us, make upon the *Sun*, whose Body is so furiously hot, that he is as boiling Fire, if a man may so speak, and the Spots about him are, as it were, the scum of this fuming *Cauldron*?

Besides that our *Atmosphere* is so thick a covering over us at that distance, that there can be the appearance of nothing but a white mist enveloping all, and shining like a bright cloud; in which the rays of the *Sun* will be so lost, that they can never return any distinct representation of things unto him. Wherefore it is as evident to *Reason* that he cannot see us, as it is to *Sense* that we see him; and therefore he can be no *Overseer* nor *Intermedler* in our actions.

8. But perhaps you will reply, That though the *Sun* cannot see the *Earth*, yet he may have a *Sense* and *Perception* in himself (for he is a fine glittering thing, and some strange matter must be presumed of him) that may amount to a wonderful large sphere of *Understanding*,
Fore-

Fore-knowledge, and Power. But this is a mere fanciful surmise, and such as cannot be made good by any of our Faculties: Nay, the quite contrary is demonstrable by such Principles as are already agreed upon. For there are no *connate Ideas* in the *Matter*, and therefore out of the collision and agitation of these *Solar* particles, we cannot rationally expect any other effect in the *Sun*, than such as we experiment in the percussing of our own eyes, out of which ordinarily follows the sense of a confused light or flame. If the *Sun* therefore has any sense of himself, it must be only the perception of a very vigorous *Light* or *Fire*, which being still one and the same representation, it is a question whether he has a sense of it or no, any more than we have of our bones, which we perceive not by reason of our accustomed and uninterrupted sense of them, as Mr. *Hobbs* ingeniously conjectures in a like supposition.

But if you will say, that there is a perception of the jogging or jostling, or of whatever touch or rubbing of one *Solar* particle against another, the body of the *Sun* being so exceeding liquid, and consequently the particles thereof never resting, but playing and moving this way and that way; yet they hitting and fridging so fortuitously one against another, the perceptions that arise from hence must be so various and fortuitous, so quick and short, so inconsistent, flitting, and unpermanent, that if any man were in such a condition as the *Sun* necessarily is, according to this Hypothesis, he would both be, and appear to all the world to be, stark mad; he would be so off and on, and so unsettled, and do, and think, and speak all things with such ungovernable rashness and temerity.

In brief, That the *Sun*, by this tumultuous agitation of his fiery *Atoms*, should hit upon any rational contrivance or right *Idea* of any of these living Creatures we see here on Earth, is utterly as hard to conceive, as that the Terrestrial particles themselves should jostle together into such contrivances and forms, which is that which I have *
* Chap. 12.
 sect. 4, 5.

9. And if the *Sun* could light on any such true frame or form of any Animal, or the due Rudiments or contrivance thereof, it is yet unconceivable how he should convey it into this Region of Generation here on Earth, partly by reason of the Earth's Distance and Invisibleness, and partly because the deepest Principle of all being but mere Motion, without any superiour power to govern it, this *Imagination* of the *Sun* working on the Earth can be but a simple *Rectilinear* impress, which can never arise to such an inward solid organization of parts in living Creatures, nor hold together these *Spectres* or *Apparitions* in the Air, in any more certain form than the smook of Chimneys, or the fume of Tobacco.

10. Nor is that Instance of the power of the Mother's fancy on the *Fœtus* in the womb, any more than a mere flourish; for the disparity is so great, that the Argument proves just nothing: For whereas the Mother has an *Explicite Idea* of the *Fœtus*, and every part thereof, the *Sun* and *Stars* have no distinct *Idea* at all of the parts of the Earth; nay I dare say, that what we have already intimated will amount to a Demonstration, That though they had *Sense*, yet they do

do not so much as *know*, whether this *Earth* we live on be *in rerum Naturâ* or no.

11. Again, the *Mark* that is impressed on the *Fœtus*, the Mother has a clear and vivid conception of; but the curious contrivance in the *Idea* of Animals, I have shewn how incompetent it is to the fortuitous jostling of the fiery particles of either *Sun* or *Stars*.

12. Thirdly, The *Impress* on the *Fœtus* is very simple and slight, and seldom so curious as the ordinary impresses of Seals upon Wax, which are but the modifications of the surface thereof; but this suppos'd Impress of the *Imagination* of the *Sun* and *Stars* is more than a solid Statue, or the most curious *Automaton* that ever was invented by the wit of man; and therefore impossible to proceed from a mere *Rectilinear* impress upon the *Æther* down to the *Earth* from the *Imagination* of the *Sun*, no not if he were suppos'd to be actuated with an *Intelligent Soul*, if the *Earth*, and all the space betwixt her and him, were devoid thereof. Nor do I conceive, though it be an infinitely more slight business, that the direction of the *Signature* of the *Fœtus* upon such a part were to be perform'd by the *Fancy* of the Mother, notwithstanding the advantage of the organization of her body, were not both her self and the *Fœtus* animated Creatures.

13. Wherefore we have demonstrated beyond all Evasion, from the *Phænomena* of the Universe, That of necessity there must be such a thing in the world as *Incorporeal Substance*; let inconsiderable Philosophasters hoot at it, and deride it as much as their Follies please.

T H E

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

1. *An addition of more Axiomes for the demonstrating that there is a Spirit or Immaterial Substance in Man.*
2. *The Truth of the first of these Axiomes confirmed from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs, as well as demonstrated in the Preface.*
- 3, 4. *That Demonstration further cleared and evinced by answering a certain Evasion.*
5. *The proof of the second Axiome.*
6. *The proof of the third.*
7. *The confirmation of the fourth from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs, as also from Reason.*
8. *An explication and proof of the fifth.*
9. *A farther Proof of the Truth thereof.*
10. *An Answer to an Evasion.*
11. *Another Evasion answered.*
12. *A further management of this first Answer thereto.*
13. *A second Answer.*
14. *A third Answer, wherein is mainly contained a confirmation of the first Answer to the second Evasion.*
15. *The plainness of the sixth Axiome.*
16. *The proof of the seventh.*



1. HAVING cleared the way thus far as to prove, That there is no Contradiction nor Inconsistency in the Notion of a Spirit, but that it may Exist in Nature; nay, that *de facto* there are incorporeal Substances really Existent in the world; we shall now drive more home to our main design, and demonstrate, That there is such an Immaterial Substance in Man, which, from the power it is conceiv'd to have in actuating and guiding the Body, is usually called the Soul. This Truth we shall make good first in a more general way, but not a whit the less stringent, by evincing, That such Faculties or Operations as we are conscious of in our selves, are

are utterly incompatible to *Matter*, consider'd *at large* without any particular organization. And then afterwards we shall more punctually consider the *Body of Man*, and every possible fitness in the structure thereof, that is worth taking notice of for the performance of *these Operations* which we ordinarily find in our selves. And that this may be done more plainly and convincingly, we shall here add to the number of our Axiomes these that follow.

A X I O M E XX.

Motion or Re-action of one part of Matter against another, or at least a due continuance thereof, is really one and the same with Sense and Perception, if there be any Sense or Perception in Matter.

* Chap. 25.
Artic. 2.

2. **T**HIS Axiome, as it is plain enough of it self, (supposing there were nothing but *Body* in the world) so has it the suffrage of our most confident and potent adversary Mr. *Hobbs* in his * Elements of Philosophy. Whose judgment I make much of in such cases as these, being perswaded as well out of Reason as Charity, that he seeing so little into the nature of *Spirits*, that defect is compensated with an extraordinary Quick-sightedness in discerning of the best and most warrantable ways of salving all *Phænomena* from the ordinary allowed properties of *Matter*. Wherefore I shall not hold it impertinent to bring in his Testimony in things of this nature, my Demonstrations becoming thereby more recommendable to men of his own Conclusions. But my design being not a particular victory over such a sort of Men, but an absolute establishing of the Truth, I shall lay down no Grounds that are merely *Argumenta ad hominem*; but such as I am perswaded, (upon this Hypothesis, That there is nothing but *Body* in the world) are evident to any one that can indifferently judge thereof. And the demonstration of this present Axiome I have prefix'd in my *Preface*, Sect. 5.

3. Against which I cannot imagine any possible Evasion, unless one should conceit, that a *general agitation* only of the particles of the *Matter* will suffice to excite them to *thinking*, and that they, being thus excited, can freely run out to other *Cogitations* and *Phantasms*, than what adequately arise from the impress of *Motion*.

But to this may briefly be answered, *First*, That since from the *Agitation* and Collision of these particles, *Sense* must needs arise, (for they being near upon of the same magnitude, they will effectually act one upon another) the *Animadversion* of these particles will be so taken up, and fixt upon their *sensible* perceptions, that though they otherwise had a power of freely thinking, yet they would always be necessarily detained in these sensible *Phantasms*.

And then, *Secondly*, All that is perceiv'd, is perceiv'd *in common* by that which is capable of being the *Percipient*. But nothing that is not really the same with corporeal Motion, or an immediate and adequate effect thereof, can be communicated to the common particles of this or that *Matter*. Hence therefore it is plain that there is not any congeries of *Matter* that does run into *free cogitations*, whether *grosser Phantasms*, or *second Notions*, for want of mutual communication of them

them in one Particle to another, as I have more particularly demonstrated in its * due place.

Thirdly and lastly, It is sufficiently manifest from sense and experience, that *Matter* is a principle *purely passive*, and no otherwise *mov'd* or *modified*, than as some other thing *moves* and *modifies* it, but cannot move it self at all. Which is most demonstrable to them that contend for *Sense* and *Perception* in it. For if it had any such *Perception*, it would, by virtue of its *Self-motion*, withdraw it self from under the knocks of hammers, or fury of the fire; or of its own accord approach to such things as are most agreeable to it and pleasing, and that without the help of *Muscles*, it being thus immediately endow'd with a *Self-moving Power*. But the *Matter* being so stupid as to want *this Power*, how can it be thought a Subject wherein a *Power* and *Activity* infinitely more *divine* should reside, that is, the free expatiating into *Variety of Thoughts*, the exercise of *Invention*, *Judgment*, and *Memory*, and that in such Objects as are supposed not to be the Impresses of the *Motion* of the particles one upon another?

* Chap. 6.
sect. 4, 5, 6.

Nor would I be thought cunning and fraudulent in naming *such gross* and *massy Matter* as uses to be struck with Hammers, or hewen with Axes, and to conclude from thence, that no *Matter* at all, no not the most subtile, does move it self: For *Self-motion* is as competent to a *massy* piece of *Matter* as the *most minute* particle imaginable; for Force will be to Force as Magnitude to Magnitude; and therefore the most *massy* pieces of *Matter* will move themselves the most strongly and most irresistibly. From whence it appears, that the *minute* particle of any *Massy* body separate from it has not one jot of advantage toward *Self-motion* thereby, but only becomes less irresistible in its *Self-motion*.

4. Nor can you help your self by recurring to the *Figment* of a *Matter specifically distinct* from what men ordinarily speak of, (which * some adorn with the title of *Divine*, as if it were the very Substance of the highest Godhead :) For we may easily undeceive our selves, if we do but contemplate some considerable quantity of this *Divine Matter*, suppose a *Globe* of some few inches Diameter, and perfectly *solid*, that is, the parts thereof immediately united without pores or intervals; and then consider how it cannot fail of being more hard than the *Pig of Lead*, or *Wedge of Gold*, which I mention in my * Demonstration of this Axiome, and as Opaque as any body whatsoever. For hence this *Divine Matter* will appear to our mind as incapable of *spontaneous Motion* and of *free Cogitations* and *Perceptions* unimpressed from corporeal motion, as the *Pig of Lead*, and *Wedge of Gold* there mentioned; and that therefore this *Figment* is but a mere Mockery of words, and as ill put together in this sense, as a *divine Pig of Lead*, or *divine Wedge of Gold* would be.

* See Book 3.
ch. 11. sect. 8.

* See Preface
sect. 5.

And what I have said of the *whole Globe*, there is the same reason of *any particle* of the same nature with it; which will be no more capable of *free cogitation*, than the particles of that *Matter* that makes up *Gold* or *Lead*. For if there be any *perception*, it must be by *corporeal Re-action* in both, if we impartially attend to the dictates of our own Faculties. And let them be as they will, *communication of free Perceptions*

ceptions will not be found possible in either; the *Divineſt Matter* imaginable having no other union than *Juxta-poſition* of parts, as our Adverſaries themſelves freely will acknowledge.

* Book 2.
ch. 2. ſect. 8.

To which faithful preſages and rational concluſions of our own Mind, you may finally add the ſuffrage of nature in Experiments, which do clearly aſſure us, that there is no ſuch *Divine Matter* endued with *free cogitation* and free Agency, intermingled or interſperſed in the *common Matter* of the world, * as I have plainly ſhewn in my * *Antidote*. And therefore we will conclude, that no *Matter* whatſoever has any *perception* in any other manner, or according to any other laws, than what Mr. *Hobbs* has already defin'd, and my ſelf in this twentieth Axiome have declared, if *Matter* have any *perception* at all.

A X I O M E XXI.

So far as this continued Re-aſtion reaches, ſo far reaches Senſe or Perception, and no farther.

5. **T**HIS Axiome is to be underſtood as well of Duration of Time, as Extension of the Subject, *viz.* That *Senſe* and *Perception* ſpread no further in *Matter* than *Re-aſtion* does, nor remain any longer than this *Re-aſtion* remains. Which Truth is fully evident out of the foregoing Axiome.

A X I O M E XXII.

That diverſity there is of Senſe or Perception does neceſſarily ariſe from the diverſity of the Magnitude, Figure, Poſition, Vigor, and Direction of Motion in parts of the Matter.

6. **T**HE truth of this is alſo clear from the 20th Axiome. For *Perception* being really one and the ſame thing with *Re-aſtion* of *Matter* one part againſt another, and there being a diverſity of *Perception*, it muſt imply alſo a diverſity of modification of *Re-aſtion*; and *Re-aſtion* being nothing but *Motion in Matter*, it cannot be varied but by ſuch *variations* as are competible to *Matter*, *viz.* ſuch as are *Magnitude, Figure, Poſture, Local Motion*, wherein is contained any endeavour towards it, as alſo the *Directions* of that either full Motion or curb'd endeavour, and a *Vigour* thereof; which if you run to the loweſt degrees, you will at laſt come to *Reſt*, which therefore is ſome way referrible to that head, as to *Magnitude* you are to refer *Littleneſs*. Theſe are the firſt conceivables in *Matter*, and therefore diverſity of *Perception* muſt of neceſſity ariſe from theſe.

A X I O M E XXIII.

Matter in all the variety of thoſe Perceptions it is ſenſible of, has none but ſuch as are impreſſ'd by Corporeal Motions, that is to ſay, that are Perceptions of ſome Actions or modified Impreſſions of parts of Matter bearing one againſt another.

7. **T**O this Truth Mr. *Hobbs* ſets his ſeal with all willingneſs imaginable, or rather eagerneſs, as alſo his Followers, they ſtoutly

ly contending that we have not the *perception* of any thing but the Phantasms of material Objects, and of sensible Words or Marks, which we make to stand for such and such Objects. Which certainly would be most true, if there were nothing but *Matter* in the world; so that they speak very consonantly to their own Principles; I say, this is not only true in that School, but also rational in it self, supposing nothing but *Matter* in the world, and that *Perception* and *Re-action* is really one. For that *Re-action* being in Brutes as well as in Men, there must not be any difference by a perception of quite another kind, but by an external way of communication of their perceptions. And therefore the distinction betwixt *Men* and *Beasts* must consist only in this, that the one can agree in some common mark, whether *Voices* or *Characters*, or whatever else, to express their *perceptions*, but the other cannot; but the *perceptions* themselves must be of one kind in both, they neither of them perceiving any thing but *corporeal impressions*, such as they feel by the parts of the *Matter* bearing one against another.

A X I O M E XXIV.

The distinct Impression of any considerable extent of variegated Matter cannot be receiv'd by a mere point of Matter.

8. **B**Y a mere point of *Matter* I do not mean a mere Mathematical point, but a perfect *Parvitude*, or the least Reality of *Matter*, (concerning which I have spoke already.) Which being the least quantity that *discerpible Matter* can consist of, no particle of *Matter* can touch it less than it self. This *Parvitude* therefore that is so little that it has properly no integral parts, really distinguishable, how can it possibly be a Subject distinctly receptive of the view, haply, of half an Horizon at once? which sight is caused by real and distinct motion from real distinct parts of the Object that is seen. But this perfect *Parvitude* being the minutest quantity that *Matter* is divisible into, no more than one real line of motion can be directed upon it, the rest will go beside. To which you may add, that if this so perfect *Parvitude* were distinctly perceptive of variegated Objects, it were a miracle if it could not perceive the particles of the *Air*, and of the Atmosphere, the *Globuli* of light, and subtilest contexture of the parts of Opake bodies.

Book I. ch. 6.

9. Again, this Object we speak of may be so variegated, I mean with such colours, that it may imply a contradiction, that one and the same particle of *Matter* (suppose some very small round one, that shall be the Cuspe of the visual Pyramid or Cone) should receive them all at once; the opposite kinds of those colours being uncommunicable to this round particle otherways than by contrariety of Motions, or by *Rest* and *Motion*, which are as contrary; * as is manifest out of that excellent Theorem concerning Colours in *Des-Cartes* his * *Meteors*, * *Cap. 8. Artic.* which if it were possible to be false, yet it is most certainly true, that 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. seeing *Motion* is the cause of *Sight*, the contrariety of Objects for Colour must arise out of contrary modifications of *Motion* in this particle we speak of, that immediately communicates the Object to the

Sentient: which contrariety of Motions at the same time, and within the same surface of the adequate place of a Body, is utterly incompatible thereto.

10. Nor is that Evasion any thing available, That there is not any contrariety of real Motion here, but that there is only endeavour to Motion: For it is plain that Endeavour is as real as Motion it self, and as contrary, because it does really affect the sight, and in a contrary manner. Besides, this Endeavour toward Motion is Motion of it self, though of an exceeding small progress:




But be it as little as it will, it is as great a contradiction, for example, that the Globe A should upon the same centre, and within the same superficies (which is its adequate place according to the meaning of that Notion in *Aristotle's* School) be turned never so little from C to B, and from B to C, at once, as to be turned quite about in that manner. To which you may add, that some Colours imply the one's *Motion*, and the others *Rest*; but a Globe if it rests in any one part from turning, rests in all. From whence it will follow, That it is impossible to see *Red* and *Black* at once.

11. This Subterfuge therefore being thus clearly taken away, they substitute another, *viz.* That the distinct parts of the Object do not act upon this round particle, which is the Cusp of the visual Pyramid, at once, but successively, and so swiftly, that the Object is represented at once; as when one swings about a fire-stick very fast, it seems one continued circle of fire. But we shall find this instance very little to the purpose, if we consider, that when one swings about a fire-stick in a circle, it describes such a circle in the bottom of the Eye, not upon one point there, but in a considerable distance; and that the Optick Nerve, or the Spirits therein, are touch'd successively, but left free to a kind of *Tremor* or *Vibration* as it were, (so as it is in the playing of a *Lute*) till the motion has gone round, and then touches in the same place again, so quick, that it finds it still vigorously moved: But there being but one particle to touch upon here, some such like inconveniencies will recur, as we noted in the former case.

12. For, as I demonstrated before, that some Colours cannot be communicated at once to one and the same round particle of *Matter*; so from thence it will follow here, That, such Colours succeeding one another, the impress of the one will take off immediately the impress of the other; from whence we shall not be able to see such various Colours as are discernible in a very large Object at once. For unless the impression make some considerable stay upon that which receives it, there is no Sensation; insomuch that a man may wag his finger so fast that he can scarce see it: and if it do make a due stay, suppose a large Object checquer'd with the most opposite Colours, it were impossible that we should see that checquer-work at once in so large a compass as we do, but we shall only see it by parts, the parts vanishing and coming again in a competent swiftness, but very discernible.

13. Again;

13. Again ; If we could possibly imagine the *vicissitudes* of the impressions, from the distinct parts of the Basis of the visual Cone to the point of it, which we will suppose to be a very small *globulus*, such as *Des-Cartes* his second Element consists of, it being thus *successively* thrust against, things must then be as I have represented them in the adjoining figure, where C A is the Object, G H the Sentient Matter, and I the *Globulus*, which will be born from E directly toward F, where there will be received such a colour in the least Reality of the Sentient Matter in F ; but from A it will be born towards B, and with a very short rowling touch in another Reality, or it may be more distantly from F, and impress such a colour from A upon B, or thereabout, and so from C upon D : so that hereby also it is manifest, that no one perfect *Parvitude* receives the whole Object C E A.



14. Lastly, this quick vicissitude of impulse or impression would contaminate all the Colours, and make the whole Object, as it were, of one confounded colour, as a man may easily perceive in a *painted Wheel* : For what is it but a quick coming on of one colour upon the same part of the Optick upon which another was, immediately that makes the whole *Wheel* seem of one blended colour ? But not to impose upon any one, this instance of the *Wheel* has a peculiar advantage above this present Supposition for making all seem one confounded colour, because the colours of the *Wheel* come not only upon one and the same part of the Nerve, but in one and the same line from the Object ; so that in this regard the instance is less accommodate. But it is shrewdly probable, that *fluid perceptive Matter* will not fail to find the colours tinctur'd from one another in some measure in the whole Object here also, especially if it be nigh and very small, by reason of the instability of that particle that is successively play'd upon from all parts thereof. But at least this instance of the *Wheel* is an unexceptionable confirmation of our first Demonstration of the weakness of the second Evasion, from the necessity of a considerable stay upon the *percipient Matter*, and that *Sensation* cannot be but with some *leisurely continuance* of this or that Motion before it be wiped out. We might add also, that there ought to be a due permanency of the Object that presses against the Organ, though no *new* impression suddenly succeeded to wipe out the former, as one may experiment in swiftly swinging about a painted Bullet in a string, which will still more fully confirm what we aim at. But this is more than enough for the making good of this 24 Axiome ; whose evidence is so clear of it self, that I believe there are very few but will be convinced of it at the first sight.

A X I O M E XXV.

Whatever impression, or parts of any impression are not receiv'd by this perfect Parvitude, or Real point of Matter, are not at all perceiv'd by it.

15. **T**HIS is so exceeding plain of it self, that it wants neither explication nor proof.

A X I O M E XXVI.

Whatever Sense or Motion there is now in Matter, it is a necessary impression from some other part of Matter, and does necessarily continue till some part or other of Matter has justled it out.

16. **T**HAT what Motion there is in any part of Matter is necessarily there, and there continues till some other part of Matter change or diminish its Motion, is plain from the laws of Motion set down by Des-Cartes in his * *Principia Philosophia*. And that there is the same Reason of Sense or Perception, supposing there is nothing but Matter in the world) is plain from Axiome 20. that makes Motion and Sense or Perception really the same.

* Part I.
Artic. 37.

N O T E S

On BOOK II. CHAP. I. Sect. 4.

AS I have plainly shewn in my *Antidote*, &c. And in *Enchirid. Metaphys.* in many Places, Chap. 9. Sect. 14, 15. Chap. 11. Sect. 15. Chap. 12. Sect. 16, 17. and elsewhere.

Sect. 9. As is manifest out of that Theoreme concerning Colours in Des-Cartes his *Meteors*, &c. Truly the Theoreme is very ingenious, and carries a wonderful shew of Truth in its first Appearance. And it is indeed very highly credible, that the Particles of light are of that figure that *Cartesius* supposeth them. But how remote it is from all Reason to assert, that their Motions are merely mechanical, I have plentifully made appear in my *Enchirid. Metaphys. ch. 19. sect. 8.*

C H A P. II.

1. That if Matter be capable of Sense, Inanimate things are so too: And of Mr. Hobbs his wavering in that point.
2. An Enumeration of several Faculties in us that Matter is utterly incapable of.
3. That Matter in no kind of Temperature is capable of Sense.
4. That no one point of Matter can be the Common Sensorium.
5. Nor a multitude of such Points receiving singly the entire image of the Object.
6. Nor yet receiving part part, and the whole the whole.
7. That Memory is incompatible

petible to Matter. 8. That the Matter is incapable of the notes of some circumstances of the Object which we remembred. 9. That Matter cannot be the seat of second Notions. 10. Mr. Hobbs his Evasion of the foregoing Demonstration clearly confuted. 11. That the Freedom of our Will evinces, that there is a Substance in us distinct from Matter. 12. That Mr. Hobbs therefore acknowledges all our actions necessary.

1. **W**E have now made our addition of such Axiomes as are most useful for our present purpose. Let us therefore, according to the order we propounded, before we consider the fabrick and organization of the Body, see if such Operations as we find in our selves be competible to Matter looked upon in a more general manner. That Matter from its own nature is incapable of Sense, plainly appears from Axiome 20, and 21. For Motion and Sense being really one and the same thing, it will necessarily follow, that wherever there is Motion, especially any considerable duration thereof, there must be Sense and Perception; Which is contrary to what we find in a Catochus, and experience daily in dead Carcasses; in both which, though there be Reaction, yet there is no Sense.

In brief, If any Matter have Sense, it will follow, that upon Reaction all shall have the like; and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every Jack-in-a-Box that School-boys play with, while it is held in by the cover pressing against it, shall be living Animals, or Sensitive Creatures. A thing so foolish and frivolous, that the mere recital of the opinion may well be thought confutation enough with the sober.

And indeed Mr. Hobbs himself, though he resolve Sense merely in to Reaction of Matter, yet is ashamed of these odd consequences thereof, and is very loth to be reckoned in the company of those Philosophers, (though, as he says, learned men) who have maintained, That all Bodies are endued with Sense, and yet he can hardly abstain from saying that they are; only he is more shie in allowing them Memory, which yet they will have whether he will or no, if he give them Sense. As for Example, in the ringing of a Bell, from every stroke there continues a tremor in the Bell, which decaying, must (according to * Chap. 25. his Philosophy) be Imagination, and, referring to the stroke past, must be Memory; and if a stroke overtake it within the compass of this Memory, what hinders but Discrimination or Judgment may follow? But the Conclusion is consonant enough to this absurd Principle, That there is nothing but Matter in the Universe, and that it is capable of perception.

2. But we will not content our selves only with the discovery of this one ugly inconvenience of this bold assertion, but shall further endeavour to shew, that the Hypothesis is false, and that Matter is utterly incapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and that therefore there is Something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal. For we find in our selves, that one and the same thing both hears, and sees, and tastes; and, to be short, perceives all the variety of Objects that Nature manifests unto us. Wherefore Sense being nothing but the impress of corporeal motion from without, that part of Matter which must be the common Sensorium, must of necessity receive all that diversity of im-

pulsions from Objects; it must likewise, *Imagine, Remember, Reason*, and be the fountain of *Spontaneous Motion*, as also the heat of what the *Greeks* call the $\pi\acute{o}\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$, or *liberty of Will*: Which supposition we shall find involved in unextricable difficulties.

3. For *First*, we cannot conceive of any *Portion of Matter* but it is either *Hard* or *Soft*. As for that which is *Hard*, all men leave it out as utterly unlike to be endued with such Cognitive faculties as we are conscious to our selves of. That which is *Soft*, will prove either *opaque, pellucid, or lucid*. If *Opaque*, it cannot see, the exterior superficies being a bar to the inward part. If *pellucid*, as *Air* and *Water*, then indeed it will admit inwardly these *Particles*, and that *Motion* which are the conveyers of the Sense, and Distinction of Colours; and *Sound* also will penetrate. But this *Matter* being *heterogeneous*, that is to say, consisting of parts of a different nature and office; the *Air*, suppose, being proper for *Sound*, and those *Round particles* which *Cartesius* describes for *Colour* and *Light*; the perception of these Objects will be differently lodged: but there is some one thing in us that perceives both. Lastly, if *lucid*, there would be much what the same inconvenience that there is in the *opaque*, for its own fieriness would fend off the gentle touch of external impresses; or if it be so mild and thin, that it is in some measure *diaphanous*, the inconveniencies will again recur that were found in the *pellucid*.

And in brief, any *liquid Matter* has such variety of particles in it, that if the whole, as it must, (being the common *Sensorium*) be affected with any impress from without, the parts thereof must be variously affected, so that no Object will seem *homogeneous*, as appears from Axiome 22. Which Truth I shall further illustrate by a homely, but very significant, representation. Suppose we should put Feathers, Bullets, and Spur-rowels in a Box, where they shall lie intermixedly, but close, one with another: upon any jog this Box receives, supposing all the stuffage thereof has *Sense*, it is evident, that the several things therein must be differently affected, and therefore if the common *Sensorium* were such, there would seem no homogeneous Object in the world. Or at least these several particles shall be the several *Receptives* of the several motions of the same kind from without, as the *Air* of Sounds, the *Cartesian Globuli* of *Light* and Colours. But what receives all these, and so can judge of them all, we are again at a loss for, as before: unless we imagine it some very fine and *subtile Matter*, so *light* and *thin*, that it feels not it self, but so *yielding* and *passive*, that it easily feels the several assaults and impresses of other Bodies upon it, or in it; which yet would imply, that *this Matter* alone were *Sensitive*, and the others not; and so it would be granted, that not all *Matter* (no not so much as in *Fluid Bodies*) has *Sense*.

Such a temper'd *Matter* as this, is analogous to the *Animal Spirits* in Man, which, if *Matter* could be the *Soul*, were the very *Soul* of the *Body*, and *Common percipient* of all Motions from within or without, by reason of the tenuity, passivity, and near homogeneity, * and || (it may be) imperceptibility of any change or alteration, from the playing together of its own tenuious and light particles; and therefore very fit to receive all manner of impresses from others. Whence we may

|| But why it may not be, something is suggested in the foregoing chapter, sect. 3.

may rationally conclude, That some such *subtile Matter* as this is either the *Soul*, or her *immediate Instrument* for all manner of perceptions. The *latter* whereof I shall prove to be true in its due place. That the *former* part is false I shall now demonstrate, by proving more stringently, That no *Matter* whatsoever is capable of such *Sense* and *Perception* as we are conscious to our selves of.

4. For concerning that part of *Matter*, which is the *Common Sensorium*, I demand whether some one point of it receive the whole image of the Object, or whether it is wholly received into every point of it, or finally, whether the whole *Sensorium* receive the whole image by expanded parts, this part of the *Sensorium* this part of the image, and that part that. If the first, seeing that in us which perceives the external Object moves also the Body, it will follow, That one little point of *Matter* will give local motion to what is innumerable millions of times bigger than it self; of which there cannot be found nor imagined any example in Nature.

5. If the second, this difficulty presents it self, which also reflects upon the former Position, How so small a point as we speak of should receive the images of so vast, or so various Objects at once, without Obliteration or Confusion; a thing impossible, as is manifest from Axiome 24. And therefore not receiving them, cannot perceive them, by Axiome 25. But if every point or particle of this *Matter* could receive the whole image, which of these innumerable particles, that receive the Image entirely, may be deemed I my self that perceive this Image? But if I be all those Points, it will come to pass, especially in a small Object, and very near at hand, that the line of impulse coming to diverse and distant Points, will seem to come as from several places, and so one Object will necessarily seem a Cluster of Objects. And if I be but one of these Points, what becomes of the rest? or who are they?


6. There remains therefore only the third way, which is that the parts of the image of the Object be received by the parts of this portion of *Matter*, which is suppos'd the common *Sensorium*. But this does perfectly contradict experience; for we find our selves to perceive the whole Object, when in this case nothing could perceive the whole, every part perceiving its part; and therefore there would be nothing that can judge of the whole. No more than three men, if they were imagined to sing a song of three parts, and none of them should hear any part but his own, could judge of the Harmony of the whole.

7. As concerning the *Seat of Imagination and Memory*, especially *Memory*, what kind of *Matter* can be found fit for this function? If it be *Fluid*, the images of Objects will be prone to vanish suddenly, as also to be perverted, or turned contrary ways. For example, C, a particle of this *fluid Matter*, receiving an impress from B, must feel it as coming from B; but in toying and tumbling up and down, as the particles of *fluid Matter* do, turns the side E F which received that impress from B toward L, whence it will feel as if the impress had been from L, for it must feel it as from the place directly op-



posite to it self, (if it can after the removal of the present Object, which the *Re-action* is, feel it at all :) and the same reason will be in other particles of this *fluid Matter*, which must needs force a great deal of preposterous confusion both upon the *Fancy* and *Memory*. If it be *Hard*, it will soon be compos'd to *Rest*, as in a Bell whose *tremor* is gone in a little time ; but we *remember* things some years together, though we never think of them till the end of that term. If *Viscid*, there is the like inconvenience, nay, it is the unfittest of all for either receiving of *Motion*, or continuing it, and therefore unlikely to be the *Seat* of either *Fancy* or *Memory*. For if *Motion* or *Re-action* and *Sense*, whether internal or external, be all one, *Motion* ceasing, *Memory* must needs cease, by Axiome 21. Nor can it any more *remember* when it is again moved in the same manner, than a Stone or a piece of Lead that was flung up into the Air, can become more light or more prone to flie upwards, when they have once ceased from *Motion* ; for they are both exquisitely as if they had never been moved.

8. Lastly, We remember some things of which there can be no *Signatures* in *Matter* to represent them, * as for example, *Wideness* and *Distance*. For as for both of them, there is no note can be made in the *Matter E* by lines from the two Objects *A B* and *C D*, whereby the difference of remoteness of *A E* above *C E*, or of the wideness of *A B* above *C D*, can be discerned ; for both the Objects make one and the same signature in the matter *E*.



9. Those that are commonly called by the name of *Secunda Notiones*, and are not sensible Objects themselves, nor the *Phantasms* of any sensible Objects, but only our manner of conceiving them, or reasoning about them, in which number are comprehended all *Logical* and *Mathematical terms* ; these, I say, never came in at the *Senses*, they being no impresses of corporeal motion, which excite in us, as in Dogs and other Brutes, the sense only of Sounds, of Colours, of Hot, of Cold, and the like. Now *Matter* being affected by no perception but of corporeal impression, by the bearing of one Body against another ; it is plain from Axiome 23, that these *Second Notions*, or *Mathematical* and *Logical* conceptions, cannot be seated in *Matter*, and therefore must be in some other Substance distinct from it, by Axiome 10.

10. Here Mr. *Hobbs*, to avoid the force of this Demonstration, has found out a marvellous witty invention to befool his followers withal, making them believe that there is no such thing as these *Secunda Notiones*, distinct from the *Names* or *Words* whereby they are said to be signified ; and that there is no perception in us, but of such *Phantasms* as are impressed from external Objects, such as are common to Us and Beasts : and as for the *Names* which we give to these, or the *Phantasms* of them, that there is the same reason of them as of other *Marks*, *Letters*, or *Characters* ; all which coming in at the *Senses*, he would bear them in hand, that it is a plain case that we have the perception of nothing but what is impressed from corporeal Objects.

But

But how ridiculous an Evasion this is, may be easily discovered, if we consider, that if these *Mathematical* and *Logical Notions* we speak of, be nothing but *Names*, Logical and Mathematical Truths will not be the same in all Nations, because they have not the same *names*. For Example, *Similitudo* and *ὁμοιότης*, *ἀναλογία* and *Proportio*, *λόγος* and *Ratio*, these *names* are utterly different, the Greek from the Latin; yet the Greeks, Latins, nor any Nation else, do vary in their conceptions couch'd under these different *names*: Wherefore it is plain, that there is a *settled Notion* distinct from these *Words* and *Names*, as well as from these corporeal Phantasms impressed from the Object; which was the thing to be demonstrated.

11. Lastly, we are conscious to our selves of that Faculty which the Greeks call *ἰσχύς*, or a *Power in our selves*, notwithstanding any outward assaults or importunate temptations, to cleave to that which is *vertuous and honest*, or to yield to pleasures, or other vile advantages. That we have this *Liberty* and freedom in our selves, and that we refuse the good, and chuse the evil, when we might have done otherwise; that natural Sense of *Remorse of Conscience* is an evident and undeniable witness of. For when a man has done amiss, the pain, grief, or indignation that he raises in himself, or at least feels raised in him, is of another kind from what we find from misfortunes or affronts we could not avoid. And that which pinches us, and vexes us so severely, is the sense that we have brought such an evil upon our selves, when it was in our power to have avoided it. Now if there be no *Sense* nor *Perception* in us but what arises from the *Re-action of Matter* one part against another; whatever Representation of things, whatever Deliberation or Determination we fall upon, it will by Axiome 26. be *purely necessary*; there being upon this Hypothesis, no more *Freedom* while we deliberate or conclude, than there is in a pair of scales, which rests as *necessarily* at last as it moved before. Wherefore it is manifest, that this Faculty we call *Free-will* is not found in *Matter*, but in some other Substance, by Axiome 10.

12. Mr. *Hobbs* therefore, to give him his due, consonantly enough to his own principles, does very peremptorily affirm, *That all our Actions are necessary*. But I having proved the contrary by that Faculty which we may call, *Internal Sense* or *Common Notion*, found in all men that have not done violence to their own nature; unless by some other approved Faculty he can discover the contrary, my Conclusion must stand for an undoubted Truth, by Axiome 5. He pretends therefore some Demonstration of *Reason*, which he would oppose against the dictate of this *Inward Sense*; which it will not be amiss to examine, that we may discover his Sophistry.

N O T E S

On CHAP. II. Sect. 3.

AND, it may be, the Imperceptibility of any change or alteration from the playing together, &c. But verily how that this cannot be, I have intimated no obscure Arguments in the foregoing Chapter, Sect. 3. Sect. 8.

Sect. 8. As for Example, Wideness and Distance, &c. Concerning the Perception of Largeness and Distance, I have accurately enough treated in my *Enchirid. Metaphys.* especially in the *Scholia*: where it is to be observ'd, that however there is some no contemptible Appearance of reason from the Curvatures of the Meeting of the two Cones from all Points of the Object, made by the crossing of them through the Pupil of the Eye, why, while the Object is *present*, it should appear at such a distance, and of such an Amplitude, yet after these Curvatures are gone off, the Object being remov'd, where there should remain any Marks or Signatures of a certain Distance or Wideness in any part of the Brain, is very difficult truly to be imagined.

C H A P. III.

1. *Mr. Hobbs his Arguments whereby he would prove all our actions necessitated. His first Argument.*
2. *His second Argument.*
3. *His third Argument.*
4. *His fourth Argument.*
5. *What must be the meaning of these words, Nothing taketh beginning from it self, in the first Argument of Mr. Hobbs.*
6. *A fuller and more determinate explication of the foregoing words, whose sense is evidently convinced to be, That no Essence of it self can vary its modification.*
7. *That this is only said by Mr. Hobbs, not proved, and a full confutation of his Assertion.*
8. *Mr. Hobbs imposed upon by his own Sophistry.*
9. *That one part of this first Argument of his is groundless, the other sophistical.*
10. *The plain proposal of his Argument, whence appears more fully the weakness and sophistry thereof.*
11. *An Answer to his second Argument.*
12. *An Answer to the third.*
13. *An Answer to a difficulty concerning the Truth and Falshood of future Propositions.*
14. *An Answer to Mr. Hobbs his fourth Argument, which, though slighted by himself, is the strongest of them all.*
15. *The difficulty of reconciling Free-will with Divine Prescience and Prophecies.*
16. *That the Faculty of Free-will is seldom put in use.*
17. *That the use of it is properly in Moral conflict.*
18. *That the Soul is not invincible there neither.*
19. *That Divine decrees either find fit instruments, or make them.*
20. *That the more exact we make Divine Prescience, even to the comprehension of any thing that implies no contradiction in it self to be comprehended, the more clear it is that man's Will may be sometimes free.*
21. *Which is sufficient to make good my last Argument against Mr. Hobbs.*

1. **H**IS first Argument runs thus (I will repeat it in his own words, as also the rest of them as they are to be found in his *Treatise of Liberty and Necessity*;) I conceive (saith he) that nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it self; and that therefore, when first a man hath an Appetite or Will to something to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will, the cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing: So that whereas it is out of Controversy, that of voluntary actions the Will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the Will is also caus'd
by

by other things, whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

2. His second thus; I hold (saith he) that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect: The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful for the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily. For whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. What follows is either the same, or so closely depending on this, that I need not add it.

3. His third Argument therefore shall be that which he urges from *Future dis-junctions*. For example, let the case be put of the *Weather*, 'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain; If therefore, saith he, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the Proposition, It shall rain, or not rain, should be true.

4. His fourth is this, That the denying of Necessity destroyeth both the Decrees and the Prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an instrument, or foreseeeth shall come to pass; a man, if he have liberty from necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be, as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

5. The Entrance into his first Argument is something obscure and ambiguous, *Nothing taketh beginning from it self*: But I shall be as candid and faithful an Interpreter as I may. If he mean by *beginning*, beginning of *Existence*, it is undoubtedly true, That no Substance nor Modification of Substance, taketh beginning from it self; but this will not infer the Conclusion he drives at. But if he mean, that *Nothing taketh beginning from it self*, of being otherwise affected or modified than before; he must either understand by nothing, no *Essence*, neither *Spirit* nor *Body*, or no *Modification* of *Essence*. He cannot mean *Spirit*, as admitting no such thing in the whole comprehension of Nature. If *Body*, it will not infer what he aims at, unless there be nothing but *Body* in the Universe; which is a mere precarious Principle of his, which he beseeches his credulous followers to admit, but he proves it no where, as I have already noted. If by *Modification* he mean the *Modification* of *Matter* or *Body*; that runs upon the former Principle, That there is nothing but *Body* in the world, and therefore he proves nothing but upon a begg'd Hypothesis, and that a false one; as I have elsewhere demonstrated. Wherefore the most favourable Interpretation I can make is, That he means by *nothing*, no *Essence*, nor *Modification* of *Essence*, being willing to hide that dearly-hug'd Hypothesis of his (*That there is nothing but Body in the World*) under so general and uncertain terms.

6. The words therefore in the other senses having no pretence to conclude any thing, let us see how far they will prevail in this, taking

no thing for no Essence, or no Modification of Essence, or what will come nearer to the matter in hand, no Faculty of an Essence. And from this two-fold meaning, let us examine two Propositions that will result from thence, viz. *That no Faculty of any Essence can vary its Operation from what it is, but from the action of some other immediate Agent without it self; or, That no Essence can vary its Modification or Operation by it self, but by the action of some other immediate Agent without it.* Of which two Propositions the latter seems the better sense by far, and most natural. For it is very harsh, and, if truly look'd into, as false, to say, *That the Mode or Faculty of any Essence changes it self;* for it is the Essence it self that exerts it self into these variations of Modes, if no external Agent is the cause of these changes. And Mr. Hobbs opposing an *External Agent* to *this Thing* that he says does not change it self, does naturally imply, That they are both not *Faculties*, but *Substances* he speaks of.

7. Wherefore there remains only the latter Proposition to be examined, *That no Essence of it self can vary its Modification.* That some Essence must have had a power of moving, is plain, in that there is *Motion* in the world, which must be the Effect of some Substance or other. But that *Motion* in a large sense, taking it for mutation or change, may proceed from that very Essence in which it is found, seems to me plain by Experience: For there is an Essence in us, whatever we may call it, which we find endued with this property; as appears from hence, that it has variety of perception, *Mathematical, Logical*, and I may add also *Moral*, that are not any impresses nor footsteps of Corporeal Motion, as I have already demonstrated: and any man may observe in himself, and discover in the writings of others, how the Mind has passed from one of these perceptions to another, in very long deductions of Demonstration; as also what stillness from bodily Motions is required in the excogitation of such series of Reasons, where the Spirits are to run into no other posture nor motion than what they are guided into by the mind it self, where these immaterial and intellectual Notions have the leading and rule. Besides, in grosser Phantasms, which are suppos'd to be somewhere impressed in the Brain, the composition of them, and disclusion and various disposal of them, it is plainly an arbitrary act, and implies an Essence that can, as it lists, excite in it self the variety of such Phantasms as have been first exhibited from External Objects, and change them, and transpose them at her own will. But what need I reason against this ground of Mr. Hobbs so solicitously? it being sufficient to discover, that he only says, that *No Essence can change the Modifications of it self*, but does not prove it; and therefore whatever he would infer hereupon, is merely upon a begg'd Principle.

8. But however, from this precarious ground he will infer, that *whenever we have a Will to a thing, the cause of this Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in our own disposing;* the meaning whereof must be, *That whenever we will, some corporeal impress which we cannot avoid, forces us thereto.* But the Illation is as weak as bold, it being built upon no foundation, as I have already shewn. I shall only take notice how Mr. Hobbs, though he has rescued himself from the Authority

thority of the Schools, and would fain set up for himself, yet he has not freed himself from their fooleries, in talking of *Faculties* and *Operations*, (and the absurdity is alike in both) as separate and distinct from the *Essence* they belong to, which causes a great deal of distraction and obscurity in the speculation of things. I speak this in reference to those expressions of his, of the *Will being the cause of willing*, and of its being the *necessary* cause of voluntary actions, and of things not being in its disposing. Whenas, if a man would speak properly, and desired to be understood, he would say, *That the Subject in which is this power or act of willing, (call it Man, or the Soul of Man,) is the cause of this or that voluntary action.* But this would discover his Sophistry, wherewith haply he has entrap'd himself, which is this, *Something out of the power of the Will necessarily causes the Will; the Will once caused is the necessary cause of voluntary actions, and therefore all necessary actions are necessitated.*

9. Besides that the first part of this Argumentation is groundless, (as I have already intimated) the second is Sophistical, that says, *That the Will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions*: For by *necessary* may be understood either *necessitated*, forced and made to act, whether it will or no; or else it may signify, that the Will is a *requisite* cause of voluntary actions, so that there can be no voluntary actions without it. The latter whereof may be in some sense true, but the former is utterly false. So the Conclusion being inferr'd from assertions whereof the one is groundless, the other Sophistical, the Illation cannot but be ridiculously weak and despicable. But if he had spoke in the *Concrete* instead of the *Abstract*, the Sophistry had been more grossly discoverable, or rather the train of his reasoning languid and contemptible. Omitting therefore to speak of the *Will* separately, which of it self is but a blind Power or Operation, let us speak of that *Essence* which is endued with *Will, Sense, Reason*, and other *Faculties*, and see what face this Argumentation of his will bear, which will then run thus;

10. *Some external, irresistible Agent does ever necessarily cause that Essence, (call it Soul or what you please) which is endued with the Faculties of Will and Understanding, to will: This Essence, endued with the power of exerting it self into the acts of Willing, is the necessary cause of Voluntary actions: Therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated.* The first Assertion now at first sight appears a gross falshood, the *Soul* being endued with *Understanding* as well as *Will*, and therefore she is not *necessarily* determined to will by external impresses, but by the displaying of certain notions and perceptions she raises in her self, that be purely intellectual. And the second seems a very slim and lank piece of Sophistry. Both which my reasons already alledged do so easily and so plainly reach, that I need add nothing more, but pass to his second Argument, the form whereof in brief is this:

11. *Every Cause is a sufficient cause, otherwise it could not produce its effect: Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, that is to say, will be sure to produce the effect, otherwise something was wanting thereto, and it was no sufficient cause: And therefore every cause is a necessary cause, and consequently every Effect or Action, even those that are termed Voluntary, are necessitated.* This reasoning looks smartly at first view; but if we come

closer to it, we shall find it a pitiful piece of Sophistry, which is easily detected, by observing the ambiguity of that Proposition, *Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause*: For the force lies not so much in that it is said to be *Sufficient*, as in that it is said to be a *Cause*; which if it be, it must of necessity have an *Effect*, whether it be *sufficient* or *insufficient*; which discovers the Sophism. For these relative terms of *Cause* and *Effect* necessarily imply one another. But every Being that is *sufficient* to act this or that, *if it will*, and so to become the *Cause* thereof, doth neither act, nor abstain from acting *necessarily*. * And therefore if it do act, it adds *Will* to the *Sufficiency* of its power; and if it did not act, it is not because it had not sufficient power, but because it would not make use of it. So that we see that every *sufficient Cause*, rightly understood without captiosity, is not a *necessary cause*, nor will be sure to produce the *Effect*; and that though there be a sufficiency of power, yet there may be something wanting, to wit, the exertion of the *Will*; whereby it may come to pass, that what might have acted if it would, did not: but if it did, *Will* being added to sufficient power, that it cannot be said to be *necessary* in any other sense, than of that Axiome in Metaphysics, *Quicquid est, quamdiu est, necesse est esse*: The reason whereof is, because it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at once. But before it acted, it might have chosen whether it would have acted or no; but it did determine it self. And in this sense is it to be said to be a *free Agent*, and not a *necessary* one. So that it is manifest, that though there be some pretty perverseness of wit in the contriving of this Argument, yet there is no solidity at all at the bottom.

12. And as little is there in his third. But in this, I must confess, I cannot so much accuse him of *Art* and *Sophistry*, as of ignorance of the rules of *Logick*; for he does plainly assert, That the necessity of the truth of that Proposition there named, depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts thereof; than which no grosser error can be committed in the Art of reasoning. For he might as well say, that the necessity of the truth of a *Connex* Axiome depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts, as of a *Disjunct*. But in a *Connex*, when both the parts are not only false, but impossible, yet the Axiome is necessarily true. As for example, *If Bucephalus be a man, he is endued with humane reason*; this Axiome is necessarily true, and yet the parts are impossible. For *Alexander's* horse can neither be a man, nor have the reason of a man, either radically or actually. The necessity therefore is only laid upon the *connexion* of the parts, not upon the parts themselves. So when I say, *To morrow it will rain, or it will not rain*, this *Disjunct* Proposition also is necessary, but the necessity lies upon the *Disjunction* of the parts, not upon the parts themselves: For they being immediately disjoin'd, there is a necessity that one of them must be, though there be no necessity that this must be determined rather than that. As when a man is kept under custody, where he has the use of two rooms only, though there be a necessity that he be found in one of the two, yet he is not confined to either one of them. And to be brief, and prevent those frivolous both answers and replies that follow in the pursuit of this Argument in Mr. *Hobbs*; As the necessity

cessity of this *Disjunct* Axiome lies upon the *Disjunction* it self, so the truth, of which this necessity is a mode, must lie there too; for it is the *Disjunction* of the parts that is affirmed, and not the parts themselves, as any one that is but moderately in his wits must needs acknowledge.

13. There is a more dangerous way that Mr. *Hobbs* might have made use of, and with more credit, but yet scarce with better success, which is the consideration of a simple Axiome that pronounces of a *future Contingent*, such as this, *Cras Socrates disputabit*. For every Axiome pronouncing either true or false, as all do agree upon; if this Axiome be now true, it is impossible but *Socrates* should dispute to morrow; or if it be now false, it is impossible he should: and so his Action of disputing, or the omission thereof, will be necessary, for the Proposition cannot be both true and false at once. Some are much troubled to extricate themselves out of this Nooze; but if we more precisely enquire into the sense of the Proposition, the difficulty will vanish. He therefore that affirms, that *Socrates* will dispute to morrow, affirms it (to use the distinction of *Futurities* that *Aristotle* somewhere suggests) either as a *τὸ μέλλον*, or *τὸ ἰσόμενον*, that is, either as a thing that is likely to be, but has a possibility of being otherwise, or else as a thing certainly to come to pass. If this latter, the Axiome is false; if the former, it is true: and so the liberty of *Socrates* his action, as also of all like *contingent* effects, are thus easily rescued from this sophistical entanglement. For every *Future* Axiome is as incapable of our judgment, unless we determine the sense of it by one of the forenamed modes, as an *Indefinite* Axiome is, before we in our minds add the notes of *Universality* or *Particularity*: Neither can we say of either of them, that they are true or false, till we have compleated and determined their sense.

14. His fourth Argument he proposes with some diffidence and dislike, as if he thought it *not good Logick* (they are his own words) to make use of it, and add it to the rest. And for my own part, I cannot but approve of the consistency of his judgment, and coherency with other parts of his Philosophy: For if there be nothing but *Body* or *Matter* in the whole comprehension of things, it will be very hard to find out any such *Deity*, as has the *knowledge* or *fore-knowledge* of any thing: And therefore I suspect that this last is only cast in as *Argumentum ad hominem*, to puzzle such as have not dived to so profound a depth of natural knowledge, as to fancy they have discovered there is no God in the world.

15. But let him vilify it as he will, it is the only Argument he has brought, that has any tolerable sense or solidity in it; and it is a Subject that has exercis'd the wits of all Ages, to reconcile the *Liberty* of man's Will with the *Decrees* and *Prescience* of God. But my *Freeness*, I hope, and *Moderation* shall make this matter more easy to me, than it ordinarily proves to them that venture upon it. My Answer therefore in brief shall be this;

16. *First*, That though there be such a Faculty in the Soul of man as *Liberty of Will*, yet she is not always in a state of acting according to it. For she may either *degenerate so far*, that it may be as cer-

tainly^o known what she will do upon this or that occasion, as what an hungry Dog will do when a Crust is offered him ; which is the general condition of almost all men in most occurrences of their lives : or else she may be so *Heroically good*, though that happen in very few, that it may be as certainly known as before what she will do or suffer upon such or such emergencies : and in these cases the use of *Liberty of Will* ceases.

17. *Secondly*, That the use of the Faculty of *Free-will* is properly there, when we find our selves so near to an *Æquiponderancy*, being touch'd with the sense of *Virtue* on the one side, and the ease or *Pleasure* of some vitious action on the other, that we are conscious to our selves that we ought, and that we may, if we will, abandon the one, and cleave to the other.

18. *Thirdly*, That in this Conflict the Soul has no such absolute power to determine her self to the one or to the other action, but *Temptation* or *Supernatural assistance* may certainly carry her this way or that way ; so that she may not be able to use that liberty of going indifferently either way.

19. *Fourthly*, That Divine Decrees either find men fit, or make them so, for the executing of whatsoever is absolutely purposed, or prophesied concerning them.

20. *Fifthly*, That the *Præscience* of God is so vast, and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, That this knowledge is most perfect and exquisite, accurately representing the Natures, Powers, and Properties of the thing it does foreknow. Whence it must follow, that if there be any Creature *free* and undeterminate, and that in such circumstances, and at such a time he may either act thus, or not act thus, this perfect *Fore-knowledge* must discern from all eternity, that the said Creature, in such circumstances, may either act thus, or so, or not. And further to declare the perfection of this *Fore-knowledge* and *Omniscience* of God ; as His *Omnipotence* ought to extend so far, as to be able to do whatsoever implies no contradiction to be done ; so his *Præscience* and *Omniscience* ought to extend so far, as to know precisely and fully whatever implies no contradiction to be known.

To conclude therefore briefly ; *Free* or *Contingent* Effects do either imply a contradiction to be *fore-known*, or they do not imply it. If they imply a contradiction to be *fore-known*, they are no object of the *Omniscience* of God ; and therefore there can be no pretence that his *Fore-knowledge* does determinate them, nor can they be argued to be determined thereby. If they imply no contradiction to be *fore-known*, that is to acknowledge that Divine *Præscience* and they may very well consist together. And so either way, notwithstanding the Divine *Omniscience*, the Actions of men may be *free*.

21. The sum therefore of all is this, That mens actions are sometimes *free*, and sometimes *not free* ; but that they are at any time *free*, is a Demonstration that there is a Faculty in us that is incompatible to mere Matter : which is sufficient for my purpose.

NOTES

On CHAP. III. Sect. II.

AND therefore if it do act, it adds Will to the sufficiency of its power; &c. This reasoning therefore of Hobbs in Agents that are not free, wants not its Ingenuity and Solidity; because in such the Addition of the Will is not requisite: but whatever is proper to produce the Effect, is immediately at hand, and that after a very sufficient manner; from whence he rightly concludes, that the Effect is necessary: And so again, every Effect from an Agent not free, or at least that proceeds not from any acting as such, implies that to be a sufficient Cause from which it doth exist; for otherwise it had not existed, by reason of the Insufficiency of the Cause. Which Speculation opens indeed a Way for the understanding of a Truth of great Moment: Namely, that nothing exists of it self, unless it contains in its own Nature a sufficient Cause of its Existence; for if it had had only an insufficient one, it would not have existed: but now if it hath a sufficient one, it exists necessarily: from whence 'tis rightly again collected, that it is repugnant to reason that any thing should exist of it self contingently: As I have elsewhere observed against such as say, that if there be a God, it is still but contingently only that he does exist: Which certainly would so be, if he had not in his own Nature a sufficient, and therefore necessary Cause of his Existence.

CHAP. IV.

1. An Enumeration of sundry Opinions concerning the Seat of Common Sense.
2. Upon supposition that we are nothing but mere Matter, That the whole Body cannot be the Common Sensorium; 3. Nor the Orifice of the Stomach; 4. Nor the Heart; 5. Nor the Brain; 6. Nor the Membranes; 7. Nor the Septum lucidum; 8. Nor Regius his small and perfectly-solid Particle. 9. The Probability of the Conarion being the common Seat of Sense.

1. **I** Have plainly proved, that neither those more Pure and Intellectual faculties of Will and Reason, nor yet those less pure of Memory and Imagination, are competible to mere Bodies. Of which we may be the more secure, I having so convincingly demonstrated, That not so much as that which we call * External Sense is competible to the same: all which Truths I have concluded concerning Matter generally considered.

* See chap. I.
sect. 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13,
14. and chap.
2. sect. 3, 4,
5, 6.

But because there may be a suspicion in some, which are over-credulous concerning the powers of Body, that Organization may do strange feats, (which Surmise notwithstanding is as fond as if they should imagine, that though neither Silver, nor Steel, nor Iron, nor Lute-strings, have any Sense apart, yet being put together in such a manner,

manner, and formed as will (suppose) make a compleat *Watch*, they may have *Sense*; that is to say, that a *Watch* may be a living Creature, though the several parts have neither *Life* nor *Sense*;) I shall for their sakes go more *particularly* to work, and recite every Opinion that I could ever meet with by converse with either men or books, concerning *the Seat of the Common Sense*, and after, try whether any of these Hypotheses can possibly be admitted for Truth, upon supposition that we consist of nothing but *mere modified and organized Matter*.

I shall first recite the Opinions, and then examine the possibility of each in particular, which in brief are these: 1. That the whole Body is the Seat of Common Sense. 2. That the Orifice of the Stomach. 3. The Heart. 4. The Brain. 5. The Membranes. 6. The *Septum lucidum*. 7. Some very small and perfectly-solid particle in the Body. 8. The *Cavarian*. 9. The concurse of the Nerves about the fourth ventricle of the Brain. 10. The Spirits in that fourth ventricle.

2. That the first Opinion is false, is manifest from hence, That, upon supposition we are nothing but *mere Matter*, if we grant the *whole Body* to be one common *Sensorium*, perceptive of all Objects, *Motion* which is impressed on the Eye or Ear, must be transmitted into all the parts of the Body. For *Sense* is really the same with *communication of Motion*, by Axiome 20. And the variety of *Sense* arising from the modification of *Motion*, which must needs be variously modified by the different temper of the parts of the Body, by Axiome 22. it plainly follows, that the Eye must be otherwise affected by the motion of Light, than the other parts to which this motion is transmitted. Wherefore if it be the *whole Body* that perceives, it will perceive the Object in every part thereof several ways modified at once; which is against all Experience. It will also appear in all likelihood in several places at once, by reason of the many windings and turnings that must happen to the transmission of this *Motion*, which are likely to be as so many Refractions or Reflexions.

3. That *the Orifice of the Stomach* cannot be the seat of *Common-Sense*, is apparent from hence, That that which is the common *Sentient* does not only *perceive* all Objects, but has the power of *moving* the Body. Now besides that there is no organization in the mouth of the Stomach that can elude the strength of our Arguments laid down in the foregoing Chapters, which took away all capacity from *Matter* of having any *perception* at all in it; there is no mechanical reason imaginable to be found in the Body, whereby it will appear possible, that supposing the mouth of the Stomach were the *common Percipient* of all Objects, it could be able to *move* the rest of the members of the Body, as we find something in us does. This is so palpably plain, that it is needless to spend any more words upon it.

4. The same may be said concerning the *Heart*. For who can imagine that, if the *Heart* were that *common Percipient*, there is any such Mechanical connexion betwixt it and all the parts of the Body, that it may, by such or such a perception, command the motion of the Foot, or little Finger? Besides, that it seems wholly imploy'd in the performance of its *Systole*, and *Diastrale*, which causes such a great difference of the situation of the *Heart* by turns, that if it were that
Seat

Seat in which the sense of all Objects centre, we should not be able to see things steddily, or fix our sight in the same place.

5. How incapable the *Brain* is of being so active a Principle of *Motion* as we find in our selves, the *visciduity* thereof does plainly indicate. Besides, that Physicians have discovered by experience, that the *Brain* is so far from being the *common Seat* of all senses, that it has in it none at all. And the *Arabians*, that say it has, have distinguished it into such several offices of *Imagination*, *Memory*, *Common Sense*, &c. that we are still at a loss for some one part of *Matter* that is to be the *Common Percipient* of all these. But I have so clearly demonstrated the impossibility of the *Brain's* being able to perform those functions that appertain truly to what ordinarily men call the *Soul*, in my *Antidote against Atheism*, that it is enough to refer the Reader thither. See Book 1: chap. 11. sect. 5, 6, 7.

6. As for the *Membranes*, whether we would fancy them *all* the *Seat* of *Common Sense*, or *some one* Membrane, or *part* thereof; the like difficulties will occur as have been mentioned already. For if *all the Membranes*, the difference and situation of them will vary the aspect and sight of the Object, so that the same things will appear to us in several hues, and several places at once, as is easily demonstrated from *Axiome 22*. If *some one Membrane*, or *part* thereof, it will be impossible to excogitate any Mechanical reason, how this *one* particular Membrane, or any *part* thereof, can be able so strongly and determinately to *move* upon occasion every part of the *Body*.

7. And therefore for this very cause cannot the *Septum lucidum* be the *Common Percipient* in us, because it is utterly unimaginable how it should have the power of so stoutly and distinctly *moving* our exterior parts and limbs.

8. As for that new and marvellous Invention of *Henricus Regius*, Philosoph. Natural. lib. 5. cap. 1. That it may be a *certain perfectly-solid, but very small, particle of Matter* in the *Body*, that is the *seat of common perception*; besides that it is as boldly asserted, that such an *hard* particle should have *Sense* in it, as that the filings of *Iron* and *Steel* should; it cannot be the spring of *Motion*: For how should so small an *Atome* *move* the whole *Body*, but by moving it self? But it being more subtile than the point of any needle, when it puts it self upon motion, especially such thrustings as we sometimes use, it must needs pass through the *Body* and leave it.

9. The most pure Mechanical Invention is that of the use of the *Conarion* propos'd by * *Des-Cartes*; which, considered with some other * Dioptr. cap. 5. Artic. 13. and De Pass. sion. Part 1. Artic. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. organizations of the *Body*, bids the fairest of any thing I have met withal, or ever hope to meet withal, for the resolution of the *Passions* and *Properties* of living *Creatures* into mere *Corporeal* motion. And therefore it is requisite to insist a little upon the explication thereof, that we may the more punctually confute them that would abuse his Mechanical contrivances to the exclusion of all Principles but *Corporeal*, in either *Man* or *Beast*.

C H A P. V.

1. How Perception of external Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, are pretended to be perform'd by the Conarion, Spirits, and Muscles, without a Soul.
2. That the Conarion, devoid of a Soul, cannot be the Common Percipient, demonstrated out of Des-Cartes himself.
3. That the Conarion, with the Spirits and Organization of the Parts of the Body, is not a sufficient Principle of Spontaneous motion, without a Soul.
4. A description of the use of the Valvulæ in the Nerves of the Muscles for spontaneous motion.
5. The insufficiency of this contrivance for that purpose.
6. A further demonstration of the insufficiency thereof, from whence is clearly evinced, that Brutes have Souls.
7. That Memory cannot be salv'd the way above described;
8. Nor Imagination.
9. A Distribution out of Des-Cartes of the Functions in us, some appertaining to the Body, and others to the Soul.
10. The Author's Observations thereupon.

Cartes. De
Pass. Part 1.
Artic. 32.

1. **T**HE sum of this Abuse must in brief be this: That the *Glandula Pinealis* is the common Sentient or Percipient of all Objects; and without a Soul, by virtue of the Spirits and Organization of the Body, may do all those feats that we ordinarily conceive to be performed by Soul and Body joined together. For it being one, whenas the rest of the Organs of Sense are double, and so handsomely seated as to communicate with the Spirits, as well of the posteriour as anterior Cavities of the Brain; by their help all the motions of the Nerves (as well of those that transmit the sense of outward Objects, as of them that serve for the inward affections of the Body, such as Hunger, Thirst, and the like) are easily convey'd unto it: and so being variously moved, it does variously determine the course of the Spirits into such and such Muscles, whereby it moves the Body.

Des-Cart. De
Pass. Part 1.
Artic. 21.

Moreover, that the transmission of Motion from the Object, through the Nerves, into the inward concavities of the Brain, and so to the Conarion, opens such and such Pores of the Brain, in such and such order or manner, which remain as tracts or footsteps of the presence of these Objects after they are removed. Which tracts, or signatures, consist mainly in this, that the Spirits will have an easier passage through these Pores than other parts of the Brain. And hence arises Memory, when the Spirits be determined by the inclining of the Conarion, to that part of the Brain where these tracts are found, they moving then the Conarion as when the Object was present, though not so strongly.

From the hitting of the Spirits into such like tracts, is also the nature of Imagination to be explain'd; in which there is little difference from Memory, saving that the reflexion upon time as past, when we saw or perceived such or such a thing, is quite left out. But these are not all the operations we are conscious to our selves of, and yet more than can be made out by this Hypothesis, That Perception of Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, may be all performed by virtue of this *Glandula*, the Animal Spirits, and mere
orga-

organization of the Body; as we shall plainly find, though but upon an easy examination.

2. For that the *Conarion*, devoid of a Soul, has no *perception* of any one Object, is demonstrable from the very description *Cartesius* makes of the transmission of the image, suppose through the Eye to the Brain, and so to the *Conarion*. For it is apparent from what he sets down in his *Treatise of the Passions of the Soul*, that the image that is propagated from the Object to the *Conarion*, is impressed thereupon in some latitude of space. Whence it is manifest, that the *Conarion* does not, nor can perceive the whole Object, though several parts may be acknowledged to have the *perception* of the several parts thereof. But something in us *perceives* the whole, which therefore cannot be the *Conarion*. Part. 1. Artic. 35. See Book 2. ch. 2. sect. 6.

And that we do not *perceive* the external Object *double* is not so much because the Image is united in the Organ of *Common Sense*, as that the lines come so from the Object to both the Eyes, that it is felt in one place; otherwise if the Object be very near, and the direction of our Eyes be not fitted to that nearness, it will seem *double* however. Which is a Demonstration that a man may see with both Eyes at once; and for my own part, I'm sure that I see better at distance, when I use both, than when one.

3. As for *Spontaneous Motion*, that the *Conarion* cannot be a sufficient Principle thereof, with the *Spirits* and organization of other parts of the Body, that we should admit it a fit seat of *Common Sense*, will easily appear, if we consider, that so weak and so small a thing as that *Glandula* is, seems utterly unable to *determine* the *Spirits* with that force and violence we find they are determined in *running*, *striking*, *thrusting*, and the like; and that it is evident, that sometimes scarce the thousandth part of the *Conarion* shall be director of this force; *viz.* when the Object of Sight, suppose, is as little as a pin's point, or when a man is prick'd with a needle, these receptions must be as little in the *Glandula* as in the exterior Sense. See the Appendix to my Antid. ch. 10. sect. 6.

But suppose the whole *Conarion* always did act in the *determining* the motion of the *Spirits* into this or that *Muscle*; it is impossible that such *fluid Matter* as these *Spirits* are, that upon the noddings of the *Conarion* forward, may easily recede back, should ever determine their course with that force and strength they are determined.

But haply it will be answered, That such subtile and fluid bodies as the *Animal Spirits*, that are in a readiness to be upon Motion any way, the least thing will *determine* their course; and that the *Muscles* themselves, being well replenished with *Spirits*, and framed with such *Valvule* as will easily intromit them from the *Brain*, and also convey them out of one opposite *Muscle* into another, upon the least redundancy of *Spirits* in the one above the other, and so shut them in; that that force we find in *spontaneous Motion* may very well be saved by this Mechanical Artifice.

4. That the insufficiency of this Answer may appear, let us more accurately consider the contrivance in the following Figure, which must be some such thing as * *Regius* has ventured at in his Philosophy, and which may serve for the more easy understanding of what Philos. Natural. lib. 4. cap. 16.

Des-

* Part 1.
Artic. 11.



Des-Cartes writes in his Book of *Passions*. Here BC are two opposite Muscles, the known Instruments of spontaneous Motion; K, some part of the Body to be moved; DE and FG are the Nerves through which Spirits are transmitted from the Brain into the foresaid Muscles; D and F two *Valvulae* to let pass the Spirits from the Brain into the Muscles, but stop them if they would regurgitate; G is a Valve that lets the Spirits out of the Muscle C into B, and E another Valve that lets the Spirit out of B into C. Now in brief, the result of this Mechanical contrivance is this, *viz.* That the Spirits being determined by the *Conarion* never so little more copiously into B than into C, those in C will pass through the Valve G into B, and so B swelling, and consequently shortning it self, it must needs bring up the Member K.

5. We will not here alledge that this may be only a mere fancy, these *Valvulae* in the *Nerves* not being yet discovered by any Anatomist to be part of the *Organization* of the Body of any Animal; but rather shew, that they would not effect what is aimed at, though they were admitted. For first, it does not appear that the Spirits will make more hast out of C into B, than the pressure caused in B by the determination of the Spirits from the *Conarion* forces them to. For all places being alike to them to play in, they will go no further than they are driven or pressed, as Wind in a Bladder. And how the *Conarion* should drive or press the Spirits into B, so as to make it press those in C, and force them out so quick and smart as we find in some Actions, is a thing utterly inconceivable.

6. Besides, admit that the *Conarion* could determine them with some considerable force so into B, that they would make those in C come to them through the Valve G, there being the Valve E to transmit them into C again, it is impossible but that the Tenth part of that force which we ordinarily use to open a man's hand against his will, should, whether he would or no, easily open it. For a very ordinary strength moving K from B towards C, must needs so press the Spirits in B, that they will certainly pass by E into C, if our Body be nothing but *Matter Mechanically organiz'd*. And therefore it is the mere *Imperium* of our Soul that does determine the Spirits to this Muscle rather than the other, and holds them there in despite of external force. From whence it is manifest, that brute Beasts must have Souls also.

De *Passion*.
Part 1.
Artic. 42.

7. Concerning *Memory* and *Imagination*, that the mere Mechanical reasons of *Des-Cartes* will not reach them, we shall clearly understand, if we consider, that the easy aperture of the same Pores of the Brain, that were opened at the presence of such an Object, is not sufficient to represent the Object, after the *Conarion* has, by inclining it self thitherward, determined the course of the Spirits into the same Pores. For this could only represent the *Figure* of a thing, not the *Colours* thereof. Besides, a man may bring an hundred Objects, and expose them to our view at the same distance, the Eye keeping exactly in the same

same posture, inſomuch that it ſhall be neceſſary for the images to take up the very ſame place of the *Brain*, and yet there ſhall be a *diſtinct Remembrance* of all theſe; which is impoſſible, if there be no *Soul* in us, but all be *mere Matter*. The ſame may be ſaid of ſo many *Names* or *Words* levell'd, if you will, out of a Trunk into the Ear, kept accurately in the ſame poſture, ſo that the *Sound* ſhall beat perpetually upon the ſame parts of the Organ, yet if there be five hundred of them, there may be a *diſtinct Memory* for every one of them; which is a power perfectly beyond the bounds of *mere Matter*, for there would be a neceſſary confuſion of all.

8. Laſtly, for thoſe imaginations or representations that are of no one Object that we ever ſee, but made up of ſeveral that have taken their diſtinct places in the *Brain*, ſome (ſuppoſe) before, and others behind, how can the *Conarion* join theſe together, and in ſuch a poſture of conjunction as it pleaſes? Or rather in one and the ſame Object, ſuppoſe this Man or that Houſe, which we ſee in a right poſture, and has left ſuch a ſignature or figure in the *Brain*, as is fit to represent it ſo, how can the *Conarion* invert the poſture of the image, and make it represent the Houſe and Man with the heels upwards? Beſides, the difficulty of representing the *Diſtance* of an Object, or the *Breadth* thereof, concerning which we have ſpoken * already. It is impoſſible the *Conarion*, if it be *mere Matter*, ſhould perform any ſuch operations as theſe. For it muſt raiſe motions in it ſelf, ſuch as are not neceſſarily convey'd by any corporeal impreſs of another Body, which is plainly againſt Axiome 26.

See Cartes. De
Paſſion. Part.
1. Artic. 43.

* Chap. 2.
ſect. 8.

9. * And therefore that ſober and judicious Wit *Des-Cartes*, dares not ſtretch the power of Mechanical organization thus far, but doth plainly confeſs, That as there are ſome *Functions* that belong to the *Body* alone, ſo there are others that belong to the *Soul*, which he calls *Cogitations*; and are, according to him, of two ſorts, the one *Actions*, the other *Paſſions*. The *Actions* are all the operations of our *Will*, as in ſome ſenſe all *Perceptions* may be termed *Actions*. And the *Actions* of the *Will* are either ſuch as are *mere Intellectual* Operations, and end in the *Soul* her ſelf, ſuch as her ſtirring up her ſelf to love God, or contemplate any Immaterial Object; or they are ſuch as have an influence on the *Body*, as when, by virtue of our *Will*, we put our ſelves upon going to this or that place.

De Paſſion.
Part. 1. Artic.
17, 18.

He diſtinguiſhes again our *Perceptions* into two ſorts, whereof the one has the *Soul* for their Cauſe, the other the *Body*. Thoſe that are cauſed by the *Body*, are moſt-what ſuch as depend on the *Nerves*. But beſides theſe, there is one kind of *Imagination* that is to be referr'd hither, and that properly has the *Body* for its cauſe, to wit, that * *Imagination* that ariſes merely from the hitting of the *Animal Spirits* againſt the tracts of thoſe Images that external Objects have left in the *Brain*, and ſo representing them to the *Conarion*; which may happen in the day-time when our *Fancy* roves, and we do not ſet our ſelves on purpoſe to think on things, as well as it does in ſleep by night. Thoſe *Perceptions* that arrive to the *Soul* by the interpoſition of the *Nerves* differ one from another in this, that ſome of them refer to outward Objects that ſtrike to our Senſe, others to our *Body*, ſuch as Hunger,

Cartes. De
Paſſion. Part.
1. Artic. 19,
20.

* De Paſſion.
Part. 1.
Artic. 21.

Artic. 22, 23,
24, 25.

Hunger, Thirst, Pain, &c. and others to the Soul it self, as Sorrow, Joy, Fear, &c.

Artic. 19,
20, 42.

Those *Perceptions* that have the *Soul* for their Cause, are either the *Perceptions* of her own *Acts of Will*, or else of her *Speculation of things purely Intelligible*, or else of *Imaginations made at pleasure*, or finally of *Reminiscency*, when she searches out something that she has let slip out of her Memory.

Cartes. Differ.
De Methodo,
Artic. 5. & de
Passion. Part.
1. Artic. 16.

10. That which is observable in this Distribution is this, That all those *Cogitations* that he calls *Actions*, as also those kind of *Perceptions* whose Cause he assigns to the *Soul*, are in themselves (and are acknowledged by him) of that nature, that they cannot be imitated by any creature by the mere organization of its Body. But for the other, he holds they may, and would make us believe they are in *Bodies of Brutes*, which he would have mere *Machinas*, that is, That from the mere Mechanical frame of their Body, outward Objects of Sense may open Pores in their Brains so, as that they may determine the Animal Spirits into such and such Muscles for Spontaneous Motion: That the course of the Spirits also falling into the Nerves in the Intestines and Stomach, Spleen, Heart, Liver, and other parts, may cause the very same effects of Passion, suppose, of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, in these brute *Machinas*, as we feel in our Bodies; though they, as being senseless, feel them not; and so the vellication of certain Tunics and Fibres in the Stomach and Throat may affect their Body, as ours is in the Sense of Hunger or Thirst: And finally, That the hitting of the Spirits into the tracts of the Brain that have been sign'd by External Objects, may so act upon their Body as it does upon ours in *Imagination* and *Memory*.

Now add to this *Machina* of *Des-Cartes*, the capacity in *Matter* of *Sensation* and *Perception*, (which yet I have demonstrated it to be incapable of) and it will be exquisitely as much as Mr. *Hobbs* himself can expect to arise from mere Body, that is, All the Motions thereof being purely Mechanical, the perceptions and propensions will be fatal, necessary and unavoidable, as he loves to have them.

But being no *Cogitations* that *Des-Cartes* terms *Actions*, as also no kind of *Perceptions* that he acknowledges the Soul to be the Cause of, are to be resolved into any *Mechanical* contrivance; * we may take notice of them as a peculiar rank of Arguments, and such, as that if it could be granted, that the *Souls of Brutes* were nothing but *Sentient Matter*, yet it would follow, that a *Substance of an higher nature*, and truly *Immaterial*, must be the Principle of those more noble Operations we find in our selves, as appears from Axiome 20, and 26.

NOTES

On CHAP. V. Sect. 9.

AND therefore that sober and judicious Wit, *Des-Cartes*, dares not stretch the power of Mechanical Organization thus far, &c. Truly *Cartesius*, as to these matters, doth no where come nearer the likeness
or

or Resemblance of the truly wise than in this Place : Where, if he truly philosophizeth, we may well wonder in a more excessive manner, how it comes to pass, that omitting these more solid Arguments of the distinction of the Soul from the Body, he should place the whole Weight of the Business on that trifling sort of Sophism that was before mentioned ; and no where endeavour plainly and distinctly to demonstrate the Incapacity of Matter for such Actions and Perceptions, as he here attributes alone to the Soul : but spend all his study and pains in the proving and illustrating the mere mechanical Powers of Organization for the Performance of all the Functions of Life, which are to be discerned in the brute Animals. Certainly to make it manifest, that by the Soul he meant not the Power of any part of the organiz'd Body, or the sufficiency of them all-together, he ought industriously to have demonstrated, that Matter, modified as you will, is incapable wholly of such Actions and Perceptions as he saith belong only to the Soul ; and not seem'd willing to support a Business of so great moment, by a simple Affirmation only, or by a subtile Sophism.

Sect. 10. We may take notice of them as a peculiar Rank of Arguments, &c. Of this sort are the Actions of the Will, and our Perceptions of them, the Speculations of things purely intelligible ; Imaginations such as we form at pleasure, and lastly Memory. Those that think the Souls of Brutes to be only sentient or percipient Matter, are yet to be convinc'd at the same time, that the humane Soul is immaterial from the Actions and Perceptions before spoken of, of which we are conscious : Which Undertaking had been worthy of the Wit of Des-Cartes : and so he had compensated in a measure for the loss of such other Arguments as he may justly seem to have weaken'd, or rather wholly taken away by his mechanical Inventions.

CHAP. VI.

1. *That no part of the Spinal Marrow can be the Common Sensorium without a Soul in the Body.*
2. *That the Animal Spirits are more likely to be that Common Percipient.*
3. *But yet it is demonstrable they are not :*
4. *As not being so much as capable of Sensation ;*
5. *Nor of directing Motion into the Muscles ;*
6. *Much less of Imagination and rational Invention ;*
7. *Nor of Memory.*
8. *An Answer to an Evasion.*
9. *The Author's reason, why he has confuted so particularly all the suppositions of the Seat of Common Sense, when few of them have been asserted with the exclusion of a Soul.*

1. **T**HERE remain now only Two Opinions to be examined : the one, *That place of the Spinal Marrow where Anatomists conceive there is the nearest concurse of all the Nerves of the Body ;* the other, *the Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.* As for the former, viz. *That part of the Spinal Marrow where the concurse of the Nerves is conceived to be,* as I have answered in like case, so I say again, that besides that I have already demonstrated, that Matter is uncapable

pable of *Sense*, and there is no modification thereof in the *Spinal Marrow*, that will make it more likely to be indu'd with that Faculty than the pith of Elder, or a mess of Curds; we are also to take notice, that it is utterly inept for *Motion*; nor is it conceivable how that part of it, or any other that is assigned to this office of being the *Common Percipient* in us of all Thoughts and Objects, (which must also have the power of *moving* our members) can, having so little agitation in it self, (as appearing nothing but a kind of soft Pap or Pulp) so nimbly and strongly *move* the parts of our Body.

2. In this regard the *Animal Spirits* seem much more likely to perform that office; and those, the importunity of whose gross fancies constrains them to make the Soul *Corporeal*, do nevertheless usually pitch upon some *subtile thin Matter* to constitute her Nature or Essence: And therefore they imagine her to be either *Air, Fire, Light*, or some such like Body; with which the *Animal Spirits* have no small affinity.

* Chap. 2.
sect. 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, &c.

3. But this opinion, though it may seem plausible at first sight, yet the difficulties it is involved in are insuperable. For it is manifest, that all the Arguments that were brought * before, will recur with full force in this place. For there is no *Matter* that is so perfectly *liquid* as *Animal Spirits*, but consists of particles only contiguous one to another, and actually upon Motion, playing and turning one by another, as busy as Atoms in the Sun. Now therefore let us consider, whether that Treasury of pure *Animal Spirits*, contained in the *fourth Ventricle*, be able to sustain so noble an office as to be the *common Percipient* in our Body, which, as I have often repeated, is so complex a Function, that it does not only contain the *Perception of external Objects*, but *Motion, Imagination, Reason, and Memory*.

4. Now at the very first dash, the transmission of the image of the Object into this crowd of particles cannot but hit variously upon them, and therefore they will have several *Perceptions* amongst them, some haply perceiving part of the Object, others all, others more than all, others also perceiving of it in one place, and others in another. But the *Percipient in us* representing no such confusion or disorder in our beholding of Objects, it is plain, that it is not the *Animal Spirits* that are it.

5. Again, That which is so confounded a *Percipient*, how can it be a right Principle of *directing Motion* into the *Muscles*? For besides what disorder may happen in this function upon the distracted representation of present Objects, the power of *thinking, excogitating, and deliberating* being in these *Animal Spirits* also, (and they having no means of *communicating* one with another, but jostling one against another; which is as much to the purpose, as if men should knock heads to communicate to each other their conceits of Wit,) it must needs follow, that they will have their *perceptions, inventions, and deliberations* apart; which, when they put in Execution, must cause a marvellous confusion in the Body, some of them commanding the parts this way, others driving them another way: or if their factions have many divisions and subdivisions, every one will be so weak, that none of them will be able to command it any way. But we find no such struggling or countermands of any thing in us, that would act our
Body

Body one way when we would another; as if when one was a going to write

Mūviv dēde, dēd — — — —

something stronger in him, whose conceits he is *not privy* to, should get the use of his hand, and instead of that write down

Arma virūmque cano — — — —

And the like may be said of any other *Spontaneous Motion*, which being so constantly within our deliberation or command as it is, it is a sufficient Argument to prove, that it is not such a lubricous Substance as the *Animal Spirits*, nor so disunited; but something more perfectly *One*, and *Indivisible*, that is the Cause thereof.

6. We need not instance any further concerning the power of *Invention* and *Reason*, how every particle of these *Animal Spirits* has a liberty to *think* by it self, and *consult* with it self, as well as to play by it self, and how there is no possible means of *communicating* their Thoughts one to another, unless it should be, as I have said, by hitting one against another: but that can only communicate *Motion*, not their determinate *Thought*; unless that these particles were conceived to figure themselves into the shape of those things they think of, which is impossible by Axiome 26. And suppose it were possible one particle should shape it self, for example, into a *George on Horse-back* with a Lance in his hand, and another into an *Inchanted Castle*; this *George on Horseback* must run against the *Castle*, to make the *Castle* receive his impress and similitude. But what then? Truly the encounter will be very unfortunate: For *S. George* indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should, by jostling against the Particle in the form of a *Castle*, convey the entire shape of himself, and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man on horse-back. Which is a Truth as demonstrable as any Theorem in *Mathematicks*, but so plain at first sight, that I need not use the curiosity of a longer Demonstration to make it more firm.

Nor is there any colourable Evasion by venturing upon a new way, as if this particle having transformed it self into a *Castle*, and that into an *Horse-man*, all the others then would see them both, and they one another. For by *what light*, and *how little* would they appear, and in *what different places*, according to the different posture of the particles of the *Animal Spirits*, and with *what different faces*, some seeing one side, others another?

But besides this there is a further difficulty, that if such *Sensible representations* as these could be convey'd from one particle to another by corporeal encounters and jostlings, or by that other way after alledged; *Logical* and *Mathematical Notions* can not. So that some of the *Animal Spirits* may think of one Demonstration in *Mathematicks*, or of part of that Demonstration, and others of another: insomuch that if a *Mathematician* be to write, while he would write one thing upon the determination of these *Animal Spirits*, others may get his hand to make use of for the writing something else, to whose Thoughts and Counsel he was not at all privy; nor can tell any thing, till those other *Animal Spirits* have writ it down. Which Absurdities are so mad and extravagant, that a man would scarce defile his pen by re-

ording them, were it not to awaken those that dore so much on the power of *Matter*, (as to think it of it self sufficient for all *Phænomena* in the world) into due shame and abhorrence of their foolish Principle.

7. The last Faculty I will consider is *Memory*, which is also necessarily joined with the rest in the *Common Percipient*; of which not only the fluidity of parts, but also their dissipability, makes the *Animal Spirits* utterly incapable. For certainly the *Spirits*, by reason of their Subtily and Activity, are very dissipable, and in all likelihood remain not the same for the space of a week together; and yet things that one has not thought of for many years, will come as fresh into a man's mind, as if they were transacted but yesterday.

8. The only Evasion they can excogitate here is this, That as there is a continual supply of *Spirits* by degrees, so as they come in, they are seasoned, fermented, and tintured with the same *Notions*, *Perceptions*, and *Propensions* that the *Spirits* they find there have. These are fine Words, but signify nothing but this, that the *Spirits* there present in the Brain, communicate the *Notions* and *Perceptions* they have to these new-comers; which is that which I have proved impossible in the foregoing Sections. And therefore it is impossible that the *Animal Spirits* should be that *Common Percipient* that hears, sees, moves, remembers, understands, and does other functions of life that we perceive performed in us, or by us.

9. We have now particularly evinced, that neither the whole Body, nor any of those parts that have been pitched upon, if we exclude the presence of a Soul, or *Immaterial Substance*, can be the Seat of *Common Sense*. In which I would not be so understood, as if it imply'd that there are none other of these parts, but some or other have affirmed might be the *common Sensorium*, though we had no Soul: But because they have been stood upon, all of them, by some or other to be the Seat of *Common Sense*, supposing a Soul in the Body, that there might no imaginable doubt or scruple be left behind, I have taken the pains thus punctually and particularly to prove, that none of them can be the place of *Common Sense* without one.

And thus I have perfectly finished my main design, which was to demonstrate, That there is a Soul or *Incorporeal Substance* residing in us, distinct from the Body. But I shall not content my self here, but for a more full discovery of her Nature and Faculties, I shall advance further, and search out her chief Seat in the Body, where, and from whence she exercises her most noble Functions; and after, enquire whether she be confined to that part thereof alone, or whether she be spread through all our members; and lastly, consider after what manner she sees, feels, hears, imagines, remembers, reasons, and moves the Body. For beside that I shall make good use of these discoveries for further purpose, it is also in it self very pleasant to have in readiness a rational and coherent account, and a determinate apprehension of things of this nature.

C H A P. VII.

1. His Enquiry after the Seat of Common Sense, upon supposition there is a Soul in the Body. 2. That there is some particular Part in the Body that is the seat of Common Sense. 3. A general division of their Opinions concerning the place of Common Sense. 4. That of those that place it out of the Head, there are two sorts. 5. The Invalidity of Helmont's reasons, whereby he would prove, the Orifice of the Stomach to be the principal Seat of the Soul. 6. An Answer to Helmont's stories for that purpose. 7. A further confutation out of his own concessions. 8. Mr. Hobbs his Opinion confuted, that makes the Heart the Seat of Common Sense. 9. A further confutation thereof from Experience. 10. That the Common Sense is seated somewhere in the Head. 11. A caution for the choice of the particular place thereof. 12. That the whole Brain is not it; 13. Nor Regius his small solid Particle; 14. Nor any external Membrane of the Brain, nor the Septum Lucidum. 15. The three most likely places. 16. Objections against Cartesius his Opinion concerning the Conarion answered. 17. That the Conarion is not the Seat of Common Sense; 18. Nor that part of the Spinal Marrow where the Nerves are conceived to concur, but the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

I. **I**T will therefore be requisite for us to resume the former Opinions, altering the Hypothesis; and to examine which of them is most reasonable, supposing there be a Substance Immaterial or Soul in man.

2. That there is some particular or restrain'd Seat of the Common Sense, is an Opinion that even all Philosophers and Physicians are agreed upon. And it is an ordinary Comparison amongst them, that the External Senses and the Common Sense considered together are like a Circle with five lines drawn from the Circumference to the Centre. Wherefore as it has been obvious for them to find out particular Organs for the External Senses, so they have also attempted to assign some distinct part of the Body to be an Organ of the Common Sense; that is to say, as they discovered Sight to be seated in the Eye; Hearing, in the Ear; Smelling, in the Nose, &c. so they conceived that there is some part of the Body wherein Seeing, Hearing, and all other Perceptions meet together, as the lines of a Circle in the Centre: and that there the Soul does also judge and discern of the difference of the Objects of the outward Senses. They have therefore justly excluded all the External parts of the Body from the lightest Suspicion of any capacity of undergoing such a function as is thus general, they being all employ'd in a more particular task, which is to be the Organ of some one of these five outward Senses; and to be affected no otherwise than what is impressed upon themselves, and chiefly from their proper Objects; amongst which five, Touch properly so called has the greatest share, it being as large as the Skin that covers us, and reaching as deep as any Membrane and Nerve in the limbs and trunk of the Body, besides all the Exterior parts of the Head. All which can no more see than the Eye can hear, or the Ear can smell.

3. Besides this, all those Arguments that do so clearly evince, that the place of *Common Sense* is somewhere in the *Head*, are a plain demonstration that the *whole Body* cannot be the Seat thereof; and what those Arguments are, you shall hear anon. For all those Opinions that have pitched on any *one Part* for the Seat of *Common Sense*, being to be divided into two Ranks, to wit, either such as assign some particular place in the *Body*, or else in the *Head*, we will proceed in this order: as first, to confute those that have made choice of any part for the Seat of *Common Sense* out of the *Head*; and then, in the second place, we will in general shew, that the common *Sensorium* must be in *some part* of the *Head*; and lastly, of those many opinions concerning *what part of the Head* this common *Sensorium* should be, those which seem less reasonable being rejected, we shall pitch upon what we conceive the most unexceptionable.

4. Those that place the Common *Sensorium* out of the *Head*, have seated it either in the *upper Orifice of the Stomach*, or in the *Heart*. The former is * *Van-Helmont's* Opinion, the other Mr. *Halley's* his.

* *Helmont de*
Sede Animæ.

5. As for *Van-Helmont*, there is nothing he alledges for his Opinion but may be easily answered. That which mainly imposed upon him was the *exceeding Sensibility* of that part, which Nature made so, that, as a faithful and sagacious Porter, it might admit nothing into the *Stomach* that might prove mischievous or troublesome to the *Body*. From this *tender Sensibility*, great offences to it may very well cause *Swoonings* and *Apoplexies*, and cessations of Sense. But *Fear*, and *Joy*, and *Grief*, have dispatch'd some very suddenly, when yet the first entrance of that deadly stroke has been at the *Ear* or the *Eye*, from some unsupportable ill news, or horrid spectacle. And the harsh handling of an angry Sore, or the treading on a Corn on the Toe, may easily cast some into a *swoon*, and yet no man will ever imagine the Seat of the *Common Sense* to be placed in the *Foot*. In fine, there is no more reason to think the Common *Sensorium* is in the *mouth of the Stomach*, because of the *Sensible Commotions* we feel there, than that it is seated in the *Stars*, because we so clearly perceive their Light, as *Des-Cartes* has well answered upon like occasion. Nor can *Phrensies* and *Madnesses*, though they may sometimes be observed to take their rise from thence, any more prove that it is the Seat of the *Common Sense*, than the *Furor uterinus*, *Apoplexies*, *Epilepsies*, and *Syncopes* proceeding from the *Womb*, do argue that the common *Sensorium* of Women lies in that part.

De Passion.
Part. I.
Artic. 33.

6. And if we consider the great *Sympathy* betwixt the *Orifice of the Stomach* and the *Heart*, whose *Pathemata* are so alike and conjoin'd, that the Ancients have given one name to both parts, calling them promiscuously *καρδία*, and the pains of the *Stomach* *καρδιαλγία*, and *καρδιωγμή*, as also that the *Heart* is that part from which manifestly are the supplies of Life, whence the *Pulse* ceasing, Life cannot long continue for want of warmth and Spirits; here is an evident reason, how it may happen that a Wound about the *mouth of the Stomach* may dispatch a man more suddenly than a wound in the *Head*, they being both suppos'd mortal, though the seat of the *Sensitive Soul* be not chiefly in the aforesaid Orifice. For partly the natural *Sympathy* be-

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twixt the Orifice of the *Stomach* and the *Heart*, and partly the horror and pain perceived by the *Soul* in the common *Sensorium*, which we will suppose in the *Head*, does so dead the *Heart*, that, as in the sudden *Passions* above-named, it ceases to perform the ordinary functions of *Life*, and so *Pulse* and *Sense*, and all is gone in short time; whereas the *Head* being wounded mortally, *Perception* is thereby so diminished, that the *Heart* escapes the more free from the force of that lethiferous passion; and so though *Sense* be gone, can continue the *Pulse* a longer time: which is a perfect answer to *Helmont's* stories he recites in his *Sedes Animæ*.

7. To all which I may add, That himself does acknowledge, in the end of that Treatise, that the power of *Motion*, of *Will*, *Memory*, and *Imagination*, is in the *Brain*; and therefore unless a man will say and deny any thing, he must say, that the *Common Sense* is there also.

8. The Opinion of Mr. *Hobbs* bears more credit and countenance with it, as having been asserted heretofore by Philosophers of great fame, *Epicurus*, * *Aristotle*, and the School of the *Stoicks*: but if we look closer to it, it will prove as little true as the other; especially in his way, that holds there is no *Soul* in a Man, but that all is but organized Matter. For let him declare any Mechanical reason whereby his *Heart* will be able to move his Finger. But upon this Hypothesis I have confuted this Opinion already. It is more maintainable, if there be granted a *Soul* in the Body, that the *Heart* is the chief Seat thereof, and place of *Common Sense*, as *Aristotle*, and others, would have it, as also the Spring of *Spontaneous Motion*. But it is very unlikely that that part, that is so continually employ'd in that natural Motion of contracting and dilating it self, should be the Seat of that Principle, which commands free and *Spontaneous* progressions: *Perceptions* also would be horribly disturbed by its squeezing of it self, and then flagging again by vicissitudes. Neither would Objects appear in the same place, or at least our sight not fixt on the same part of the Object, when the *Heart* is drawn up, and when it is let down again, as I have above intimated: the extreme heat also of it could not admit that it be affected with the gentle motions of the Objects of *Sense*, the Blood being there in a manner scalding hot. And it is in this *Sense* that that Aphorism in *Aristotle* is to be understood, τὸ μέσον κριτικόν, That which must receive the variety of external impresses, must not be it self in any high temper or agitation.

9. Wherefore it is a very rash thing to assert, That the *Heart* is the Seat of *Common Sense*, unless by some plain experience it could be evinced to be so, whereas indeed Experiments are recorded to the contrary. As, that if we bind a Nerve, *Sense* and *Motion* will be betwixt the *Ligature* and the *Brain*, but not betwixt the *Heart* and the *Ligature*. And that the *Crocodile*, his *Heart* being cut out, will live for a considerable time, and fight, and defend himself. The like is observed of the *Sea-Tortoise* and the wild Goat, as *Calcidius* writes. To which you may add, what *Galen* relates of sacrificed Beasts, that their *Hearts* being taken out, and laid upon the Altar, they have been seen in the mean time not only to breath, and roar aloud, but also to run away, till the expence of Blood has made them fall down. Which Narrations

Elements of Philosophy,
Part 4. ch. 25.
Artic. 4.
* *Aristot. de Juventute & Senectute,*
cap. 3.

Galen de Placit. Hippocratis & Platonis, lib. 2.

ons to me are the more credible, I having seen with mine own eyes a *Frog* quite exenterated, heart, stomach, guts, and all taken out by an ingenious friend of mine, and dexterous Anatomist; after which the *Frog* could see, and would avoid any object in its way, and skipped as freely and nimbly up and down as when it was entire, and that for a great while. But a very little wound in the *Head* deprives them immediately of *Life* and *Motion*. Whence it is plain, that the derivation of *Sense* and *spontaneous Motion* is not from the *Heart*. For if the *Motion* be intercepted betwixt the *Brain* and the *Heart*, by * Mr. *Hobbs* his own concession, there will be no perception of the Object. And there is the same reason of the *Orifice of the Stomach*: so that this one Experiment does clearly evince these two Opinions to be erroneous.

* In his *Elements of Philosophy*, Part 4. chap. 25. Artic. 4.

Histor. Anatom. lib. 4. quest. 7.

10. And that no man hereafter may make any other unhappy choice in the parts of the Body, we shall now propose such Reasons as we hope will plainly prove, That the common *Sensorium* must needs be in the *Head*; or indeed rather repeat them: For some of those whereby we proved, that the *Heart* is not the Seat of *Common Sense*, will plainly evince that the *Head* is. As that out of *Laurentius*, that a *Nerve* being ty'd, *Sense* and *Motion* will be preserved from the Ligation up towards the *Head*, but downwards they will be lost. As also that experiment of a *Frog*, whose brain if you pierce will presently be devoid of *Sense* and *Motion*, though all the Entrails being taken out, it will skip up and down, and exercise its Senses as before. Which is a plain evidence, that *Motion* and *Sense* is derived from the *Head*; and there is now no pretence to trace any *Motion* into a farther fountain, the *Heart* (from whence the *Nerves* were conceived to branch by *Aristotle*, and from whence certainly the *Veins* and *Arteries* do, as appears by every Anatomy) being so justly discharged from that office.

To which it may suffice to add the consideration of those Diseases that seize upon all the Animal functions at once, such as are the *Lethargy*, *Apoplexy*, *Epilepsy*, and the like; the causes of which Physicians find in the *Head*, and accordingly apply remedies. Which is a plain detection that the Seat of the Soul, as much as concerns the Animal Faculties, is chiefly in the *Head*. The same may be said of *Phrensy* and *Melancholy*, and such like distempers that deprave a man's *Imagination* and *Judgment*; Physicians always conclude something amiss within the *Cranium*.

Lastly, If it were nothing but the near attendance on the outward Senses on the Soul, or her *discerning Faculty*, being so fitly placed about her in the *Head*; this, unless there were some considerable Argument to the contrary, should be sufficient to determine any one that is unprejudic'd to conclude, that the Seat of *Common Sense*, *Understanding*, and *command of Motion*, is there also.

11. But now the greatest difficulty will be to define, *In what part thereof it is to be placed*. In which, unless we will go over-boldly and carelessly to work, we are to have a regard to Mechanical congruities, and not pitch upon any thing that, by the advantage of this Supposal,
That

That *there is a Soul in man*, may go for possible; but to chuse what is most handsome and convenient.

12. That the whole Brain is not the Seat of *Common Sense*, appears from the wounds and cuts it may receive, without the destruction of that Faculty; for they will not take away *Sense and Motion*, unless they pierce so deep as to reach the *Ventricles of the Brain*, as *Galen* has observed.

13. Nor is it in *Regius* his small solid particle. For besides that it is not likely the *Centre of Perception* is so minute, it is very incongruous to place it in a Body so perfectly solid, more hard than Marble or Iron. But this Invention being but a little freak of his petulant fancy, that has an ambition to make a blunder and confusion of all *Des-Cartes* his Metaphysical Speculations, (and therefore found out this rare quirk of wit to shew, how though the Soul were nothing but Matter, yet it might be *incorruptible and immortal*) it was not worth the while to take notice of it here in this Hypothesis, which we have demonstrated to be true, viz. *That there is a Soul in the Body, whose nature is Immaterial or Incorporeal*.

14. Nor are the Membranes in the Head the common *Sensorium*; neither those that envelop the Brain, (for they would be then able to see the light through the hole the *Trepan* makes, though the Party *Trepan'd* wink'd with his eyes; to say nothing of the conveyance of the Nerves, the Organs of external Sense that carry beyond these exterior Membranes, and therefore point to a place more inward, that must be the *Recipient* of all their impresses) nor any *Internal membrane*, as that which bids the fairest for it, the *Septum Lucidum*, as being in the midst of the upper Ventricle. But yet if the level of Motion through the external Senses be accurately considered, some will shoot under, and some in a distant parallel, so that this Membrane will not be struck with all the Objects of our Senses. Besides that it seems odd and ridiculous, that the *Centre of Perception* should be either driven out so into plates, or spread into hollow convexities, as it must be supposed, if we make either the external or internal Membranes of the Brain the Seat of *Common Sense*.

15. The most likely place is some one of those that the three last Opinions point at, viz. either the *Conarion*, or the *Concourse of the Nerves in the fourth Ventricle*, or the *Animal Spirits* there.

16. The first is *Des-Cartes* his Opinion, and not rashly to be refus'd, neither do I find any Arguments hitherto that are valid enough to deface it. Those that are recited out of *Bartholine*, and subscribed to by the learned Author * of *Adenographia*, in my apprehension have not the force to ruine it. We will first repeat them, and then examine them.

* Wharton.
Adenograph.
cap. 23.

The First is, That this *Glandula* is too little to be able to represent the Images of all that the Soul has represented to her.

The Second, That the external Nerves do not reach to the *Glandula*, and that therefore it cannot receive the impress of sensible Objects.

The Third, That it is placed in a place of excrements, which would soil the *Species* of things.

The

The *Fourth*, That the *Species* of things are perceived there where they are carried by the *Nerves*. But the *Nerves* meet about the beginning or head of the *Spinal Marrow*, a more noble and *ample* place than the *Glandula pinealis*.

See chap. 11.
sect. 4, 5.

To the *First* I answer, That the *amplitude* of that place where the *Nerves* meet in the *Spinal Marrow*, is not large enough to receive the distinct impresses of all the Objects the Mind retains in *Memory*. (Besides, that the other parts of the *Brain* may serve for that purpose, as much as any of it can.) But it must be the Soul her self alone that is capable of retaining so distinct and perfect representations of things, though it were admitted that she might make an occasional use of some private marks she impresses in the *Brain*; which haply may be nothing at all like the things it would *remember*, nor of any considerable magnitude nor proportion to them, such as we observe in the words *Arx* and *Atomus*, where there is no correspondency of either likeness or bigness betwixt the words, and the things represented by them.

To the *Second*, That though there be no continuation of *Nerves* to the *Conarion*, yet there is of *Spirits*; which are as able to convey the impresses of Motion from external Sense to the *Conarion*, as the Air and *Æther* the impress of the Stars unto the Eye.

To the *Third*, That the *Glandula* is conveniently enough placed, so long as the Body is sound; for no excrementitious humours will then overflow it, or besmear it. But in such distempers wherein they do, *Apoplexies*, *Catalepsies*, or such like diseases will arise; which we see do fall out, let the Seat of *Common Sense* be where it will.

To the *Last* I answer, That the *Nerves*, when they are once got any thing far into the *Brain*, are devoid of *Tunicles*, and be so soft and spongy, that the motion of the *Spirits* can play through them, and that therefore they may ray through the sides, and so continue their motion to the *Conarion*, wherever their extremities may seem to tend.

* Chap. 5.
sect. 3, 4, 5, 6.

17. But though these Arguments do not sufficiently confute the Opinion, yet I am not so wedded to it, but I can think something more unexceptionable may be found out, especially it being so much to be suspected, that all Animals have not this *Conarion*; and then, that what pleas'd *Des-Cartes* so much in this Invention was, that he conceited it such a marvellous fine instrument to beat the *Animal Spirits* into such and such Pores of the Brain; a thing that I cannot at all close with, for reasons * above alledged. Besides, that *Stones* have been found in this *Glandula*, and that it is apparent that it is environ'd with a net of *Veins* and *Arteries*, which are indications that it is a part assigned for some more inferiour office. But yet I would not dismiss it without fair play.

Adenograph.
Cap. 23.

18. Wherefore that Opinion of the fore-cited Author, who places the Seat of *Common Sense* in that part of the *Spinal Marrow* where the *Nerves* are suspected to meet, as it is more plain and simple, so it is more irrefutable, supposing that the Soul's *Centre of perception* (whereby she does not only apprehend all the Objects of the external Senses, but does *imagine*, *reason*, and *freely command* and *determine* the *Spirits* into what part of the Body she pleases) could be conveniently seated

in

in such dull pasty Matter as the *Pith of the Brain* is; a thing, I must needs profess, that pleases not my Palate at all, and therefore I will also take leave of this Opinion too, and adventure to pronounce, *That the chief Seat of the Soul, where she perceives all Objects, where she imagines, reasons, and invents, and from whence she commands all the parts of the Body, is those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.*

C H A P. VIII.

1. *The first reason of his Opinion, the convenient Situation of these Spirits.*
2. *The second, that the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in all her functions.*
3. *The proof of the second Reason from the general Authority of Philosophers, and particularly of Hippocrates;*
4. *From our Sympathizing with the changes of the Air;*
5. *From the celerity of Motion and Cogitation;*
6. *From what is observed generally in the Generation of things;*
7. *From Regius his experiment of a Snail in a glass;*
8. *From the running round of Images in a Vertigo;*
9. *From the constitution of the Eye, and motion of the Spirits there;*
10. *From the dependency of the action of the Soul upon the Body, whether in Meditation or corporeal Motion;*
11. *From the recovery of Motion and Sense into a stupify'd part;*
12. *And lastly, from what is observed in swooning fits, of paleness and sharpness of visage, &c.*
13. *The inference from all this, That the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle are the Seat of Common Sense, and that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to preserve the Spirits.*

1. **T**HAT which makes me embrace this Opinion rather than any other is this; That, first, this situation of the common *Sensorium* betwixt the *Head* and the trunk of the *Body* is the most exactly convenient to receive the impresses of Objects from both, as also to impart Motion to the Muscles in both the *Head* and in the *Body*. In which I look upon it as equal with the last Opinion, and superiour to all them that went before. For whatever may be objected, is already answered in what I have said to the last Objection against *Descartes*.

2. But now in the second place, (wherein this Opinion of mine has a notorious advantage above all else that I know) it is most reasonable that that Matter which is the *immediate Instrument* of all the Animal functions of the Soul, should be the chiefest Seat from whence and where she exercises these functions, and if there be any place where there is a freer plenty of the purest sort of this Matter, that her *peculiar residence* should be there. Now the *immediate Instrument* of the functions of the Soul is that *thinner Matter* which they ordinarily call *Animal Spirits*, which are to be found in their greatest purity and plenty in the *fourth Ventricle of the Brain*. From whence it must follow, that that precious and choice part of the Soul, which we call the *Centre of perception*, is to be placed in that Ventricle, not in any pith of the Brain thereabout, but in the midst of these Spirits themselves;

selves; for that is the most natural situation for the commanding them into the parts of the *Head* and *Body*; besides a more delicate and subtile use of them at home, in pursuing various imaginations and inventions.

3. That this *thin and Spirituous Matter* is the immediate engine of the Soul in all her operations, is in a manner the general opinion of all Philosophers. And even those that have placed the Common *Sensorium* in the *Heart*, have been secure of the truth of this their conceit, because they took it for granted, that the left Ventricle thereof was the fountain of these pure and subtile Spirits, and please themselves very much in that they fancied that Oracle of Physicians, the grave and wise *Hippocrates*; to speak their own sense so fully and significantly.

Hippocrat. Γνώμη δὲ ἡ τῶ ἀνθρώπου πέφυκεν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ κοιλίᾳ τρέφεσθαι ἢ ἔτε σίλοις ἢ ποτοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς μηδύος, ἀλλὰ καθαρῇ καὶ φωτεινῇ πνεύματι γεγενυμένη ἐκ τῆς διακρίσεως τοῦ αἵματος·
lib. de corde. that is to say, *That the Mind of man is in the left Ventricle of his Heart; and that it is not nourished from meats and drinks from the belly, but by a clear and luminous Substance that redounds by separation from the blood:* which is that which happens exactly in the *Brain*. For the *Spirits* there are nothing else but more pure and subtile parts of the blood, whose tenuity and agitation makes them separate from the rest of the mass thereof, and so replenish the Ventricles of the *Brain*.

4. Moreover, our *sympathizing* so sensibly with the *changes of the Air*, which *Hippocrates* also takes notice of, that in *clear Air* our *Thoughts* are more *clear*; and in *cloudy*, more *obscure* and *dull*, is no slight indication, that that which conveys *Sense*, *Thought*, and *Passions* immediately to the Soul, is very tenuious and delicate, and of a nature very congenerous to the *Air*, with which it changes so easily.

5. The strange *Agility* also of *Motions* and *Cogitations* that we find in our selves, has forced the most sluggish wits, even such as have been so gross as to deem the Soul *Corporeal*, yet to chuse the freest, subtilest, and most active Matter to compound her of, that their imaginations could excogitate. And *Lucretius*, the most confident of the *Epicurean* Sect, thinks he has hit the nail on the head in his choice;

Nunc igitur quoniam est animi natura reperta
Mobilis egregie, per quam constare necesse est
Corporibus parvis & levibus atque rotundis:

whose Testimony I account the better in this case, by how much the more crafty Philosopher he is, the necessity of the tenuity of particles that are to pervade the Body of a Man being convinced hence to be so plain, that the dimmest eyes can easily discover it.

6. But we will advance higher to more forcible Arguments; amongst which this, I think, may find some place, That we cannot discover any immediate operation of any kind of Soul in the world, but what it first works upon *that Matter* which participates in a great measure of this *fineness* and *tenuity of parts*, which will easily yield and be guided; as may be universally observed in all *Generations*, * where the *Body* is always *organiz'd* out of *thin fluid liquor*, that will easily yield to the plastick power of the Soul. In which I do not doubt
but

but it takes the advantage of moving the most subtile parts of all first, such as *Des-Cartes* his first and second Element, which are never excluded from any such humid and tenuous substance : which Elements of his are that true *Heavenly* or *Æthereal Matter* which is every where, as *Ficinus* somewhere saith Heaven is ; and is that *Fire* which *Trismegist* affirms, is the most inward vehicle of the Mind, and the instrument that God used in the forming of the world, * and which the Soul of the world, wherever she acts, does most certainly still use.

Trismegist. Parmand. cap. 10. five Clavis.

7. And to make yet a step further, That ocular demonstration that *Henricus Regius* brings into view, seems to me both ingenious and solid : It is in a *Snail*, such as have no shells, moving in a glass : so soon as she begins to creep, certain Bubbles are discovered to move from her tail to her head ; but so soon as she ceases moving, those Bubbles cease. Whence he concludes, That a gale of Spirits that circuit from her head along her back to her tail, and thence along her belly to her head again, is the cause of her progressive motion.

Philos. Natural. l. 4. c. 16.

8. That such *thin Spirits* are the immediate Instruments of *Sense*, is also discovered by what is observed in a *Vertigo*. For the *Brain* it self is not of such a *fluid* substance as to turn round, and to make external Objects seem to do so. Wherefore it is a sign that the immediate corporeal Instrument of conveying the images of things is the *Spirits* in the *Brain*.

9. And that they are the chief Organ of *Sight* is plain in the exterior parts of the *Eye* : for we may easily discern how full they are of that *καθαρή καὶ πορροδὴς οὐσία*, pure and lucid substance, which *Hippocrates* speaks of, though he seat it in a wrong place ; and how upon the passions of the Mind these *Spirits* ebb or flow in the *Eye*, and are otherwise wonderful-significantly modified ; inasmuch that the Soul even seems to speak through them, in that silent voice of Angels, which some fancy to be by nothing but by dumb shews, * but I do not at all believe it. It is also plain enough, that dimness of sight comes from deficiency of these *Spirits*, though the parts of the *Eye* otherwise be entire enough. The wider opening also of the pupil of one upon the shutting of the other, does indicate the flux and more copious presence of *Spirits* there, as *Galen* has ingeniously collected.

* See *Antidote*, Book 3^d ch. 3. sect. 8.

10. To which we may add, that in those more noble operations of the Mind, when she meditates and excogitates various Theorems, that either she uses some part of the Body as an Instrument then, or acts freely and independently of the Body. That the latter is false, is manifest from hence, that then the change of Air, or Distemper and Disease, could not prejudice her in her *Inventive* and *purely Intellectual* Operations ; but it is manifest that they do, and that a man's Mind is much more cloudy one time than another, and in one Country than another, whence is that proverbial Verse,

Bæotum crasso jurares aere natum.

If she uses any part of the Body, it must be either these *Animal Spirits*, or the *Brain*. That it is not the *Brain*, the very consistency thereof so clammy and sluggish is an evident demonstration.

X x

Which

Which will still have the more force, if we consider what is most certainly true, That the Soul has not any *power*, or else exceeding little, of *moving Matter*; * but her peculiar privilege is, of *determining Matter in motion*; which the more subtile and agitated it is, the more easily, by reason of its own mobility, it is determined by her. For if it were an immediate faculty of the Soul *to contribute motion* to any Matter, I do not understand how that faculty never failing or diminishing no more than the Soul her self can fail or diminish, that we should ever be weary of motion. Insomuch that those nimble-footed *Menades*, or she-Priests of *Bacchus*, with other agile Virgins of the Country, which *Dionysius* describes dancing in the flowry meadows of *Meander* and *Cayster*, might, if life and limbs would last, be found dancing there to this very day, as free and frolick as wanton Kids, (* as he pleases to set out their activity) and that without any lassitude at all. For that immediate *motive* faculty of the Soul can still as fresh as ever impart *motion* to all the Body, and sooner consume it into air or ashes, by heating and agitating it, than make her self *weary*, or the Body seem so.

Wherefore it is plain, that that *motion* or *heat* that the Soul voluntarily confers upon the Body, is by virtue of the *Spirits*, which she, when they are playing only and gently toying amongst themselves, sends forth into the exterior members, and so agitates and moves them: but they being so subtile and dissipable, the Soul spends them in using of them; and they being much spent, she can hardly move the Body any longer, the sense whereof we call *Lassitude*. These are the *τὰ ὀρμῶντα* or *ἐνορμῶντα* of *Hippocrates*, and the Soul's immediate engine of *motion* through all the parts of the Body.

Hippocrat.
Epid. lib. 6.

De Human.
Corpor. fabric.
lib. 7. cap. 1.

11. As they are also of *Sense* in the more remote parts as well as in the Head, as *Spigelius* handsomely insinuates by that ordinary example of a man's legg being stupify'd or asleep, as some call it, by compression of whatever hindrance may be of the propagation of the *Spirits* into that part. For as *Sense* and *Motion* is restored, a man may plainly feel something creep into it tingling and stinging like Pismires, as he compares it; which can be nothing but the *Spirits* forcing their passage into the part. Wherein what they suffer is made sensible to the Soul, they being her immediate Vehicle of life and sense.

12. Lastly, In *swooning fits*, when *Motion* and *Sense* fails, the exterior parts are *pale* and *fallen*, the Face looking more *lean* and *sharp*; of which there can be no other meaning, than that benign gale of vital air that fill'd up the parts before, is now absent and retreated from them; that is, that the *fluid Spirits* are retired, without which no *Sense* nor *Motion* can be performed: whence it is apparent, that they are the immediate Instrument of both.

13. I have proved that the *Animal Spirits* are the Soul's immediate organ for *Sense* and *Motion*. If therefore there be any place where these *Spirits* are in the fittest plenty and purity, and in the most convenient situation for Animal functions; that in all reason must be concluded the chief Seat and *Acropolis* of the Soul. Now the *Spirits* in the *middle ventricle* of the *Brain* are not so indifferently situated for both the *Body* and the *Head*, as those in the *fourth* are; nor so pure.

The

The upper Ventricles, being two, are not so fit for this office, that is so very much one and singular. Besides, that the sensiferous impresses of motion through the eyes play under them; to say nothing how the *Spirits* here are less defecate also than in the *fourth Ventricle*.

Wherefore there being *sufficient plenty*, and *greatest purity*, and *fittest situation of the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle*, it is manifest, that in these is placed the *Centre of Perception*, and that they are the *common Sensorium* of the Soul: And that as the *Heart* pumps out *Blood* perpetually to supply the whole Body with nourishment, to keep up the bulk of this Edifice for the Soul to dwell in, and also, from the more subtile and agile parts thereof, to replenish the *Brain* and *Nerves* with *Spirits*, (which are the immediate Instrument of the Soul for *Sense* and *Motion*;) So likewise is it plain, that the main use of the *Brain* and *Nerves* is to keep these *subtile Spirits* from over-speedy dissipation; and that the *Brain*, with its Caverns, is but one great round *Nerve*; as the *Nerves*, with their invisible porosities, are but so many smaller productions, or slenderer prolongations of the *Brain*: And so all-together are but one continued Receptacle or Case of that immediate Instrument of the sensiferous motions of the Soul, the *Animal Spirits*, wherein also lies her hidden Vehicle of life in this mortal body.

N O T E S

On CHAP. VIII. Sect. 6.

WHERE the Body is always organiz'd out of this fluid Liquor, &c. Which *Harvey de Generat. Animal.* rightly judgeth to be similar and homogeneous. The first Rudiment of the Body is only a sort of similar or soft Glue, not much unlike the Concretion of *Sperm*; which (by the order of Generation going on) being changed, and at the same time broken and divided into several Parts, as by a Divine Fiat, as I said, (let here be a Mouth, there a Muscle or Nerve, here the Bowels, there the Receptacle of the Excrements, &c.) from inorganic it becomes organical; from similar, dissimilar; from one, and that of the same nature, many, and those divers, and also contrary, &c. See *Scholia* on the *Antidote against Atheism*, Book 2. Ch. 9. Sect. 11. But that all Generation is from a thin melting Liquor, that most excellent Naturalist Dr. *William Harvey*, very frequently attests in the Tract aforesaid: And *Aristotle* himself casts in his Suffrage, who defines Conception thus; *A Humour contain'd in a thin Membrane, namely, in such Creatures as bring forth live Births, as if you should take away the Shell of an Egg*: From whence *Harvey* again truly calls an Egg a Conception thrust out abroad, from whence the Chicken is generated, and Conception an Egg remaining within till the Fœtus hath attain'd in it its due Perfection. But as to the Pellucidness and Meltingness of the Matter, which *Harvey* calls in an Egg the Yolk, or the Egg's Eye; there is every where the same reason: For he saith he hath observed in the Wombs of Does that melted sort of Matter, chrySTALLINE and transparent, contain'd in a thin and round Coat. See *Exercit.* 62, and 68.

X x 2

And

And which the Soul of the World, wherever she acts, doth most certainly still use. By the Soul of the World, understand the Spirit of Nature, not such a Soul of the World as the Platonists for the most part suppose.

Sect. 10. *But her peculiar Privilege is of determining Matter in Motion, &c. The vital Motion which all the Matter of the World hath, is from the Spirit of Nature, and also governed by it, unless so much of it as is permitted to particular Souls to excite in it; which may direct this Motion of the Matter to their own Purposes, but not to such a degree as they please: as appears in the Example brought in this Section.*

As he pleaseth to set out their Activity, &c. The Description of these Women dancing near the Meander and Caystor, in Asia Minor, is thus.

Οὐ μὰν ἐδὲ γυναικας ἐνόηται αἱ καὶ καὶ, &c.

To this Sense.

*Nor shall the Women that with Loins girt round
With golden Ties dance on that sacred Ground
Be blam'd; strange Rings they form while on this wise
Great Bacchus Rites with Trips they solemnize.
At the same time the Virgins of the Place
Leap too as Kids, and with the rest keep pace.
While the soft Winds around them briskly blow,
And make the Vestments on their Breasts to flow.*

• C H A P. IX.

1. *Several Objections against Animal Spirits.* 2. *An Answer to the first Objection touching the Porosity of the Nerves.* 3. *To the second and third, from the Extravasation of the Spirits and pituitous Excrements found in the Brain.* 4. *To the fourth, fetch'd from the incredible swiftness of motion in the Spirits.* 5. *To the last, from Ligation.* 6. *Undeniable Demonstrations that there are Animal Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain.*

* See chap. 6.
sect. 9.

1. **B**EFORE we proceed to our other *two Enquiries, we are forced to make a stop a while, and listen to some few Objections made by some late Authors, who, against the common stream of all other Philosophers, Physicians, and Anatomists, are not ashamed to deny, that there are any such things as *Spirits* in the Body; or at least, that there are any in the Ventricles of the Brain. For as for the *Nerves*, say they, they have no Pores or Cavities to receive them; and besides, it is plain, that what is fluid in them is nothing but a milky white juice, as is observed in the pricking of a *Nerve*. And as for the *Ventricles of the Brain*, those Cavities are too big; and the *Spirits*, if they issue into them, will be as *extravasated Blood*, whence they must needs be spoiled and corrupt. Besides, that they will evaporate at those passages through which the mucous or pituitous excrements pass

pass from the Brain. Whose appearance there is, say they, another great argument, that these Ventricles were intended only for receptacles and conveyances of such excrementitious Humours, which the Brain discharges it self of. Lastly, If *Spontaneous Motion* be made by means of these *Spirits*, it could not be so extremely *sudden* as it is; for we can wag our finger as quick as thought, but *corporeal Motion* cannot be so swift. And if the *Spirits* be continued from the Head to the Finger, suppose, in the ligation of the Nerve, there would be sense from the Ligature to the Finger's end; which is, say they, against Experience. These are the main Objections I have met withal in *Hofman*, and others; but are such as I think are very easily answered: and indeed they do in some sort clash some of them one with another.

2. For how can the *Nerves* derive juice if they have no Pores, or are not so much as passable to these thin active *Spirits* we speak of? or from whence can we better conceive that juice to arise, than from these *Spirits* themselves, as they lose their agitation, and flag into a more gross consistency?

3. Neither can the *Spirits* be look'd upon as *extravasated* in the Ventricles of the Brain, more than the Blood in the Auricles or Ventricles of the Heart. Nor is there any fear of their sliding away through the *Infundibulum*, the pituitous excrements having no passage there but what they make by their weight, as well as their insinuating moistness, which always besmearing these parts, makes them more impervious to the light *Spirits*, whose agility also, and componderancy with the outward Air, renders them incapable of leaving the Caverns in which they are.

That arguing from the *pituitous excrements* found there, that they were made only for a Receptacle of such useless redundancy, is as ineptly inferr'd, as if a man should argue from what is found in the *Intestinum rectum*, that the Stomach, and all the Intestines, were made for a Receptacle of Stercoreous excrement. The *Spirits* in the Ventricles of the Brain, playing about and hitting against the sides of the Caverns they are in, will, in process of time, abate of their agitation, the grosser parts especially; and so necessarily come to a more coarse consistency, and settle into some moist Sediment as is found at the bottom of the Ventricles, which Nature dischargeth through fit passages, whereby the *Spirits* are left more pure. But because this necessary feculency is found in these Cavities, to conclude that that is the only use of them, is as ridiculous as to infer, That because I spit at my Mouth, and blow my Nose, that that was the chief end and use of these two parts of my Body; or that my Eyes were not made for seeing, but weeping.

4. The nature of the *swiftness of Motion* in these *Spirits* is much like that of *Light*, which is a Body as well as they. But that Lucid Matter in the Sun does not, so soon as he appears upon the Horizon, fly so many thousand miles in a moment to salute our eyes; but Motion is propagated as it were at once from the Sun to our Eye, through the æthereal Matter betwixt. Or suppose a long Tube, as long as you will, and one to blow in it; in a moment, so soon as he blows at one end, the Motion will be felt at the other, and that downwards as

well as upwards, and as easily; to satisfy that other frivolous Objection I find in *Hofman*, as if it were so hard a business, that these *Spirits* should be commanded downwards into the *Nerves*. But the Opposers of this ancient and solid Opinion are very simple and careless.

5. That of the *Ligature* proves nothing. For though the *Nerve* betwixt the *Ligature* and the Finger be well enough stored with *Spirits*, yet the *Centre of Perception* being not there, and there being an interruption and division betwixt the *Spirits* that are continued to their *Common Sensorium*, and these on the other side of the *Ligature*; 'tis no more wonder that we feel nothing on this side of the *Ligature*, than that we see nothing in our neighbour's garden when a wall is betwixt, though the Sun shine clearly on both sides of the wall.

6. We see how invalid their Arguments are against this received Opinion of almost all both Physicians and Philosophers: It is needless to produce any for the confirmation of it: Those which we have made use of for proving, that the *Spirits* are the *immediate Instrument* of the Soul, being of equal force most of them, to conclude their existence in the Body.

And yet for an Overplus I will not much care to cast in a brief suggestion of the use of the *Lungs*, which the best Physicians and Anatomists adjudge to be chiefly for conveying prepared air to the Heart; as also of the *Rete mirabile* and *Plexus Choroides*, whose bare situation discover their use, that they may more plentifully evaporate the thinner and more agile particles of the Blood into the Ventricles of the Brain.

The *Diastole* also of the *Brain* keeping time with the *Pulse* of the *Heart*, is a manifest indication what a vehement steam of *Spirits*, by the direct and short passage of the *Arterie Carotides*, are carried thither. For if one part of the Blood be more fiery and subtile than another, it will be sure to reach the Head. From whence, considering the sponginess and laxness of the Brain, and thinness of the Tunics in the little Arteries that are there; it will follow, by Mechanical necessity, that the Ventricles thereof will be filled with that *καθαρὴ καὶ ψαλομένη αἰσθητικὴ ἐν διαστολῇ τοῦ ἀνωτέρου*, which *Hippocrates* so fitly describes, though he fancy the Seat of it in an unfitting place.

Institution.

Anatom. lib. 3.

cap. 4.

But the purest of these *Spirits* being in the fourth Ventricle, as *Bartholine* and others have judiciously concluded, it follows plainly from what has been alledged, That the *Common Sensorium* is to be placed in the midst of these purer *Spirits* of the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

C H A P. X.

1. That the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium.
2. The first Argument from the Plastick power of the Soul.
3. Which is confirmed from the gradual dignity of the Soul's Faculties, of which this Plastick is the lowest;
4. External Sensation the next;
5. After that, Imagination, and then Reason.
6. The second Argument from Passions and Sympathies

thies in Animals. 7. An illustration of the manner of Natural Magick.
 8. The third Argument from the Perception of Pain in the exterior parts of the Body. 9. The fourth and last from the nature of Sight.

I. **W**E are now at leisure to resume the two remaining Enquiries; the former whereof is, whether the Soul be so in this *fourth Ventricle*, that it is essentially no where else in the Body; or whether it be spread out into all the Members. *Regius* would coup it up in the *Conarion*, which he believes to be the Common Sensorium, and so by consequence it should be confined to the *fourth Ventricle*, and not expatiate at all thence, supposing that the Seat of Common Sense. The reason of this conceit of his is this, That whatever is in the rest of the Body, may come to pass by powers merely *Mechanical*; wherein he does very superstitiously tread in the footsteps of his Master *Des-Cartes*. But for my own part, I cannot but dissent, I finding in neither any sufficient grounds of so novel an opinion, but rather apparent reasons to the contrary.

*Philos. Natu-
ral. l. 5. cap. 1.*

2. As first, the *Frame of the Body*, of which I think it most reasonable to conclude the Soul her self to be the more particular *Architect*, (for I will not wholly reject *Plotinus* his Opinion;) and that the *Plastick power* resides in her, as also in the Souls of Brute animals, as very learned and worthy Writers have determined. That the *Fabrick of the Body* is out of the concurrence of *Atoms*, is a mere precarious Opinion, without any ground or reason. For *Sense* does not discover any such thing, the first rudiments of life being out of some *liquid homogeneous Matter*; and it is against * *Reason*, that the tumbling of *Atoms*, or corporeal particles, should produce such exquisite frames of creatures, wherein the acutest wit is not able to find any thing inept, but all done exquisitely well every where, where the foulness and coarseness of *Matter* has not been in fault.

* See my *An-
tidote*, Book 2.
chap. 12. sect.
2, 3, 4, &c.

That God is not the *immediate Maker* of the *Bodies*, the particular miscarriages demonstrate. For there is no Matter so perverse and stubborn but his *Omnipotency* could tame; whence there would be no Defects nor Monstrosities in the generation of Animals.

Nor is it so congruous to admit, that the *Plastick faculty* of the *Soul of the World* is the sole contriver of these *Fabricks* of particular Creatures, (though I will not deny * but she may give some rude || preparative strokes towards Efformation;) but that in every particular World, such as man is especially, his own Soul is the peculiar and most perfective Architect thereof, as the Soul of the World is of it. For this *vital Fabrication* is not as in *artificial Architecture*, when an external person acts upon Matter; but implies a more particular and near union with that Matter it thus intrinsically shapes out and organizes. And what ought to have a more particular and close union with our Bodies than our Souls themselves?

|| *Plotinus* calls them
σευ πογρα-
φην, and σε-
δρόμους ἐλ-
λαμψεις εἰς
τὴν, *En-
nead. 6. lib.
7. cap. 7.*

My opinion is therefore, That the Soul, which is a *Spirit*, and therefore *contractible* and *dilatable*, begins with less compass at first in Organizing the fitly-prepared Matter, and so bears it self on in the same tenour of work till the Body has attained its full growth; and that the Soul *dilates* it self in the dilating of the Body, and so possesses it through all the members thereof.

3. The

3. The congruity of this Truth will further discover it self, if we consider the nature of the Faculties of the Soul, (of which you may read more fully in *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*) in what a *natural graduality* they arise till they come to the *most free* of all. The *deepest* or *lowest* is this *Plastick power* we have already spoke of, in virtue whereof is continued that perpetual *Systole* and *Diastole* of the *Heart*, as I am more prone to think, than that it is merely Mechanical, as also that *Respiration* that is performed without the command of our Will: For the *Libration* or *Reciprocation* of the *Spirits* in the *Tensility* of the *Muscles*, would not be so perpetual, but cease in a small time, did not some more mystical Principle than what is merely Mechanical give Assistance; as any one may understand by observing the insufficiency of those devices, that *Henricus Regius* propounds for adequate causes of such motions in the Body. These I look upon as the *First Faculties* of the Soul which may be bounded by this general Character, That the exercise of them does not at all imply so much as our *Perception*.

Enthus. Triumph. sect. 3.
4, 5.

Philos. Natural. lib. 4.
cap. 16.

4. Next to these is the *Sensation* of any external Object, such as *Hearing*, *Seeing*, *Feeling*, &c. All which include *Perception* in an unresistible necessity thereof, the Object being present before us, and no external Obstacle interposing.

5. *Imagination* is more free, we being able to avoid its representations, for the most part, without any external help; but it is a degree on this side *Will* and *Reason*, by which we correct and silence unallowable fancies. Thus we see how the *Faculties* of the Soul rise by *Degrees*; which makes it still the more easy and credible, that the *lowest* of all is competent to her as well as the *highest*.

6. Moreover, *Passions* and *Sympathies*, in my judgment, are more easily to be resolved into this Hypothesis of the Soul's pervading the whole Body, than in restraining its essential presence to one part thereof.

* See Des-Cartes De Passion. Part. 1. Artic. 36.

* For to believe that such an horrible Object as, suppose, a Bear or Tyger, by transmission of Motion from it through the Eyes of an Animal to the *Conarion*, shall so reflect thence, as to determine the *Spirits* into such Nerves as will streighten the Orifice of the Heart, and lessen the Pulse, and cause all other symptoms of *Fear*; seems to me little better than a mere piece of *Mechanical Credulity*. Those Motions that represent the *Species* of things, being turned this way or the other way, without any such *impetus* of Matter as should do such feats as *Des-Cartes* speaks of in his Book of *Passions*. And that which he would give us as a pledge of this Truth is so false, that it does the more animate me to disbelieve the Theorem. * For the waving of one hand near the Eye of a man's friend, is no sufficient proof, That external Objects will necessarily and mechanically determine the *Spirits* into the *Muscles*, no Faculty of the Soul intermeddling. For if one be fully assured, or rather can keep himself from the fear of any hurt, by the waving of his friend's Hand before his Eye, he may easily abstain from winking: But if fear surprize him, the Soul is to be entituled to the action, and not the mere *Mechanism* of the Body. Wherefore this is no proof that the *Phenomena* of *Passions*, with their consequences, may be falved in brute Beasts by pure *Mechanicks*; and therefore neither in Men.

* De Passion. Part. 1. Artic. 13.

But

But it is evident that they arise in us *against* both our *Will* and *Appetite*. For who would bear the tortures of *Fears* and *Jealousies*, if he could avoid them? And therefore the Soul sends not, nor determines the Spirits thus to her own Torture, as she resides in the Head. Whence it is plain, that it is the Effect of her as she resides in the *Heart* and *Stomach*, which sympathize with the horrid representation in the *Common Sensorium*, by reason of the exquisite unity of the Soul with her self, and of the continuity of Spirits in the Body, the necessary instrument of all her Functions. And there is good reason the *Heart* and *Stomach* should be so much affected, they being the chief Seats of those Faculties that maintain the *Life* of the Body; the danger whereof is the most eminent Object of *Fear* in any Animal.

7. From this Principle, I conceive that not only the *Sympathy* of parts in one particular Subject, but of *different and distant Subjects*, may be understood: such as betwixt the party wounded and the Knife or Sword that wounded him, besmeared with the Weapon-salve, and kept in a due temper: Which certainly is not *purely Mechanical*, but *Magical*, though not in an unlawful sense; that is to say, it is not to be resolved into *mere Matter*, of what thinness or subtilty soever you please, but into the *Unity* of the *Soul of the Universe*, * which is inter-
 † Plotinus says, * that the World is ὁ μέγας γόνος, the grand Magus or Enchanter. And I do not question, but that upon this score merely, without the association of any Familiar Spirit, several odd things may be done, for evil as well as good. For this *Spirit of the World* has Faculties that work not by Election, but fatally or naturally, as several *Gamaieu**, we meet withal in Nature, seem somewhat obscurely to subindicate. Of this Principle we shall speak more fully in its * due place.

8. But we have yet a more clear discovery, that our Soul is *not confined to any one part* of the Head, but possesses the whole Body, from the *Perception of Pain* in the parts thereof: For it is plainly impossible, that so high a torture as is felt but in the pricking of a Pin, can be communicated to the *Centre of Perception*, upon a mere Mechanical account. For whether the *immediate Instrument of Sense* be the *Pith of the Nerves*, as *Des-Cartes* would have it, or whether it be the *Spirits*, as is most true; it is ridiculous to think, that by the forcible parting of what was join'd together at ease, (when this case is not communicated to either the *Spirits*, or *Pith of the Nerves*, from the place of the Puncture, to the very seat of Common Sense) the Soul there seated should feel so smart a torment, unless that her very Essence did reach to the part where the *pain* is felt to be. For then the reason of this is plain, that it is the *Unity of Soul* possessing the whole Body, and the *Continuity of Spirits* that is the cause thereof.

And it is no wonder, if the continuation and natural composure of the Spirits be Rest and Ease to the Soul, and a violent disjoining and bruising of them, and baring the Soul of them, as I may so speak, should cause a very harsh and torturous sense in the *Centre of Perception*. This Argument bears undeniable Evidence with it, if we do
 but

* See Book 3. chap. 6. sect. 7, 8, 9.


† Ἡ ἀληθινή μαγεία ἢ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φύσει καὶ τὸ νείκεον αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ γόνος ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ φαρμακεύς ἕως ὅτου δέξιν.

Plotin. Ennead. 4. lib. 4. cap. 40.

* Book 3. ch. 12, & 13.

but consider the fuzziness of the *Pith of the Nerves*, and the fluidity of the *Spirits*, and what little stress or crowding so small a thing as a Pin or Needle can make in such soft and liquid Matter. The consideration whereof ought eternally to silence their scrupulosity, who are so amused, that the harms of the Body should be the pains of the Soul, the Body in the mean time being not pained. For this is infinitely more conceivable, than that some part of *Matter* in my Head should feel pain by a prick in my finger, that Matter in my Head being not at all incommodated, if so much as in the least measure moved thereby; and yet, that *Perception* is within the *Head* alone, has been abundantly demonstrated.

9. Lastly, unless the very Essence of the Soul reach from the Common *Sensorium* to the *Eye*, there will be very great difficulties how there should be so distinct a representation of any visible Object. For it is very hard to conceive that the *Colours* will not be confounded, and the bigness of the Object diminished, and indeed that the image will not be quite lost before it can come to the Soul, if it be only in the Common *Sensorium*. For it is plain, and Experience will demonstrate, that there is a very perfect Image of the Object in the bottom of the Eye, which is made by the decussation of the lines of Motion from it thus: The Line A B from the Object A C bears against that point in the bottom of the Eye in B, and the line C D against



the point D; whereby C and A are felt in their place, and in such a distance as they are in the Object C A: and so of all the lines which come from the Object C A into the bottom of the Eye B D. From whence the Object is felt in such a length and breadth as it is

capable of being perceived in at such a distance from the Eye. And as the Motion that is convey'd from A to B, and from C to D, is felt there; so the modification of it, whereby the Object in those parts may seem red, yellow, green, or any other colour, is felt there also. Whence it is plain, that there will be an exquisite impression, according to all circumstances of the Object, in the bottom of the Eye: so that if the Soul receive it there, and convey it thence to her *Centre of Perception* intirely in the same circumstances, the representation will be compleat.

But if the Soul be not there, but the conveyance thereof must be left to the bare laws of *Matter*, the Image will be much depraved, or lost, before it can come to the Common *Sensorium*. For this Motion must be propagated from B and D till it come to the hole E, and so pass into the Optick Nerve, to be carried into the Brain, and so to the seat of Common Sense: but betwixt B and E, or D and E, there may be the depainture of sundry colours, whence it will be necessary that F be tintured with the colour D, and G with the colour of both D and F; and so of the rest of the Lines drawn from the Object to the Eye: so that all their *Colours* would be blended before they came to E. Now at that

that harsh flexure at E, where the visual Line is as crooked as BER, according to the experiments of *Reflexion* and *Refraction*, the breadth or length of the Object CA would be lost. For we must needs expect, that as it is in *Reflexions* and *Refractions*, where the Object will appear in that Line that immediately conveys the sense of it, so here it must be also; and therefore the point C and A must appear about Q, whence the Object will shrivel up in a manner into nothing.

And suppose it might appear in some tolerable latitude, for all this, the *Brain* being an *opaque* substance, so soon as the Motion comes thither, it would be so either changed or lost, that the Image could not pass the opacity of it in any splendour or entireness. Wherefore I do not doubt but that the Image which the Soul perceives is that in the Eye, and not any other corporeally produced to the inside of the Brain, (where *Colour* and *Figure* would be so strangely depraved, if not quite obliterated) I mean it is the concurrence of the *lucid Spirits* in the bottom of the Eye, with the outward Light conveyed through the Humours thereof, (which is the best sense of the Platonick *συνάμματα* that *Plutarch* speaks of) wherein the great Mystery of *Sight* consists.

N O T E S

On CHAP. X. Sect. 2.

BUT she may give some rude preparative strokes towards Efformation, &c. *Plotinus* calls these first Delineations and Rudiments of Life, *προγραφὴν καὶ προδρομὸν ἐλαμψαίς εἰς ὕλην*, the strokes, as it were, of the first hand, or a previous Adumbration, and the first workings or shinings upon the Matter, *Ennead* 6. Book 7. Chap. 7. But that these first Lineaments are made by the Soul of the World, or by the Spirit of Nature, it is no small Argument, that in Eggs, where the Soul of the Mother is not present, these first Lineaments are formed before the coming in of the Soul of the Chicken, as being not yet organiz'd: But particular Souls are, according to *Aristotle*, the Actings of an organical Body. But the *Punctum saliens*, or *Life-point*, discovers not any proper sense, but only Life when it withdraws it self from any hurtful touch: as neither do what we call the *Plant-Animals*; which I do not take to live by any proper Soul, but through the Spirit of Nature, which hath either no Sense at all, or what is very dull.

Sect. 7. What is interested in all Plastick Powers, &c. For the universal Preparation of Matter is from the Spirit of Nature; and after the same manner it assists in the very first Beginnings of the Generation of Animals, it also affords its help for the increasing, perfecting, and preserving of the same; and this even at considerably remote distances.

That the World is ὁ μέγας γόνος, the grand Magus, or Enchanter, &c. For so *Plotinus* hath it, *Ennead*. 4. l. 4. c. 40. Ἡ ἀληθινὴ Μαγεία ἡ ἐν τῇ πασῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῷ νῦν αὖ. καὶ ὁ γόνος ὁ πρῶτος, καὶ ὁ φαρμακός, ὅτις ἐστίν. The true Magick is that Concord or Harmony, and also that Discord there is in the World or Universe; and this is that chief Magus or Enchanter.

CHAP.

C H A P. XI.

1. That neither the Soul without the Spirits, nor the Spirits without the presence of the Soul in the Organ, are sufficient Causes of Sensation. 2. A brief Declaration how Sensation is made. 3. How Imagination. 4. Of Reason and Memory, and whether there be any Marks in the Brain. 5. That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in Memory also; and how Memory arises; 6. As also Forgetfulness. 7. How Spontaneous Motion is performed. 8. How we walk, sing, and play, though thinking of something else. 9. That though the Spirits be not alike fine every where, yet the Sensiferous Impression will pass to the Common Sensorium. 10. That there is an Heterogeneity in the very Soul her self; and what it is in her we call the Root, the Centre, and the Eye; and what the Rays and Branches. 11. That the sober and allowable Distribution of her into Parts, is into Perceptive and Plastick.

* See ch. 6.
sect. 9.

1. **A**FTER our evincing that the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium, but does essentially reach all the Organs of the Body; it will be more easy to determine the Nature of Sensation, and other Operations we mentioned, * which is the third thing we proposed. For we have already demonstrated these two things of main consequence; That the Spirits are not sufficient of themselves for these Functions; nor the Soul of her self, without the assistance of the Spirits: as is plain in the interception or disjunction of the Spirits by Ligature or Obstruction; whence it is, that Blindness sometimes happens merely for that the Optick Nerve is obstructed.

* Ch. 6. sect 9.

2. Wherefore briefly to dispatch our * third Query; I say in general, That Sensation is made by the arrival of motion from the Object to the Organ; where it is received in all the circumstances we perceive it in, and convey'd by virtue of the Soul's presence there, assisted by her immediate Instrument the Spirits, by virtue of whose continuity to those in the Common Sensorium, the Image or Impression of every Object is faithfully transmitted thither.

3. As for Imagination, there is no question but that Function is mainly exercised in the chief seat of the Soul, those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. I speak especially of that Imagination which is most free, such as we use in Romantick Inventions, or such as accompany the more severe Meditations and Disquisitions in Philosophy, or any other Intellectual entertainments. For Fasting, fresh Air, moderate Wine, and all things that tend to an handsome supply and depuration of the Spirits, make our thoughts more free, subtile, and clear.

4. Reason is so involved together with Imagination, that we need say nothing of it apart by it self. Memory is a Faculty of a more peculiar consideration; and if the Pith of the Brain contribute to the Functions of any power of the Mind, (more than by conserving the Animal Spirits) it is to this. But that the Brain should be stored with distinct images, (whether they consist of the Flexures of the supposed Fibrille, or the orderly puncture of Pores, or in a continued modified Motion

Motion of the parts thereof, some in this manner, and others in that) is a thing, as I have * already proved, utterly impossible. *See Chap. 5. sect. 7. also chap. 2. sect. 7, 8.

If there be any *Marks* in it, it must be a kind of *Brachygraphy*, some small dots here and there standing for the recovering to Memory a series of things that would fill, it may be, many sheets of paper to write them at large. As if a man should tie a string about a friend's finger to remember a business, that a whole day's discourse, it may be, was but little enough to give him full instructions in. From whence it is plain, that the *Memory* is in the *Soul*, and not in the *Brain*. And if she do make any such *Marks* as we speak of, she having no perception of them distinct from the representation of those things which they are to remind her of, she must not make them by any *Cognitive power*, but by some such as is Analogous to her *Plastick Faculty* of organizing the *Body*, where she acts and perceives it not.

5. But whether the *Soul* act thus or no upon the *Brain*, is a matter of uncertain determination; nor can it be demonstrated by any experiment that I know. And therefore if we will contain our selves within the capacities of the *Spirits*, which I have so often affirmed to be the immediate Instrument of the *Soul* in all her operations, that Position will be more unexceptionable. And truly I do not understand but that they, and the *Soul* together, will perform all the Functions of *Memory* that we are conscious to our selves of.

Wherefore I shall conclude that *Memory* consists in this, That the *Soul* has acquired a greater *Promptitude* to think of this or that Phantasm, with the circumstances thereof, which were raised in her upon some occasion. Which *Promptitude* is acquired by either the *often representation* of the same Phantasm to her; or else by a *more vivid impress* of it from its *novelty*, *excellency*, *mischievousness*, or some such like condition, that at once will pierce the *Soul* with an extraordinary resentment; or finally by *voluntary attention*, when she very carefully, and on set purpose, imprints the *Idea* as deeply as she can into her inward Sense. This *Promptitude* to think on such an *Idea* will lessen in time, and be so quite spent, that when the same *Idea* is represented again to the *Soul*, she cannot tell that ever she saw it before.

But before this inclination thereto be quite gone, upon this proneness to return to the same conception, with the circumstances, the *Relative Sense* of having seen it before (which we call *Memory*) does necessarily emerge upon a fresh representation of the Object.

6. But *Forgetfulness* arises either out of mere *Desuetude* of thinking on such an Object, or on others that are link'd in with it, in such a Series as would represent it as past, and so make it a proper Object of *Memory*. Or else for that the *Spirits*, which the *Soul* uses in her Functions, be not in a due temper; which may arise from overmuch *Coolness*, or *Waterishness* in the *Head*, to which alone *Sennertus* ascribes *Obliviousness*.

Institutiones Medicin. lib. 2. part. 3. sect. 2. cap. 4.

7. The last thing we are to consider is *Spontaneous Motion*. Which that it is performed by the continuation of the *Spirits* from the Seat of Common Sense to the *Muscles*, which is the gross Engine of *Motion*, is out of doubt. The manner how it is, we partly feel and see; that is to say, we find in our selves a power, at our own pleasure, to move

Y y

this

this or the other member with very great force, and that the *Muscle* swells that moves the part; which is a plain indication of influx of *Spirits* thither directed, or there guided, by our mere Will: a thing admirable to consider, and worth our most serious meditation.

That this direction of the impress of *Motion*, is made by our mere Will, and Imagination of doing so, we know and feel it so intimately, that we can be of nothing more sure. That there is some fluid and subtile Matter, which we ordinarily call *Spirits*, directed into the *Muscle* that moves the Member, its swelling does evidence to our sight; as also the experience, that moderate use of *Wine*, which supplies *Spirits* apace, will make this motion the more strong.

As for the manner, whether there be any such *Valvula* or no in the *Nerve*, common to the opposite *Muscles*, as also in those that are proper to each, it is not material. This great privilege of our Soul's directing the motion of Matter thus, is wonderful enough in either Hypothesis. But I look upon the *Fibrous* parts of the *Muscle* as the main Engine of motion; which the Soul moistening with that subtile liquor of the *Animal Spirits* makes them swell and shrink, like Lute-strings in rainy weather: And in this chiefly consists that notable strength of our Limbs in *Spontaneous Motion*. But for those conceived *Valvula* that Experience has not found out yet, nor sufficient Reason, they are to wait for admission till they bring better evidence. For the presence of the *Animal Spirits* in this *Fibrous* flesh, and the command of the Soul to move, is sufficient to save all *Phænomena* of this kind. For upon the Will conceived in the *Common Sensorium*, that part of the Soul that resides in the *Muscles*, by a power near a-kin to that by which she made the Body and the Organs thereof, guides the *Spirits* into such Pores and Parts, as is most requisite for the shewing the use of this excellent Fabrick.

8. And in virtue of some such power as this we do easily walk, though we think not of; it as also breath, and sing, and play on the Lute, though our Minds be taken up with something else. For Custom is another Nature: and though the *Animal Spirits*, * as being merely corporeal, cannot be capable of any habits; * yet the Soul, even in that part thereof that is not *Cognitive*, may, and therefore may move the Body, though *Cogitation* cease; provided the members be well replenished with *Spirits*, whose assistance in natural motions of Animals is so great, that their *Heads* being taken off, their Body for a long time will move as before: as *Chalcidius* relates of *Wasps* and *Hornets*, who will fly about, and use their wings, a good part of an hour after they have lost their Head: which is to be imputed to the residence of their Soul in them still, * and the intireness of the *Animal Spirits*, not easily evaporating through their crustaceous Bodies.

For it is but a vulgar conceit to think, that the *Head* being taken off, the Soul must presently fly out, like a Bird out of a Basket, when the Lid is lifted up. For the whole World is as much throng'd with *Body*, as where she is; and that Tye of the *Spirits* as yet not being lost, it is a greater engagement to her to be there than any where else. This motion therefore in the *Wasp*, that is so perfect and durable, I hold

hold to be *Vital*; but that in the parts of dismembred creatures, that are less perfect, may be usually *Mechanical*.

9. We have now, so far forth as it is requisite for our design, considered the *Nature and Function of the Soul*; and have plainly demonstrated, That she is a Substance distinct from the Body, and that her very Essence is spread throughout all the Organs thereof; as also that the general Instrument of all her Operations is the subtile *Spirits*; which though they be not in like quantity and sincerity every where, yet they make all the Body so pervious to the impresses of Objects upon the external Organs, that like Lightning they pass to the Common *Sensorium*. For it is not necessary that the *Medium* be so fine and tenuious as the Matter where the subtile motion begins. Whence Light passes both Air and Water, though Air alone is not sufficient for such a motion as Light, and Water almost incapable of being the Seat of the fountain thereof. This may serve to illustrate the passage of Sense from the Membranes (or in what other seat soever the Spirits are most subtile and lucid) through thicker places of the Body to the very *Centre of Perception*.

10. Lastly, we have discovered a kind of *Heterogeneity* in the Soul; and that she is not of the same power every where. For her *Centre of Perception* is confined to the *Fourth Ventricle of the Brain*; and if the *Sensiferous Motions*, we speak of, be not faithfully conducted thither, we have no knowledge of the Object. That part therefore of the Soul is to be looked upon as most precious; and she not being an independent Mass, as *Matter* is, * but one part resulting from another, that which is the noblest is in all reason to be deemed the cause of the rest. For which reason (as *Synefius* calls God, on whom all things depend, $\rho\iota\zeta\omega\nu\ \rho\iota\zeta\alpha\nu$, so) I think *this Part* may be called the *Root of the Soul*.

Which apprehension of ours will seem the less strange, if we consider that from the highest *Life*, viz. the *Deity*, there does result that which has no *Life* nor *Sense* at all, to wit the *stupid Matter*. Wherefore in very good Analogy we may admit, that that precious part of the Soul in which resides *Perception*, *Sense*, and *Understanding*, may send forth such an *Essential Emanation from it self*, as is utterly devoid of all *Sense* and *Perception*; which you may call, if you will, *the exterior branches of the Soul*, or *the Rays of the Soul*, if you call that nobler and diviner part the *Centre*; which may very well merit also the appellation of *the Eye of the Soul*, * all the rest of its parts being but mere darkness without it. In which, like another *Cyclops*, it will resemble the World we live in, whose one Eye is conspicuous to all that behold the light.

11. But to leave such lufurious Considerations, that rather gratify our Fancy than satisfy our severer Faculties; we shall content our selves hereafter, from those two notorious Powers, and so perfectly different, which Philosophers acknowledge in the Soul, (to wit, *Perception* and *Organization*,) only to term * that more noble part of her in the Common *Sensorium*, the *Perceptive*, and all the rest of the *Plastick* part of the Soul.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XI. Sect. 8.

AS *being merely corporeal, cannot be capable of any Habits, &c.* By Habit I understand here a facility or readiness gain'd by frequent Acts for the doing again any thing, upon occasions offer'd, though after the ceasing to do it for some time. In a Stone therefore that is cast from us, although it is mov'd, yet that Motion is not call'd a Habit; (and there is the same reason in every thing else that is corporeal) because it perpetually acts so, and not as afresh, or from a Habit; nor if it was cast forth after that manner a hundred times, after it hath ceas'd moving, would it be mov'd ever the more easily or readily for it.

Yet the Soul, even in that part thereof that is not cognitive, &c. There are some here that object, that Matter it self or Body is equally capable of Habits with any incorporeal Substance that is destitute of Perception and Knowledge: For it is from thence alone, that Matter is incapable of Habits, that it cannot act afresh without some fresh external Impulse: but there is the same reason in an incorporeal Substance that is destitute of all Perception; for that cannot act anew, unless from some external Impulse that is a-new impress'd upon it, after it hath once ceas'd from acting: So that there is either need of a new Impression from without, or a necessity that it should never cease to act. Which Incongruity they feign also in the *Spirit of Nature*; which, with great assurance, they deny occasionally to act, unless it knows what it acts; that is, they affirm there can be no *Life* but what is *Cognitive*.

Which, that it is most false, may abundantly appear from the things that occur in this very Treatise; where I demonstrate the Soul, and so Life with it, to be extended throughout the whole Body; but that yet the *Perceptive* thereof is only in the Head; and that therefore the other part of the Soul, if I may so express it, is not *Perceptive* but *Plastical*, or endued with a *plastick Life* only; such as the whole *Spirit of Nature* may also be. But since, as the *Plastick* of the Soul, so the *Spirit of Nature* is a vital Substance, or in which there is *Life* intimately and essentially, and yet such a Life as is diversly affected from Matter diversly dispos'd, it immediately exerts as different Operations according unto certain Laws implanted in it. This Spirit further is never idle, but by a very sure, tho' blind Instinct, and by such an one as is *vital*, not *intellectual*, acts upon all sorts of Matter; and that also in the general, which is always for the best: It doth not act indifferently, or at random, as these Persons will have it, but according as the Matter is dispos'd; nor doth it attempt to go divers ways, but always the very same in the same circumstances; nor is it frustrated in its Purposes, since it never acts according to the Nature of things; nor doth it want Counsel or Reason, since out of its own proper *Life* it only acts as from the Pattern of the Divine Counsel and Wisdom.

Which

Which we ought the less to wonder at, since we our selves excite Phantasms without any *previous Perception*; but we perceive them to be excited through a certain Life, that is intimately in our Souls, and previous unto any operations: as appears especially in Dreams, where the *vital Substance* of the Soul it self affected by either Choler, or else by a sanguine or melancholick humour, doth not by any *Counsel*, but *vitally* and *necessarily*, without any previous Perception, excite suitable scenes of things, and perceives them when so excited in it. Why may not therefore the *vital Spirit* of the World as congruously be conceived to raise *Plasmata*, or *Works*, without any previous Perception, or to move and dispose Matter according unto certain Laws, as our Souls without any previous Perception to raise *Phantasms*? Truly, unless a Person be over-much a Stranger in the Knowledge of the Faculties of his own Mind, these things cannot but be very evident to him.

But to return to our own *Plastick*; since it is *Life*, though not *perceptive*, it doth not methinks seem at all foreign from it, that by use and custom it should be readier and more awakened for some things than others; and so be capable of Habits, as well as the *Perceptive* part of the Soul it self: Which, even in the use of intellectual Habits, produceth readily its Notions or Apprehensions of things, rather by a *vital intellectual Operation*, than by *Perception*: For neither doth it perceive them before it hath produced them; nor doth it then produce them by a previous Perception, but by a sort of *immediate vital intellectual Faculty* of the Soul; for otherwise the Process would be infinite. In the *vital Essence* therefore, whether *intellectual* or *plastical*, is the Habit rooted: While Matter in the mean time, as being of it self void of all *Life*, is no way capable of Habits.

And the extireness of the Animal Spirits, &c. Add to this the custom of moving in the *Plastick* part of the Soul, tho' by the cutting off of the Head the Animadversion ceaseth.

Sect. 10. But one part resulting from another, &c. Both this, and the rest that follows, is spoken with regard to that possible Description of a Soul or Spirit, *Book 1. Chap. 6.* But that which seems to me to be the truest Notion or Idea of a Soul or Spirit, I have, with sufficient plainness, declar'd in my *Scholia* on the place mentioned; so that there is no need to repeat it here.

All the rest of its parts being but mere Darknes without it, &c. The Truth is, the Soul being destitute of its *perceptive* part, which I call the Eyes, would be like a Man blind in the midst of the Sun; but destitute of its *Plastick*, as a Man endued indeed with Sight, but plac'd at the same time in a mid-night Darknes: For by virtue of the *Plastick* we perceive whatever we perceive of the exterior World; nay, we draw in farther all manner of *Life* through it, be it *natural* or *divine*: Of so great Moment is it that the *Plastick* be in right order; and prepared for Regeneration by Temperance and sincere Devotion: For whatever is transacted only in the *Perceptive*, modified as you please from dry jejune Reason or Imagination, are only *Shadows* and *Images*, no true *Life* or *Substance*.

Sect. 11. That more noble part of her in the Sensorium the Perceptive, and all the rest the plastick part of the Soul, &c. This indeed is the most adviseable, and so to let go that more operose possible Idea of a Soul, describ'd Book 1. Chap. 6. and to consider the Essence of the Soul as a Being one of it self, whose parts, if I may so speak, are not so properly subordinate as co-ordinate, according to the Idea conceiv'd of it in the Divine Intellect; nor is there one only Centre, as in a Circle, but two, as it were, co-ordinate Focus's, the one Plastick, the other perceptive.

C H A P. XII.

1. *An Answer to an Objection, That our Arguments will as well prove the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes as of Men.* 2. *Another Objection inferring the Præexistence of Brutes Souls, and consequently of ours.* 3. *The first Answer to the Objection.* 4. *The second Answer, consisting of four parts.* 5. *First, That the Hypothesis of Præexistence is more agreeable to Reason than any other Hypothesis.* 6. *And not only so, but that it is very solid in it self.* 7. *That the Wisdom and Goodness of God argue the truth thereof.* 8. *As also the face of Providence in the World.* 9. *The second part of the second Answer, That the Præexistence of the Soul has the suffrage of all Philosophers in all Ages, that held it Incorporeal.* 10. *That the Gymnosophists of Ægypt, the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, and all the learned of the Jews were of this Opinion.* 11. *A Catalogue of particular famous persons that held the same.* 12. *That Aristotle was also of the same mind.* 13. *Another more clear place in Aristotle to this purpose, with Sennertus his Interpretation.* 15. *The last and clearest place of all out of Aristotle's Writings.*

Chap. 10.
sect. 7.

1. **H**AVING thus discovered the Nature of the Soul, and that she is a Substance distinct from the Body; I should be in readiness to treat of her Separation from it, did I not think my self oblig'd first, to answer an envious Objection cast in our way, whereby they would make us believe, That the Arguments which we have used, though they be no less than Demonstrations, are mere Sophisms, because some of them, and those of not the least validity, prove what is very absurd and false, viz. That the Souls of Brutes also are Substances Incorporeal, distinct from the Body: from whence it will follow, that they are Immortal. But to this I have answered already in the Appendix to my Antidote, and in brief concluded, That they are properly no more Immortal than the stupid Matter which never perishes, and that out of a terrestrial Body they may have no more sense than it. For all these things are as it pleases the first Creator of them.

2. To this they perversly reply, That if the Souls of Brutes subsist after death, and are then senseless and unactive, it will necessarily follow, that they must come into Bodies again. But it is very ridiculous to think that these Souls, having a Being yet in the World, and wanting nothing but fitly-prepar'd Matter to put them in a capacity of living again, should be always neglected, and never brought into play,

play, but that new ones should be daily created in their stead: for those innumerable Myriads of Souls would lie useless in the Universe, the number still increasing even to infinity. But if they come into Bodies again, it is evident that they *praexist*: and if the Souls of Brutes *praexist*, then certainly the Souls of Men do so too. Which is an Opinion so wild and extravagant, that a wry mouth and a loud laughter (*the Argument that every Fool is able to use*) is sufficient to silence it, and dash it out of countenance. No *wise man* can ever harbour such a conceit as this, which every *Idiot* is able to confute by consulting but with his own *Memory*. For he is sure, if he had been before, he could *remember* something of that life past. Besides the unconceivableness of the Approach and Entrance of these *praexistent* Souls into the *Matter* that they are to actuate.

3. To this may be answered two things. The *First*, That though indeed it cannot be well denied, but that the concession of the *Praexistence* of the Souls of Brutes is a very fair introduction to the belief of the *Praexistence* of the Souls of Men also; * yet the sequel is not at all *necessary*, but one may be without the other.

4. The *Second* is this, That if the sequel were granted, no Absurdity can be detected from thence in Reason, if the prejudices of Education, and the blind suggestion of unconcerned Faculties, that have no right to vote here, be laid aside. To speak more explicitly, I say, This consequence of our Soul's *Praexistence* is more agreeable to Reason than any other Hypothesis whatever; Has been received by the most learned Philosophers of all Ages, there being scarce any of them that held the Soul of man *Immortal*, upon the mere light of Nature and Reason, but asserted also her *Praexistence*; That *Memory* is no fit Judge to appeal to in this Controversy: and *lastly*, That *Traduction* and *Creation* are as intricate and unconceivable as this opposed Opinion.

5. I shall make all these four parts of my Answer good in order. The truth of the first we shall understand, if we compare it with those Opinions that stand in competition with it, which are but two that are considerable. The one is of those that say, the Soul is *extraduce*; the other, of those that say it is *created*, upon occasion. The first Opinion is a plain contradiction to the *Notion* of a Soul, which is a *Spirit*, and therefore of an *Indivisible*, that is, of an *Indiscerpible* Essence. The second Opinion implies both an Indignity to the Majesty of God (in making him the chief assistant and actor in the highest, freest, and most particular way that the Divinity can be conceived to act, in those abominable crimes of Whoredom, Adultery, Incest, nay Buggery it self, by supplying those foul coitions with new-created Souls for the purpose:) and also an injury to the Souls themselves; that they being ever thus created by the immediate hand of God, and therefore pure, innocent, and immaculate, should be imprisoned in unclean, diseased, and disordered Bodies, where very many of them seem to be so fatally over-mastered, and in such an utter incapacity of closing with what is good and vertuous, that they must needs be adjudged to that extreme calamity which attends all those that forget God. Wherefore these two Opinions being so incongruous, what

what is there left that can seem probable but the *Præexistence* of the Soul?

6. But I shall not press the *Reasonableness* of this Opinion only from comparing it with others; but also from the concinnity that is to be found in it self. For it is no greater wonder that every particular man's Soul that lives now upon Earth should be *à mundo conditò*, than the particular Matter of their Bodies should, (which has haply undergone many Millions of Alterations and Modifications before it be lighted into such a contexture as to prove the entire Body of any one person in the world, has been in places unimaginably distant, has filed, it may be, through the triangular passages of as many *Vortices* as we see stars in a clear frosty night, and has shone once as bright as the Sun, (as the *Cartesian* Hypothesis would have all the Earth to have done) insomuch that we eat, drink, and cloath our selves with that which was once pure Light and Flame :) So, that *de facto* they do bear the same date with the Creation of the World, that unavoidable certainty of the *Præexistence* of the Souls of Brutes does, according to the very concession of our Adversaries, fairly insinuate.

7. But this is not all. Both the *Attributes* of God, and Face of things in the world, out of which his *Providence* is not be excluded, are very strong Demonstrations thereof to Reason unprejudiced. For first, if it be good for the Souls of men to be at all, the sooner they are, the better. But we are most certain, that the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God will do that which is the best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these *Terrestrial* Bodies, (it being better for them to enjoy themselves than not,) they must be before they come into these Bodies; that is, they must be in a capacity of enjoying themselves without them for long periods of time, before they appear'd here in this Age of the World. For nothing hinders but that they may live before they come into the Body, as well as they may after their going out of it: the latter whereof is acknowledged even by them that deny the *Præexistence*.

* Whereore the *Præexistence* of Souls is a necessary result of the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God, who can no more fail to do that which is best, than he can to understand it: for otherwise his *Wisdom* would exceed his *Benignity*; nay, there would be less hold to be taken of His *Goodness*, than of the *Bounty* of a very benign and good man, who, we may be well assured, will slip no opportunity of doing good that lies in his power, especially if it be neither damage nor trouble to him; both which hindrances are incompetible to the Deity.

8. Again, The face of *Providence* in the World seems very much to suit with this Opinion; there being not any so natural and easy account to be given of those things that seem the most harsh in the affairs of men, as from this Hypothesis, That their Souls did once subsist in some other state; where, in several manners and degrees, they forfeited the favour of their Creator. And so, according to that just *Nemesis* that He has interwoven in the constitution of the Universe and of their own natures, they undergo several calamities and asperities of Fortune, and sad drudgeries of Fate, as a punishment inflicted, or a disease contracted from the several *Obliquities* of their *Apostacy*. Which key is not only able to unlock

lock that recondite mystery of some particular mens almost fatal averseness from all Religion and Vertue, their stupidity and dulness, and even invincible slowness to these things from their very childhood, and their uncorrigible propension to all manner of Vice; but also of that squalid forlornness and brutish Barbarity that whole Nations, for many Ages, have lain under, and many do still lie under at this very day. Which sad Scene of things must needs exceedingly cloud and obscure the ways of *Divine Providence*, and make them utterly unintelligible; unless some light be let in from the present Hypothesis we speak of.

It is plain therefore that there are very weighty Reasons may be found out to conclude *the Præexistence of Souls*. And therefore this Opinion being so demonstrable from this Faculty, and there being no other that can contradict it, (for that the verdict of *Memory* in this case is invalid, I shall prove anon) we are, according to the light of Nature, undoubtedly to conclude, *That the Souls of Men do præexist*, by Axiome 5.

9. And as this Hypothesis is *Rational* in it self, so has it also gained the suffrage of all Philosophers of all Ages, of any note, that have held the Soul of Man *Incorporeal* and *Immortal*. And therefore I am not at all solicitous what either the *Epicureans* or *Stoicks* held concerning this Matter; this contest being betwixt those only that agree on this Truth, *That the Soul is a Substance Immaterial*. And such amongst the Philosophers as held it so, did unanimously agree, *That it does Præexist*. This is so plain, that it is enough only to make this challenge; every one in the search will satisfy himself of the Truth thereof. I shall only add, for the better countenance of the business, some few Instances herein, as a pledge of the Truth of my general Conclusion. Let us cast our Eye therefore into what corner of the World we will, that has been famous for *Wisdom* and Literature, and the *wisest* of those Nations you shall find the Assertors of this Opinion.

10. In *Egypt*, that ancient Nurse of all hidden Sciences, that this Opinion was in vogue amongst the wisest men there, those fragments of *Trismegist* do sufficiently witness. For though there may be suspected some fraud and corruption in several passages in that Book, in reference to the interest of Christianity; yet this Opinion of the *Præexistence of the Soul*, in which Christianity did not interest it self, cannot but be judged, from the Testimony of those Writings, to have been a Branch of the *Wisdom* of that Nation: of which Opinion, not only the *Gymnosophists*, and other wise men of *Egypt*, were, but also the *Brachmans* of *India*, and the *Magi* of *Babylon* and *Persia*; as you may plainly see by those *Oracles* that are called either *Magical* or *Chaldaical*, which *Pletho* and *Pfellus* have commented upon. To these you may add the abstruse Philosophy of the *Jews*, which they call their *Cabbala*, of which *the Soul's Præexistence* makes a considerable part; as all the learned of the *Jews* do confess. And how naturally applicable this Theory is to those three first mysterious chapters of *Genesis*, I have, I hope, with no contemptible success, endeavour'd to shew in my *Conjectura Cabbalistica*.

11. And

11. And if I should particularize in persons of this Opinion, truly they are such, of so great fame for depth of Understanding and abstrusest Science, that their Testimony alone might seem sufficient to bear down any ordinary modest man into an assent to their doctrine. And in the first place, If we can believe the *Cabbala* of the *Jews*, we must assign it to *Moses*, the greatest *Philosopher* certainly that ever was in the world; to whom you may add *Zoroaster*, *Pythagoras*, *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Cebes*, *Euripides*, *Plato*, *Euclide*, *Philo*, *Virgil*, *Marcus Cicero*, *Plotinus*, *Iamblichus*, *Proclus*, *Boethius*, *Pfellus*, and several others, which it would be too long to recite. * And if it were fit to add *Fathers* to *Philosophers*, we might enter into the same list *Synesius* and *Origen*: the latter of whom was surely the greatest Light and Bulwark that ancient Christianity had; who, unless there had been some very great matter in it, was far from that levity and vanity as to entertain an Opinion so vulgarly slighted and neglected by other men: and the same may be said of others that were Christians, as *Boethius*, *Pfellus*, and the late learned *Marsilius Ficinus*. But I have not yet ended my Catalogue: that admirable Physician *Johannes Fernelius* is also of this persuasion, and is not content to be so himself only, but discovers those two grand Masters of Medicine, *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, to be so too; as you may see in his * *De abditis rerum causis*.

* Lib. 2. cap. 4.
† De Animo-
rum Immor-
tal. sub titulo,
Aristotelis de
Animorum
immortalitate
opinio. pag.
235, 236,
237, &c. us-
que ad 239.

† *Cardan* also, that famous *Philosopher* of his Age, expressly concludes, that the *Rational Soul* is both a distinct being from the *Soul of the World*, and that it does *præexist* before it comes into the *Body*: and lastly *Pomponatius*, no friend to the *Soul's Immortality*, yet cannot but confess, that the safest way to hold it is also therewith to acknowledge her *Præexistence*.

* Lib. 1. c. 3.

12. And that nothing may be wanting to shew the frivolousness of this part of the Objection, we shall evince that *Aristotle*, that has the luck to be believed more than most Authors, was of the same opinion, in his Treatise * *De Anima*. Where he, speaking of the necessity of the qualification of the *Body* that the *Soul* is to actuate, and blaming those that omit that consideration, says, That they are as careless of that matter, as if it were possible that, according to the *Pythagorick fables*, any *Soul* might enter into any *Body*. Wheneas every *Animal*, as it has its proper *species*, so it is to have its peculiar *form*. But those that define otherwise, παραπλήσιον λέγουσι, saith he, ὡς περ εἰς τὴν τινὶ τέχνην εἰς αὐτὴν ἐνδύεσθαι. οὐδ' ὅτι τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὄργανοις, * ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα, i. e. They speak as if one should affirm, that the Skill of a Carpenter did enter into a Flute or Pipe; * for every Art must use its proper Instruments, and every Soul its proper Body. Where (as *Cardan* also has observed) *Aristotle* does not find fault with the Opinion of the *Soul's* going out of one *Body* into another, (which implies their *Præexistence*;) but that the *Soul* of a *Beast* should go into the *Body* of a *Man*, and the *Soul* of a *Man* into a *Beast's Body*: this is the Absurdity that *Aristotle* justly rejects, the other Opinion he seems tacitly to allow of.

De Animorum
Immortalitat.
pag. 237.

Lib. 3. cap. 11.

13. He speaks something more plainly in his *De Generat. Animal*. There are generated, saith he, in the Earth, and in the moisture thereof, Plants and living Creatures; because in the Earth is the moisture, and in the

the moisture, Spirit; and in the whole Universe, an Animal warmth or heat; insomuch that in a manner all places are full of Souls, ὥς τινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη, Adeo ut modo quodam omnia sint Animarum plena, as Sennertus interprets the place: Aristotle understanding by ψυχή, the same that he does afterwards by ψυχὴ ἀρχή, that Principle we call Soul, according to the nobility whereof, he asserts that Animals are more or less noble; which assertion therefore reaches Humane Souls as well as these of Beasts.

14. Nor can this Text be eluded by being so injurious to Aristotle, as to make him assert, that there is but one Soul in the world, because he says, ψυχῆς, not ψυχῶν. For the Text admitting of Sennertus his exposition, as well as this other, that which is most reasonable is to be attributed to him. Now if his meaning was, that there is but one Soul in the World that goes through all things, and makes the Universe one great Animal, as the Stoicks would have it; he need not say that all places are, in a manner, full of this Soul, but absolutely full of it, as our Body is wholly actuated by the Soul in it. And therefore the Sense must be, that all places indeed are, in a manner, full of Souls: not that they have opportunity to actuate the Matter, and shew their presence there by vital operation; but are there dormant, as to any vital energy, till prepared Matter engage them to more sensible actions.

15. We will add a third place still more clear, out of the same Treatise, where he starts that very question of the *Præexistence of Souls*, *De Generatione Animal.* of the Sensitive and Rational especially; καὶ αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς καὶ νοητικῆς, *lib. 2. cap. 3.* whether both kinds do προϋπάρχειν, that is, *præexist* before they come into the Body, or whether the Rational only: and he concludes thus, Λείπει δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον ὑπάρχειν ἐκείθεν καὶ δεῖον εἶναι μόνον. ἔστιν γὰρ αὐτὴ τῇ ἐέργειᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικῇ ἐέργειᾳ, i. e. *It remains that the Rational or Intellectual Soul only enter from without, as being only of a nature purely divine; with whose actions the actions of this gross Body have no communication.* Concerning which point he concludes like an Orthodox Scholar of his excellent Master Plato; to whose footsteps the closer he keeps, the less he ever wanders from the Truth. For in this very place he does plainly profess, what many would not have him so apertly guilty of, *that the Soul of man is *Immortal*, and can perform her proper Functions without the help of this *Terrestrial Body*.

And thus I think I have made good the two first parts of my Answer to the proposed Objection; and have clearly proved, That the *Præexistence of the Soul* is an Opinion both in it self the most rational that can be maintained, and has had the suffrage of the renownedst Philosophers in all Ages of the World; and that therefore this Sequel from our Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul, is no discovery of any fallacy in them.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XII. Sect. 3.

YET the Sequel is not at all necessary, &c. Namely, seeing humane Souls are understood to be of that Nature, that they can perform the offices of Life, after the putting off this terrestrial Vehicle: the contrary unto which almost all agree in, as to the Souls of Brutes.

Sect. 7. Wherefore the *Præexistence* of Souls is a necessary result of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, &c. Here some, that they may elude the force of this Argument, deny the Goodness of God to be the Measure of his Actings; while yet they freely confess at the same time, that he can do nothing contrary to his Justice; nay, nor any thing that is less just: as if the Goodness of God was not at least an equally sacred and inviolable Attribute of the Deity with his Justice. But let those that thus philosophize consider well, whether they suffer not themselves to fall into a more refin'd sort of *Anthropomorphism*; not indeed fashioning the external Person of God after their own shape, that is, a humane one, yet modelling the Divine Nature and Genius, if I may so express it, after the Similitude of that of their own mind; who taking it for a Privilege, that they can do some things for their own Mind's sake, or out of a wanton and uncertain Fancy, and of which no solid Reason can be given, affix their own Weaknesses, Levities, and Imperceptions, to the most perfect Divinity; who orders all things according to the certain and immutable Rectitude of his own most perfect Nature.

Sect. 11. And if it were fit to add *Fathers to Philosophers*, &c. See the *Preface General*, Sect. 18. The Places of holy Scripture might also here be added. But I had rather in this place take notice by the by, what little force that passage of St. Paul hath against the Doctrine of *Præexistence*, Rom. IX. 11. *For the Children being not yet born, neither having done either good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of Works, but of him that calleth*, &c. For from hence they will conclude, that seeing the Children, before their Birth into this World, had never done any thing, their Souls did not *præexist*. Which is much the same, as if any one from that place of Solomon, Eccles. IX. 10. *Whatsoever thy Hand findeth to do, do it with thy Might; for there is no Work, nor Device, nor Knowledge, nor Wisdom in the Grave whither thou goest*; should conclude, that the Soul doth not *subsist* after Death. Which place indeed doth as strongly prove the Soul not to *subsist* after Death, as the former, that it doth not *præexist* before our Birth. But we ought, in both cases, to have regard to what is treated of; and to restrain the sense to the Actions of this terrestrial Life: according also unto which Sense, many other places of Scripture are to be interpreted, unless we will have the Soul to be mortal.

Sect. 12. For every Art must use its proper Instruments, and every Soul its proper Body, &c. Aristotle speaks here much more cautiously and correctly than some of the *Platonists*: who yield, that humane Souls pass also into the Bodies of Brutes; nay, that they go into stupid Plants:

Plants: as if the *Plastick* of the humane Soul, that man may still be better called a *little World*, contained in it self even all the Forms that are beheld in the Universe. But surely every prudent and sober Person will think rather with *Timæus Locrus*, that antient *Pythagorean*, who looks upon the Fictions or poetical Fables of this kind, as invented to fright the Vulgar; who, for the most part, are sooner drawn off from their evil Ways by Lies, than by Truth. ὡς δὲ τὰ σώματα, &c. For as we sometimes heal Bodies by unwholsom things, when they will not yield to what are most wholsome; so we also restrain Souls by false Speeches, when we cannot lead them with true. From hence he owns it necessary to bring in, τιμωρίας ξένας, strange and foreign Punishments, or such rather as are very foreign from all Philosophy and solid Reason: Of which sort are those preposterous and absurd Transmigrations of Souls: which yet bear some Appearance with 'em of Probability to the Vulgar: Namely, That the Souls of the Timorous, should go into Women's Bodies; the Libidinous, into those of Sows or Boars; of Murderers, into those of wild Beasts; and of the light or vain, into the Bodies of Birds, &c. Which Things to me seem no way likely, but set beneath very much the natural Dignity of the Souls of Men. Besides, it is plainly a very harsh Device to admit of no Souls to actuate and inform the Bodies of Brutes but humane ones: as also sufficiently absurd to suppose 'em to be informed, partly by the Souls of Men, and partly by such as are proper to Brutes, when no manner of difference appears in the Effects. Lastly, since a great many, at least of the Brutes, have animal Spirits, no less fine and lucid (as you may perceive by their Eyes) than most Men, it is certainly a wonder, they should not shew some very manifest Symptoms of a freer sort of Reason: And since they can speak, as we see in Pies and Parrots, and such other Birds; that yet they should not upon occasion be able to use their Voices appositly and fitly. Truly, if they were humane Souls, that is, from their very intimate Essence reasonable, seeing they have such pure and quick Spirits, it is incredible that they should not sometimes, nay, frequently put forth very conspicuous Fruits or Effects of their Reason.

The *Plastick* therefore of the Soul of Man is not *omniform*, as the *Spirit of Nature*; but *Homini-form* only: but now as the *Spirit of Nature* contains vitally in every point of it all Mundane Forms whatever, with all the particular Parts of every one of them, (for the *omniform* Life of the *Spirit of Nature*, for so much as concerns the World, answers to the *omniform* divine Intellect it self) so the *Plastick* of the Soul of Man contains also vitally in every point, as it were, of it, the whole humane Form enlarged to its just Bigness, with all the Degrees, Parts, or Particles of it: So that none need to wonder, that either the *Plastick* of the *Spirit of Nature*, or of the humane Soul, should discharge its *Plastical* office through the whole Formation of the Fœtus, with all the degrees of the Increase in it: For that *Homini-form* Life being every where in the *Plastick* of the Soul is exerted as occasion is according to all its Parts and Degrees; and the Parts contracted within themselves, conspire all the same way, and impress throughout the whole Process the same Form on Matter; but greater and greater

still in all the Parts, according to the Body's Growth or Increase, until it come unto its just Stature. He that shall understand rightly the working of the *Spirit of Nature*, will not find any Difficulty as to the *Plastick* of the Soul.

Señ. 15. That the Soul of Man is Immortal, &c. Not only its Intellect, which *Aristotle* calls *νῦν*, *Mind*, namely, the Soul so far as it is intellectual, but the whole entire Soul together. For to understand the very Faculty only would be ridiculous, since it is only a Mode, and cannot be separated from the Subject, or be immortal by it self; nor can the *Intellectual* part of the Soul exist without the *Plastical*, seeing that the Soul is indiscerpible: therefore the whole Soul is immortal, and can act after it hath put off its earthly Body.

C H A P. XIII.

1. *The third part of the second Answer, That the forgetting the former state is no good Argument against the Soul's Præexistence.*
2. *What are the chief causes of Forgetfulness.*
3. *That they all conspire, and that in the highest degree, to destroy the memory of the other state.*
4. *That mischances and Diseases have quite taken away the Memory of things here in this life.*
5. *That it is impossible for the Soul to remember her former condition without a Miracle.*
6. *The fourth part of the second Answer, That the Entrance of a Præexistent Soul into a Body is as intelligible as either Creation or Traduction.*

1. **A**S for the two last Difficulties, concerning the *Soul's Memory* of her former state, and the manner of her coming into the Body; I hope I shall with as much ease extricate my self here also, especially in the former. For if we consider what things they are that either quite take away, or exceedingly diminish our Memory in this life; we shall find the concurrence of them all, and that in a higher degree, or from stronger causes, contained in our descent into this *Earthly Body*, than we can meet with here: they none of them being so violent as to dislodge us out of it.

2. Now the things that take away our Memory here, are chiefly these; either, *The want of opportunity of being re-minded of a thing*, as it happens with many, who rise confident they slept without dreaming such a night, and yet before they go to bed again, recover a whole Series of representations they had in their last sleep, by something that fell out in the day, without which it had been impossible for them to recall to mind their Dream. Or else, in the second place, *Desuetude of thinking of a matter*; whereby it comes to pass, that what we have earnestly meditated, laboured for, and penn'd down with our own hands, when we were at School, were it not that we saw our names written under the Exercise, we could not acknowledge for ours when we are grown men. Or lastly, *Some considerable change in the frame and temper of our Body*, whether from some external mischance, or from some violent Disease, or else for old age, which is
disease

disease enough of it self: which often do *exceedingly impair*, if not quite take away, the *Memory*, though the Soul be still in the *same Body*.

3. Now all these Principles of *Forgetfulness*, namely, *The want of something to remind us*, *Desuetude of thinking*, and *an Extraordinary change in the Body*, are more eminently to be found in the *Descent* of the Soul into these Earthly prisons, than can happen to her for any time of *her abode* therein. For there is a greater *difference* in all probability, betwixt that Scene of things the Soul sees *out* of the Body and in it, than betwixt what she sees *sleeping* and *waking*: and the perpetual occurrences of this present life continue a long *Desuetude* of thinking on the former. Besides that their *Descent* hither in all likelihood scarce befalls them, but in their state of *Silence* and *Inactivity*, in which myriads of Souls may haply be for many Ages, as the maintainers of this Opinion may pretend, by reason of the innumerable expirations of the *Aerial periods of Life*, and the more narrow Laws of *preparing Terrestrial Matter*. And lastly, * her coming into this *Earthly Body*, is a greater and more disadvantageous change, for the utter spoiling of the *Memory* of things she was acquainted with before, than any *Mischance* or *Disease* can be for the bringing upon her a *forgetfulness* of what she has known in this life.

4. And yet that *Diseases* and *Casualties* have even utterly taken away, all *memory* is amply recorded in History. As that *Messala Corvinus* forgot his own name; that one, by a blow with a stone, forgot all his learning; another, by a fall from an Horse, the name of his Mother and Kinsfolks. A young Student of *Montpelier*, by a wound, lost his Memory so, that he was fain to be taught the letters of the Alphabet again. The like befel a *Franciscan* after a Fever. And *Thucydides* writes of some, who, after their recovery from that great Pestilence at *Athens*, did not only forget the names and persons of their friends, but themselves too, not knowing who themselves were, nor by what name they were called:

*Atque etiam quosdam cepisse oblivia rerum
Cunctarum, neque se possent cognoscere ut ipsi;*

as the Poet *Lucretius* sadly sets down in his description of that devouring Plague, out of the fore-named Historian. *De Natura rerum, lib. 6.*

5. Wherefore, without a miracle, it is impossible the Soul should remember any particular circumstance of her former condition, though she did really *præexist*, and was in a capacity of acting before she came into this Body, (as *Aristotle* plainly acknowledges she was) her change being far greater by coming into the Body, than can ever be made while she stays in it. Which we haply shall be yet more assured of, after we have considered the manner of her descent, which is the last Difficulty objected.

6. I might easily decline this Controversy, by pleading only, That the Entrance of the Soul into the Body, supposing her *Præexistence*, is as intelligible as in those other two ways, of *Creation* and *Traduction*. For how this newly-created Soul is infused by God, no man knows; nor how, if it be traducted from the Parents, both their Souls con-

tribute to the making up a new one. For if there be decision of part of the Soul of the Male, in the injection of his seed into the matrix of the Female, and part of the Female Soul to join with that of the Male's; besides, that the decision of these parts of their Souls makes the Soul a *Discerpible essence*, it is unconceivable how these *two parts* should make up *one Soul* for the Infant: a thing ridiculous at first view. But if there be no decision of any parts of the Soul, and yet the Soul of the Parent be the Cause of the Soul of the Child, it is perfectly an act of *Creation*; a thing that all sober men conclude incompetent to any particular Creature. It is therefore plainly unintelligible, how any Soul should pass from the Parents into the Body of the seed of the *Fœtus*, to actuate and inform it: which might be sufficient to stop the mouth of the Opposer, that pretends such great obscurities concerning the *entrance of Præexistent Souls into their Bodies*.

N O T E S

On C H A P. XIII. Sect. 3.

HER coming into this earthly Body is a greater and more disadvantageous Change, for the utter spoiling of the Memory of Things, &c. It is objected here from a certain ingenious Person, that this reasoning is not a little weaken'd by the things that occur, Chap. 15. Sect. 7, and 8. For if the Souls of those that are in an Ecstasy, or in a perfect *ἀσυνεσία*, or *Separation*, wander out of the Body through the Air, view the Actions of Men in very remote Places, retain 'em firmly in their Memory, and relate the things which they saw after they are enter'd into their Bodies again, as *Cornelius* the Priest, his Body lying at *Padua* in *Italy*, is reported to have seen the Fight between *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, in the Fields of *Pharsalia*, and to have told before-hand all the Circumstances of it, and *Cæsar's* Victory; nor to have declar'd only the Event of the Battle, but all the Reciprocations or Turns of the Fight, very exactly after he return'd to the Body: Verily the Memory of humane Souls, if they *præexisted*, and liv'd before in airy Vehicles, cannot justly be thought to be so extinguished by their coming into terrestrial Bodies, as not to be able to remember their former Life, or the things which were done in it. I will not here suggest, that the Matter is so related in *A. Gellius*, as if it was a simple Ecstasy, no perfect Separation: For I do my self suspect, that *A. Gellius* took this matter otherwise than it was; and agree rather with *Marsilius Ficinus*, who, if I remember right, reckons it amongst the perfect *Separations*. But I answer, That this ingenious Person might have observed, that there is a very great difference between such like Separations, and the Descent of Souls into earthly Bodies: For neither doth such a *Sèparation* differ much from a simple Ecstasy, or more than ordinary profound Sleep, as to any Change of the Body; but its Temperament, by the help of the *Spirit of Nature*, is kept, as it were, entire; and the Soul, after its Re-entrance, is just as if it had
never

never left it, bating that the Scene of the things it saw in those remote Places, is imprinted on its Memory ; which its Entrance into the Body, it being of its accustomed Temper, doth no more extinguish, than if they had been seen in the Body it self; for the Impressions of the Images, or Appearances of things, are made upon the Soul it self, nor are they soon lost, provided the Temper of the Body be not changed for the worse: which happens not in this case. But the Matter is much otherwise in the Descent of the Soul from an aery Vehicle into an Earthly Body; where, amidst the moistures of the Womb, it lives the Life of a Plant, rather than an Animal: to say nothing of its state of silence. Whereas in an *ἀπαρσις*, or Separation, there is no interruption of the Thoughts, but the Functions, even of the intellectual Life, are preserved vivid and entire. So little doth this Objection make against the *Præexistence* of Souls.

CH A P. XIV.

1. The knowledge of the difference of Vehicles, and the Soul's Union with them, necessary for the understanding how she enters into this Earthly Body.
2. That though the Name of Vehicle be not in Aristotle, yet the Thing is there.
3. A clearing of Aristotle's notion of the Vehicle, out of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes.
4. A full interpretation of his Text.
5. That Aristotle makes only two Vehicles, Terrestrial and Æthereal; which is more than sufficient to prove the Soul's Oblivion of her former state.
6. That the ordinary Vehicle of the Soul after death is Air.
7. The duration of the Soul in her several Vehicles.
8. That the Union of the Soul with her Vehicle does not consist in Mechanical Congruity, but Vital.
9. In what Vital congruity of the Matter consists.
10. In what Vital congruity of the Soul consists, and how it changing, the Soul may be free from her Aery Vehicle, without violent precipitation out of it.
11. Of the manner of the Descent of Souls into Earthly Bodies.
12. That there is so little Absurdity in the *Præexistence* of Souls, that the concession thereof can be but a very small prejudice to our Demonstrations of her Immortality.

1. **B**UT I shall spend my time better in clearing the Opinion I here defend, than in perplexing the other that is so gross of it self, that none, that thoroughly understand the nature of the Soul, can so much as allow the possibility thereof: wherefore for the better conceiving how a *Præexistent* Soul may enter this Terrestrial Body, there are two things to be enquired into; the difference of the Vehicles of Souls, and the cause of their union with them. * The Platonists do chiefly take notice of Three kinds of Vehicles, Æthereal, Aereal, and Terrestrial, in every one whereof there may be several degrees of purity and impurity, which yet need not amount to a new Species.

2. This Notion of Vehicles, though it be discoursed of most in the School of Plato, yet is not altogether neglected by Aristotle, as appears in his *De Generat. Animal.* where, though he does not use the Name, Lib. 2. cap. 3.

yet he does expressly acknowledge the Thing it self: For he does plainly affirm, That every Soul partakes of a Body distinct from this organiz'd terrestrial Body, and of a more divine nature than the Elements so call'd; and that as one Soul is more noble than another, so is the difference of this diviner Body; which yet is nothing else with him than that warmth or heat in the seed, τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι εὐπαράχον τὸ καλέμενον θερμὸν, which is not Fire, but a Spirit contained in the spumeous feed, and in this Spirit a nature analogous to the Element of the Stars.

3. Of which neither *Aristotle* himself had, nor any one else can have, so explicate an apprehension as those that understand the first and second Element of *Des-Cartes*; which is the most subtile and active Body that is in the World, and is of the very same nature that the Heaven and Stars are, that is to say, is the very Body of Light, (which is to be understood chiefly of the first Element) though so mingled with other Matter here below that it does not shine, but is the Basis of all that natural warmth in all generations, and the immediate Instrument of the Soul, when it organizeth any Matter into the figure or shape of an Animal; as I have also intimated * elsewhere, when I proved, *That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in all Vital and Animal functions.* In which *Spirits* of necessity is contain'd this *Celestial* Substance, which keeps them from congealing, as it does also all other liquid bodies, and must needs be in the Pores of them; there being no *Vacuum* in the whole comprehension of Nature.

4. The full and express meaning therefore of *Aristotle's* text must be this, That in the spumeous and watry or terrene moisture of the feed is contained a Body of a more spirituous or aerial consistency, and in this aerial or spirituous consistency is comprehended φύσις ἀνάλογος ὅσα πρὸς τῶν ἀστρον στοιχείῳ, a nature that is analogous or like to the Element of the stars, * namely, that is of it self *ethereal* and *lucid*.

5. And it is in this *Vehicle* that *Aristotle* seems to assert that the Soul does act in separate from the Body; as if she were ever either in this *Terrestrial* Body, or in her *Ethereal* one: which, if it were true, so vast a change must needs obliterate all *Memory* of her former condition, when she is once plunged into this earthly prison. But it seems not so probable to me, that Nature admits of so great a Chasm; nor is it necessary to suppose it for this purpose: the descent of the Soul out of her *Aiery* Vehicle into this *terrestrial* Body, and besmearing moisture of the first rudiments of Life, being sufficient to lull her into an eternal oblivion of whatever happen'd to her in that other condition; to say nothing of her long state of *Silence* and *Inactivity* before her turn came to revive in an *earthly* body.

6. Wherefore not letting go that more orderly conceit of the *Platonists*, I shall make bold to assert, That the Soul may live and act in an *Aereal* Vehicle as well as in the *Ethereal*; and that there are very few that arrive to that high happiness, as to acquire a *Celestial* Vehicle immediately upon their quitting the *Terrestrial* one: * that *Heavenly Chariot* necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest Happiness the Soul of man is capable of: which would arrive to all men indifferently, good and bad, if the parting with this *Earthly* Body would
fud-

* In this
2d. Book,
chap. 8.

suddenly mount us into the *Heavenly*. Where by a just *Nemesis*, the Souls of men, that are not Heroically vertuous, will find themselves restrained within the compass of this caliginous *Air*, as both Reason it self will suggest, and the *Platonists* have unanimously determined.

7. We have competently described the difference of those *Three kinds of Vehicles*, for their *purity* and *consistency*. The *Platonists* add to this the difference of *duration*, making some of them of that nature as to entertain the Soul a longer time in them, others a shorter. The shortest of all is that of the *Terrestrial Vehicle*. In the *Aereal* the Soul may inhabit, as they define, many Ages; and in the *Æthereal*, for ever.

8. But this makes little to the clearing of the *manner of their descent, eis γένεσιν*, which cannot be better understood than by considering their *Union* with the Body generated, or indeed with any kind of Body whatever, where the Soul is held captive, and cannot quit her self thereof by the free *imperium* of her own Imagination and Will. For what can be the cause of this cohesion, the very Essence of the Soul being so easily penetrative of *Matter*, and the dimensions of all *Matter* being alike penetrable every where? For there being no more *Body* or *Matter* in a Vessel filled with *Lead*, than when it is full of *Water*; nor when full with *Water*, than when with *Air*, or what other subtiler Body soever that can be imagined in the Universe; it is manifest, that the *Craffities* of *Matter* is every where alike, and alike penetrable and passable to the Soul. And therefore it is unconceivable how her *Union* should be so with any of it, as that she should not be able at any time to glide freely from one part thereof to another as she pleases.

It is plain therefore, that this *Union of the Soul with Matter* does not arise from any such gross *Mechanical* way, as when two Bodies stick one in another, by reason of any toughness and viscosity, or streight commissure of parts; but from a *congruity* of another nature, which I know not better how to term than *Vital*: which *Vital Congruity* is chiefly in the Soul it self, it being the noblest Principle of Life; but is also in the *Matter*, and is there nothing but such modification thereof as fits the *Plastick* part of the Soul, and tempts out that Faculty into act.

9. Not that there is any *Life* in the *Matter* with which this in the Soul should sympathize and unite; but it is termed *Vital*, because it makes the *Matter* a *congruous* Subject for the Soul to reside in, and exercise the functions of *life*. For that which has no *life* it self may tie to it that which has. As some men are said to be ty'd by the teeth, or ty'd by the Ear, when they are detain'd by the pleasure they are struck with from good Musick or delicious Viands. But neither is that which they eat *alive*, nor that which makes the Musick, neither the Instrument, nor the Air that conveys the sound. For there is nothing in all this but mere *Matter* and corporeal Motion, and yet our *vital* functions are affected thereby. Now as we see that the *Perceptive* part of the Soul * is thus vitally affected with that which has no life in it, so it is reasonable that the *Plastick* part thereof may be so too; That there may be an Harmony betwixt *Matter* thus and thus modified, and that Power that we call *Plastick*, that is utterly devoid of
all

all *Perception*. And in this alone consists that which we call *Vital Congruity* in the prepared Matter, either to be organized, or already shaped into the perfect form of an Animal.

10. And that *Vital Congruity* which is in the Soul, I mean in the *Plastick* part thereof, is analogous to that Pleasure that is perceived by the Sense, or rather to the capacity of receiving it, when the Sense is by agreeable motions from without, or in the Body it self, very much gratified, and that whether the Mind will or no. For there are some Touches that will, in their *Perception*, seem pleasant, whether our Judgment would have them so or not. What this is to the *Perceptive* part of the Soul, that other *Congruity of Matter* is to the *Plastick*. And therefore that which ties the Soul and this or that Matter together, is an unresistible and unperceptible pleasure, if I may so call it, arising from the *congruity of Matter* to the *Plastick* faculty of the Soul: which *Congruity in the Matter* not failing, nor that in the Soul, the *Union* is at least as necessary as the continuation of eating and drinking, so long as Hunger and Thirst continues, and the Meat and Drink proves good. But either satiety in the Stomach, or some ill tast in the Meat may break the *congruity* on either side, and then the action will cease with the pleasure thereof. And upon this very account may a Soul be conceived to quit her *Aery Vehicle* within a certain period of Ages, as the *Platonists* hold she does, without any violent *Precipitation* of her self out of it.

11. What are the *strings* or *cords* that tie the Soul to the Body, or to what Vehicle else soever, I have declared as clearly as I can. From which it will be easy to understand the *manner of her descent*. For assuredly, the same *cords* or *strings* that tie her there, may draw her thither: Where the carcass is, there will the Eagles be gathered. Not that she need use her *Perceptive* faculty in her descent, as Hawks and Kites, by their sight or smelling, fly directly to the lure or prey: but she being within the *Atmosphere* (as I may so call it) of Generation, and so her *Plastick* power being reached and touch'd by such an invisible reek, (as Birds of prey are, that smell out their food at a distance;) she may be fatally carried, all *Perceptions* ceasing in her, to that Matter that is so fit a receptacle for her to exercise her efformative power upon. For this *Magick-sphere*, as I may so term it, that has this power of conjuring Souls into *Earthly Bodies*, the nearer the Centre, the virtue is the stronger; and therefore the Soul will never cease till she has slid into the very Matter that sent out those rays, or subtile reek to allure her.

From whence it is easy to conceive, that the Souls of Brutes also, though they be not able to exercise their *Perceptive* faculty out of a *Terrestrial* body; yet they may infallibly find the way again into the world, as often as *Matter* is fitly prepared for generation. And this is one Hypothesis, and most intelligible to those that are pleas'd so much with the opinion of those large Spheres they conceive of *emissary Atoms*.

There is also another, which is the Power and Activity of the *Spirit of Nature*, or *Inferiour Soul of the World*, who is as fit an Agent to trans-

transmit particular Souls, as she is to move the parts of Matter. But of this * hereafter.

12. What has been said is enough for the present to illustrate the pretended obscurity and unconceivableness of this Mystery. So that I have fully made good all the four parts of my Answer to that Objection, that would have supplanted the force of my strongest Arguments for the Soul's Immortality; and have clearly prov'd, That though this sequel did necessarily result from them, *That the Souls of Men and Beasts did Præexist*, yet, to unprejudiced Reason, there is no Absurdity nor Inconvenience at all in the Opinion. And therefore this Obstacle being removed, I shall the more chearfully proceed to the demonstrating of the Soul's *actual Separation* from the Body.

* Book 3.
chap. 13.
sect. 9.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XIV. Sect. 1.

THE Platonists do chiefly take notice of three kinds of Vehicles, &c. Of these three Vehicles more things occur in the Chapter next following, which treats of this threefold *vital Congruity*.

Sect. 4. *A Nature that is analogous, or like to the Element of the Stars, &c.* This Place often occurs in Harvey, in his Treatise *De Generat. Animal. Exerc. 29.* But the Seed, Conception, and Egg are of the same kind; and that which makes fruitful in all of them, is the same, or of a like nature, and that divine, analogous to Heaven, Art, Intellect, and Providence. To much the same Sense he speaks *Exercitat. 46.* where he considers that Principle which forms the Fœtus as something incorporeal, and coming from without; which (as Art or Mind) fashions the Fœtus with Understanding and Providence, and orders and disposeth all things about it to some end, and for its better Subsistence; which Principle he will have to be indigitated in that Place of *Aristotle*. But that *Harvey* thinks there is something divine in those Words, (*A Nature that is analogous to the Element of the Stars,*) I take to come from hence, that *Aristotle* establish'd an intelligent Principle, and truly Divine, only in the Heavens; and so intimates, that the Efficacy of such a Principle as this, reacheth also unto us: But I say 'tis the omniform *Spirit of Nature*, answering not to the Heaven, or to the Stars, but to the divine Intellect, that acts in the Efformation of such-like Animals. And this is that Exemplar of the divine Wisdom, which that wise and industrious Naturalist *Harvey*, by feeling, as it were, after it, endeavour'd to attain to, but fell short of the distinct knowledge of it.

Sect. 6. *That heavenly Chariot necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest Happiness, &c.* For this heavenly Chariot is never destitute of the *divine Element* in the Souls of men that are regenerate.

Sect. 9. *Is thus vitally affected with that which hath no Life in it, &c.* so indeed it appears to us. But whether it would be so affected without the *Spirit of Nature*, is a new Question. But though not without

out the Concurrence of the *Spirit of Nature*; yet, if with the Concurrence of the same Spirit, it be effected from the Matter with which it is united, the thing is in both cases the same.

C H A P. XV.

1. *What is meant by the Separation of the Soul, with a confutation of Regius, who would stop her in the dead Corps.*
2. *An Answer to those that profess themselves puzzled how the Soul can get out of the Body.*
3. *That there is a threefold Vital Congruity to be found in three several Subjects.*
4. *That this triple Congruity is also competent to one Subject, viz. the Soul of Man.*
5. *That upon this Hypothesis it is very intelligible how the Soul may leave the Body.*
6. *That her Union with the Aereal Vehicle may be very sudden, and as it were in a moment.*
7. *That the Soul is actually separate from the Body, is to be proved either by History or Reason. Examples of the former kind out of Pliny, Herodotus, Ficinus.*
8. *Whether the Ecstasy of Witches prove an actual separation of the Soul from the Body.*
9. *That this real separation of the Soul in Ecstasy is very possible.*
10. *How the Soul may be loosen'd, and leave the Body, and yet return thither again.*
11. *That though Reason and Will cannot in this life release the Soul from the Body, yet Passion may; and yet so that she may return again.*
12. *The peculiar power of Desire for this purpose.*
13. *Of Cardan's Ecstasies, and the Ointment of Witches, and what truth there may be in their confessions.*

1. **C**ONCERNING the actual and local Separation of the Soul from the Body, it is manifest that it is to be understood of this Terrestrial Body. For to be in such a separate state, as to be where no Body or Matter is, is to be out of the World: the whole Universe being so thick set with Matter or Body, that there is not to be found the least vacuity therein. The question therefore is only, whether upon Death the Soul can pass from the Corps into some other place. *Henricus Regius* seems to arrest her there by that general law of Nature, termed the law of *Immutability*; whereby every thing is to continue in the same condition it once is in, till something else change it. But the application of this law is very grossly unjust in this case. For, as I above intimated, the Union of the Soul with the Body is upon certain terms; neither is every piece of Matter fit for every Soul to unite with, as *Aristotle* of old has very solidly concluded. Wherefore that condition of the Matter not being kept, the Soul is no longer engaged to the Body. What he here says for the justifying of himself, is so arbitrary, so childish and ridiculous, that, according to the merit thereof, I shall utterly neglect it, and pass it by, not vouchsafing of it any Answer.

2. Others are much puzzled in their imagination, how the Soul can get out of the Body, being imprisoned and lock'd up in so close a Castle. But these seem to forget both the Nature of the Soul, with the tenuity of her Vehicle, and also the Anatomy of the Body. For considering the nature of the Soul her self, and of Matter, which is alike pene-

Philosoph. Natural. lib. 5. cap. 1. pag. 351, 352.

penetrable every where, the Soul can pass through solid Iron and Marble, as well as through the soft Air and Æther; so that the thickness of the Body is no impediment to her. Besides, her *Astral* Vehicle is of that tenuity, that it self can as easily pass the smallest pores of the Body as the Light does Glass, or the Lightning the Scabbard of a Sword without tearing or scorching of it. And lastly, whether we look upon that principal seat of the *Plastick* power of the *Heart*, or that of *Perception*, the *Brain*; when a man dies, the Soul may collect her self, and the small residue of Spirits (that may haply serve her in the inchoation of her new Vehicle) either into the Heart, whence is an easy passage into the Lungs, and so out at the Mouth; or else into the Head, out of which there are more doors open than I will stand to number. These things are very easily imaginable, though as invisible as the Air, in whose element they are transacted.

3. But that they may still be more perfectly understood, I shall resume again the consideration of that Faculty in the *Plastick* part of the Soul, which we call *Vital Congruity*. * Which, according to the number of Vehicles, we will define to be threefold, *Terrestrial*, *Aereal*, and *Æthereal* or *Celestial*. That these *vital Congruities* are found, some in some kind of Spirits, and others in otherwise, is very plain. For that the *Terrestrial* is in the Soul of Brutes, and in our own, is without controversy; as also that the *Aereal* in that kind of Beings, which the Ancients called *Δαίμονες* and lastly, that the *Heavenly* and *Æthereal* in those Spirits that Antiquity more properly called *Θεοί*, as being Inhabitants of the Heavens. For that there are such *Aereal* and *Æthereal* Beings that are analogous to *Terrestrial* Animals, if we compare the nature of God with the *Phænomena* of the world, it cannot prove less than a Demonstration.

For this Earth that is replenish'd with living Creatures, nay put in all the Planets too that are in the world, and fancy them inhabited, they, all join'd together, bear not so great a proportion to the rest of the liquid Matter of the Universe (that is in a nearer capacity of being the Vehicle of Life) as a single Cumin-seed to the Globe of the Earth. But how ridiculous a thing would it be, that all the Earth beside being neglected, only one piece thereof, no better than the rest, nor bigger than the smallest seed, should be inhabited? The same may be said also of the compass of the Air; and therefore it is necessary to enlarge their Territories, and confidently to pronounce there are *Æthereal Animals*, as well as *Terrestrial* and *Aereal*.

4. It is plain therefore that these three *Congruities* are to be found in several Subjects; but that which makes most to our purpose is to find them in one, and that in the Soul of Man. And there will be an easy intimation thereof, if we consider the vast difference of those Faculties that we are sure are in her *Perceptive* part, and how they occasionally emerge, and how, upon the laying asleep of one, others will spring up. Neither can there be any greater difference betwixt the highest and lowest of these *Vital congruities* in the *Plastick* part, than there is betwixt the highest and lowest of those Faculties that result from the *Perceptive*. For some Perceptions are the very same with those of *Beasts*; others little inferiour to those that belong to *Angels*,
as

as we ordinarily call them; some perfectly brutish, others purely divine: why therefore may there not reside so great a Latitude of capacities in the *Plastick* part of the Soul, as she may have in her all those three *Vital Congruities*, whereby she may be able livingly to unite as well with the *Celestial* and *Aereal Body*, as with this *Terrestrial* one? Nay, our nature being so free and multifarious as it is, it would seem a reproach to Providence, to deny this capacity of living in these several Vehicles, because that *Divine Nemesis* which is supposed to rule in the world, would seem defective without this contrivance.

But without controversy, Eternal Wisdom and Justice have forecast that which is the best: and unless we will say nothing at all, we have nothing to judge by but our own Faculties, we must say, that the Forecast is according to what we, upon our most accurate search, do conceive to be the best. For there being no Envy in the Deity, as *Plato* somewhere has noted, it is not to be thought but that He has framed our Faculties so, that when we have rightly prepared ourselves for the use of them, they will have a right correspondency with those things that are offered to them to contemplate in the world.

And truly if we had here time to consider, I do not doubt but it might be made to appear a very rational thing, that there should be such an *Amphibion* as the Soul of man, that had a capacity, (as some Creatures have to live either in the Water or on the Earth) to change her Element, and after her abode here in this *Terrestrial Vehicle* amongst Men and Beasts, to ascend into the company of the *Aereal Genii*, in a Vehicle answerable to their nature.

5. Supposing then this triple capacity of *Vital Congruity* in the Soul of Man, the manner how she may leave this Body is very intelligible. For the Body's fitness of temper to retain the Soul being lost in Death, the lower *Vital Congruity* in the Soul loseth its Object, and consequently its Operation. And therefore as the letting go one thought in the *Perceptive part* of the Soul is the bringing up another; so the ceasing of one *Vital Congruity* is the wakening of another, if there be an Object, or Subject, ready to entertain it; as certainly there is, partly in the Body, but mainly without it. For there is a *vital Air* that pervades all this lower world, which is continued with the life of all things, and is the chiefest Principle thereof. Whence *Theon* in his *Scholia* upon *Aratus*, interprets that Hemistich,

——— Τὸ δὲ καὶ γένεσθαι ἐσμέν,

in a secondary meaning as spoken of the *Air*, which he calls τὸν Δία or τὸν Ζῆνα τὸν φυσικόν, the *natural Jupiter*, in whom, in an inferiour sense, we may be said to live, and move, and have our Being: for without *Air*, neither Fishes, Fowls, nor Beasts can subsist, it administering the most immediate matter of life unto them, by feeding and refreshing their Animal Spirits.

Wherefore upon the cessation of the lowest *Vital Congruity*, that *Aereal* capacity awakening into Act, and finding so fit Matter every where to imploy her self upon, the Soul will not fail to leave the Body: either upon choice, by the power of her own Imagination and Will; or else (supposing the very worst that can happen) by a natu-

ra

ral kind of Attraction, or Transvection, she being her self, in that stound and confusion that accompanies Death, utterly unsensible of all things.

For the Air without being more *wholesome* and *vital* than in the corrupt caverns of the dead Body, and yet there being a continuation thereof with that without; it is as easy to understand how (that Principle of joining therewith in the *Plastick* part of the Soul being once excited) she will naturally glide out of the Body into the free Air, as how the Fire will ascend upwards, or a stone fall downwards: for neither are the motions of these merely Mechanical, but vital or Magical, that cannot be resolved into *mere Matter*, as I shall demonstrate in my Third Book.

6. And being once recovered into this vast Ocean of *Life*, and *sensible Spirit of the world*, so full of enlivening Balsame; it will be no wonder if the Soul suddenly regain the use of her *Perceptive* faculty, being, as it were in a moment, regenerate into a natural power of Life and Motion, by so happy a concurse of rightly-prepared Matter for her *Plastick* part vitally to unite withal. For grosser generations are performed in almost as inconsiderable a space of time; if those Histories be true, of extemporary Sallads, sown and gathered not many hours before the meal they are eaten at: and of the sudden ingendring of Frogs upon the fall of rain, whole swarms whereof, that had no Being before, have appeared with perfect shape and liveliness in the space of half an hour, after some more unctuous droppings upon the dry ground; as I find not only recited out of *Fallopins*, * *Scaliger*, and others, but have been certainly my self informed of it by them that have been eye-witnesses thereof; as *Vaninus* also professes himself to have been by his friend *Johannes Ginochius*, who told him for a certain, that in the month of *July* he saw with his own eyes, a drop of Rain turned into a Frog. By such examples as these it is evident, that the reason why Life is so long a compleating in Terrestrial generations, is only the sluggishness of the Matter the *Plastick* powers work upon. Wherefore a Soul once united with Air, cannot miss of being able, in a manner in the twinkling of an Eye, to exercise all *Perceptive functions* again, if there was ever any intercession of them in the astonishments of Death.

7. How the Soul *may* live and act separate from the Body, may be easily understood out of what has been spoken. But that she does so *de facto*, there are but two ways to prove it; the one by the testimony of *History*, the other by *Reason*. That of *History* is either of persons *perfectly dead*, or of those that have been subject to *Ecstasies*, or rather to that height thereof, which is more properly called *ἀσπασία*, when the Soul does really leave the Body, and yet return again. Of this latter sort is that Example that *Pliny* recites of *Hermotimus Clazementus*, whose Soul would often quit her Body, and wander up and down; and, after her return, tell many true stories of what she had seen during the time of her disjunction. The same, *Maximus Tyrius* and * *Herodotus* report of *Aristaeus Proconnesius*. † *Marsilius Ficinus* adjoins to this rank that narration in *Aulus Gellius*, concerning one *Cornelius* a Priest, who in an Ecstasy saw the Battel fought betwixt

Chap. 13.
sect. 6.

* Scalig. de
Subril. Exerc.
323.

Histor. Natu-
ral. lib. 7.
cap. 52.

* Historiar.
lib. 4.
† Theolog.
Platonic. lib.

13. cap. 2.
A Gell. Noct.
Attic. lib. 15.

Cæsar cap. 18.

See my *Antidote*, Book 3.
ch. 11. sect. 7.
* *Histor. Natural. lib. 7.*
cap. 52.

Cæsar and *Pompey* in *Thessalie*, his Body being then at *Padua*; and yet could, after his return to himself, punctually declare the Time, Order, and Success of the Fight. That in *Wierus*, of the *Weasel* coming out of the Soldier's mouth when he was asleep, is a more plain example: which, if it were true, would make *Aristaus* his *Pigeon* not so much suspected of fabulosity, * as *Pliny* would have it. Several Relations there are in the world to this effect, that cannot but be loudly laugh'd at by them that think the Soul inseparable from the Body; and ordinarily they seem very ridiculous also to those that think it is separable, but as firmly believe that it is never, nor ever can be, separate but in Death.

See my *Antidote*, Book 3.
chap. 11.
sect. 2, 3.

* See *Enthusiast. Triumphat.*
sect. 5, ad 28.

8. *Bodinus* has a very great desire, notwithstanding it is so incredible to others, that the thing should be true; it being so evincing an Argument for the Soul's Immortality. And he thinks this Truth is evident from innumerable examples of the *Ecstasies* of Witches: which we must confess with him not to be natural; but that they amount to a perfect *ἀπαρρησία*, or carrying away the Soul out of the Body, the lively sense of their meeting, and dancing, and adoring the Devil, and the mutual remembrance of the persons that meet one another there at such a time, will be no * infallible *Demonstration* that they were there indeed, while their Bodies lay at home in Bed. Conformity of their Confessions concerning the same Conventicle is only a *shrewd probability*, if it once could be made good that this leaving their Bodies were a thing possible.

For when they are out of them, they are much-what in the same condition that other *Spirits* are, and can imitate what shape they please; so that many of these Transformations into Wolves and Cats may be as likely of the Soul having left thus the Body, as by the Devil's possessing the Body, and transfiguring it himself. And what these *airy* Cats or Wolves suffer, whether cuttings of their limbs, or breaking the Back, or any such like mischief, that the Witch in her Bed suffers the like, may very well arise from that *Magick Sympathy* that is seated in the Unity of the Spirit of the World, and the continuity of the subtile Matter dispersed throughout: the Universe in some sense being, as the *Stoicks* and *Platonists* define it, * one vast entire *Animal*.

9. Now that this *real Separation of the Soul* may happen in some *Ecstasies*, will be easily admitted, if we consider that the Soul, in her own Nature, is separable from the Body, as being a Substance really distinct therefrom; and that all Bodies are alike penetrable and passable to her, she being devoid of that corporeal property, which they ordinarily call *ἀντιστοιχία*, and therefore can freely slide through any Matter whatsoever, without any *knocking* or *resistance*; and lastly, that she does not so properly impart Heat and Motion to the Body, as Organization: and therefore when the Body is well organiz'd, and there be that due temper of the Blood, the Heart and Pulse will in some measure beat, and the Brain will be replenish'd with Spirits, and therewith the whole Body, though the Soul were out of it. In which case (saving that the *Spirit of Nature* cannot be excluded thence) it would be perfectly *Cartesius* his *Machina* without Sense, though seemingly as much

much alive as any animate Creature in a deep sleep. Whence it appears, that if the Soul could leave the Body, that she might do it for a certain time without any detriment thereto, that is, so long as it might well live without Repast. Which fully answers their fears, who conceit, that if the Soul was but once out of the Body, perfect Death must necessarily ensue, and all possible return thither be precluded.

10. But all the difficulty is to understand how the Soul may be loosened from the Body, while the Body is in a *fit* condition to retain her. That is a very great Difficulty indeed, and in a manner impossible for any power but what is supernatural. But it is not hard to conceive, that this *vital fitness* in the Body may be changed, either by way of *natural Disease*, or by *Art*. For why may not some certain Fermentation in the Body so alter the Blood and Spirits, that the powers of the *Plastick* part of the Soul may cease to operate, as well as sometimes the *Perceptive* faculties do, as in *Catalepsies*, *Apoplexies*, and the like? Wherefore this passing of the Soul out of the Body in *Sleep*, or *Ecstasy*, may be sometime a certain Disease, as well as that of the *νυκτοβάται*, *those that walk in their sleep*.

Now if it should happen that some such distemper should arise in the Body, as would very much change the *Vital Congruity* thereof for a time, and in this Paroxysm, that other Disease of the *Noctambuli* should surprize the party; his Imagination driving him to walk to this or that place, his Soul may very easily be conceiv'd in this loosened condition it lies in, to be able to leave the Body, and pass in the Air, as other Inhabitants of that Element do, and act the part of separate Spirits, and exercise such Functions of the *Perceptive* faculty as they do, that are quite released from Terrestrial Matter. Only here is the difference, That that damp in the Body that loosen'd the Union of the Soul being spent, the Soul by that natural *Magick* that I have more than once intimated, will certainly return to the Body, and unite with it again as firm as ever. But no man can, when he pleases, pass out of his Body thus, by the *Imperium* of his Will, no more than he can walk in his Sleep: For this capacity is pressed down more deep into the lower life of the Soul, whither neither the *Liberty of Will*, nor *free Imagination* can reach.

11. *Passion* is more likely to take effect in this case than either of the other two Powers, the seat of Passions being originally in the Heart, which is the chiefest Fort of these lower Faculties, and therefore, by their propinquity, can more easily act upon the first Principles of Vital Union. The effect of these has been so great, that they have quite carried the Soul out of the Body, as appears in sundry Histories of that kind. For both *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the *Sicilian* Tyrant dy'd suddenly upon the news of a Tragick Victory; as *Polycrita* also, a Noble-woman of the Isle of *Naxos*; the Poet *Philippides*, and *Diagoras* of *Rhodes*, upon the like excess of Joy. We might add examples of sudden *Fear* and *Grief*, but it is needless.

It is a known and granted Truth, that *Passion* has so much power over the vital temper of the Body, as to make it an unfit mansion for the Soul; from whence will necessarily follow her disunion from it.

Now if *Passion* will so utterly change the Harmony of the Blood and Spirits, as quite to release the Soul from the Body by a perfect Death; why may it not sometime act on this side that degree, and only bring a present *intemperies*, out of which the Body may recover, and consequently regain the Soul back again, by virtue of that *Mundane Sympathy* I have so often spoke of?

See Helmont,
Demagnetica
vulnerum cu-
ratione, Para-
graph. 74,
75, 76.

12. Now of all *Passions* whatever, excess of *Desire* is fittest for this more harmless and momentary ablegation of the Soul from the Body; because the great strength thereof is so closely assisted with the imagination of departing to the place where the party would be, that upon disunion not amounting to perfect Death, the power of Fancy may carry the Soul to the place intended; and being satisfied and returned, may rekindle life in the Body to the same degree it had before it was infested by this excess of Desire. This is that, if any thing, that has made dying men visit their friends before their departure, at many miles distance, their Bodies still keeping their sick-bed; and those that have been well, give a visit to their sick friends, of whole health they have been over-desirous and solicitous. For this *Ecstasy* is really of the Soul, and not of the Blood or Animal Spirits; neither of which have any *Sense* or *Perception* in them at all. And therefore into this Principle is to be resolved that Story which *Martinus Del-Rio* reports of a Lad who, through the strength of Imagination and Desire of seeing his Father, fell into an *Ecstasy*; and, after he came to himself, confidently affirmed he had seen him, and told infallible Circumstances of his being present with him.

13. That *Cardan* and others could fall into an *Ecstasy* when they pleased, by force of *Imagination* and *Desire* to fall into it, is recorded and believed by very grave and sober Writers: but whether they could ever do it to a compleat *ἀσυνείδητα*, or local disjunction of the Soul from the Body, I know none that dare affirm; such events being rather the chances of Nature and Complexion, as in the *Noctambuli*, than the effects of our Will. But we cannot assuredly conclude, but that *Art* may bring into our power and ordering that which natural causes put upon us sometimes without our leaves. But whether those *Ointments* of Witches have any such effect; or whether those unclean Spirits they deal with, by their immediate presence in their Bodies, cannot, for a time, so suppress or alter their *Vital fitness* to such degrees as will loosen the Soul, I leave to more curious Inquisitors to search after. It is sufficient that I have demonstrated a very intelligible possibility of this actual separation without *Death* properly so called.

From whence the peremptory Confessions of Witches, and the agreement of the story which they tell in several, as well those that are there bodily, as they that leave their Bodies behind them, especially when, at their return, they bring something home with them, as a permanent sign of their being at the place, is (though it may be all the delusion of their *Familiars*) no contemptible probability of their being there indeed where they declare they have been. For these are the greatest evidences that can be had in humane affairs: And nothing, so much as the suppos'd Impossibility thereof, has deterr'd men from believing the thing to be true.

CHAP.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XV. Sect. 3.

WHICH, according to the number of Vehicles, we will define to be three-fold, *Terrestrial, Aerial, and Ætherial*, &c. This seems to be the adequate distribution of vital Congruity, if we have respect to the Places of the Universe: for there seems to be no place in the Universe but what (if Earth be taken in a due latitude) is either *Terrestrial, Aerial, or Celestial*. But there are farther two Congruities, which do not so much imply a distinction of *Places*, as of *Dignity and Condition*; being such as may be join'd with any of those three former Congruities, although it be somewhat difficult to determine by what Names to call them. The first of these Congruities is that by which the *Plastick* of the Soul is so prepar'd, as that it can unite with the *divine Seed*, or Element, that so the *new Man* may be generated, and, what is the same thing, be fed with the true *heavenly Manna*; and nourish'd in such a manner, as that it may grow to be a perfect Man. It is in this the Mystery of *Regeneration* consists. Of which I have spoken elsewhere more at large; nor doth it belong unto this place. The other Congruity is that by which the humane Soul and Body together become one with the *Divine Logos*, as the Body doth with the Soul. And this truly is a certain *single*, or solitary *Congruity*, competent only to the Soul of the *Messias*, but to no Souls else subject unto his Government. The former indeed, on the account of the *Divine Seed*, may, in some Sense, be call'd *Divine*; but for this latter, I am at a loss wholly what term to give it. And certainly it is a Matter of some religious Awe how we offer to give any Name to it; since the Attempt may seem no less daring than that rash and fatal Inspection of the *Bethshemites* into the Ark. And it is expressly said, with regard to this so admirable and adorable Union, in the Apocalypse, *That he hath a Name written that no Man knew but he himself*. It is the most adviseable therefore to give no Name to this Congruity; since we know of none to give, unless perhaps it may be safely call'd amongst us Men, a *nameless*, or *ineffable Congruity*.

But I thought it very well worth the while to observe here by the by, that since the Name of Christ is such in the foresaid Place of the Apocalypse, that *none* (though he was follow'd by the entire Company of regenerate Souls, *cloth'd with Linnen clean and white*) *knew* it besides *himself*, this is a manifest Sign that that Communication of the divine Nature, which is competent to other holy Souls, is not of the same kind with that by which Christ is called God; that is, with that Union by which the Soul of Christ is united with the Divinity; for otherwise that Name would be known, not to Christ alone, but to others also. Which I would have to be noted against those high swollen Enthusiasts, which boast themselves to be united to the Divinity, with the same kind, though not degree, of Union with Christ himself.

But to return to my Business: From this most antient Doctrine, as I conceive, amongst the *Jews*, of these five vital Congruities, that monstrous Fiction of five Souls in Man, really distinct from one another, amongst the later *Cabbalists* took its Beginning. For to those three first Souls, *Nepheesh*, *Ruach*, *Neschamah*, any one may conjecture, without Rashness, those three first Conditions of the Soul, as it is either in a *Terrestrial*, an *Aerial*, or else in a *Celestial* or *Ætherial* Vehicle, gave the true occasion; since the same Soul is call'd *Nepheesh*, as it is in a *Terrestrial* Vehicle; *Ruach*, as in an *Aerial*; and *Neschamah*, as in a *Celestial*. But the two last seem to have arisen from hence; namely, *Chajah* and *Jachidah*, that there are two other Conditions yet superadded, of which one is the *vital* Coalition of the Soul with the *divine* Seed, from whence it attains its *divine* Senses, and the *divine* Life: In which, as I elsewhere signify, is couch'd the Mystery of real *Regeneration*. Now as to *Jachidah*, since that Term no where occurs but in *Psal.* XXII. 21. where the very Soul of the *Messias* is most apparently indigitated, it is manifest, that it relates to that *special* or solitary Congruity, that was but now mention'd: whereas the *Cabbalists* notwithstanding, out of their great Ignorance, describe that Condition as common unto many. From which Place farther of that said Psalm, whether that *anonymous* Congruity may not also be called the *Jachidean* Congruity, I leave to the Criticks and Divines to dispute at leisure.

In the mean time, while the *Cabbalists* affirm these two last but faintly and obscurely to be distinct Souls, with the greater confidence may any one conclude the three first to be only a threefold condition of one and the same Soul, according to the threefold State of its Vehicle: Though the *Cabbalists* notwithstanding make 'em to that degree distinct Souls, that they may at the same time be one in the *Grave*, another in *Abraham's Bosom*, and a third in *Paradise*: nay also they most ridiculously pretend, that they meet sometimes in one place, and consult in common together about their Affairs, as if they were plainly three distinct Persons. But I look upon all these Dotages as proceeding from that antient Doctrine of the threefold vital Congruity of Souls wrong understood, or almost now lost amongst them. Let those consider it that are better vers'd in the Books of the *Cabbalists*.

In the mean while I cannot but observe, that *R. Simeon Ben-Jochai*, in *R. Moses Corduerus*, hath this Tradition concerning the Soul. That the Man being dead, the Abode of *Nepheesh* is in the Sepulchre; of *Ruach*, in the inferiour Paradise; and of *Neschamah*, in the upper Paradise. *Pardef. Sect.* 31. *Pref.* And *Chap.* 2. That when the World stands in need of Mercy and Pity, the Living go, and make it known to the *Nepheeshes* of the just, weeping over their Sepulchres; upon which the *Nepheeshes* of the just are much mov'd, and, taking Wings, fly to those that sleep in *Chebron*, and open to them the World's Trouble; then all together make it known unto the *Ruchim* in the Garden of *Eden*, and the *Ruchim* to the *Neschamahs*, and the *Neschamahs* propose the Matter to *S. J. B.* And yet in *Chap.* I. he had made the Form of Man to be divided only into three parts, the *Nepheesh*, *Ruach*, and *Neschamah*: And adds *Chap.* IV. that the Image is some fourth thing, which is neither the *Nepheesh*, nor the *Ruach*, nor yet

yet the *Neschamah*, but is call'd *Zelem*, of which I have spoken more above: When yet undoubtedly there is but one Soul *Nephef*, whose *Plastical* part, that is inseparable from it, is *Zelem*. But *Ruach* and *Neschamah* are only two of its States, the *Jetzirathick*, suppose, and *Briathick*, as *Chajah* is also the *Aziluthick*. But one and the same Soul in its *Afiathick* State is call'd *Nephef*; in its *Jetzirathick*, *Ruach*; in its *Briathick*, *Neschamah*, and in its *Aziluthick*, *Chajah*; Concerning which four States consult my *Exposition of Ezekiel's Vision*, or of the *Mercavah*.

Sect. 8. One vast entire Animal, &c. It is certainly either one huge Animal, or one monstrous Plant, *viz.* if it wants all manner of Sense; but since I have no certain Arguments that it doth want it, if any will adventure to call it an Animal, for me he may.

CHAP. XVI.

1. That Souls departed communicate Dreams. 2. Examples of Apparitions of Souls deceased. 3. Of Apparitions in fields where pitch'd Battels have been fought; as also of those in Church-yards, and other vaporous places. 4. That the Spissitude of the Air may well contribute to the easiness of the the appearing of Ghosts and Spectres. 5. A further proof thereof from sundry Examples. 6. Of Marfilus Ficinus his appearing after death. 7. With what sort of people such Examples as these avail little. 8. Reasons to perswade the unprejudiced that ordinarily those Apparitions that bear the shape and person of the deceased, are indeed the Souls of them.

1. **T**HE Examples of the other sort, *viz.* of the appearing of the Ghosts of men after Death, are so numerous and frequent in all mens mouths, that it may seem superfluous to particularize in any. This appearing is either by Dreams, or open Vision. In Dreams, as that which happened to *Avenzoar Albumaron*, an Arabian Physician, to whom his lately deceased friend suggested in his sleep a very soveraign Medicine for his sore Eyes. Like to this is that in * *Diodorus* concerning *Isis* Queen of *Egypt*, whom he reports to have communicated remedies to the *Egyptians* in their sleep after her death, as well as she did when she was alive. Of this kind is also that memorable story of † *Posidonius* the *Stoick*, concerning two young men of *Arcadia*, who being come to *Megara*, and lying the one at a Victuallers, the other in an Inn; he in the Inn, while he was asleep, dream'd that his Fellow-traveller earnestly desir'd him to come and help him, as being assaulted by the Victualler, and in danger to be kill'd by him: But he, after he was perfectly awake, finding it but a Dream, neglected it. But fallen asleep again, his murdered friend appeared to him the second time, beseeching him, that though he did not help him alive, yet he would see his Death revenged; telling him how the Victualler had cast his Body into a Dung-Cart, and that if he would get up timely in the morning, and watch at the Town-gate, he might thereby discover the murder: which he did accordingly, and so saw Justice

See Marfil.
Ficin. Theolog.
Platon. lib. 16.
cap. 5.
* Biblioth. Hi-
storic. lib. 1.
pag. 15.

† Marfil. Fi-
cin. Theolog.
Platon. lib. 16.
cap. 5.

Justice done on the Murderer. Nor does the first Dream make the second impertinent to our purpose: For as that might be from the strength of Imagination, and desire of help in the distressed *Arcadian*, impressed on the *Spirit of the World*, and so transmitted to his friend asleep, (a condition fittest for such communications) so it is plain, that this after his Death must fail, * if his Soul did either cease to be, or to act. And therefore it is manifest, that she both was, and did act, and suggested this Dream in revenge of the Murder. Of which kind there be infinite Examples, I mean of Murders discovered by Dreams, the Soul of the person murdered seeming to appear to some or other asleep, and to make his complaint to them.

Marfil. Ficin.
Theolog. Pla-
ton. lib. 16.
cap. 5.

But I will content my self only to add an Example of *Gratitude* to this of *Revenge*: As that of *Simonides*, who, lighting by chance on a dead Body by the Sea side, and, out of the sense of Humanity, bestowing Burial upon it, was requited with a Dream that saved his Life. For he was admonished to desist from his Voyage he intended by Sea, which the Soul of the deceased told him would be so perillous, that it would hazard the lives of the Passengers. He believ'd the Vision, and abstaining, was safe; those others that went, suffer'd Shipwreck.

2. We will adjoin only an Example or two of that other kind of *Visions*, which are ordinarily call'd the *Apparitions of the dead*. And such is that which *Pliny* relates at large in his Epistle to *Sura*, of an house haunted at *Athens*, and freed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher, after the Body of that person that appear'd to him was digg'd up, and interred with due Solemnity. It is not a thing unlikely, that most houses that are haunted, are so chiefly from the Souls of the deceased; who have either been murdered, or some way injured, or have some hid treasure to discover, or the like. And persons are haunted for the like causes, as well as houses; as *Nero* was after the murdering of his Mother; *Otho* pull'd out of his bed in the night by the Ghost of *Galba*. Such instances are infinite: as also those wherein the Soul of one's friend, suppose Father, Mother, or Husband, have appeared to give them good counsel, and to instruct them of the Event of the greatest affairs of their life. The Ghosts also of deceased Lovers have been reported to adhere to their Paramours after they had left their Bodies; taking all opportunities to meet them in Solitude, whether by day or by night.

3. There be also other more fortuitous occurrences of these deceas'd Spirits; of which one can give no account, unless it be, because they find themselves in a more easy capacity to appear. As haply it may be in Fields after great slaughters of Armies, and in publick Burial-places. Though some would ridiculously put off these *Apparitions*, by making them nothing but the reek or vapour of the Bodies of the dead, which they fancy will fall into the like stature and shape with the man it comes from: Which yet *Cardan* plays the fool in as well as *Vaninus*, and * others; as he does also in his account of those *Spectra* that appear so ordinary in † *Iseland*, where the Inhabitants meet their deceased friends in so lively an Image, that they salute them, and embrace them for the same persons; not knowing of their death, unless by their

* Gaffarel, his
unheard of
Curios. part 2.
chap. 5.
See my *Anti-*
dote, Book 3.
chap. 16.
sect. 2, 3.
† See *Cardan*
De Subilita-
te, lib. 18.

their sudden disappearing, or by after-information that they were then dead. This he imputes partly to the *Thickneſs* of the Air, and partly to the foul food and groſs ſpirits of the *Iſlanders*; and yet implies, that their fancies are ſo ſtrong, as to convert the thick vaporous Air into the compleat ſhape of their abſent and deceased acquaintance, and ſo perſwade themſelves that they ſee them, and talk with them; whenas it is nothing elſe but an Aiery Image made out by the power of their own Fancy, from the ragged rudiments of theſe thick flying vapours, as men ſanſy ſhapes in the broken clouds. But certainly it had been better flatly to have denied the Narration, than to give ſo flight and unprobable reaſon of the *Phænomenon*. For neither do ſuch viſible vaporous conſiſtencies near humane ſtature move near the Earth; nor, if they did, could men be miſtaken in an object ſo nigh at hand.

4. That the *Spiffitude* of the Air in that place may contribute ſomething to the frequency of theſe *ſpectra*, is rational enough. For it being more thick, it is the more eaſily reduc'd to a viſible conſiſtency: but muſt be ſhaped, not by the fancy of the Spectator, (for that were a monſtrous power) but by the Imagination of the Spirit that actuates its own Vehicle of that groſs Air. For the ſame reaſon alſo in other places, theſe *Apparitions* haply appear oftner in the Night than in the Day, the Air being more clammy and thick after the Sun has been ſome while down than before. To which alſo that cuſtom of the *Lappians*, a people of *Scandia*, ſeems ſomething to agree; who, as *Caspar Peucerus* relates, are very much haunted with Apparitions of their deceased friends. For which trouble they have no remedy but burying them under their Hearth. Which Ceremony can have no natural influence upon theſe *Lemures*, unleſs they ſhould thereby be engaged to keep in a warmer Air, and conſequently more rarefied, than if they were interred elſewhere. Or rather, becauſe their Bodies will ſooner putreſy by the warmth of the hearth; whenas otherwiſe the coldneſs of that Clime would permit them to be ſound a longer time, * and conſequently be fit for the Souls of the deceased to have recourſe to, and replenish their Vehicle with ſuch a *Cambium*, or gluſh moiſture, as will make it far eaſier to be commanded into a *viſible conſiſtence*.

5. That this facilitates their condition of *appearing*, is evident from that known recourſe theſe infeſtant Spirits have to their dead Bodies. As is notorious in the Hiſtory of *Cuntius*, which I have ſet down at large in my *Antidote*, as alſo in that of the *Sileſian* Shoe-maker and his Maid. To which you may add what * *Agrippa* writes out of the *Cretian Annals*, How there the *Catechanes*, that is, the *Spirits* of the deceased Husbands, would be very troubleſome to their Wives, and endeavour to lie with them, while they could have any recourſe to their dead Bodies. Which miſchief therefore was prevented by a Law, that if any Woman was thus infeſted, the Body of her Husband ſhould be burnt, and his Heart ſtruck through with a ſtake. Which alſo put a ſpeedy end to thoſe ſtirs and tragedies the Gholt of *Cuntius*, and thoſe others cauſ'd at *Penſch* and *Breſlaw* in *Sileſia*.

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See *Magica de ſpectris*, published by Henningus Groſius, lib. 1. ſect. 140.

Book 3. chap. 8, and 9. * *De occulta Philoſoph.* l. 3. cap. 41.

See *Magica
de Spectris*,
Henning.
Großii lib. 1.
sect. 184.

The like disquietnesses are reported to have happen'd in the year 1567, at *Trawtenaw*, a City of *Bohemia*, by one *Stephanus Hubener*, who was to admiration grown rich, as *Cuntius of Pentisch*, and, when he dy'd, did as much mischief to his fellow-Citizens. For he would ordinarily appear in the very shape he was when he was alive, and such as he met, would salute them with so close embraces, that he caused many to fall sick, and several to die by the unkind hugs he gave them. But burning his Body, rid the Town of the perilous occurrences of this malicious Goblin.

All which Instances do prove not only the *appearing* of Souls after they have left this life, but also that some thickning Matter, (such as may be got either from Bodies alive, or lately dead, or as fresh as those that are but newly dead, (as the Body of this *Hubener* was, tho' it had lien 20 weeks in the Grave,) or lastly, from thick vaporous Air,) may facilitate much their appearing, and so invite them to play tricks when they can do it at so cheap a rate; though they have little or no end in doing them, but the pleasing of their own, either ludicrous, or boisterous and domineering, humour.

6. But of any private person that ever appeared upon design after his death, there is none did upon a more noble one than that eximious Platonist *Marsilius Ficinus*; who, after a warm dispute of the Immortality of the Soul, having (as *Baronius* relates) made a solemn vow with his fellow-Platonist *Michael Mercatus*, that whether of them two dy'd first should appear to his friend, and give him certain information of that Truth; (it being his fate to die first, and indeed not long after this mutual resolution) was mindful of his promise when he had left the Body. For *Michael Mercatus* being very intent at his Studies betimes on a morning, heard an horse riding by with all speed, and observed that he stopped at his window: and there-with heard the voice of his friend *Ficinus* crying out aloud, *O Michael, Michael, vera, vera sunt illa*. Whereupon he suddenly opened the window, and espying *Marsilius* on a white Steed, called after him, but he vanish'd in his sight. He sent therefore presently to *Florence*, to know how *Marsilius* did; and understood that he dy'd about that hour he called at his window, to assure him of his own, and other mens Immortalities.

7. The Examples I have produced of the *appearing* of the Souls of men after death, considering how clearly I have demonstrated the *separability* of them from the Body, and their capacity of Vital Union with an *Aiery Vehicle*, cannot but have their due weight of Argument with them that are unprejudic'd. But as for those that have their minds enveloped in the dark mist of Atheism, that lazy and Melancholick saying which has dropt from the careless pen of that uncertain Writer *Cardan*, *Orbis magnus est, & ævum longum, & error ac timor multum in hominibus possunt*, will prevail more with them than all the Stories the same Author writes of *Apparitions*, or whatever any one else can add unto them. And others that do admit of these things, preconceptions from Education, that the Soul, when she departs this life, is suddenly either twitched up into the *Cælum Empyreum*, or hurried down headlong towards the Centre of the Earth, makes the

De subtil.
lib. 18.

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Apparitions of the Ghosts of men altogether incredible to them; they always substituting in their place some Angel or Devil, which must represent their persons, themselves being not at leisure to act any such part.

8. But *Misconceit* and *Prejudice*, though it may hinder the force of an Argument with those that are in that manner *entangled*, yet *Reason* cannot but take place with them that are *free*. To whom I dare appeal, whether (considering the *Aereal Vehicles* of Souls which are common to them with other *Genii*, so that whatever they are fancy'd to do in their stead, they may perform themselves; as also how congruous it is, that those persons that are most concerned, when it is in their power, should act in their own affairs, as in detecting the Murderer; in disposing their estate; in rebuking injurious Executors; in visiting and counselling their Wives and Children; in forewarning them of such and such courses, with other matters of like sort: to which you may add the profession of the Spirit thus appearing, of being the Soul of such an one, as also the similitude of person; and that all this ado is in things very just and serious, unfit for a Devil with that care and kindness to promote, and as unfit for a good *Genius*, it being below so noble a nature to tell a Lie, especially when the affair may be as effectually transacted without it;) I say, I dare appeal to any one, whether all these things put together, and rightly weigh'd, the violence of prejudice not pulling down the balance, it will not be certainly carried for the present Cause; and whether any indifferent Judge ought not to conclude, if these Stories that are so frequent every where, and in all Ages, concerning the Ghosts of men appearing, be but true; that it is true also that they are their Ghosts, and that therefore the Souls of men subsist and act after they have left these Earthly Bodies.

NOTES

On CHAP. XVI. Sect. 1.

IF his Soul did either cease to be, or to act, &c. For that the Spirit of Nature should impart so distinct, and in every respect such true Dreams, is not probable.

Sect. 4. And consequently be fit for the Souls of the deceas'd to have recourse to, &c. But since it is very little that the *Lemures*, or *Hobgoblins*, take from the dead Body, it may very well seem to be rather from a certain thickning Contagion, or *gluish moisture*, than from any just Plenty of the thick Matter, that these Hobgoblins frame to themselves visible Bodies; and also that it must be some such Quality or Contagion again, that can have a proper Influence upon the *Plastick* of the Soul of the deceased.

Sect. 8. To which you may add the Profession of the Spirit thus appearing, of being the Soul of such an one; as also the similitude of Person, &c. A certain late Patron of, and Champion for the Witches, vellicates, after his man-

manner, and impugnes this last Paragraph of the appearing of Souls after Death; as he doth also some other Places of my Writings, but truly very insipidly and unskilfully. But I easily pass by all, unworthy of any answer, that with an eager impertinence, through either Ignorance or Malevolence, he hath scribbled against any thing of mine; and pardon all for the sake of that one story he relates to us; which, with me, is of more value than all his whole Books besides; as what seems to be a mere (I want *Latin* Words whereby to express compendiously its Vanity and Insignificancy) *θεολογοφιλοσοφικοφλυαία*, a *Theological Philosophical Trifling*. But that Story, because so very fit and seasonable in this Place, I think highly worthy, in the briefest manner possible, to be here transcribed. And in short 'tis thus: About the Year of our Lord 1630, a young Woman, Kinswoman to one *Walker*, a Yeoman-man of good Estate, and a Widower, liv'd with him near *Chester in the Street*, (a Town between *Durham* and *New-Castle*) and kept his House: but being with Child by him, that the Matter might be conceal'd, she was, in an Evening, sent privately away with one *Mark Sharp*, a Collier. But after having been long wanting, she appear'd at length about Mid-night to one *James Graham*, a Miller, at his Mill about two Miles from the place where *Walker* liv'd, with her Hair about her Head all bloody, and with five large Wounds upon her Head. The Miller being much astonish'd with the Spectre, asked who it was; to which the Ghost reply'd, *I am the Spirit of that Woman that liv'd with Walker; who, after he had gotten me with Child, having promis'd that I should be well look'd to till I was brought in Bed, and well again; and that then I should come again and keep his House, he sent me away in secret one Evening with Mark Sharp the Collier, to a private Place, where I was to stay during my time of Child-bearing. But he, in the Way, upon a Moor (a place that the Miller well knew) slew me with a Pick, (such as Men dig Coals with) and gave me these five Wounds, and after threw my Body into the next Coal-pit; and hid the Pick, with his Shoes and Stockins, because he could not wash forth the Blood from them, in a Bank.* And the Apparition farther ordered the Miller to reveal the Matter to the Magistrate; which, unless he did, she would continually haunt him. The Miller notwithstanding forbore for some time; but wearied out, and affrighted with her frequent Appearances, he made the Magistrate at length acquainted with the whole: and, upon a diligent Search, all things were found done as the Spectre had related. The Body of the Woman was found in the Coal-pit, with five Wounds in the Head; and the Pick, with the Shoes and Stockins yet bloody, in the Bank. Upon this, to be short, *Walker* and *Sharp* are apprehended and imprisoned, and, at the next Assizes for the County, receiv'd Sentence of Death.

This is told for a most certain Truth by the Writer aforesaid; and to which he himself, though otherwise incredulous about Relations of this kind, gives an entire Belief. Who therefore since he so expressly denies the Devil ever to concern himself in things good or honest, I appeal to any unbiass'd Judge, what other Spirit this could be besides the Soul of the murder'd Woman: For neither would any good Angels, much less God himself, for the sake of any whatsoever, speak falsely,

faſſly, and ſay, I am the Spirit of this or that Woman, when it was either God himſelf, or ſome good Angel.

But now to own an *Aſtral Spirit* of a Woman, corporeal and mortal, and yet endued with Senſe and Memory, there can be nothing more awkward than any ſuch conceit, or more remote from all true Philoſophy and Reaſon. He that holds this, is ignorant plainly of the Nature of things material, and of the Faculties of Thinking or Remembering, of which Matter is altogether incapable. And he muſt have a Mind wholly ſtupid, or extremely careleſs and deſultory, that doth not intimately perceive, that 'tis the ſame thing in him that thinks, remembers, and reaſons: ſo that there can be nothing more monſtrous, than to make two Souls in Man, the one ſenſitive, the other rational, really diſtinct from one another; and to give the Name of *Aſtral Spirit* to the former; when there is in Man no *Aſtral Spirit* beſides the *Plaiſtick* of the Soul it ſelf, which is always inſeparable from that which is rational. Nor upon any other account can it be called *Aſtral*, but as it is liable to that corporeal Temperament which proceeds from the Stars, or rather from any natural Cauſes in general; as not being yet ſufficiently united with the *Divine Body*, that Vehicle of divine Virtue or Power.

But that it is the ſame Soul that thinks and underſtands, the Text of *Mofes* himſelf may farther confirm to us; where the Soul, which is breath'd into *Adam* by God, and which undoubtedly comprehends Reaſon in it, is call'd *the Breath of Life*, as containing in it the ſenſitive as well as rational Life. And that it contains in it the ſenſitive, is farther manifeſt from hence, that *Adam* is repreſented as a *Statue of Clay* before the Infuſion of this *Life*; but after it was thus infus'd, there's none in his right Wits that will deny it to have had Senſe, eſpecially ſince the very Text affirms, that, upon this Breathing, or Infuſion, *Adam became a living Soul*; which Term is given alſo by *Mofes* unto *Gen. chap. 1.* the Brute Animals. But there is the leſs need of enlarging upon theſe things here, becauſe I have elſewhere diſcourſed of them. It is manifeſt therefore, partly from the very Conceſſions of the Adverſary, and partly from Philoſophy, and the Holy Scriptures, that the *Spirit* which appeared to the Miller, was both the rational and the ſenſitive Soul together (which is but one and the ſame Soul in reality) of the murdered Woman, and not her *Aſtral Spirit*. Which is but the mere figment of ſome fanciful and diſtemper'd Perſons, no true Phænomenon in the nature of things.

And let this be ſaid in a way of Philoſophy upon the Story before recited. But for the farther Confirmation of the Narrative, it will not be amiſs to add, that I have likewiſe underſtood from a friend of mine, a prudent and learned Perſon, and one alſo that is no careleſs Inquirer into theſe Matters, and that from Authors highly worthy of Credit, and who were preſent at the ſaid Aſſizes, viz. Mr. *William Lumly*, *Walker's* next Neighbour, and Mr. *James Smart* of *Durham*, that the Story is moſt certainly true; that a Matter of ſo great a moment may not depend upon the ſingle Credit of *Webſter*, who was not preſent at the Aſſizes: And I do purpoſely paſs over many others who heard the thing only by report. It is alſo added by Mr.

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ducism. Tri-
umphat. Ac-
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Lumly, that the Name of the Woman that was murder'd was *Anne Walker*; and that the Spectre so haunted the Miller, that the Clothes were almost every Night pluck'd off from him, until he had disclos'd the Business: And by Mr. *Smart*, that one *Fairhair* gave it in Evidence upon Oath in open Court, that he saw the Likeness of a Child stand upon *Walker's* Shoulders during the time of the Trial: At which time *Smart* observed the Judge to be very much troubled; and he gave Sentence that Night the Trial was; a thing never us'd in *Durham* before nor after. I believe the Apparition of the little Child upon *Walker's* Shoulders gave the Occasion to a Report, that the Spectre of the Woman her self appear'd at those Assizes: Of which *Webster* makes mention, yet as of a Matter that he was less certain in; being the mean while most absolutely assured of all the rest. Whether that Likeness of a Child was the Ghost of the Infant murdered with its Mother in the Womb, I leave to the Disquisition of others.

But for the Ghosts of adult Persons deceas'd, there are so many fresh and late Stories, partly here in *England*, and partly in *Ireland*, that I should be over-tedious if I should relate them all. The first is of Mrs. *Bretton*, who appear'd after Death to her Servant, ordering her to go and mind her Brother of restoring a piece of Ground that belonged to the Poor: Which she did with such a certain Token of having had Discourse with her dead Mistress, that the Ground was immediately restor'd, and the Poor enjoy it at this Day. For this thing happen'd almost Twenty Years ago. Another is of a certain murder'd Person, who appear'd after the same manner he was wounded (as *Ann Walker* did to the Miller) to his Wife and Son in different Places, but about the same Hour of the Day; and discover'd to his Wife both the Murderer, and the Place also where he had bestow'd his Body. A Third, of a Daughter who, immediately after Death, appear'd to her Father; having agreed with him, that whichever of them dy'd first, they should, if possible, appear unto the other. And from this Apparition of his Daughter, he knew her to be dead, although in a Place many Miles distant; and told the same to his Family two Days before the Messenger arriv'd. A Fourth, concerning a Soul newly departed from the Body, and rushing between two Persons clap'd together by their Arms, as they were walking next the Wall, and throwing both with Violence upon the Ground. I had this Account from one of the very Persons concerned in the Misfortune. The Fifth, of a certain Brother deceas'd putting his living Brother in mind, as he was going to Bed, of paying some Money that he had promis'd to a Friend. A Sixth, of a certain Person who, seven Years after his Death, brought help to one as well by Deed as Counsel, that was grievously infested with Hobgoblins. This haunted Person he himself that told me, and several others at Table, the whole Matter, one highly worthy of Credit, saw carried in the Air above Mens Shoulders. And now lastly, a Seventh, of one *Haddock*, who appeared first in the Shape of a Horseman to another as he was riding, and ask'd if he knew him, for he drank with him in such a Place. This other Person soon own'd him for *Haddock*; but added, that he was dead. This dead Person then communicated some things to him,

him, and told him, that unless he would impart the same to his Wife, and some others concern'd, he would continually trouble him; and did it under various shapes till the other had observed his Orders. I have the full Narratives of almost all these by me: but it would be too much to transcribe them at large here, and as troublesome perhaps to the Reader as my self. But they are such as very clearly shew, that the Souls of the Deceas'd do sometimes appear after Death; their very Souls, I say, themselves, and not their *Astral Spirits*; a Dream that can become none but such as are *Frantick*, or *Planet-stricken*.

C H A P. XVII.

1. The Preeminence of Arguments drawn from Reason above those from Story.
2. The first step towards a Demonstration of Reason, that the Soul acts out of her Body, for that she is an Immaterial Substance separable therefrom.
3. The second, That the immediate Instruments for Sense, Motion, and Organization of the Body, are certain subtile and tenuous Spirits.
4. A comparison betwixt the Soul in the Body and the Aereal Genii.
5. Of the nature of Dæmons from the account of Marcus the Eremite, and how the Soul is presently such, having once left this Body.
6. An Objection concerning the Souls of Brutes: to which is answered, First, by way of concession; 7. Secondly, by confuting the Arguments for the former concession.
8. That there is no rational doubt at all of the Humane Soul acting after death.
9. A further Argument of her activity out of this Body, from her Conflicts with it while she is in it.
10. As also from the general hope and belief of all Nations, that they shall live after death.

1. **B**UT we proceed now to what is less subject to the evasions and misinterpretations of either the *Profane* or *Superstitious*. For none but such as will profess themselves mere Brutes, can cast off the Decrees and Conclusions of Philosophy and Reason; though they think that in things of this nature they may, with a great deal of applause and credit, refuse the testimony of other mens Senses, if not of their own: all *Apparitions* being with them nothing but the strong surprisals of *Melancholy* and *Imagination*. But they cannot, with that ease nor credit, silence the Deductions of Reason, by saying it is but a *Fallacy*, unless they can shew the *Sophism*; which they cannot do, where it is not.

2. To carry on therefore our present Argument in a rational way, and by degrees; we are first to consider, That (according as already has been clearly * demonstrated) there is a Substance in us which is ordinarily called *the Soul*, really distinct from the Body, (for otherwise, how can it be a Substance?) And therefore it is really and locally separable from the Body. Which is a very considerable step towards what we aim at.

3. In the next place we are to take notice, That the *immediate Instruments* of the Soul are those tenuous and aereal particles, which they

* Chap. 8, 9. ordinarily call the * *Spirits*; that these are they by which the Soul hears, sees, feels, imagines, remembers, reasons, and by moving which, or at least directing their motion, she moves likewise the Body; and by using them, or some subtile Matter like them, she either compleats, or at least contributes to the Body's Organization. For that the Soul should be the the *Vital Architect* of her own house, that close connexion and sure possession she is to have of it, distinct and secure from the invasion of any other particular Soul, seems no slight Argument. And yet that while she is exercising that Faculty, she may have a more than ordinary Union, or Implication with the *Spirit of Nature*, or the *Soul of the World*, so far forth as it is *Plastick*, seems not unreasonable: and therefore is asserted by *Plotinus*; and may justly be suspected to be true, if we attend to the prodigious effects of the Mother's Imagination derived upon the Infant, which sometimes are so very great, that, unless she raised the *Spirit of Nature* into consent, they might well seem to exceed the power of any Cause. I shall abstain from producing any Examples till the proper place: in the mean time I hope I may be excus'd from any rashness in this assignation of the Cause of those many and various Signatures found in Nature, so plainly pointing at such a Principle in the World as I have intimated

* Chap. 10. * before. M. to ... sdt ... enorm ...

sect. 7.

4. But to return, and cast our eye upon the Subject in hand. It appears from the two precedent Conclusions, That the Soul, considered as invested immediately with this *tenuous Matter* we speak of, which is her inward Vehicle, has very little more difference from the *Aereal Genii*, than a man in a Prison from one that is free. The one can only see, and suck Air through the Grates of the Prison, and must be annoy'd with all the stench and unwholsome fumes of that sad habitation; whereas the other may walk, and take the fresh air where he finds it most commodious and agreeable.

This difference there is betwixt the *Genii* and an *incorporated Soul*. The *Soul*, as a man fallen into a deep pit, (who can have no better Water, nor Air, nor no longer enjoyment of the Sun, and his cheerful light and warmth, than the measure and quality of the pit will permit him) so she once immured in the Body, cannot enjoy any better *Spirits* (in which all her life and comfort consists) than the constitution of the Body, after such circuits of concoction, can administer to her. But those *Genii* of the Air, who possess their Vehicles upon no such hard terms, if themselves be not in fault, may, by the power of their minds, accommodate themselves with more pure and impolluted Matter, and such as will more easily conspire with the noblest and divinest functions of their Spirit.

In brief therefore, if we consider things aright, we cannot abstain from strongly surmising, that there is no more difference betwixt a Soul and an *aereal Genii*, than there is betwixt a Sword in the scabbard and one out of it: and that a Soul is but a *Genius* in the Body, and a *Genius* a Soul out of the Body; as the Ancients also have defin'd, giving the same name, as well as nature, promiscuously to them both, by calling them both *Genii*, as I have elsewhere noted.

See Chap. 8.
sect. 13.

5. This

5. This is very consonant to what * *Michael Pfellus* sets down, from * See his the singular knowledge and experience of *Marcus* the Eremit, in these *περὶ ἐργείας* matters; who describes the nature of these *δαίμονες*, as being through- *δαίμονων* out *Spirit* and *Air*; whence they hear, and see, and feel in every part of their Body. Which he makes good by this reason, and wonders at the ignorance of men that do not take notice of it, *viz.* τὸ μὴδὲ τίνα τῶν ὀστέων ἢ νεύρων εἶναι τὸ αἰστανόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τέτοις ἐνυπάρχον πνεῦμα, that it is neither Bones, nor Nerves, nor any gross or visible part of the Body, or of any Organ thereof, whereby the Soul immediately exercises the functions of Sense; but that it is the Spirits that are her nearest and inmost instrument of these operations: Of which, when the Body is depriv'd, there is found no Sense in it, though the gross Organs and parts are in their usual consistency, as we see in *Syncope*s and *Apoplexies*. Which plainly shews, that the immediate Vehicle of Life are the *Spirits*, and that the Soul's connexion with the Body is by these; as the most learned Physicians do conclude with one consent. Whence it will follow, that this *Vinculum* being broke, the Soul will be free from the Body, and will as naturally be carried out of the corrupt carcass that now has no harmony with the Soul, into that Element that is more congenerous to her, the vital Air, as the Fire will mount upwards; as I have * already noted. And so Principles of Life being fully kin- * Chap. 13. dled in this thinner Vehicle, she being as compleat for Sense and Acti- sect. 5. on, as any other Inhabitants of these Aiery regions.

6. There is only one perverse Objection against this so easy and natural Conclusion, which is this; That by this manner of reasoning, the Souls of Brutes, especially those of the perfecter sort, will also not only subsist, (for that difficulty is concocted pretty well already) but also live and enjoy themselves after death. To which I dare boldly answer, That it is a thousand times more resonable that they do, than that the Souls of Men do not. Yet I will not confidently assert that they do, or do not; but will lightly examine each Hypothesis. And first, by way of feigned concession, we will say, They do; and take notice of the Reasons that may induce one to think so. Amongst which two prime ones are those involved in the Objection, That they do subsist after death; and, That the immediate instrument of their Vital Functions are their Spirits, as well as in Man. To which we may add, That for the present we are fellow-inhabitants of one and the same Element, subject to the same fate of Fire, Deluges, and Earthquakes. That it is improbable that the vast space of Air and Æther, that must be inhabited by living Creatures, should have none but of one sort, that is, the Angels or *Genii*, good or bad. For it would seem as great a solitude as if Men alone were the Inhabitants of the Earth, or Mermaids of the Sea. That the periods of *Vital Congruity*, wound up in the Nature of their Souls, by that eternal Wisdom that is the Creatress of all things, may be shorter or longer, according as the property of their essence and relation to the Universe requires; and that so their Descents and Returns may be accordingly swifter or slower. That it is more conformable to the Divine goodness to be so than otherwise, if their natures will permit it: And that their existence would be in vain, while they were de-

prived of vital operation when they may conveniently have it. That they would be no more capable of Salvation in the other state, than they are here of Conversion. That the intellectual Inhabitants of the Air, having also external and corporeal Sense, variety of Objects would do as well there, as here amongst us on Earth. * Besides, that Histories seem to imply, as if there were such kind of Aereal Animals amongst them, as Dogs, Horses, and the like. And therefore to be short, that the Souls of Brutes cease to be alive after they are separate from this Body, can have no other reason than *Immortality*, the Mother of *Ignorance*, (that is, nothing but narrowness of spirit, out of over-much self-love, and contempt of other Creatures) to embolden us so confidently to adhere to so groundless a Conclusion.

7. This Position makes indeed a plausible shew, insomuch that if the Objection drove one to acknowledge it for Truth, he might seem to have very little reason to be ashamed of it. But this Controversy is not so easily decided. For though it be plain, that the Souls of Beasts be Substances really separable from their Bodies; yet if they have but one *Vital congruity*, namely, the *Terrestrial* one, they cannot recover life in the Air. But their having one or two, or more Vital congruities, wholly depends upon his wisdom and counsel that has made all things. Besides, the Souls of Brutes seem to have a more passive nature than to be able to manage or enjoy this escape of Death, that free and commanding Imagination belonging to us, as also Reminiscency. But Brutes have only a passive Imagination, and bare Memory; which failing them in all likelihood in the ship-wreck of their Body, if they could live in the Air, they would begin the World perfectly on a new score, which is little better than Death: so that they might, in this sense, be rightly deemed mortal. Our being Co-inhabitants of the same element, the Earth, proves nothing: for, by the same reason, Worms and Fleas should live out of their Bodies, and Fishes should not, who, notwithstanding their shape, it may be, a little changed (for there is no necessity that these creatures, in their Aairy Vehicles, should be exactly like themselves in their Terrestrial ones) might act and live in the more moist tracts of the Air.

As for the supposed solitude that would be in the Air, it reaches not this matter. For in the lower Regions thereof the various Objects of the Earth and Sea will serve the turn. The winding up of those several circuits of *Vital Congruity* may indeed pass for an ingenious invention, as of a thing possible in the Souls of Brutes: but, as the Schools say well, *A posse ad esse non valet consequentia*. As for that Argument from *Divine Goodness*, it not excluding his Wisdom, which attempts it self to the nature of things, and we not knowing the nature of the Souls of Brutes so perfectly as we do our own, we cannot so easily be assured from thence what will be in this case. A Musician strikes not all strings at once; neither is it to be expected that every thing in Nature at every time should act: but when it is its turn, then touched upon it will give its sound; in the interim it lies silent. And so it may be with the Souls of Brutes for a time, especially when the vital temper of Earth and Air and Sea shall fail;
yea

yea and at other times too, if none but Intellectual Spirits be fit to manage *Aereal Vehicles*.

I confess indeed, that Salvation can no more belong to the Souls of Brutes than Conversion; but that is as true of the Souls of Plants, (if they have any distinct from the *Universal Spirit of Nature*) but yet it does not prove, that the Souls of Vegetables shall live and act in *Aiery Vehicles*, after an Herb or Tree is dead and rotten here. To that of conveniency of variety of Objects for the *Aiery Inhabitants* I have answered already. And for the Apparitions of Horses, Dogs, and the like, they may be the transformation of the *Aereal Genii* into these shapes: Which, though it be a sign that they would not abhor from the use and society of such Aerial Animals, if they had them; yet they may the better want them, they being able so well themselves to supply their places.

We will briefly therefore conclude, that from the mere light of Reason it cannot be infallibly demonstrated, That the Souls of Brutes do not live after death; nor that it is any Incongruity in Nature to say they do. Which is sufficient to enervate the present Objection.

8. But for the life and activity of the Souls of Men out of this Body, all things go on hand-smooth for it, without any check or stop. For we finding the *Aerial Genii* so exceeding near-a-kin to us in their Faculties, we being both *intellectual Creatures*, and both using the same immediate Instrument of Sense and Perception, to wit, *Aerial Spirits*, infomuch that we can scarce discover any other difference betwixt us, than there is betwixt a man that is naked, and one clad in gross thick cloathing; it is the most easy and natural inference that can be, to conclude, that, when we are separate from the Body, and are invested only in Air, that we shall be just like them, and have the same life and activity they have. For though a Brute fall short of this Privilege, it ought to be no disheartning to us; because there is a greater cognation betwixt the *Intellectual Faculties* and the *Aiery* or *Aethereal Vehicle*, than there is betwixt such Vehicles, and those more low and sensual powers common to us with Beasts. And we find, in taking the fresh air, that the more fine and pure our *Spirits* are, our thoughts become the more noble and divine, and the more purely intellectual.

Nor is the step greater upwards than downwards: For seeing that what in us is so *Divine* and *Angelical* may be united with the body of a *Brute*, (for such is the Earthly clothing) why may not the Soul, notwithstanding her *Terrestrial Congruity* of life, (which, upon new occasions, may be easily conceived to surcease from acting) be united with the Vehicle of an *Angel*? So that there is no puzzle at all concerning the Soul of Man, but that, immediately upon Death, she may associate her self with those Aerial Inhabitants, the *Genii* or *Angels*.

9. Which we may still be the better assur'd of, if we consider how we have such Faculties in us as the Soul finds entangled and fettered, clouded and obscured by her fatal residence in this prison of the Body. Infomuch that, so far as it is lawful, she falls out with it for those incommodations that the most confirmed brutish health brings usually upon her. How her Will tuggs against the impurity of the
Spirits

Spirits that stir up bestial Passions, (that are notwithstanding the height and flower of other Creatures enjoyments) and how many times her whole life upon Earth is nothing else but a perpetual warfare against the results of her union with this lump of Earth that is so much like to other terrestrial Animals. Whence it is plain she finds her self in a wrong condition, and that she was created for a better and purer state; which she could not attain to, unless she lived out of the Body: which she does in some sort in *divine Ecstasies* and *Dreams*; in which case she making no use of the Body's Organs, but of the purer Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, she acts as it were by her self, and performs some prelude Exercises, conformable to those in her Aëry Vehicle.

10. Add unto all this, that *the Immortality of the Soul* is the common, and therefore natural, hope and expectation of all Nations; there being very few so barbarous as not to hold it for a Truth: though, it may be, as in other things, they may be something ridiculous in the manner of expressing themselves about it; as that they shall retire after Death to such a Grove or Wood, or beyond such a Hill, or unto such an Island, such as was *Δρόμος Ἀχιλλέως*, the Island where *Achilles* his Ghost was conceived to wander, or the *Insula Fortunata*, the noted *Elysium* of the Ancients. And yet, it may be, if we should tell these of the *Cælum Eympyreum*, and compute the height of it, and distance from the Earth, and how many solid Orbs must be glided through before a Soul can come thither; these simple Barbarians would think as oddly of the *Scholastick* Opinion, as we do of theirs: and it may be some more judicious and sagacious Wit will laugh at us both alike.

It is sufficient, that in the main all Nations in a manner are agreed that there is an *Immortality* to be expected, as well as that there is a *Deity* to be worshipped; though ignorance of circumstances makes Religion vary, even to Monstrosity, in many parts of the world. But both Religion, and the belief of the Reward of it, which is a blessed state after Death, being so generally acknowledged by all the Inhabitants of the Earth; it is a plain Argument that it is true, according to the Light of Nature. And not only because they believe so, but because they do so seriously either desire it, or are so horribly afraid of it, if they offend much against their Consciences: which Properties would not be in men so universally, if there were no Objects in Nature answering to these Faculties, as I have elsewhere argued in the like case.

Antidote,
Book I. ch. 10.
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On CHAP. XVII. Sect. 6.

BESIDES that Histories seem to imply, as if there were such kind of Aerial Animals amongst them as Dogs, &c. As to Aerial Chariots, and Horsemen more especially, there are so many Relations deliver'd down to us both by Fame and Writing, that it would be endless to repeat

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CH A P. XVIII.

1. That the Faculties of our Souls, and the nature of the immediate Instrument of them, the Spirits, do so nearly symbolize with those of Demons, that it seems reasonable, if God did not on purpose hinder it, that they would not fail to act out of this earthly Body.
2. Or if they would, his Power and Wisdom could easily implant in their essence a double or triple Vital Congruity, to make all sure.
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11. A more particular enforcement of

of that Argument, and who they are upon whom it will work least. 12. That the Noblest and most Vertuous Spirit is the most assurable of the Soul's Immortality.

1. **B**UT finally to make all sure, let us contemplate the Nature of God, who is the Author and Maker of all things, according to whose Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, all things were created, and are ever ordered, and let us take special notice how many steps towards this Immortality we now treat of, are impressed upon the very nature of the Soul already; and then seriously consider, if it be possible that the Sovereign Deity should stop there, and go no further, when there are so great Reasons, if we understand any thing, that He perfect our expectations. For we have already clearly demonstrated, That the Soul of Man is a Substance actually * separable from the Body; and that all her Operations and Functions are immediately performed, not by those parts of the Body that are of an earthly and gross consistency, but by what is more Aerial or Ætherial, the Vital and * Animal Spirits; which are very congenerous to the Vehicles of the Angels or Genii. Infomuch that if the Divine power did but leave Nature to work of it self, it might seem very strange, considering those Divine and Intellectual Faculties in us, (as conformable to the Essences or Souls of Angels, as our Animal Spirits are to their Vehicles) if it would not be an immediate sequel of this Privilege, that our Souls, once separate from the Body, should act and inform the Air they are in with like facility that other Genii do, there being so very little difference betwixt both their natures.

* Chap. 2, 3,
4, 5, 6.

* Chap. 8, 9.

2. Or if one single *Plastick* power, in a Subject so near a-kin to these Aerial people, will not necessarily suffice for both states, certainly it must be a very little addition that will help out: and how easy is it for that Eternal Wisdom to contrive a double or triple Vital Congruity, to wit, *Aerial* and *Ætherial*, as well as *Terrestrial*, in such an Essence, whose Faculties and Properties do so plainly symbolize with those purer Inhabitants of both the *Æther* and *Air*?

3. But this is not all we have to say. For if there be one thing more precious in the Deity than another, we shall have it all as a sure and infallible pledge of this present Truth, *That our Souls will not fall to prove Immortal*. And for my own part, I know nothing more precious in the Godhead than his *Veracity*, *Justice*, and *Goodness*; and all these Three will assure us and secure us, that we shall sustain no loss or damage by our departure out of these Earthly Bodies, in either Life or Essence. For it were a very high reproach to that Attribute of God which we call his *Veracity*, he so plainly and universally promising to all the Nations of the World, where there is any Religion at all, a happy state after this life; if there should in reality be no such thing to be expected. For he does not only connive at the Error, if it be one, by not declaring himself against it, (as any upright person would, if another should take upon him, in his presence or hearing, to tell others that he intended to bestow such and such gifts and revenues upon them, when there was no such matter :) but he has, as a man may say, on set purpose indued men with extraordinary

nary parts and powers, to set this Opinion on foot in the Earth; all *Prophets* and *Workers of Miracles* that have appeared in the world, having one way or other assured to Mankind this so weighty Truth. And the most *Noble* and *Vertuous* Spirits in all Ages have been the most prone to believe it. And this not only out of a sense of their own Interest; but any one that ever had the happiness to experience these things may observe, That the Clearness and Purity of temper that most consists with the love and admiration of God and Vertue, and all those divine Accomplishments that even those that never could attain to them, give their highest approbation of, I say, that this more refined temper of Mind does of it self beget a wonderful proneness, if not a necessity, of presuming of the Truth of this Opinion we plead for. And therefore if it be not true, God has laid a train in Nature, that the most Vertuous and Pious men shall be the most sure to be deceived: Which is a contradiction to his Attribute of *Veracity*.

4. Nor can the strength of this Argument be evaded by replying, That God may deceive men for their good, as Parents do their Children; and therefore his *Wisdom* may contrive such a natural Error as this, to be serviceable for States and Politicks, to keep the People in awe, and so render them more faithful and governable. I must confess, that there does result from this divine Truth such an *Usefulness*, by the by, for the better holding together of Commonweals: But to think that this is the main use thereof, and that there is nothing more in it than so, is as Idiotical and Childish as to conclude, that, because the Stars, those vast lights, do some small offices for us by Night, that therefore that is all the meaning of them, and that they serve for nothing else.

Besides, there is no Father would tell a Lie to his Child, if he were furnish'd with Truth as effectual for his purpose; and if he told any thing really good, as well as desirable to his Child, to induce him to Obedience, if it lay in his power, he would be sure to perform his promise. But it is in the power of God to make good whatever he has propounded for reward; nor need he make use of any falshood in this matter. Wherefore, if he do, he has less *Veracity* than an ordinary honest man; which is *blasphemous*, and *contradictory* to the nature of the Deity.

5. Again upon point of *Justice*, God was engaged to contrive the Nature and Order of things so, that the Souls of Men may live after death, and that they may fare according to their behaviour here upon earth. For the Godhead, as the Philosopher calls him, is *Νόμος* *ἰσχυρὸς*, and does immutably and inevitably distribute Justice, both *Reward* and *Punishment*, in the world. But how difficult a thing it is to be good, and to live according to Vertue, the common practice and complaint of all men do confess with one consent; and that it is exceeding hard to perswade any one to do that violence to their own natures, as to endeavour after a due degree and right sense of Vertue, (for Craft and Policy are easy enough, and other things there are that, set against the contrary Vices, look like Vertues, but are not :) But to perswade to those that truly are, is, I say, exceeding hard,

hard, if not impossible, without the inculcation of this grand concernment, *the State of the Soul after Death*, and the *Reward* that will then follow a *Vertuous* life. Of which hopes, if we be frustrated by the Soul's Mortality, we are defrauded of our Reward, and God of the honour of *Justice*.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be enervated by either that high pretension of *Stoicism*, *That Vertue to it self is a sufficient reward*; or that the very hopes of this Immortality, it being accompanied with so much joy, tranquillity, and contentment, will countervail all the pain and trouble of either acquiring or keeping close to Vertue once acquired. For as for the first, it is one thing to talk high, and another thing to practise. And for my own part, I think in the main, that *Epicurus*, who placed the chiefest good in *Pleasure*, philosophiz'd more solidly than the paradoxical *Stoicks*. For questionless that is that which all men ought to drive at, if they had the true notion of it, and knew wherein to place it, or could arrive to the purest and most warrantable Sense of it. But there can be no *Pleasure*, (without a perfect Miracle) while our Spirits are disturbed and vitiated by sordid and contemptible Poverty, by Imprisonments, Sickneses, Tortures, ill Diet, and a number of such Adversities, that those that are the most exactly Vertuous have been in all Ages most liable to. Besides, the Care and sollicitude of perpetually standing upon their guard, the stings of Calumny and Defamation, and a continual vexation to see the baseness and vileness of mens tempers, and ugly oblique transactions of affairs in the world. Which inquietudes cannot be avoided by any other remedy but what is as ill as the disease, or worse, (it being altogether incompetent to a true *Heroical* tenour of mind,) I mean their *Stoical Apathy*; of which the best that can be said is, that it is a kind of constant and safe piece of fullness, stating us only in the condition of those that are said to have neither won nor lost: So poor a reward is persecuted and distressed Vertue of it self, without the hope of future Happiness.

7. But to say, the Hope thereof without Enjoyment is a sufficient compensation, is like that mockery *Plutarch* records of *Dionysius* towards a Fidler, whom he caused to play before him, promising him a reward; but when he demanded it of him for his pains, deny'd it him, or rather said, that it was paid already, putting him off with this jest, ὅσον χρέον εὐφραίνες ἄδων, τοσῶτον ἔχαιρες ἐλπίζων, i. e. *So long as you pleased me with playing, so long you rejoiced your self, hoping after the reward; so that you are sufficiently paid already.* Which piece of injurious mirth may be passable in a ludicrous matter, and from a Tyrant, where height of Fortune makes proud and forgetful Mortality condemn their inferiours: But in a thing of this nature, that concerns not only this transient life, but the sempiternal duration of the Soul, *Injustice* there is unspeakably grievous; and so much the more harsh and uncomely, if we consider that it is supposed to be committed, not by a frail earthly Potentate, (the height of whose honours may make him regardless of smaller affairs and meaner persons,) but by the God of Heaven, who can with the like ease attend all things as he can any one thing; and who is perfectly and immutably just, not do-
ing

ing nor omitting any thing by changeable humours, as it happens in vain Men, but ever acting according to the transcendent Excellency and Holiness of his own Nature.

8. Neither is *Divine Justice* engaged only to reward, but also to punish; which cannot be, unless the Souls of men subsist after Death. For there are questionless many thousands that have committed most enormous Villanies, persecuted the Good, taking away their possessions, liberties, or lives, adding sometimes most barbarous tortures and reproachful abuses; and in all this highly gratified their covetousness, ambition, and revenge; nay, it may be the bestial ferocity of their own spirits, that have pleas'd themselves exceedingly to bring the truly religious into disgrace, and have laughed at all vertuous actions as the fruits of Ignorance and Folly; and yet for all this have dy'd in peace on their beds, after their Lives have been as thick set with all sensual enjoyments of Honour, Riches, and Pleasure, as their Story is with Frauds, Rapines, Murders, Sacrileges, and whatever crimes the impious boldness of lawless persons will venture on.

9. Such things as these happen proportionably through all the ranks and orders of men. Nor is it sufficient to reply, that their own Consciences, as so many Furies, do lash them and scorch them in this life: For we speak of inveterate and successful wickedness, where that Principle is utterly laid asleep; or, if it at any time wake and cry, the noise of the affairs of the world, and hurry of business, and continual visits of friends and flatterers, false instructions of covetous Priests, or mercenary Philosophers, (who, for gain, will impudently corrupt and pervert both the Light of Nature and Sense of Religion,) the sound and clatter of these, I say, will so possess the ear of the prosperously wicked, that the voice of Conscience can be no more heard in this continual tumult, than the vagient Cries of the Infant *Jupiter* amidst the rude shuffles and dancings of the *Cretick Corybantes*, and the tinckling and clashing of their brazen Targets. And therefore if there be no Life hereafter, the worst of men have the greatest share of happiness, their passions and affections being so continually gratified, and that to the height, in those things that are so agreeable, and, rightly circumstantiated, allowable to humane Nature: such as are the sweet reflexion on the success of our political management of the affairs of the World; the general tribute of Honour and respect for our Policy and Wit, and that ample testimony thereof, our acquisitions of Power or Riches; that great satisfaction of foiling and bearing down our Enemies, and obliging and making sure our more serviceable Friends; to which finally you may add all the variety of Mirth and Pastime that flesh and blood can entertain it self with, from either *Musick, Wine, or Women*.

10. Thirdly and lastly, The Mortality of the Soul is not only inconsistent with the *Veracity* and *Justice* of God, but also with his *Goodness*, the most sovereign and sacred Attribute in the Deity, and which alone is enough to demonstrate, *That the Soul of Man cannot perish in Death*. For suppose that God had made no promise to us, either by any extraordinary Prophet, or by the suggestion of our own natural Faculties, that we shall be Immortal; and that there was neither

Merit, nor Demerit in this life, so that all plea from either the Divine Veracity or Justice were quite cut off; his Goodness alone (especially if we consider how capable the Soul is of after-subsistence) is a sufficient assurance that we shall not fail to live after Death. For how can that sovereign Goodness, assisted by an Omnipotent Knowledge, fail to contrive it so; it being so infinitely more conformable to His Transcendent Bounty to ordain thus than otherwise? that is to say, so soon as he created the World, to make it so compleat, as at once to bring into Being not only all Corporeal Substance, (according as all men confess he did) but also all Substances Immaterial or Incorporeal, and as many of them as can partake of Life, and of enjoyment of themselves and the Universe, to set them upon living and working in all places and Elements that their Nature is able to operate in; and therefore, amongst other Beings of the Intellectual Order, to ordain that the Souls of men also, wherever they were, or ever should be, especially if it were not long of themselves, should have a power of Life and Motion, and that no other Nemesis should follow them than what they themselves lay the trains of; nor this to utter annihilation, but by way of chastisement or punishment: and that they being of so multifarious a nature, as to have such Faculties as are nearly a-kin to Brutes, as well as such as have so close an affinity with those of the Aereal Genii and Celestial Angels, their Vital Congruity should be as multifarious, and themselves made capable of a living Union with either Celestial, Aerial, or Terrestrial Vehicles; and that the leaving of one should be but the taking up of another, so long as the Elements continue in their natural temper, and as soon as the Laws of Generation will permit.

II. These, and a long series of other things consonant to these, represent themselves to their view that have the favour of beholding the more hidden treasures of the Divine Benignity. But they being more than the present occasion requires, I shall content my self with what precisely touches the matter in hand, which is, That the Soul of man being capable to act after this Life in an Aereal Vehicle, as well as here in an Earthly; and it being better that she do live and act, than that she be idle and silent in death; and it depending merely upon the Will of God, whether she shall or no; He ordering the natures of things infallibly according to what is best, must of necessity ordain that the Souls of men live and act after death. This is an unavoidable Deduction of Reason to those that acknowledge the Being of God, and rightly relish that transcendent Attribute in the Divine Nature. For those that have a true sense thereof, can as hardly deny this Conclusion, as the Existence of the Deity. Nor can they ever be perswaded, that He who is so perfectly Good in himself, and to whom they have so long adhered in faithful obedience and amorous devotion, has made them of such a nature, that when they hope most to enjoy him, they shall not be able to enjoy him at all, nor any thing else; as not being in a capacity to act but in an Earthly Body. But to those that be of a mere animal temper, that relish no love but that of themselves, and their own interest, nor care for any but those that are serviceable to them, and make for their profit, these being prone

prone to judge of God according to the vileness of their own Spirit, will easily conceit, that God's care of us, and tenderness over us, is only proportionable to the fruit he reaps by us; which is just none at all.

12. And therefore this Argument especially, and also the Two former, though they be undeniable Demonstrations in themselves, yet they requiring a due resentment of Morality, that is, of *Veracity*, *Justice*, and *Goodness*, in him that is to be perswaded by them; it will follow, that those whose Minds are most blinded and debased by Vice, will feel least the force of them; and the *Noblest* and most *Generous Spirit* will be the *most firmly assured of the Immortality of the Soul*.


THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

1. *Why the Author treats of the state of the Soul after Death, and in what Method.* 2. *Arguments to prove that the Soul is ever united vitally with some Matter or other.* 3. *Further Reasons to evince the same.* 4. *That the Soul is capable of an Aiery and Æthereal Body, as well as a Terrestrial.* 5. *That she ordinarily passes out of an Earthly into an Aereal Vehicle first.* 6. *That in her Aiery Vehicles she is capable of Sense, Pleasure, and Pain.* 7. *That the main power of the Soul over her Aereal Vehicle is the direction of Motion in the particles thereof.* 8. *That she may also add or diminish Motion in her Æthereal.* 9. *How the purity of the Vehicles confers to the quickness of Sense and Knowledge.* 10. *Of the Soul's power of changing the temper of her Aerial Vehicle;* 11. *As also the shape thereof.* 12. *The plainness of the last Axiome.*

I.



WE have, I hope, with undeniable evidence demonstrated the Immortality of the Soul to such as neither by their slowness of parts, nor any prejudice of Immorality, are made incompetent Judges of the truth of Demonstrations of this kind: so that I have already perfected my main Design. But my own Curiosity, and the desire of gratifying others who love to entertain themselves with Speculations of this nature, do call me out something further; if the very Dignity of the present Matter I am upon doth not justly require me, as will be best seen after the finishing thereof: which is concerning the State of the Soul after Death. Wherein,

in, though I may not haply be able to fix my foot so firmly as in the foregoing part of this Treatise, yet I will assert nothing but what shall be reasonable, though not demonstrable, and far preponderating to whatever shall be alledged to the contrary, and in such clear Order and Method, that if what I write be not worthy to convince, it shall not be able to deceive or entangle by perplexedness and obscurity; and therefore I shall offer to view at once the main Principles upon which I shall build the residue of my Discourse.

A X I O M E XXVII.

The Soul, separate from this Terrestrial Body, is not released from all Vital Union with Matter.

2. **T**HIS is the general Opinion of the *Platonists*. *Plotinus* indeed dissents, especially concerning the most divine Souls, as if they at last were perfectly unbared of all Matter, and had no union with any thing but God himself: which I look upon as a fancy proceeding from the same inequality of temper, that made him surmise, that the most degenerate Souls did at last sleep in the bodies of Trees, and grew up merely into *Plantal life*. Such fictions as these of fanciful men have much depraved the ancient *Cabbala*, and sacred Doctrine which the *Platonists* themselves do profess to be *θεοπνευστος*, a holy Tradition received from the mouth of God or Angels. But however *Plotinus* himself doth not deny, but till the Soul arrive to such an exceeding height of purification, that she acts in either an *Aiery* or *Celestial Body*.

But that she is never released so perfectly from all Matter, how pure soever and tenuous, her condition of operating here in this life is a greater presumption than can be fetch'd from any thing else, that she ever is. For we find plainly, that her most subtile and most Intellectual operations depend upon the *fitness of temper* in the *Spirits*, and that it is the *fineness* and *purity* of them, that invites and enables her to love and look after *Divine* and *Intellectual Objects*: Which kind of Motions if she could exert immediately by her own proper power and essence, what should hinder her but that, having a will, she should bring it to effect? which yet we find she cannot, if the *Spirits* be *indisposed*. But, as I said, the Soul cannot be hindered by the undue temper of the *Spirits* in these Acts, if they be of that nature that they belong to the bare essence of the Soul quite prescinded from all Union with *Matter*. For then as to these Acts, it is all one where the Soul is, that is, in *what Matter* she is, (and she must be in some, because the Universe is every where thick-set with *Matter*) whether she be raised into the purest regions of the Air, or plunged down into the foulest Receptacles of Earth or Water; for her *Intellectual* actings would be alike in both; * this Conjunction in all likelihood engaging only the *Plastick* and *Sensitive* powers of the Soul, even when she is vitally united with *Matter*. What then is there imaginable in the *Body* that can hinder her in her nobler operations?

Wherefore it is plain that the nature of the Soul is such, as that she cannot act but in dependance on *Matter*, and that her Operations are

some way or other always modified thereby. And therefore if the Soul act at all after death, (which we have demonstrated she does) it is evident that she is not released from all *vital union* with all kind of *Matter* whatsoever: Which is not only the Opinion of the *Platonists*, but of *Aristotle* also, as may be easily gathered out of what we have

Book 2. ch. 14.
sect. 4, 5.

3. Besides, it seems a very wild leap in nature, that the Soul of Man, from being so deeply and muddily immersed into Matter as to keep company with Beasts, by vital union with gross flesh and bones, should so on a sudden be changed, that she should not adhere to any Matter whatsoever, but ascend into an *αὐλότης* competent happy to none but God himself; unless there be such Creatures as the *Platonists* call *Nóes*, or *pure Intellects*. This must seem to any indifferent man very harsh and incongruous, especially if we consider what noble Beings there are on this side the *Nóes* or *Nóes*, that all the Philosophers, that ever treated of them, acknowledge to be vitally united with either *Aereal* or *Æthereal* Vehicles. For of this condition are all the *Genii* or *Angels*.

It is sufficient therefore that the Soul never exceed the immateriality of those Orders of Beings; the lower sort whereof that they are vitally united to Vehicles of *Air*, their ignorance in nature seems manifestly to bewray. For it had been an easy thing, and more for their credit, to have informed their followers better in the Mysteries of Nature; but that themselves were ignorant of these things, which they could not but know, if they were not thus bound to their *Airy* bodies. For then they were not engaged to move with the whole course of the *Air*, but keeping themselves steady, as being disunited from all Matter, * they might in a moment have perceived both the *diurnal* and *annual motion* of the *Earth*, and so have saved the Credit of their followers, by communicating this Theory to them; the want of the knowledge whereof spoils their repute with them that understand the System of the world better than themselves, for all they boast of their Philosophy, so as if it were the Dictate of the highest Angels.

A X I O M E XXVIII.

There is a Triple Vital Congruity in the Soul, namely, Æthereal, Aereal, and Terrestrial.

* Book 2. ch.
14. sect. 1.

THAT this is the common Opinion of the *Platonists*, I have * above intimated. That this Opinion is also true in it self, appears from the foregoing Axiome. Of the *Terrestrial Congruity* there can be no doubt; and as little can there be but that at least one of the other two is to be granted, else the Soul would be released from all *vital union* with *Matter* after Death. Wherefore she has a *Vital aptitude* at least to unite with *Air*: But *Air* is a common Receptacle of bad and good Spirits, (as the *Earth* is of all sorts of men and beasts) nay indeed rather of those that are in some sort or other bad, than of good, as it is upon *Earth*. But the Soul of Man is capable of very high refinements, even to a condition *purely Angelical*. Whence Reason will

will judge it fit, and all Antiquity has voted it, That the Souls of men arrived to such a due pitch of purification must at last obtain *Celestial Vehicles*.

A X I O M E XXIX.
According to the usual custom of Nature, the Soul awakes orderly into these Vital Congruities, not passing from one Extreme to another without any stay in the middle.

5. **T**HIS Truth, besides that at first sight it cannot but seem very reasonable, according to that known Aphorism, *Natura non facit saltum*; so if it be further examined, the solidity thereof will more fully appear. For considering how small degrees of purification the Souls of almost all men get in this life, even theirs who pass vulgarly for honest and good men; it will plainly follow, that very few arrive to their *Aethereal Vehicle* immediately upon quitting their *Terrestrial Body*; that being a privilege that has appertained to none but very Noble and *Heroical Spirits* indeed, of which History records but very few. But that there may be degrees of purity and excellency in the *Aereal Bodies*, is a thing that is not to be denied, so that a just *Nemesis* will find out every one after death.

A X I O M E XXX.

The Soul, in her *Aereal Vehicle*, is capable of Sense properly so called, and consequently of Pleasure and Pain.

6. **T**HIS plainly appears from the 27 and 28 Axiomes. For there is a necessity of the resulting of Sense from Vital Union of the Soul with any Body whatsoever: and we may remember that the immediate Instrument of Sense, even in this *Earthly Body*, are the *Spirits*: so that there can be no doubt of this Truth. And Pleasure and Pain being the proper modifications of Sense, and there being no Body but what is possible, it is evident that these *Vehicles of Air* are subject to Pain as well as Pleasure, in this Region where ill things are to be met with as well as good.

A X I O M E XXXI.

The Soul can neither impart, nor take away from the Matter of her Vehicle of Air any considerable degree of Motion, but yet can direct the particles moved which way she pleases by the Imperium of her Will.

7. **T**HE reasonableness of this Axiome may be evinced, partly out of the former; for considering the brushiness and angulosity of the parts of the *Air*, a more than ordinary Motion or compressive Rest may very well prove painful to the Soul, and dis-harmonious to her touch: and partly from what we may observe in our own *Spirits* in this Body, which we can only direct, not give Motion to, nor diminish their Motion by our Imagination or Will, (for no man can imagine himself into Heat or Cold, the sure consequences of extraordinary Motion and Rest, by willing his *Spirits* to move faster or slower;

flower; but he may direct them into the Organs of spontaneous Motion, and so by moving the grosser parts of the Body, by this direction he may spend them, and heat these parts in the expence of them; and this is all we can do :) and partly from that Divine Providence that made all things, and measures out the Powers and Faculties of his Creatures according to his own Wisdom and Counsel, and therefore has bound that state of the Soul to streighter conditions, that are competible to the bad as well as to the good.

AXIOME XXXII.

Though the Soul can neither confer, nor take away any considerable degree of Motion from the Matter of her Aairy Vehicle, yet nothing hinders but that she may do both in her Æthereal.

8. **T**HE reason hereof is, because the particles of her *Æthereal Vehicle* consist partly of smooth spherical Figures, and partly of tenuous Matter, so exceeding liquid that it will, without any violence, comply to any thing: whereas the *Air*, as may be observed in Wind-Guns, has parts so stubborn and so stiff, that after they have been compressed to such a certain degree, that the barrel of the Piece grows hot again, they have not lost their shapes nor virtue; but like a spring of Steel, liberty being given, they return to their natural posture with that violence, that they discharge a Bullet with equal force that Gun-powder does. Besides, that the Goodness of that Deity, on whom all Beings depend, may be justly thought to have privileged the *Æthereal Congruity of Life* (which awakes only in perfectly-obedient Souls, such as may be trusted as thoroughly faithful to his Empire) with a larger power than the other, there being no incompetibleness in the Subject. For it is as easy a thing to conceive, that God may endow a Soul with a power of moving or resting Matter, as of determining the motions thereof.

AXIOME XXXIII.

The purer the Vehicle is, the more quick and perfect are the Perceptive Faculties of the Soul.

9. **T**HE truth of this we may in a manner experience in this life, where we find, that the quickness of Hearing, Seeing, Tasting, Smelling, the nimbleness of Reminiscency, Reason, and all other *Perceptive* Faculties, are advanced or abated by the clearness, or foulness and dulness of the *Spirits* of our Body; and that Oblivion and Sottishness arise from their thickness and earthiness, or waterishness, or whatsoever other gross consistency of them: which distemper removed, and the Body being replenish'd with good Spirits in sufficient plenty and purity, the Mind recovers her activity again, remembers what she had forgot, and understands what she was before incapable of, sees and hears at a greater distance; and so of the rest.

A X I O M E XXXIV.

The Soul has a marvellous power of not only changing the temper of her Aairy Vehicle, but also of the external shape thereof.

10. **T**HE truth of the first part of this Axiome appears from daily experience; for we may frequently observe how strangely the *Passions* of the Mind will work upon our Spirits in this state; how Wrath, and Grief, and Envy will alter the Body, to say nothing of other Affections. And assuredly the finer the Body is, the more mutable it is upon this account: so that the *Passions* of the Mind must needs have a very great influence upon the Soul's *Aereal Vehicle*; which, though they cannot change into any thing but Air, yet they may change this *Air* into qualifications as vastly different as *Vertue* is from *Vice*, *Sickness* from *Health*, *Pain* from *Pleasure*, *Light* from *Darkness*, and the *stink* of a *Gaol* from the *Aromatick odours* of a flourishing *Paradise*.

11. The truth of the latter part is demonstrable from the latter part of the 31 Axiome. For supposing a power in the Soul of directing the motions of the particles of her fluid Vehicle, it must needs follow, that she will also have a power of shaping it in some measure, according to her own Will and Fancy. To which you may add, as no contemptible pledge of this Truth, what is done in that kind by our Will and Fancy in this life: as, only because I will and fancy the moving of my Mouth, Foot, or Fingers; I can move them, provided I have but Spirits to direct into this motion; and the whole Vehicle of the Soul is in a manner nothing else but Spirits. The *Signatures* also of the *Fœtus* in the Womb by the Desire and Imagination of the Mother, is very serviceable for the evincing of this Truth: but I shall speak of it more fully in its place.

Chap. 5. sect.
11, 12. ch. 6.

A X I O M E XXXV.

It is rational to think, that as some Faculties are laid asleep in Death, or after Death, so others may awake that are more suitable for that state.

12. **T**HE truth of this Axiome appears from hence, That our Souls come not by chance, but are made by an All-wise God, who, foreseeing all their states, has fitted the *Excitation* or *Composition* of Powers and Faculties suitably to the present condition they are to be in.

A X I O M E XXXVI.

Whether the Vital Congruity of the Soul expire, as whose period being quite unwound, or that of the Matter be defaced by any essential Dis-harmony, Vital Union immediately ceases.

13. **T**HIS last Axiome is plain enough of it self at first sight, and the usefulness thereof may be glanced at in its due place.

These are the main Truths I shall recur to, or at least suppose, in my following Disquisitions: others will be more seasonably deliver'd in the continuation of our Discourse.

NOTES

N O T E S

On BOOK III. CHAP. I. Sect. 2.

THIS Conjunction, in all likelihood, engaging only the *Plastick and Sensitive Powers of the Soul*, &c. Truly, if the Soul can act, though devoid of all Body, it is highly likely, that the intellectual Part of it would be free in its Operations, though in a state of Union with any Body whatever: because it seems as if the Soul can, by its *Plastick* only, be united to a Body: for if it were united by Understanding and Will, we might at pleasure be able to dissolve the Union. But since our intellectual Operations are clogg'd or hinder'd, according to the Quality of the Body, it is but suitable to conceive, that they depend some Way on the *Plastick*: whose own good state also depends on the Nature of its Vehicle; and that the Soul, unless in a state of Silence, is never destitute of a Body.

Sect. 3. They might in a Moment have perceived the diurnal and Annual Motion of the Earth, &c. Surely in a very little time, they would not only find themselves in a new or different Horizon from the swift diurnal Motion of the Earth, but to be wholly also out of the Compass of the Atmosphere from the Annual Motion of it, almost three times swifter than the former.

CHAP. II.

1. Of the Dimensions of the Soul considered barely in her self.
2. Of the Figure of the Soul's Dimensions.
3. Of the Heterogeneity of her Essence.
4. That there is an Heterogeneity in her *Plastick* part distinct from the Perceptive.
5. Of the acting of this *Plastick* part in her framing of the Vehicle.
6. The excellency of Des-Cartes his Philosophy.
7. That the Vehicles of Ghosts have as much of solid corporeal Substance in them as the Bodies of Men.
8. The folly of the contrary Opinion evinced.
9. The advantage of the Soul, for matter of Body, in the other state, above this.

Book I. ch. 3,
5, 8. Also
Book 2.
Chap. 1, 2.

THAT we may now have a more clear and determinate apprehension of the nature and condition of the Soul out of the Body, let us first consider her a while, what she is in her own Essence, without any reference to any Body at all, and we shall find her a Substance extended and indiscerpible, as may be easily gathered out of what we have above written. And it is a seasonable Contemplation here, (where we consider the Soul as having left this *Terrestrial* Body) that she hath as ample, if not more ample, Dimensions of her own, than are visible in the Body she has left. Which I think worth taking notice of, that it may stop the mouths of them that, not without reason, laugh at those unconceivable and ridiculous fancies of the Schools; that first rashly take away all Extension from Spirits, whether Souls
or

or *Angels*, and then dispute how many of them booted and spur'd may dance on a needle's point at once. Footeries much derogatory to the Truth, and that pinch our Perception into such an intolerable streightness and evanidness, that we cannot imagine any thing of our own Being; and, if we do, are prone to fall into Despair, or contempt of our selves, by fancying our selves such inconsiderable Motes of the Sun.

2. But as it is very manifest that *the Soul has Dimensions*, and yet not infinite, and therefore that she is necessarily bounded in some Figure or other; so it is very uncertain whether there be any peculiar Figure natural to her, answerable to animal shape, or whether she be of her self of either a Round or Oval figure, but does change her shape according as occasion requires. It is not material to define any thing in this Question more than thus: That when the Soul acts in *Terrestrial Matter*, her *Plastick* part is determined to the Organization of the Body into humane form; and in the *Aereal* or *Æthereal*, that she is neither more nor less determined to any shape than the *Genii* or *Angels*; and that, if their Vehicles are more naturally guided into one shape than another, that hers is in the same condition; so that in her visible Vehicle * she will bear the ordinary form of *Angels*, such a countenance, and so cloath'd, as they.

3. That which is more material, I think is more easy to be defin'd, and that is, whether the Soul be one *Homogeneous* Substance, or whether it be in some manner *Heterogeneous*. That the latter is in some measure true, it is manifest from what we have elsewhere written, namely, That the *Perceptive* faculty reaches not throughout the whole Soul, but is confined to a certain part, which we called the *Centre*, or *Eye of the Soul*, as also her *Perceptive* part; but all the rest *Plastick*. But here arises a further Scruple, whether there be not an *Heterogeneity* in the very *Plastick* part also of the Soul. The *Aristoteleans* seem to be confident there is not, and do affirm, that if there were an Eye in the Toe, the Toe would see as well as the Head. Of which I very much doubt: For hence it would follow, that some Creatures would have a glimmering Light all over, they being in a manner all over transparent, and some thin and clear Complexions might haply have the perception of Light betwixt the lower parts of their Fingers, which are in some good measure pellucid: and therefore Life and Spirits being continued from thence to the *Conarion*, as they are, or to the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, it would follow, that the Soul would have a perception of some glimmerings of Light from thence, which were to see there as well as to feel.

Book 2. chap.
11. sect. 10,
11.

4. Wherefore it seems more rational to admit an *Heterogeneity* in the *Plastick* part of the Soul also, and to acknowledge, that every removal from the Seat of Common Sense, that is to say, every Circle that surrounds the *Centre of the Soul*, has not the same bounds of power, neither for number nor extent. But that as concerning the former, there is a gradual falling off from the first excellency, which is the *Perceptive* part of the Soul; the closest Circle to which is that part of the *Plastick* that is able to convey Objects of Sight, as well as of Touch and Hearing, and what other Senses else there may be in the Soul.

Soul. The next Circle is *Hearing* without *Seeing*, though not without *Touch*: for *Touch* spreads through all. But in its exterior region, which is excessively the greatest, it transmits the circumstantiated Perceptions of no Objects but those that are *Tactile*; but to others it is only as a dead Medium, as the Circle of *Hearing* is but as a dead Medium to the Objects of *Sight*. So that if we would please our Imagination with *Ficinus*, in fancying the Soul as a Star, we shall do it more perfectly if we look upon her in her Circles, as having an *Halo* about her: For the Soul to our *Reason* is no more *Homogeneous* than that Spectacle is to our *Sight*.

5. But if we look upon the Soul as ever propending to some personal shape, the direction of the *Plastick* rays must then tend to a kind of Organization, so far as is conducent to the state the Soul is in, whether in an *Aiery* or *Æthereal* Vehicle. For that the *Plastick* omits or changes, as she is drawn forth by the nature of the Matter she acts upon, is discoverable in her Organization of our Bodies here. For in all likelihood the Soul in her self is as much of one sex as another; which makes her sometimes sign the *Matter* with both, but that very seldom: and therefore it is manifest that she omits one part of her *Plastick* power, and makes use of the other in all efformations of the *Fœtus*.

Whence it is easy to conclude, that supposing her *Plastick* power naturally work the *Æthereal* or *Aereal* Vehicle into any *animal* shape, it may put forth only such strokes of the efformative virtue as are convenient and becoming the Angelical Nature.

But, according to this Hypothesis, haply all Objects of Sense * will not arrive to the *Centre of the Soul* from every part of the Horizon; no, not though this Organization were not natural, but merely arbitrary. But be the Soul conceived either bound up thus into *animal* form, or spread loose into any careless round shape, according as her rays shall display themselves in her *Vehicle* of *Air* or *Æther*, yet the *seat of sight* will be duly restrained, which is a consideration of no contemptible consequence.

6. This in general may suffice concerning the very Nature of the Soul it self, her *Extension* and *Heterogeneity*. I shall only add to this one Observable concerning her *Aiery* and *Æthereal* Vehicle, and then I shall descend to more particular disquisitions. Rash fancies and false deductions from misunderstood Experiments have made some very confident, that there is a *Vacuum* in Nature, and that every Body by how much more light it is, so much less Substance it has in it self. A thing very fond and irrational, at first sight, to such as are but indifferently well versed in the incomparable Philosophy of *Renatus Descartes*, whose dexterous wit and through insight into the nature and laws of *Matter*, has so perfected the Reasons of those *Phænomena* that *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, * *Lucretius*, and others have puzzled themselves about, that there seems nothing now wanting as concerning that way of philosophizing, but patience and an unprejudiced judgment to peruse what he has writ.

7. According therefore to his Philosophy and the Truth, there is ever as much Matter or Body in one consistency as another; as for example,

example, there is as much Matter in a Cup of Air as in the same Cup filled with Water, and as much in this Cup of Water as if it were filled with Lead or Quick-silver. Which I take notice of here, that I may free the Imagination of men from that ordinary and idiotick misapprehension which they entertain of *Spirits* that appear, as if they were as evanid and devoid of Substance as the very Shadows of our Bodies cast against a Wall, or our Images reflected from a River or Looking-glass; and therefore from this error have given them names accordingly, calling the Ghosts of men that present themselves to them, *Εἰδωλα* and *Umbræ*, *Images* and *Shades*. The which, the more visible they are, they think them the more substantial; fancying that the *Air* is so condensed, that there is not only more of it, but also that simply there is more Matter or Substance, when it appears thus visible, than there was in the same space before. And therefore they must needs conceit, that Death reduces us to a pitiful thin pittance of Being, that our Substance is in a manner lost, and nothing but a tenuous reek remains; no more in proportion to us, than what a sweating horse leaves behind him as he gallops by in a frosty morning. Which certainly must be a very lamentable consideration to such as love this thick and plump Body they bear about with them, and are pleased to consider, how many pounds they outweighed their Neighbour the last time they were put in the balance together.

8. But if a kind of dubious Transparency will demonstrate the deficiency of Corporeal Substance, a Pillar of *Crystal* will have less thereof than one of *Tobacco-smoak*; which though it may be so doubtful and evanid an Object to the Eye, if we try it by the Hand, it will prove exceeding solid: as also these *Ghosts* that are said to appear in this manner have proved to them that have touched them, or have been touched by them. For it is a thing ridiculous and unworthy of a Philosopher, to judge the measure of *corporeal Matter* by what it seems to our sight; for so *Air* would be nothing at all: or what it is to our handling or weighing of it; * for so indeed a Cup of Quick-silver would seem to have infinitely more Matter in it than one fill'd with Air only, and a vessel of Water less when it is plunged under the water in the River, than when it is carried in the Air. But we are to remember, that let *Matter* be of what consistency it will, as thin and pure as the flame of a candle, there is not less of *corporeal Substance* therein than there is in the same dimensions of Silver, Lead, or Gold.

9. So that we need not bemoan the shrivelled condition of the deceased, as if they were stript almost of all Substance corporeal, and were too thinly clad to enjoy themselves as to any Object of Sense. For they have no less Body than we our selves have, only this Body is far more active than ours, being more *spiritualized*, that is to say, having greater degrees of Motion communicated unto it; which the whole Matter of the world receives from some *Spiritual Being* or other, and therefore in this regard may be said the more to symbolize with that Immaterial Being, the more Motion is communicated to it: As it does also in that which is the effect of Motion, to wit, the tenuity and subtilty of its particles, whereby it is enabled to imi-

tate, in some sort, the proper privileges of Spirits that pass through all Bodies whatsoever. And these Vehicles of the Soul, by reason of the tenuity of their parts, may well pass through such Matter as seems to us impervious, though it be not really so to them. For Matter reduced to such fluid Subtlety of particles as are invisible, may well have entrance through Pores unperceptible.

Whence it is manifest that the Soul, speaking in a natural sense, loseth nothing by Death, but is a very considerable gainer thereby. For she does not only possess as much Body as before, with as full and solid dimensions, but has that accession cast in, of having this Body more invigorated with Life and Motion than it was formerly. Which consideration I could not but take notice of, that I might thereby expunge that false conceit, that adheres to most mens fancies, of that *evanid* and *starved* condition of the other state.

N O T E S

On CHAP. II. Sect. 2.

SHE will bear the ordinary form of Angels, &c. But since the Angels have *Plasticks*, as having either *Aerial* or *Ætherial* Vehicles, it is most consonant unto Reason, that they have also the humane Form: Which ought to be held as very firm of them that think there is no manner of difference between the Souls or Spirits of Angels, and the Souls of Men. Not to take Notice that the *Vision* of *Ezekiel* doth very much favour this Hypothesis.

Sect. 5. Will not arrive to the Centre of the Soul from every part of the *Horizon*, &c. Namely, to the *Perceptive* Centre: For if this were so, that Organization might justly appear vain and superfluous. But since this Organization is not made but when the Soul or Angel is reduced unto a visible Form and Personality, nor can this Visibility of Form arise otherwise than by some Opakeness that may reflect light; from hence 'tis easily understood, how that all Passages for the entrance of the visible Species of things, unless it be through the Organs of the Eyes, are shut up. And that it is the *Plastick* it self within, that provides for this Concinnity, by thickning somewhat the Matter where it is most needful, there's none that considers the Point well can ever doubt.

Sect. 6. *Lucretius* and others have puzzled themselves about, &c. Truly all those have appeared to me to philosophize in these things after a very gross and clumsy manner, in comparison of *Cartesius*. But in this *Cartesius* is egregiously in the wrong, that not content to have arrived at the most probable immediate material causes of things, he so enlarged the power of Matter furnished with its mechanical Motion, as if, of it self alone, it was able to work it self into all the Phenomena of the World, no Principle that is immaterial governing or directing it. Than which there can be no conceit more monstrous or extravagant; as I have copiously elsewhere, and particularly in my *Enchirid. Metaphys.* demonstrated. *Sect. 8.*

Sect. 8. For so indeed a Cup of Quick-silver would seem to have infinitely more Matter in it, &c. Which Observation ought to silence those who so loudly boast of their demonstrating the Aristotelian Condensation, from the difference of Weight in Bodies of the same Magnitude: for on this Account a Cup of Mercury would have infinitely in it a greater Quantity of Matter, than the same Cup filled with Air, (for Air in the Air weighs even nothing) which seems to be very absurd.

C H A P. III.

1. That the natural abode of the Soul after Death is the Air. 2. That she cannot quit the Aereal Regions till the Æthereal Congruity of life be awakened in her. 3. That all Souls are not in the same Region of the Air. 4. Cardan's conceit of placing all Dæmons in the upper Region. 5. The use of this conceit for the shewing the reason of their seldom appearing. 6. That this Phænomenon is salved by a more rational Hypothesis. 7. A further confutation of Cardan's Opinion. 8. More tending to the same scope. 9. The Original of Cardan's error concerning the remote operations of Dæmons. 10. An Objection how Dæmons and Souls separate can be in this lower Region, where Winds and Tempests are so frequent. 11. A Preparation to an Answer from the consideration of the nature of the Winds. 12. Particular Answers to the Objection. 13. A further Answer from the Statick Faculty of the Soul. 14. Another from the sudden power of actuating her Vehicle. 15. What incommodations she suffers from Hail, Rain, &c.

1. **T**HOSE more particular Enquiries we intend to fall upon, may be reduced to these few Heads, viz. *The place of the Soul's abode, Her Employment, and Her Moral condition after Death.* That the place of her abode is the Air, is the constant opinion of the ancient Philosophers and natural Theologers, who do unanimously make *that Element* the Receptacle of Souls departed: which therefore they called *Æðers*, that is, *Æðers*, because men deceased are in a state of *Invisibility*, as the place they are confined to is an Element utterly *invisible* of its own nature, and is accloy'd also with caliginous mists, and envelop'd by vicissitudes with the dark shadow of the Earth. The Truth of this Opinion of theirs is plainly demonstrable from the 29 and 31 Axiomes. For Nature making no enormous jumps, it must needs follow, that Separate Souls must take their first station in the Air, because that *Vital Congruity* that fits an *Aereal Vehicle* does of order awaken immediately upon the quitting of the *Earthly Body*.

2. Wherefore the Soul being thus vitally united with a *Body or Vehicle of Air*, it is impossible that she should drive out of those Regions: because her motions are only according to the capacity of her Vehicle, she being not able to alter the consistency thereof into any more subtile or purer temper than the Air will admit of, keeping still its own Species. Only she may *conspissate* the Air by directing the

motion thereof towards her, and so squeezing out a considerable part of the first and second Element may retain more Air than ordinary : But she cannot command the Air from her so entirely, as to actuate these two Elements alone, or any considerable part of them, because the *Æthereal Congruity* of life, is as yet wholly asleep ; nor is it in the power of the Soul to awake it as she pleases : and therefore it would be Pain and Death to her to attempt the removal of the *Aereal Matter* quite from her. Besides that it would require such a force as would imply a contribution of motion to it, as well as direction of it, to make it able to bear against other parts of the Air that love not to be streightened or crouded : which though it may haply be done in some measure, yet that she may, by this force of direction, recover a whole *Vehicle of Æther*, seems excessively improbable, as is plain from the 31 Axiome.

3. Wherefore it is necessary that the Soul departed this life should be somewhere in the *Air*, though it be not at all necessary that they should inhabit all of them the *same Region* thereof. For as some Souls are *more purified* than others when they leave the Body, so a *more pure* degree of *Vital Congruity* will awake in them : whence by that Divine *Nemesis* that runs through all things, they will be naturally convey'd to such places, and be associated to such company as is most congruous to their Nature ; and will be as distinctly sorted by that Eternal Justice that God has so deeply ingrafted in the very essential texture of the Universe, as humane Laws dispose of Persons with us, sending some to Prisons, some to Pest-houses, and others to the *Prytaneum*.

De verum varietate, l. 16.
cap. 93. pag.
1139.

4. It will therefore, in all likelihood, fall to some of their shares to be fatally fettered to this *lower Region of the Air*, as I doubt not but many other Spirits are ; though *Cardan* much pleases himself with a peculiar conceit of his own, as if the *supreme Region of the Air* was the only habitation of all *Demons* or Spirits whatever, and that their descent to us is as rare as the diving of Men into the bottom of the Sea, and almost as difficult, this *thick Air* we breath in being in a manner as unsuitable to their tenuous consistencies as the *Water* is to us ; in which we are fain to hold our breath, and consequently to make a very short stay in that Element.

Besides that he fancies the passage of the *Middle Region* tedious to them, by reason of its Coldness ; which therefore he saith is as it were a fence betwixt us and them, as the Sea is betwixt the Fishes and us ; whom though we exceed much in Wit and Industry, and have a great desire to catch and kill them, yet we get very few into our hands, in comparison of those that scape us : And so these *Demons*, though they bear us no good will, by bodily conflict they can hurt none of us (it being so difficult a thing to come at us) and very few of us by their Art and Industry.

For this fanciful Philosopher will have them only attempt us as we do the Fishes, by Baits, and Nets, and Eel-spears, or such like Engines which we cast into the bottom of the Water : So, saith he, these *Aereal Genii*, keeping their station above in the third Region of the Air, as we do on the bank of the River, or in the Boat on the Sea,

when

when we fish) by sending down *Dreams* and *Apparitions*, may entangle some men so, that by affrightments and disturbances of mind at last, though at this distance, they may work their Ruine and Destruction.

5. This Hypothesis, I suppose, he has framed to give an account why the appearing of the *Genii* is so seldom, and why so little hurt is done by them as there is. For an Answer would be ready, that this lower Air is no Element for them to abide in: and that it is as foolishly argued by those that say, there are no Spirits, because they are so seldom seen, as if the Fishes, upon a concession of Speech and Reason to their mute Tribe, should generally conclude, that there are no such Creatures as Men or Horses, because it happens so very seldom that they can see them; and should contemn and laugh at those Fishes that, having had the hap to meet with them, should say they have seen such Creatures, as if they were fanatick and lunatick, and not well in their wits, or else too much in them, and that they contrived such fictions for some political design.

6. Which Parable may hold good, though not upon the same grounds, only by substituting *difference of condition* for *distance of place*; and the similitude will prove as sound as before. For, for a *Spirit* to *condensate* his Vehicle to almost a Terrestrial grossness and Visibility, is as rare and uncouth as for Terrestrial animals to dive to the bottom of the Sea, and it's likely every jot as difficult, and so the reason as obvious why so few are seen, and the confident denial of their existence as rash and foolish, by them that have not seen them themselves. For it is as if the Fishes should contest amongst themselves about the existence of Men, and their diving into the Water, and whether there were any places haunted in the Sea; as those would be the most famous where they fish for Pearls, or that cause the most frequent Shipwrecks, or are most pleasant to swim in. And some notable occasion, mischance, or weighty design, such as occur more rarely, must be reasonably conceived the only invitations to the *Genii* to expose themselves to our view.

7. That there is so little hurt done by them, need not be resolved into the *distance of their habitation*, but into the *Law of the Universe*, whose force penetrates through all Orders of Beings. Besides, it is too trivial and idiotick a conceit, and far below the pitch of a Philosopher, to think that *all* Aereal Spirits are Haters of Mankind, so as to take delight merely in destroying them. For Men do not hate Fishes, because they live in another Element different from theirs; but catch them merely in love to themselves, for gain and food; which the Aery *Genii* cannot aim at in destroying of us. But to do mischief merely for mischief's sake, is so excessive an Enormity, that some doubt whether it be competent to any *Intellectual Being*. And therefore *Cardan* ought to have proved that first: as also, if there be any so extremely degenerate, that there be many of them, or rather so many that they cannot be awed by the number of those that are less depraved. For we may observe, that men amongst our selves that are sufficiently wicked, yet they abhor very much from those things that are grossly and causelessly destructive to either Man or Beast; and

themselves would help to destroy, punish, or at least hinder the attempters of such wild and exorbitant outrages that have no pretence of Reason, but are a mere exercise of Cruelty and Vexation to other Creatures.

He ought also to have demonstrated, that all Mankind are not the *Peculium* of some Spirits or other, and that there are not invisible Governours of Nations, Cities, Families, and sometime of particular Men; and that at least a *Political Goodness*, such as serves for the safety of Persons, and what belongs to them, is not exceedingly more prevalent, even in these Kingdoms of the *Air*, than *gross Injustice*. For all this may be on the side of the *Divine Life*: so that there is no fear of making these Aereal Inhabitants over-perfect by this Supposition. In a word, he should have proved that *Political Order*, in the full exercise thereof, did not reach from *Heaven to Earth*, and pierce into the *Subterraneous Regions* also, if there be also any *Intellectual Creatures* there. For this will suffice to give a reason that so little hurt is done, though all places be full of *Aereal Spirits*.

8. Add unto all this, that though they may not be permitted to do any gross evil themselves, and to kill men at pleasure without their consents, yet they must abet them in such ways, or invite them to such courses, as will prove destructive to them: but, it may be, with no greater plot than we have, when we set Dogs together by the ears, fight Cocks, bait Bears and Bulls, run Horses, and the like; where often, by our occasion, as being excited and animated by us, they pursue their own Inclinations to the loss of their lives.

But though we do not care to kill a Dog or a Cock in this way; yet there are none so barbarous as to knock these Creatures on the head merely because they will do so. So these worser kind of *Genii*, according as their tempers are, may haply follow some men, prone to such or such vices, in which they may drive them in way of contest, or to please their own fancies, to the utmost they can do in it; and, taking their parts, sport themselves in making one man overcome another in duelling, in drinking, in craft and undermining, in wenching, in getting riches, in clambering to honours; and so of the rest. Where it may be their pastime to try the victory of that Person they have taken to; and if he perish by the hurry of their temptations and animations, it is a thing they intended no more, it may be, than he that sets his Cock into the pit, desires his neck should be broke: but if it happen so, the sorrow is much alike in both cases.

Wherefore these Spirits may do mischief enough in the world, in abetting men that act it, though haply they neither take pleasure in doing of it upon any other terms, nor, if they did, are able to do it, there being so many watchful eyes over them. For these *Aereal Legions* are as capable of *Political Honesty*, and may as deeply resent it, as the nations of the Earth do; and it may be more deeply.

9. But if these Creatures were removed so far off as *Cardan* would have them, I do not see how they could have any communion at all with us, to do us either good or hurt. For that they are able to send *Apparitions* or *Dreams* at this distance, is it self but a Dream, occasioned from that first Error in the *Aristotelean* Philosophy, that makes

God

God and the Intelligences act from the heavenly spheres, and so to produce all these Effects of Nature below; such as can never be done but by a present *Numen* and *Spirit of Life* that pervades all things.

10. This conceit therefore of his shall be no hindrance to our concluding, That this *lower Region of the Air* is also replenished with *Dæmons*. Which if it be, it is not unlikely but that the *Impurer Souls* wander there also; though I have taken all this pains to bring still greater trouble upon my self. For it is obvious to object that which *Lucretius* has started of old, that this Region being so obnoxious to *Winds* and *Tempests*, the Souls will not be able to keep their *Vehicles of Air* about them, but that they will be blown in pieces by the roughness of these storms. But we may be easily delivered of this solicitude, if we consider the nature of the *Winds*, the nature of these *Vehicles*, and the *Statick* power of the Soul. For to say they will make as good shift as the *Genii* here, is not fully satisfactory, because a man would also willingly understand how the *Genii* themselves are not liable to this inconvenience. My Answer therefore shall reach both.

11. That *Winds* are nothing else but Watery particles at their greatest agitation, *Cartesius* has very handsomely demonstrated in his *Meteors*: Which particles do not so much drive the Air before them, as pass through it, as a flight of arrows, and showers of hail or rain. One part of the Air therefore is not driven from another; but it is as if one should conceive so many little pieces of hair twirling on their middle point as at quarter-staff, and so passing through the Air; which motion would pass free, without carrying the Air along with it. This therefore being the nature of *Wind*, the Air is not torn a-pieces thereby, though we find the *impetus* of it moving against us, because it cannot penetrate our Bodies with that facility that it does the Air.

12. But the *Vehicles* of the *Genii* and Souls deceased are much-what of the very nature of the Air; whence it is plainly impossible that the *Wind* should have any other force on them than what it has on the rest of that Element; and therefore the least thing imaginable will hold all the parts together. Which is true also, if the *Wind* did carry along the Air with it: for then the *Vehicles* of the *Genii* would move along with the stream, suffering little or no violence at all, unless they would force themselves against it. Which they are not necessitated to do, as indeed not so much as to come into it, or not at least to continue in it, but may take shelter, *as other living Creatures do, in houses, behind Walls, in woods, dales, caverns, rocks, and other obvious places; and that maturely enough, the change of Air and prognostick of storms being more perceptible to them than to any terrestrial animal.

13. And yet they need not be so cautious to keep out of danger, they having a power to grapple with the greatest of it, which is their *Statick* faculty; which arises from the power of directing the motion of the particles of their Vehicle. For they having this power of directing the motion of these particles which way they please, by Axiome 3^r, it necessarily follows, that they can determinate their course inwards, or toward the Centre; by which direction they will be all kept close

to-

together, firm and tight: which ability I call the *Statick* power of the Soul. Which, if it can direct the whole agitation of the particles of the Vehicle, as well those of the first and second Element, as those of the Air; and that partly towards the Centre, and partly in a countertendency against the storm, this force and firmness will be far above the strongest *Winds* that she can possibly meet with.

14. Wherefore the Soul's Vehicle is in no danger from the boisterousness of the *Winds*, and if it were, yet there is no fear of cessation of Life. For as the wind blows off one part of Air, it brings on another, which may be immediately actuated by the presence of the Soul; though there be no need to take refuge in so large an Hypothesis. And it is more probable that she is more peculiarly united to one part of the Air than another, and that she dismisses her Vehicle but by degrees, as our Spirits leisurely pass away by insensible Perspiration.

15. Wee see how little the Soul's Vehicle can be incommodated by storms of *Wind*. And yet *Rain*, *Hail*, *Snow*, and *Thunder*, will incommodate her still less. For they pass as they do through other parts of Air, * which close again immediately, and leave neither wound nor scar behind them. Wherefore all these *Meteors* in their Mediocrity may be a pleasure to her and refreshment; and in their excess no long pain, nor in their highest rage any destruction of life at all. From whence we may safely conclude, that not only the *Upper Region*, but this *Lower* also, may be inhabited both by the *deceased Souls of Men* and by *Demons*.

N O T E S

On C H A P. III. Sect. 12.

AS other living Creatures do, in Houses, behind Walls, &c. This Place can offend none, unless they be Persons of an abject Mind, and very superstitious; who look upon all *Dæmons* as so many Gods, and conceit every intelligent Creature besides Man to be presently a sort of divine Being, and next to Omnipotent. Thus indeed those are wont to do that are the Slaves of Superstition and Ignorance, strangers to any true Philosophy or Religion. But both these will teach us, that the *Dæmons* are not only capable of suffering, but of being in a very miserable Manner bodily tormented; which is but necessary, if they have Sense; as if Sense, then that they have also airy and thin Vehicles obnoxious to the *Winds*, &c. But 'tis not worth the while to stay long in answering the senseless and frivolous Cavils of stupid and illiterate Persons.

Sect. 15. Which close again immediately, and leave neither Wound, &c. Which State, if it be less pleasing to some, these *Genii*, by their *Statick* Power or Faculty, can so bind or keep close their Vehicles, that neither the Rain-drops, nor yet the Hail, can penetrate them; but they will recoil as from our Skins, and so fall at length to the ground.

C H A P.

CHAP. IV.

1. That the Soul once having quitted this Earthly Body becomes a Dæmon.
2. Of the External Senses of the Soul separate, their number and limits in the Vehicle.
3. Of Sight in a Vehicle organized and unorganized.
4. How Dæmons and separate Souls hear and see at a vast Distance: and whence it is that though they may so easily hear or see us, we may neither see nor hear them.
5. That they have Hearing as well as Sight.
6. Of the Touch, Smell, Taste, and Nourishment of Dæmons.
7. The external employment that the Genii and Souls deceased may have out of the Body.
8. That the actions of Separate Souls, in reference to us, are most what conformable to their life here on Earth.
9. What their Entertainments are in reference to themselves.
10. The distinction of Orders of Dæmons from the places they most frequent.

1. **T**HE next thing we are to enquire into, is the Employment of the Soul after Death; how she can entertain her self, and pass away the time, and that either in Solitude, in Company, or as she is a Political member of some Kingdom or Empire. Concerning all which in the general we may conclude, that it is with her as with the rest of the Aereal Genii, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀποδυσσάμενν τὸ σῶμα δαίμονιν ἐστὶ, for the Soul having once put off this Terrestrial Body becomes a Genius her self; as Maximus Tyrius, Xenocrates, Philo, and others expressly affirm. But we shall consider these things more particularly.

2. As for those Employments wherewith she may entertain her self in solitude, they are either Objects of the External Senses, or of the Inward Mind. Concerning the former whereof it is more easy to move Questions than satisfy them; as, Whether she have the same number of Senses she had in this life? That she is endued with Hearing, Sight, and Touch, I think there can be no scruple, because these will fall to her share necessarily, whether her Vehicle be organized or not; and that of Seeing and Touch is the most uncontrovertible of all. For the sense of visible Objects being discovered to us by transmission of Motion through those Spherical particles that are continued along from the Object through the Air to our very Organ of Sight, (which sees merely by reason of these particles being vitally united with the Soul) * the same particles pervading all the Soul's Vehicle, it is impossible but that she should see. But the Question is, whether she sees in every part thereof. To which I must answer, No: partly from what I have * already declared concerning the Heterogeneity of her Plastick part; and partly from a gross inconvenience that would follow this Supposition. For if we should grant that the Soul saw in every part of her Vehicle, every Object that is near would not only seem double, but centuple, or millecuple; which would be a very ugly enormity and defacement of Sight. Wherefore we have, with very good reason, restrained the Visive faculty of the Soul in this state of Separation, as well as it was in the Terrestrial Body.

3. But this hinders nothing but that the Soul, when she lies in one Homogeneous orb of Air, devoid of organization, may see round about her,

* Chap. 2.
sect. 5.

her, behind, before, above, beneath, and every way. But if she organize her Vehicle, *Sight* may haply be restrain'd, as in us who cannot see behind us. Which Consideration we touch'd upon * before.

4. It is plain therefore that these *Aereal Spirits*, though we cannot see them, cannot miss of *seeing* us; and that, it may be, from a mighty distance, if they can transform their Vehicle, or the Organ of Sight, into some such advantageous Figure as is wrought in Dioptrick Glasses. Which power will infinitely exceed the contracting and dilating of the pupil of our Eye, which yet is a weaker and more defectuous attempt towards so high a Privilege as we speak of: which notwithstanding may seem very possible in *Spirits*, from 31 and 34 Axiomes. The same also may be said of their *Hearing*. For the same principle may enable them to shape themselves Organs for the receiving of *Sounds*, of greater art and excellency than the most accurate *Acoustick* we read of, or can excogitate.

Wherefore it is a very childish mistake to think, that because we neither *see* the shape, nor *hear* the discourse of *Spirits*, that they neither *hear* nor *see* us. For soft Bodies are impressible by hard ones, but not on the contrary, as melted Wax will receive the Signature of the Seal, but the Seal is not at all impressed upon by the Wax. And so a solid Body will stop the course of the Air, but the Air will not stop the course of a solid Body; and every inconsiderable terrestrial consistency will reflect Light, but Light scarce moves any terrestrial Body out of its place, but is rebounded back by it. That therefore that is most tenuous and thin, is most passive, and therefore if it be once the Vehicle of Sense, is most sensible.

Whence it will follow, that the reflexion of Light from Objects being able to move our Organs, that are not so fine, they will more necessarily move those of the *Genii*, and at a greater distance. But their Bodies being of *diaphanous Air*, it is impossible for us to *see* them, they will give themselves the trouble of reducing them to a more *terrestrial consistency*, whereby they may reflect light. Nor can we easily *hear* their ordinary speech, partly because a very gentle motion of the Air will act upon their Vehicles, and partly because they may haply use the finer and purer part of that Element in this exercise, which it not so fit to move our Sense. And therefore unless they will be heard *datâ operâ* (of which the Devil of *Mascon* is a notorious * example) naturally that impress of the Air in their usual discourse can never strike our Organ.

* See *Antidote*, Book 3.
chap. 3. sect.
8.

* Chap. 2.
sect. 4.

5. And that we may not seem to say all this for nought; that they will have *Hearing*, as well as *Seeing*, appears from what I have intimated * above, that *this Faculty* is ranged near the Common *Sensorium* in the Vehicle, as well as that of *Sight*; and therefore the Vehicle being all Air, such percussions of it, as cause the sense of Sound in us, will necessarily do the like in them; but more accurately, haply, if they organize their Vehicle for the purpose, which will answer to the arrection of the Ears of Animals, for the better taking in the Sound.

6. That they have the sense of *Touch* is inevitably true, else how could they feel resistance, which is necessary in the bearing of one Body

Body against another, because they are impenetrable? And to speak freely my mind, it will be a very hard thing to disprove that they have not something analogical to *Smell* and *Tast*, which are very near a-kin to *Touch* properly so called. For *Fumes* and *Odours* passing so easily through the Air, will very naturally insinuate into their Vehicles also: which *Fumes*, if they be grosser and humectant, may raise that diversification of *Touch* which we Mortals call *Tasting*; if more subtile and dry, that which we call *Smelling*. Which if we should admit, we are within modest bounds as yet in comparison of others; as * *Cardan*, who affirms downright, that the Aereal *Genii* are nourished, and that some of them get into the Bodies of Animals to batten themselves there in their Blood and Spirits. Which is also averred by *Marcus* the *Mesopotamian* *Eremite* in * *Pfellus*, who tells us, that the purer sort of the *Genii* are nourished by the drawing in the Air, as our Spirits are in the Nerves and Arteries; and that other *Genii*, of a courser kind, suck in moisture, not with the Mouth as we do, but as a Sponge does water. And * *Moses Aegyptius* writes concerning the *Zabii*, that they eat of the blood of their Sacrifice, because, they thought it was the food of the *Demons* they worshipped, and that by eating thereof they were in a better capacity to communicate with them. Which things, if they could be believed, that would be no such hard Probleme concerning the *Familiars* of Witches, why they suck them. But such curiosities, being not much to our purpose, I willingly omit.

* De rerum
varietate, lib.
16. cap. 93.

* In his
ἐν πύλαις
δαίμονων.

* In his *More*
Nevochim,
part. 3. c. 46.

7. The conclusion of what has been said is this, That it is certain that the *Genii*, and consequently the Souls of men departed, who *ipso facto* are of the same rank with them, have the sense of *Seeing*, *Hearing*, and *Touching*, and not improbably of *Smelling* and *Tasting*. Which Faculties being granted, they need not be much at a loss how to spend their time, though it were but upon external Objects; all the furniture of Heaven and Earth being fairly exposed to their view. They see the same Sun and Moon that we do, behold the persons and converse of all men; and, if no special Law inhibit them, may pass from Town to Town, and from City to City, as *Hesiod* also intimates,

Ἡ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀμύρωι πᾶσαν ποιεῶσιν ἐπ' αἶαν.

There is nothing that we enjoy but they may have their fees out of it; fair Fields, large and invious Woods, pleasant Gardens, high and healthful Mountains, where the purest gusts of Air are to be met with, Crystal Rivers, mossy Springs, solemnity of Entertainments, Theatrick Poms and Shews, publick and private Discourses, the exercises of Religion, whether in Temples, Families, or hidden Cells.

They may be also (and haply not uninterested) Spectators of the glorious and mischievous hazards of War, whether Sea-fights or Land-fights; besides those soft and silent, though sometimes no less dangerous, Combats in the Camps of *Cupid*; and a thousand more particularities that it would be too long to reckon up, where they haply are not mere Spectators, but Abettors, as *Plutarch* writes: Like old men that are past Wrestling, Pitching the Bar, or playing at Cudgels themselves, yet will assist and abet the young men of the Parish at those Exercises. So the Souls of men departed, though they have put

put off with the Body the capacity of the ordinary functions of humane Life, yet they may assist and abet them, as pursuing some design in them; and that either for evil or good, according as they were affected themselves when they were in the Body.

8. In brief, whatever is the *Custom* and *Desire* of the Soul in this life, that sticks and adheres to her in that which is to come; and she will be sure, so far as she is capable, either to act it, or to be at least a Spectator and Abettor of such kind of actions.

— — — — — *Quæ gratia currum*

Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura nitentes

Pascere equos, eadem sequitur tellure repostos.

Dissertat. 27. τὰς αὐτὰς χρόνῳ καὶ νόμῳ δαίμονες αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων, i. e. being made ipso facto Genii instead of Men, that, beside the peculiar happiness they reap thereby to themselves, they are appointed by God, and have a mission from him to be Overseers of humane affairs: but that every Genius does not perform every office, but as their natural Inclinations and Customs were in this life, they exercise the like in some manner in the other. And therefore he will have Æsculapius to practise Physick still, and Hercules to exercise his strength, Amphilochous to prophesy, Castor and Pollux to navigate, Minos to hear causes, and Achilles to war. Which opinion is as likely to hold true in Bad Souls as in Good; and then it will follow, that the Souls of the wicked make it their business to assist and abet the exercise of such Vices as themselves were most addicted to in this life, and to animate and tempt men to them. From whence it would follow, that they being thus by their separate state Demons, as has been said already, if they be also tempters to evil, they will very little differ from mere Devils.

Which rightly understood is no poetical fiction, but a professed Truth in Plato's Philosophy. And Maximus Tyrius speaks expressly even of the better sort of Souls, who having left the body, and so becoming *Genii* instead of Men, that, beside the peculiar happiness they reap thereby to themselves, they are appointed by God, and have a mission from him to be Overseers of humane affairs: but that every Genius does not perform every office, but as their natural Inclinations and Customs were in this life, they exercise the like in some manner in the other. And therefore he will have *Æsculapius* to practise Physick still, and *Hercules* to exercise his strength, *Amphilochous* to prophesy, *Castor* and *Pollux* to navigate, *Minos* to hear causes, and *Achilles* to war. Which opinion is as likely to hold true in Bad Souls as in Good; and then it will follow, that the Souls of the wicked make it their business to assist and abet the exercise of such Vices as themselves were most addicted to in this life, and to animate and tempt men to them. From whence it would follow, that they being thus by their separate state *Demons*, as has been said already, if they be also tempters to evil, they will very little differ from mere *Devils*.

9. But besides this employment in reference to us, they may entertain themselves with *Intellectual* Contemplations, whether Natural, Mathematical, or Metaphysical. For assuredly *Knowledge* is not so easy and cheap in this state of Separation, but that they may advance and improve themselves by Exercise and Meditations. And they being in a capacity to forget by reason of desuetude, it will be a new pleasure to them to recal to mind their almost obliterate speculations. And for those that take more pleasure in *outward Sense* than in the operations of their *Understanding*; there being so much change in Nature, and so various qualifications of the Air, and these inferiour Elements, which must needs act upon their *Aereal* Bodies to more or less gratification or dislike, this also will excuse them from being idle, and put them upon quest after such refreshments and delights as Nature will afford the multifarious presages and desires of their fitting Vehicles.

10. Not but that they keep constant to some general inclination, which has divided these *Aereal* wanderers into so many Orders or Tribes; the ancient Philosophers and Poets (which are Philosophers of the ancientest standing of all) having assigned places proper to each Order: the Sea, Rivers, and Springs to one, Mountains and Groves to others, and so of the rest. Whence they imposed also those names

of

of the *Nereides*, *Naiades*, *Oreades*, *Dryades*, and the like: to which you may add the *Dii tutelares* of Cities and Countries, and those that love the warmth of Families, and homely converse of Men, such as they styled *Lares familiares*. All which, and hundreds more, which there is no need to recite, though they be engaged ever in one natural propensity; yet there being so great variety of occasions to gratify it more or less, their thoughts may be employed in purchasing and improving those delights that are most agreeable to their own nature. Which particularities to run over, would be as infinite as useless.

These short intimations are sufficient to make us understand, that the *Genii* and *Separate Souls* need want no *Employment*, no not in *Solitude*: for such must their stay also amongst us be esteemed, when they do not sensibly and personally converse with us.

N O T E S

On CHAP. IV. Sect. 2.

THE same Particles pervading all the Soul's Vehicle, it is impossible but she should see, &c. unless in this separate State also a Collection of the rays coming from one Point into some other Point again is necessary. But since through a very little hole of any thin Plate applied to the Eye, we see the Object about us, even in this gross Body, with sufficient clearness and distinctness, why may we not by the help of single Rays, and not thus co-united, be able to see Objects very distinctly in a Vehicle so tender and so fine as what we now speak of, unless peradventure there may some difficulty arise about the distance.

C H A P. V.

1. That the Separate Soul spends not all her time in Solitude.
2. That her converse with us seems more intelligible than that with the *Genii*.
3. How the *Genii* may be visible one to another, though they be to us invisible.
4. Of their approaches, and of the limits of their swiftness of motion:
5. And how far they exceed us in celerity.
6. Of the figure or shape of their Vehicles, and of their privacy, when they would be invisible.
7. That they cannot well converse in a mere simple Orbicular form.
8. That they converse in Humane shape, at least the better sort of them.
9. Whether the shape they be in, proceed merely from the Imperium of their Will and Fancy, or is regulated by a natural Character of the Plastick part of the Soul.
10. That the personal shape of a Soul or Genius is partly from the Will, and partly from the Plastick power.
11. That considering how the Soul organizes the Fœtus in the Womb, and moves our limbs at pleasure, it were a wonder if Spirits should not have such command over their Vehicles as is believed.
12. A further Argument from an excessive virtue some have given to Imagination.

E e e

1. But

1. **B**UT the *Separate* state of the Soul does not condemn her to this *Solitude*, but being admitted into the Order of the *Genii*, she is possessed of their Privileges, which is to converse personally with this *Aereal* people, and also upon occasion with the Inhabitants of the Earth; though the latter with far more difficulty.

2. As for her converse with the *Aereal Genii* and other Souls separate, it must be in all reason concluded to be exceeding much more frequent than that with Men, and yet this latter is in some sort more intelligible; because it is certain she can *see* us, light being reflected from our Opake Bodies unto her Sense, and by conspissating her Vehicle, she may make her self *visible* to us. But the Vehicles of the *Genii* and of *Souls* being in their natural consistence purely *Aereal*, and Air being a transparent Body, it will transmit the light wholly; and so no reflexion being made from these *Aiery* Bodies, they can have no perception of one another's presence, and therefore no society nor communion one with another.

3. This seems a shrewd Difficulty at the first view. But it is easily taken off, if we consider that *Air* will admit of many degrees of *Rarefaction* and *Condensation*, and yet still appear unto us alike invisible, as one may observe in the *Weather-glass*. But it were proper to propose in this case the Experiment of the *Wind-gun*, wherein the *Air* is compressed to a great number of degrees of *Condensation* beyond its natural state; within the compass of many whereof there is no doubt, if not in the utmost, that the *Air* does remain invisible to us. But there is no scruple to be made but that in the progress of these degrees of *Condensation* the *Air*, if it were in a *Glass-barrel*, might become visible to the *Genii*, by reason of the tenderness and delicacy of their Senses, before it would be so to us.

Whence it follows, that the Vehicles of the *Genii* may have a consistency different from the *Air*, and perceptible to them, that is to say, to one another's sight, though it be as unperceptible to us as the rest of the *Air* is. As, it may be, a man that has but bad eyes would not be able to distinguish Ice immersed in the Water from the Water it self by his sight, though he might by his Touch. Or if their Vehicles could be supposed purer and finer than the rest of the *Air*, their presence might be perceptible by that means too. For this vaporous Air having without question a confused reflexion of light in it, every way in some proportion like that in a Mist, or when the Sun shines waterishly and prognosticks rain; these repercussions of light being far more sensible to the *Genii* than to us, the lessening of them would be more sensible, and therefore the diminution of reflexion from their Vehicles would be sufficient to discover their presence one to another: and for the illustrating of this Hypothesis, the experiment of the *Weather-glass* is more proper.

* But the other supposition I look upon as the more likely to be true; and that as the *aquatil Animals* that live in the *Sea*, have a consistency grosser than the Element they move in, so it is with these that live in the *Air*, though there be nothing near so great a difference here as in that other Element.

4. It is plain therefore, that the Persons of the *Genii* and Separate Souls are visible one to another: But yet not at any distance, and therefore there is necessity of approaching to one another for mutual converse: which enforces us to say something of their *Local Motion*. Which is neither by Fins nor Wings, as in Fishes or Birds, who are fain to sustain themselves by these instruments from sinking to the bottom of either Element: but it is merely by the direction of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicle toward the place they aim at; and in such a swiftness or leisureliness as best pleases themselves, and is competent to their natures. For they can go no swifter than the whole sum of agitation of the particles of their Vehicle will carry so much Matter, nor indeed so swift; * for it implies that their Vehicles would be turned into an absolutely-hard Body, such as Brass or Iron, or whatever we find harder; so that necessarily they would fall down to the Earth as dead as a Stone. These therefore are but phantastick conceits that give such agility to Spirits, as if they could be here and there and every where at once, skip from one Pole of the World to another, and be on the Earth again in a moment: whereas in truth they can pass with no greater swiftness than the direction of such a part of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicles will permit, as may be spared from what is employed in keeping them within a tolerable compass of a due Aereal fluidity.

5. And this alone will suffice to make them exceed us in activity and swiftness by many degrees. For their whole Vehicle is haply at least as thin and moveable as our *Animal Spirits*, which are very few in comparison of this luggage of an earthly Body that they are to drive along with them. But the *spiritual Bodies* of the *Genii* have nothing to drive along with them but themselves; and therefore are more free and light, compared to us, than a mettled Steed that has cast his Rider, compared with a Pack-horse loaden with a Sack of Salt.

6. The next thing to be considered touching the *mutual Conversation* of these Aereal *Genii*, is the *shape* they appear in one to another, of what *Figure* it is, and whether the Figure be *Natural*, or *Arbitrary*, or *Mixed*. For that they must appear in *some Figure* or other is plain, in that their Vehicles are not of an infinite extension. It is the more general Opinion, that there is no particular Figure that belongs unto them naturally, unless it be that which of all Figures is most simple and most easy to conform to, even by external helps, which is the equal compression of the Air on every side of the Vehicle, by which means drops of Dew and Rain, and pellets of Hail, come so ordinarily into that shape. Which also will more handsomely accord with the nature of the Soul, * supposing she consist of *Central* and *Radial* essence, as I have above described, and the *Common Sensorium* be placed in the midst. In this Figure may the Soul reside in the Air, and haply melt her self, I mean her Vehicle, into near so equal a liquidity with that part of that Element adjacent to her, that it may be in some measure like our retiring into secrecy from the sight of men, when we desire to be private by our selves.

7. But she may, if she will, and likely with far more ease, change this consistency of her *Aereal* Body into such degree of thickness, that there may be a dubious discovery of her, as in the glimpse of a Fish under the water, and may still make her self more visible to her Fellow-*Genii*, though keeping yet this simple *Orbicular* form. But what converse there can be betwixt two such heaps of living Air, I know not. They may indeed communicate their *Affections* one to another in such a way as is discovered in the Eye, wherein the *motions of the Spirits* do plainly indicate the *Passions of the Mind*: so that it may seem possible in this simple Figure to make known their joy or grief, peaceableness or wrath, love or dislike, by the modification of the motion of the Spirits of their Vehicle. * But how there can well be entertained any *Intellectual* or *Rational Conference*, without any further organization of their *Aiery* Bodies, I profess my self at a loss to understand.

8. Wherefore the *Genii* and *Separate Souls*, whatever their shape be in private, appear in a more operose and articulate form when they are to converse with one another. For they can change their Figure in a manner as they please, by Axiome 34. which power, I conceive, will be made use of not only for service, but ornament and pulchritude. And the most unexceptionable Beauty, questionless, is that of *Man* in the best patterns, (chuse what Sex you will) and far above the rest of Creatures; which is not our judgment only, but His that made us. For certainly he would give to the *Principal of terrestrial Animals* the noblest form and shape; which, though it be much obscured by our unfortunate Fall, yet questionless the defacement is not so great, but that we may have a near guess what it has been heretofore. It is most rational therefore to conclude, that the *Aereal Genii* converse with one another in *Humane* shape, at least the better sort of them.

9. But the difficulty now is, whether that *Humane* shape that the Soul transforms her Vehicle into, be simply the Effect of the *Imperium* of her *Will* over the Matter she actuates, or that her *Will* may be in some measure limited or circumscribed in its effect by a concomitant exertion of the *Plastick* power; * so that what proceeds from the *Will* may be only more general, that is, That the Soul's *Will* may only command the Vehicle into an *Animal* form; but that it is the form or shape of a *Man*, may arise in a more natural way, from the concomitant exertion of the *Plastick* virtue; I say, in a more easy and natural way; For vehemency of desire to alter the Figure into another representation, may make the appearance resemble some other creature: But no forced thing can last long.

The more easy and natural shape therefore that, at least, the better *Genii* appear in, is *Humane*: which if it may be granted, it may be as likely that such a determinate *Humane* shape may be more easy and natural than another; and that the Soul, when she wills to appear in personal Figure, will transform her Vehicle into one constant likeness, unless she disguise her self on set purpose. That is, the *Plastick* power of every Soul, whether of Men or of the other *Genii*, does naturally display it self into a different modification of the *Humane* shape, which is the proper Signature of every particular or individual person:

person: which though it may be a little changed in Generation by virtue of the Imagination of the Parents, or quality of their seed, yet the Soul set free from that Body she got here, may exquisitely recover her ancient form again.

10. Not that the *Plastick* virtue, awakened by the *Imperium* of her *Will*, shall renew all the Lineaments it did in this *Earthly Body* (for abundance of them are useless and to no purpose, which therefore, Providence so ordaining, will be silent in this *Aiery* figuration, and only such operate as are fit for this separate state; and such are those as are requisite to perfect the visible feature of a Person, giving him all parts of either ornament or use for the pleasure of a rational converse;) nor that this *Efformative* power does determine the whole appearance alone (for these *Aereal Spirits* appear variously clad, some like beautiful Virgins, others like valiant Warriors with their Helmets and Plumes of feathers, as *Philostratus* would make us believe *Achilles* did to *Apollonius*;) But there is a *mixt* action and effect, resulting partly from the freeness of the *Will* and *Imagination*, and partly from the natural propension of the *Plastick* virtue, to cast the Vehicle into such a personal shape.

11. Which Prerogative of the Soul, in having this power thus to shape her Vehicle at will, though it may seem very strange, because we do not see it done before our eyes, nor often think on such things; yet it is not much more wonderful than that she organizes the *Fœtus* in the womb, or that we can move the parts of our Body merely by our *Will* and *Imagination*. And that the *Aereal Spirits* can do these things, that they can shape their Vehicles, and transform themselves into several Appearances, I need bring no new instances thereof. Those Narrations I have recited in my *Third Book* against *Atheism* do sufficiently evince this Truth. And verily considering the great power acknowledged in *Imagination* by all Philosophers, nothing would seem more strange, than that these *Aiery Spirits* should not have this command over their own Vehicles, to transform them as they please.

12. For there are some, and they of no small note, that attribute so wonderful effects to that Faculty armed with *Confidence* and *Belief* (to which *Passion Fear* may in some manner be referred, as being a strong belief of an imminent evil, and that it will surely take effect, as also vehement *Desire*, as being accompanied with no small measure of perswasion that we may obtain the thing desired, else *Desire* would not be so very active) I say, they attribute so wonderful force to *Imagination*, that they affirm that it will not only alter a man's own Body, but act upon anothers, and that at a distance; that it will inflict diseases on the sound, and heal the sick; that it will cause Hail, Snows, and Winds; that it will strike down an Horse or Camel, and cast their Riders into a ditch; that it will do all the feats of Witchcraft, even to the making of Ghosts and Spirits appear, by transforming the adjacent Air into the shape of a person that cannot only be felt and seen, but heard to discourse, and that not only by them whose *Imagination* created this *aiery Spectrum*, but by other by-standers, whose *Fancy* contributed nothing to its existence. To such an extent as this have *Avicenna*, *Algazel*, *Paracelsus*, *Pomponatius*,

Vaninus and others, exalted the power of *humane Imagination*: which if it were true, this transfiguration of the Vehicles of the separate Souls and *Genii* were but a trifle in comparison thereof.

N O T E S

On CHAP. V. Sect. 3.

BUT the other Hypothesis I look upon as the more likely to be true, &c. It seems indeed by far to be the more probable Opinion. For if the Vehicles of the aerial *Genii* were thinner than the Air it self, they would with too great Force be compress'd by it; which, according to the Laws of Nature, would perpetually endeavour to overflow and fill the Vehicle of a Genius. So that it is very necessary that the consistency of the Vehicle should be equally thick with, or thicker than the Air.

Sect. 4. For it implies that their Vehicles would be turned into an absolutely hard Body, &c. This would certainly follow from the Principles of the *Cartesian* Philosophy, which makes the Rest and the Union of Parts the same. But as to my self, all things at the last being well considered, I take the Union of the Parts of Matter to be owing to a *spiritual Principle*; as also the Motion of the Matter of the World to be *Vital*: so that there is nothing to be feared in this stony Hardness, although a Genius should direct all the Motion of its Vehicle for a progressive Tendency towards some Part. But that the Swiftesses of these progressive Motions would be still limited by the limited main Sum of Motion in a Vehicle, is sufficiently apparent.

Sect. 6. Supposing she consist of central and radial Essence, as I have above described, &c. But that this Hypothesis is not so likely to be true, I have openly in my Notes on the very Place above declared. See Book I. Chap. VI. where the Description is made.

Sect. 7. But how there can well be entertain'd any intellectual or rational Conference without any farther, &c. And this is no mean Argument amongst others, that the *Plasticks* of the *Genii* are *Hominiform*, since they are certainly sociable, in as much as they are rational.

Therefore they ought to have some Personal Form. But what Form is preferable to the Humane one?

Sect. 9. So that what proceeds from the Will may be only more general, that is, &c. This surely is very likely, since the *Plastick* it self is of its own Nature *Hominiform*, as I have noted above. But whatever is superadded, or as often as this Form is changed, how it is effected, is from other Reasons to be explicated.

C H A P. VI.

1. More credible Instances of the Effects of Imagination.
2. A special and peculiar Instance in Signatures of the Fœtus.
3. That what *Fienus* grants, who has so cautiously bounded the power of *Bancy*, is sufficient for

for the present purpose. 4. Examples approved of by Fienus. 5. Certain Examples rejected by him, and yet approved of by Fernelius and Sennertus. 6. Three notorious Stories of the power of the Mother's Imagination on the Fœtus out of Helmont. 7. A conjectural inference from those Stories, what influence the Spirit of Nature has in all Plastick operations. 8. A further confirmation of the Conjecture from Signatures on the Fœtus. 9. An application thereof to the transfiguration of the Vehicles of Demons.

I. **B**UT I shall contain my belief within more moderate bounds, that which the most sober Authors assent to, being sufficient for our turn; and that is the power of Imagination on our own Bodies, or what is comprehended within our own, viz. the Fœtus in the Womb of the Mother. For that Imagination will bring real and sensible effects to pass is plain, in that some have raised diseases in their own Bodies by too strongly imagining of them; by fancying bitter or sour things, have brought those real saviours into their mouths; at the remembring of some filthy Object, have fallen a vomiting; at the imagining of a Potion, have fallen a purging; and many such things of the like nature. Amongst which, that of prefixing to one's self what time in the morning we will wake, is no less admirable than any. Which Alterations upon the Spirits for the production of such qualities, is every jot as hard as the ranging them into new figures or postures.

But the hardest of all is, to make them so determinately active, as to change the shape of the Body, by sending out knobs like horns, as it happen'd to Cyppus, of which Agrippa speaks in his *Occulta Philosoph.* Which I should not have repeated here, had I not been credibly informed of a later Example of the like effect of Imagination, though upon more fanciful grounds. That Fear has killed some, and turned others gray, is to be referred to Imagination also: the later of which examples * is a sign that the Plastick power of the Soul has some influence also upon the very hairs: which will make it less marvellous that the Soul's Vehicle may be turned into the live effigies of a Man; not a hair, that is necessary to the perfecting of his representation, being excluded, free Imagination succeeding or assisting the Plastick power in the other state.

2. But of all Examples, those of the Signatures of the Fœtus by the Imagination of the Mother, come the nearest to our purpose. For we may easily conceive, that as the Plastick power in the Fœtus is directed or seduced by the force of the Mother's Fancy; so the Efformative virtue in Souls separate and the Genii may be governed and directed, or perverted by the force of their Imagination. And so much the more surely by how much the union is more betwixt the Imagination of the Soul and her own Plastick faculty, than betwixt her and the Plastick power of another Soul; and the capacity of being changed, greater in the yielding Aereal Vehicle, than in the grosser rudiments of the Fœtus in the Womb.

3. And yet the Effects of the force of the Mother's Imagination in the signing of the Fœtus is very wonderful, and almost beyond belief

to

to those that have not examined these things. But the more learned fort both of Physicians and Philosophers are agreed on the truth thereof, as *Empedocles*, *Aristotle*, *Pliny*, *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, and all the modern Physicians, being born down into assent by daily experience. For these *Signatures* of less extravagance and enormity are frequent enough, as the similitude of Cherries, Mulberries, the colour of Claret-wine spilt on a woman with child, with many such like instances. And if we stand to what *Fienus* has defined in this Matter, who has, I think, behaved himself as cautiously and modestly as may be, there will be enough granted to assure us of what we aim at. For he does acknowledge that the *Imagination* of the Mother may change the figure of the *Fœtus* so as to make it bear a resemblance, though not absolutely perfect, of an Ape, Pig, or Dog, or any such like Animal. The like he affirms of colours, hairs, and excrescencies of several sorts: that it may produce also what is very like or analogous to horns and hoofs, and that it may encrease the bigness and number of the parts of the Body.

Fien. de viri-
bus Imagina-
tionis, quest.
22.

Fien. de viri-
bus Imaginat.
quest. 13.
exempl. 5, 7,
18, 19, 27.
quest. 22.

4. And though he does reject several of the Examples he has produced out of Authors, yet those which he admits for true are Indications plain enough, what we may expect in the Vehicle of a departed Soul or Demon. As that of the Hairy Girl out of *Marcus Damascenus*; that other out of *Gulielmus Paradissus*, of a Child whose skin and nails resembled those of a Bear; and a third of *Balduinus Ronseus*, of one born with many excrescencies coloured and figured like those in a Turkey-cock; and a fourth out of *Pareus*, of one who was born with an head like a Frog; as lastly that out of *Avicenna*, of Chickens with Hawks heads. All which deviations of the *Plastick* power happened from the force of *Imagination* in the Females, either in the time of Conception, or gestation of their young.

Fien. de viri-
bus Imaginat.
quest. 13.
exempl. 14.

Sennert. de
viribus Ima-
ginat. cap. 14.

5. But he scruples giving assent to others, which yet are assented to by very learned Writers. As that of Black-moors being born of white Parents, and white Children of black, by the exposal of pictures representing an *Aethiopian* or *European*: which those two excellent Physicians, *Fernelius* and *Sennertus*, both agree to. He rejects also that of *Cornelius Gemma*, of a Child that was born with his Forehead wounded and running with blood, from the husband's threatening his wife, when she was big, with a drawn Sword which he directed towards her Forehead. Which will not seem so incredible, if we consider what *Sennertus* records of his own knowledge, viz. That a woman with Child seeing a Butcher divide a Swine's head with his Cleaver, brought forth her Child with its face cloven in the upper jaw, the palate, and upper lip, to the very nose.

6. But the most notorious instances of this sort are those, of *Helmont*, *De injectis materialibus*. The one of a Taylor's wife at *Mablin*, who standing at her door, and seeing a Soldier's hand cut off in a quarrel, presently fell into labour, being struck with horror at the spectacle, and brought forth a child with one hand, the other arm bleeding without one, of which wound the infant died by the great expense of blood. Another woman, the wife of one *Marcus de Hoeter*, Merchant of *Antwerp*, in the year 1602. seeing a soldier begging who had

had lost his right arm in *Ostend*-siege, which he shewed to the people still bloody, fell presently into labour, and brought forth a Daughter with one arm struck off, nothing left but a bloody stump to employ the Chirurgeon's skill: this woman married afterwards to one *Hooch-camer*, Merchant of *Amsterdam*, and was yet alive in the year 1638. as *Helmont* writes. He adds a third Example, of another Merchant's wife which he knew, who hearing on a morning there were thirteen men to be beheaded, (this happened at *Antwerp* in Duke *D'Alva* his time) she had the curiosity to see the execution. She getting therefore a place in the chamber of a certain widow-woman, a friend of hers that dwelt in the Market-place, beheld this Tragick spectacle; upon which she suddenly fell into labour, and brought forth a perfectly formed infant, only the head was wanting, but the neck bloody as their bodies she beheld that had their heads cut off. And that which does still advance the wonder is, that the hand, arm, and head of these infants, were none of them to be found. From whence *Van-Helmont* would infer a penetration of dimensions; but how groundlessly I will not dispute here.

See *Helmont. de Inject. Material. pagr. 9.*

7. If these Stories he recites be true, as I must confess I do not well know how to deny them, he reporting them with so honest and credible circumstances; they are notable examples of the power of *Imagination*, and such as do not only win belief to themselves, but also to others that *Fienus* would reject, not of this nature only we are upon, of wounding the body of the Infant, but also of more exorbitant conformation of parts, of which we shall bring an Instance or two anon.

In the mean time, while I more carefully contemplate this strange virtue and power of the Soul of the Mother in which there is no such measure of purification or exaltedness, that it should be able to act such miracles, as I may call them, rather than *natural effects*; I cannot but be more than usually inclinable to think, that the *Plastick* faculty of the Soul of the Infant, or whatever accessions there may be from the *Imagination* of the Mother, is not the adequate cause of the formation of the *Fætus*: a thing which *Plotinus* somewhere intimates by the bye, as I have * already noted, viz. That the Soul of the World, or the Spirit of Nature, assists in this performance. Which, if it be true, we have discovered a Cause proportionable to so prodigious an effect. For we may easily conceive that the deeply-impassioned Fancy of the Mother snatches away the Spirit of Nature into consent: Which Spirit may rationally be acknowledged to have a hand in the efformation of all vital Beings in the World, and haply be the only Agent in forming of all manner of *Plants*.

* Book 2. ch. 10. lect. 2.

In which kind, whether she exert her power in any other Elements than *Earth* and *Water*, I will conclude no further, than that there may be a possibility thereof in the calmer Regions of *Air* and *Æther*. To the right understanding of which conjecture, some light will offer it self from what we have said concerning the *Visibility* and *Consistency* of the *Aereal Demons* in their excursions one with another.

8. But this is not the only Argument that would move one to think that this Spirit of Nature intermeddles with the Efformation of the

the *Fætus*. For those *Signatures* that are derived on the Infant from the Mother's fancy in the act of Conception cannot well be understood without this Hypothesis. For what can be the Subject of that Signature? Not the *Plastick* part of the Soul of the Mother; for that it is not *the Mother's Soul* that efforms the *Embryo*, as *Sennertus* ingeniously conjectures from the manner of the efformation of Birds, which is in their Eggs, distinct from the Hen, and they may as well be hatched without any Hen at all, a thing ordinarily practised in *Egypt*; nor the *Body* of the *Embryo*, for it has yet no Body; nor its *Soul*, for the Soul, if we believe *Aristotle*, is not yet present there. But the *Spirit of Nature* is present every where, * which snatched into consent by the force of the *Imagination* of the Mother, retains the Note, and will be sure to seal it on the Body of the Infant.

*De formarum
Origine, c. 9.*

For what rude inchoations the *Soul of the World* has begun in the Matter of the *Fætus*, this *Signature* is comprehended in the whole design, and after compleated by the presence and operation of the particular *Soul of the Infant*, which co-operates conformably to the pattern of the Soul of the World, and insists in her footsteps; who having once begun any hint to an entire design, she is alike able to pursue it in any place, she being every where like, or rather the same to her self. For as our Soul being one; yet, upon the various temper of the Spirits, exerts her self into various imaginations and conceptions; so the Soul of the World being the same perfectly every where, is engaged to send her *Efformative* power every where alike, where the Matter is exactly the same.

Whence it had been no wonder, if those Chickens above-mentioned with Hawks heads had been hatched an hundred miles distant from the Hen, whose *Imagination* was disturbed in the act of Conception: because the *Soul of the World* had begun a rude draught, which it self would as necessarily pursue every where, as a *Geometrician* certainly knows how to draw a Circle that will fit three points given.

9. This Opinion therefore of *Plotinus* is neither irrational nor unintelligible, * That the *Soul of the World* interposes and insinuates into all generations of things, while the Matter is fluid and yielding. Which would induce a man to believe, that she may not stand idle in the transfiguration of the Vehicles of the *Demons*, but assist their fancies and desires, and so help to cloath them and attire them according to their own pleasure: or it may be sometimes against their wills, as the unwieldiness of the Mother's Fancy forces upon her a Monstrous birth.

NOTES

On CHAP. VI. Sect. I.

IS a Sign, that the *Plastick Power* of the Soul hath some Influence also on the very Hairs, &c. For it is the *Plastick* in which lies the proper Seat of the Passions. And seeing that the Force of the *Spirit of Nature*

Nature is most seen in the first strokes of the Formation of Animals, it is not at all unreasonable, that the Soul's own Plastick should, at least after this, mix it self with the Operations of the *Spirit of Nature* for the producing of the Hairs. But there is in all these vital Operations a close and marvellous Union and Conjunction of the *Spirit of Nature*, and the proper Plastick of Souls.

Sect. 8. Which snatch'd into Consent by the Force of the Imagination of the Mother, retains the Note, &c. Not that this Note is branded, as it were, into that part of the *Spirit of Nature*, so as to remain there in the Spirit, and as in that very Place; but that the *Spirit of Nature* promotes and perfects the Signature which it so begins, wherever the Matter of Conception shall be found; since, with reference to its self, that Spirit is the same every where; and will do the very same as if the Matter of Conception had remained in the same Place; as is more largely explained in this very Section.

Sect. 9. That the Soul of the World *interposeth*, &c. Nay, it seems to be necessary in the first Rudiments of such Fœtus's as are to be form'd; since the particular Soul is not yet present, while the Body remains as yet unorganiz'd.

And so help to clothe them, and attire them, &c. For, since the Vehicles of Dæmons are tender and tenuious, and their Imaginations strong and vehement, what hinders but that the *Spirit of Nature* may be snatched away into Consent here; as in the Signatures upon Fœtus's is often done.

C H A P. VII.

1. Three notable Examples of Signatures, rejected by Fienus: 2. And yet so far allowed for possible, as will fit our Design. 3. That Helmont's Cherry, and Licetus his Crab-fish are shrewd Arguments that the Soul of the World has to do with all Efformations of both Animals and Plants. 4. An Example of a most exact and lively Signature out of Kircher: 5. With his Judgment thereupon. 6. Another Example out of him, of a Child with gray hairs. 7. An Explication of what has been said hitherto, concerning the Signatures of the Fœtus, to the transfiguration of the Aiery Vehicles of Separate Souls and Dæmons. 8. Of their personal transformation visible to us.

1. **T**HOSE other Examples of the Signation of the Fœtus from the Mother's Fancy, which Fienus rejecteth, the one of them is out of Wierus, of a man that threatned his Wife when she was bigg with Child, saying, she bore the Devil in her Womb, and that he would kill him: whereupon, not long after, she brought forth a Child well shaped from the middle downwards, but upwards spotted with black and red spots, with Eyes in its forehead, a mouth like a Satyr, ears like a Dog, and bended horns on its head like a Goat. The other out of Ludovicus Vives, of one who returning home in the Disguise of a Devil, whose part he had acted on the Stage, and having

Wierus de
Præstigi. Dæ-
mon. lib. 4.
cap. 18.

Fien. de viri-
bus Imaginat.
quest. 15.
exempl. 8.

having to do with his Wife in that habit, saying, he would beget a Devil on her, impregnated her with a Monster of a shape plainly *diabolical*. The third and most remarkable is out of *Peramatus*, of a Monster born at *St. Laurence* in the *West-Indies*, in the year 1573. the narration whereof was brought to the Duke of *Medina Sidonia*, from very faithful hands. How there was a Child born there at that time, that, besides the horrid deformity of its mouth, ears, and nose, had two Horns on the head, like those of young Goats, long hair on the Body, a fleshy girdle about his middle, double, from whence hung a piece of flesh like a purse, and a bell of flesh in his left hand, like those the *Indians* use when they dance, white boots of flesh on his legs, doubled down: In brief, the whole shape was horrid and *diabolical*, and conceived to proceed from some fright the Mother had taken from the antick dances of the *Indians*, amongst whom the *Devil* himself does not fail to appear sometimes.

Fien. de viri-
bus Imaginat.
quest. 13.
exempl. 9.

Fien. de viri-
bus Imagina-
tionis, quest.
22.

2. These Narrations *Fienus* rejecteth, not as false, but as not being done by any natural power, or, if they be, that the descriptions are sometimes more lively than the truth. But in the mean time he does freely admit, that by the mere power of Imagination there might be such excrescencies as might represent those things that are there mentioned; though those *diabolical* shapes could not have true horns, hoofs, tail, or any other part specifically distinct from the nature of Man. But so far as he acknowledges is enough for our turn.

Licetus de
Monstrorum
causis & dif-
ferentiis, l. 2.
cap. 66.

3. But *Fortunius Licetus* is more liberal in his grants, allowing not only that the Births of women may be very exquisitely distorted in some of their parts into the likeness of those of Brutes, but that Chimerical imaginations in Dreams may also effect it, as well as Fancies, or external Objects when they are awake. Of the latter sort whereof he produces an Example that will more than match our purpose, of a *Sicilian* matron, who by chance beholding a Crab in a Fisherman's hand new caught, and of a more than ordinary largeness, when she was brought to bed, brought forth a Crab (as well as a Child) perfectly like those that are ordinarily caught in the Sea. This was told him by a person of credit, who both knew the Woman, and saw the Crab she brought forth.

In his Demens
Idea, paragr.
37.
De Magneti-
ca vulnerum
curat. paragr.
133.
In his Vis
Magnetica.
In his Tract-
at. Anima,
paragr. 7.
and else-
where.

Helmont's Cherry he so often mentions, and how it was green, pale, yellow, and red, at the times of year other Cherries are, is something of this nature; that is to say, comes near to the perfect species of a Cherry, as this did of a Crab, the plantal life of the Cherry being in some measure in the one, as the life of an Animal was perfectly in the other. Which confirms what we said before, that strength of our Desire and Imagination may snatch into consent the Spirit of Nature, and make it act: Which once having begun, leaves not off, if Matter will but serve for to work upon; and being the same in all places, acts the same upon the same Matter, in the same circumstances. For the Root and Soul of every Vegetable is the Spirit of Nature; in virtue whereof this Cherry flourish'd and ripened, according to the seasons of the Country where the party was that bore that live Signature.

These

These two instances are very shrewd arguments that the *Soul of the World* has to do with all Efformations of either *Plants* or *Animals*. For neither the Child's Soul, nor the Mother's, in any likelihood, could frame that *Crab*, though the Mother might, by that strange Power of *Desire* and *Imagination*, excite the *Spirit of the World*, that attempts upon any Matter that is fitted for generation, some way or other, to make something of it; and being determined by the Fancy of the Woman, might sign the humid materials in her Womb with the image of her Mind.

4. Wherefore if *Fienus* had considered from what potent causes *Signatures* may arise, he would not have been so scrupulous in believing that degree of exactness that some of them are reported to have: or if he had had the good hap to have met with so notable an example thereof, as * *Kircher* professes himself to have met with. For he tells a story of a Man that came to him for this very cause, to have his opinion, what a certain strange *Signature*, which he had on his Arm from his birth, might portend; concerning which he had consulted both *Astrologers* and *Cabbalists*, who had promised great preferments, the one imputing it to the influence of the Stars, the other to the favour of the *sealing* Order of Angels. But *Kircher* would not spend his judgment upon a mere verbal description thereof; though he had plainly enough told him, it was the *Pope sitting on his Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, and an Angel putting a Crown on his head.* * De Arte Magnetica, lib. 3. part. 7. cap. 7.

Wherefore the man, desirous to hear a further confirmation of these hopes, (he had conceived from the favourable conjectures of others) by the suffrage of so learned a man, was willing, in private, to put off his doublet, and shew his Arm to *Kircher*: who having view'd it with all possible care, does profess that the *Signature* was so perfect, that it seem'd rather the work of *Art*, than of exorbitating *Nature*; and yet by certain observations he made, that he was well assured it was the work of *Nature*, and not of *Art*, though it was an artificial piece that Nature imitated, viz. the picture of *Pope Gregory XIII.* who is sometimes drawn according as this *Signature* did lively represent, namely, on a Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, leaning with one hand on his Seat, and bearing the other in that posture in which they give the Benediction, and an Angel removing a Curtain, and reaching a Crown towards his head.

5. *Kircher* therefore leaving the superstitions and fooleries of the spurious *Cabbalists* and *Astrologers*, told him the truth, though nothing so pleasant as their lies and flatteries, viz. That this *Signature* was not impressed by any either influence of the Stars, or Seals of Angels, but that it was the effect of the *Imagination* of his Mother that bore him, who in some more than ordinary fit of affection towards this Pope, whose Picture she beheld in some Chappel, or other place of her devotion, and having some occasion to touch her Arm, printed that image on the Arm of her Child, as it ordinarily happens in such cases. Which doubtless was the true solution of the mystery.

6. The same Author writes, how he was invited by a friend to contemplate another strange miracle, (as he thought that did invite him to behold it) that he might spend his judgment upon it. Which * Athanas. Kircher. de arte Magnet. lib. 3. part. 7. was 7. cap. 7.

was nothing else but an exposed Infant of some fourteen days old, that was *grey-hair'd*, both head and eye-brows. Which his friend, an Apothecary, look'd upon as a grand Prodigy, till he was inform'd of the cause thereof: That the Mother that brought it forth, being married to an old man, whose Head was all white, the fear of being surpriz'd in the Act of Adultery by her snowy-headed husband, made her imprint that colour on the Child she bore. Which Story I could not omit to recite, it witnessing to what an exact curiosity the power of *Fancy* will work for the fashioning and modifying the Matter, not missing so much as the very *colours of the hair*, as I have already noted something to that purpose.

7. To conclude therefore at length, and leave this luxuriant Theme, Whether it be the *Power of Imagination* carrying captive the *Spirit of Nature* into consent, or the *Soul of the Infant*, or both; it is evident, that the Effects are notable, and sometimes very accurately answering the *Idea* of the Impregnate, derived upon the moist and ductil matter in the Womb: Which yet not being any thing so yielding as the soft Air, nor the Soul of the Mother so much one with that of the Infant, as the separate Soul is one with it self, nor so peculiarly united to the Body of the Infant as the Soul separate with her own Vehicle, nor having any nearer or more mysterious Commerce with the *Spirit of Nature* than she has when her *Plastick* part, by the *Imperium* of her *Will* and *Imagination*, is to organize her Vehicle into a certain shape and form, which is a kind of a momentaneous Birth of the distinct Personality, of either a *Soul separate*, or any other *Dæmon*; it follows, that we may be very secure, that there is such a power in the *Genii* and *Separate Souls*, that they can with ease and accuracy transfigure themselves into shapes and forms, agreeable to their own Temper and nature.

8. All which I have meant hitherto in reference to their Visible congresses one with another. But they are sometimes visible to us also, under some Animal shape, which questionless is much more difficult to them than that other Visibility is. But this is also possible, though more unusual by far, as being more unnatural. For it is possible by Art to *compress Air* so, as to reduce it to visible opacity, and has been done by some, and particularly by a friend of *Des-Cartes*, whom he mentions in his Letters as having made this Experiment; the Air getting this opacity by squeezing the *Globuli* out of it. Which, though the *Separate Souls* and *Spirits* may do by that directive faculty, Axiome 31. yet surely it would be very painful. For the first Element lying bare, if the *Air* be not drawn exceeding close, it will cause an ungrateful heat; and if it be, as unnatural a cold; and so small a moment will make the first Element too much or too little, that it may, haply, be very hard, at least for these inferiour Spirits, to keep steddily in a due mean. And therefore when they appear, it is not unlikely, but that * they soak their Vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous moisture or other, that they may become visible to us at a more easy rate.

NOTES

On CHAP. VII. Sect. 3.

THEY soak their Vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous Moisture or other, &c. Nay, it seems to be in a sort necessary, since it is matter of so much Trouble and Difficulty to compress or condense the Air it self to a State of Opacity. But after they have taken some Moisture into their Vehicles, that that may be made now opake, which was before pellucid, may be understood in some sort from the Example of chymical pellucid liquors, which, being mix'd, become dark or opake: And the Story of *Cuntius*, and so many more of that kind, seem further to assure us, that it is so. See *Cornel. Agrippa de Occult. Philosop. lib. 3. Cap. 42.*

CHAP. VIII.

1. That the Better sort of Genii converse in Humane shape, the Baser sometimes in Bestial.
2. How they are dispos'd to turn themselves into several Bestial forms.
3. Of Psellus his *ἁγὰι πυρώδεις*, or Igneous splendours of Dæmons, how they are made.
4. That the external Beauty of the Genii is according to the degree of the inward Vertue of their Minds.
5. That their Aereal form need not be purely transparent, but more finely opake and coloured.
6. That there is a distinction of Masculine and Feminine beauty in their personal figurations.

1. **A**FTER this Digression of shewing the facility of the figuring of the Vehicles of the Genii into personal shape, I shall return again where we left; which was concerning the Society of these Genii and Souls Separate, and under what shape they converse one with another; which I have already defin'd to be *Humane*, especially in the Better sort of Spirits. And as for the worst kind, I should think that they are likewise for the most part in Humane form, though disguis'd with ugly circumstances; but that they figure themselves also into *Bestial* appearances; it being so easy for them to transform their Vehicle into what shape they please, and to imitate the figures as dexterously as some men will the voices of brute beasts, whom we may hear sing like a Cuckow, crow like a Cock, bellow like a Cow and Calf, bark like a Dog, grunt and squeak like a Pig, and indeed imitate the cry of almost any Bird or Beast whatsoever. And as easie a matter is it for these lower Genii to resemble the shapes of all these Creatures, in which they also appear visibly oftentimes to them that entertain them, and sometimes to them that would willingly shun them.

2. Nor is it improbable, but the variety of their impurities may dispose them to turn themselves into one *brutish* shape rather than another; as envying, or admiring, or in some sort approving and lik-

ing the condition and properties of such and such *Beasts*: as *Theocritus* merrily sets out the Venereousness of the Goatherd he describes,

ὦ πόλ' ἔκκ' ἐσορῇ πὺς μνησάσας οἷα βατεῦν,
τάκε' ὀφθαλμός, ὅτι ἔτράγ' αὐτὸς ἔγαντο.

As if he envied the happiness of the He-goats, and wish'd himself in their stead, in their acts of carnal Copulation. So according to the several *Bestial* properties that symbolize with the uncleanness and viciousness of the tempers of these *Demons*, they may have a propension to imitate their shape rather than others, and appear ugly, according to the manner and measure of their internal turpitudes.

In his *Περὶ
ἐργείας
δαιμόνων.*

3. * As it is likely also that those *θεοπῆλαι* or *ἀγλαὶ πυρώδεις*, those *Igneous Splendours* *Pfellus* makes mention of, (as the end and scope of the nefarious ceremonies those wicked wretches, he describes, often used) were coloured according to the more or less feculency of the Vehicle of the *Demon* that did appear in this manner, *viz.* in no personal shape, but by exhibiting a light to the eyes of his abominable Spectators and Adorers: which, I suppose, he stirred up within limits of his own Vehicle; the power of his *Will* and *Imagination*, by Axiome 31. commanding the grosser particles of the Air and terrestrial vapours, together with the *Globuli*, to give back every way, from one point to a certain compass, not great, and therefore the more easy to be done. Whence the first Element lies bare in some considerable measure, whose activity cannot but lick into it some particles of the Vehicle that borders next thereto, and thereby exhibit, not a pure star-like light, (which would be, if the first Element thus unbared, and in the midst of pure Air, were it self unmixt with other Matter) but by the feculency of those parts that it abrades and converts into fewel, and the foulness of the ambient Vehicle through which it shines, exhibit a show red and fiery like the Horizontal Sun, seen through a thick throng of vapours.

Which *Fiery splendour* may either only slide down amongst them, and so pass by with the Motion of the *Demon's* Vehicle, which *Pfellus* seems mainly to aim at; or else it may make some stay and discourse with them it approaches, according as I have heard some Narrations. The reason of which *lucid appearances* being so intelligible out of the Principles of *Cartesius* his Philosophy, we need not conceit that they are nothing but the prestigious delusions of *Fancy*, and no real Objects, as *Pfellus* would have them; it being no more incompetent to a *Demon* to raise such a light in his Vehicle, and a purer than I have described, than to a wicked man to light a candle at a tinder-box.

4. But what we have said concerning the purity and impurity of this light, reminds me of what is of more suitable consequence to discourse of here, which is the *Splendour and Beauty of personal shape* in the *Better* sort of the *Genii*. Which assuredly is greater or lesser, according to the degrees of *Virtue and Moral affections* in them. For even in this Body, that is not so yielding to the powers of the Mind, a man may observe that, according as persons are better or worse inclined, the air of their visage will alter much; and that vicious courses

courses, defacing the inward pulchritude of the Soul, do even change the outward countenance to an abhorr'd hue.

Which must therefore necessarily take place, in a far greater measure, in the other state; where our outward form is wholly framed from the inward *Imperium* of our Mind: which by how much more pure it self is, it will exhibit the more irreprehensible pulchritude in the outward feature and fashion of the Body, both for proportion of parts, the Spirit and air of the Countenance, and the ornament of cloaths and attirings: there being an indissoluble connexion in the Soul of the Sense of these Three things together, *Virtue, Love, and Beauty*; of all which she her self is the first Root, and especially in the *Separate* state, even of *outward Beauty* it self: whence the converse of the most Vertuous there must needs afford the highest pleasure and satisfaction; not only in point of rational communication, but in reference to external and personal complacency also. For if *Virtue* and *Vice* can be ever seen with outward eyes, it must be in these Aereal Vehicles, which yield so to the Will and Idea of good and pure affections, that the Soul in a manner becomes perfectly transparent through them, discovering her lovely *Beauty* in all the efflorescencies thereof, to the ineffable enravishment of the beholder.

5. Not that I mean, that there is any necessity that their Vehicle should be as a Statue of fluid *Crystal*; but that those impresses of *Beauty* and *Ornament* will be so faithfully and lively represented, according to the dictates of her inward Sense and Imagination, that if we could see the Soul her self, we could know no more by her than she thus exhibits to our eye: which personal figuration in the extimate parts thereof, that represent the Body, Face, and Vestments, may be attempered to so fine an opacity, that it may reflect the light in more perfect colours than it is from any earthly body, and yet the whole Vehicle be so devoid of weight, as it will necessarily keep its station in the Air. Which we cannot wonder at, while we consider the hanging of the *Clouds* there, less *Aereal* by far than this consistency we speak of: to say nothing of *Aereal Apparitions* as high as the *Clouds*, and in the same colours and figures as are seen here below, and yet no reflections of terrestrial Objects, as I have proved in my *Third Book against Atheism*.

6. The *exact Beauty* of the personal shapes and becoming habits of these Aiery Beings, the briefest and safest account thereof that Philosophy can give, is to refer to the description of such things in Poets: and then, when we have perused what the height and elegance of their Fancy has penn'd down, to write under it, *An obscure Subindication of the transcendent pulchritude of the Aereal Genii, whether Nymphs or Heroes*. For though there can be neither Lust, nor difference of Sex amongst them, (whence the kindest commotions of Mind will never be any thing else but an exercise of *Intellectual love*, whose Object is *Virtue* and *Beauty*;) yet it is not improbable, but that there are some general structures of discrimination of this Beauty into *Masculine* and *Feminine*: partly because the temper of their Vehicles may incline to this kind of pulchritude rather than that; and partly because several of these *Aereal Spirits* have sustained the difference of Sex in

Antidote,
Book 3. ch.
16. lect. 4, 5,
6, 7, &c.

this life, some of them here having been *Males*, others *Females*; and therefore their History being to be continued from their departure hence, they ought to retain some character, especially so *general* a one, of what they were here. And it is very harsh to conceit, that *Aeneas* should meet with *Dido* in the other World, in any other form than that of a *Woman*: whence a necessity of some slighter distinction of habits, and manner of wearing their hair, will follow. Which dress, as that of the *Masculine* mode, is easily fitted to them by the power of their *Will* and *Imagination*: as appears from that Story out of *Peramatus*, of the *Indian Monster* that was born with fleshy boots, girdle, Purse, and other things that are no parts of a Man, but his clothing or utensils; and this merely by the Fancy of his Mother, disturb'd and frighted, either in sleep or awake, with some such ugly appearance as that *Monster* resembled.

N O T E S

On CHAP. VIII. Sect. 3.

AS it is likely also that those Θεοπτείας or ἀνυαί πυράδες, those igneous Splendours, &c. The description of these in *Pfellus* is thus; Ἀπικρύνθῃ μὲν ὃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, &c. For from them descend certain igneous Splendours upon those of whom they are worshipped; like the excursive Motions of Sparks, (by the Greeks they are call'd διασπόμεναι, and vulgarly falling Stars) which Splendours the foolish are so bold as to call Θεοπτείας, or the Appearances of God; in which there is nothing true, nothing certain, nothing firm or consistent; for what is there of any true Light amongst the dark Demons, &c. From whence, and the things which follow in *Pfellus*, it is plainly insinuated, as if they were no true Lights but Delusions, and Mockeries of the Imagination. But what little need there is to fly to this Shift, the philosophical Reasons brought in this Section do sufficiently evince. But to pass by the evil Demons of *Marcus* the Hermit, (for such are all those that receive Worship from Men) to be found in *Pfellus*: As to Relations of certain Lights or Shinings, amongst some sort of *Genii*, or *Souls* at least, which allur'd by no Worship, but rather against perhaps the Wills of other, they of their own Accord represent or exhibit; besides those which occur in Writers, I have heard so many from Authors worthy of Credit, that I confess with me they obtain a full Belief: One more especially, which I had very lately from a Surgeon and Physician in *Ireland*, both a good and prudent Person, and that also was an Eye-witness: He, with many others that were present, saw not one such Light only, but three of them dancing together; a fourth and a fifth also mixing themselves at times, though not often with them; and this for half an hour or more, in the Hill call'd *Fairy*, or *Elf-Hill*, in *Ireland*. They danc'd as if three Stakes being set down, they would interweave a Hedge: Which sort of Dance is call'd by the *English*, the *Hey*. Sometimes those Lights gather'd themselves together into one Light; and stood thus

thus conjoin'd without moving; presently they renew'd their Dancing again.

That it was the sport of some *Genii*, and of no idle or wanton Men, the very circumstances of it do sufficiently shew: for that curious and diligent Observer of the Dance told me, that the Motion of the Dancers was so swift, that no man can imitate it. Further, all the Lights were not only of a bright Flame, but of an upright Pyramidal Form; which is impossible to fall out in the Motion of a Lamp or Torch through the Air; the Flame of which is necessarily drawn backward, and in a swift Motion lies flat, and almost parallel with the Horizon. Add to this, that tho' it was not seen by himself, yet it was told him by one of the Family that was an Eye-witness of it; that this Fire or Light which divided it self into three parts on *Fairy Hill*, was seen in the Court of a House, not far distant from the Hill, to rise as from the Earth, and passing over the Wall to go directly to go to that Hill; but that there were none seen to carry it, though the Night was sufficiently clear, the Moon shining at the full. Lastly, the Matter being told to the Lady of the Family, a most Religious Heroine, which lay at that Time ill of a Distemper, she answer'd, that such a Light appear'd also there before the Death of her Brother. But she dy'd not only her self, but two of her Sons likewise, most hopeful Youths, through an untimely Fate, within the Space almost of one Year. These Signs of our approaching Fate *Paracelsus* imputes to the Care or Solitude of the foreknowing Stars, with respect to our Affairs; but I to the foreknowing *Genii* or Spirits; who, as it should seem, have a very different opinion of Death from the Generality of Men; who celebrate the approaching Departure of the Good with Lights and Dancings. These Things were told me before the Consummation of the Event; and when those that gave me the Relation, or at least some that were present at it, doubted of this Sign of what was afterwards to come to pass.

It being no more incompetent to a Demon to raise such a Light in his Vehicle, &c. Especially if they shall use some Art, and Helps also unto Nature. Which truly I know not but might be done by these dancing *Genii*: For that Surgeon being a diligent and expert Person, view'd the Place the next Morning where those *Genii* had danced; and observ'd the Grass and Herbs to be sprinkled here and there as with some thin Tallow Droppings; which white Drops he gather'd up, and, for Trial sake, cast 'em into the Fire; and being thrown in, they yielded, he said, a Flame. Which to me seems not at all strange or incongruous, since it is equally likely, that these *Genii* should collect together, and use certain oily and fattish Liquors, for the more easily representing a Light or Flame, as that others should use moistures for the more easily exhibiting of an opaque Appearance: Which we have observ'd in the *Eighth Section* of the preceding Chapter, is wont to be done.

C H A P. IX.

1. *A general account of the mutual entertains of the Genii in the other World.*
2. *Of their Philosophical and Political Conferences.*
3. *Of their Religious Exercises.*
4. *Of the innocent Pastimes and Recreations of the Better sort of them.*
5. *A Confirmation thereof from the Conventicles of Witches.*
6. *Whether the purer Dæmons have their times of repast, or no.*
7. *Whence the Bad Genii have their food.*
8. *Of the food and feastings of the Better sort of Genii.*

1. **W**E have now accurately enough defined in what form or garb the Aereal Genii converse with one another. It remains we consider *how they mutually entertain one another* in passing away the time. Which is obvious enough to conceive, to those that are not led aside into that blind Labyrinth, which the generality of men are kept in, of suspecting *that no representation of the state of these Beings is true, that is not so confounded and unintelligible that a man cannot think it sense, unless he wink with the inward eyes of his Mind, and command silence to all his Rational Faculties.* But if he will but bethink himself, that the immediate Instrument of the Soul in this life is the *Spirits*, which are very congenerous to the body of *Angels*; and that all our *Passions* and *Conceptions* are either suggested from them, or impress'd upon them; he cannot much doubt but that all his Faculties of *Reason*, *Imagination*, and *Affection*, for the general, will be in him in the other state as they were here in this: namely, that he will be capable of *Love*, of *Joy*, of *Grief*, of *Anger*; that he will be able to *imagine*, to *discourse*, to *remember*, and the rest of such operations as were not proper to the Fabrick of this Earthly Body, which is the Officine of Death and Generation.

2. Hence it will follow, that the Souls of men deceased, and the rest of the Aereal *Dæmons*, may administer much content to one another in mutual Conferences concerning the nature of things, whether *Moral*, *Natural*, or *Metaphysical*. For to think that the quitting the earthly Body, entitles us to an *Omniscieny*, is a Fable never enough to be laugh'd at. And *Socrates*, somewhere in *Plato*, presages, that he shall continue his old Trade when he comes into the other World; convincing and confounding the idle and vain-glorious *Sophists* wherever he went. And by the same Reason *Platonists*, *Aristoteleans*, *Stoicks*, *Epicureans*, and whatever other sects and humours are on the Earth, may in likelihood be met with there, so far as that estate will permit; though they cannot doubt of all things we doubt of here. For these Aereal Spirits know that themselves *are*, and that the Souls of men *subsist* and *act* after death, unless such as are too deeply tinctur'd with *Avenroism*. But they may doubt whether they will hold out for ever, or whether they will perish at the conflagration of the World, as the *Stoicks* would have them.

It may be also a great controversy amongst them, whether *Pythagoras's* or *Ptolemy's* Hypothesis be true concerning the Motion of the Earth; and whether the Stars be so big as some define them. For these

these lower *Demons* have no better means than we to assure themselves of the truth or falshood of these Opinions. Besides the discourse of News, of the affairs as well of the *Earth* as *Air*. For the *Aereal Inhabitants* cannot be less active than the *Terrestrial*, nor less busie, either in the performance of some solemn exercises, or in carrying on designs party against party; and that either more Private or more Publick; the Events of which will fill the *Aereal Regions* with a quick spreading fame of their Actions. To say nothing of prudential conjectures concerning future successes aforehand, and innumerable other entertains of Conference, which would be too long to reckon up, but bear a very near analogy to such as men pass away their time in here.

3. But of all *Pleasures*, there are none that are comparable to those that proceed from their joint exercise of *Religion* and *Devotion*. For their Bodies surpassing ours so much in tenuity and purity, they must needs be a fitter soil for the *Divinest* thoughts to spring up in, and the most delicate and enravishing affections towards their Maker. Which being heighten'd by *sacred Hymns* and *Songs*, sung with voices perfectly imitating the sweet passionate relishes of the sense of their devout Minds, must even melt their Souls into Divine Love, and make them swim with Joy in God. But these kinds of Exercises being so highly rapturous and ecstatical, transporting them beyond the ordinary limits of their Nature, cannot in Reason be thought to be exceeding frequent; but as a solemn Repast, after which they shall enjoy themselves better for a good space of time after.

4. Wherefore there be other Entertainments, which though they be of an inferior nature to these, yet they far exceed the greatest pleasure and contentments of this present state. For the *Animal life* being as essential to the Soul, as Union with a Body, which she is never free from; it will follow, that there be some fitting gratifications of it in the other World. And none greater can be imagined than *Sociableness* and *Personal Complacency*, not only in rational discourses, which is so agreeable to the Philosophical Ingeny, but innocent Pastimes, in which the *Musical* and *Amorous* propension may be also recreated. For these Three dispositions are the flower of all the rest, as *Plotinus* has somewhere noted: And his reception into the other World is set out by *Apollo's Oracle*, from such like circumstances as these.

Μεθ' ὁμήγευσιν ἔρχεται ἡδὴ
 Δαιμονίῳ ἐχθροῖσιν ἀνα πνεύσαν ἀήταις.
 Ἐνδ' ἐνὶ μὲν φιλόῳ, ἐνὶ δ' ἱμερῷ ἄλγος ἰδέσθαι
 Εὐφροσύνης πλείων καθαρῆς πληρέμενός αἰὲν
 Ἀμβροσίων ὀχετῶν θεόθεν ὅθεν ὅτιν ἐρώτων
 Πείσματα καὶ γλυκερὰ πνοὴ καὶ νῶεμ' αἰδέηρ.

Of the meaning of which Verses, that the Reader may not quite be deprived, I shall render their sense in this careless paraphrase:

Now the blest meetings thou arriv'st unto
 Of th' Aiery Genii, where soft winds do blow,

Where

Where Friendship, Love, and gentle sweet Desire
 Fill their thrice-welcome guests with joys entire.
 Ever supply'd from that immortal spring
 Whose streams pure Nectar from great Jove do bring:
 Whence kind Converse and amorous Eloquence
 Warm their chaste minds into the highest sense
 Of Heav'nly Love, whose Myst'ries they declare
 'Midst the fresh breathings of the peaceful Air.

And he holds on, naming the happy company the Soul of *Plotinus* was to associate with, viz. *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and the purer Spirits of the Golden Age, and all such as made up the Chorus of immortal Love and Friendship.

These sing, and play, and dance together, reaping the lawful pleasures of the very *Animal life*, in a far higher degree than we are capable of in this World. For every thing here does as it were tast of the cask, and has some coarseness and foulness with it. The sweet motions of the Spirits in the passion of *Love* can very hardly be commanded off from too near bordering upon the shameful sense of *Lust*; the Fabrick of the *Terrestrial Body* almost necessitating them to that deviation. The tenderer *Ear* cannot but feel the rude thumpings of the wood, and gratings of the rosin; the hoarseness, or some harshness and untunableness or other, in the best concerts of Musical Instruments and Voices. The judicious *Eye* cannot but espy some considerable defect in either the proportion, colour, or the air of the face, in the most fam'd and most admir'd beauties of either Sex: to say nothing of the inconcinnity of their deportment and habits. But in that other state, where the Fancy consults with that First Exemplar of Beauty, *Intellectual Love* and *Vertue*, and the Body is wholly obedient to the imagination of the Mind, and will to every Punctilio yield to the impresses of that inward Pattern; nothing there can be found amiss, every touch and stroke of Motion and Beauty being convey'd from so judicious a power through so delicate and depurate a Medium. Wherefore they cannot but enravish one anothers Souls, while they are mutual Spectators of the perfect pulchritude of one anothers persons and comely carriage, of their graceful dancing, their melodious singing and playing, with accents so sweet and soft, as if we should imagine the Air here of it self to compose Lessons, and send forth Musical sounds without the help of any terrestrial instrument. These, and such like Pastimes as these, are part of the Happiness of the best sort of the *Aereal Genii*.

5. Which the more certain knowledge of what is done amongst the inferiour *Demons* will further assure us of. For it is very probable that their Conventicles, into which Witches and Wizards are admitted, are but a depraved adumbration of the friendly meetings of the superiour *Genii*. And what *Musick*, *Dancing*, and *Feasting*, there is in these, the free confession of those Wretches, or fortuitous detection of others, has made manifest to the World, viz. How *Humane* and *Angelical Beauty* is transformed there into *Bestial Deformity*, the chief in the company ordinarily appearing in the Figures of *Satyrs*,
Apes,

Apes, Goats, or such like *ugly* Animals; how the comely deportments of Body, into ridiculous gesticulations, perverse postures, and antick dances; and how innocuous love and pure friendship degenerate into the most brutish lust and abominable obscenity that can be imagined: of which I shall add nothing more, having spoke enough of this matter in the Appendix to my *Antidote*.

Chap. 12.
sect. 36

6. What is most material for the present, is to consider, whether as the *Musick* and *Dancing* of these lower and more deeply-lapsed *Demons*, are a distorted imitation of what the higher and more pure *Demons* do in their Regions; so their *Feasting* may not be a perverted resemblance of the others Banquetings also: that is to say, it is worth our enquiring into, whether they do not *eat* and *drink* as well as these. For the rich amongst us must have their repast as well as the poor, and Princes feed as well as Prisoners, though there be a great difference in their diet. And I must confess, there is no small difficulty in both, whence the good or bad *Genii* may have their food; though it be easy enough to conceive, that they may feed and refresh their Vehicles.

For supposing they do vitally actuate some particular portion of the Air that they drive along with them, which is a certain extent, it is most natural to conceive, that partly by local motion, and partly by the activity of their thoughts, they set some particles of their Vehicles into a more than usual agitation, which being thus moved, scatter and perspire; and that so the Vehicle lessens in some measure, and therefore admits of a recruit: which must be either by formal repast, or by drawing in the crude Air only, which haply may be enough; but it being so like it self always, the pleasure will be more flat. Wherefore it is not improbable, but that both may have their times of Refection, for pleasure at least, if not necessity; which will be the greater advantage for the *Good*, and the more exquisite misery for the *Bad*, they being punishable in this regard also.

7. But, as I said, the greatest difficulty is to give a rational account whence the Bad *Genii* have their food, in their execrable Feasts, so formally made up into dishes. That the materials of it is a *vaporous Air*, appears as well from the faintness and emptiness of them that have been entertained at those Feasts, as from their forbidding the use of *Salt* at them, it having a virtue of dissolving of all aqueous substances, as well as hindering their congelation. But how the *Air* is moulded up into that form and consistency, it is very hard to conceive: whether it be done by the mere power of Imagination upon their own Vehicles, first dabled in some humidities that are the fittest for their design, which they change into these forms of Viands, and then withdraw, when they have given them such a figure, colour, and consistency, with some small touch of such a sapour or tincture: or whether it be the privilege of these *Aereal Creatures*, by a sharp Desire and keen Imagination, to pierce the *Spirit of Nature*, so as to awaken her activity, and engage her to the completing in a moment, as it were, the full design of their own wishes, but in such matter as the Element they are in is capable of, which is this crude and *vaporous Air*; whence their food must be very dilute

lute and flashy, and rather a mockery, than any solid satisfaction and pleasure.

8. But those Superiour *Demons* which inhabit that part of the Air that no storm nor tempest can reach, need be put to no such shifts, though they may be as able in them as in the other. For in the tranquillity of those upper Regions, that *Promus-Condus* of the *Universe*, the *Spirit of Nature*, may silently send forth whole Gardens and Orchards, of most delectable fruits and flowers, of an equilibrated ponderosity to the parts of the Air they grow in, to whose shape and colours the transparency of these Plants, may add a particular lustre, as we see it is in precious Stones. And the *Chymists* are never quiet till the heat of their Fancy have calcined and vitrified the Earth into a crystalline pellucidity, conceiving that it will be then a very fine thing indeed, and all that then grows out of it: which desirable Spectacle they may haply enjoy in a more perfect manner, whenever they are admitted into those *higher Regions* of the Air.

For the very Soil then under them shall be transparent, in which they may trace the very Roots of the Trees of this *Superiour Paradise* with their Eyes, and, if it may not offend them, see this opake Earth through it, bounding their Sight with such a white faint splendour as is discovered in the Moon, with that difference of brightness that will arise from the distinction of Land and Water; and if they will recreate their palats, may tast of such Fruits, as whose natural juice will vie with their noblest Extractions and Quintessences. For such certainly will they there find the blood of the Grape, the rubie-coloured Cherries, and Nectarines.

And if, for the compleating of the pleasantness of these habitations, that they may look less like a silent and dead solitude, they meet with Birds and Beasts of curious shapes and colours, the single accents of whose voices are very grateful to the Ear, and the varying of their notes perfect Musical harmony; they would do very kindly to bring us word back of the certainty of these things, and make this more than a *Philosophical Conjecture*.

But that there may be *Food* and *Feasting* in those higher Aereal Regions, is less doubted by the *Platonists*; which makes *Maximus Tyrius* call the Soul, when she has left the Body, *δρέμμα αἰθέριον* and the above-cited Oracle of *Apollo*, describes the Felicity of that Chorus of immortal Lovers he mentions there, from feasting together with the blessed *Genii*,

——— Ὅσοις κῆαρ ἐν θαλίῃσιν
Ἄϊεν εὐφροσύνῃσιν ἰαίνει ———

So that the *Nectar* and *Ambrosia* of the Poets may not be a mere fable. For the *Spirit of Nature*, which is the immediate Instrument of God, may enrich the fruits of these *Aereal Paradises* with such liquors, as being receiv'd into the bodies of these purer *Demons*, and diffusing it self through their Vehicles, may cause such grateful motions analogical to our *tast*, and excite such a more than ordinary quickness in their minds, and benign chearfulness, that it may far transcend the most delicate Refection that the greatest Epicures could ever invent upon Earth; and that without all satiety and burdensomeness, 'it filling them with nothing but Divine Love, Joy, and Devotion.

CHAP.

C H A P. X.

1. *How hard it is to define any thing concerning the Aereal or Æthereal Elysiums.*
2. *That there is Political Order and Laws amongst these Aiery Dæmons.*
3. *That this Chain of Government reaches down from the highest Æthereal Powers through the Aereal to the very Inhabitants of the Earth. The great security we live in thereby.*
5. *How easily detectible and punishable wicked Spirits are by those of their own Tribe.*
6. *Other Reasons of the security we find our selves in, from the gross infestations of evil Spirits.*
7. *What kind of punishments the Aereal Officers inflict upon their Malefactors.*

1. **I** Might enlarge my self much on this Subject, by representing the many Concamerations of the *Aereal* and *Æthereal Elysiums*, depainting them out in all the variety of their Ornaments: but there is no prudence of being lavish of one's pen in a matter so lubricous and Conjectural. Of the bare existence whereof we have no other ground, than that otherwise the greatest part of the Universe, by infinite measure, and the most noble, would lie as it were uncultivate, like a desert of Sand, wherein a man can see neither Plant nor living Creature. Which though it may seem as strange as if Nature should have restrained all the Varieties she would put forth to one contemptible Mole-hill, and have made all the rest of the Earth one Homogeneous surface of dry clay or stone, on which not one sprig of Grass, much less any Flower or Tree, should grow, nor Bird nor Beast be found once to set their foot thereon: yet the *Spirits* of us *Mortals* being too pusillanimous to be able to grapple with such vast Objects, we must resolve to rest either ignorant, or Sceptical, in this matter.

2. And therefore let us consider what will more easily fall under our comprehension, and that is the *Polity* of the *Aiery Dæmons*. Concerning which, that in general there is such a thing among them, is the most assuredly true in it self, and of the most use to us to be perswaded of. To know their particular *Orders* and *Customs* is a more needless Curiosity. But that they do lie under the restraint of *Government*, is not only the opinion of the *Pythagoreans*, (who have even to the nicety of *Grammatical Criticism* assign'd distinct names to the Law that belongs to these Three distinct ranks of Beings, *ἄνθρωποι*, *δαίμονες* and *θεοί*, calling the Law that belongs to the first *νόμος*, the second *δίκη*, and the third *θεμία*) but it is also the easy and obvious suggestion of ordinary Reason, that it must needs be so; and especially amongst the *Aereal Genii* in these lower Regions, they being a mixt rabble of good and bad, wise and foolish, in such a sense as we may say the *Inhabitants* of the Earth are so, and therefore they must naturally fall under a Government, and submit to Laws, as well, and for the same reasons as Men do. For otherwise they cannot tolerably subsist, nor enjoy what rights may some way or other appertain to them.

For the Souls of men deceased and the *Dæmons* being endued with corporeal Sense, by *Axiome* 30. and therefore capable of *Pleasure* and

Pain, and consequently of both *Injury* and *Punishment*, it is manifest, that having the use of Reason, they cannot fail to mould themselves into some *Political* form or other; and so to be divided into Nations and Provinces, and to have their Officers of State, from the King on his Throne to the very lowest and most abhorred Executioners of Justice.

3. Which invisible Government is not circumscrib'd within the compass of the *Aiery* Regions, but takes hold also on the Inhabitants of the *Earth*, as the Government of Men does on several sorts of brute Beasts, * and the *Æthereal* Powers also have a Right and Exercise of Rule over the *Aereal*. Whence nothing can be committed in the World against the more indispensable Laws thereof, but a most severe and inevitable Punishment will follow: every Nation, City, Family and Person, being in some Manner the *Peculium*, and therefore in the tutelage of some invisible Power or other, as I have above intimated.

Chap. 3.
sect. 7.

4. And such Transgressions as are against those Laws, without whose observance the Creation could not subsist, we may be assur'd are punish'd with Torture intolerable, and infinitely above any Pleasure imaginable the evil *Genii* can take in doing of those of their own Order, or us Mortals, any Mischief. Whence it is manifest, that we are as secure from their gross outrages, (such as the firing of our houses, the stealing away our Jewels or more necessary Utensils, murdering our selves or children, destroying our cattle, corn, and other things of the like sort,) as if they were not *in rerum natura*. Unless they have some special permission to act, as we our selves enable them by our rash and indiscreet tampering with them, or suffer from the malice of some person that is in league with them. For their greatest liberty of doing mischief is upon that account; which yet is very much limited, in that all these Actions must pass the consent of a visible person, not hard to be discovered in these unlawful practices, and easy to be punish'd by the Law of Men.

5. And the *Aereal Genii* can, with as much ease, inflict punishment on one another, as we Mortals can apprehend, imprison, and punish such as transgress against our Laws. For though these *Demons* be invisible to us, yet they are not so to their own Tribe: nor can the activity and subtilty of the Bad over-master the Good Commonwealths-men there, that uphold the Laws better than they are amongst us. Nor may the various Transfiguration of their shapes conceal their persons, no more than the disguises that are used by fraudulent men. * For they are as able to discern what is fictitious from what is true and natural amongst themselves, as we are amongst our selves. And every *Aereal* Spirit being part of some *Political Subdivision*, upon any outrage committed, it will be an easy matter to hunt out the Malefactor; no *Demon* being able to transfigure himself, but upon command he will be forced to appear in his natural and usual form, not daring to deny upon examination to what particular *Subdivision* he belongs. Whence the easy discovery of their miscarriages, and certainty of insupportable torment, will secure the

World

World from all the disorder that some scrupulous wits suspect would arise from this kind of Creatures, if they were in Being.

6. To which we may add also, That what we have is useless to them, and that it is very hard to conceive that there are many Rational Beings so degenerate as to take pleasure in ill, when it is no good to themselves. That *Socrates* his Aphorism, *πᾶς ὁ πολυθνήσκων ἀγνοεῖ*, may be in no small measure true in the other World, as well as in this. That all that these evil Spirits desire, may be only our lapse into as great a degree of Apostasy from God as themselves, and to be full partakers with them of their false Liberty; as debauch'd persons in this life love to make Profelytes, and to have respect from their Nurslings in wickedness. And several other Considerations there are that serve for the taking away this Panick fear of the incursions and molestations of these Aereal Inhabitants, and might further silence the suspicious Atheist; which I willingly omit, having said more than Chap. 3. sect. 7, 8.

7. If any be so curious, as to demand what kind of Punishment this People of the Air inflict upon their Malefactors, I had rather refer them to the Fancies of *Cornelius Agrippa*, than be laugh'd at my self for venturing to descend to such particularities. Amongst other things he names their Incarceration, or confinement to most vile and squalid Habitations. His own words are very significant: *Accedunt etiam vilissimorum ac teterrimorum locorum habitacula, ubi Aetnai ignes, aquarum ingluvies, fulgurum & tonitruorum concussus, terrarum voragines, ubi Regio lucis inops, nec radiorum Solis capax, ignarâque splendoris siderum, perpetuis tenebris & noctis specie caligat.* Whence he would make us believe, that the subterraneous caverns of the Earth are made use of for Dungeons for the wicked Demons to be punished in: as if the several Volcano's, such as *Aetna*, *Vesuvius*, *Hecla*, and many others, especially in *America*, were so many Prisons or houses of Correction for the unruly Genii. De Occulta Philosophia, lib. 3. cap. 41.

That there is a tedious restraint upon them upon villainies committed, and that intolerable, is without all question; they being endued with corporeal Sense, and that more quick and passive than ours, and therefore more subject to the highest degrees of torment. So that not only by incarcerating them, and keeping them in by a watch, in the caverns of burning Mountains, where the heat of those infernal Chambers, and the steam of Brimstone cannot but excruciate them exceedingly; but also by commanding them into sundry other Hollows of the ground, noisome by several fumes and vapours, they may torture them in several fashions and degrees, fully proportionable to the greatest crime that is in their power to commit, and far above what the cruellest Tyranny has inflicted here, either upon the guilty or innocent. But how these Confinements and Torments are inflicted on them, and by what Degrees and Relaxations, is a thing neither easy to determine, nor needful to understand.

Wherefore we will surcease from pursuing any further so unprofitable a Subject, and come to the Third general Head we mentioned, which is, *What the Moral condition of the Soul is when she has left this Body.*

NOTES

On CHAP. X. Sect. 3.

AND *Æthereal Powers also have a right, and exercise of Rule over the Aerial, &c.* But the greatest Power over all hath Jesus Christ, or the Soul of the *Messias* united with the eternal *Logos*, as is manifest from the Vision of *Ezekiel*, or the *Mercavah*: which is nothing else but a Representation of this so mighty Polity and Government of Christ, reaching from the highest *Æthereal Regions*, or from what the *Cabbalists* call the *Ariluthick World* to this *Asiathick and Terrestrial World*, in which our selves are. As I have copiously set forth in my Exposition of that Vision, and in my *Catechismus Cabbalisticus*.

Sect. 5. For they are as able to discern what is fictitious from what is true, &c. Which is not at all to be wonder'd at, when the same in a sort is done by the brute Animals, and especially by our hunting Dogs. For the older Dogs easily distinguish the Notes that the younger Dogs put forth, when they have found the true Scent of the Prey before 'em, from empty and ineffectual ones: which they regard not in the least, but upon the other they immediately run and follow. Besides, since the *Plastick* of every Soul is not only *Hominiform*, but of such a Form, or individual Appearance, as differs from all other individual Forms; hence it easily comes to pass, that the most cunning Dæmon, or one the best vers'd in *Vertumnus* his Arts, is pretty easily distinguished who he is.

CHAP. XI.

1. Three things to be considered before we come to the Moral condition of the Soul after Death: namely, her Memory of transactions in this Life.
2. The peculiar feature and individual Character of her Aereal Vehicle.
3. The Retainment of the same Name. 4. How her ill deportment here lays the train of her Misery hereafter. 5. The unspeakable torments of Conscience worse than Death, and not to be avoided by dying. 6. Of the hideous tortures of external sense on them whose searedness of Conscience may seem to make them incapable of her Lashes. 7. Of the state of the Souls of the more innocent and conscientious Pagans. 8. Of the natural accruments of After-happiness to the morally-good in this life. 9. How the Soul enjoys her actings or sufferings in this Life for an indispensable Cause, when she has passed to the other. 10. That the reason is proportionably the same in things of less consequence. 11. What mischief men may create to themselves in the other world by their zealous mistakes in this. 12. That though there were no Memory after Death, yet the manner of our Life may sow the seeds of the Souls future happiness or misery.

1. **F**OR the better solution of this Question, there is another first in nature to be decided; namely, Whether the Soul remembers any thing of this Life after Death. For Aristotle and Cardan seem to deny

deny it; but I do not remember any reasons in either that will make good their Opinion. But that the contrary is true, appears from what we have already proved in my second Book, viz. *That the immediate Seat of Memory is the Soul her self, and that all Representations with their circumstances are reserved in her, not in the Spirits,* (a thing which * *Vaninus* himself cannot deny) *nor in any part of the Body.* And * *In Dial. 60.* Chap. 11. sect. 4, 5, 6. that the *Spirits* are only a necessary Instrument whereby the Soul works; which while they are too cool and gross and waterish, Oblivion creeps upon her in that measure that the *Spirits* are thus distempered; but the disease being chased away, and the temper of the *Spirits* rectified, the Soul forthwith recovers the memory of what things she could not well command before, as being now in a better state of activity. Whence, by the 33 Axiome it will follow, that her *Memory* will be rather more perfect after Death, and *Conscience* more nimble to excuse or accuse her, according to her Deeds here.

2. It is not altogether beside the purpose to take notice also, That the natural and usual Figure of the Soul's *Aereal Vehicle* bears a resemblance with the feature of the party in this life; it being most obvious for the *Plastick part* (at the command of the *Will* to put forth into personal shape) to fall as near to that in this life, as the new state will permit. With which act the *Spirit of Nature* haply does concur, as in the figuration of the *Fœtus*; but with such limits as becomes the *Aereal Congruity* of life, of which we have spoke already: Chap. 9, 10. as also how the proper Idea or Figure of every Soul, (though it may deflect something by the power of the Parent's Imagination in the act of Conception, or Gestation, yet) may return more near to its peculiar semblance afterwards, and so be an unconcealable Note of *Individuality*.

3. We will add to all this, the Retainment of the same Name which the deceased had here, unless there be some special reason to change it: so that their persons will be as punctually distinguish'd and circumscrib'd as any of ours in this life. All which things, as they are most probable in themselves that they will thus naturally fall out, so they are very convenient for the administration of Justice, and keeping of Order in the other State.

4. These things therefore premised, it will not be hard to conceive how the condition of the Soul after this life depends on her *Moral* deportment here. For *Memory* ceasing not, *Conscience* may very likely awake more furiously than ever; the Mind becoming a more clear Judge of evil Actions past than she could be in the *Flesh*, being now stript of all those circumstances and concurrences of things that kept her off from the opportunity of calling her self to account, or of perceiving the ugliness of her own ways. Besides, there being that communication betwixt the *Earth* and the *Air*, that at least the fame of things will arrive to their cognoscence that have left this life; the after ill success of their wicked enterprizes and unreasonable transactions, may arm their tormenting *Conscience* with new whips and stings, when they shall either hear, or see with their eyes, what they have unjustly built up, to run with shame to ruine, and behold all their designs come to nought, and their fame blasted upon Earth.

5. This is the state of such Souls as are capable of a sense of dislike of their past-actions: and a man would think they need no other punishment than this, if he consider the mighty power of the Mind over her own Vehicle, and how vulnerable it is from her self. These *Passions* therefore of the Soul that follow an ill Conscience, must needs bring her Aiery body into intolerable distempers, worse than Death it self. Nor yet can she die if she would, neither by fire nor sword, nor any means imaginable; no not if she would fling her self into the flames of smoaking *Aetna*. For suppose she could keep her self so long there, as to endure that hideous pain of destroying the *vital Congruity* of her Vehicle by that sulphureous fire; she would be no sooner released, but she would catch life again in the Air, and all the former troubles and vexations would return, besides the overplus of these pangs of Death. For *Memory* would return, and an ill Conscience would return, and all those buse Furies, those disordered *Passions* which follow it. And thus it would be, though the Soul should kill her self a thousand and a thousand times; she could but pain and punish her self, not destroy her self.

6. But if we could suppose some mens Consciences *fear'd* in the next state as well as this, (for certainly there are that make it their business to obliterate all sense of difference of Good and Evil out of their minds; and hold it to be an high strain of wit, (though it be nothing else but a piece of bestial stupidity) to think there is no such thing as *Vice* and *Vertue*, and that it is a principal part of perfection, to be so degenerate as to act according to this Principle without any remorse at all;) these men may seem to have an excellent privilege in the other world: they being thus armour-proof against all the fiery darts of that domestick Devil: As if the greatest security in the other life were, to have been compleatly wicked in this.

But it is not out of the reach of mere Reason and Philosophy to discover, that such bold and impudent wretches as have lost all *inward* sense of Good and Evil, may there, against their wills, feel a lash in the *outward*. For the Divine *Nemesis* is excluded out of no part of the Universe; and *Goodness* and *Justice*, which they contemn here, will be acquainted with them in that other state, whether they will or no. I speak of such course Spirits that can swallow down Murder, Perjury, Extortion, Adultery, Buggery, and the like gross crimes, without the least disgust, and think they have a right to satisfy their own Lust, though it be by never so great Injury against their Neighbour. If these men should carry it with impunity, there were really no Providence, and themselves were the truest Prophets, and faithfullest Instructors of mankind, divulging the choicest *Arcanum* they have to impart to them, namely, *That there is no God*.

But the case stands quite otherwise. For whether it be by the importunity of them they injure in this life, who may meet with them afterward, as * *Cardan*, by way of Objection, suggests in his Treatise of this Subject: or whether by a general desertion by all of the other world that are able to protect, (such Monsters as I describe being haply far less in proportion to the number of the other state, than these are to this;) they will be necessarily exposed to those grim and

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* De Immortalit. Anim. Object. 31.

remorseless *Officers of Justice*, who are as devoid of all sense of what is Good as those that they shall punish. So that their penalty shall be inflicted from such as are of the same Principles with themselves, who watch for such booties as these, and when they can catch them, dress them, and adorn them, according to the multifarious petulancy of their own unaccountable humours; and taking a special pride and pleasure in the making and seeing Creatures miserable, fall upon their prey with all eagerness and alacrity, as the hungry Lions on a condemned malefactor, but with more ferocity and insultation by far. For having more wit, and, if it be possible, less goodness than the Soul they thus assault, they satiate their lascivient cruelty with all manner of abuses and torments they can imagine, giving her only so much respite as will serve to receive their new inventions with a fresher smart and more distinct pain. Neither can any Reason or Rhetorick prevail with them, no Expostulation, Petition, or Submission. For to what purpose can it be, to expostulate about Injury and violence with them, whose deepest reach of wit is to understand this one Principle, *That every one's Lust, when he can act with impunity, is the most sacred and sovereign Law?* Or what can either Petitions or Submissions do with those who hold it the *most contemptible piece of fondness and silliness that is, to be intreated to recede from their own Interest?* And they acknowledging no such thing as *Vertue and Vice*, make it their only interest to please themselves in what is agreeable to their own desires: and their main pleasure is, to excruciate and torture, in the most exquisite ways they can, as many as Opportunity delivers up to their power.

And thus we see how, in the other life, the proud conceited *Atheist* may at last feel the sad inconvenience of his own Practices and Principles. For even those that pleased themselves in helping him forward, while he was in this life, to that high pitch of wickedness, may haply take as much pleasure to see him punish'd by those *grim Executioners* in the other. Like that sportful cruelty (which some attribute to *Nero's* person) of causing the *Vestal* virgins to be ravish'd, and then putting them to death for being so.

7. But this Subject would be too tedious and too Tragical to insist on any longer. Let us cast our Eyes therefore upon a more tolerable Object; and that is, The state of the Soul that has, according to the best opportunity she had of knowledge, liv'd vertuously and conscientiously, in what part or Age of the world soever. For though this *Moral Innocency* amongst the *Pagans*, will not amount to what our Religion calls *Salvation*; yet it cannot but be advantageous to them in the other state, according to the several degrees thereof; they being more or less *Happy or Miserable*, as they have been more or less *Vertuous* in this life. For we cannot imagine why God should be more harsh to them in the other world than in this, nothing having happened to them to alienate his affection but Death: which was not in their power to avoid, and looks more like a punishment than a fault: though it be neither to those that are well-meaning and conscientious, and not professed contemners of the wholesome suggestions of the Light of Nature, but are Lovers of Humanity and Vertue. For to these it is only an entrance into another life,

— *Ad amœna vireta*
Fortunatorum nemorum, sedesque beatas.

Which Truth I could not conceal, it being a great prejudice to *Divine Providence* to think otherwise. For to those that are free, her ways will seem as unintelligible in overloading the simple with punishment, as in not rewarding the more perfectly righteous and illuminate. For from a fault in either, they will be tempted to a misbelief of the whole, and hold no Providence at all.

8. Let there therefore be peculiar Privileges of *Morality* every where, to those that pass into the other State. For unless God make a stop on purpose, it will naturally follow, That *Memory after Death* suggesting nothing but what the *Conscience* allows of, much *Tranquility of Mind* must result from thence, and a certain *Health and Beauty* of the *Aereal Vehicle*; also better Company and Converse, and more pleasant Tracts and Regions to inhabit. For what *Plotinus* speaks of the *extreme* degrees, is also true of the *intermediate*, else *Divine Justice* would be very maim. For a man, saith he, having once appropriated to himself a pravity of temper, and united with it, is known well what he is; and according to his nature is thrust forward to what he propends to, both here, and departed hence, and so shall be pulled by the drawings of Nature into a suitable place. But the Good man, his Receptions and Communications shall be of another sort, by the drawing as it were of certain hidden strings transposed and pulled by Nature's own Fingers. So admirable is the power and order of the Universe, all things being carried on in a silent way of Justice which none can avoid, and which the Wicked man has no perception nor understanding of, but is drawn, knowing nothing whither in the Universe he ought to be carried. But the Good man both knows and goes whither he ought, and discerns before he departs hence where he must inhabit, and is full of hopes that it shall be with the Gods. This large Paragraph of *Plotinus*, is not without some small Truth in it, if rightly limited and understood; but seems not to reach at all the Circumstances and accruments of *Happiness* to the Soul in the other State, which will naturally follow her, from her transactions in this life.

9. For certainly, according to the several degrees of *Benignity of Spirit*, and the desire of doing good to mankind in this life, and the more ample opportunities of doing it, the *Felicity* of the other World is redoubled upon them; there being so certain communication and intercourse betwixt both. And therefore they that act or suffer deeply in such Causes as God will maintain in the World; and are just and holy at the bottom, (and there are some Principles that are indispensably such, which Providence has countenanced both by Miracles, the suffrages of the Wisest men in all Ages, and the common voice of Nature;) those that have been the most Heroical Abettors and Promoters of these things in this life, will naturally receive the greater contentment of Mind after it, being conscious to themselves how seriously they have assisted what God will never desert, and that Truth is mighty, and must at last prevail; which they are better assured of out of the Body, than when they were in it.

10. Nor

10. Nor is this kind of access of Happiness to be confined only to our furtherance of what is of the highest and most indispensable consideration here, but in proportion touches all transactions that proceed from a virtuous and good Principle, whereof there are several degrees: amongst which those may not be reckoned the meanest that refer to a *National* good. And therefore those that, out of a natural generosity of Spirit and successful fortitude in War, have deliver'd their Country from bondage, or have been so wise and understanding in Politicks, as to have contriv'd wholesome Laws for the greater happiness and comfort of the People; while such a Nation prospers, and is in Being, it cannot but be an accrement of Happiness to these so considerable Benefactors, unless we should imagine them less generous and good in the other World, where they have the advantage of being Better. And what I have said in this more notable instance, is in a degree true in things of smaller concernment, which would be infinite to rehearse. But whole Nations, with their Laws and Orders of Men, and Families, may fail, and therefore these accessions be cut off: but he that lays out his pains in this life for the carrying on such designs as will take place so long as the World endures, and must have a compleat Triumph at last; such a one lays a train for an Everlasting advantage in the other World, which, in despite of all the tumblings and turnings of unsettled fortune, will be sure to take effect.

11. But this matter requires Judgment as well as Heat and Forwardness. For pragmatistical Ignorance, though accompanied with some measure of Sincerity and well-meaning, may set a foot such things in the World, or set upon record such either false, or impertinent and unseasonable Principles, as being made ill use of, may very much prejudice the Cause one desires to promote; which will be a sad spectacle for them in the other State. For though their simplicity may be pardonable, yet they will not fail to find the ill effect of their mistake upon themselves. As he that kills a friend instead of an enemy, though he may satisfy his Conscience, that rightly pleads his innocency; yet he cannot avoid the sense of shame and sorrow, that naturally follows so mischievous an error.

12. Such accruencies as these there may be to our Enjoyments in the other World, from the durable traces of our transactions in this, if we have any *Memory* of things after Death, as I have already demonstrated that we have. But if we had not, but *Aristotle's* and *Cardan's* Opinion were true, yet *Vertue* and *Piety* will not prove *only* useful for this present state. Because according to our living here, we shall hereafter, by a hidden concatenation of causes, be drawn to a condition answerable to the purity or impurity of our Souls in this life: that silent *Nemesis* that passes through the whole contexture of the Universe, ever fatally contriving us into such a state as we ourselves have fitted our selves for by our accustomed actions. Of so great consequence is it, while we have opportunity, to aspire to the Best things.

C H A P. XII.

1. *What the Spirit of Nature is.* 2. *Experiments that argue its real Existence; such as that of two Strings tuned Unisons.* 3. *Sympathetick Cures and Tortures.* 4. *The Sympathy betwixt the Earthly and Astral Body.* 5. *Monstrous Births.* 6. *The Attraction of the Loadstone and Roundness of the Sun and Stars.*

1. **W**E had now quite finish'd our Discourse, did I not think it convenient to answer a double Expectation of the Reader. The one is, touching the *The Spirit of Nature*; the other, the producing of *Objections* that may be made against our concluded Assertion of the Soul's Immortality. For as for the former, I can easily imagine he may well desire a more punctual account of that Principle I have had so often recourse to, than I have hitherto given, and will think it fit that I should somewhere more fully explain what I mean by the terms, and shew him my strongest grounds why I conceive there is any such Being in the World. To hold him therefore no longer in suspense, I shall do both in this place. *The Spirit of Nature* therefore, according to that notion I have of it, is, *A substance incorporeal, * but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a Plastical power therein, according to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phænomena in the World, by directing the parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers.* This rude Description may serve to convey to any one a conception determinate enough of the nature of the thing. And that it is not a mere Notion, but a real Being, besides what I have occasionally hinted already (and shall here again confirm by new instances) there are several other Considerations may persuade us.

2. The first whereof shall be concerning those Experiments of *Sympathetick Pains, Affwagements, and Cures*; of which there are many Examples, approv'd by the most scrupulous Pretenders to sobriety and judgment, and of all which I cannot forbear to pronounce, that I suspect them to come to pass by some such power as makes Strings that be tuned *Unisons*, (though on several Instruments) the one being touched, the other to tremble and move very sensibly, and to cast off a straw or pin, or any such small thing laid upon it. Which cannot be resolved into any *Mechanical Principle*, though some have ingeniously gone about it. For before they attempted to shew the reason, why that String that is not *Unison* to that which is struck, should not leap and move, as it doth that is, they should have demonstrated, that by the mere *Vibration of the Air* that which is *Unison* can be so moved; for if it could, these *Vibrations* would not fail to move other Bodies more movable by far than the String it self that is thus moved. As for example, if one hung loose near the String that is struck a small thred of silk or an hair with some light thing at the end of it, they must needs receive thole reciprocal Vibrations that are communicated to the *Unison* string at a far greater distance,

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if the mere motion of the material Air caused subsultation of the string tuned *Unison*: Which yet is contrary to experience.

Besides that, if it were the mere *Vibration of the Air* that caus'd this tremor in the *Unison* string, the effect would not be considerable, unless both the strings lay well-nigh in the same Plane, and that the Vibration of the string that is struck be made in that Plane they both lie in. But let the string be struck so as to cut the Plane perpendicularly by its tremulous excursions; or let both the strings be in two several Planes at a good distance above one another, the event is much-what the same, though the Air cannot rationally be conceiv'd to *vibrate* backwards and forwards, otherwise than well-nigh in the Planes wherein the strings are moved.

All which things do clearly shew, that pure *Corporeal* causes cannot produce this effect: and that therefore we must suppose, that *both* the strings are united with some one *Incorporeal* Being, which has a different *Unity* and *Activity* from *Matter*, but yet a *Sympathy* therewith; which affecting this *Immaterial* Being, makes it affect the *Matter* in the same manner in another place, where it does symbolize with that other in some predisposition or qualification, as these two strings do in being tuned *Unisons* to one another: and this, without sending any particles to the *Matter* it does thus act upon; as my thought of moving of my Toe being represented within my Brain, by the power of my Soul I can, without sending Spirits into my Toe, but only by making use of them that are there, move my Toe as I please, by reason of that *Unity* and *Activity* that is peculiar to my Soul as a *Spiritual* substance that pervades my whole Body. Whence I would conclude also, that there is some such Principle as we call *The Spirit of Nature*, or *the inferiour Soul of the World*, into which such *Phænomena* as these are to be resolved.

3. And I account *Sympathetick Cures*, Pains, and Asswagements to be such. As for example, when in the use of those *Magnetick Remedies*, as some call them, they can make the wound dolorously hot or chill at a great distance, or can put it into perfect ease, this is not by any agency of *emissary Atoms*. For these *hot Atoms* would cool sufficiently in their progress to the party through the frigid air; and the *cold Atoms*, if they could be so active as to dispatch so far, would be warm enough by their journey in the Summer Sun. The inflammations also of the Cows Udder by the boiling over of the milk into the fire, the scalding of mens entrails at a distance by the burning of their excrements, with other pranks of the like nature; these cannot be rationally resolved into the recourse of the Spirits of Men or Kine mingled with fiery Atoms, and so re-entring the parts thus affected, because the minuteness of those Atoms argues the suddainness of their extinction, as the smallest wires made red hot soonest cool.

To all which you may add (if it will prove true) that notable example of the Wines working when the Vines are in the flower, and that this *Sympathetick* effect must be from the Vines of that Country from which they came: whence these exhalations of the Vineyards must spread as far as from *Spain* and the *Canaries* to *England*, and by the same reason must reach round about every way as far from the

Canaries, besides their journey upwards into the Air. So that there will be an Hemisphere of vineal Atoms of an incredible extent, unless they part themselves into trains, and march only to those places whither their Wines are carried. But what *corporeal* cause can guide them thither? Which question may be made of other *Phænomena* of the like nature. Whence again it will be necessary to establish the Principle I drive at, though the effects were caused by the transmission of Atoms.

4. The notablest examples of this *Mundane Sympathy* are in histories more uncertain and obscure, and such as, though I have been very credibly inform'd, yet, as I have already declared my self, I dare only avouch as possible, viz. the Souls of men leaving their Bodies, and appearing in shapes, suppose of *Cats*, *Pigeons*, *Weasels*, and sometimes of *Men*; and that whatever hurt befalls them * in these *Astral* bodies, as the *Paracelsians* love to call them, the same is inflicted upon their *Terrestrial*, lying in the mean time in their beds, or on the ground. As if their *Astral bodies* be scalded, wounded, have the back broke, the same certainly happens to their *Earthly bodies*.

See Book 2.
Chap. 15.
sect. 8, 9, 10.

Which things if they be true, in all likelihood they are to be resolved into this Principle we speak of, and that *The Spirit of Nature* is snatch'd into consent with the Imagination of the Souls in these *Astral bodies*, or *Aiery Vehicles*. Which act of *imagining* must needs be strong in them, it being so set on and assisted by a quick and sharp pain and fright in these scaldings, woundings, and strokes on the back; some such thing happening here, as in women with child, whose Fancies, made keen by a sudden fear, have depriv'd their children of their arms, yea and of their heads too; as also appears by two remarkable stories Sr. *Kenelm Digby* relates in his witty and eloquent *Discourse of the Cure of Wounds, by the powder of Sympathy*, besides what * we have already recited out of *Helmont*.

* Chap. 6.
sect. 6.

5. Which effects I suppose to be beyond the power of any humane Fancy unassisted by some more forcible Agent; as also that prodigious birth he mentions of a woman of *Carcassona*, who, by her overmuch sporting and pleasing her self with an *Ape*, while she was with Child, brought forth a Monster exactly of that shape. And if we should conclude with that learned Writer, that it was a real *Ape*, it is no more wonderful, nor so much as that birth of a *Crab-fish* or *Lobster* we have above mentioned out of *Fortunius Licetus*; as we might also other more usual, though no less monstrous births for the wombs of women to bear. Of which the Soul of the Mother cannot be suspected to be the cause, she not so much as being the Efformer of her own *Fœtus*, as that judicious Naturalist Dr. *Harvey* has determined. And if the Mother's Soul could be the Efformer of the *Fœtus*, in all reason, her *Plastick* power would be ever Particular and Specifick, as the Soul it self is Particular.

What remains therefore but the *Universal Soul of the World*, or *Spirit of Nature*, that can do these feats? who, *Vertumnus*-like, is ready to change his own activity and the yielding Matter into any mode and shape indifferently, as occasion engages him, and so to prepare an edifice, at least the more rude strokes and delineaments thereof, for any

any Specifick Soul whatsoever, and in any place where the Matter will yield to his operations. But the time of the arrival thither of the particular guest it is intended for, though we cannot say how soon it is, yet we may be sure it is not later than a clear discovery of *Sensation*, as well as *Vegetation* and *Organization* in the Matter.

6. The *Attraction of the Load-stone* seems to have some affinity with these instances of *Sympathy*. This mystery *Des-Cartes* has explained with admirable artifice, as to the immediate Corporeal causes thereof, to wit, those wreathed particles which he makes to pass certain screw-pores in the *Loadstone* and *Iron*. But how the efformation of these particles is above the reach of the mere Mechanical powers in *Matter*, as also the exquisite direction of their motion, whereby they make their peculiar *Vortex* he describes about the Earth from Pole to Pole, and thread an incrustated Star, passing in a right line in so long a journey as the Diameter thereof, without being swung to the sides; how these things, I say, are beyond the powers of *Matter*, I have fully enough declared and proved in a large Letter of mine to V. C. and *Epist. ad V. C. sect. 5.* therefore that I may not *actum agere*, shall forbear speaking any farther thereof in this place. To which you may add, That mere corporeal motion in Matter without any other guide, would never so much as produce a round *Sun* or *Star*, of which figure notwithstanding *Des-Cartes* acknowledges them to be. But my reasons why it *Epist. 3. ad R. Cartes.* cannot be effected by the simple Mechanical powers of *Matter*, I have particularly set down in my Letters to that excellent Philosopher.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XII. Sect. 1.

BUT without Sense and Adimadversion, &c. That the Spirit of Nature hath Life, and that both *Plastical* and *Omniform*, I dare more confidently to aver: but as to Sense and Animadversion, I hold it a more rash business to determine any thing either negatively or affirmatively. But that it is devoid of Reason and Free-will is with me an establish'd Point. But seeing I have had occasion in some other Places to speak of this Matter, and have nothing that is new to add to what I have there said, I deem 'tis needless to go on with any more here.

Sect. 4. In these Astral Bodies, as the Paracelsians love to call them, &c. Whose Form of speaking, though I here use, yet I would have it to be understood in my own Sense; who understand nothing more by an *Astral Body*, than a tenuous and mere natural Body, subject to the Laws and Influences of the Stars, or rather, of common Nature. For what many, through their Ignorance, attribute to the Stars, is, by a much better Title, to be attributed to the Spirit of Nature, and unto those Circumstances of the Matter, by which its Force is awakened.

And that the Spirit of Nature is snatch'd into Consent with the Imagination of the Souls in these Astral Bodies, &c. As to the Truth of such Pha-

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nomena as these, that fresh Example of *Jane Brookes* may pass for an egregious Evidence, the Matter of Fact being so very certain; the Hand of whose Shew, or *Astral* Spirit, being struck with a Knife, the very same Hand of her *Terrestrial* Body was found wounded by it; (as I have related out of *J. Glanvil*, in my Notes upon the *Antidote against Atheism*.) And as to the Cause which is here intimated, certainly it seems to be the most probable, since the *Spirit of Nature* doth so assuredly mix it self with all the *Efformations of Animals*, and *Corruptions* of their Parts; namely, those of the same Body, though at a great Distance: as in artificial Noses that are made of other mens Flesh, with many other things of that Kind, which are held as very true. For the Man being dead, and now putrefying, to whom those Parts appertain'd, they do immediately putrefy and stink: Which, without all Question, comes to pass in Virtue of the Communion of the *Spirit of Nature*. What hinders then but that when the *Astral* Body of any Soul is wounded by any sudden Stroke, the *Terrestrial* Body of the same Soul may be hurt also with a quick Wound, by Reason of the Communication of the *Spirit of Nature*; and it being snatch'd away into Consent with the *Plastick* of the said particular Soul? For the *Spirit of Nature* in a sort actuates and informs all Bodies whatever: Whence is easily understood this Community and Consent of Life I speak of, and also real Sympathy; so that this Body suffering, another at a Distance suffers the very same, by reason of the Community of the same Spirit. Surely this is much more agreeable than to suppose some *Demon*, who, the *Astral* Body being wounded, immediately inflicts the like Wound upon the *Terrestrial*. And what *Dæmon* in those Relations of *Helmont*, mention'd *Chap. 6. Sect. 6.* maimed, and cut off the Head, Hand, and Arm of those three miserable Foetus's in the Womb.

C H A P. XIII.

1. That the Descent of heavy Bodies argues the existence of The Spirit of Nature, because else they would either hang in the Air as they are placed,
2. Or would be diverted from a perpendicular, as they fall near a Plate of Metal set sloping.
3. That the endeavour of the *Æther* or Air from the Centre to the Circumference is not the Cause of Gravity, against Mr. Hobbs.
4. A full confutation of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion.
5. An ocular Demonstration of the absurd consequence thereof.
6. An absolute Demonstration that Gravity cannot be the effect of mere Mechanical powers.
7. The Latitude of the operations of The Spirit of Nature, how large, and where bounded.
8. The reason of its name.
9. Of Instinct, whether it be, and what it is.
10. The grand office of the Spirit of Nature in transmitting Souls into rightly-prepared Matter.


1. **A**ND a farther confirmation that I am not mistaken therein, is what we daily here experience upon Earth, which is the descending of heavy Bodies, as we call them. * Concerning the motion where.

whereof I agree with *Des-Cartes* in the assignation of the immediate corporeal cause, to wit, the *Æthereal* matter, which is so plentifully in the Air over it is in grosser Bodies; but withal do vehemently surmise, that there must be some *Immaterial* cause, such as we call *The Spirit of Nature*, or *Inferiour Soul of the World*, that must direct the motions of the *Æthereal* particles to act upon these grosser Bodies to drive them towards the Earth. For that surplussage of Agitation of the globular particles of the *Æther* above what they spend in turning the Earth about, is carried every way indifferently, according to his own concession; by which motion * the drops of liquors are formed into round figures, as he ingeniously concludes. From whence it is apparent, that a bullet of iron, silver or gold, placed in the Air is equally assaulted on all sides by the occurrence of these *Æthereal* particles, and therefore will be moved no more downwards than upwards, but hang in *æquilibrio*, as a piece of Cork rests on the water, where there is neither wind nor stream, but is equally play'd against by the particles of water on all sides.

*Cartes. Prin-
cip. Philos.
Part. 4. Artic.
15, 16, 18,
19, 20.*

2. Nor is it imaginable how the occurrences of this *Æthereal* Element here against the surface of the Earth, being it is so fluid a Body, should make it endeavour to lift it self from the Earth at so great a distance as the middle Region of the Air and further. Besides, that this is not the cause of the descent of heavy Bodies is manifest, because then a broad Plate of the most solid Metal and most perfectly polish'd, such as is able to reflect the *Æthereal* particles most efficaciously, being placed sloping, would change the course of the Descent of things, and make them fall perpendicularly to it, and not to the Plane of the Horizon; as for Example, not from A to B, but from A to C; which is against experience. For the heavy Body will always fall down from A to B, though the recession of the *Æthereal* Matter must needs be from C to A, according to this Hypothesis.


*Cartes. Prin-
cip. Philos.
Part. 4. Artic.
22, 23.*



3. Nor can the endeavour of the Celestial Matter from the centre to the circumference take place here. For besides that *Des-Cartes*, the profoundest Master of Mechanics, has declin'd that way himself (though * Mr. *Hobbs* has taken it up,) it would follow, that near the Poles of the Earth there would be no descent of heavy Bodies at all, and in the very Clime we live in, none perpendicular. To say nothing how this way will not save the Union of that great Water that adheres to the body of the Moon.

* In his *Elements of Philosophy*, part 4, Chap. 30. Artic. 4.


4. But to make good what I said, by undeniable proof that heavy Bodies in the very Clime where we live, will not descend perpendicularly to the Earth, if Mr. *Hobbs* his solution of the *Phenomenon* of Gravity be true; we shall evidently demonstrate both to the Eye and to Reason the proportion of their declination from a perpendicular



in any elevation of the Pole. In the Circle therefore A B D, let the *Æquator* be B D, and from the point C draw a line to E, parallel to B D: which line C E will cut the circle in F 60 degrees, suppose, from B. Imagine now a heavy Body at E; according to Mr. *Hobbs* his solution of the Probleme of *Gravity*, it must fall towards the Earth in a line parallel to the *Æquator*, viz. in the line E F; which, say I, declines from

the line H F drawn perpendicular to the Horizon L K two third parts of a right angle, that is to say, 60 degrees. For the angle E F H is equal to G F R, which again is equal to the alternate angle B G F, which is two third parts of a right angle *ex thesi*. Whence it is plain that E F declines from a perpendicular no less than 60 degrees. By the same reason, if we had drawn the Scheme for the elevation of 50. which is more Southern than our Clime, we might demonstrate that the descent of heavy Bodies declines from a perpendicular to the Horizon 50 degrees, or, of a right angle, and so of the rest. From whence it will follow, that men cannot walk upright, but declining, in the elevation suppose of 60 degrees, as near to the ground as E F is to F L, and much nearer in the more remote parts of the North, as in *Norway, Russia, Frisland, Island, Scricfinnia, Greenland*, and others; and there is proportionably the same reason in other Climes less Northern. So that Mr. *Hobbs* need not send us so far off, as to the Poles, to make the experiment.

5. For if for example we drew a Scheme for the Parallel under which we live, suppose about 52 degrees of Elevation, we might represent truly to the eye in what posture men would walk at *London* or *Cambridge*, according to Mr. *Hobbs* his determination of the causes of *Gravity*. For it is plain from what has been above demonstrated, that the natural posture of their Bodies upon the Horizon L K would



be in the line E F, out of which if they did force themselves towards the perpendicular H F, it would be much pain to them, neither could they place themselves in the line H F without being born headlong to the ground, and laid flat upon the Horizon F K; the

force of the Air, or whatever more subtile Elements therein pressing in lines parallel to E F, and therefore necessarily bearing down whatever is placed loose in the line H F, as is plain to any one at first sight.

But we finding no such thing in experience, it is evident that Mr *Hobbs* his solution is false; nay I may say that he has not render'd so much as a possible cause of this so ordinary a *Phænomenon*. A thing truly much to be lamented in one who, upon pretence that all the Appearances in the Universe may be resolved into mere Corporeal causes, has, with unparallel'd confidence, and not without some wit, derided and exploded all *Immaterial Substance* out of the World; when

whenas in the mean time he does not produce so much as possible Corporeal causes of the most ordinary effects in Nature. But to leave Mr. *Hobbs* to his own ways, and to return to *Des-Cartes*.

6. Add unto all this, that if the motion of gross Bodies were according to mere Mechanical laws, a Bullet, suppose of Lead or Gold, cast up into the Air, would never descend again, but would persist in a rectilinear motion. For it being far more solid than so much Air and Æther put together as would fill its place, and being moved with no less swiftness than that wherewith the Earth is carried about in twenty four hours, it must needs break out in a straight line through the thin Air, and never return again to the Earth, but get away, as a *Comet* does out of a *Vortex*. Add that *de facto* a Cannon-Bullet has been shot so high that it never fell back again upon the ground, *Des-Cartes* does admit of as true experiment. Of which, for my own part, I can imagine no other unexceptionable reason, but that at a certain distance *The Spirit of Nature* in some regard leaves the motion of *Matter* to the pure laws of *Mechanicks*, but within other bounds checks it, whence it is that the Water does not swill out of the Moon.

7. Now if the pure *Mechanick* powers in *Matter* and Corporeal motion will not amount to so simple a *Phenomenon* as the falling of a stone to the Earth, how shall we hope they will be the adequate cause of sundry sorts of *Plants* and other things that have far more artifice and curiosity than the direct descent of a stone to the ground?

Nor are we beaten back again by this discovery into that dotage of the confounded *Schools*, who have indued almost every different Object of our Senses with a distinct *Substantial form*, and then puzzle themselves with endless scrupulosities about the generation, corruption, and mixtion of them. For I affirm with *Des-Cartes*, that nothing affects our Senses but such Variations of *Matter* as are made by difference of Motion, Figure, Situation of parts, &c. but I dissent from him in this, in that I hold it is not mere and pure Mechanical motion that causes all these sensible Modifications in *Matter*, * but that many times the immediate Director thereof is this *Spirit of Nature* (I speak of) one and the same every where, and acting always alike upon the like occasions, as a clear-minded man, and of a solid judgment, gives always the same verdict in the same circumstances.

For this *Spirit of Nature* intermeddling with the efformation of the *Fœtus* of Animals, (as I have * already shewn more than once) where notwithstanding there seems not so much need, there being in them a more particular Agent for that purpose; 'tis exceeding rational that all *Plants* and *Flowers* of all sorts (in which we have no argument to prove there is any particular Soul) should be the effects of this *Universal Soul of the World*. Which Hypothesis, besides that it is most reasonable in it self, according to that ordinary Axiome, *Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora*, is also very serviceable for the preventing many hard Problems about the *Divisibility* of the Souls of *Plants*, their *Transmutations* into other *Species*, the growing of *Slips*, and the like. For there is one Soul ready every where to pursue the advantages of prepared Matter. Which is the common and only

* Chap. 6.
sect. 7, 8.
chap. 7.
sect. 3.

of all *Plantal appearances*, or of whatever other *Phænomena* there be, greater or smaller, that exceed the pure Mechanical powers of *Matter*. We except only *Men* and *Beasts*, who having all of them the capacity of some sort of enjoyments or other, it was fit they should have particular Souls for the multiplying of the sense of those enjoyments, which the transcendent Wisdom of the Creator has contrived.

8. I have now plainly enough set down what I mean by *The Spirit of Nature*, and sufficiently prov'd its existence. Out of what has been said may be easily conceiv'd why I give it this name, it being a Principle that is of so great influence and activity in the *Nascency*, as I may so call it, and *Coalescency* of things: And this not only in the production of *Plants*, with all other *Concretions* of an inferiour nature, and yet above the mere *Mechanical* laws of *Matter*; but also in respect of the *birth* of *Animals*, whereunto it is preparatory and assistent.

I know not whether I may entitle it also to the guidance of *Animals* in the chiefest of those actions which we usually impute to *natural Instinct*. Amongst which none so famous as the *Birds* making their *Nests*, and particularly the artificial structure of the *Martin's* nests under the arches of Church-windows. In which there being so notable a design unknown to themselves, and so small a pleasure to present Sense, it looks as if they were actuated by another, inspired and carried away in a natural rapture by this *Spirit of Nature* to do they know not what, though it be really a necessary provision and accommodation for laying their *Eggs*, and hatching their young, in the efformation whereof this *Inferiour Soul of the World*, is so rationally conceiv'd to assist and intermedle: and therefore may the better be suppos'd to overpower the *Fancy*, and make use of the members of the *Birds* to build these convenient *Receptacles*, as certain shops to lay up the *Matter* whereon she intends to work, namely, the *Eggs* of these *Birds* whom she thus guides in making of their nests.

9. For that this building of their nests in such sort should not be from *natural Instinct*, but from acquir'd Art and observation, or from the instruction of the old ones, there is no reason or ground for any one to conceit. For in that their actions tend to so considerable a scope, that is no argument that they know it, or ever consulted about it, no more than that *Ivy* or *Bindweed*, that wind about the next plant that can support them, cast up with themselves beforehand either the necessity or convenience of such close embraces. Nor does it at all follow, because the young ones might see the old ones make their nests before they begin to make theirs, that they do see them, or take notice of them. Nay, who can produce any one example of the old one tutoring or teaching her young ones in this kind of *Architecture*? or has spy'd the young one of her self to apply her mind to learn that art by observing what the old one does? Wherefore a man may as well argue, yea much better, that the *Notes* of *Birds* are not by *Instinct*, but by learning and art, because they may have heard the old ones sing or whistle before them: whenas they will take up naturally of themselves such notes as belong to their kind, without hearing of the old ones at any time. So that it is

not

not from any ground of Reason, but a mere vain and shallow surmise, to think that the Architecture of Birds in building their nests is not *natural Instinct*, but acquir'd *Art* and *Imitation*.

But on the other side, there are very plain and positive Reasons to convince us, that this Architecture of theirs is from *Instinct*, and no *acquir'd faculty*. And that first, because in general brute Animals are of such a nature as is devoid of that free and reflexive reason which is requisite to acquir'd Art and Consultation. For if they had any such Principle, some of them would be able to speak. The want of which power is the only plausible presumption for *Dés-Cartes* his conceit of their being mere *Machina's*. Which, though it will not reach to so enormous a Paradox, yet it may justly exclude them from the participation of such a free Reason as will make them able for consultation and learning of Arts and Mysteries.

Secondly, The hatching of their eggs being by mere *Instinct*, and not out of any deliberate Knowledge, it is reasonable to think, that the making of their nests, which is but in order thereto, is mere *Instinct* also.

Thirdly, That which is specifical is not acquir'd, but is by Nature or Instinct; but to make their nests thus or thus, is specifical to this or that kind of Bird, even as their note is, and therefore is plainly natural.

Fourthly, The peculiar Indocility of those Birds that are the most ingenious Architects in building their nests, is a plain indication that it is not *free Reason* but *Instinct* that guides them. And * *Pliny* observes in the *Swallow*, how indocile she is, and yet how admirable in framing her little mansions of mudd. * *Histor. Natural. lib. 10. c. 45, & 33.*

Fifthly, That this Architecture is not a piece of learning derived from the old ones in succession, but the immediate effect of Nature, is further manifest, in that in all parts of the World the same kind of Birds make the same kinds of nests, when it cannot be well suppos'd that they learned it from those in remote countries, whom the vastness of the Seas kept from mutual converse.

Sixthly and lastly, There is no man can well think or discourse of examples of natural Architecture, but the *Martin's Nest*, the *Combs of Bees*, the *Webs of Spiders*, and the *Bags of Silk-worms*, will one bring in another, as being wholly congenerous, and of the same nature. Which makes * *Pliny*, *Cardan*, *Nierembergius*, join them in one Catalogue, as examples of one suit, and may well induce us to conclude them so near a-kin, as if that one be *natural Instinct*, all the rest must be so too. And our foregoing Argument is infinitely pressing in the three last instances. For we may be sure that all the *Bees* in the world came not out of one *Hive*, and therefore could not derive their Architectural skill from the same teachers, and yet they all make their *Combs* with the same artifice, as I may so call it, and with the same exactness of Geometry. And as for *Spiders*, it is evident that they are of the *αὐτομάτως γερόμενα*, as *Aristotle* phrases it, and are generated of mere fluttery and putrefaction. And yet these Insects, so soon as they are bred, can set up shop, and fall to their trade of weaving, without any Teacher or Instructor. * *Plin. Histor. Natur. lib. 11. c. 10, 11, 22, 24.* *Cardan. de Subtil. lib. 14.* *Nieremb. Histor. Natur. lib. 3. cap. 28.*

But

But the noblest and most apposite instance is that last of the *Silk-worm*, who works so concealedly within her *folliculus* or little bag, as if she either envied the communication of her skill to her fellows, who of themselves are very dim-sighted, or ought him a shame that should be so injudiciously bold as to impute the *natural Instinct* of such like Animals to external observation and imitation. And yet there is a great affinity betwixt the *Nidifications* of *Birds*, and these *Conglomerations* of the threads of the *Silk-worm*: not only in regard of the outward Figure of those clues of silk, as I may so call them, which are not unlike the Nests of *Birds*, but also in regard of the end and design of them both. Which is not the accommodating of the *Individual*, but a plot for the propagation of the *Species*. For that Insect we call the *Silk-worm*, after she has run through multifarious changes and names, as, of * σκώληξ, κάμπη, βομβύλις, χρυσάλις, νύμφη, νεκύδαλος, ψυχή, in this last title and change ends all with a plentiful provision for the continuation of the kind. For when she has arriv'd to her third change, wherein she is called βομβύλις, from her mouth, and with her fore-feet, she works that *Folliculus*, or clue of silk above nam'd, building thus her own tomb, which yet is the womb or cradle of her self, when having passed the state of a χρυσάλις, (wherein she does ἀκίνητος, as *Aristotle* speaks, and approaches near to the shape and nature of an egg) she emerges after to a nearer tendency toward her purposed animal delineaments, and is called νύμφη and after this, acquiring a greater degree of life and motion, is styl'd * νεκύδαλος, as if her dead body had catch'd vital fire again. In this state she does not lie loose, but sticks again to the cavity of the Clue, and grown to full maturity, breaks through, and shews her self in the compleat form of a Butterfly. To which pitch of perfection when they are arrived, they enjoy but a very small time. For after three or four days indulgence to the delightful usages of *Venus*, the Male immediately bids the world adieu; whom soon after the Female follows, but yet so as that she leaves behind her some hundreds of eggs, small like the grains of millet, as a numerous pledge and provision for the continuation of their kind. How then, according to this account, can the old one ever teach the young ones their trade of spinning or weaving?

* i. e. Vermis, Eruca, Bombyx, Aurelia, Nympha, Nectydalus, Papiho. See Arist. Histor. Animal. l. 5. c. 19.

* An quod ex campe mortuâ velut accenditur? νέκυσ mortuus, δαίω accendo, unde δαίω titio. Martin.

Histor. Animal. lib. 9. cap. 7.

Book 2. ch. 9. sect. 9.

Histor. Natural. lib. 10. cap. 45.

And yet the *Silk-worm's Bag* is as great a piece of Artifice, and of as great design, or rather the same as the nests of *Swallows* or *Martins*. The making of which, notwithstanding *Aristotle* calls μιμήματα τῆς ἀνθρώπινος ζωῆς, *Imitations of humane Reason*, which they having not themselves, some Principle distinct from them must be their Guide in these performances: whence I have rightly concluded in my *Antidote*, That the *Nidification* of *Birds*, as well as their *Incubation*, is no obscure argument of a *Divine Providence*. Which I understand mainly of the structure of their Nests; though the choice of the places where they build them, may not be merely from the lightness of their bodies, and their assuefaction to Edifices, Trees, or Bushes, but partly from the dictate of that *Instinct*, which suggests to them every where what is most for their safety, and makes them many times sagacious above our apprehension. As it appears in what *Pliny* writes concerning a kind

kind of *Swallows* that use to build their nests near *Coptos* in *Agypt*, who do either not make or forsake their nests many days before, *si futurum est ut auctus annis attingat.*

That there is such a thing therefore as *Instinct* in Brute Animals, I think is very plain, that is to say, That there is an *Instigation* or *Impetus* in them to do such things without counsel, deliberation, or acquired knowledge, as according to our reason and best consultation we cannot but approve to be fittest to be done. Which Principle in general *Scaliger* seems to parallel to Divine Inspiration. *Instinctus dicitur à Natura, sicut à Diis Afflatio.* *Exercit. 3072* But methinks it is most safely and ^{n. 4.} unexceptionably apply'd where the *Instinct* respects not so much the welfare of the *Individual* as the common good of this or that *Species*. For if there be any *Impulse* from an Extrinsic Principle upon any particular Animal, it is most sure to be then, when that Animal is transported from the pursuance of its own particular accommodation to serve a more publick end. For from whence can this motion be so well as from that which is not a particular Being, but such as in whose Essence the scope and purpose of the general good of the World, and of all the *Species* therein, is vitally compriz'd, and therefore binds all Particulars together by that common Essential Law, which is it self, occasionally impelling them to such actions and services (either above their Knowledge, or against their particular Interests) as is most conducing to the Conversation of the Whole? And this is that which we have styl'd the *Spirit of Nature*, which goes through, and assists all corporeal Beings, and is the *Vicarious power of God* (who is that *Νόμος ἰσοκλινής*, as the Philosopher calls Him) upon the Universal Matter of the World. This suggests to the *Spider*, the fancy of spinning and weaving her Web; and to the *Bee*, of the framing of her Honey-combs; but especially to the *Silk-worm*, of conglomerating her both funeral and natal Clue; and to the *Birds*, of building their Nests, and of their so diligent hatching of their Eggs. But I have insisted upon this Argument too long.

10. The most notable of those offices that can be assigned to *The Spirit of Nature*, and that suitably to his name, is the Translocation of the Souls of Beasts into such Matter as is most fitting for them, he being the common *Proxenet* or *Contractor* of all natural Matches and Marriages betwixt *Forms* and *Matter*, if we may also speak Metaphors as well as *Aristotle*, whose Aphorism it is, that *Materia appetit formam ut fœmina virum.*

This *Spirit* therefore may have not only the power of directing the motion of Matter at hand, but also of transporting of particular Souls and Spirits in their state of *Silence* and *Inactivity* to such Matter as they are in a fitness to catch life in again. Which *Transportation* or *Transmission* may very well be at immense distances, the effect of this *Sympathy* and *Coactivity* being so great in the working of *Wines*, as has been above noted, though a thing of less concernment, or (which is a more unexceptionable instance) in conducting the *magnetick* particles from one Pole of the Earth to the other.

Whence, to conclude, we may look upon this *Spirit of Nature* as the great *Quartermaster-General* of Divine Providence, but able alone, without

out any under-Officers, to lodge every Soul, according to her rank and Merit, whenever she leaves the Body: And would prove a very serviceable Hypothesis for those that fancy the *Praeexistence* of humane Souls, to declare how they may be convey'd into Bodies here, be they at what distance they will before; and how Matter haply may be so fitted, * that the best of them may be fetch'd from the purest *Aethereal* Regions into an humane Body, without serving any long Apprentiship in the intermediate *Air*: as also how the Souls of Brutes, tho' the Earth were made perfectly inept for the life of any Animal, need not lie for ever useless in the Universe.

But such Speculations as these are of so vast a comprehension and impenetrable obscurity, that I cannot have the confidence to dwell any longer thereon; especially they not touching so essentially our present design, and being more fit to fill a volume themselves, than to be compriz'd within the narrow limits of my now almost-finish'd Discourse.

N O T E S

ON CHAP. XIII. SECT. I.

CONCERNING the Motion whereof I agree with Des-Cartes, &c. I made a Conscience, as it should seem, here of forsaking wholly the *Cartesian* Philosophy. But now, ingenuously to confess the Truth, as I find it, that *Aethereal* Matter is no more the immediate material Cause of the Descent of a Stone, than the Stone it self is the immediate material Cause of the Ascent of the *Aethereal* Matter: but it is the joint and co-temporary Act of the *Spirit of Nature* upon the Stone and *Aethereal* Matter together: for that Spirit penetrating even all things is never idle.

The Drops of Liquors are form'd into round Figures, as he ingeniously concludes, &c. The Invention indeed is very ingenious, but how far from being solid, you may understand from the things that I have offer'd *Enchirid. Metaphys. Chap. 21.*

Sect. 7. But that many times the immediate Director thereof is the Spirit of Nature, &c. Nay rather always; since the Universal Motion of all the Matter of the World is *Vital*, and not *Mechanical*, unless it be by Accident.

Sect. 10. That the best of them may be fetch'd from the purest Aethereal Regions into an humane Body, &c. That this is wholly impossible I do not think. But the more gradual Descent of Souls being suppos'd, from the *Aviluthick* World, as the *Cabbalists* speak, into the *Briathick*, and from the *Briathick* into the *Jetzirathick*, and from the *Jetzirathick* into the *Asiathick*, and its Atmosphere; it seems not probable then, that any Souls should make such enormous Leaps, as immediately from the *Aziluthick* World to be plunged into an Earthly Body.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIV.

1. *Objections against the Soul's Immortality from her condition in Infancy, Old age, Sleep, and Sicknesſes.* 2. *Other Objections taken from Experiments that ſeem to prove her Diſcerpibility.* 3. *As alſo from the ſeldom appearing of the Souls of the deceased;* 4. *And from our natural fear of Death.* 5. *A Subterfuge of the adverſe party, in ſuppoſing but one common Soul to all Creatures.* 6. *An Answer concerning the Littleneſſ of the Soul in Infancy:* 7. *As alſo concerning the weakneſſ of her Intellectuals then, and in Old age.* 8. *That Sleep does not at all argue the Soul's Mortality, but rather illuſtrate her Immortality.* 9. *An Answer to the Objection from Apoplexies and Catalepsies:* 10. *As alſo to that from Madneſſ.* 11. *That the various depravations of her Intellectual Faculties do no more argue her Mortality, than the worſer Modifications of Matter its natural Annihilability. And why God created Souls ſympathizing with Matter.*

1. **A**S for the *Objections* that are uſually made againſt the *Immortality of the Soul*; to propound them all, were both tedious and uſeleſſ, there being ſcarce above one in twenty that can appear of any moment to but an indifferent Wit and Judgment. But the greateſt difficulties that can be urged I ſhall bring into play, that the Truth we do maintain may be the more fully cleared, and the more firmly believed. The moſt material *Objections* that I know againſt the *Soul's Immortality*, are theſe *Five*. The *Fiſt* is from the conſideration of the condition of the Soul in *Infancy*, and *Old age*, as alſo in *Madneſſ*, *Sleep*, and *Apoplexies*. For if we do but obſerve the great difference of our Intellectual operations in *Infancy* and *Dotage*, from what they are when we are in the prime of our years; and how that our Wit grows up by degrees, flouriſhes for a time, and at laſt decays, keeping the ſame pace with the changes that Age and Years bring into our Body, which obſerves the ſame laws that Flowers and Plants do; what can we ſuſpect, but that the Soul of Man, which is ſo magnificently ſpoken of amongſt the learned, is nothing elſe but a Temperature of Body, and that it grows and ſpreads with it, both in bigneſſ and virtues, and withers and dies as the Body does, or at leaſt that it does wholly depend on the Body in its Operations, and therefore that there is no ſenſe nor perception of any thing after Death? And when the Soul has the beſt advantage of years, ſhe is not then exempted from thoſe Eclipſes of the power of the Mind that proceed from *Sleep*, *Madneſſ*, *Apoplexies*, and other *Difeaſes* of that nature. All which ſhew her condition, whatever more exalted Wits ſurmize of her, that ſhe is but a poor, mortal, and corporeal thing.

2. The *Second* Objection is taken from ſuch Experiments as are thought to prove the Soul *diviſible* in the groſſeſt ſenſe, that is to ſay, *diſcerpible* into pieces. And it ſeems a more clear caſe in thoſe more contemptible Animals which are called *Inſects*, eſpecially the τὰ μικρὰ καὶ πολυπόδα, as *Ariſtotle* deſcribes them, and doth acknowledge that, being cut into pieces, each ſegment will have its motion and ſenſe apart

to

De Hiſtor. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 7.

to it self. The most notable Instance of this kind is in the *Scolopendra*, whose parts *Aristotle* affirms to live a long time divided, and to run backwards and forwards; and therefore he will have it to look like many living Creatures growing together, rather than one single one, *De Juventute* Ἐοίκασι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς ζώων πολλοῖς ζώοις συμπεφυκόσι. But yet he will not afford them the privilege of Plants, whose slips will live and grow, being set in the Earth. But the instances that belong to this Objection ascend higher, for they pretend that the parts of perfect Animals will also live asunder.

There are two main instances thereof. The one, that of the Eagle *Fromond. de Fromondus* mentions, whose *Head* being chopt off by an angry Clown, for quarrelling with his dog, the Body flew over the barn near the place of this rude execution. This was done at *Fromondus* his father's house: nor is the story improbable, if we consider what ordinarily happens in Pigeons and Ducks, when their heads are cut off. The other instance is, of a Malefactor beheaded at *Antwerp*, whose *Head* when it had given some few jumps into the croud, and a Dog fell a licking the blood, caught the Dog's ear in its teeth, and held it so fast, that he being frightened, ran away with the man's head hanging at his ear, to the great astonishment and confusion of the people. This was told *Fromondus* by an eye-witness of the fact. From which two Examples they think may be safely inferred, that the Souls of Men, as well as of the more perfect kind of Brutes, are also *discerpible*.

That example in the same Author out of *Josephus Acoſta*, if true, yet is smally to this purpose. For the speaking of the sacrific'd Captive, when his *Heart* was cut out, may be a further confirmation indeed, that the *Brain* is the Seat of the Common Sense, but no argument of the *Divisibility* of the Soul, she remaining at that time entire in the Body, after the cutting out of the *Heart*, whose office it is to afford *Spirits*, which were not yet so far dissipated, but that they sufficed for that suddain operation of life.

See Book 2.
Chap. 7.
sect. 9.

3. The *Third* Objection is from the seldom appearance of the Souls of the deceased. For if they can at all appear, why do they not oftner? if they never appear, it is a strong suspicion that they are not at all in Being.

4. The *Fourth*, is from the Fear of Death, and an inward down-bearing sense in us at some times, that we are utterly mortal, and that there is nothing to be expected after this life.

5. The *Fifth*, and last, is rather a Subterfuge than an Objection, That there is but *One Common Soul* in all Men and Beasts, that operates according to the variety of Animals and Persons it does actuate and vivificate, bearing a seeming particularity according to the particular pieces of Matter it informs, but is *One* in all; and that this particularity of Body being lost, this particular Man or Beast is lost, and so every living creature is properly and entirely mortal. These are the reallest and most pertinent *Objections* I could ever meet withal, or can excogitate, concerning the Soul's Immortality: to which I shall answer in order.

6. And to the *First*, which seems to be the shrewdest, I say, That neither the *Contractedness* of the Soul in *Infancy*, nor the *Weakness* of her

her Intellectual Operations either *then*, or in *extreme Old age*, are sufficient proofs of her *Corporeity* or *Mortality*. For what wonder is it that the Soul, fall'n into this low and fatal condition, where she must submit to the course of Nature, and the laws of other Animals that are generated here on Earth, should display her self by degrees, from smaller dimensions to the ordinary size of men; whenas this faculty of *contracting and dilating* of themselves is in the very essence and notion of all *Spirits*? as I have noted already. So she does but that lei- Book 1. ch. 5:
surely and naturally now, being subjected to the laws of this terrestrial Fate, which she does, exempt from this condition, suddenly and freely: not growing by *Juxta-position* of parts, or *Intromission* of Matter, but enlarging of her self with the Body merely by the *dilatation* of her own Substance, which is one and the same always.

7. As for the *Debility* of her Intellectuals in *Infancy* and *Old age*, this consideration has less force to evince her a *mere corporeal* essence than the former, and touches not our Principles at all, who have provided for the very worst surmise concerning the operations of the Mind, in acknowledging them, of my own accord, to depend very intimately on the temper and tenour of the Soul's immediate instrument, the *Spirits*; which being more torpid and watry in *Children* and *Old men*, must needs hinder her in such Operations as require another constitution of *Spirits* than is usually in *Age* and *Childhood*: though I will not profess my self absolutely confident, that the Soul cannot act without all dependence on Matter. But if it does not, which is most probable, it must needs follow, that its Operations will keep the laws of the Body it is united with. Whence it is demonstrable, how necessary *Purity* and *Temperance* are to preserve and advance a man's parts.

8. As for *Sleep*, which the dying Philosopher called *the Brother of Death*, I do not see how it argues the Soul's Mortality, more than a man's inability to wake again: but rather helps us to conceive, how
Ælian. Var. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 35.
that though the stounds and agonies of Death seem utterly to take away all the hopes of the Soul's living after them; yet upon a recovery of a quicker Vehicle of Air, she may suddenly awake into fuller and fresher participation of life than before. But I may answer also, that *Sleep* being only the ligation of the outward Senses, and the interception of motion from the external world, argues no more any radical defect of Life and Immortality in the Soul, than the having a man's Sight bounded within the walls of his chamber by Shuts, does argue any blindness in the immured party; who haply is busie reading by candle-light, and that with ease, so small a Print as would trouble an ordinary Sight to read it by day. And that the Soul is not perpetually employ'd in *Sleep*, is very hard for any to demonstrate; we so often remembring our dreams merely by occasions, which, if they had not occur'd, we had never suspected we had dream'd that night.

9. Which Answer, as also the former, is applicable to *Apoplexies*, *Catalepsies*, and whatever other *Diseases* partake of their nature, and witness how nimble the Soul is to act upon the suppeditation of due Matter, and how *Life*, and *Sense*, and *Memory*, and *Reason* and all return, upon return of the fitting temper of the *Spirits*, suitable to that *vital Congruity* that then is predominant in the Soul.

10. And as for *Madness*, there are no Apprehensions so frantick but are arguments of the *Soul's Immortality*, not as they are *frantick*, but as *Apprehensions*. For *Matter* cannot apprehend any thing, either wildly or soberly, as I have * already sufficiently demonstrated. And it is as irrational for a man to conclude, that the depraved Operations of the Soul argue her Mortality, as that the worser tempers, or figures, or whatever more contemptible modifications there are of Matter, should argue its annihilation by the mere power of Nature; which no man that understands himself will ever admit.

* Book 2.
ch. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

The Soul indeed is indued with several Faculties, and some of them very fatally passive, such as those are that have the nearest commerce with *Matter*, and are not so absolutely in her own power, but that her levity and mindlessness of the divine light may bring her into subjection to them; as all are, in too sad a sort, that are incarcerated in this *Tereſtrial* Body, but some have better luck than other-some in this wild and audacious ramble from a more secure state. Of which Apostacy, if there be some that are made more for Tragick examples than others, of their straggling from their sovereign Happiness, it is but a merciful admonition of the danger we all have incurr'd, by being where we are; and very few so well escaped, but that if they could examine their Desires, Designs, and Transactions here, by that Truth they were once masters of, they would very freely confess, that the mistakes and errors of their life are not inferior to, but of worse consequence than those of natural Fools and Madmen, whom all either hoot at for their folly, or else lament their misery. And questionless the Souls of Men, if they were once reduced to that sobriety they are capable of, would be as much ashamed of such *Desires* and *Notions* they are now wholly engaged in, as any mad-man, reduc'd to his right Senses, is of those freaks he play'd when he was out of his wits.

11. But the variety of degrees, or kinds of depravation in the Intellectual faculties of the Soul, her Substance being *Indiscernible*, cannot at all argue her *Mortality*, no more than the different modifications of *Matter* the *Annihilability* thereof, as I have already intimated. Nor need a man trouble himself how there should be such a * Sympathy betwixt Body and Soul, when it is so demonstrable that there is. For it is sufficient to consider, that it is their immediate nature so to be by the will and ordinance of Him that has made all things. And that if *Matter* has no *Sense* nor *Cogitation* it self, as we have demonstrated it has not, it had been in vain, if God had not put forth into Being that Order of *Immaterial* Creatures which we call *Souls*, vitally unitable with the *Matter*: Which therefore, according to the several modifications thereof, will necessarily have a different effect upon the Soul, the Soul abiding still as unperishable as the *Matter* that is more mutable than *she*. For the *Matter* is *dissipable*, but *she* utterly *indiscernible*.

* See Book 2:
chap. 10.
sect. 9.

C H A P. XV.

1. *An Answer to the experiment of the Scolopendra cut into pieces:* 2. *And to the flying of an headless Eagle over a barn; as also to that of the Malefactor's head biting a Dog by the ear.* 3. *A superaddition of a difficulty concerning Monsters born with two or more Heads, and but one Body and Heart.* 4. *A solution of the difficulty.* 5. *An Answer touching the seldom appearing of the Souls of the deceased:* 6. *As also concerning the fear of Death;* 7. *And a down-bearing sense that sometimes so forcibly obtrudes upon us the belief of the Soul's Mortality.* 8. *Of the Tragical Pomp and dreadful Preludes of Death, with some corroborative Considerations against such sad spectacles.* 9. *That there is nothing really sad and miserable in the Universe, unless to the wicked and impious.*

I. **N**OR do those Instances in the second Objection prove any thing to the contrary, as if the Soul it self were really divisible. The most forcible Example is that of the *Scolopendra*, the motion of the *divided* parts being so quick and nimble, and so lasting. But it is easy to conceive, that the activity of the Spirits in the Mechanical conformation of the pieces of that Insect, till motion has dissipated them, will as necessarily make them run up and down, as Gunpowder in a squib will cause its motion. And therefore the Soul of the *Scolopendra* will be but in one of those Segments, and uncertain in which, but likely according as the Segments be made. For cut a Wasp's head off from the Body, the Soul retires out of the Head into the Body; but cut her in the Waist, leaving the upper part of the Body to the Head, the Soul then retires into that forepart of the Wasp. And therefore it is no wonder that the Head being cut off, the Body of the Wasp will fly and flutter so long, the Soul being still in it, and haply conferring to the direction of the Spirits for motion, not out of Sense, but from custom or nature: as we walk not thinking of it, or playing on the Lute, though our mind be running on something else, as I have * noted before. But when the Waist is left to the Head, it is less wonder, for then the Animal may not be destitute of sense and fancy, to convey the Spirits to move the wings.

* Book 2.
Ch. 11. sect. 8.

2. The former case will fit that of the headless Eagle that flew over the Barn. But the man's Head that catch'd the Dog by the ear would have more difficulty in it, (it not seeming so perfectly referrible to the latter case of the Wasp) did not we consider how hard the teeth will set in a swoon. As this Head therefore was gasping while the Dog was licking the blood thereof, his ear chanced to dangle into the mouth of it, which closing together as the ear hung into it, pinch'd it so fast that it could not fall off.

Besides, it is not altogether improbable, especially considering that some men die upwards, and some downwards, that the Soul may, as it happens, sometimes retire into the Head, and sometimes into the Body, in these decollations, according as they are more or less replenish'd with Spirits, and by the lusty jumping of this Head, it

should seem it was very full of them. Many such things as these also may happen by the activity of the *Spirit of Nature*, who, it's like, may be as busie in the ruins of Animals, while the Spirits last, as it is in the fluid rudiments of them when they are generated. But the former Answers being sufficient, it is needless to enlarge our selves upon this new Theme.

3. To this second Objection might have been added Such monstrous births, as seem to imply the *Perceptive part* of the Soul divided actually into two or more parts. For *Aristotle* seems expressly to affirm, that that monstrous birth that has two Hearts is two Animals, but that which has but one Heart is but one. From whence it will follow, that there is but one Soul also in that one-hearted Monster, though it have two or more Heads; whence it is also evident, that the *Perceptive part* of that one Soul must be actually divided into two or more. This opinion of *Aristotle*, *Sennertus* subscribes to, and therefore conceives that that monstrous child that was born at *Emmaus*, in *Theodosius* his Time, with two Heads and two Hearts, was two persons; but that other born *Anno 1531.* with two Heads but one Heart, who liv'd till he was a man, was but one person. Which he conceives appears the plainer, in that both the Heads professed their agreement perpetually to the same actions, in that they had the same appetite, the same hunger and thirst, spoke alike, had the same desire to lie with their wife, and of all other acts of exonerating nature. But for that other that had two Hearts, and was divided to the Navel, there was not this identity of affection and desire, but sometimes one would have a mind to a thing, and sometimes another; sometimes they would play with one another, and sometimes fight.

4. But I answer, and first to *Aristotle's* authority, that he does not so confidently assert, that every Monster that has but one Heart is but one *Animal*. For his words run thus; "Εν ᾧ εἶναι τὸ ζῶον τὸ τετρατῶδες ἢ πλείω συμπεφυκότα δὲ νομίζειν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν, οἷον ἐν τοῖσιν ἑκάστην ἢ καρδίαν μίαν, τὸ μὲν μίαν ἔχον καρδίαν ἐν ζῶον. Where he only speaks hypothetically, not peremptorily, that the Heart is that part where the first Principle of life is, and from which the rest of life in Soul or Body is to be derived. For indeed he makes it * elsewhere the seat of Common Sense; but that it is a mistake we have already demonstrated, and himself seems not confident of his own Opinion; and therefore we may with the less offence decline it, and affirm, (and that without all hesitancy) that a Monster is either one or more Animals, according to the number of the Heads of it, and that there are as many distinct Souls as there are Heads in a monstrous Birth. But from the Heads downwards, the Body being but one, and the Heart but one, that there must needs be a wonderful exact concord in the sense of affections in these Heads, they having their Blood and Spirits from one fountain, and one common seat of their passions and desires. But questionless whenever one Head winked, it could not then see by the eyes of the other; or if one had pricked one of these Heads, the other would not have felt it: though whatever was inflicted below, it is likely they both felt alike, both the Souls equally acting

De generat. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 4.

Sennert. Epit. tom. Scient. Natural. l. 6. cap. 1.

De generat. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 4.

* *De Juvent. & Senect. c. 3.*
* Book 2.
Chap. 7.
sect. 8, 9.

acting the Body of this Monster, but the Head being actuated by them only in several. Which is a sufficient Answer to *Sennertus*.

5. The weakness of the third Objection is manifest, in that it takes away the Existence of all Spirits as well as the Souls of the deceased. Of whose Being notwithstanding none can doubt that are not dotingly incredulous. We say therefore that the Souls of men, being in the same condition that other Spirits are, *appear sometimes*, though but *seldom*. The cause in both being, partly the difficulty of bringing their Vehicles to an unnatural consistency, and partly they having no occasion so to do, and lastly it being not permitted to them to do as they please, or to be where they have a mind to be.

6. As for the *Fear of Death*, and that *down-bearing* sense that sometimes so uncontrollably suggests to us that we are wholly mortal: To the first I answer, That it is a necessary result of our union with the Body, and if we should admit it one of the imperfections or infirmities we contract by being in this state, it were a solid Answer. And therefore this fear and presage of ill in Death is no argument that there is any ill in it, nor any more to be heeded than the predictions of any fanatical fellow that will pretend to prophesie. But besides this, it is fitting that there should be in us this fear and abhorrence, to make us keep this Station Providence has plac'd us in; otherwise every little pet would invite us to pack our selves out of this World, and try our fortunes in the other, and so leave the Earth to be inhabited only by Beasts, * whenas it is to be ordered and cultivated by Men.

* See *Cabb. Philof. cap. 3. v. 20, 21, 22.*

7. To the second I answer, That such peremptory conclusions are nothing but the impostures of Melancholy, or some dull and fulsome distempers of blood that corrupt the Imagination; but that Fancy proves nothing, by Axiome 4. And that though the Soul enthron'd in her *Aethereal Vehicle* be a very magnificent thing, full of Divine Love, Majesty, and Tranquillity; yet in this present state she is in, clogg'd and accloy'd with the foulness and darkness of this *Terrestrial Body*, she is subject to many fears and jealousies, and other disturbing passions, whose Objects, though but a mockery, yet are a real disquiet to her mind in this her Captivity and Imprisonment.

Which condition of hers is lively set out by that incomparable Poet and Platonist, in his *Aeneid*. where, comparing that more free and pure state of our Souls in their Celestial or Fiery Vehicles, with their restraint in this Earthly Dungeon, he makes this short and true description of the whole matter.

Aeneid. 6.

*Ignæus est ollis vigor, & cælestis origo
Seminibus; quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundæque membra:
Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudèntque, nec auras
Respiciunt, clausi tenebris & carcere cæco.*

To this SENSE.

A fiery vigour from an heavenly source
Is in these seeds, so far as the dull force

I i i 3

Of

Of noxious Bodies does not them retard,
 In heavy earth and dying limbs imbarr'd.
 Hence, fool'd with fears, foul lusts, sharp grief, vain joy,
 In this dark Gaol they low and grovelling lie,
 Nor with one glance of their oblivious mind
 Look back to that free Air they left behind.

This is the sad estate of the more deeply-lapsed Souls upon Earth; who are so wholly master'd by the motions of the Body, that they are carried headlong into an assent to all the suggestions and imaginations that it so confidently obtrudes upon them; of which that of our *Mortality* is not the weakest.

But such melancholy fancies, that would bear us down so peremptorily, that we are utterly extinct in death, are no more argument thereof, than those of them that have been perswaded they were dead already, while they were alive; and therefore would not eat, because they thought the dead never take any repast, till they were cheated into an appetite, by seeing some of their friends, disguised in winding sheets, feed heartily at the table, whose example then they thought fit to follow, and so were kept alive.

8. I cannot but confess that the *Tragick pomp and preparation to dying*, that lays wast the operations of the Mind, putting her into fits of dotage or fury, making the very visage look ghastly and distracted, and at the best sadly pale and consumed, as if Life and Soul were even almost quite extinct, cannot but imprint strange impressions even upon the stoutest Mind, and raise suspicions that all is lost in so great a change. But the knowing and Benign Spirit, though he may flow in tears at so dismal a Spectacle, yet it does not at all suppress his hope and confidence of the Soul's safe passage into the other world; and is no otherwise moved than the more passionate Spectators of some cunningly-contriv'd Tragedy, where persons, whose either Vertue, or misfortunes, or both, have won the affection of the beholders, are at last seen wallowing in their blood, and after some horrid groans and gasps, lie stretch'd stark dead upon the stage: but being once drawn off, find themselves well and alive, and are ready to tast a cup of wine with their friends in the attiring room, to solace themselves really, after their fictitious pangs of death, and leave the easy-natur'd multitude to indulge to their soft passions for an evil that never beset them.

9. The *fear* and abhorrency therefore we have of *Death*, and the *sorrow* that accompanies it, is no argument but that we may live after it, and are but due affections for those that are to be spectators of the great *Tragick-Comedy* of the World; the whole plot whereof being contriv'd by Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, we cannot but surmise, that the most sad representations are but a *show*, but the delight *real* to such as are not wicked and impious; and that what the ignorant call *Evil* in this Universe, is but as a shadowy strokes in a fair picture, or the mournful notes in Musick, by which the Beauty of the one is more lively and express, and the Melody of the other more pleasing and melting.

C H A P. XVI.

1. *That that which we properly are, is both Sensitive and Intellectual.*
2. *What is the true Notion of a Soul being One.*
3. *That if there be but One Soul in the world, it is both Rational and Sensitive.*
4. *The most favourable representation of their Opinion that hold but One.*
5. *A Confutation of the foregoing representation.*
6. *A Reply to the Confutation.*
7. *An Answer to the Reply.*
8. *That the Soul of Man is not properly any Ray either of God or the Soul of the World.*
9. *And yet if she were so, it would be no prejudice to her Immortality: whence the folly of Pomponatius is noted.*
10. *A further animadversion upon Pomponatius his folly, in admitting a certain number of remote Intelligencies, and denying Particular Immaterial Substances in Men and Brutes.*

1. **A**S for the last Objection, or rather Subterfuge, of such as have no mind to find their Souls immortal, pretending indeed they have none distinct from that *one Universal Soul* of the World, whereby notwithstanding they acknowledge, that the Operations we are conscious to our selves of, of Reason and other Faculties, cannot be without one; we shall easily discover either the falseness or unserviceableness of this conceit for their design, who would so fain sink out of Being after the mad freaks they have play'd in this Life. For it is manifestly true, that a Man is most properly that, whatever it is, that *animadvert*s in him; for that is such an operation that no Being but himself can do it for him. And that which *animadvert*s in us, does not only perceive and take notice of its *Intellectual* and *Rational* operations, but of all *Sensations* whatsoever that we are conscious of, whether they terminate in our Body, or on some outward Object. From whence it is plain, that *That which we are* is both *Sensitive* and *Intellectual*.

2. Now if we rightly consider what is comprehended in the true and usual Notion of the *Unity* of a Soul, it is very manifest that it mainly consists in this, that the *Animadversive* thereof is *but one*, and that there is no *Sensation* nor *Perception* of any kind in the Soul, but what is communicated to, and perceived by the whole *Animadversive*.

3. Which things being premis'd, it necessarily follows, that if there be *but one Soul* in the World, that Soul is both *Rational* and *Sensitive*, and that there cannot be any Pain, Pleasure, or Speculation, in *one* man's Soul, but the same would be in *all*, nay, that a man cannot lash a Dog, or spur a Horse, but himself would feel the smart of it: which is flatly against all experience, and therefore palpably false. Of this wild Supposition I have spoken so fully in my *Poems*, that I need add nothing here in this place, having sufficiently confuted it there.

4. But not to cut them so very short, let us imagine the most favourable contrivance of their Opinion we can, and conceit, that tho' this *Soul of the World* be of it self every where alike, and that the *Animadversive* faculty is in it all in like vigour; yet it being engaged in severally-tempered Bodies, *Animadversion* is confin'd to that part of

Mat-

Matter only which it actuates ; and is stupid and unsensible of all other operations, whether Sensitive or Intellectual, that are transacted by her without, in other persons : a thing very hard to conceive, and quite repugnant to the Idea of the *Unity* of a Soul, not to be conscious to her self of her own perceptions. But let it pass for a possibility, and let us suppose that one part of the *Soul of the World* informs one man, and another another, or at least some vital Ray there; yet notwithstanding, this opinion will be incumbered with very harsh difficulties.

For if several parts of the *Soul of the World* inform several parts of the Matter, when a man changes his place, he either tears one part of the *Soul of the World* from another, or else changes Souls every step; and therefore it is a wonder that he changes not his Wits too, and loses his Memory. Unless they will say, that every part of the *Soul of the World*, upon the application of a new Body, acts just so in it as that part acted which it left, if there can be no change or alteration thereof: whence every part of the *Soul of the World* will have the self-same Thoughts, Errors, Truths, Remembrances, Pains, Pleasures, that the part had the Body newly left. So that a man shall always fancy it is himself, wherever he goes, though this self be nothing but the *Soul of the World* acting in such a particular Body, and retaining and renewing to her self the Memory of all Accidents, Impressions, Motions, and Cogitations, she had the perception of in this particular piece of organiz'd Matter. This is the most advantageous representation of this Opinion that can possibly be excogitated. But I leave it to those that love to amuse themselves in such Mysteries, to try if they can make any good sense of it.

5. And he that can fancy it as a thing possible, I would demand of him, upon this supposition, who *himself* is; and he cannot deny but that he is a Being *Perceptive* and *Animadversive*, which the *Body* is not, and therefore that himself is not the *Body*; wherefore he is that in him which is properly called *Soul*: But not its *Operations*, for the former reason; because they perceive nothing, but the *Soul* perceives them in exerting them: nor the *Faculties*, for they perceive not one another's *Operations*; but that which is a man's *Self* perceives them all: Wherefore he must say, he is the *Soul*; and there being but one *Soul* in the *World*, he must be forc'd to vaunt himself to be the *Soul of the World*. But this boasting must suddainly fall again, if he but consider, that the *Soul of the World* will be every man's personal *Ipseity* as well as his; whence every *one* man will be *all* men, and *all* men but *one* Individual man; which is a perfect contradiction to all the Laws of *Metaphysicks* and *Logick*.

6. But reminded of these inconveniencies, he will pronounce more cautiously, and affirm, that he is not the *Soul of the World* at large, but only so far forth as she expedites, or exerts her self into the Sense and Remembrance of all those Notions or Impressions that happen to her wherever she is join'd with his *Body*; but that so soon as this *Body* of his is dissipated or dissolved, that she will no longer raise any such determinate Thoughts or Senses that refer to that Union; and that so the Memory of such Actions, Notions, and Impressions, that were

were held together, in relation to a particular Body, being lost and laid aside upon the failing of the Body to which they did refer, this *Ipseity* or *Personality*, which consisted mainly in this, does necessarily perish in death.

This certainly is that (if they know their own meaning) which many Libertines would have, who are afraid to meet themselves in the other World, for fear they should quarrel with themselves there for their transactions in this. And it is the handsomest Hypothesis that they can frame in favour of themselves, and far beyond that dull conceit, *That there is nothing but mere Matter in the World*; which is infinitely more liable to confutation.

7. And yet this is too scant a covering to shelter them, and secure them from the sad after-claps they may justly expect in the other life. For First, it is necessary for them to confess, that they have in this life as particular and proper sense of Torment, of Pleasure, of Peace, and Pangs of Conscience, and of other Impressions, as if they had an individual Soul of their own, distinct from that of the World, and from every one's else; and if there be any *Demons* or *Genii*, * as * *Antidote*, certainly there are, that it is so with them too. We have also demon- Book 3. ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, &c. strated, that all *Sense* and *Perception* is immediately excited in the Soul by the † *Spirits*; wherefore with what confidence can they promise themselves, that the death of this earthly Body will quite obliterate all the tracts of their Being here on earth? whenas the subtiler ruins thereof, in all likelihood, may determine the Thoughts of the *Soul of the World* to the same tenour as before, and draw from her the memory of all the Transactions of this life, and make her exercise her judgment upon them, and cause her to contrive the most vital exhalations of the Terrestrial Body into an Aereal Vehicle, of like nature with the ferment of these material rudiments of life, saved out of the ruins of death.

For any slight touch is enough to engage her to perfect the whole Scene; and so a man shall be represented to himself and others in the other state whether he will or no, and have as distinct a personal *Ipseity* there as he had in this life. Whence it is plain, that this false Hypothesis, *That we are nothing but the Soul of the World acting in our Bodies*, will not serve their turns at all that would have it so; nor secure them from future danger, though it were admitted to be true. But I have demonstrated it false already, from the Notion of the *Unity* of a Soul.

Of the truth of which Demonstration we shall be the better assur'd, if we consider that the subtile Elements, which are the immediate conveyers of *Perceptions* in our Souls, are continued throughout in the *Soul of the World*, and insinuate into all living Creatures. So that the *Soul of the World* will be necessarily informed in every one, what she thinks or feels every where, if she be the only Soul that actuates every Animal upon earth. Whence the Sun, Stars, and Planets, would appear to us in that bigness they really are of, they being perceiv'd in that bigness by those parts of the *Soul of the World* that are at a convenient nearness to them.

* See Lips.
Physiolog.
Stoic. lib. 3.
Dissert. 8.

8. That other conceit of our Souls being a *Vital Ray of the Soul of the World*, may gain much countenance by expressions in ancient Authors that seem to favour the Opinion, as that of * *Epicætetus*, who saith that the Souls of men are *σωαφῆς τῷ θεῷ, ὅτε αὐτὸ μόρια ἔσαι καὶ ἀποσπασμαῖα*. And *Philo* calls the Mind of man *τῆς θείας ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα καὶ διασπέρων*; and *Trismegist*, *ὁ νῦν ἐκ ἑσιν ἀποτελεσμενός τῆς ἐσότητος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡπλωμένον καὶ ἀπερ τὸ τὸ ἡλίον φῶς*. All which expressions make the Soul of man a *Ray or Beam of the Soul of the World*, or of *God*. But we are to take notice that they are but Metaphorical phrases, and that what is understood thereby, is, *that there is an emanation of a secondary substance from the several parts of the Soul of the World, resembling the Rays of the Sun*. Which way of conception, though it be more easy than the other, yet it has difficulties enough. For this *Vital Ray* must have some head from whence it is stretch'd, and so the Body would be like a Bird in a string, which would be drawn to a great length when one takes long voyages, suppose to the East or West *Indies*; which yet are nothing so long as our yearly sailing on the Earth from *Libra* to *Aries*. Or if you will not have it a *linear Ray*, but an *Orb* of particular life; every such particular *Orb* must be hugely vast, that the Body may not travel out of the reach of the Soul. Besides, this *Orb* will strike through other Bodies as well as its own, and its own be in several parts of it; which are such incongruities and inconcinnities as are very harsh and displeasing to our Rational faculties.

Wherefore that Notion is infinitely more neat and safe, that proportions the Soul to the dimensions of the Body, and makes her independent on any but the Will and Essence of her Creator; which being exactly the same every where, as also his Power is, her emanative support is exactly the same to what she had in the very first point of her production and station in the World. In which respect of dependence she may be said to be a *Ray* of Him, as the rest of the Creation also; but in no other sense that I know of, unless of likeness and similitude, she being the *Image of God*, as the *Rays of Light* are of the *Sun*.

De Immortalit. Anim.
cap. 14.

9. But let every particular Soul be so many *Rays* of the *Soul of the World*, what gain they by this, whenas these *Rays* may be as capable of all the several congruities of life, as the Soul is in that sense we have described? and therefore *Personality*, *Memory*, and *Conscience* will as surely return or continue in the other state, according to this Hypothesis, as the other more usual one. Which also discovers the great folly of *Pomponatius*, (and of as many as are of the same leaven with him) who indeed is so modest and judicious as not to deny *Apparitions*, but attributes all to the influence of the Stars, or rather, the *Intelligencies* of the Celestial Orbs. For they giving life and animation to brute Animals, why may they not also, upon occasion, animate and actuate the Air into shape and form, even to the making them speak and discourse one shape with another? For so *Pomponatius* argues in his Book of the *Immortality of the Soul* from *Aquinas* his concession, that Angels and Souls separate may figure the Air into shape, and speak through it; *Quare igitur Intelligentie moventes corpora celestia*

De Immortal.
Animæ, c. 14.
pag. 114, 115.

hec

hac facere non possunt cum suis instrumentis quæ tot ac tanta possunt, quæ faciunt Psittacos, Picos, Corvos, & Merulas loqui? And a little after, he plainly reasons from the power the *Intelligencies* have of generating Animals, that it is not at all strange that they should raise such kinds of *Apparitions* as are recorded in History.

But if these *Celestial Intelligencies* be confined to their own Orbs, so as that no *secondary Essence* reach these inferior Regions, it is impossible to conceive how they can actuate the Matter here below. But if there be any such *essential Emanations* from them, whereby they actuate the Matter into these living *Species* we see in the World, of Men and Brutes; nothing hinders but the same *Emanations* remaining, may actuate the Air when this earthly fabrick fails, and retain the memory of things transacted in this life, and that still our *Personality* will be conserved as perfect and distinct as it was here.

10. But this conceit of *Pomponatius* is far more foolish than theirs that make only one *Anima Mundi* that passes through all the Matter of the World, and is present in every place to do all feats, that there are to be done. But to acknowledge so many several *Intellectual Beings* as there be fancied *Celestial Orbs*, and to scruple, or rather to seem confident, that there are not so many particular Souls as there be Men here on Earth, is nothing but Humour and Madness. For it is as rational to acknowledge eight hundred Thousand Myriads of *Intellectual* and *Immaterial Beings* really distinct from one another, as eight; and an infinite number, as but one, that could not create the Matter of the World. For then two Substances, wholly independent on one another, would be granted, as also the Infinite parts of Matter that have no dependence one on the other.

Why may not there be therefore Infinite numbers of Spirits or Souls that have as little dependence one on another, as well as there should be eight *Intelligencies*? whenas the motions and operations of every Animal, are a more certain argument of an *Immaterial Being* residing there, than the motions of the Heavens of any distinct *Intelligencies* in their Orbs, if they could be granted to have any: And it is no stranger a thing to conceive an Infinite multitude of *Immaterial*, as well as *Material Essences*, independent on one another, than but two; namely, the Matter, and the Soul of the World. But if there be so excellent a Principle existent as can create Beings, as certainly there is; we are still the more assured that there are such multitudes of Spiritual Essences, surviving all the chances of this present life, as the most sober and knowing men in all Ages have professed there are.

C H A P. XVII.

1. *That the Author having safely conducted the Soul into her Aereal condition through the dangers of Death, might well be excused from attending her any further.* 2. *What reasons urge him to consider what fates may befall her afterwards.* 3. *Three hazards the Soul runs after this life, whereby she may again become obnoxious to Death, according to the opinion of some.* 4. *That the Aereal Genii are mortal, confirm'd by three testimonies.* 5. *The one from the Vision of Facius Cardanus, in which the Spirits, that appear'd to him, profess themselves mortal.* 6. *The time they stay'd with him, and the matters they disputed of.* 7. *What credit Hieronymus Cardanus gives to his Father's Vision.* 8. *The other testimony out of Plutarch, concerning the Death of the great God Pan.* 9. *The third and last of Hesiod, whose opinion Plutarch has polish'd and refin'd.* 10. *An Enumeration of the several Paradoxes contain'd in Facius Cardanus his Vision.* 11. *What must be the sense of the third Paradox, if those Aereal Speculators spake as they thought.* 12. *Another Hypothesis to the same purpose.* 13. *The craft of these Dæmons, in shuffling in poisonous Error amongst solid Truths.* 14. *What makes the story of the death of Pan less to the present matter, with an addition of Demetrius his observations touching the Sacred Islands near Britain.* 15. *That Hesiod his opinion is the most unexceptionable, and that the harshness therein is but seeming, not real.* 16. *That the Æthereal Vehicle instates the Soul in a condition of perfect Immortality.* 17. *That there is no internal impediment to those that are Heroically good, but that they may attain an everlasting Happiness after Death.*

1. **W**E have now, maugre all the Oppositions and Objections made to the contrary, safely conducted the Soul into the other state, and installed her into the same condition with the *Aereal Genii*. I might be very well excused, if I took leave of her here, and committed her to that fortune that attends those of the Invisible World: it being more seasonable for them that are there, to meditate and prefigure in their minds all futurities belonging to them, than for us that are on this side the passage. It is enough that I have demonstrated, that neither the Essence nor Operations of the Soul are extinct by Death; but that they either not intermit, or suddenly revive upon the recovery of her *Aiery Body*.

2. But seeing that those that take any pleasure at all in thinking of these things, can seldom command the ranging of their thoughts within what compass they please, or that it is obvious for them to doubt, whether the Soul can be secure of her permanency in life in the other world, (it implying no contradiction, That her *Vital Congruity*, appropriate to this or that Element, may either of it self expire, or that she may by some carelessness debilitate one *Congruity*, and awaken another, in some measure, and so make her self obnoxious to Fate;) we cannot but think it in a manner necessary to extricate such difficulties as these, that we may not seem in this after-game to lose all we have won in the former; and make men suspect, that the

the Soul is not at all Immortal, if her Immortality will not secure her against all future fates.

3. To which she seems liable upon three accounts. The one we have named already, and respects an intrinsecal Principle, the *Periodical terms* of her *Vital Congruity*, or else the Levity and Miscarriage of her own Will. Which obnoxiousness of hers is still more fully argued from what is affirmed of the *Aereal Genii*, (whose companion and fellow-Citizen she is) whom sundry Philosophers assert to be *Mortal*. The other two hazards she runs are from without, to wit, the *Conflagration of the World*, and the *Extinction of the Sun*.

4. That the *Aereal Genii* are mortal, three main Testimonies are alledged for it. The Vision of *Facius Cardanus*, the Death of the great God *Pan* in *Plutarch*, and the Opinion of *Hesiod*. I will set them all down fully, as I find them, and then answer to them. The Vision of *Facius Cardanus* is punctually recited by his son *Hieronymus*, in his *De Subtilitate*, in this manner.

5. That his Father *Facius Cardanus*, who confessed that he had the society of a familiar Spirit for about thirty years together, told him this following Story often when he was alive, and after his death he found the exact relation of it committed to writing, which was this. *The 13 day of August 1491. after I had done my holy things, at the 20 hour of the day, there appeared to me, after their usual manner, seven men cloath'd in silk garments, with cloaks after the Greek mode, with purple stockins and crimson Cassocks, red and shining on their breasts: nor were they all of them thus clad, but only two of them who were the chief. On the ruddier and taller of these, two other two waited, but the less and paler had three attendants; so that they made up seven in all. They were about forty years of age, but look'd as if they had not reach'd thirty. When they were asked who they were, they answered that they were Homines Aerii, Aereal Men, who are born, and die as we; but that their life is much longer than ours, as reaching to 300 years. Being ask'd concerning the Immortality of our Souls, they answered, Nihil quod cuique proprium esset superesse: That they were of nearer affinity with the Divi than we; but yet infinitely different from them: and that their happiness or misery as much transcended ours, as ours does the brute Beasts. That they knew all things that are hid, whether Monies or Books. And that the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the best and noblest men, as the basest men are the trainers up of the best sort of Dogs. That the tenuity of their Bodies was such, that they can do us neither good nor hurt, saving in what they may be able to do by Spectres and Terrors, and impartment of knowledge. That they were both publick Professors in an Academy, and that he of the lesser stature had 300 disciples, the other 200. Cardan's Father further asking them why they would not reveal such treasures as they knew unto men; they answered, that there was a special law against it, upon a very grievous penalty.*

6. These *Aereal Inhabitants* stay'd at least three hours with *Facius Cardanus*, disputing and arguing of sundry things, amongst which one was, The Original of the World. The taller deny'd that God made the world ab æterno: the lesser affirmed that he so created it every moment, that if he should desist but one moment, it would perish. Whereupon he cited some things out of the *Disputations* of *Avenroes*, which Book was not yet extant, and named several other Treatises, part whereof are known, part not, which

were all of Avenroes his writing, and withal did openly profess himself to be an Avenroist.

See Cardan.
de rerum va-
rietat. lib. 16.
cap. 93.

7. The record of this Apparition Cardan found amongst his Father's Papers, but seems unwilling to determine whether it be a true history or a fable, but disputes against it in such a shuffling manner, as if he was perswaded it were true, and had a mind that others should think it so: I am sure he most-what steers his course in his Metaphysical adventures, according to this *Cynosura*, which is no obscure indication of his assent and belief.

8. That of the Death of the great God Pan, you may read in Plutarch, in his *De defectu Oraculorum*; where Philippus, for the proof of the Mortality of Demons, recites a Story which he heard from one Æmilian a Roman, and one that was remov'd far enough from all either stupidity or vanity: *How his Father Epithereses being shipt for Italy, in the evening, near the Echinades, the wind failed them; and their Ship being carried by an uncertain course upon the Island Paxæ, that most of the Passengers being waken, many of them drinking merrily after Supper, there was a voice suddainly heard from the Island, which called to Thamus by name, who was an Egyptian by birth, and the Pilot of the Ship: which the Passengers much wonder'd at, few of them having taken notice of the Pilot's name before. He was twice called to before he gave any sign that he attended to the Voice, but after giving express attention, a clear and distinct voice was heard from the Island, uttering these words, Ὅταν γένῃ καὶ τὸ Παλῶδες, ἀπάγῃλον, ὅτι Πάν ὁ μέγας τέθνηκεν. The company was much astonish'd at the hearing of the voice: and after much debate amongst themselves, Thamus resolved that if the wind blew fair, he would sail by, and say nothing; but if they were becalmed there, he would do his Message: and therefore they being becalmed when they came to Palodes, neither Wind nor Tide carrying them on, Thamus looking out of the poop of the Ship toward the shore, deliver'd his Message, telling them that the great Pan was dead. Upon which was suddenly heard as it were a joint groaning of a multitude together, mingled with a murmurous admiration.*

See Plutarch.
De Oracul.
defectu.

9. The opinion of Hesiod also is, that the Genii or Demons within a certain period of years do die; but he attributes a considerable Longævity to them, to wit of nine thousand seven hundred and twenty years, which is the utmost that any allow them, most men less. Plutarch, under the person of others, has polish'd this Opinion into a more curious and distinct dress: for out of the mortality of the Demons, and the several ranks which Hesiod mentions of Rational Beings, viz. θεοὶ, δαίμονες, ἥρωες, and ἄνθρωποι, he has affixed a certain manner and law of their passing out of one state into another, making them to change their Elements as well as Dignities; ἑτέροι δ', saith he, μεταβολῶ τοῖς τε σώμασιν ὁμοίως ποιεῖσι καὶ ψυχαῖς. ὥστε ἐκ γῆς ὕδαρ, ἐκ δ' ὕδαρ πῦρ γενώμενον ὁρᾷται, τῆς ἐσίας ἀνω φερομένης. ἕως ἐκ μὲν ἀνθρώπων εἰ ἥρωας, ἐκ δ' ἥρων εἰς δαίμονας αἱ βελτίονες ψυχαὶ καὶ μετεβολὴν λαμβάνουσιν, ἐκ δ' δαίμονων ὀλίγαι μὲν εἰς χροῖον πολλῶ δ' ἀρετῆς καθαρθεῖσαι παρ' ἅπασιν θεότητι μελεχόν. But other, he saith, μὴ κρατεῖσαι ἑαυτῶν, not having sufficient command of themselves, are again wrought down into humane Bodies, to live there an evanid and obscure life, ἀλαμπῇ καὶ ἀμυδρῇ ζῶν ἰχθεῖν, as he phrases it.

10. These

10. These are the most notable Testimonies for the Mortality of *Demons* that I have met withal; and therefore the more worth our reviewing. That Vision of *Facius Cardanus*, if it be not a Fable, contains many Paradoxes.

As First, *That these Aereal Genii are born at set times as well as we.* Not that any *ſhe-Demons* are brought to bed of them, but that they seem to have a beginning of their Existence, from which they may be reckoned to have continued; some more years, and some less. A thing unconceivable, unless we should imagine, that there is still a lapse or descent of Souls out of the higher Regions of the Air into these lower, or that these that leave these Earthly Bodies pass into the number of the *Aiery Demons*. As neither their death can so well be understood, unless we should fancy, that their Souls pass into more pure Vehicles, or else descend into *Terrestrial Bodies*. For *Car-* *De rerum vari-
rietate, lib. 16.
cap. 93.*
dan himself acknowledges they perish not; which also is agreeable with his Opinion of the *Præexistence* of our Souls.

Secondly, *That these Aereal Genii live but about 300 years,* which is against *Hesiod*, and the greatest number of the *Platonists*, unless they should speak of that particular Order themselves were of; for it is likely there may be as much difference in their ages, as there is in the ages of several kinds of Birds and Beasts.

Thirdly, *That our Souls are so far mortal, as that there is nothing proper to us remaining after death.*

Fourthly, *That they were nearer allied to the Gods than we by far, and that there was as much difference betwixt them and us, as there is betwixt us and Beasts.* Which they must understand then concerning the excellency of their Vehicles and the natural activity of them, not the pre-eminency of their Intellectual Faculties. Or if they do, they must be understood of the better sort of those *Aereal Spirits*. Or if they mean it of all their Orders, it may be a mistake out of pride: as those that are rich and powerful as well as speculative amongst us take it for granted that they are more judicious and discerning than the poor and despicable, let them be never so wise.

Fifthly, *That they know all secret things, whether hidden Books or Monies:* which men might do too, if they could stand by concealedly from them that hide them.

Sixthly, *That the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the Noblest men, as the baser sort of Men are the keepers and Educators of the better kind of Dogs and Horses.* This clause of the Vision also is envelop'd with obscurity, they having not defin'd whether this meanness of condition of the *Tutelar Genii* be to be understood in a *Political* or *Physical* sense; whether the meanness of rank and power, or of natural wit and sagacity; in which many times the Groom exceeds the young Gallant, who assigns him to keep his Dogs and Horses.

Seventhly, *That such is the thinness and lightness of their Bodies, that they can do neither good nor hurt thereby, though they may send strange Sights and Terrors, and communicate Knowledge;* which then must be chiefly of such things as belong to their *Aereal Region*. For concerning matters in the Sea, the Fishes, if they could speak, might inform men better than they. And for their corporeal debility, it is uncertain

De Subtil.
lib. 19.

whether they may not pretend it, to animate their Confabulators to a more secure converse; or whether the thing be really true in some kinds of them. For that it is not in all, may be evinced by that Narration that *Cardan* a little after recites out of *Erasmus*, of the Devil that carried a Witch into the Air, and set her on the top of a Chimney, giving her a Pot, and bidding her turn the mouth downwards, which done, the whole Town was fired, and burnt down within the space of an hour. This hapned *April* the 10th, *Anno* 1533. The Town's name was *Schiltach*, eight German miles distant from *Friburg*. The Story is so well attested, and guarded with such unexceptionable circumstances, that though *Cardan* love to shew his wit in cavilling at most he recites, yet he finds nothing at all to quarrel at in this.

Eighthly, *That there are Students and Professors of Philosophy in the Aereal World, and are divided into Sects and Opinions there, as well as we are here.* Which cannot possibly be true, unless they set some value upon Knowledge, and are at an eager loss how to find it, and are fain to hew out their way by arguing and reasoning as we do.

Ninthly and Lastly, *That they are reduced under a Political Government, and are afraid of the infliction of Punishment.*

De Subtil.
lib. 19.

11. These are the main matters comprehended in *Facius* his Vision, which how true they all are, would be too much trouble to determine. But one clause, which is the third, I cannot let pass, it so nearly concerning the present Subject, and seeming to intercept all hopes of the Soul's Immortality. To speak therefore to the sum of the whole business; we must either conceive these Aereal Philosophers to instruct *Facius Cardanus* as well as they could, they being guilty of nothing but a forward pride, to offer themselves as dictating Oracles to that doubtful Exorcist (for his son *Cardan* acknowledges that his Father had a form of Conjurat[i]on that a *Spaniard* gave him at his death;) or else we must take the liberty of equivocating, if not downright lying.

Now if they had a mind to inform *Facius Cardanus* of these things directly as they themselves thought of them, it being altogether unlikely but that there appeared to them, in their Aereal Regions, such sights as represented the persons of men here deceased, it is impossible that they should think otherwise than as we have describ'd their Opinion in the foregoing Chapter, that hold there is but one Soul in the World, by which all living Creatures are actuated. Which, though but a mere possibility, if so much, yet some or other of these Aereal Speculators may as well hold to it, as some do amongst us. For *Pomponatius* and others of the *Avenroists* are as ridiculously pertinacious as they.

And therefore these *Avenroistical Demons* answered punctually according to the Conclusions of their own School, *Nihil proprium cuiquam superesse post mortem.* For the Mind or Soul being a Substance common to all, and now disunited from those Terrestrial Bodies which it actuated in *Plato*, suppose, or *Socrates*, and these Bodies dead and dissipated, and only the common Soul of the World surviving, there being nothing but this Soul and these Bodies to make up *Socrates* and *Plato*; they conclude it is a plain case, that nothing that is proper

proper survives after death. And therefore though they see the representation of *Socrates* and *Plato* in the other World, owning also their own personalities, with all the Actions they did, and accidents that befel them in this life; yet according to the fullen subtilties and curiosities of their School, they may think and profess, that to speak accurately and Philosophically, it is none of them, there being no Substance proper to them remaining after death, but only *the Soul of the World*, renewing the thoughts to her self of what appertained to those parties in this life.

12. This one Hypothesis is consistent enough with the veracity of these *Demons*; but there is also another, not at all impossible, *viz.* That the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed are as invisible to this Order of the *Genii* that confabulated with *Facius Cardanus*, as that Order is to us: and that therefore, though there be the appearances of the Ghosts of Men deceased to them as well as to us; yet it being but for a time, it moves them no more than our confirmed *Epicureans* in this world are moved thereby: especially it being prone for them to think that they are nothing but some ludicrous spectacles, that the universal Soul of the World represents to her self and other Spectators, when, and how long a time she pleases, and the vaporous reliques of the dead body administer occasion.

Now that the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed this Life, after they come to a settled condition, may be far thinner and more invisible than those of the fore-named *Demons*, without committing any inconcinnity in Nature, may appear from hence: For the excellency of the inward Spirit is not always according to the consistency of the Element with which it does incorporate; otherwise those Fishes that are of humane shape, and are at set times taken in the Indian Sea, should have an higher degree of Reason and Religion than we that live upon Earth, and have bodies made of that Element. Whence nothing hinders but that the Spirit of man may be more noble than the Spirit of some of the Aereal *Demons*. And Nature not always running in Arithmetical, but also in Geometrical Progression, one Remove in one may reach far above what is before it for the present in the other degrees of Progression. * As a creeping worm is above a cad-worm, and any four-footed beasts above the birds, till they can use their leggs as well as they; but they are no sooner even with them but they are straight far above them, and cannot only go, but fly. As a Peasant is above an imprison'd Prince, and has more command; but this Prince can be no sooner set free, and become even with the Peasant in his liberty, but he is infinitely above him. And so it may be naturally with the Souls of men when they are freed from this prison of the Body, their steps being made in Geometrical Progression, as soon as they seem equal to that Order of *Demons* we speak of, they may mount far above them in tenuity and subtilty of Body, and so become invisible to them; and therefore leave them in a capacity of falsely surmising that they are not at all, because they cannot see them.

13. But if they thought that there is either some particular Ray of the Soul of the World that belongs peculiarly (suppose) to *Socrates* or

K k k 3

Plato,

See *Jonston. Histor. Natural. de Piscibus, lib. 4. titul. 3. c. 1.*

Plato, or that they had proper Souls really distinct, then it is evident that they did either equivocate or lye. Which their pride and scorn of mankind (they looking upon us but as Beasts in comparison of themselves) might easily permit; they making no more conscience to deceive us, than we do to put a dodge upon a dog, to make our selves merry. But if they had a design to wind us into some dangerous error, it is very likely that they would shuffle it in amongst many Truths, that those Truths being examined, and found solid at the bottom, we might not suspect any one of their dictates to be false. Wherefore this Vision being ill meant, the poison intended was, that of the Soul's Mortality; the dangerous falseness of which opinion was to be covered by the mixture of others that are true.

14. As for that Relation of *Æmilianus*, which he heard from his Father *Epitherses*, it would still come more home to the purpose, if the conclusion of the Philologers at *Rome*, after *Thamus* had been sent for, and averred the truth thereof to *Tiberius Cæsar*, could be thought authentick, namely, that this *Pan*, the news of whose death *Thamus* told to the *Dæmons* at *Palodes*, was the Son of *Mercury* and *Penelope*; for then 'tis plain that *Pan* was an humane Soul, and therefore concerns the present question more nearly. But this Narration being applicable to a more sacred and venerable Subject, it loses so much of its force and fitness for the present use. That which *Demetrius* adds, concerning certain Holy Islands near *Britain*, had been more fit in this regard. Whither when *Demetrius* came, suddenly upon his arrival there hapen'd a great commotion of the air, mighty tempests and prodigious whirlwinds. After the ceasing whereof, the Inhabitants pronounced, Ὅτι τῶν κρείττονων τινὸς ἐκλήψις γέγονεν, *That some of a nature more than humane was dead.* Upon which *Plutarch*, according to his usual Rhethrick, descants after this manner, Ὡς γὰρ λύχνος ἀναπτρόμενος φαίνει δὲ γνὼν ἐσθὲν ἔχει, σβεννύμενος δὲ πολλοῖς λυπηρὸς ὄσιν· ἔτσι αἱ μεγάλα ψυχὰ τὰς μὲν ἀναλάμψις εὐμενὲς καὶ ἀλύπτως ἔχουσιν, αἱ δὲ σβέσις αὐτῶν καὶ οὐραὶ πολλάκις μὲν, ὥς νυνὶ, πνέματα καὶ ζέλας τρέπτει, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ λοιμικοῖς πάθεσιν ἄλλα φαρμάττειν, i. e. *As the lighting of a lamp brings no grievance with it, but the extinction of it is offensive to many; so great Souls, while they remain kindled into life, shine forth harmlessly and benignly; but their extinction or corruption often stirs up winds and tempests, as in this present example, and often infects the the Air with pestilential annoiances.*

De Defectu
Oraculorum.

15. But the last Testimony is the most unexceptionable, though the least pretending to be infallible, and seems to strike dead both ways. For whether the Souls of men that go out of these *Earthly* bodies be Vertuous or Vitious, they must die to their *Aereal* Vehicles. Which seems a sad story at first sight, as if *Righteousness* could not deliver from *Death*. But if it be more carefully perused, the terrour will be found only to concern the *Wicked*. For the profoundest pitch of *Death* is the *Descent into this Terrestrial Body*, in which, besides that we necessarily forget whatever is past, we do for the present lead ἀλαμπῇ καὶ ἀμυδρῇ ζωῇ, *a dark and obscure life*, as *Plutarch* speaks, dragging this weight of *Earth* along with us, as Prisoners and Malefactors do their heavy shackles in their sordid and secluse confinements. But in our return
back

back from this state, *Life* is naturally more large to them that are prepared to make good use of that advantage they have of their *Aiery Vehicle*. But if they be not masters of themselves in that state, they will be fatally remanded back to their former Prison in Process of time; which is the most gross *Death* imaginable. But for the *Good* and *Vertuous* Souls, that after many Ages change their *Aereal Vehicle* for an *Ethereal* one, that is no *Death* to them, but an higher ascent into *Life*. And a man may as well say of an Infant, that has left the dark Womb of his Mother, that this change of his is *Death*, as that a *Genius* dies by leaving the gross *Air*, and emerging into that Vehicle of *Light*, which they ordinarily call *Ethereal* or *Celestial*.

16. There may be therefore, by Axiome 36. a dangerous relapse out of the *Aereal Vehicle* into the *Terrestrial*, which is properly the *Death* of the Soul that is thus retrograde. But for those that ever reach the *Ethereal state*, the periods of *Life* there are infinite; and though they may have their *Perige's* as well as *Apoge's*, yet these Circuits being of so vast a compass, and their *Perige's* so rare and short, and their return as certain to their former *Apfis* as that of the *Celestial Bodies*, and their *Ethereal* sense ever leaving them in their lowest touches towards the Earth, it is manifest that they have arrived to that *Life* that is justly styl'd *Eternal*.

17. Whence it is plain, that *Perseverance in Vertue*, if no *external Fate* hinder, will carry Man to an *Immortal life*. But whether those that be thus *Heroically good*, be so by discipline and endeavour, or *δὲν τινὶ μοίρῃ*, by a special favour and irresistible design of God, is not to be disputed in this place; though it be at large discussed somewhere in the Dialogues of *Plato*. But in the mean time we will not doubt to conclude, that there is no *Internal Impediment* to those that are highly and *Heroically vertuous*, but that, in process of time, they may arrive to an everlasting security of *Life* and *Happiness*, after they have left this *Earthly Body*.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XVII. Sect. 12.

AS a creeping Worm is above a Cad-worm, &c. The Word *Cad-worm* occurs in the three-tongued little Dictionary of that Learned Person *Joh. Ray*, Fellow of the Royal Society. But it is that little Animal which we call in *English* sometimes *Straw-worm*, sometimes *Cad-worm*: *Straw-worm*, because being a Worm, it lies yet wrapt in a piece of Straw or Haum, at the sides of the Channel of small Rivers; and is sought for there by such as are Fishers, as a Bait to catch Chevins as I my self very well know. *Skinner* saith also they are a Bait for Trouts. They say that this Worm, wrapt up in a piece of Straw, grows at length into a sort of Flie; and, leaving the Mud and Water, flies up and down in the free Air. But it is call'd a *Cad-worm*, or *Cod-worm*, because this piece of Stubble or Straw is it's Sheath or Covering.

Covering. The first *English* Name *Calamo-scolecium*, the other *Coleo-scolecium*, in *Greek* expresth to the full. For καλᾶμη signifies *Straw* or *Haum*, κολεός a *Sheath*, and σκωλήκιον a *little Worm*. But φρύγανον denotes not properly *Straw* or *Stubble*, but *Brush-wood* only in general; or rather all *Wood* that is twiggy, dry, and easy to be burnt. But I have observed many years ago the *Sheath* of these *Cad-worms* to be a little piece of *Straw* or *Haum*, but not any *Twig* hollow'd or putrefied. Yet to speak the *Truth*, in every *Lexicographer* *Stipula* is render'd by φρύγανον; if rightly, then φρύγανιον may be the same with καλαμοσκολήκιον. And this little *Animal* which is call'd in *English* a *Straw-worm*, by a more full and open *Apellation* may be call'd φρυγανοσκολήκιον; shorter and more roundly *Phryganium*.

C H A P. XVIII.

1. The Conflagration of the World, an Opinion of the Stoicks. 2. Two ways of destroying the World the Ancients have taken notice of, and especially that by Fire. 3. That the Conflagration of the World, so far as it respects us, is to be understood only of the burning of the Earth. 4. That the Ends of the Stoick's Conflagration are competent only to the Earth's burning. 5. An acknowledgment that the Earth may be burnt, though the proof thereof be impertinent to this place. 6. That the Conflagration thereof will prove very fatal to the Souls of Wicked men and Dæmons. 7. Five several Opinions concerning their state after the Conflagration; whereof the first is, That they are quite destroy'd by Fire. 8. The second, That they are annihilated by a special act of Omnipotency. 9. The Third, That they lie senseless in an eternal Death. 10. The fourth, That they are in a perpetual, furious, and painful Dream. 11. The Fifth and last, That they will revive again, and that the Earth and Air will be inhabited by them. 12. That the last seems to be fram'd from the fictitious παλιγενεσία of the Stoicks, who were very sorry Metaphysicians, and as ill Naturalists. 13. An Animadversion upon a self-contradicting sentence of Seneca. 14. The unintelligibleness of the state of the Souls of the Wicked after the Conflagration. 15. That the Æthereal Inhabitants will be safe. And what will then become of Good men and Dæmons on the Earth and in the Air. And how they cannot be delivered but by a supernatural power.

1. **A**S for the External impediments, we shall now examine them, and see of what force they will be, and whether they be at all. The former of which is, *The Conflagration of the World*. Which is an ancient Opinion, believed and entertained, not only by Religious, but by Philosophers also, the Stoicks especially, who affirm that the Souls of Men do subsist after Death, but cannot continue any longer in Being than to the Conflagration of the World. But it is not so much material what they thought, as to consider what is the condition indeed of the Souls of Men and Dæmons after that sad Fate.

2. Those

2. Those that will not have the World eternal, have found out two ways to destroy it, *ἑνδατώσει* or *ἐκπύρωσι*, by *Water* or by *Fire*. Which, they say, does as naturally happen in a vast Period of Time, which they call *Annus Magnus*, as Winter and Summer do in our ordinary year. *Inundatio non secus quàm Hyems, quàm Æstas lege Mundi venit.* But for this *ἑνδατώσει*, it being not so famous, nor so frequently spoken of, nor so destructive, nor so likely to end the World as the other way, nor belonging so properly to our enquiry, we shall let it pass. The general prognostick is concerning *Fire* now, not only of the *Stoicks*, as *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, *Chrysippus*, *Seneca*; but of several also of different Sects, as *Heraclitus*, *Epicurus*, *Cicero*, *Pliny*, *Aristocles*, *Numenius*, and sundry others.

Seneca apud
Lipf. Physiol.
Stoic. lib. 2.
Dissert. 21.

3. But though there be so great and unanimous consent, that the World shall be burnt, yet they do not express themselves all alike in the business. *Seneca's* vote is the most madly explicate of any, making the very Stars run and dash one against another, and so set all on fire. But *Posidonius* and *Panætius* had more wit, who did not hold that *ἐκπύρωσις τῶν ἑλῶν*, which the other *Stoicks* did. For the destroying of the *Æthereal* Regions by *Fire*, is as foolish a Fancy as the sentencing of the *Hele* to be drown'd, because the matter of the *Æther* is too fine and subtile for *Fire* to rage in, it being indeed nothing but a pure Light or *Fire* it self. And yet this *Æthereal* Matter is infinitely the greatest portion of the World. Wherefore the World cannot be said properly to be liable to the destruction of *Fire* from any natural causes, as the *Stoicks* would have it. Which is demonstratively true upon *Des-Cartes* his Principles, who makes *Fire* nothing but the motion of certain little particles of Matter, and holds that there is no more motion at one time in the World than at another; because one part of the Matter cannot impress any agitation upon another, but it must lose so much it self. This hideous noise therefore of the *Conflagration of the World* must be restrain'd to the firing of the *Earth* only, so far as it concerns us. For there is nothing else combustible in the Universe but the *Earth*, and other *Planets*, and what *Vapours* and *Exhalations* arise from them.

Lipf.
Physiolog.
Stoic. lib. 2.
Dissert. 22.

4. This *Conflagration* therefore that *Philosophers*, *Poets*, *Sibyls*, and all have fill'd the World with the fame of, is nothing but the burning of the *Earth*. And the ends the *Stoicks* pretend of their *ἐκπύρωσις*, may be competible to it, but not to the burning of the *Heavens* or *Æther*, as any but meanly skill'd in Philosophy cannot but acknowledge. For their nature is so simple that they cannot corrupt, and therefore want no renovation as the *Earth* does. Nor do the Inhabitants of those Heavenly Regions defile themselves with any vice; or if they do, they sink from their material station as well as moral, and fall towards these terrestrial dreggs. And therefore that part of the happy *ὑποκάτωσις* *Seneca* speaks of, *Omne Animal ex integro generabitur, dabiturque terris homo inscius scelerum, & melioribus auspiciis natus*, will take no place with those *Æthereal* Creatures.

Lipf. Physiol.
Stoicor. lib. 2.
Dissert. 22.

5. We are willing then to be born down, by this common and loud cry of *Fire* that must burn the World, into an acknowledgment that the *Earth* may within a certain Period of time be burnt,
with

with all those things that are upon it, or near it. But what concurse of natural causes may contribute to this dismal spectacle, it is not proper for me to dispute, especially in this place. I shall only take a view of what sad effects this *Conflagration* may have upon the *Souls* of *Demons* and *Men*. For that those that have recovered their *Æthereal* Vehicles are exempt from this fate, is evident; the remoteness of their habitation securing them from both the rage and noisomeness of these sulphureous flames.

6. The most certain and most destructive execution that this *Fire* will do, must be upon the unrecover'd *Souls* of *Wicked Men* and *Demons*; those that are so deeply sunk and drown'd εἰς γένεσιν, that the very consistency of their Vehicles does imprison them within the confines of this thick caliginous Air. These Souls or Spirits therefore that have so inextricably entangled themselves in the Fate of this lower World, giving up all their Senses to the momentary pleasures of the most luxurious Principle, which is the very seat of Death, these, in the Mystical Philosophy of the Ancients, are the *Nymphs*, to whom, they allot a long Series of years, yet they do not exempt them from mortality and fate. And *Demetrius* in *Plutarch* pronounces expressly out of *Hesiod*, that their Life will be terminated with the *Conflagration* of the World, from what the Poet intimates *Ænigmatically*,
καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐλάτῃ ἡνίχθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς Ἡσιόδῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπόρωσιν, ὅπῃ τὰ σκελεπταῖς ὑγροῖς εἰκὸς ἔστι τὰς Νύμφας,

— Αἱ τ' ἄλσεν καλὰ νέμονται,
καὶ πηγὰς ποταμῶν καὶ πείρεα ποίευντα.

7. But to leave these Poetical Riddles, and take a more serious and distinct view of the condition of the Soul after the *Conflagration* of the Earth; we shall find Five several sorts of Opinions concerning it. The first hold, *That this unmerciful heat and fire will at last destroy and consume the Soul as well as the Body*. But this seems to me impossible, that any created Substance should utterly destroy another Substance, so as to reduce it to nothing. For no part of *Matter*, acting the most furiously upon another part thereof, does effect that. It can only attenuate, dissipate, and disperse the parts, and make them invisible. But the Substance of the Soul is *indissipable* and *indiscerpible*, and therefore remains entire, whatever becomes of the Body or Vehilce.

8. The second Opinion is, *That after long and tedious torture in these flames, the Soul, by a special act of Omnipotency, is annihilated*. But, methinks, this is to put Providence too much to her shifts, as if God were so brought to a plunge in his creating a Creature of it self Immortal, that he must be fain to *uncreate* it again, that is to say, to *annihilate* it. Besides that that Divine *Nemesis* that lies within the compass of Philosophy, never supposes any such forcible eruptions of the Deity into extraordinary effects, but that all things are brought about by a wise and infallible, or inevitable train of secondary Causes, whether natural or free Agents.

9. The third therefore, to avoid these absurdities, denies both *assumption* by *Fire* and *annihilation*; but conceives, *That tediousness and extremity of pain makes the Soul at last, of her self, shrink from all commerce*

merce with Matter; the immediate Principle of Union, which we call *Vital Congruity*, consisting of a certain modification of the Body or Vehicle, as well as of the Soul, which being spoiled and lost, and the Soul thereby quite loosened from all sympathy with Body or Matter, *she becomes perfectly dead, and senseless to all things*, by Axiome 36. and, as they say, *will so remain for ever*. But this seems not so rational; for, as Aristotle somewhere has it, *Ἐκαστον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρμα, ἕως ἔνθεν οὐ δύναται*. Wherefore so many entire Immaterial Substances would be continued in being to all Eternity to no end nor purpose, notwithstanding they may be made use of, and actuate Matter again as well as ever.

10. A fourth sort therefore of Speculators there is, who conceive that after this solution of the Souls or Spirits of *Wicked Men* and *Demons* from their Vehicles, *That their pain is continued to them even in that separate state, they falling into an unquiet sleep, full of furious tormenting Dreams, that act as fiercely upon their Spirits as the external Fire did upon their Bodies*. But others except against this Opinion as a very uncertain Conjecture, it supposing that which to them seems not so found, *viz.* That the Soul can act when it has lost all vital Union with the Matter; which seems repugnant with that so intimate and essential aptitude it has to be united therewith. And the Dreams of the Soul in the Body, are not transacted without the help of the Animal Spirits in the Brain, they usually symbolizing with their temper. Whence they conclude, that there is no certain ground to establish this Opinion upon.

11. The last therefore, to make all sure, that there may be no inconvenience in admitting that the Souls or Spirits, as well of evil *Demons* as *wicked Men*, disjoyned from their Vehicles by the force of that fatal *Conflagration*, may subsist, have excogitated an odd and unexpected Hypothesis, *That when this firing of the World has done due execution upon that unfortunate Crue, and tedious and direful torture has wearied their afflicted Ghosts into an utter recess from all Matter, and thereby into a profound sleep or death; that after a long Series of years, when not only the fury of the Fire is utterly slaked, but that vast Atmosphere of smoak and vapours, which was sent up during the time of the Earth's Conflagration, has returned back in copious showres of rain, (which will again make Seas and Rivers, will bind and consolidate the ground, and, falling exceeding plentifully all over, make the soil pleasant and fruitful, and the Air cool and wholesome) that Nature recovering thus to her advantage, and becoming youthful again, and full of genital salt and moisture, the Souls of all living Creatures belonging to these lower Regions of the Earth, and Air, will awaken orderly in their proper places: The Seas and Rivers will be again replenished with Fish; the Earth will send forth all manner of Fowls, four-footed Beasts, and creeping things; and the Souls of Men also shall then catch life from the more pure and balsamick parts of the Earth, and be clothed again in terrestrial Bodies; and lastly, the Aereal Genii, that Element becoming again wholesome and vital, shall, in due order and time, awaken and revive in the cool rorid Air. Which Expergefaction into life is accompanied, say they, with propensions answerable to those*
reso-

resolutions they made with themselves in those fiery torments, and with which they fell into their long sleep.

Lips. Physiol.
Stoic. lib. 1.
Dissert. 6. l. 3.
Dissert. 13.
l. 2. Dissert. 14.

12. But the whole Hypothesis seems to be framed out of that dream of the Stoicks, concerning the ἀποκατάστασις or παλιγγενεσία of the World, after the ἀνάστασις or ἐκπύρωσις thereof. As if that of Seneca belonged to this case, Epist. 36. *Mors, quam pertimescimus ac recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit. Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponit dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.* But how courly the Stoicks philosophize, when they are once turned out of their road-way of moral Sentences, any one but moderately skill'd in Nature and Metaphysicks may easily discern. For what Errors can be more gross than those that they entertain of God, of the Soul, and of the Stars? they making the two former Corporeal Substances, and feeding the latter with the Vapours of the Earth; affirming that the Sun sips up the water of the great Ocean to quench his thirst, but that the Moon drinks off the lesser Rivers and Brooks; * which is as true as that the As drunk up the Moon. Such conceits are more fit for Anacreon in a drunken fit to stumble upon, who, to invite his Companions to tipple, compos'd that Catch,

Πίνε δάλασσα δ' αἶρας,
Ὅ δ' ἦλθε δάλασαν,

than for to be either found out, or own'd by a serious and sober Philosopher. And yet Seneca mightily triumphs in this notion of fodering the Stars with the thick foggs of the Earth, and declares his opinion with no mean strains of eloquence: but I loving solid sense better than fine words, shall not take the pains to recite them.

De rerum natura, lib. 3.

13. At what a pitch his Understanding was set, may be easily discerned by my last quotation, wherein there seems a palpable contradiction. *Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponit dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.* If nos, how oblitos? If oblitos, how nos? For we are not we, unless we remember that we are so. And if madmen may be said, and that truly, to be besides themselves, or not to be themselves, because they have lost their wits; certainly they will be far from being themselves that have quite lost the Memory of themselves, but must be as if they never had been before. As Lucretius has excellently well declared himself;

*Nec, si materiam nostram conlegerit atas
Post obitum, rursusque redegerit ut sita nunc est,
Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vita,
Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum,
Interrupta semel cum sit retinentia nostri.*

Where the Poet seems industriously to explode all the hopes of any benefit of this Stoical παλιγγενεσία, and to profess that he is as if he had never been, that cannot remember he has ever been before. From whence it would follow, that though the Souls of men should revive after the Conflagration of the World, yet they have not escaped a perpetual and permanent death.

14. We

14. We see therefore how desperately undemonstrable the condition of the Soul is after the *Conflagration* of the Earth, all these five Opinions being accompanied with so much lubricity and uncertainty. And therefore they are to be look'd upon rather as some Night-landskip to feed our amused Melancholy, than a clear and distinct draught of comprehensible Truth to inform our Judgment.

15. All that we can be assured of is, That those Souls that have obtained their *Aethereal Vehicles* are out of the reach of that sad fate that follows this *Conflagration*; and, That the *wicked Souls of Men and Demons* will be involved in it. But there are a middle sort betwixt these, concerning whom not only curiosity but good will would make a man solicitous. For it is possible, that the *Conflagration* of the World may surprize many thousands of Souls, that neither the course of Time, nor Nature, nor any higher Principle has wrought up into an *Aethereal Congruity*, but yet may be very holy, innocent, and vertuous.

Which we may easily believe, if we consider that these *Earthly Bodies* are not so great impediments to the goodness and sincerity of the Mind, but that many, even in this life, have given great examples thereof. Nor can that *Aereal* state be less capable of, nor well be without, the *good Genii*, no more than the Earth without *good men*, who are the most immediate Ministers of the Goodness and Justice of God. But exemption from certain fates in the World is not always upon *Innocency*, but most ordinarily upon *natural power*. And therefore there may be numbers of the *good Genii*, and of very holy and innocuous Spirits of men departed; the consistency of whose Vehicles may be such, that they can no more quit these *Aereal Regions*, than we can fly into them, that have heavy bodies, without wings. To say nothing of those vertuous and pious men that may haply be then found alive, and so be liable to be overtaken by this storm of Fire.

Undoubtedly, unless there appear, before the approach of this fate, some visible *Zeus σωτήρ*, or *Jupiter Sospitator*, as the Heathens would call him, they must necessarily be involved in the ruine of the wicked. Which would be a great eye-sore in that exact and irreprehensible frame of Providence, that all men promise to themselves who acknowledge, That there is a God. Wherefore, according to the light of Reason, there must be some Supernatural means to rescue those innocuous and benign Spirits out of this common calamity. But to describe the manner of it here how it must be done, would be to entitle natural Light and Philosophy to greater abilities than they are guilty of; and therefore that Subject must be reserved for its proper place.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XVIII. Sect. 12.

WHICH is as true as that the Afs drank up the Moon, &c. I allude to the known Story of a foolish Person, who, when he saw the Moon shining in the Water, but that, Clouds intervening, it was gone suddenly from his Sight, while the Afs on which he rode was drinking, conceited that the Afs had swallowed up the Moon, and took it clear away out of all Being.

C H A P. XIX.

1. That the Extinction of the Sun is no Panick fear, but may be rationally suspected from the Records of History, and grounds of natural Philosophy.
2. The sad Influence of this Extinction upon Man and Beast, and all the Aereal Dæmons, imprisoned within their several Atmospheres in our Vortex.
3. That it will do little or no damage to the Æthereal Inhabitants, in reference to heat or warmth.
4. Nor will they find much want of his Light.
5. And if they did, they may pass out of one Vortex into another, by the Privilege of their Æthereal Vehicles;
6. And that without any Labour or Toil, and as maturely as they please.
7. The vast incomprehensibleness of the tracts and compasses of the ways of Providence.
8. A short Recapitulation of the whole Discourse.
9. An Explication of the Persians two Principles of Light and Darkeness, which they called *Oeds* and *Δάμωv*, and when and where the Principle of Light gets the full victory.
10. That Philosophy, or something more sacred than Philosophy, is the only Guide to a true *Ἀποθέωσις*.

Natural Hi-
stor. lib. 2.
cap. 30.

1. **T**HE last danger that threatens the Separate Soul, is the Extinction of the Sun; which, though it may seem a mere Panick fear at first sight, yet if the matter be examined, there will appear no contemptible Reasons that may induce men to suspect, that it may at last fall out, there having been, at certain times, such near offers in Nature towards this sad accident already. Pliny, though he instances but in one example, yet speaks of it as a thing that several times comes to pass. *Fiunt, faith he, prodigiosi & longiores Solis defectus, qualis occiso Dictatore Casare, & Antoniano bello, totius anni pallore continuo.* The like happened in Justinian's time, as Cedrenus writes; when, for a whole Year together, the Sun was of a very dim and duskish hue, as if he had been in a perpetual Eclipse. And in the time of Irene, the Empress, it was so dark for seventeen days together, that the ships lost their way on the sea, and were ready to run against one another, as Theophanes relates. But the late accurate discovery of the Spots of the Sun, by Shiner, and the appearing of fixt Stars; and the excursions of Comets into the remoter Parts of our Vertex, as also the very intrinsecal

fecal contexture of that admirable Philosophy of *Des-Cartes*, do argue it more than possible that, after some periods of time, the Sun may be so inextricably enveloped by the *Maculae*, that he is never free from, that he may quite lose his light.

2. The Preambles of which *Extinction* will be very hideous, and intolerable to all the Inhabitants of the Planets in our *Vortex*, if the Planets have then any Inhabitants at all. For this defect of light and heat coming on by degrees, must needs weary out poor mortals with heavy languishments, both for want of the comfort of the usual warmth of the Sun, whereby the Bodies of Men are recreated, and also by reason of his inability to ripen the fruits of the Soil; whence necessarily must follow Famine, Plagues, Sickneses, and at length an utter devastation and destruction of both *Man* and *Beasts*.

Nor can the *Aereal Demons* scape free, but that the *vital tye* to their Vehicles necessarily confining them to their several *Atmospheres*, they will be inevitably imprisoned in more than *Cimmerian* darkness. For the *Extinction of the Sun* will put out the light of all their *Moons*, and nothing but Ice, and Frost, and flakes of Snow, and thick Mists, as palpable as those of *Egypt*, will possess the Regions of their habitation. Of which sad spectacle, though those twinkling eyes of heaven, the Stars, might be compassionate spectators; yet they cannot send out one ray of light to succour or visit them, their tender and remote beams not being able to pierce, much less to dissipate the clammy and stiff consistency of that long and fatal Night.

3. Wherefore calling our mind off from so dismal a sight, let us place it upon a more hopeful Object; and consider the condition of those Souls that are arrived to their *Aethereal Vehicle*, and see how far this fate can take hold of them. And it is plain at first sight, that they are out of the reach of this misty dungeon, as being already mounted into the secure mansions of the purer *Aether*.

The worst that can be imagined of them is, that they may find themselves in a condition something like that of ours, when we walk out in a clear, star-light, frosty night, which to them that are sound is rather a pleasure than an offence. And if we can bear it with some delight in these Earthly Bodies, whose parts will grow hard and stiff, for want of due heat, it can prove nothing else but a new modification of actual pleasure to those *Aethereal Inhabitants*, whose bodies are not constricted as ours, but are themselves a kind of *agile light and fire*.

All that can be conceived is, that the spherical particles of their Vehicles may stand a little more closely and firmly together than usual, whence the triangular intervals being more streight, the subtilest element will move something more quick in them, which will raise a Sense of greater vigour and alacrity than usual. So little formidable is this fate to them in this regard.

4. But their light, you'll say, will be obscured, *the Sun being put out*, whose shining seems to concern the Gods, as well as Men, as *Homer* would intimate;

ἡ δὲ φέρον ἡδὲ βροτοῖσι.

But I answer, that that of *Homer* is chiefly to be understood of the *Aereal Demons*, not the *Æthereal Deities*, who can turn themselves into a pure actual Light when they please. So that there is no fear but that their personal converse will be as chearful and distinct as before, white letters being as legible upon black paper, as black upon white. But this is to suppose them in the dark, which they are not, but in a more soft and mild light, which is but a change of pleasure, as it is to see the Moon shine fair into a room, after the putting out of the Candle. And certainly the contribution of the light of the Stars * is more to their quick and tender senses, than the clearest Moon-shine night is to ours; though we should suppose them no nearer any Star than we are. But such great changes as these may have their conveniencies for such as Providence will favour, as well as their inconveniencies. And the *Extinction of our Sun* may be the Augmentation of Light in some Star of a neighbouring *Vortex*. Which, though it may not be able to pierce those *Cimmerian Prisons* I spake of before, yet it may give sufficient light to these *Spirits* that are free. Besides that the Disruption and spoil of our *Vortex*, that will then happen, will necessarily bring us very much nearer the Centre of some other, whose Star will administer sufficient light to the *Æthereal Genii*, though it be too weak to relieve the *Aereal*.

And that so remote a distance from these central Luminaries of the *Vortices*, is consistent with the perfectest happiness, we may discern partly, in that the Celestial Matter above *Saturn*, till the very marge of the *Vortex*, * is more strongly agitated than that betwixt him and the Sun, and therefore has less need of the Sun's beams to conserve its agility and liquidity; and partly, in that those huge vast Regions of *Æther* would be lost, and in vain in a manner, * if they were not frequented by *Æthereal Inhabitants*, which, in all reason and likelihood, are of the noblest kind, according to the nature of their Element. And therefore all the *Æthereal People* may retire thither upon such an exigency as this, and there rest secure in joy and happiness, in these true *Intermundia Deorum*, which *Epicurus* dreamed of.

5. Which we may easily admit, if we consider the grand Privileges of the *Æthereal Vehicle*, wherein so great a power of the Soul is awakened, that she can moderate the motion of the particles thereof as she pleases, by adding or diminishing the degrees of agitation, Axiome 32. whereby she is also able to temper the solidity thereof, * and, according to this contemperation of her Vehicle, to ascend or descend in the *Vortex*, as she lists her self, and that with a great variety of swiftness, according to her own pleasure. By the improvement of which Privilege she may also, if she please, pass from one *Vortex* into another, and receive the warmth of a new *Vesta*, so that no fate imaginable shall be ever able to lay hold upon her.

6. Nor will this be any more labour to her, than sailing down the stream. For she, having once fitted the agitation and solidity of her *Vehicle*, for her Celestial voyage, will be as naturally carried whither she is bound, as a stone goes downward, or the fire upward. So that there is no fear of any lassitude, no more than being rowed in a Boat, or carried in a Sedan. * For the Celestial Matter that en-
vrons

virions her Vehicle, works her upward or downward, toward the Centre, or from the Centre of a *Vortex*, at its own proper pains and charges. Lastly, such is the tenuity and subtilty of the Senses of the *Æthereal* Inhabitants, that their prevision and sagacity must be, beyond all conceit, above that of ours; besides that there will be warnings and premonitions of this future disaster, both many, and those very visible and continued, before the Sun shall fail so far as that they shall at all be concerned in his decay; so that the least blast of misfortune shall never be able to blow upon them, nor the least evil imaginable overtake them.

7. This is a small glance at the Mysteries of Providence, whose fetches are so large, and Circuits so immense, that they may very well seem utterly incomprehensible to the *Incredulous* and *Idiots*, who are exceeding prone to think, that all things will ever be as they are, and desire they should be so: though it be as rude and irrational, as if one that comes into a *Ball*, and is taken much with the first Dance he sees, would have none danced but that, or have them move no further one from another, than they did when he first came into the room; whenas they are to trace nearer one another, or further off, according to the measures of the Musick, and the law of the Dance they are in. And the whole Matter of the Universe, and all the parts thereof, are ever upon Motion, and in such a Dance, as whose traces backwards and forwards take a vast compass: and what seems to have made the longest stand, must again move, according to the modulations and accents of that Musick, that is indeed out of the hearing of the acuteest ears, but yet perceptible by the purest Minds, and the sharpest Wits. The Truth whereof none would dare to oppose, if the breath of the gainsayer could but tell its own story, and declare through how many *Stars* and *Vortices* it has been strain'd, before the particles thereof met, to be abused to the framing of so rash a contradiction.

8. We have now finish'd our whole *Discourse*, the summary result whereof is this; *That there is an Incorporeal Substance, and that in Man, which we call his Soul. That this Soul of his subsists and acts after the death of his Body, and that usually, first, in an Aereal Vehicle, as other Dæmons do; wherein she is not quite exempt from fate, but is then perfect and secure when she has obtained her Æthereal one, she being then out of the reach of that evil Principle, whose dominion is commensurable with misery and death.* Which power the *Persian Magi* termed *Arimanius*, and resembled him to *Darkness*, as the other good Principle, which they called *Oromazes*, to *Light*, styling one by the name of *Δαίμων*, the other by the name of *Θεός*.

9. Of which there can be no other meaning that will prove allowable, but an adumbration of those two grand parts of Providence, the one working in the *Demoniacal*, the other in the *Divine* Orders. Betwixt which natures there is perpetually more or less strife and contest, both inwardly and outwardly. But if *Theopompus* his Prophecy be true in *Plutarch*, who was initiated into these *Arcana*, the power of the *Benign Principle* will get the upper hand at last, *τῆς ἰσχυρῆς ὁψι-
δος ἀπολείπειν τὴν ἡδονήν, &c.* At length *Hades*, or *Arimanius*, will be left in

the lurch, who so strongly holds us captive, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀνδράπους εὐδαίμονας ἔσσει, μήτε τροφῆς δεομένους, μήτε σκιάν ποιῦντας, and men shall then be perfectly happy, needing no food, nor casting any shadow. For what shadow can that Body cast, that is a pure and transparent light, such as the *Æthereal Vehicle* is? And therefore that Oracle is then fulfilled, when the Soul has ascended into that condition we have already described, in which alone it is out of the reach of Fate and Mortality.

10. This is the true Ἀποδείξις, to speak according to the *Persian* Language, with whose empty title Emperors and great Potentates of the Earth have been ambitious to adorn their Memory after death; but is so high a Privilege of the Soul of Man, that mere *Political* virtues, as *Plotinus* calls them, can never advance her to that pitch of Happiness. Either Philosophy, or something more sacred than Philosophy, must be her Guide to so transcendent a condition. And not being curious to dispute, whether the *Pythagoreans* ever arrived to it, by living according to the precepts of their Master, I shall notwithstanding with confidence averr, that what they aimed at, is the sublimest felicity our nature is capable of; and being the utmost Discovery this *Treatise* could pretend to, I shall conclude all with a *Distich* of theirs, (which I have elsewhere taken notice of upon like occasion) it comprehending the furthest scope, not only of their Philosophy, but of this present Discourse.

Ἦν δ' ἀπολείψας σῶμα ἐς αἰθέρ' ἐλευθέρον ἕλθης,
Ἔσσιαι ἀθάνατοι, δεὸς ἀμβροτοῖο, ἐκέτι θνήσκει.

To this SENSE,

Who, after death, once reach th' *Æthereal Plain*,
Are straight made Gods, and never die again.

N O T E S

On CHAP. XIX. Sect. 4.

IS more to their quick and tender Senses, &c. For the Souls in these Regions also, are suppos'd to have organiz'd Vehicles: And 'tis manifest by Experience, that in a Chamber so darkned, that, at the first Entrance, one can hardly see so much as one's Hand, upon a small Stay, one may be able to discern, with sufficient distinctness, the Faces of the Persons present. How great a Clearness then is to be expected from the vivid Vibrations of the Light of all the Stars in Conjunction together. Nor for the Souls that dwell in those Regions, is half of the Heavens hid from them by a terrestrial Horizon.

Is more strongly agitated, than betwixt him and the Sun, &c. That it is either more Subtil, more Fiery and *Æthereal*, or its Parts more strongly agitated, appears from hence, that Comets are carried with so swift a Motion through those Regions. See *Cartesius*, *Princip. Philosoph.* Part. 3. Artic. 83. 128.

If

If they were not frequented by *Aethereal Inhabitants*, &c. This therefore is most likely to be the Seat of the *Aziluthick* Worlds; to say nothing of the World *Briathick*. For where the Sense is most tender, and the Condition of their Vehicles the most pure, there it is plainly suitable should be the greatest Distance from the Heat of the Sun. These therefore inhabit in the *Ey'd Robe* of *Aaron*; but the *Inhabitants* of the Planets in his *Purple-colour'd Vestment*.

Sect. 5. And according to this *Contemperation* of her Vehicle, to ascend or descend in the Vortex, &c. which, if it be exactly tempered to the Consistency of that Part of the *Æther* where she is, though she useth not her progressive Faculty at all, yet she will be carried with the most swift Motion of the Vortex about the Sun, in those supreme Regions; namely, according to the Course or Flux of the Vortex: But she can use the mean while her progressive Faculty upwards, downwards, forwards, backwards, without any new changing of her Vehicle.

Sect. 6. For the *Celestial Matter* that invirons her Vehicle, works her upwards or downwards, towards the Centre or from the Centre of a Vortex, &c. So it would be indeed, if the Motion of the World were *mechanical*, according to the *Cartesian* Philosophy. But now that it so clearly appears not to be *mechanical*, but *vital*; I affirm, that it is not so much the *Celestial Matter*, as the *Spirit of Nature*, that moves the Vehicle of the Soul thus or thus, according to the Nature of its Consistency.

THE



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Conjectura

Conjectura Cabbalistica:

OR, A
CONJECTURAL ESSAY
Of Interpreting the MIND of
M O S E S,
I N T H E
Three First Chapters of GENESIS,
According to a Threefold
C A B B A L A:
Viz. { *Literal,*
Philosophical,
Mystical, or, Divinely Moral.

B Y
HENRY MORE, D. D.
Fellow of Christ's-College in Cambridge.

EXOD. XXXIV.

*And when Aaron and all the People of Israel saw Moses, behold, the Skin of his Face shone, and they were afraid to come nigh him.
Wherefore Moses, while he spake unto them, put a Veil on his Face.*

MATTH. X.

There is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed; and hid, that shall not be known.

What I tell you in Darkness, speak you in Light; and what you hear in the Ear, that preach you on the House-tops.

L O N D O N,

Printed by Joseph Downing in Bartholomew-Close near
West-Smithfield, MDCCXIII.

Constitutional Cabbages

CONSTITUTIONAL CABBAGES

M O S E S

C A B B A G E



HENRY MORSE

Follow of Christ Church in

the City of New York

the 1st of January 1840

at the City of New York

the 1st of January 1840

at the City of New York

the 1st of January 1840

at the City of New York

the 1st of January 1840

at the City of New York

T O T H E

Eminently Learned, and truly Religious,

Dr. CUDWORTH,

Master of Christ's College, and Hebrew Professor in the University of Cambridge.

S I R,

Concerning the choice of the *subject matter* of my present pains, I have, I think, spoke enough in the ensuing *Preface*. Concerning the choice of my *Patron*, I shall say no more, than that the sole inducement thereto was his singular *Learning* and *Piety*. The former of which is so conspicuous to the world, that it is universally acknowledged of all; and for the latter, there is none that can be ignorant thereof, who has ever had the happiness, though but in a smaller measure, of his more free and intimate converse. As for my own part, I cannot but publicly profess, I never met with any yet so truly and becomingly religious, where the right knowledge of God and Christ bears the enlighten'd mind so even, that it is as far removed from *Superstition* as *Irreligion* it self. And my present Labours cannot find better welcome, or more judicious acceptance with any, than with such as these. For such free and unprejudic'd spirits will neither antiquate Truth for the oldness of the Notion, nor flight her for looking young, or bearing the face of Novelty. Besides, there are none that can be better assured of the sincerity and efficacy of my present Design. For as many as are born of the *Spirit*, and are not the mere sons of the *Letter*, know very well how much the more inward and mysterious meaning of the Text, makes for the reverence of the Holy Scripture, and advantage of Godliness; whenas the urging of the bare *literal* sense has either made or confirmed many an *Atheist*. And assuredly those men see very little

little in the affairs of Religion, that do not plainly discover, that it is the *Atheist's* highest interest, to have it taken for granted, that there is no *spiritual* meaning, either in *Scripture* or *Sacrament*, that extends further than the mere Grammatical sense in the one, or the sensible, gross, external performance in the other. As for example, That to be regenerated, and become a true and real *Christian*, is nothing else but to receive the outward *Baptism* of visible water: and, that the *Mosaical Philosophy* concerning God, and the nature of things, is none other than that which most obviously offers it self in the mere letter of *Moses*. Which, if the *Atheist* could have fully granted to him on all sides, and get but this in also to the bargain, That there is no knowledge of God but what *Moses* his Text set on foot in the world, or what is *Traditional*; he cannot but think, That Religion in this dress is so empty, exceptionable, and contemptible, that it is but just with as many as are not mere fools to look upon it as some melancholick conceit, or cunning fiction, brought into the world to awe the simpler sort, but behind the hangings to be freely laughed at, and derided by those that are more wise: and that it were an easy thing in a short time to raze the memory of it out of the minds of men, it having so little root in the humane faculties. Which, for my part, I think as hopeful, as that posterity will be born without Eyes and Ears, and lose the use of Speech. For I think the knowledge of God, and a sense of Religion, is as natural to mankind, as any other Property in them whatsoever; and that the generations of men shall as soon become utterly irrational, as plainly irreligious. Which, I think, my *Treatise against Atheism* will make good to any one that with care and judgment will peruse it.

Nor does it at all follow, because a Truth is delivered by way of *Tradition*, that it is unconcludable by *Reason*. For I do not know any one *Theorem* in all *Natural Philosophy* that has more sufficient reasons for it than the *Motion of the Earth*, which notwithstanding is part of the *Philosophick Cabbala*, or *Traditions of Moses*, as I shall plainly shew in its due place. So likewise for the *Præexistence of the Soul*, which seems to have been part of the same *Tradition*, it is abundantly consen-
taneous

taneous to *Reason*. And as we can give a genuine account of all those seeming irregularities of motion in the Planets, supposing they and the Earth move round about the Sun; so we may open the Causes of all those astonishing *Paradoxes* of *Providence* from this other *Hypothesis*, and shew, that there is nothing here unsuitable to the precious *Attributes of God*, if we could place the Eye of our Understanding in that Centre of all free motions, that *steady eternal Good*; and were not our selves carried aloof off from him, amongst other wandering Planets, (as St. *Jude* calls them) that at several distances play about him, and yet all of them, in some measure or other, not only pretending to him, but, whether they pretend or not, really receiving something from him. For of this *First* is all, both *Wisdom*, *Pleasure*, and *Power*. But it is enough to have but hinted these things briefly and ænigmatically, the wrath and ignorance of all Ages receiving the most generous Truths with the greatest offence.

But, for my own part, I know no reason but that all well-willers to Truth and Godliness should heartily thank me for my present *Cabbalistical Enterprize*, I having so plainly therein vindicated the holy Mystery of the *Trinity* from being (as a very bold Sect would have it) a mere *Pagan* invention. For it is plainly shewn here that it is from *Moses* originally, not from *Pythagoras* or *Plato*. And seeing that *Christ* is nothing but *Moses* unveiled, I think it was a special act of *Providence*, that this hidden *Cabbala* came so seasonably to the knowledge of the *Gentiles*, that it might afore-hand fit them for the easier entertainment of the whole Mystery of *Christianity*, when in the fulness of Time it should be more clearly revealed unto the world.

Besides this, we have also shown, That, according to *Moses* his *Philosophy*, the Soul is secure both from death, and from sleep after death; which those drowsie *Nodders* over the Letter of the Scripture have very oscitantly collected, and yet as boldly afterwards maintained, pretending that the contrary is more *Platonical* than *Christian* or *Scriptural*.

Wherefore my design being so pious as it proves, I could do nothing more fit than to make choice of so true a lover of Piety as your self for a Patron of my present Labours.

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Espe-

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Wherefore my design being so pious as it proves, I could do nothing more fit than to make choice of so true a lover of *Piety* as your self for a *Patron* of my present Labours.

Especially you being so well able to do the most proper office of a Patron; to defend the Truth that is presented to you in them, and to make up, out of your rich Treasury of Learning, what our Penury could not reach to, or Inadvertency may have omitted. And truly, if I may not hope this from you, I know not whence to expect it. For I do not know where to meet with any so universally and fully accomplished in all parts of Learning as your self, as well in the *Oriental Tongues* and *History*, as in all the choicest kinds of *Philosophy*: any one of which *Acquisitions* is enough to fill, if not to swell, an ordinary man with great conceit and pride; whenas it is your sole privilege to have them all, and yet not to take upon you, nor to be any thing more imperious, or censorious of others, than they ought to be that know the least.

These were the true Considerations that directed me in the Dedication of this Book, which if you accordingly please to take into your favourable Patronage, and accept as a Monument or Remembrance of our mutual Friendship, you shall much oblige

Your affectionate friend and Servant,

H. MORE.

T H E

i

T H E P R E F A C E T O T H E R E A D E R.

1. What is meant by the term *Cabbala*, and how warrantably the *Literal* Exposition of the Text may be so called. 2. That dispensable speculations are best propounded in a *Sceptical* manner. 3. A clear description of the nature and dignity of *Reason*, and what the Divine *Logos* is. 4. The general probabilities of the truth of this present *Cabbala*. 5. The design of the Author in publishing of it.

R E A D E R,

I Present thee here with a triple interpretation of the Three first Chapters of Genesis, which, in my Title-page, I have termed a Threefold *Cabbala*; concerning which, for thy better direction and satisfaction, I hold it not amiss to speak some few things by way of Preface, such as thou thy self, in all likelihood, wouldst be forward to ask of me. As why, for example, I call this interpretation of mine a *Cabbala*, and from whom I received it; what may be the probabilities of the truth of it; and what my purpose is in publishing of it.

To the First I answer, That the Jewish *Cabbala* is conceived to be a Traditional doctrine or exposition of the Pentateuch, which Moses received from the mouth of God while he was on the Mount with him. And this Sense, or Interpretation of the Law, or Pentateuch, as it is a doctrine received by Moses first, and then from him by Joshua, and from Joshua by the Seventy Elders, and so on, was called *Cabbala* from קִיבֵּל *kibbel*, to receive: But as it was delivered, as well as received, it was called *Massora*, which signifies a Tradition; though this latter more properly respects that Critical and Grammatical skill of the Learned among the Jews, and therefore was profitable for the explaining the *Literal* sense as well as that more *Mysterious* meaning of the Text where it was intended. Whence, without any boldness or abuse of the word, I may call the *Literal* interpretation which I have light upon, *Cabbala*, as well as the Philosophical or Moral; the *Literal* sense it self being not so plain and determinate, but that it may seem to require some Traditional Doctrine or Exposition to settle it, as well as those other senses that are more *Mystical*.

And therefore I thought fit to call this Threefold interpretation that I have hit upon, Cabbala's, as if I had indeed light upon the true Cabbala of Moses in all the three senses of the Text, such as might have become his own mouth to have uttered, for the instruction of a willing and well-prepared Disciple. And therefore, for the greater comeliness and solemnity of the matter, I bring in Moses speaking his own mind in all the Three several Expositions.

2. And yet I call the whole Interpretation but a Conjecture, having no desire to seem more definitively wise than others can bear or approve of. For though in such things as are Necessary and Essential to the Happiness of a man, as the belief that there is a God, and the like, it is not sufficient for a man only to bring undeniable Reasons for what he would prove, but also to profess plainly and dogmatically that himself gives full assent to the Conclusion he hath demonstrated; so that those that do not so well understand the power of Reason, may notwithstanding thereby be encouraged to be of the same Faith with them that do, it being of so great consequence to them to believe the thing propounded: Yet I conceive that Speculative and Dispensable Truths, a man not only may, but ought rather to propound them Sceptically to the world, there being more prudence and modesty in offering the strongest Arguments he can, without dogmatizing at all, or seeming to dote upon the Conclusion, or more earnestly to affect the winning of Proselytes to his own opinion. For where the force of the Arguments is perceived, Assent will naturally follow, according to the proportion of the discovery of the force of the Arguments. And an assent to opinions merely Speculative, without the Reasons of them, is neither any pleasure nor accomplishment of a rational creature.

3. To your Second demand I answer, That though I call this Interpretation of mine Cabbala, yet I must confess I receiv'd it neither from Man nor Angel. Nor came it to me by Divine Inspiration, unless you will be so wise as to call the seasonable suggestions of that Divine Life and Sense that vigorously resides in the Rational Spirit of free and well-meaning Christians, by the name of Inspiration. But such Inspiration as this is no distracter from, but an accomplisher and an enlarger of the humane faculties. And I may add, that this is the great mystery of Christianity that we are called to partake of, viz. The perfecting of the Humane nature by participation of the Divine. Which cannot be understood so properly of this gross flesh and External senses, as of the Inward humanity, viz. our Intellect, Reason, and Fancy. But to exclude the use of Reason in the search of Divine truth is no dictate of the Spirit, but of headstrong Melancholy and blind Enthusiasme, that religious Phrensie men run into, by lying passive for the reception of such Impresses as have no proportion with their Faculties. Which mistake and irregularity, if they can once away with, they put themselves in a posture of promiscuously admitting any thing, and so in due time of growing either moped or mad, and under pretence of being highly Christians, (the right Mystery whereof they understand not) of working themselves lower than the lowest of men.

But for mine own part, Reason seems to me to be so far from being any contemptible Principle in man, that it must be acknowledged in some sort to be in God himself. For what is the Divine Wisdom but that steady comprehension of the Ideas of all things, with their mutual respects one to another,

ther, congruities and incongruities, dependences and independences? which respects do necessarily arise from the natures of the Ideas themselves; both which the Divine Intellect looks through at once, discerning thus the order and coherence of all things. And what is this but Ratio stabilis, a kind of steady and immoveable Reason, discovering the connexion of all things at once? But that in us is Ratio mobilis, or Reason in evolution, we being able to apprehend things only in a successive manner one after another. But so many as we can comprehend at a time, while we plainly perceive and carefully view their Ideas, we know how well they fit, or how much they disagree one with another, and so prove or disprove one thing by another: which is really a participation of that Divine Reason in God, and is a true and faithful Principle in man, when it is perfected and polished by the Holy Spirit; but before, very earthly and obscure, especially in Spiritual things.

But now seeing the Logos, or steady comprehensive Wisdom of God, in which all Ideas and their respects are contained, is but universal stable Reason, how can there be any pretence of being so highly inspired as to be blown above Reason it self, unless men will fancy themselves wiser than God, or their Understandings above the natures and reasons of things themselves?

Wherefore to frame a brief Answer to your Second demand; I say, this threefold Cabbala you enquire after, is the dictate of the free Reason of my Mind, heedfully considering the written Text of Moses, and carefully canvassing the Expositions of such Interpreters as are ordinarily to be had upon him. And I know nothing to the contrary, but that I have been so successful as to have light upon the old true Cabbala indeed.

4. Of which, in the Third place, I will set down some general Probabilities, referring you for the rest to the Defence of the Cabbala's themselves, and the Introduction thereunto.

And first, that the Literal Cabbala is true, it is no contemptible Argument, in that it is carried on so evenly and consistently one part with another, every thing also being represented so accommodately to the capacity of the people, and so advantageously for the keeping of their minds in the fear of God, and obedience to his Law; as shall be particularly shown in the Defence of that Cabbala. So that according to the sense of this Literal Cabbala, Moses is discovered to be a man of the highest Political accomplishments, and true and warrantable Prudence that may be.

Nor is he to fall short in Philosophy; And therefore the Philosophical Cabbala contains the Noblest Truths, as well Theological as Natural, that the Mind of man can entertain her self with: Insomuch that Moses seems to have been aforehand, and prevented the subtlest and abstrusest Inventions of the choicest Philosophers that ever appeared after him to this very day. And further presumption of the truth of this Philosophical Cabbala is, that the grand mysteries therein contained, are most-what the same that those two eximious Philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato, brought out of Ægypt, and the parts of Asia, into Europe. And it is generally acknowledged by Christians, that they had their Philosophy from Moses. And Numenius, the Platonist, speaks out plainly concerning his Master; What is Plato, but Moses Atticus? And for Pythagoras, it is a thing incredible that he and his Followers should make such a deal of doe with the

mystery of Numbers, had not he been favoured with a sight of Moses his Creation of the World in six days, and had the Philosophick Cabbala thereof communicated to him, which mainly consists in Numbers, as I shall in the Defence of this Cabbala more particularly declare.

Iamblich. de vita Pythag. cap. 28, & 29. And the Pythagoreans Oath, swearing by him that taught them the mystery of the Tetractys, or the number Four, what a ridiculous thing had it been, if it had been in reference merely to dry numbers? But it is exceeding probable that, under the mystery of Four, Pythagoras was first himself taught the meaning of the fourth day's work in the Creation, and after delivered it to his disciples. In which Cabbala of the fourth day, Pythagoras was instructed, amongst other things, that the Earth was a Planet, and moved about the Sun: and it is notoriously well known, that this was ever the opinion of the Pythagoreans, and so, in all likelihood, a part of the Philosophick Cabbala of Moses. Which you will more fully understand in my Defence thereof.

Aristot. de Cælo, lib. 2. cap. 13.

In brief, all those Conclusions that are comprised in the Philosophick Cabbala, they being such as may best become the sublime and comprehensive Understanding of Moses, and being also so plainly answerable to the Phænomena of Nature, and Attributes of God, as well as continued agreeable, without any force or distortion, to the Historical Text; this, I conceive, is no small probability that this Cabbala is true: For what can be the Properties of the true Philosophick Cabbala of Moses, if these be not which I have named?

Now for the Moral Cabbala, it bears its own evidence with it all the way, representing Moses as well experienced in all Godliness and Honesty, as he was skilful in Poiticks and Philosophy.

5. And the edifying Usefulness of this Mystical or Moral Cabbala, to answer to your Last demand, was no small invitation amongst the rest to publish this present Exposition. For Moral and Spiritual Truth that so nearly concerns us, being so strangely and unexpectedly, and yet so fitly and appositely, represented in this History of Moses, it will, in all likelihood, make the more forcible impress upon the Mind, and more powerfully carry away our Affections toward what is good and warrantable, pre-instructing us with delight concerning the true way to Vertue and Godliness.

Nor are the Philosophick nor Literal Cabbala's destitute of their honest uses. For in the former, to the amazement of the mere Naturalist, (who commonly conceits that pious men, and Patrons of Religion, have no ornaments of Mind, but scrupulosities about Vertue, and Melancholick fancies concerning a Deity) Moses is found to have been Master of the most sublime and generous Speculations that are in all Natural Philosophy: Besides that he places the Soul of Man many degrees out of the reach of fate and mortality. And, by the latter, there is a charitable provision made for them that are so prone to expect rigid Precepts of Philosophy in Moses his outward Text. For this Literal Cabbala will steer them from that toil of endeavouring to make the bare Letter speak consonantly to the true frame of Nature; which, while they attempt with more zeal than knowledge, they both disgrace themselves, and wrong Moses. For there are unalterable and indeleble Ideas and Notions in the Mind of Man, into which, when we are awakened, and apply to the known course and order of Nature, we can no more forsake the use of them, than we can the use of our own Eyes, nor misbelieve

believe their dictates more, or so much, as we may those of our outward Senses. Wherefore to men recovered into a due command of their Reason, and well-skill'd in the contemplation and experience of the nature of things, to propound to them such kind of Mosaical Philosophy, as the boldness and superstition of some has adventured to do, for want of a right Literal Cabbala to guide them, is, as much as in them lies, to hazard the making not only of Moses, but of Religion it self, contemptible and ridiculous.

Whence it is apparent enough, I think, to what good purpose it is thus carefully to distinguish betwixt the Literal and Philosophical Cabbala, and so plainly and fully to set out the sense of either, apart by themselves, that there may hereafter be no confusion or mistake. For beside that the discovering of these weighty Truths, and high, but irrefutable, Paradoxes in Moses his Text, does assert Religion, and vindicate her from that vile imputation of Ignorance in Philosophy, and the knowledge of things; it does also justify those more noble results of free Reason and Philosophy, from that vulgar suspicion of Impiety and Irreligion.

THE

TO THE
HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
OF THE PROVINCE OF
NEW SOUTH WALES
IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED
I HAVE THE HONOR TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT
OF YOUR RESOLUTION
PASSED ON THE 11TH
MAY 1881
RELATIVE TO THE
PROPOSED
AMENDMENT
OF THE
LAND ACT
1878
AND TO ADVISE THAT
THE SAME HAS BEEN
FORWARDED TO THE
LAND OFFICE
FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION
AND REPORT

THE L I T E R A L C A B B A L A.

C H A P. I.

2. *The Earth at first a deep miry Abyſſe, covered over with Waters, over which was a fierce Wind, and through all Darkneſs.* 3. *Day made at first without a Sun.* 6. *The Earth a floor, the Heavens a transparent Canopy, or ſtrong Tent over it, to keep off the Upper waters, or blue conſpicious Sea, from drowning the World.* 8. *Why this Tent or Canopy was not ſaid to be good. The Lower waters commanded into one place.* 1. *Herbs, Flowers, and Fruits of Trees, before either Sun or Seasons of the year to ripen them.* 14. *The Sun created, and added to the Day, as a peculiar Ornament thereof, as the Moon and Stars to the Night.* 20. *The Creation of Fiſh and Fowl.* 24. *The Creation of Beaſts and creeping things.* 27. *Man created in the very ſhape and figure of God, but yet ſo, that there were made females as well as males.* 28. *How Man came to be Lord over the reſt of living creatures.* 30. *How it came to paſs, that Man feeds on the better ſort of the fruits of the Earth, and the Beaſts on the worſe.*



E are to recount to you in this Book, the Generations and Genealogies of the Patriarchs, from *Adam* to *Noah*, from *Noah* to *Abraham*, from *Abraham* to *Joſeph*; and to continue the Hiſtory to our own times. But it will not be amiſs firſt to inform you concerning the Creation of the World, and the Original and Beginning of things; how God made Heaven and Earth, and all the garniſhings of them, before he made Man.

2. But the Earth at firſt was but a rude and deſolate heap, devoid of Herbs, Flowers, and Trees, and all living creatures, being nothing but a deep miry Abyſs, covered all over with Waters; and there was a very fierce and ſtrong Wind that blew upon the Waters: And (what made it ſtill more horrid and comfortleſs) there was as yet no Light, but all was inveloped with thick Darkneſs, and bore the face a pitchy-black and wet tempeſtuous Night.

3. But

3. But God let not his work lie long in this sad condition, but commanded Light to appear, and the Morning brake out upon the face of the Abyfs, and wheel'd about from East to West, being clearest in the middle of its course about Noon, and then abating of its brightness towards the West, at last quite disappeared; after such sort as you may often observe the day-light to break forth in the East, and ripen to greater clearness, but at last to leave the sky in the West, no Sun appearing all the while.

4. And God saw the Light, (for it is a thing very visible) that it was good, and so separated the Darkness from the Light, that they could not both of them be upon the face of the Earth together, but had their vicissitudes, and took their turns one after another.

5. And he called the return of the light *Day*, and the return of darkness he called *Night*: and the evening and the morning made up the *First* natural day.

6. Now after God had made this *Basís* or floor of this greater edifice of the World, the *Earth*, he sets upon the higher parts of the fabrick. He commands therefore that there should be a hollow *Expansion*, firm and transparent, which, by its strength, should bear up against the Waters which are above, and keep them from falling upon the Earth in excess.

7. And so it became a Partition betwixt the Upper and the Lower waters; so that by virtue of this hollow *Firmament*, man might live safe from the violence of such destructive inundations, as one shelter'd in a well-pitch'd Tent from storms of rain. For the danger of these Waters is apparent to the eye, this ceruleous or blue-colour'd Sea, that overspreads the diaphanous *Firmament*, being easily discern'd through the body thereof; and there are very frequent and copious showers of rain descend from above, whenas there is no water espied ascending up thither; wherefore it must all come from that upper Sea, if we do but appeal to our outward sense.

8. Now therefore this diaphanous Canopy or firmly-stretch'd Tent over the whole pavement of the Earth, though I cannot say properly that God saw it was good, (it being indeed of a nature invisible) yet the use of it shews it to be exceeding good and necessary. And God called the whole capacity of this hollow *Firmament*, *Heaven*. And the evening and the morning made up the *Second* natural day.

9. And now so sure a Defence being made against the inundation of the Upper waters, that they might not fall upon the Earth, God betook himself the next day to order the Lower waters, that as yet were spread over the whole face thereof: at his command therefore the Waters fled into one place, and the dry land did appear.

10. And God called the dry land *Earth*; and the gathering together of the Waters he called *Sea*; and I may now properly say, that God saw that it was good; for the *Sea* and the *Land* are things visible enough, and fit objects of our sight.

11. And forthwith, before he made either Sun, Moon, or Stars, did God command the earth to bring forth Grass, Herbs, and Flowers, in their full beauty, and Fruit-trees yielding delicious fruit, tho' there had as yet been no vicissitude of Spring, Summer, or Autumn, nor any

any approach of the Sun to ripen and concoct the fruit of those Trees. Whence you may easily discern the foolishness of the idolatrous Nations, that dote so much on Second causes, as that they forget the First, ascribing that to the Sun and Moon that was caus'd at first by the immediate command of God.

12. For at his command it was, before there was either Sun or Moon in the Firmament, that the Earth brought forth Grass, and Herb yielding seed after his kind, and the Tree yielding Fruit, whose seed was in it self, after his kind; so that the several sorts of Plants might, by this means, be conserv'd upon the Earth. And God saw that it was good.

13. And the evening and the morning made up the *Third* natural day.

14. There have three days past without a Sun, as well as three nights without either Moon or Stars; as you your selves may haply have observed some number of Moonless and Starless nights, as well as of Sunless days, to have succeeded one another: And so it might have been always, had not God said, Let there be Lights within the Firmament of Heaven, to make a Difference betwixt Day and Night, and to be peculiar garnishings of either. Let them be also for signs of weather, for seasons of the year, and also for periods of days, months, and years.

15. Moreover, let them be as Lights hung up within the hollow roof or Firmament of Heaven, to give light to men walking upon the pavement of the Earth: and it was so.

16. And God made two great Lights: the greater one, the most glorious and Princely object we can see by day, to be, as it were, the Governor and Monarch of the Day; the lesser, the most resplendent and illustrious sight we can cast our eyes on by night, to be Governess and Queen of the Night. And he made, though for their smallness they be not so considerable, the Stars also.

17. And he placed them all in the Firmament of Heaven, to give light upon the Earth:

18. And to shew their preeminence for external lustre above whatever else appears by either day or night, and to be peculiar garnishings or ornaments to make a notable difference betwixt the light and the darkness, the superaddition of the Sun to adorn the day, and to invigorate the light thereof, the Moon and the Stars to garnish the night, and to mitigate the dulness and darkness thereof. And God saw that it was good.

19. And the evening and the morning was the *Fourth* natural day.

20. After this, God commanded the Waters to bring forth Fish and Fowl, which they did in abundance; and the Fowl flew above the Earth, in the open Firmament of Heaven.

21. And God created great Whales also, as well as other Fishes that move in the waters: And God saw that it was good.

22. And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the Seas, and let the Fowl multiply on the Earth.

23. And the evening and the morning made up the *Fifth* natural day.

24. Then

24. Then God commanded the Earth to bring forth all creeping things and four-footed Beasts, as before he commanded the Waters to send forth Fish and Fowl: and it was so.

25. And when God had made the Beast of the Earth after his kind, and cattle, and every creeping thing after his kind, he saw that it was good.

26. And coming at last to his highest Master-piece, Man, he encouraged himself, saying, Go to, let us now make Man; and I will make him after the same image and shape that I bear my self; and he shall have dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowls of the Air, and over the Cattel, and over all the Earth, and over every Creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth.

27. So God created *Man* in his own shape and figure, with an upright stature, with legs, hands, arms, with a face and mouth, to speak and command, as God himself hath: I say, in the image of God did he thus create him. But, mistake me not, whereas you conceive of God as masculine, and more perfect, yet you must not understand me, as if God made mankind so exactly after his own image, that he made none but males; for I tell you, he made females as well as males, as you shall hear more particularly hereafter.

28. And having made them thus male and female, he bad them make use of the distinction of sexes that he had given them; and blessing them, God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the Earth with your off-spring, and be lords thereof, and have dominion also over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowls of the Air, as well as over Beasts and cattel, and every creeping thing that moves upon the Earth.

29. And God said, Behold, I give you every frugiferous Herb, which is upon the face of the Earth, such as the Straw-berry, the several sorts of Corn, as Rye, Wheat, and Rice, as also the delicious fruits of Trees; to you they shall be for meat.

30. But for the Beasts of the Earth, and the Fowls of the Air, and for every living thing that creepeth upon the Earth, the worser kind of Herbs and ordinary Grass I have assigned for them. And so it came to pass, that mankind are made lords and possessors of the choicest fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts of the field are to be contented with baser Herbage, and the common Grass.

31. And God viewed all the Works that he had made, and behold they were exceeding good: and the evening and the morning was the *Sixth* natural day.

C H A P. II.

3. *The Original of the Jewish Sabbaths, from God's resting himself from his Six days labours.* 5. *Herbs and Plants before either Rain, Gardening, or Husbandry; and the reason why it was so.* 7. *Adam made of the dust of the ground, and his Soul breathed in at his nostrils.* 8. *The Planting of Paradise.* 9. *A wonderful Tree there, that would continue youth, and make a man immortal upon earth: Another strange Tree, viz. the Tree of knowledge of Good and Evil.* 11. *The Rivers of Paradise, Phasis, Gihon, Tygris, Euphrates.* 18. *The high Commendation of Matrimony.* 19. *Adam gives names to all kind of creatures, except Fishes.* 21. *Woman is made of a rib of Adam, a deep sleep falling upon him, his Mind then also being in a trance.* 24. *The first Institution of Marriage.*

1. **T**HUS the Heavens and the Earth were finish'd, and all the Creatures wherewith they were garnish'd and replenish'd.

2. And God having, within Six days, perfected all his work, on the *Seventh* day he rested himself.

3. And so made the *Seventh* day an holy day, a Festival of rest, because himself then first rested from his works. Whence you plainly see the reason and original of your *Sabbaths*.

4. These are the generations of the Heavens, and of the Earth, which I have so compendiously recounted to you, as they were created in the days that the Lord made Heaven and Earth, and the several garnishings of them.

5. But there are some things that I would a little more fully touch upon, and give you notice of, to the praise of God, and the manifesting of his Power unto you. As that the Herbs and Plants of the field did not come up of their own accords out of the Earth, before God made them; but that God created them before there were any seeds of any such thing in the Earth, and before there was any rain, or men to use gardening or husbandry for the procuring their growth: So that hereafter you may have the more firm Faith in God for the blessings and fruits of the Earth, when the ordinary course of Nature shall threaten dearth and scarcity, for want of rain and seasonable showers.

6. For there had been no Showers when God caused the Plants and Herbs of the field to spring up out of the Earth; only, as I told you at the first of all, there was a mighty torrent of water, that rose every where above the Earth, and covered the universal face of the ground, which yet God afterward, by his Almighty power, commanded so into certain bounds, that the residue of the Earth was mere dry land.

7. And that you farther may understand how the power of God is exalted above the course of Natural causes, God taking of the dust of this dry ground, wrought it with his hands into such a temper, that it was matter fit to make the Body of a Man: which, when he first had fram'd, was as yet but like a senseless statue, till coming

O o o

near

near unto it with his mouth, he breath'd into the nostrils thereof the breath of life; as you may observe to this day, that men breath through their nostrils, though their mouths be clos'd. And thus Man became a living creature, and his name was called *Adam*, because he was made of the Earth.

8. But I should have told you first more at large, how the Lord God planted a Garden Eastward of *Judea* in the Countrey of *Eden*, about *Mesopotamia*, where afterwards he put the man *Adam*, whom he after this wise had form'd.

9. And the description of this Garden is this: Out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every Tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food. But amongst these several sorts of Trees, there were two of singular notice that stood planted in the midst of the Garden; the one of which had fruit of that wonderful virtue, as to continue youth and strength, and to make a man immortal upon earth, wherefore it was called *the Tree of Life*. There was also another Tree planted there, of whose fruit, if a man ate, it had this strange effect, that it would make a man know the difference betwixt good and evil: for the Lord God had so ordained, that if *Adam* touched the forbidden fruit thereof, he should, by his disobedience, feel the sense of evil as well as good; wherefore, by way of Anticipation, it was called *the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil*.

10. And there was a River went out of *Eden* to water the Garden, and from thence it was parted, and became into four heads.

11. The name of the first was *Phasis*, or *Phasi-Tigris*, which compasses the whole Land of the *Chaulateans*, where there is Gold.

12. And the Gold of that Land is excellent: there is also found *Bdellium*, and the *Onyx-stone*.

13. And the name of the second River is *Gihon*; the same is it that compasseth the whole Land of the *Arabian-Ethiopia*.

14. And the name of the third River is *Tigris*; that is that which goeth towards the East of *Assyria*. And the fourth River is *Euphrates*.

15. And the Lord God took the man *Adam* by the hand, and led him into the Garden of *Eden*, and laid commands upon him to dress it, and look to it, and to keep things handsome and in order in it, and that it should not be any wise spoil'd, or misus'd by incursions, or careless ramblings of the heedless beasts.

16. And the Lord God recommended unto *Adam* all the Trees of the Garden, for very wholesome and delightful food, bidding him freely eat thereof.

17. Only he excepted *the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil*, which he strictly charged him to forbear; for, if he ever tasted thereof, he should assuredly die.

18. But, to the high commendation of Matrimony be it spoken, though God had placed *Adam* in so delightful a Paradise, yet his happiness was but maimed and imperfect, till he had the society of a Woman: For the Lord God said, It is not good that man should be alone, I will make him an help meet for him.

19. Now out of the ground the Lord God had formed every Beast of the field, and every Fowl of the air, and these brought he unto
Adam

Adam, to see what he would call them ; and whatsoever *Adam* called every living creature, that was the name thereof.

20. And *Adam* gave names to all Cattel, and to the Fowls of the air, and to every Beast of the field : but he could not so kindly take acquaintance with any of these, or so fully enjoy their society ; but there was still some considerable matter wanting to make up *Adam's* full felicity, and there was a meet help to be found out for him.

21. Wherefore the Lord God caus'd a deep sleep to fall upon *Adam* ; and lo, as he slept upon the ground, he fell into a dream, how God had put his hand into his side, and pulled out one of his ribs, closing up the flesh in stead thereof :

22. And how the rib, which the Lord God had taken from him, was made into a Woman ; and how God, when he had thus made her, took her by the hand, and brought her unto him. And he had no sooner awakened, but he found his dream to be true, for God stood by him with the Woman in his hand which he had brought.

23. Wherefore *Adam*, being preadvertised by the vision, was presently able to pronounce, This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh : what are the rest of the Creatures to this ? And he bestowed upon her also a fitting name, calling her *Woman*, because she was taken out of *Man*.

24. And the Lord God said, Thou hast spoken well, *Adam* : And for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave unto his Wife, and they two shall be one flesh : so strict and sacred a tie is the band of Wedlock.

25. And they were both naked, *Adam* and his Wife, and were not ashamed : but how the shame of being seen naked came into the world, I shall declare unto you hereafter.

C H A P. III.

1. *A subtle Serpent in Paradise, indued with both Reason and the power of Speech, deceives the Woman.* 2. *The Dialogue betwixt the Woman and the Serpent.* 7. *How the shame of nakedness came into the world.* 8. *God walks in the Garden, and calls to Adam.* 10. *The Dialogue betwixt Adam and God.* 14. *The reason why Serpents want feet, and creep upon the ground.* 15. *The reason of the Antipathy betwixt Men and Serpents.* 16. *As also of Womens pangs in child-bearing, and of their being bound in subjection to their Husbands.* 18. *Also of the barrenness of the Earth, and of man's toil and drudgery.* 21. *God teacheth Adam and Eve the use of leathern clothing.* 24. *Paradise haunted with Apparitions: Adam frighted from daring to taste of the Tree of Life, whence his Posterity became mortal to this very day.*

i. **A**ND truly it cannot but be very obvious for you to consider often with your selves, not only how this Shame of Nakedness came into the world, but the toil and drudgery of Tillage and Husbandry ; the grievous pangs of Child-bearing ; and lastly, what

is most terrible of all, Death it self: Of all which, as of some other things also, I shall give such plain and intelligible reasons, that your own hearts could not wish more plain and more intelligible. To what an happy condition *Adam* was created, you have already heard; How he was placed by God in a Garden of delight, where all his Senses were gratified with the most pleasing Objects imaginable; his Eyes, with the beauty of trees and flowers, and various delightful forms of living creatures; his Ears, with the sweet musical accent of the canorous birds; his Smell, with the fragrant odours of Aromatick herbs; his Taste, with variety of delicious fruit; and his Touch, with the soft breathings of the Air in the flowry alleys of this ever-springing Paradise. Add unto this, that pleasure of pleasures, the delectable conversation of his beautiful Bride, the enjoyments of whose Love neither created care to himself, nor pangs of child-bearing to her: for all the functions of life were performed with ease and delight; and there had been no need for man to sweat for the provision of his family; for in this Garden of *Eden* there was a perpetual Spring, and the vigour of the soil prevented man's industry; and youth and jollity had never left the bodies of *Adam* and his posterity, because old age and death were perpetually to be kept off by that soveraign virtue of *the Tree of Life*. And I know, as you heartily could wish this state might have ever continued to *Adam*, and his seed; so you eagerly expect to hear the reason why he was depriv'd of it: and in short it is this, *His Disobedience to a Commandment which God had given him*; the circumstances whereof I shall declare unto you, as followeth.

Amongst those several living creatures which were in Paradise, there was *the Serpent* also, whom you know to this very day to be full of subtilty; and therefore you will less wonder, if, when he was in his perfection, he had not only the use of *Reason*, but the power of *Speech*. It was therefore this Serpent that was the first occasion of all this mischief to *Adam*, and his posterity: for he cunningly came unto the Woman, and said unto her, Is it so indeed, that God has commanded you that you should not eat of * any of the Trees of the Garden?

* See Paul.
Phag.

2. And the Woman answerd unto the Serpent, You are mistaken; God hath not forbid us to eat of all the fruit of the Trees of the Garden.

3. But indeed of the fruit of the Tree in the midst of the Garden, God hath strictly charged us, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.

4. But the Serpent said unto the Woman, Tush, I warrant you this is only but to terrify you, and abridge you of that liberty and happiness you are capable of; you shall not so certainly die.

5. But God knows the virtue of that Tree full well, that so soon as you eat thereof, your eyes shall be opened, and you shall become as Gods, knowing good and evil.

6. And when the Woman saw that the Tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eye, and a Tree to be desired to make one

one wife; she took of the fruit, and did eat, and gave also to her Husband with her, and he did eat.

7. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew they were naked, and were ashamed; and therefore they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves aprons to cover their parts of shame.

8. And the Lord God came into the Garden toward the cool of the evening, and, walking in the Garden, call'd for *Adam*: But *Adam* had no sooner heard his voice, but he, and his wife, ran away into the thickest of the trees of the Garden, to hide themselves from his presence.

9. But the Lord God called unto *Adam* the second time, and said unto him, *Adam*, where art thou?

10. Then *Adam* was forced to make answer, and said, I heard thy voice in the Garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and so I hid my self.

11. Then God said unto him, Who hath made thee so wise, that thou should'st know that thou art naked, or wantest any covering? Hast thou eaten of the forbidden fruit?

12. And *Adam* excus'd himself, saying, The Woman whom thou recommendedst to me for a meet help, she gave me of the fruit, and I did eat.

13. And the Lord God said unto the Woman, What is this that thou hast done? And the Woman excus'd her self, saying, The Serpent beguiled me, and I did eat.

14. Then the Lord God gave Sentence upon all three: and to the Serpent he said, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattel, and above every beast of the field: and whereas hitherto thou hast been able to bear thy body aloft, and go upright, thou shalt henceforth creep upon thy belly, like a worm, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life.

15. And there shall be a perpetual Antipathy betwixt not only the woman and thee, but betwixt thy seed and her seed: For universal mankind shall abhor thee, and hate all the cursed generations that come of thee. They indeed shall busily lie in wait to sting mens feet, which their skill in Herbs however shall be able to cure; but they shall knock all Serpents on the head, and kill them without any pity or remorse, deservedly using thy seed as their deadly Enemy.

16. And the doom of the Woman was, Her sorrow and pangs in child-bearing, and her subjection to her Husband. Which law of subjection is generally observed in the Nations of the World unto this very day.

17. And the doom of *Adam* was, the toil of Husbandry upon barren ground.

18. For the Earth was cursed for his sake, which is the reason that it brings forth thorns, and thistles, and other weeds, that Husbandmen could wish would not cumber the ground, upon which they bestow their toilsome labour.

19. Thus, in the sweat of his face, was *Adam* to eat his bread, till he return to the dust out of which he was taken.

20. And *Adam* called his wife *Eve*, because she was the Mother of all men that ever were born into the World, and liv'd upon the face of the Earth.

21. And the generations of men were cloth'd at first with the skins of wild beasts, the use of which God taught *Adam* and *Eve* in Paradise.

22. And when they were thus accoutred for their journey, and armed for greater hardship, God turns them both out: and the Lord God said concerning *Adam*, deriding his disobedience, Behold, *Adam* is become as one of us, to know good and evil: Let us look to him now, lest he put his hand to the *Tree of Life*, and so make himself immortal.

23. Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of *Eden*, to till the ground, from whence he was taken.


24. So he drove out *Adam*, and his Wife was forced to follow him: For there was no longer staying in Paradise, because the place was terribly haunted with Spirits, and fearful Apparitions appeared at the entrance thereof, winged men with fiery-flaming Swords in their hands brandish'd every way, so that *Adam* durst never adventure to go back to taste of the fruit of the *tree of Life*: whence it is that mankind hath continued mortal to this very day.

T H E

THE PHILOSOPHICK CABBALA.

CHAP. I.

1. The World of Life or Forms, and the Potentiality of the visible Universe created by the Tri-une God, and referr'd to a Monad or Unite.
6. The Universal immense Matter of the visible World, created out of nothing, and referr'd to the number Two.
7. Why it was not said of this matter that it was good.
9. The ordering of an Earth or Planet for making it conveniently habitable; referr'd to the number Three.
14. The immense Æthereal matter, or Heaven, contriv'd into Suns or Planets, as well Primary as Secondary, viz. as well Earths as Moons, and referr'd to the number Four.
20. The replenishing of an Earth with Fish and Fowl, referred to the number Five.
24. The Creation of Beasts and Cattel, but more chiefly of Man himself, referr'd to the number Six.

1.  UR design being to set out the more conspicuous parts of the external Creation, before we descend to the Genealogies and successions of Mankind; there are two notable Objects present themselves to our Understanding, which we must first take notice of, as having an universal influence upon all that follows: and these I Symbolically decypher, the one by the name of *Heaven* and *Light*; for I mean the same thing by both these terms; the other by the name of *Earth*. By *Heaven* or *Light* you are to understand, *The whole comprehension of Intellectual Spirits*, Souls of men and beasts, and the Seminal forms of all things, which you may call, if you please, *The World of Life*. By *Earth* you are to understand, the *Potentiality* or *Capability* of the Existence of the outward Creation: This Possibility being exhibited to our minds, as the result of the Omnipotence of God, without whom nothing would be, and is indeed the utmost shadow, and darkest projection thereof, wherein also is involved the *Impossibility* and *Incommensurability* of things.

The *Tri-une* God therefore, by his Eternal Wisdom, first created this Symbolical *Heaven* and *Earth*.

2. And this *Earth* was nothing but Solitude and Emptiness, and it was a deep bottomless Capacity of being whatever God thought good

good to make out of it, that implied no contradiction to be made. And there being a possibility of creating things after sundry and manifold manners, nothing was yet determined, but this vast Capability of things was unsettled, fluid, and, of it self, undeterminable as *Water*: But the *Spirit of God*, who was the *Vehicle* of the *Eternal Wisdom*, and of the *Super-essential Goodness*, by a swift forecast of Counsel and Discourse of Reason truly Divine, such as at once strikes through all things, and discerns what is best to be done, having hover'd awhile over all the Capacities of this fluid Possibility, forthwith settled upon what was the most perfect and exact.

3. Wherefore the intire Deity, by an *inward Word*, which is nothing but *Wisdom* and *Power*, edg'd with *actual Will*, with more ease than we can present any *Notion* or *Idea* to our own minds, exhibited really to their own view, the whole Creation of Spiritual Substances, such as Angels are in their inward natures, the Souls of men, and other Animals, and the Seminal Forms of all things; so that all those, as many as ever were to be of them, did really and actually exist, without any dependency on corporeal Matter.

4. And God approv'd of, and pleas'd himself in all this as good: but yet, though in design there was a settlement of the *fluid darkness*, or *obscure possibility* of the outward Creation, yet it remained as yet but a *dark Possibility*. And a notorious distinction indeed there was betwixt this *Actual Spiritual Creation* and the *dim Possibility* of the material, or outward world.

5. Inasmuch that the one might very well be called *Day*, and the other *Night*: because the *Night* does deface and obliterate all the distinct figures and colours of things; but the *Day* exhibits them all orderly and clearly to our sight. Thus therefore was the *Immaterial Creature* perfectly finish'd, being an *inexhaustible Treasure of Light and Form*, for the garnishing and consummating the material world, to afford a *Morning* or *Active principle* to every *Passive* one in the future parts of the corporeal Creation. But in this *First day's* work, as we will call it, the *Morning* and *Evening* are purely *Metaphysical*: for the *Active* and *Passive* principles here are not two distinct *Substances*, the one *Material*, the other *Spiritual*; but the *Passive* principle is *Matter* merely *Metaphysical*, and indeed no *real* or *actual* entity; and, as hath been already said, is quite divided from the *Light*, or *Spiritual* substance, not belonging to it, but to the outward world, whose shadowy possibility it is. But, be they how they will, this *Passive* and *Active* principle, are the *First day's* work: A *Monad* or *Unit*, being so fit a Symbol of the *Immaterial* nature.

6. And God thought again, and invigorating his thought with his Will and Power, created an immense deal of real and corporeal *Matter*, a Substance which you must conceive to lie betwixt the foresaid *fluid possibility* of *Natural things*, and the Region of *Seminal Forms*; not that these things are distinguish'd Locally, but according to a more intellectual Order.

7. And the Thought of God, armed with his Omnipotent Will, took effect, and this immensely-diffused *Matter* was made. But he was not very forward to say, it was good, or to please himself much
in

in it; because he foresaw what mischief straying Souls, if they were not very cautious, might bring to themselves, by sinking themselves too deep therein. Besides it was little worth, till greater polishings were bestowed upon it, and his Wisdom had contrived it to fitting uses, being nothing as yet but a boundless Ocean of rude divisible Matter.

8. Wherefore *this Matter* was actuated and agitated forthwith in the very creation thereof by that hand that made it, and was guided and moderated by some *Universal Spirit*, yet part of the *World of Life*, whence it became very subtile and *Æthereal*; so that *this Matter* was rightly called *Heaven*: and the Union of the *Passive* and *Active* Principle in the Creation of this Material Heaven is the *Second day's* Work, and the *Binarie* denotes the nature thereof.

9. I shall also declare unto you, how God orders a real *material Earth*, (which is always environed with that *Æthereal Matter* which is called *Heaven*) for the making it pleasant and delightful for both man and beast when once it is made. But for the *very making* of the *Earth*, it is to be referred to the following day. For the Stars and Planets belong to that number; and as a primary Planet, in respect of its reflexion of light, is rightly called a *Planet*, so in respect of its habitableness it is as rightly termed an *Earth*. These Earths therefore God orders in such sort, that they neither want Water to lie upon them, nor be covered over with Water, though they be environed round with the fluid Air, in which also is that *Æther* or *Heaven*, and under which the Waters would have overspread the face of the Earth, had not his Providence gathered them into one Place:

10. And thereby made partly dry Land, and partly Sea, Rivers, and Springs, for those conveniencies which are obvious for every one to conceive.

11. He adorns the ground also with Grass, Herbs, and Flowers; and hath made a wise provision of Seed, that they bring forth, for the perpetuation of such useful commodities upon the face of the earth.

12. For indeed these things are very good and necessary both for man and beast.

13. Therefore God prepared the Matter of the Earth so, as that there was a *Vital Congruity* of the parts thereof with sundry sorts of Seminal Forms of Trees, Herbs, and choicest kinds of Flowers; and so the Body of the Earth drew in sundry principles of *Plantal Life* from the *World of Life*, that is at hand every where: and the *Passive* and *Active* Principle thus put together, made up the *Third day's* work, and the *Ternary* denotes the nature thereof.

14. The *Ternary* had allotted it to the garnishing of an Earth with Trees, Flowers, and Herbs, after the distinction of *Land* and *Sea*: as the *Quinary* hath allotted to it the replenishing of an Earth with Fish and Fowl; the *Senary* with Man and Beast. But this *Fourth Day* comprehends the garnishing of the body of the *whole World*, viz. that vast and immense *Æthereal* matter, which is called the *fluid Heaven*,

ven, with infinite numbers of fundry sorts of Lights, Suns, and Planets, which God's Wisdom and Power, by union of fit and active principles, drawn from *the World of Life*, made of this *Æthereal* matter; whose usefulness is plain in Nature, that they are all of them for Prognostick signs, and seasons, and days, and years. (Which implies that there are Planets every where through the whole Heavens allotted to the Suns.)

15. As also for administering of light to all the inhabitants of the world; that the Planets may receive light from their fountains of light, that reflect light one to another.

16. And there are Two sorts of these Lights that all the inhabitants of the world must acknowledge every where, consulting with the outward sight, from their proper stations. And the dominion of the greater of these kinds of Lights is conspicuous by day, the dominion of the lesser by night: the former we ordinarily call a *Sun*, the other a *Moon*; which *Moon* is truly a *Planet* and opaque, but reflecting light very plentifully to the beholders sight, and yet is but a *secondary*, or lesser kind of *Planet*: but he made the *Primary* and more eminent *Planets* also, and such an one is *this Earth* we live upon.

17. And God placed all these sorts of Lights in the thin and liquid Heaven, that they might reflect their rays one upon another, and shine upon the inhabitants of the World, dwelling on their respective Earths:

18. And that their beauty and resplendency might be conspicuous to the beholders of them, whether by day or by night; which is mainly to be understood of the Suns, that supply also the place of Stars at a far distance, but whose chief office it is to make vicissitudes of day and night on their respective Earths or Planets. And the Universal dark *Æther* being thus adorn'd with the goodly and glorious furniture of those several kinds of Lights, God approv'd of it as good.

19. And the union of the *Passive* and *Active* principle was the *Fourth* day's work, and the number denotes the nature thereof.

20. And now you have heard of a verdant Earth, and a bounded Sea, and Lights to shine through the Air and Water, and to gratify the eyes of all living creatures, whereby they may see one another, and be able to seek their food, you may seasonably expect the mention of fundry Animals proper to their Elements. Wherefore God, by his *Inward Word* and *Power*, prepared the Matter in the waters, and near the waters, with several *Vital congruities*, so that it drew in fundry Souls from *the World of Life*, which, actuating the parts of the Matter, caus'd great plenty of Fish to swim in the Waters, and Fowls to fly above the earth in the open Air.

21. And after this manner he created great Whales also, as well as the lesser kinds of Fishes; and he approved of them all as good.

22. And the blessing of his *Inward Word*, or *Wisdom*, was upon them for their multiplication; for, according to the preparation of the Matter, the *Plastical Power* of the Souls that descend from *the World of Life*, did faithfully and effectually work those wise contrivances of *Male*
and

and *Female*, they being once rightly united with the Matter, so that by this means, the Fish filled the Waters in the Seas, and the Fowls multiplied upon the Earth.

23. And the union of the *Passive* and *Active* principle was the *Fifth* day's work; and the *Quinary* denotes the nature thereof.

24. And God persisted farther in the Creation of living creatures, and, by espousing new Souls from *the World of Life* to the more *Mediterraneous* parts of the Matter, created land-serpents, cattel, and the beasts of the field.

25. And when he had thus made them, he approved of them for good.

26. Then God reflecting upon his own Nature, and, viewing himself, consulting with the *Super-essential Goodness*, the *Eternal Intellect*, and *unextinguishable Love-flame of his Omnipotent Spirit*, concluded to make a far higher kind of living creature than was as yet brought into the world: He made therefore *Man* in his own Image, after his own Likeness. For, after he had prepared the Matter fit for so noble a guest as an humane Soul, *the World of Life* was forced to let go what the rightly-prepared Matter so justly call'd for: and Man appeared upon the stage of the Earth, Lord of all living creatures. For it was just that he that bears the Image of the Invisible God, should be supreme Monarch of this visible World. And what can be more like God than the Soul of man, that is so Free, so rational, and so Intellectual as it is? And he is not the less like him now he is united to the Terrestrial body, his Soul or Spirit possessing, and striking through a compendious collection of all kind of Corporeal matter, and managing it with his understanding free to think of other things, even as God vivificates and actuates the whole world, being yet wholly free to contemplate himself. Wherefore God gave Man dominion over the Fowls of the air, the Fish of the sea, and the Beasts of the earth: for it is reasonable the worser should be in subserviency to the better.

27. Thus God created Man in his own Image, he consisting of an Intellectual Soul, and a Terrestrial Body actuated thereby. Wherefore mankind became Male and Female, as other terrestrial animals are.

28. And the benediction of the Divine Wisdom for the propagation of their kind was manifest in the contrivance of the parts that were framed for that purpose: And, as they grew in multitudes, they lorded it over the Earth, and over-mastered by their power and policy, the beasts of the field, and fed themselves with Fish and Fowl, and what else pleased them, and made for their content; for all was given to them by right of Creation.

29. And that nothing might be wanting to their delight, behold also Divine Providence hath prepared for their palate all precious and pleasant Herbs for fallads, and made them banquets of the most delicate fruit of the fruit-bearing trees.

30. But for the courser Grass, and worser kind of Herbs, they are intended for the worser and baser kind of creatures: Wherefore it is free for Man to seek out his own, and make use of it.

31. And

31. And God considering every thing that he had made, approved of it as very good : and the union of the *Passive* and *Active* principle was the *Sixth* day's work ; and the *Senary* denotes the nature thereof.

CHAP. II.

2. God's full and absolute Rest from creating any thing of anew, adumbrated by the number Seven. 4. Suns and Planets not only the furniture but effects of the *Æthereal* Matter, or Heaven. 6. The manner of Man, and other Animals, rising out of the Earth by the power of God in Nature. 8. How it was with Adam before he descended into flesh, and became a Terrestrial Animal. 10. That the four Cardinal Vertues were in Adam in his *Æthereal* or *Paradisical* condition. 17. Adam in Paradise forbidden to taste or relish his own Will, under pain of descending into the Region of Death. 18. The Masculine and Feminine faculties in Adam. 20. The great Pleasure and Solace of the Feminine faculties. 21. The Masculine faculties laid asleep, the Feminine appear and act, viz. the grateful sense of the Life of the Vehicle. 25. That this sense and joy of the Life of the Vehicle is in it self, without either blame or shame.

1. **T**HUS the Heavens and the Earth were finish'd, and all the garnishings of them, such as are Trees, Flowers, and Herbs ; Suns, Moons, and Stars ; Fishes, Fowls, and Beasts of the field ; and the chiefest of all, Man himself.

2. Wherefore God having thus compleated his work in the *Senary*, comprehending the whole Creation in *Six* orders of things, he ceased from ever creating any thing more, either in this outward Material world, or in the world of Life. But his Creative Power retiring into himself, he enjoy'd his own *eternal Rest*, which is his immutable and indefatigable Nature, that with ease oversees all the whole Compass of Beings, and continues *Essence*, *Life*, and *Activity* to them ; and the better rectifies the worse, and all are guided by his *Eternal Word* and *Spirit* ; but no new substance hath been ever created since the *Six* days production of things, nor shall ever be hereafter.

3. For this *Seventh* day God hath made an *Eternal Holy-day*, or *Festival of Rest* to himself, wherein he will only please himself, to behold the exquisite Order, and Motion, and right Nature of things ; his *Wisdom*, *Justice*, and *Mercy*, unavoidably insinuating themselves, according to the set frame of the World, into all the parts of the Creation, he having *Ministers of his Goodness and Wrath* prepared every where : So that himself need but to look on, and see the Effects of that *Nemesis* that is necessarily interwoven in the nature of the things themselves which he hath made. This therefore is that *Sabbath*, or *Festival of Rest*, which God himself is said to celebrate in the *Seventh* day ; and indeed the number declares the nature thereof.

4. And now to open my mind more fully and plainly unto you, I must tell you, That those things which before I termed the *Garnishings*

nishings of the Heaven and of the Earth, they are not only so, but the *Generations* of them: I say, *Plants* and *Animals* were the *Generations*, *Effects*, and *Productions* of the *Earth*, the *Seminal Forms* and *Souls* of *Animals* insinuating themselves into the prepared Matter thereof; and *Suns*, *Planets*, or *Earths*, were the *Generations* or *productions* of the *Heavens*, vigour and motion being imparted from the *World of Life* to the immense body of the Universe: so that what I before called mere *Garnishings*, are indeed the *Productions*, or *Generations* of the *Heavens*, and of the *Earth*, so soon as they were made; though I do not take upon me to define the Time wherein God made the *Heavens* and the *Earth*: For he might do it at once by his absolute Omnipotency; or he might, when he had created all Substance, as well material as immaterial, let them act one upon the other so, and in such periods of time, as the nature of the production of the things themselves required.

5. But it was for pious purposes that I cast the Creation into that order of *Six* days, and for the more firmly rooting in the hearts of the people this grand and useful Truth, *That the Omnipotency of God is such, that he can act above, and contrary to natural causes*, that I mentioned *Herbs* and *Plants* of the field, before I take notice of either rain, or man to exercise Gardening and Husbandry: For indeed, according to my former narration, there had been no such kind of rain, as ordinarily now-a-days waters the labours of the Husbandman.

6. But yet there went up a moist Vapour from the Earth, which being matured and concocted by the *Spirit of the World*, which is very active in the Heavens or Air, became a precious *balmy liquor*, and fit *vehicle of Life*, which, descending down in some sort like dewy showers upon the face of the Earth, moistned the ground; so that the warmth of the Sun gently playing upon the surface thereof, prepared matter variously for sundry sorts, not only of Sensual forms of *Plants*, but *Souls of Animals* also.

7. And *Man* himself rose out of the Earth after this manner; the dust thereof being rightly prepared and attempered by these unctuous showers and balmy droppings of Heaven. For God had so contriv'd, by his infinite Wisdom, that Matter thus or thus prepar'd should, by a *Vital congruity*, attract proportional Forms from the *World of Life*, which is every where nigh at hand, and does very throngly inequitate the moist and unctuous Air. Wherefore after this manner was the *Aereal* or *Æthereal Adam* convey'd into an Earthly body, having his most conspicuous residence in the Head or Brain: And thus *Adam* became the Soul of a *Terrestrial living Creature*.

8. But how it is with *Adam* before he descends into this lower condition of life, I shall declare unto you in the *Ænigmatical* narration that follows, which is this; That the Lord God had planted a Garden East-ward in *Eden*, where he had put the Man, which afterward he formed into a *Terrestrial Animal*: For *Adam* was first wholly *Æthereal*, and placed in Paradise, that is, in a happy and joyful condition of the Spirit; for he was placed under the invigorating beams of the *Divine Intellect*, and the Sun of Righteousness then shone fairly upon him.

9. And his Soul was as the ground which God hath blest, and so brought forth every pleasant Tree, and every goodly Plant of her heavenly Father's own planting; for the holy Spirit of Life had enriched the soil, that it brought forth all manner of pleasant and profitable fruits: And *the Tree of Life* was in the midst of this Garden of man's Soul, to wit, *the Essential Will of God*, which is the true root of Regeneration: but so high a pitch *Adam* as yet had not reach'd unto; and the fruit of this Tree in this *Æthereal* state of the Soul had been *Immortality*, or *Life everlasting*: And the *Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil* was there also, viz. *His own Will*.

10. And there was a very pleasant River that watered this Garden, distinguishable into four streams, which are the four Cardinal Virtues, which are in several degrees in the Soul, according to the several degrees of the purity of her *Vehicle*.

11. And the name of the first is *Pison*, which is *Prudence* and Experience in things that are comely to be done: For the Soul of man is never idle, neither in this world, nor in any state else, but hath some Province to make good, and is to promote his interest whose she is. For what greater gratification can there be of a good Soul, than to be a dispenser of some portion of that Universal good that God lets out upon the world? And there can be no external conversation, nor society of persons, be they *Terrestrial*, *Aereal*, or *Æthereal*, but forthwith it implies an Use of *Prudence*: Wherefore *Prudence* is an inseparable Accomplishment of the Soul: So that *Pison* is rightly deemed one of the Rivers even of that Celestial Paradise. And this is that *Wisdom* which God himself doth shew to the Soul by communication of the divine Light; for it is said to compass the Land of *Havilah*.

12. Where also idle and useless Speculations are not regarded, as is plainly declared by the pure and approved *Gold*, *Bdellium*, and *Onyx*, the Commodities thereof.

13. And the name of the second River is *Gihon*, which is *Justice*, as is intimated from the fame of the *Æthiopians*, whose Land it is said to compass, as also from the notation of the name thereof.

13. And the name of the third River is *Hiddekel*, which is *Fortitude*, that, like a rapid stream, bears all down before it, and stoutly resists all the powers of darkness, running forcibly against *Assyria*, which is situated Westward of it. And the fourth River is *Perath*, which is *Temperance*, the nourisher and cherisher of all the plants of Paradise; whereas *Intemperance*, or too much addicting the Mind to the pleasure of the *Vehicle*, or *Life of the Matter*, be it in what state soever, drowns and choaks those sacred Vegetables. As the Earth, you know, was not at all fruitful till the Waters were removed into one place, and the dry land appeared, whenas before it was drowned and flocked with overmuch moisture.

15. In this Paradise thus described had the Lord God placed Man to dress it, and to keep it in such good order as he found it.

16. And the Divine Word or Light in man charged him, saying, Of every Tree of Paradise thou mayest freely eat. For all things here are wholesome as well as pleasant, if thou hast a right care of thy self, and beest obedient to my Commands.

17. But

17. But of the luscious and poisonous fruit of *the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil*, that is, of *thine own Will*, thou shalt not by any means eat: For at what time thou eatest thereof, thy Soul shall contract that languor, debility, and unsettledness, that, in process of time, thou shalt slide into the earth, and be buried in humane flesh, and become an inhabitant of the *Region of mortality and death*.

18. Hitherto I have not taken much notice in the *Æthereal Adam* of any other Faculties, but such as carried him upwards towards *Vertue* and the *holy Intellect*. And indeed this is the more *perfect* and *masculine Adam*, which consists in pure subtile Intellectual Knowledge. But we will now inform you of another Faculty of the Soul of man, which, though it seem inferiour, yet is far from being contemptible, it being both good for himself, and convenient for the terrestrial world: For this makes him in a capacity of being the Head of all the living creatures in the earth, as that Faculty indeed is the mother of all mankind.

19. Those higher and more Intellectual accomplishments, I must confess, made *Adam* very wise, and of a quick perception. For he knew very well the natures of the Beasts of the field, and Fowls of the air: I mean, not only of the visible and terrestrial creatures, but also of the fallen and unfallen Angels, or good and bad *Genii*; and was able to judge aright of them, according to the principles they consisted of, and the properties they had.

20. And his Reason and Understanding was not mistaken, but he pronounced aright in all. But however, he could take no such pleasure in the external Creation of God, and his various works, without having some Principle of Life, congruously joining with, and joyfully actuating the like Matter themselves consisted of: Wherefore God indued the Soul of Man with a Faculty of being united with vital joy and complacency to the Matter, as well as of aspiring to an Union with God himself, whose Divine Essence is too highly disproportioned to our poor substances. But the Divine Life is communicable, in some sort, to both Soul and Body, whether it be *Æthereal*, or of grosser consistence: and those wonderful grateful pleasures that we feel, are nothing but the kindly motions of the Soul's *Vehicle*; from whence Divine joys themselves are, by a kind of reflexion, strengthened and advanced. Of so great consequence is that Vital principle that joins the Soul to the Matter of the Universe.

21. Wherefore God, to gratify *Adam*, made him not indefatigable in his aspirings towards Intellectual things; Lassitude of Contemplation, and of Affectation of Immateriality, (he being not able to receive those things as they are, but according to his poor capacity, which is very small, in respect of the object it is exercis'd about) brought upon him remisness and drowsiness to such like exercises, till, by degrees, he fell into a more * profound sleep. At what time Divine Providence having laid the plot aforehand, that lower Vivificative principle of his Soul did grow so strong, and did so vigorously, and with such exultant sympathy and joy, actuate his *Vehicle*, that, in virtue of his Integrity, which he yet retain'd, this became more dear to him, and of greater contentment than any thing he yet had experience of.

* See *Philos*
leg. Allegor.
lib. 3.

22. I say, when Divine Providence had so lively and warmly stirred up this new sense of his *Vehicle* in him.

23. He straightway acknowledged that all the sense and knowledge of any thing he had hitherto was more lifeless and evanid, and seemed less congruous and grateful unto him, and more estranged from his nature: but this was so agreeable and consentaneous to his Soul, that he looked upon it as a necessary part of himself, and called it after his own name.

24. And he thought thus within himself, For this cause will any one leave his over-tedious *aspires*, to unite with the *Eternal Intellect and Universal Soul of the World*, the immenseness of whose excellencies are too highly rais'd for us to continue long in their embraces; and will cleave to the joyous and chearful *life of his Vehicle*, and account this living *Vehicle* and his Soul, one Person.

25. Thus *Adam*, with his new-wedded Joy, stood naked before God, but was not as yet at all ashamed, by reason of his Innocency and Simplicity; for *Adam* neither in his Reason nor Affection as yet had transgressed in any thing.

CHAP. III.

1. Satan tempts *Adam*, taking advantage upon the Invigoration of the Life of his *Vehicle*.
2. The Dialogue betwixt *Adam* and Satan.
6. The Masculine faculties in *Adam*, swayed by the Feminine, assent to sin against God.
7. *Adam* excuses the use of that wild Liberty he gave himself, discerning the Plastick Power somewhat awakened in him.
8. A dispute betwixt *Adam* and the Divine Light, arraigning him at the Tribunal of his own Conscience.
14. Satan stricken down into the lower Regions of the Air.
15. A Prophecy of the Incarnation of the Soul of the *Messias*, and of his Triumph over the head and highest Powers of the rebellious Angels.
16. A decree of God to sowre and disturb all the pleasures and contentments of the Terrestrial Life.
20. *Adam* again excuses his Fall, from the usefulness of his Presence and Government upon Earth.
21. *Adam* is fully incorporated into Flesh, and appears in the true shape of a Terrestrial Animal.
24. That Immortality is incompatible to the Earthly *Adam*, nor can his Soul reach it till she return into her *Æthereal Vehicle*.

1. **N**OW the Life of the *Vehicle* being so highly invigorated in *Adam*, by the remission of exercise in his more subtile and immaterial Faculties, he was fit, with all alacrity and chearfulness, to pursue any game set before him: and wanted nothing but fair external opportunity to call him out into action. Which one of the evil *Genii*, or fallen Angels, observed, who had no small skill in doing mischief, having, in all likelihood, practis'd the same villany upon some of his own Order, and was the very Ring-leader of rebellion against God, the Divine Light: For he was more perversly subtile than all the rest of the evil *Genii*, or Beasts of the field, which God had

had made Angels; but their Bestiality they contracted by their own Rebellion. For every thing that hath Sense and Understanding, and wants the Divine Life in it, in the judgment of all wise and good men, is truly a Beast. This *old Serpent* therefore, the subtlest of all the *Beasts of the field*, cunningly assaulted *Adam* with such conference as would surely please his *Feminine* part, which was now so invigorated with life, that the best news to her would be the tidings of a Commission to do any thing. Wherefore the *Serpent* said to the *feminized Adam*, Why are you so demure? and what makes you so bound up in spirit? Is it so indeed that God has confined you, taken away your Liberty, and forbidden you all things that you may take pleasure in?

2. And *Adam* answered him, saying, No; we are not forbidden any thing that the *Divine Life* in us approves as good and pleasant.

3. We are only forbidden to feed on *our own Will*, and to seek pleasures apart, and without the approbation of the Will of God. For if our own Will get head in us, we shall assuredly descend into the *Region of Mortality*, and be cast into a state of Death.

4. But the *Serpent* said unto *Adam*, Tush, this is but a *Panick* fear in you, *Adam*; you shall not so surely die as you conceit.

5. The only matter is this; God indeed loves to keep his creatures in awe, and to hold them in from ranging too far, and reaching too high: but he knows very well, that if you take but your liberty with us, and satiate your selves freely with your own Will, your eyes will be wonderfully opened, and you will meet with a world of variety of experiments in things, so that you will grow abundantly wise, and, like Gods, know all things whatsoever, whether good or evil.

6. Now the *Feminine* part in *Adam* was so tickled with this Doctrine of the *old Deceiver*, that the *Concupiscible* began to be so immoderate as to resolve to do any thing that may promote pleasure and experience in things, and snatch'd away with it *Adam's* Will and Reason, by his heedlessness and inadvertency. So that *Adam* was wholly set upon doing things at randome, according as the various toyings and titillations of the lascivient *Life of the Vehicle* suggested to him, no longer consulting with the Voice of God, or taking any farther aim by the Inlet of the Divine Light.

7. And when he had tired himself with a rabble of toys, and unfruitful or unsatisfactory devices, rising from the multifarious workings of the *Particles* of his *Vehicle*, at last the eyes of his faculties were opened, and they perceived how naked they were; he having neither the covering of the Heavenly Nature, nor as yet of the Terrestrial Body. Only they sewed fig-leaves together, and made some pretences of excuse, from the vigour of the *Plantal Life* that now in a thinner manner might manifest it self in *Adam*, and predispose him for a more perfect exercise of his *Plastick Power*, when the prepared Matter of the Earth shall drink him in.

8. In the mean time the Voice of God, or the Divine Wisdom, spake to them in the cool of the day, when the hurry of this mad Career had well flaked. But *Adam* now with his wife was grown so

out of order, and so much estranged from the *Life of God*, that they hid themselves at the sensible approach thereof, as wild beasts run away into the Wood at the sight of a man.

9. But the *Divine Light* in the Conscience of *Adam* pursued him, and upbraided unto him the case he was in.

20. And *Adam* acknowledged within himself how naked he was, having no power, nor ornaments, nor abilities of his own, and yet that he had left his obedience and dependence upon God: Wherefore he was ashamed, and hid himself at the approach of the divine Light manifesting it self unto him, to the reprehension and rebuke of him.

11. And the divine Light charged all this misery and confusion that had thus overtaken him upon the eating of the forbidden fruit, *the lascious dictates of his own Will*.

12. But *Adam* again excused himself within himself, that it was the vigour and impetuosity of that *Life in the Vehicle*, which God himself implanted in it, whereby he miscarried: the woman that God had given him.

13. And the *divine Light* spake in *Adam* concerning the woman, What work hath she made here? But the woman in *Adam* excused her self; for she was beguiled by that grand Deceiver the *Serpent*. In this confusion of mind was *Adam* by forsaking the *divine Light*, and letting his own Will get head against it. For it so changed the nature of his *Vehicle*, that (whereas he might have continued in an *Angelical* and *Aethereal* condition, and his *Feminine* part been brought into perfect obedience to the *divine Light*, and had joys multiplied upon the whole man beyond all expression and imagination for ever) he now sunk more and more towards a mortal and terrestrial estate, himself not being unsensible thereof; as you shall hear, when I have told you the doom of the Eternal God, concerning the *Serpent* and him.

14. Things therefore having been carried on this wise, the Eternal Lord God decreed thus with himself concerning the *Serpent* and *Adam*; That this *old Serpent*, the Prince of the rebellious Angels, should be more accursed than all the rest; and (whereas he lorded it aloft in the higher parts of the Air, and could glide in the very *Aethereal* Region, amongst the innocent and unfallen Souls of men, and the good Angels before) that he should now sweep the dust with his belly, being cast lower toward the surface of the Earth.

15. And that there should be a general enmity and abhorrency betwixt this *old Serpent*, as also all of his fellow-rebels, and betwixt *Mankind*. And that, in process of time, the ever-faithful and obedient Soul of the *Messias* should take a Body, and should trample over the power of the *Devil*, very notoriously here upon Earth, and, after his death, should be constituted Prince of all the *Angelical* Orders whatever in Heaven.

16. And concerning *Adam*, the Eternal Lord God decreed, that he should descend down to be an Inhabitant of the Earth, and that he should not there indulge to himself the pleasures of the body, without the concomitants of pain and sorrow; and that his *Feminine* part,

part, his Affections, should be under the chastisement and correction of his Reason.

17. That he should have a wearisome and toilsome travail in this world.

18. The Earth bringing forth thorns and thistles, though he must subsist by the Corn of the field.

19. Wherefore in the sweat of his brows he should eat his bread, till he returned unto the ground, of which his Terrestrial body is made. This was the Counsel of God concerning *Adam* and the *Serpent*.

20. Now, as I was a telling you, *Adam*, though he was sinking apace into those lower functions of life, yet his Mind was not as yet grown so fully stupid, but he had the knowledge of his own condition, and added to all his former Apologies, that the *Feminine* part in him, though it had seduced him, yet there was some use of this miscarriage, for the Earth would hence be inhabited by *Intellectual Animals*: wherefore he call'd the *Life of his Vehicle*, *EVE*, because she is indeed the Mother of all the generations of men that live upon the Earth.

21. At last the *Plastick power* being fully awakened, *Adam's* Soul descended into the prepared Matter of the Earth, and, in due process of time, *Adam* appeared cloth'd in the skins of beasts; that is, he became a down-right *Terrestrial Animal*, and a mortal creature upon Earth.

22. For the Eternal God had so decreed, and his Wisdom, Mercy, and Justice did but (if I may so speak) play and sport together in the business. And the rather, because *Adam* had but precipitated himself into that condition which, in due time, might have fallen to his share by course: for it is fitting there should be some such Head among the living creatures of the earth as a *Terrestrial Adam*, but to live always here were his disadvantage.

23. Wherefore when God remov'd him from that higher condition,

24. He made sure he should not be Immortal, nor is he in any capacity of reaching unto the fruit of the *Tree of Life*, without passing through the condition of being re-invested with a *fiery Vehicle*, and becoming a pure and defecate *Aethereal Spirit*: Then he may be admitted to taste the fruit of the *Tree of Life* and Immortality, and so live for ever.

THE M O R A L C A B B A L A.

C H A P. I.

1. *Man a Microcosm or Little World, in whom there are two Principles, Spirit and Flesh.* 2. *The Earthly or Fleshly Nature appears first.* 4. *The Light of Conscience unlistned to.* 6. *The Spirit of Savoury, and affectionate discernment betwixt good and evil.* 10. *The inordinate desires of the flesh driven aside and limited.* 11. *Hereupon the plants of Righteousness bear fruit and flourish.* 16. *The hearty and sincere Love of God, and a man's neighbour, is as the Sun in the Soul of man: Notionality and Opinions, the weak and faint Light of the dispersed Stars.* 18. *Those that walk in sincere Love, walk in the Day: They that are guided by Notionality, travel in the Night.* 22. *The Natural Concupiscible brings forth by the command of God, and is corrected by Devotion.* 24. *The Irascible also brings forth.* 26. *Christ the Image of God is created, being a perfect Ruler over all the motions of the Irascible and Concupiscible.* 29. *The food of the Divine Life.* 30. *The food of the Animal Life.* 31. *The Divine Wisdom approves of whatsoever is simply natural, as good.*



E shall set before you in this History of *Genesis*, several eminent Examples of good and perfect men, such as *Abel, Seth, Enoch, Abraham*, and the like: Wherefore we thought fit, though *Ænigmatically*, and in a dark Parable, to shadow out in general the manner of progress to this divine Perfection; looking upon *Man* as a *Microcosm*, or a *Little World*, who, if he hold out the whole progress of the Spiritual Creation, the process thereof will be figuratively understood as follows. Wherefore first of all, I say, That by the will of God every man living on the face of the Earth, hath these two Principles in him, *Heaven and Earth, Divinity and Animality, Spirit and Flesh*.

2. But that which is *Animal* or *Natural* operates first, the *Spiritual* or *Heavenly Life*, lying for a while closed up at rest in its own Principle.

ciple. During which time, and indeed some while afterwards too, the *Animal* or *Fleshy* Life domineers in darkness and deformity; the mighty tempestuous Passions of the flesh contending and struggling over that *Abyss of unsatiable Desire*, which has no bottom, and which, in this case, carries the Mind to nothing but emptiness and unprofitableness.

3. But by the Will of God it is, that afterwards the Day-light appears, though not in so vigorous measure, out of the *Heavenly*, or *Spiritual Principle*.

4. And Conscience being thus enlightened, offers her self a guide to a better condition: and God has framed the nature of man so, that he cannot but say that this Light is good, and distinguish betwixt the dark tumultuous motions of the *Flesh* and it;

5. And say, that there is as true a difference as betwixt the natural Day and Night. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* were the *First* day's progress.

6. But though there be this Principle of Life set up in the Conscience of Man, and he cannot say any thing against it, but that it is good and true, yet has he not presently so lively and savoury a relish in his distinction betwixt the *evil* and the *good*: For the *evil* as yet wholly holds his Affections, though his Fancy and Reason be touch'd a little with the Theoretical apprehensions of what is *good*: wherefore by the will of God the *Heavenly Principle* (though it be in it self invisible and undiscernible) in due time becomes a *Spirit of savoury and affectionate discernment betwixt the evil and the good*; betwixt the pure waters that flow from the *Holy Spirit*, and the muddy and tumultuous suggestions of the *Flesh*.

7. And thus is Man enabled in a living manner to distinguish betwixt the *Earthly* and *Heavenly* life.

8. For the *Heavenly Principle* is now made to him a *Spirit of savoury discernment*; and being taught by God after this manner, he will not fail to pronounce, That this Principle, whereby he has so quick and lively a sense of what is *good* and *evil*, is *Heavenly* indeed: And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* is made the *Second* day's progress.

9. Now the sweetness of the *Upper waters* being so well relish'd by man, he has a great nauseating against the *Lower feculent waters* of the unbounded desires of the *flesh*: so that God adding power to his will, the inordinate desires of the flesh are driven within set limits, and he has a command over himself to become more staid and steady.

10. And this steadiness and command he gets over himself, he is taught by the Divine Principle in him to compare to the *Earth* or *dry land* for safeness and stability; but the desires of the flesh he looks upon as a dangerous and turbulent *Sea*. Wherefore the bounding of them thus, and arriving to a state of command over a man's self, and freedom from such colluctations and collisions as are found in the working Seas, the Divine Nature in him could not but approve as good.

11. For so it comes to pass, by the will of God, and according to the nature of things, that this state of *Sobriety* in man (he being in so good a measure rid of the boisterousness of evil Concupiscence) gives him leisure so to cultivate his Mind with principles of *Vertue* and

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Honesty, that he is as a fruitful field, whom the Lord hath blessed.

12. Sending forth out of himself sundry sorts of fruit-bearing trees, herbs, and flowers; that is, various kinds of good works, to the praise of God and the help of his neighbour: and God and his own Conscience witness to him that this is good.

13. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* is made the *Third* day's progress.

14. Now when God has proceeded so far in the *Spiritual* Creation, as to raise the *Heavenly* Principle in man to that power and efficacy, that it takes hold on his Affections, and brings forth laudable works of Righteousness, he thereupon adds a very eminent accession of Light and Strength, setting before his eyes sundry sorts of Luminaries in the *Heavenly* or *Intellectual* Nature, whereby he may be able more notoriously to distinguish betwixt the *Day* and the *Night*; that is, betwixt the condition of a truly-illuminated Soul, and one that is as yet much benighted in ignorance, and estranged from the true knowledge of God. For, according to the difference of these Lights, it is signified to a man in what condition himself or others are in, whether it be indeed *Day* or *Night* with them, *Summer* or *Winter*, *Spring-time* or *Harvest*, or what period or progress they have made in the Divine Life.

15. And though there be so great a difference betwixt these Lights, yet the meanest are better than mere darkness, and serve in some measure or other, to give light to the Earthly man.

16. But among these many Lights which God made to appear to man, there are two more eminent by far than the rest. The greater of which two has his dominion by day, and is a faithful guide to those which walk in the day, that is, that work the works of Righteousness. And this greater Light is but one, and does, being added, mightily invigorate the former day-light man walked by, and it is a more full appearance of the *Sun of Righteousness*, which is an hearty and sincere *Love of God, and a man's neighbour*. The lesser of these two great Lights has dominion by night, and is a rule to those whose inward minds are held as yet too strongly in the works of darkness: and it is a Principle weak, and variable as the Moon, and is called *Inconstancy of Life and Knowledge*. There are also an abundance of other little Lights, thickly dispersed over the whole Understanding of man, as the Stars in the Firmament, which you may call *Notionality*, or *Multiplicity of ineffectual Opinions*.

17. But the worst of all these are better than down-right Sensuality and Brutishness, and therefore God may well be said to set them up in the *Heavenly* part of man, his Understanding, to give what light they are able to his *Earthly* parts, his corrupt and inordinate Affections.

18. And as the *Sun of Righteousness*, that is, the hearty and sincere *Love of God, and a man's neighbour*, by his single light and warmth, with cheerfulness and safety guides them that are in the day: so that more uneven and changeable Principle, and the numerous Lights of *Notionality*, may conduct them, as well as they are able, that are benighted

ed in darkness: And (what is most of all considerable) a man, by the wide difference of these latter Lights from that of the Day, may discern when himself or another is benighted in the state of unrighteousness. For *multifarious Notionality* and *Inconstancy of life and knowledge*, are certain signs that a man is in the night: But the sticking to this one single, but vigorous and effectual Light, of the hearty and sincere *Love of God, and a man's neighbour*, is a sign that a man walks in the day. And he that is arrived to this condition plainly discerns, in the Light of God, that all this is very good.

19. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* is made the *Fourth* day's progress.

20. And now so noble, so warm, and so vigorous a Principle or Light as the *Sun of Righteousness*, being set up in the *Heavenly* part of the Soul of man, the unskilful may unwarily expect, that the next news will be, that even the Seas themselves are dried up with the heat thereof, that is, that the *Concupiscible* in man is quite destroyed: But God doth appoint far otherwise; for the Waters bring forth abundance of Fish, as well as Fowl innumerable.

21. Thoughts therefore of natural delights do swim to and fro in the *Concupiscible* of man, and the fervent love he bears to God, causes not a many faint ineffectual notions, but an abundance of holy affectionate meditations, and *winged Ejaculations* that fly up heaven-ward, which, returning back again, and falling upon the numerous fry of natural *Concupiscence*, help to lessen their numbers, as those Fowls that frequent the waters devour the Fish thereof. And God and good men do see nothing but good in all this.

22. Wherefore God multiplies the Thoughts of natural delight in the lower *Concupiscible*, as well as he does those Heavenly thoughts and holy meditations, that the entire Humanity might be filled with all the degrees of good it is capable of; and that the *Divine Life* might have something to order and overcome.

23. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* made the *Fifth* day's progress.

24. Nor does God only cause the Waters to bring forth, but the dry Land also, several living creatures after their kind, and makes the *Irascible* fruitful as well as the *Concupiscible*.

25. For God saw that they were both good, and that they were a fit subject for the *Heavenly Man* to exercise his Rule and Dominion over.

26. For God multiplies strength, as well as occasions to employ it upon. And the Divine Life that hath been, under the several degrees of the advancement thereof, so variously represented in the *Five* foregoing progresses, God at last works up to the height, and being compleat in all things, styles it by the name of *his own Image*; the Divine Life arrived to this pitch, being the right Image of him indeed.

Thus it is therefore, that at last God, in our nature, fully manifests the *true and perfect Man*, whereby we our selves become good and perfect, who does not only see and affect what is good, but has full power to effect it in all things: For he has full dominion over the Fish of the Sea, can rule and guide the Fowls of the air, and with ease command the Beasts of the field, and whatever moveth upon the earth.

27. Thus

27. Thus God creates Man in his own Image, making him as powerful a Commander in his *Little World*, over all the Thoughts and Motions of the *Concupiscible* and *Irascible*, as himself is over the Natural frame of the Universe or greater World. And this Image is *Male* and *Female*, consisting of a *clear and free Understanding*, and *divine Affection*, which are now arrived to that height, that no lower Life is able to rebel against them, and to bring them under.

28. For God blesses them and makes them fruitful, and multiplies their noble off-spring in so great and wonderful a measure, that they replenish the cultivated nature of man with such an abundance of real *Truth* and *Equity*, that there is no *living Figure*, *Imagination*, or *Motion* of the *Irascible* or *Concupiscible*, no extravagant or ignorant *Irregularity* in *Religious meditations* and *devotions*, but they are presently moderated and rectified. For the whole Territories of the Humane Nature are every where so well peopled with the several beautiful shapes or *Ideas* of *Truth* and *Goodness*, the off-spring of the *Heavenly Adam*, *Christ*, that no *Animal* figure can offer to move or wagg amiss, but it meets with a proper Corrector, and Re-composer of its motions.

29. And the Divine Life in man being thus perfected, he is there-with instructed by God, what is his food, as *Divine*, and what is the food of the *Animal Life* in him; viz. the most vertuous, most truly pious and divine Actions he has given to the *Heavenly Adam* to feed upon, fulfilling the Will of God in all things, which is more pleasant than the choicest sallads, or the most delicate fruit the taste can relish.

30. Nor is the *Animal Life* quite to be starved and pined, but regulated and kept in subjection; and therefore they are to have their worser sort of Herbs to feed on, that is, *Natural Actions* consentaneous to the Principle from whence they flow; that that Principle may also enjoy it self in the liberty of prosecuting what its nature prompts it unto. And thus the sundry Modifications of the *Irascible* and *Concupiscible*, as also the various *Figurations* of *Religious Melancholy*, and *Natural Devotions*, (which are the Fishes, Beasts, and Fowls in the *Animal Nature* of Man) are permitted to feed and refresh themselves in those lower kinds of Operations they incline us to; provided all be approved and rightly regulated by the *Heavenly Adam*.

31. For the Divine Wisdom in Man sees and approves all things which God hath created in us to be very good in their kind. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* was the *Sixth* day's progress.

CHAP. II.

3. The true Sabbatism of the Sons of God. 5. A Description of men taught by God. 7. The mysterie of that Adam that comes by Water and the Spirit. 9. Obedience, the Tree of Life: Disobedience, the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil. 10. The Rivers of Paradise, the four Cardinal Vertues in the Soul of man. 17. The Life of Righteousness lost by Disobedience. 19. The mere contemplative and Spiritual Man sees the motions of the Animal Life, and rigidly enough censures them. 21. That

21. *That it is incompetent to Man perpetually to dwell in Spiritual Contemplations.* 22. *That upon the flaking of those, the kindly Joy of the Life of the Body springs out, which is our Eve.* 23. *That this kindly Joy of the Body is more grateful to Man in Innocency than any thing.* 25. *Nor is man mistaken in his judgment thereof.*

1. **T**HUS the Heavenly and Earthly Nature in Man were finish'd, and fully replenish'd with all the garnishings belonging to them.

2. So the Divine Wisdom in the Humane Nature celebrated her *Sabbath*, having now wrought through the toil of all the *Six* day's travel.

3. And the Divine Wisdom looked upon this *Seventh* day as blessed and sacred; a day of Righteousness, Rest, and Joy in the Holy Ghost.

4. These were the Generations or Pullulations of the *Heavenly* and *Earthly* Nature, of the *Divine* and *Animal* Life in Man, when God created them.

5. I mean, those fruitful Plants, and pleasant and useful Herbs which he himself planted: For I have describ'd unto you the condition of a Man taught of God, and instructed and cherish'd up by his inward Light, where there is no external Doctrine to distil as the rain, nor outward Gardener to intermeddle in God's Husbandry.

6. Only there is a *Fountain of Water*, which is *Repentance* from dead works, and bubbles up in the *Earthly Adam*, so as universally to wash all the ground.

7. And thus the nature of Man being prepared for further Accomplishments, God shapes him into his own *Image*, which is *Righteousness* and *true Holiness*, and breaths into him the *Spirit of Life*: And this is that *Adam* which is born of *Water and the Spirit*.

8. Hitherto I have shewed unto you how mankind is raised up from one degree of Spiritual Light and Righteousness unto another, till we come at last to that full Command and Perfection in the Divine Life, that a man may be said in some sort thus to have attain'd to the Kingdom of Heaven, or found a Paradise upon Earth. The Narration that follows, shall instruct and forewarn you of those evil courses, whereby man loses that measure of Paradisiacal happiness God estates him in, even while he is in this world. I say therefore, that the Lord God planted a Garden Eastward in *Eden*, and there he put the Man whom he had made; that is, Man living under the Intellectual rays of the Spirit, and being guided by the morning Light of the Sun of Righteousness, is led into a very pleasant and sweet Contentment of mind, and the testimony of a good Conscience is his great delight.

9. And that the fundry Germinations and Springings up of the works of Righteousness in him are a delectable Paradise to him, pleasing both the sight and taste of that measure of Divine Life that is manifested in him. But of all the Plants that grow in him, there is none of so sovereign virtue as that in the midst of this Garden, to wit, the *Tree of Life*, which is, a *Sincere Obedience to the Will of God*: nor any that bears so lethiferous and poisonous fruit, as the *Tree of the*

knowledge of good and evil, which is *Disobedience to the Will of God, as it is manifested in Man*. For the pleasure of the Soul consists in conforming her self faithfully to what she is perswaded in her own Conscience is the Will of God, whatever others would insinuate to the contrary.

10. And all the fruit-bearing Trees of Righteousness are watered by these four Rivers, which wind along this Garden of Pleasure, which indeed are the *four Cardinal Vertues*.

11. The name of the first is *Pison*, which is *Prudence*; not the suggestions of fleshly Craft, and over-reaching Subtilty, but the Indications of the Spirit, or divine Intellect, which is fit, and profitable, and decorous to be done.

12. Here is well tried and certain approved *Experience*, healthful Industry, and Alacrity to honest Labour.

13. And the name of the second River is *Gihon*, which is *Justice*.

14. And the name of the third River is *Hiddekel*, which is *Fortitude*; and the fourth River is *Euphrates*, which is *Temperance*.

15. This is the Paradise where the Lord God had placed the Man, that he might further cultivate it, and improve it.

16. And the Divine Light manifested in the Man, encouraged the Man to eat of the fruits of Paradise freely, and to delight himself in all manner of holy Understanding and Righteousness.

17. But withal he bad him have a special care how he relish'd *his own Will or Power* in any thing, but that he should be obedient to the manifest Will of God in all things great and small; or else assuredly he would lose the life he now lived, and become dead to all Righteousness and Truth. So the man had a special care, and his Soul wrought wholly towards Heavenly and Divine things, and heeded nothing but these, his more noble and *Masculine* Faculties being after a manner solely set on work, but the Natural Life (in which notwithstanding, if it were rightly guided, there is no sin) being almost quite forgot and disregarded.

18. But the Wisdom of God saw that it was not good for the Soul of man, that the *Masculine* Powers thereof should thus operate alone, but that all the Faculties of Life should be set afloat, that the whole humane Nature might be accomplish'd with the Divine.

19. Now the Powers of the Soul working so wholly upwards towards Divine things, the several Modifications or Figurations of the *Animal Life*, (which God, acting in the frame of the humane Nature, represented to the Man, whence he had occasion to view them, and judge of them) by the quick Understanding of Man, were indeed easily discern'd what they were, and he had a determinate apprehension of every particular Figuration of the *Animal Life*.

20. And did censure them, or pronounce of them, though truly, yet rigidly enough and severely; but as yet was not in a capacity of taking any delight in them, there was not any of them fit for his turn to please himself in.

21. Wherefore Divine Providence brought it so to pass, for the good of the Man, and that he might more vigorously and fully be enrich'd with delight, that the operations of the *Masculine* Faculties
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of the Soul were for a while well flaked and consopited; during which time the Faculties themselves were something lessened or weakened, yet in such a due measure and proportion, that, considering the future advantage that was expected, that was not miss'd that was taken away, but all as handsome and compleat as before.

22. For what was thus abated in the *Masculine Faculties*, was compensated abundantly in exhibiting to the Man the grateful sense of the *Feminine*: for there was no way but this to *Create the Woman*, which is to elicit that *kindly-flowring Joy, or harmless delight of the Natural Life, and health of the Body*; which once exhibited and joined with Simplicity and Innocency of Spirit, is the greatest part of that Paradise a man is capable of upon Earth.

23. And the actuating of the Matter being the most proper and essential operation of a Soul, man presently acknowledged this *kindly-flowring joy of the Body* of nearer cognation and affinity with himself, than any thing else he ever had yet experience of, and he loved it as his own life.

24. And the Man was so mightily taken with his new Spouse, which is, *The kindly Joy of the Life of the Body*, that he concluded with himself, that any one may, with a safe Conscience, forego those more earnest attempts towards the knowledge of the Eternal God that created him, as also the performance of those more scrupulous injunctions of his Mother the Church, so far forth as they are incompatible with the *Health and Joy of the Life of his natural Body*, and might, in such a case, rather cleave to his Spouse, and become one with her; provided he still lived in obedience to the indispensable Precepts of that Superiour Light and Power that begot him.

25. Nor had *Adam's* Reason or Affection transgressed at all in this; concluding nothing but what the *Divine Wisdom and Equity* would approve as true. Wherefore *Adam* and his Wife as yet sought no corners, nor covering-places to shelter them from the Divine Light; but having done nothing amiss, appeared naked in the presence of it, without any shame or blushing.

CHAP. III.

1. *Adam is tempted by inordinate pleasure, from the springing up of the Joy of the invigorated Life of his Body.*
2. *A dialogue or dispute in the Mind of Adam, betwixt The inordinate Desire of Pleasure, and The natural Joy of the Body.*
6. *The Will of Adam is drawn away to assent to Inordinate Pleasure.*
8. *Adam having transgressed, is impatient of the Presence of the divine Light.*
10. *A long conflict of Conscience, or dispute betwixt Adam's earthly mind, and the divine Light, examining him, and setting before him both his present and future condition, if he persisted in rebellion.*
20. *He adheres to the Joy of his Body without reason or measure, notwithstanding all the castigations and monitions of the divine Light.*
21. *The divine Light takes leave of Adam therefore for the present, with deserved scorn and reproach.*
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The doom of the Eternal God concerning laps'd Man, that will not suffer them to settle in wickedness, according to their own depraved wills and desires.

1. **B**UT so it came to pass, that *the Life of the Body* being thus invigorated in Man, straightway the flyest and subtlest of all the *Animal Figurations*, the *Serpent*, which is the *inordinate Desire of Pleasure*, craftily insinuated it self into the *Feminine* part of *Adam*, viz. *The kindly Joy of the Body*; and thus assaulting Man, whisper'd such suggestions as these unto him. What a rigid and severe thing is this business of Religion, and the Law of God, as they call it, that deprives a man of all manner of Pleasure, and cuts him short of all the contentments of Life?

2. But the *Womanish* part in *Adam*, to wit, *The natural and kindly Joy of the Body*, could witness against this, and answered, We may delight our selves with the operations of all the Faculties both of Soul and Body, which God and Nature have bestowed upon us.

3. Only we are to take heed of Disobedience, and of promiscuously following *our own Will*; but we are to consult with the Will of God, and the Divine Light manifested in our Understandings, and so do all things orderly and measurably: For if we transgress against this, we shall die the death, and lose the Life of Vertue and Righteousness, which is now awake in us.

4. But the *Serpent*, which is *the inordinate desire of Pleasure*, befooled *Adam*, through the frailty of his *Womanish Faculties*, and made him believe he should not die; but with safety might serve the free dictates of Pleasure, or his own Will, and the Will of God; that *Flesh* and *Spirit* might both rule in him, and be no such prejudice the one to the other:

5. But that his skill and experience in things will be more enlarged, and so come nearer to Divine Perfection indeed, and imitate that fulness of Wisdom which is in God, who knows all things whatsoever, whether good or evil.

6. This crafty suggestion so insinuated it self into *Adam's Feminine Faculties*, that his fleshly *Concupiscence* began to be so strong, that it carried the assent of his Will away with it, and the whole Man became a lawless and unruly Creature. For it seemed a very pleasant thing at first sight to put in execution whatever our own Lusts suggest unto us without control; and very desirable to try all Conclusions to gain experience and knowledge of things. But this brought in nothing but *the Wisdom of the Flesh*, and made *Adam* earthly-minded.

7. But he had not rambled very far in these dissolute courses, but his eyes were opened, and he saw the difference, how naked now he was, and bare of all strength and power to divine and holy things; and began to meditate with himself some slight pretences for his notorious folly and disobedience.

8. For the Voice of the Divine Light had come unto him in the cool of the day, when the fury and heat of his inordinate passions was something flaked: But *Adam* could not endure the presence of it, but hid himself from it, meditating what he should answer by way of Apology or Excuse.

9. But

9. But the Divine Light persisted, and came up closer to him, and upbraided unto him, that he was grown so wild and estranged from her self, demanding of him in what condition he was, and wherefore he fled.

10. Then *Adam* ingenuously confessed, that he found himself in such a pitiful, poor, naked condition, that he was ashamed to appear in the Presence of the Divine Light; and that was the reason he hid himself from it, because it would so manifestly upbraid to him his Nakedness and Deformity.

11. And the Divine Light farther examined him, how he fell into this sensible beggarly nakedness he was in, charging the sad event upon his Disobedience, that he had fed upon, and taken a surfeit of the fruit of his own Will.

12. But *Adam* excused his rational faculties, and said, They did but follow the natural Dictate of the *Joy of the Body*, the *Woman* that God himself bestowed upon him for an help and delight.

13. But the Divine Light again blamed *Adam*, that he kept his *Feminine faculties* in no better order nor subjection; that they should so boldly and overcomingly dictate to him such things as are not fit. To which he had nothing to say, but that the subtile *Serpent*, the *inordinate Desire of Pleasure*, had beguiled both his Faculties, as well *Masculine* as *Feminine*, his Will and Affection were quite carried away therewith.

14. Then the Divine Light began to chastise the *Serpent*, in the hearing of *Adam*, pronouncing of it, that it was more accursed than all the *Animal figurations* beside; and that it crept basely upon the belly, tempting to Riot and Venery, and relishing nothing but earth and dirt. This will always be the guise of it so long as it lives in a man.

15. But might I once descend so far into the Man as to take possession of his *Feminine faculties*, I would set the *Natural Joy of the Body* at Defiance with the *Serpent*; and though the subtilty of the *Serpent* may a little wound and disorder the *Woman* for a while, yet her warrantable and free operations, she being actuated by divine vigour, should afterward quite destroy and extinguish the *Seed of the Serpent*, to wit, the *Operations of the inordinate desire of Pleasure*.

16. And she added farther in the hearing of *Adam* concerning the *Woman*, as she stood thus disjoin'd from the *heavenly Life*, and was not obedient to right Reason, that, by a divine *Nemesis*, she should conceive with sorrow, and bring forth Vanity; and that her Husband, the *Earthly-minded Adam*, should tyrannize over, and weary her out, and foil her: So that the *kindly Joy of the Health, and Life of the Body* should be much depraved, or made faint and languid, by the unbridled humours and impetuous Luxury and Intemperance of the *Earthly-minded Adam*.

17. And to *Adam* he said, who had become so *Earthly-minded* by listening to the Voice of his *deceived Woman*, and so acting disobediently to the Will of God, That his Flesh or Earth was accursed for his sake, with labour and toil should he reap the fruits thereof all the while he continued in this *Earthly-mindedness*.

18. *Cares* also and *Anxieties* shall it bring forth unto him, and his Thoughts shall be as base as those of the Beasts in the field; he shall ruminate of nothing but what is Earthly and Sensual.

19. With sweat and anguish should he labour to satisfy his hunger and insatiableness, till he returned to the Principle out of which he was taken: for the *Earthly-mindedness* came from this *animated Earth, the Body*; and is to shrink up again into its own Principle, and to perish.

20. After all these Castigations and Premonitions of the Divine Light, *Adam* was not sufficiently awakened to the sense of what was good, but his Mind was straightway taken up again with the delights of the flesh, and dearly embracing *the Joy of his Body*, for all she was grown so inordinate, called her *My Life*, professing she was the nourishing Mother, and chief comfort of all men living, and none could subsist without her.

21. Then the Divine Wisdom put hairy coats, made of the skins of wild beasts, upon *Adam* and his *Wife*, and deservedly reproached them, saying, Now get you gone for a couple of Brutes. And *Adam* would have very gladly escaped so, if he might, and set up his rest for ever in the bestial Nature.

22. But the Eternal God of Heaven, whose Providence reaches to all things, and whose Mercy is over all his works, looking upon *Adam*, perceived in what a pitiful ridiculous case he was; who, seeking to be like unto God for knowledge and freedom, made himself no better than a Beast, and could willingly have lived for ever in that baser kind of nature. Wherefore the Eternal Lord God, in compassion to *Adam*, designed the contrary; and, deriding his boldness and curiosity that made him transgress, Behold, says he, *Adam* is become like one of us, knowing Good and Evil; and can of himself enlarge his pleasure, and create new Paradises of his own, which forsooth must have also their *Tree of Life*, or *Immortality*: and *Adam* would for ever live in this foolish state he hath placed himself in.

23. But the Eternal Lord God would not suffer *Adam* to take up his rest in the bestial delight, which he had chosen, but drove him out of this *false Paradise*, which he would have made to himself, and set him to cultivate his *fleshly members*, out of which his *Earthly-mindedness* was taken.

24. I say, he forcibly drove out *Adam* from this *Paradise of Luxury*; nor could he settle perpetually in the brutish Life, because the *Che- rubim* with the flaming sword, that turned every way, beat him off; that is, the *Manly Faculties* of *Reason* and *Conscience* met him ever and anon in his brutish purposes, and convinced him so of his folly, that he could not set up his rest for ever in this bestial condition.



THE

T H E
D E F E N C E
O F T H E
T H R E E F O L D
C A B B A L A.

PHILO JUD.

Ἄπαζαν ἢ νομοθεσίαν εἰκέναι ζῶν· καὶ σῶμα μὲν ἔχον τὰς ῥητὰς διατάξεις, ψυχῶν
ἢ τὸν ἀποκείμενον ταῖς λέξεσιν ἀόρατον νοῦν.

That is,

That the whole Law of Moses is like to a living Creature, whose Body is the Literal sense; but the Soul the more inward and hidden meaning, covered under the sense of the Letter.

R. MOSES ÆGYPT.

Non omnia secundum literam intelligenda & accipienda esse qua dicuntur in Opere Bereschith seu Creationis, sicut vulgus hominum existimat. Sensus enim illorum literales vel gignunt pravas opiniones de natura Dei Opt. Max. vel certè fundamenta Legis evertunt, Haresinque aliquam introducunt.

L O N D O N,

Printed by Joseph Downing in Bartholomew-Close near
West-Smithfield, MDCCXIII.

THE
DEFENCE
OF
THE
CABAL

Printed by

W. R.



Printed by
W. R.
at the
University
of Cambridge

T H E P R E F A C E T O T H E R E A D E R.

READER,

1. **T**HE Cabbala's thou hast read being, in all likelihood, so strange and unexpected, especially the Philosophical, that the Defence it self, which should cure and cease thy amazement, may not occasion in any passage thereof any further scruple or offence, I thought fit a while to interrupt thee, that whatever I conjecture may less satisfy, may afore-hand be strengthened by this short Preface.

And for my own part, I cannot presage what may be in any shew of Reason alledged by any man, unless it be, The unusual Mystery of Numbers; The using of the Authority of the Heathen in Explication of Scripture; The adding also of Miracles done by them for the further confirming their Authority; and lastly, The Strangeness of the Philosophical Conclusions themselves.

2. Now for the Mystery of Numbers, that this ancient Philosophy of Moses should be wrapped up in it, will not seem improbable, * if we consider, that the Cabbala of the Creation was conserved in the hands of Abraham, and his family, who was famous for Mathematicks, (of which Arithmetick is a necessary part) first among the Chaldeans, and that after he taught the † Egyptians the same Arts, as Historians write. Be-† Τὴν τε 'Α- sides Prophetical and Enigmatical writings, that it is usual with them τοῖς μυστικῶν hide their Secrets, * as under the allusions of Names and Etymologies, so αὐτοῖς χαρί- also under the adumbrations of Numbers, it is so notoriously known, and ἑταί, ὅτι τὰ that in the very Scriptures themselves, that it needs no proof; * I will οὐδ' Ἀρρογο- instance but in that one eminent example of the number of the Beast 666. μίαν ἑξα- δωσι. Jo-

3. As for citing the Heathen Writers so frequently; you are to con- seph. Anti- sider, that they are the Wisest and the most Vertuous of them, and either quit. Judaic. such as the Fathers say, had their Philosophy from Moses and the Prophets, lib. 1. cap. 9. as Pythagoras and Plato, or else the Disciples or Friends of these Philo- sophers. And therefore I thought it very proper to use their Testimony in a thing that they seemed to be so fit witnesses of for the main, as having receiv'd the Cabbala from the ancient Prophets; though I will not deny, but they have mingled their own fooleries with it, * either out of the wantonness of their Fancy, or mistake of Judgment: Such as are the Trans- migration

migration of Humane Souls into Brutes; An utter abstinence from Flesh; Too severe reproaches against the Pleasures of the Body; Vilification of Marriage, and the like: which is no more Argument against the main drift of the Cabbala, than unwarrantable superstitious Opinions and Practices of some deceived Churches, are against the solid grounds of Christianity.

Again, I do not alledge Philosophers alone, but, as occasion requires, Fathers, and (which I conceive as valid in this case) the Jewish Rabbins, who, in things where prejudice need not blind them, I should think as fit as any to confirm a Cabbalistical sense, especially if there be a general consent of them, and that they do not write their private fancy, but the mind of their whole Church.

Now if any shall take offence at Pythagoras his Scholars, swearing, as is conceived, by their Master that taught them the mystery of the Tetractys, (as you shall understand more at large in the Explication of the Fourth day's work) I must profess that I my self am not a little offended with it. But that high reverence they bore to Pythagoras, as it is a sign of Vanity, and some kind of Superstition in them; so is it also an Argument of a stupendous measure of Knowledge and Sanctity in Pythagoras himself, that he should extort from them so great Honour, and that his Memory should be so sacred to them. Which profound Knowledge and Sanctity he having got by conversing with the Jewish Prophets, it ultimately tends to the renown of that Church, and consequently to the Christian, which inherits those holy Oracles which were first peculiar to the Jews.

But what the followers of Pythagoras transgressed in, is no more to be imputed to him, than the Superstitions exhibited to the Virgin Mary can be laid to her charge. Besides, it may be a * question, whether in that Pythagorick Oath, *Ὁ ὅρκος τῶν*, &c. they did not swear by God, the first Author of the Cabbala, and that mysterious Explication of the Tetractys, that is indeed, of all knowledge Divine and Natural, who first gave it to Adam, and then revived or confirmed it again to Moses. Or if it be understood of Pythagoras, why may it be looked upon as a civil Oath, or Asseveration, such as Joseph's swearing by the Life of Pharaoh, and Noblemen by their Honours? neither of which notwithstanding for my own part I can allow, or assure my self that they are merely Civil, but touch upon Religion, or rather Idolatrous Superstition.

4. As for the Miracles Pythagoras did, though I do not believe all that are recorded of him are true, yet those that I have recited I hold probable enough, they being not unbecoming the worth of the Person: but those that suppose the Transmigration of Humane Souls into the Bodies of Beasts, I look upon as Fables; and his * whispering into the ear of an Ox to forbear to eat Beans, as a loud Lie. But it seems very consonant unto Divine Providence, that Pythagoras, having got the Knowledge of the holy Cabbala, which God imparted to Adam and Moses, he should countenance it before the Nations, by enabling him to do Miracles. For so those noble and ancient Truths were more firmly radicated amongst the Philosophers of Greece, and happily preserved to this very day.

Nor can his being † carried in the Air make him be suspected to be a were Magician or Conjuror, sith the holy Prophets and Apostles themselves have been transported after that manner; as * Habbakuk from Jewry

* See Append.
to the Defence
of the Philo-
soph. Cab. c. 2.
sect. 3.

* Iamblich. de
vita Pythag.
cap. 13.

† Iamblich. de
vita Pythag.
cap. 28.

* Histor. Bel.
& Draccon.

to Babylon, and * Philip, after he had baptiz'd the Eunuch, from * Acts 8. v. betwixt Gaza and Jerusalem to Azotus. But for my own part, I 39, 40. think working of Miracles is one of the least Perfections of a man, and is nothing at all to the Happiness of him that does them, or rather seems to do them: For if they be Miracles, he does them not, but some other Power or Person distinct from him. And yet here Magicians and Witches are greatly delighted, in that this Power is in some sort attributed to themselves, and that they are admired of the People, as is manifest in Simon Magus. But thus to lord it and domineer in the Attribute of Power with the Prince of the Air, what is it but mere Pride, the most irrational and provoking Vice that is? And with what gross folly is it here conjoined, they priding and pleasing themselves in that they sometimes do that, or rather suffer that, which Hens and wild Geese, and every ordinary Fowl; can do of it self; that is, mount aloft, and glide through the fleeting Air? But Holy and Good men know that the greatest Sweetness and Perfection of a Vertuous Soul, is the kindly accomplishment of her own Nature in true Wisdom and divine Love. And if any thing miraculous happen to them, or be done by them, it is, that that worth and knowledge that is in them, may be taken notice of, and that God thereby may be glorified, whose witnesses they are. But no other accession of Happiness accrues to them from this, but that hereby they may be in a better capacity of making others happy: which I confess I conceive here Pythagoras his case.

And that men may not indulge too much to their own Melancholy and Fancy, which they ordinarily call Inspiration; if they be so great Lights to the World as they pretend, and so high, that they will not condescend to the examination of humane Reason, it were desirable that such persons would keep in their heat to concoct the crudities of their own Conceptions, till the warrant of a Miracle call them out; and so they might more rightfully challenge an attention from the people, as being authorised from above to tell us something we knew not before, nor can so well know as believe, the main Argument being not Reason, but Miracle.

5. Lastly, for the Strangeness of the Philosophical Conclusions themselves; It were the strangest thing of all, if at first sight they did not seem very Paradoxical and strange: Else why should they be hid and concealed from the Vulgar, but that they did transcend their capacity, and were overmuch disproportioned to their belief: But in the behalf of these Cabbalistical Conclusions; I will only note thus much, That they are such, that supposing them true, (which I shall no longer assert, than till such time as some able Philosopher or Theologer shall convince me of their falsehood) there is nothing of any grand consideration in Theology or Nature, that will not easily be extricated by this Hypothesis, an eminent part whereof is, the Motion of the Earth, and the Præ-existency of Souls. The evidence of the former of which Truth is such, that it has won the assent of the most famous Mathematicians of our later Ages; and the reasonableness of the latter is no less: there having never been any Philosopher that held the Soul of Man immortal, but he held that it did also præ-exist.

But

But Religion not being curious to expose the full View of Truth to the people, but only what was most necessary to keep them in the fear of a Deity, and obedience to the Law, contented her self with what merely concerned the state of the Soul after the dissolution of the Body, concealing whatever was conceivable concerning her condition before. Now, I say, it is a pretty privilege of Falshood, (if this Hypothesis be false) and very remarkable, that it should better suit with the Attributes of God, the visible Events of Providence, the Phenomena of Nature, the Reason of Man, and the holy Text it self, where men acknowledge a mysterious Cabbala, than that which by all means must be accounted true, viz. That there is no such Motion of the Earth about the Sun, nor any *Præ-existency* of Humane Souls.

Reader, I have done what lies on my part, that thou may'st peruse this Defence of mine without any rub or stumbling; let me request but one thing which thou art bound to grant, which is, That thou read my Defence without Prejudice, and that all along as thou goest, thou make not thy recourse to the customary conceits of thy Fancy, but consult with thy free Reason, τὸ δὲ σύνδεσ γινώσκοντες, as Aristotle speaks in his *Metaphysicks*: For Custom is another Nature; and therefore those conceits that are accustomary and familiar, we unawares appeal to, as if they were indeed the natural Light of the Mind, and her first Common Notions. And he gives an Instance not altogether unsuitable to our present purpose; *Ἡλικὸν δ' ἴσθ' ἔχει τὸ σύνδεσ οἱ νόμοι δηλαδὲ σιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μᾶλλον ἴσθ' ὅτι γινώσκουσιν ἀπὸ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθ'.* The Philosopher may be as bold as he pleases with the Ritual laws and Religious stories of the Heathens, but I do not know that he ever was acquainted with the Law of Moses. But I think I may speak it not without due Reverence, that there is something of Aristotle's saying Analogically true in the very History of the Creation, and that the first impressions of the Literal Text, which is so plainly accommodated to the capacity of mere Children and Idiots, by reason of custom, have so strongly rooted themselves in the minds of some, that they take that sense to be more true, than the true meaning of the Text indeed. Which is plain in no manner a person than one of the Fathers, namely, Lactantius; who, looking upon the World as a Tent, according to the description in the Literal Cabbala, did very stoutly and confidently deny Antipodes. So much did a customary Fancy prevail over the free use of his Reason.

Thus much for better caution I thought fit to preface. The rest the Introduction to the Defence, and the very frame and nature of the Defence it self, I hope will make good to the judicious and ingenuous Reader.

Aristot. *Metaphys.* lib. 2. cap. 3.

Lact. lib. 3. *Divin. Instit.* cap. 24. See also *Jos. Acost. Histor. Ind.* lib. 1.

S C H O L I A

In Præfat. S E C T. 2.

UT sub Allusionibus Nominum, &c. Hujusce rei quamplurima occurrunt exempla in *Visione septem Ecclesiarum*, cujus *Explicationem* vide. Sed interim nimium propero, viri eruditissimi *Samuelis Andreae* immemor SS. Theol. Doctoris & Philos. Professoris *Herbornensis*, qui in *Examine* suo *Generali Cabbalæ* meæ *Philosophicæ* multa attulit, quorum nonnulla, potissima nempe quæque, notare mecum statui, eisque respondere; omnia enim si prosequerer, in nimiam molem Scholia mea excrescere faceret. Quæ autem in hanc Sectionem scripsit minimè duxi prætereunda. Recurramus igitur paululum ad quæ proximè præcesserunt:

Si consideremus *Cabbalam Creationis* conservatam fuisse in manibus *Abrahami ejusque Familiae*, qui ob *Scientias Mathematicas*, quorum *Arithmetica Pars est necessaria*, celebris erat, &c. Multus est S. A. in confutando hanc Historicorum opinionem de peritia *Abrahami Arithmetica*. Nos verò ut magis perspicuè methodicèque procedamus, ea primo in loco proponemus quæ ab utroque nostrum pro concessis habentur. Et certè satis liberaliter hoc nobis ultrò largitur *Andreades*, pag. 77. Extra controversiam nempe esse quòd in manibus *Abrahami & Familiae ejus Cabbala* quædam fuerit, seu *Traditio à Patribus accepta de ortu Universi, Diluvio, aliisque rebus fidem & obsequium Creatori debitum spectantibus*, quòdque is hanc doctrinam à Majoribus acceptam alios docuerit & ad posteros transmiserit. Consentitque cum *Maimonide* qui *More Nevoch.* part. 2. cap. 39. sic scribit. Docere solebat *Abraham & per demonstrationes speculativas ostendere, quòd Mundus habeat Deum unum solum, quòd is creaverit omnia alia quæ extra vel præter ipsum sunt, & quòd non sit serviendum Figuris istiusmodi externis aut ulli Creaturæ.* Et si affirmemus cum *Josepho*, quòd *Abrahamus Aegyptiis Astronomiam & Arithmeticam tradiderit*, non multum reluctatur. Quam *Josephi* sententiam non solum *R. Gedaliam* sed & *Eusebium, Rabanum Maurum, & Zonaram* approbare agnoscit. *Ut taceam Clementem Alexandrinum*, quem *Abrahamum* Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποκαλύπτειν, introducere ait. Quod minimè mirum est cum tam apertum extaret ea de re apud *Josephum* Testimonium. Immo verò *Clementem* observasse ait, vel *Mysticum* sive *Symbolicum Numerorum usum Abrahamum* nequaquam latuisse, indèque factum esse, secundum sententiam *Clementis*, ut *Abrahamus* trecentos octodecim vernas armasse dicatur ad redimendum fratrem *Lot*. *ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ μὲν κυριακὸν σημεῖον τύπον, κατὰ τὸ ἡμέρα, τὸ τριακοσίοσδε στοιχεῖον, τὸ ἰῶτα καὶ τὸ ἦτα τένομα σημαίνειν τὸ σωτήριον.* T. 300. *Crucem* nempe significare, i vero & *H* duas primas literas nominis *Ἰησοῦς* innuere. Istorum autem Numerorum hunc esse sensum *Mysticum* sive *Symbolicum, Ambrosium, Eucherium, Rupertumque Abbatem Tuitiensem* affirmasse, ipsumque *Prudentium*, huc tanquam ad communem Christianorum, suâ ætate, sententiam in istis versibus,

R r r

Nos

Nos esse largè vernularum divites,
Si, quid trecenti bis novenis additis
Possint, figurâ noverimus mysticâ.

Exam. Gene-
ral. p. 75.

(in Præfat. Psychomach.) respexisse ipse apertè fatetur *Andreades*. *Clemens*que non suam solius sed communem seculi sui opinionem istâ voculâ *φασιν*, satis subindicat. Tot scilicet suffragiis confirmari videtur, *Authores* citante ipso etiam S. A. *Abrahamum* non communis solum sed & *Symbolicæ* *Arithmeticæ* peritum fuisse. Quod tamen an tam certò collegerint ex Græco Textu, (cum *Abrahamus* Græcus non esset sed Hebræus) *Clemens* aliquæ ipsi viderint. Cæterum ex ipso Textu Linguae Hebraica idem pro *Abrahami* peritia in *Arithmetica Symbolica* eruitur argumentum. Videturque pro Tessera militari fuisse istius *Vernarum Numeri* electio, nempe trecentorum octodecim, quem Numerum continet nomen *אליקר*, quod significat, *Deus meus Adjutorium meum*. Quasi hæc esset parvi illius exercitus Tessera militaris. Quod verò *Bar Kappara* per suam *Gematriam* in *Berisch. Rabb.* pro trecentis istis octodecim solum *Eliezerem* intelligi vult, id fanè meritò à viro erudito, pag. 75. tanquam merum delirium exploditur. Neque enim ad ullum hominem referendum est nomen *אליקר* numero 318. contentum, sed ad Deum adiutorem, cujus auspiciis ab *Abrahamo* educendus erat exercitus, ut T. I. H. ad Jesum crucifixum, verum nostrum *Eliezerem* seu *Emanuelem*, qui à spiritali Captivitate per crucem nos redimit. Quod autem tam in Græco Textu quàm Hebræo usus hic numerorum *Symbolicus* innotescat, & in re tanti momenti, admiratione profectò dignum est, nec sine singulari providentia factum. Nec obscuro denique argumento est, *Abrahamum* usum numerorum *Symbolicum* satis calluisse. Sed longius prolapsus sum quàm putabam.

Pag. 75, 76.

Recurramus ad ea quæ tam facile vel ultrò concedit S. A. *Cabbalam* fuisse in manibus *Abrahami* & familiæ ejus, de Mundi Creatione sive Ortu Universi, hoc extra omnem controversiam situm esse agnoscit. Et communem quidem *Arithmeticam* & scivisse *Abrahamum* & docuisse non multum refragatur. Astronomum verò fuisse ex isto Textu, Gen. 15. 5. ubi Deus dicitur eum ad Stellas contemplandas eduxisse, evinci posse non solum negat, sed & falsè deridet. Et fortean haud immeritò. Quippe qui, præterquam quòd id factum fuerit in visione Prophetica, ignorantiam potius *Abrahami* in rebus Astronomicis arguere contendit, quòd Numerus Stellarum, quæ apparent, ipsi incognitus fuerit, quem quilibet Tironum Astronomiæ hodie novit referre: Haud inscitum profectò argumentum! Et quod planè innuit, Deum in visione Prophetica *Abrahamum* eduxisse ad Stellas, mentis quidem non corporis oculis aspectandas, & non tanquam *Astrologum* sed *Physiologum* satis gnarum, qui ex vera de Creatione Mundi *Cabbala*, quàm infinitus ferè fuerit Stellarum, i. e. Solum Vorticumque Numerus jam olim intellexisset, atque hæc comparatione Deum innumeram *Abrahamo* futuram progeniem illustrasse. Porro ex hac verisimillimum est Philosophia *Abrahamum* demonstrasse, quemadmodum ait *Maimonides*, quòd Mundus habeat unum Deum solum, quòdque is creaverit omnia quæ extra vel præter ipsum sunt. Et certè ad convincendas gentes, quarum pleræque omnes Solem pro supremo Numine habuerunt, Stellas reliquas

liquas pro Diis minoribus, nulla est accommodatior Philosophia, quam ea ipsa quam nos tanquam *Mosaicam*, *Abrahamicam*ve operi quartæ diei Creationis applicavimus. Hæc certè omnem Gentium Superstitionem & Idololatriam uno quasi ictu abscindit, quemadmodum & in magno Pietatis *Mysterio* notavimus. Lib. 3, cap. 1, & 2.

Attamen verò S. A. quanquam *Abrahamum Cabbalam* sive Doctrinam de Mundi Creatione & accipisse & tradidisse concedit, nec dissimilem fortè ei ipsi (cùm ad confutandos Atheos & Idololatrias tam idonea sit,) quam nos Textui *Mosaico* applicavimus, *sub Numerorum tamen Symbolis à majoribus fuisse acceptam, vel ab ipso Abrahamo, quippe insigni Mathematico, eisdem involutam, & sic posteris traditam & ad Mosen delatam, nequaquam* censet admittendum, ut quod omni ratione careat. Quid ità obsecro, mi *Andreade*! *Abrahami tempore Arithmetica non extabat, cujus inventorem Pythagoram* *Freculphus Episcopus Lexoviensis constituit, Plato in Phædro Θεός Deum Ægyptium, Hermetem nempe Trismegistum, quem viri docti aut Mosen, aut Josephum Patriarcham, quæ probabilior opinio est, fuisse contendunt. Quos omnes Abrahamo posteriores fuisse in confesso est.* At verò *Josephum Patriarcham Abrahami pronepotem fuisse satis constat, & suprà ex Josepho concessisti Abrahamum non solum calluisse Arithmeticam, sed & alios eam docuisse.* Ità eruditum *Andreaden* ex animo nimis obstinato & insenso adversus veritatem malè sibi constare videmus, andruantem & reandruantem ac præ nimio ardore & levitate juvenili, quo loco staret, nescientem. *Abrahamum vel Symbolicæ Arithmeticæ peritum fuisse ex numero Vernarum illiusque significatione satis suprà constabat. Et concedit tandem Andreades, sed non esse credibile eum Creationis Cabbalam numerorum symbolis abscondere voluisse, quamvis istam artem noverit, cùm res adeo insolens sit ut nusquam in sacris Literis, si unicum Numerum Bestiæ excipias, illius occurrat exemplum, nec ullus bonus sit Numerorum hujusmodi Symbolicorum usus.*

Sed ad prius breviter respondeo, Inscitiam suam prodere aut egregiam oscitantiam S. A. dum sic statuit, (quemadmodum & *Daneus*, qui ad sensum *Chronologicum* istum Numerum inflectere conatur, qui proculdubio est *Symbolicus*.) Nam in proximo Capite, nempe Apoc. 14. Numerum 144 Chiliadum *Numericè* interpretari & non *Symbolicè*, admodum absurdum esset ac puerile. Ex radice enim Numeri 144. sensus *Symbolicus* apertè intelligitur. Multaque alia sunt, in Apocalypsi præsertim, horum Numerorum *Symbolicorum* exempla, ut in mille Annis Regni Christi, In septem millibus Nominum occisorum, Apoc. 11. 13. In tertia parte Arborum, Fluminum, Maris, &c. Apoc. 8. 7. Vox hæc numeralis [Tertia] decies ad minimum istoc in Capite, *Symbolicè* usurpatur, ut & Numerus *Duodenarius*, cap. 21. septies saltem octièsv. Ut taceam Numerum 144. illuc iterum occurrere *Symbolicè* intelligendum. Hæc sufficere debent, quanquam & alia multa possint superaddi. Temeraria autem illa Numeri Bestiæ Interpretatio ad sensum *Chronologicum* (quam ego semper non sine aliqua animi indignatione rejeci, nunquam autem cum majori, quam apud amicos quosdam me ea de re sciscitantes anno uno aut altero ante Urbis *Londini* incendium quod contigit A. D. 1666.) funestissimo argumento

jam confutata est, ut desinere tandem discant homines imperiti & leves in Prophetiis interpretandis ineptire.

Ad posterius quod attinet, de usu Numerorum *Symbolicorum*, (quos usus alii fingunt ipsi defendant) Ego duos omnino usus eorum præcipuos maximèque conspicuos noto, unum, ut per eos satis certa sit abstrusissimarum maximèque sublimium Veritatum Revelatio ac Traditio; alterum, ut ista Traditio non quibuscumque aut personis aut temporibus pateat, sed idoneis & opportunis. Hinc abstrusissima Creationis Myſteria, cum vulgarem excedant captum atque fidem, Historia illius per Numeros *Symbolicos* sic narratur ut vulgus habeant quod Pietatem & Religionem in ipsis alat, ut intelligant utique quod verissimum est, Deum hujus visibilis Mundi esse Creatorem, omnesque causas secundas ab illius nutu pendere; & certa interim derivetur *Cabbala* apud sapientes, *Mundi* hujus visibilis *Systema* longè aliud repræsentans quàm vulgo videtur, Illius scilicet ambitum nubibus non terminari, nec *Stellas* nubibus esse conterminas, *Terram* motu annuo ac diurno, non *Solem* *Stellasque* fixas moveri, In *Planetarum* medio *Solem* non *Terram* collocari, &c. Per Numerorum, inquam, *Symbolicorum* intelligentiam hæc Philosophica Creationis *Cabbala* æquè certò apud eos, qui capaces sunt, transmittitur, atque ipsa *Cabbala* *Literalis*. Quemadmodum videre est ex uno illo exemplo Numeri *Quaternarii* (ut alios missos faciam) qui ad opus quarti Diei pertinet. Cum enim *Tetractys* sive *Quaternarius* suâ vi *Symbolicâ*, totum *Universum* repræsentet, quippe qui potestate *Denarium* (qui cum omnes Numeros contineat, *Universi* *Symbolum* est) complectitur, hinc intellexerunt Sapientes & *Arithmeticæ Symbolicæ* gnari, quanquam in *Litera*, *Dies* quarta partem tantum Creationis, *Solem* nempe & *Lunam* reliquasque *Stellas* commemorare videatur, reverà tamen eam verum repræsentare totius *Universi* *Systema*; *Terramque* ipsam, utpote unum è *Luminariis* minoris dignitatis, sive *Planetis*, inter reliqua *Luminaria* creatam. Unde sequitur, moveri etiam circa *Solem*, *Stellarumque* aliarum perinde atque *Solis* vortices in principio vi *Divini Verbi* factos esse, &c. Atque hinc quarti diei enarrationem, veri *Systematis Mundani* totiusque *Naturæ* sive rerum *Universitatis* genuinam explicationem continuisse. Quam ob causam *Tetractys* meritò à *Pythagoreis* vocatur κλειδὸς τῆς οὐσίας, quippe quæ clavem gerebat quâ rerum *Naturæ* *Systema* verum sapientibus aperiretur. Quæ cum tam mira *Naturæ* *Myſteria* completeretur, minimè mirandum est in *Juramenti* formam apud *Pythagoreos* abiisse,

— Νῆ τὸν ᾠδαίνοντα τετρακλὺν,
Παγὰν ἀνά τ' οὐσέως ῥίζωμά τ' ἔχουσαν.

Qua de re plura postea, cum ad illam hujus *Juramenti* explicationem pervenerimus, quam ex aliis viris doctis in hujus, quam hîc inno, locum, substituere vult S. A. Interim eum velim advertere, quàm omnia nobis ex voto cedant: *Abrahamum* Creationis *Cabbalam* recepisse, non solum *Arithmeticam*, sed *Symbolicam* *Arithmeticam* calluisse, immo & eâ usum esse in *Vernarum* *Numero* feligendo. Eundem egregium *Physiologum* fuisse, eamque scivisse *Physiologiam* quæ ad subvertendum *Polytheismum* & *Idololatriam* *Gentium*, quæ *Solem* tanquam

quam summum Numen colebant, maximè esset idonea. Et talem denique esse quæ per vim *Symbolicam* Numeri Quaternarii Operi diei quarti aptè à nobis applicetur, quæque tutò ac certò apud Sapientes per Arithmeticæ *Symbolicæ* peritiam possit transmitti aut saltem conservari, quamdiu Historia *Literalis* maneat. Quid igitur reliquum est quàm ut concludamus rem ita planè se habere quemadmodum nos statuimus?

Et certè tandem ista omnia de *Abrahamo* largiri videtur *Andreades*. Sed hanc postremò difficultatem movet, Quamquam scilicet *Abrahamus*, insignis Mathematicus, Historiam Creationis Numerorum Mysteriis involutam tradidit posteritati, non tamen probabile esse Moſen, qualem à Majoribus acceperat, in literas retulisse. Quippe quòd, quæ is scripsit, *δεσπασμένα* fuerunt, non *παρεσπασμένα*, alioqui divinitati narrationem ejus non parum derogaret. Sed breviter respondeo: Quæ scripsit & *παρεσπασμένα* esse posse & simul *δεσπασμένα*, nempe ea à Deo primitus tradita & in manibus postea Familiæ Dei custodita, posteritati per singula secula ad Moſen usque potuisse transmitti, & confirmari denud pleniusque illustrari in colloquiis suis cum Deo facie ad faciem, in monte *Sinai*. Tam parum derogatur divinitati Narrationum ejus quantum ad Myſteria Creationis. Ut omittam, cum jam concessum sit *Abrahamum* Creationis *Cabbalam* Numeris *Symbolicis* involvisse; cumque sit manifestum ipsos Numeros dierum Creationis vim habere *Symbolicam*, talèque quæ Physiologiæ *Abrahamicæ* apprimè conveniat; valdè torpidæ & imperitæ incredulitatis videri, si quis magnopere dubitet an hæc illa ipsa *Cabbala* sit, quæ olim tradita sit *Abrahamo*, quàmque *Abrahamus* posteris suis tradiderit. Sic ex omnibus difficultatibus circa hanc rem quas copiosa & inundans *Andreadæ* eruditio nobis offudit, quibûsque nos obruere voluit, tuti tandem eluctati sumus, & quasi enatavimus incolumes.

Unicum hoc eminens exemplum proferre contentus ero, Numerum scilicet *Bestiæ* 666. Hunc in locum sic scribit *Andreades*, pag. 81. *Ausim asserere, inquit, nullum dari in tota Scriptura exemplum, ubi Numerus (extra respectum Typicum (e.g. in Jonæ triduo, Matth. 12. 40 significante triduum mortis Christi) & Chronologicum) ad personam aut rem significandam adhibeatur.* Quàm autem temerè hoc dixerit videre est ex suprà allatis, ubi viginti plùs minùs exempla produxi, possimque plura si opus esset superaddere. Reliqua quæ in hunc locum adhibet, inepti cujusdam sunt apud veteres Patres, & affectati Numerorum *Symbolicorum* abusûs exempla. Ad quæ hoc tantum respondeo, quanto ineptius illi in *Myſtico* Numerorum usu versati sunt, tanto credibilius esse, traditionem de Numerorum usu *Myſtico* & *Symbolico* esse firmam & solidam in genere. Alioqui, cum ipsi eas ad res adeò inhabili essent & infœlici ingenio, haud tantopere isti studio indulſissent. Quid autem hæc faciant contra cautum castumque Numerorum *Myſticorum* usum, qualem nostrum esse contendo, equidem non video.


Sect. 3. Ut suas ineptias ei admiscuerint. Hinc consequi ait S. A. *Omne illud à conversatione istorum Philosophorum cum Aegyptiis aut Judæis petatum argumentum infirmum esse pro veritate hujus Cabbalæ stabilienda.* Respondeo autem me *Andreaden* observare in suo *Examine* eàdem fere

femper errare chordâ, & aut datâ operâ aut inscien-
ter, vim ac ner-
vos nostræ *Cabbale* ejusque Defensionis, prætervolare. Neque enim
in hoc consistit vis meæ Interpretationis, quod pag. 71. S. A. tan-
quam meum convellit; viz. Plato & Pythagoras *quadam immo multa*
& *præcipua à Mose & Judæis hauserunt. Idem hæc & hæc quoque tra-*
diderunt. Ergo Mosaica sunt, quibus sententia Mosis tutò exponi potest.
Equidem absurda hæc est mancæque Ratiocinatio, quam festiviter
ac lepidè Theologiæ juvenis Professor ex proprio cerebro per deridi-
culum efformat. Dum vero agnoscit S. A. *Platonem ac Pythagoram*
multa eaque præclara à *Mose Judæisque* accepisse, (quamvis nugas
postea & quisquilias admiscere potuerint,) cùmque præclara illa dog-
mata, quæ *Pythagoram Platonemque* tenuisse constat, manifestum sit,
mirificâ congruitate tum *Rerum*, tum *Numerorum* cum *Textu Mosaico*
Mysticè exposito, consentire, indè quidem, nec temerè profectò, con-
cludimus, ea ipsa dogmata sive *Platonica* sive *Pythagorica*, quæ tanti
momenti sunt, quæque tam aptè congruentèrque *Textui Mosaico* ap-
plicari possunt, fuisse primitus *Mosaica*, & à *Mosis* successoribus ad
Græcos fuisse derivata.

THE

THE INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENCE.

1. Diodorus his mistake concerning Moses, and other Law-givers, that have professed themselves to have received their Laws from either God, or some good Angel. 2. Reasons why Moses began his History with the Creation of the World. 3. The Sun and Moon the same with the Egyptians Osiris and Isis, and how they came to be worshipped for Gods. 4. The Apotheosis of mortal men, such as Bacchus and Ceres, how it first came into the world. 5. That the Letter of the Scripture speaks ordinarily in Philosophical things, according to the sense and imagination of the Vulgar. 6. That there is a Philosophical sense that lies hid in the Letter of the Three first Chapters of Genesis. 7. That there is a Moral or Mystical sense, not only in these three Chapters, but in several other places of the Scripture.

1.  OT to stay you with too tedious a Prologue to the matter in hand, concerning the Author of this Book of Genesis, to wit, Moses; I shall look upon him mainly in reference to that publick induement, in which, at the very first sight, he will appear admirable, viz. as a Politician or a Law-giver. In which his skill was so great, that, even in the judgment of Heathen Writers, he had the preheminance above all the rest. Diodorus has placed him in the head of his Catalogue of the most famous Law-givers, under the name of Μωϋσῆς, if * Justin Martyr be not mistaken; or if he be, at least he bears them company that are reputed the best, reserv'd for the last and most notable Instance of those that entituled their Laws divine, and made themselves Spokes-men betwixt God and the People. This Mneves is said to receive his Laws from Mercury; as Minos, from Jupiter; Lycurgus, from Apollo; Zathraustes, from his ἀγαθὸς δαίμων, his good Genius; Zamolxis, from Vesta; and Moses, from Iao; that is, Jehovah. παρὰ ὃ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις Μωϋσῆν τὸν Ἰαὼ ἐπικαλέμενον θεόν. But he speaks like a mere Historian in the business. προσποιήσασθαι is the word which he boldly abuses, to the diminution of all their Authorities promiscuously. For he says, they feigned they received Laws from these Deities; and adds the reason of it too, but like an arrant Statesman, or an incredulous Philosopher, εἴτε θανμάσθην καὶ θεῶν

ὅπως ἐννοίαν κείνης τὴν μέλλουσαν ἀφελήσθαι ἀνθρώπων πλῆθος· ἤτε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπερ-
 χλὴ καὶ δυνάμιν ἧς εὐρεῖν λεγομένων τὰς νόμους, ἀπεβλέψατο τὸν ὄχλον, μᾶλλον ὑπακούσασθαι,
 διαλαβόντας. *Whether it be, says he, that they judged it an admirable and*
plainly divine Project, that redounded unto the profit of a multitude; or
whether they conceived that hereby the People, looking upon the greatness and
supereminence of their Law-givers, would be more obedient to their Laws.
 That saying in the Schools is not so trivial as true, *Quicquid recipitur,*
recipitur ad modum recipientis, Every thing is as it is taken, or at least
 appears to be so. The Tincture of our own Nature stains the ap-
 pearance of all Objects. So that I wonder not that *Diodorus Siculus,*
 a man of a mere political Spirit, (as it is very plain how near History
 and Policy are a-kin) should count the receiving of Laws from some
 Deity, rather a piece of prudential and political forgery, than reality
 and truth.

But to leave *Diodorus* to his *Ethnicism*, and *Incredulity*; as for us
 that ought to believe Scripture, if we will not gainsay the Authority
 of the Greek Text, we shall not only be fully persuaded of *Moses* his
 receiving of Laws from God's own mouth, but have some hints to
 believe, that something Analogical to it may come to pass in other
 Law-givers. *Deut. 32. Ὅτε διμέλειεν ὁ Ὑψίστος ἔθνη, &c. When the most*
High divided the Nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the
bounds of the Nations according to the Number of the Angels of God; but
Jacob was the portion of Jehovah, that is, Iao, &c. So that it is not im-
 probable, but that as the great Angel of the Covenant, (he whom
Philo calls τῶν ἀγγέλων πρεσβύτατον, τὸν ἀρχάγγελον, λόγον, ἀρχὴν, ὄνομα θεῶν, that
 is, the Eldest of the Angels, the Archangel, the Word, the Beginning, the
 Name of God, which is *Jehovah*) I say, that as he gave Laws to his
 charge, so the *Tutelar Angels* of other Nations might be the Instructors
 of those that they raised up to be Law-givers to their charge: Though
 in Process of Time, the Nations that were at first under the Govern-
 ment of good Angels, by their lewdness and disobedience, might
 make themselves obnoxious to the power and delusion of those ἀπατε-
 ῶνες δαίμονες, as they are called, *deceitful and tyrannical Devils.* But this
 is but a digression; That which I would briefly have intimated is this,
 That *Moses*, the great Lawgiver of the Jews, was a man instructed of
 God himself to Prudence and true Policy. And therefore I make
 account, if we will but with diligence search, we may surely find the
 foot-steps of unsophisticate Policy, in all the passages of the whole
Pentateuch.

2. And here in the very entrance it will offer it self unto our
 view: Where *Moses* shews himself such, as that noble Spirit of *Plato*
 desires all Governours of Commonwealths should be, who has, in his
 Epistle to *Dion*, and his Friends, foretold, that mankind will never
 cease to be miserable, till such time as either true and right Philoso-
 phers rule in the Commonwealth; or those that do rule, apply them-
 selves to true and sound Philosophy. And what is *Moses* his *Bereishith*,
 but a fair invitation thereto; it comprehending at least the whole
 fabrick of Nature, and conspicuous furniture of the visible World?
 As if he dare appeal unto the whole Assembly of God's Creation; to
 the Voice of the great Universe, if what he propounds to his people,
 over

over whom God hath set him, be not righteous and true; and that by acting according to his Precepts, they would but approve themselves *Cosmopolita's*, true *Citizens of the world*, and *Loyal Subjects to God and Nature*. It is *Philo's* interpretation upon the place; which, how true it is in *Moses* veiled, I will not here dispute; that it is most true in *Moses* unveiled, Christ our Lord, is true without all dispute and controversy. But to return to *Moses*.

Another reason no less considerable, why that holy and wise Law-giver, *Moses*, should begin with the Creation of the world, is this: The Laws and Ordinances which he gave to the *Israelites*, were given by him as *θεοπαιδιστα*, as *Statutes received from God*. And therefore the great argument and incitement to Obedience, should lie in this first and highest Law-giver, God himself, the great *Jehovah*, whose *Wisdom*, *Power*, and *Goodness*, could not better be set out, than by ascribing the Creation of the whole visible world unto him. So that for his *Power* he might be feared, admired for his *Wisdom*, and finally, for his *Goodness* be loved, adored, and deify'd: That as he was truly in himself the most High God, so he should be acknowledged of the people to be so.

For certainly there is nothing that doth so win away, nay, ravish, or carry captive the minds of poor mankind, as *Bounty* and *Munificence*; all men loving themselves most affectionately, and most of all the meanest and basest spirits, whose Souls are so far from being a little rais'd and releas'd from themselves, that they do impotently and impetuously cleave and cling to their dear carcasses. Hence have they, out of the strong relish and favour of the pleasures and conveniencies thereof, made no scruple of honouring them for Gods, who have by their industry, or by good luck, produced any thing that might conduce for the improvement of the happiness and comfort of the Body.

3. From hence it is that the *Sun* and *Moon* have been accounted for the two prime Deities, by Idolatrous Antiquity, viz. from that sensible good they conferred upon hungry mankind: The one watering as it were the Earth, by her humid influence; the other ripening the fruit of the ground, by his warm rays and opening daily all the hid treasures of the visible world, by his glorious approach; pleasing the sight with the variety of Nature's objects, and chearing the whole body by his comfortable heat. To these, as to the most conspicuous Benefactors to mankind, was the name *θεοι* given, *θεοὶ τὸ διὰ*, because they observed, that these conceived Deities were in perpetual motion.

These two are the *Egyptians* *Osiris* and *Isis*, and *Five* more added to them, as very sensible Benefactors, but subordinate to these two, and Dependents on them. And in plain speech they are these, *Fire*, *Spirit*, *Humidity*, *Siccity*, and *Air*; but in their divine Titles, *Vulcan*, *Jupiter*, *Oceanus*, *Ceres*, and *Minerva*. These are the *οἱ ἀίδιον γενεαν ἔχοντες θεοι*, as * *Diodorus* speaks.

4. But after these, mortal men were canoniz'd for immortal Deities, *διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν*, for their *prudence and benefaction*; as you may see at large in *Diodorus Siculus*. I will name but two
for

* Bibliothec.
Hisor. lib. 1.
pag. 8.

for instance, *Bacchus* and *Ceres*; the one, the Inventor of *Corn*; the other, of *Wine* and *Beer*. So that all may be resolved into that brutish Aphorism,

Τὸ γὰρ τρέφον ἡμᾶς τὸ ἐξ ὧν οἰμαί δεόν.

That which could please or pleasure degenerate mankind in the Body, (they having lost the Image of God in their Souls, and become mere Brutes after a manner) that must be their God.

Wherefore it was necessary for *Moses*, having to deal with such Terrestrial Spirits, Sons of Sense and Corporeity, to propose to them *Jehovah*, as Maker of this Sensible and Corporeal world, that whatever sweet they suck out of the varieties thereof, they may attribute to him, as the first Fountain and Author, without whom neither they, nor any thing else, had been; that thereby they might be stirred up to praise his Name, and accomplish his Will, revealed by his servant *Moses* unto them. And this was true and sound Prudence, aiming at nothing but the Glory of God, and the Good of the poor ignorant people.

5. And from the same Head springs the manner of his delivering of the Creation; that is, accommodately to the apprehension of the meanest: not speaking of things according to their *very Essence* and *real Nature*, but according to their *Appearances to us*: not starting of high and intricate Questions, and concluding them by subtle Arguments, but familiarly and condescendingly setting out the Creation, according to the most easie and obvious conceits they themselves had of those things they saw in the world; omitting even those grosser things that lay hid in the bowels of the Earth, as Metals and Minerals, and the like, as well as those things that fall not at all under Sense, as those immaterial Substances, Angels or Intelligences. Thus fitly has the Wisdom and Goodness of God accommodated the outward *Cortex* of the Scripture to the most narrow and slow apprehension of the Vulgar.

Nor doth it therefore follow, that the Narration must be true, because it is according to the *appearance* of things to Sense and obvious Fancy; for there is also a *Truth of Appearance*, according to which Scripture most-what speaks in *Philosophical* matters.

And this Position is the main Key, as I conceive, and I hope shall hereafter plainly prove, whereby *Moses* his *Bereshith* may, according to the Outward and *Literal* sense, be understood without any difficulty, or clashing one part against another.

First therefore, I say, that it is a thing confessed by the Learned *Hebrews*, who make it a Rule for the understanding of many places of Scripture, * *Loquitur lex juxta linguam humanam*; That the Law speaks according to the language of the sons of men.

* R. Maimonid. More
Nevoch. part.
1. cap. 26.

And secondly, (which will come home more to the purpose) I shall instance in some places that of necessity are to be thus understood.

Gen. 19. 23. The Sun was risen upon the Earth when Lot entred into *Zoar*; which implies, that it was before under the Earth, which is true only according to Sense and vulgar Fancy.

Deute-

Deuteronom. 30. v. 4. קצה השמים or ἀκρον τῆς γῆνός, implies that the Earth is bounded at certain places, as if there were truly an *Hercules Pillar*, or *Non plus ultra*: As it is manifest to them that understand but the natural signification of קצה and ἀκρον; for those words plainly import the Earth bounded by the blue Heavens, and the Heavens bounded by the *Horizon* of the Earth, they touching one another mutually: which is true only to *Sense* and in appearance, as any man, that is not a mere Idiot, will confess.

Ecclesiastic. 27. v. 12. The discourse of a godly man is always with wisdom, but a fool changeth as the Moon. This is to be understood according to *Sense* and *Appearance*: For if a fool changeth no more than the Moon doth really, he is a wise and excellently accomplish'd man; *Semper idem*, though to the sight of the Vulgar different. For at least an Hemisphere of the Moon is always enlightened, and even then most when she least appears unto us.

Hitherto may be referred also that, *2 Chron. 4. 2.* Also he made a molten Sea, ten cubits from brim to brim, round in compass, and five cubits the height thereof, and a line of thirty cubits did compass it round about. A thing plainly impossible that the Diameter should be ten Cubits, and the Circumference but thirty. But it pleaseth the Spirit of God here to speak according to the common use and opinion of men, and not according to the subtilty of *Archimedes* his Demonstration.

Again *Psalms 19.* In them hath he set a Tabernacle for the Sun, which as a Bridegroom cometh out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run his race. This, as *Mr. John Calvin* observes, is spoken according to the rude apprehension of the Vulgar, whom *David* should in vain have endeavoured to teach the mysteries of *Astronomy*: And therefore he makes no mention of the course of the Sun in the nocturnal Hemisphere.

Add to these *Joshua 10. v. 12.* Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou Moon in the Valley of Ajalon; where it is manifest, that *Joshua* speaks not according to the *Astronomical truth* of the thing, but according to *Sense* and *Appearance*. For suppose the Sun placed, and the Moon, at the best advantage you can, so that they leave not their natural course, they were so far from being one over *Ajalon*, and the other over *Gibeon*, that they were, in very truth, many hundreds of miles distant from them. And if the Sun and Moon were on the other side of the *Aequator*, the distance might amount to thousands.

Lastly, (and than which nothing is more considerable,) The Letter of the Scripture bounds the Extent of the World no higher than the Clouds, or thereabout; as is very apparent,

First, because the Clouds are made the place of God's abode; whence we are to suppose them plac'd with the highest. There he lives, and runs, and rides, and walks. He came walking upon the wings of the wind, in the 104th Psalm. Who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters; who maketh the Clouds his chariot, and walketh on the wings of the wind: Laieth the beams of His chambers in the waters, to wit, the

the *Upper waters*, which are the *Clouds*. The Almighty's lodgings therefore, according to the letter, are placed in the *Clouds*. ~~There~~

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the same height, that which is exceeding high, the mercy and truth of God.

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league and confederacy with Jabin. This Jael was in shew so courteous as to meet Sisera, and invite him into her Tent, saying, Turn in, my Lord, turn in to me, fear not. And when he had turned in unto her into the Tent, she covered him with a mantle. And he said unto her, Give me, I pray thee, a little water to drink: And she opened a bottle of Milk, and gave him drink, and covered him. In short, he trusted her with his life, and gave himself to her protection, and she suddenly, so soon as he fell asleep, drove a nail with an hammer into his temples, and betray'd his Corps to the will of his Enemies.* An Act certainly that the Spirit of God would not have approved, much less applauded so much, but in reference to the Mystery that lies under it.

My three Rules for the interpreting of Scripture I have, I hope, by this time, sufficiently established, by way of a more general preparation to the Defence of my threefold Cabbala. I shall now apply my self to a more particular clearing and confirming the several passages therein.

SCHOLIA

In Introduct. Sect. 1.

SUB nomine. Μυσῆος, nisi quod fortè ea in re erraverit Justinus Martyr, &c. Just. Mart. Protreptic. ad Græcos. Μωσὴν ἀνδρα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέγαν, καὶ τῷ βίῳ ἱκανότατον. Quod apud Diodorum sic est: Μωσὴν ἀνδρα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέγαν καὶ τῷ βίῳ κεινέτατον. *Diodor. Sicul. Bibliothec. Histor. lib. 1. pag. 59.

Sect. 7. Hæc autem omnia Typicè eveniebant eis, &c. Sic vertit Beza, ex M. S. credo, cujus meminit Hugo Grotius, ubi pro τύποι habetur τυπικῶς. Quem locum sic exponit doctissimus Grotius; Erant quæ ipsis evenère, præfigurationes, rudia lineamenta. Nam in omnibus actionibus præsci seculi Deus semper ob oculos habebat tempora Messiæ, in quibus non Vaticinia tantum sed & Figure omnes implerentur. Et interpretes profectò plerique omnes hac in re cum Grotio consentiunt. Per τύπος verò hîc si nuda tantum exempla intelligis, frigida erit ac jejuna interpretatio, & quæ mentem Pauli nequaquam plenè assequitur, qui Petram v. 4. non exemplum Christi sed Typum proculdubio facit, Mysticum sensum subesse innuens. Quapropter Petram Spiritualem vocat, id est, Mysticam. Ut Civitas illa in Apocalypsi, cap. 11. πνευματικῆς, Spiritualiter dicitur, Sodoma & Ægyptus. Nempe Sodoma & Ægyptus sensu Mystico Civitatem illam denotant, ut Petra Christum.

THE

T H E D E F E N C E T O T H E Literal Cabbala.

C H A P. I.

1. *The genuine sense of In the Beginning. The difference of עשה ברא neglected by the Seventy, who translate ברא only ἐποίησεν. 2. The ground of their mistake discovered, who conceive Moses to intimate, that the Matter is uncreated. That רוח אלהים is no more than ventus magnus. 4, 5. That the first Darkness was not properly Night. 6. Why the Seventy translate רקיע Firmamentum, and that it is in allusion to a firmly pitch'd Tent. 11. That the sensible Effects of the Sun invited the Heathen to Idolatry, and that their Oracles taught them to call him by the name of Jao. 14. That the Prophet Jeremy divides the day from the Sun, speaking according to the vulgar capacity. 15. The Reason why the Stars appear on this side the upper ceruleous Sea. 27. The Opinion of the Anthropomorphites, and of what great consequence it is for the Vulgar to imagine God in the shape of a man. Aristophanes his story in Plato of Men and Womens growing together at first, as if they made both but one Animal.*

THE first Rule that I laid down in my *Introduction to the Defence of my Threefold Cabbala*, I need not here again repeat, but desire the Reader only to carry it in mind, and will warrant the easie and familiar sense that I shall settle upon Moses his Text, in the *Literal* meaning thereof. Unto which, if I add also reasons from the pious prudence of this holy Law-giver, shewing how every passage makes for greater Faith in God, and more affectionate Obedience to his Law, there will be nothing wanting, I think, (though I shall sometimes cast in some notable advantages from *Critical Learning*) that may gain belief to the truth of the Interpretation.

Vers. 1. In this first verse I put no other sense of *In the Beginning*, than that it denotes to us the order of the History. Which is also the opinion of *Maimonides*, who deriving ראשית from ראש signifying the-Head, rightly observes the Analogy; that as the Head is the fore-part of a living creature, so ראשית signifies that which is placed first

in any thing else: and that thus the Creation of the world is the Head or Forepart of the History that *Moses* intends to set down.

Wherefore *Moses* having in his mind (as is plain from the Title of this Book, *Genesis*, as well as the matter therein contained) to write an History and Genealogy from the Beginning of the world to his own time, it is very easy and obvious to conceive, that, in reference to what he should after add, he said, *In the Beginning*; as if the whole frame of his thoughts lay thus. First of all, God made the Heavens and the Earth with all that they contain, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, the Day and Night, the Plants, and living Creatures that were in the Air, Water, and on the Earth; and after all these he made *Adam*, and *Adam* begot *Cain* and *Abel*, and so on in the full continuance of the History and Genealogies.

And this sense I conceive more easy and natural than that of *Austin*, *Ambrose*, and *Basil*, who will have, *In the Beginning*, to signify, *In the Beginning of Time*, or, *In the Beginning of the World*. And yet I thought it not amiss to name also these, that the Reader may take his choice.

Manass. Ben.
Israel de Cre-
atione, Pro-
blem. 4.
sect. 5.

God made Heaven and Earth. *Maimonides* and *Manasseh Ben Israel* observe these three words used in Scripture, when Creation of the world is attributed to God, viz. *ברא*, *עשה*, *קנה*; and that *ברא* signifies the production of things out of nothing, which is the Schools Notion of Creation; *עשה* is the making up a thing perfect and compleat, according to its own kind and properties; *קנה* intimates the dominion and right possession that God has of all things thus created or made. But though *ברא* according to the mind of the Learned Jews, signifies Creation properly so called; yet the Seventy observe no such Criticism, but translate it *ποίησεν*, which is no more than made. And vulgar men are not at leisure to distinguish so subtilly. Wherefore this latter sense I receive as the vulgar Literal sense, the other as Philosophical. And where I use the word Creation in this Literal Cabbala, I understand but that common and general Notion of Making a thing, be it with what circumstances it will.

Neither do I translate *אלהים* in the plural number, the Trinity; because, as *Vatablus* observes out of the Hebrew Doctors, that when the inferiour speaks of his superiour, he speaks of him in the Plural Number. So *Esay* 19. 4. *Tradam Egyptum in manum dominorum duri*; and *Exod.* 22. 10. *Et accipiet domini ejus*, for *dominus*. The Text therefore necessarily requiring no such sense, and the mystery being so abstruse, it is rightly left out in this Literal Cabbala.

Vers. 2. In the first verse there was a summary Proposal of the whole Creation in those two main parts of it, *Heaven* and *Earth*. Now he begins the particular prosecution of each day's work. But it is not needful for him here again to inculcate the making of the Earth: For it is the last word he spake in his general Proposal, and therefore it had been harsh or needless to have repeated it presently again. And that's the reason why before the making of the Earth there is not prefixed, *And the Lord said, Let there be an Earth*. Which I conceive has imposed upon the ignorance and inconsiderateness of some, so as to make them believe, that this confused muddy heap, which is called the Earth, was an Eternal First Matter, independent of God, and

and never created by him: Which, if a man appeal to his own Faculties, is impossible, as I shall again intimate, when I come to the *Philosophick Cabbala*.

The sense therefore is, That the *Earth* was made first, which was covered with *Water*, and on the *Water* was the *Wind*, and in all this a thick *Darkness*. And God was in this dark, windy, and wet Night. So that this Globe of *Earth*, and *Water*, and *Wind*, was but one dark Tempest and Sea-storm, a Night of Confusion and tumultuous Agitation. For רוח אלהים is not in the *Letter* any thing more than *Ventus ingens, A great and mighty wind*; as the *Cedars of God*, and *Mountains of God*, are tall *Cedars*, great *Mountains*, and so in Analogy, the *Wind of God*, a great *Wind*.

Vers. 3. But in the midst of this tempestuous darkness, God intending to fall to his work, doth as it were light his Lamp, or set up himself a Candle and Lanthorn in this dark Shop. And whatever hitherto hath been mentioned, are words that strike the Fancy and Sense strongly, and are of easy perception to the rude people, whom every dark and stormy Night may well remind of the sad face of things, till God commanded the comfortable Day to spring forth, the sole Author of Light, that so pleases the eyes, and cheers the spirits of Man.

And that *Day-light* is a thing independent of the *Sun*, as well as the *Night of the Stars*, is a conceit wondrous suitable to the imaginations of the Vulgar, as I have my self found out by conversing with them. They are also prone to think, unless there be a sensible wind stirring, that there is nothing betwixt the Earth and the Clouds, but that it is a mere vacuity. Wherefore I have not translated רוח אלהים the *Air*, as *Maimonides* somewhere does, but a *mighty wind*, for that the rude people are sensible of; and making the first deformed face of things so dismal and tempestuous, it will cause them to remember the first Morning light with more thankfulness and devotion.

Vers. 4. For it is a thing very visible. See what is said upon the eighth verse.

Vers. 5. By *Evening and Morning* is meant the *Artificial Day* and the *Artificial Night*, by a Synecdoche, as *Castellio* in his Notes tells us. Therefore this *Artificial Day* and *Night* put together make one Νυχθημερον, or *Natural Day*. And the *Evening* is put before the *Morning*, *Night* before *Day*, because *Darkness* is before *Light*. But that *Primitive Darkness* was not properly *Night*: For *Night* is μία μεγάλη σκιά, as *Aristotle* describes it, one great Shadow cast from the Earth, which implies *Light* of one side thereof. And therefore *Night* properly so called could not be before *Light*. But the illiterate people trouble themselves with no such curiosities, nor easily conceive any such difference betwixt that determinate *Conical* shadow of the Earth, which is *Night*, and that infinite *Primitive Darkness*, that had no bounds before there was any *Light*. And therefore that same *Darkness* prefixed to an *Artificial Day*, makes up one *Natural Day* to them: Which *Hesiod* also swallows down without chewing, whether following his own fancy, or this Text of *Moses*, I know not.

ΝΥΚΤΟΣ δ' αὐτ' αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἡμέρα ἐξέγενοντο.

That is,

But of the Night both Day and Sky were born.

Introduç.
sect. 5.

Eſay 40. 22.

Lib. 1. cap. 7.

Verſ. 6. This Baſis or Floor. That the Earth ſeems like a round Floor, plain and running out ſo every way as to join with the bottom of the Heavens, I have in my *Introduction* hinted to you already; and that it is look'd upon as ſuch in the phraſe of Scripture, accommodating it ſelf to our outward Senſes and vulgar conceit. Upon this Floor ſtands the hollow Firmament, as a Tent pitched upon the ground; which is the very expreſſion of the Prophet *Eſay*, deſcribing the Power of God, *That ſtretcheth out the Heavens like a Curtain, and ſpreadeth them out as a Tent to dwell in.* And the word רקיע, which is uſually rendered Firmament, ſignifies diduction, expansion, or ſpreading out. But how the Seventy come to interpret it σπένωμα, Firmamentum, Fuller, in his *Miſcellanies*, gives a very ingenious reaſon, and ſuch as makes very much to our purpoſe. *Nam Cælum ſeu רקיע* (ſaith he) *quandoquidem Tentorio ſepiſſime in Sacris literis aſſimilatur, πῆγνυται dicitur, quatenus expanditur. Sic enim expandi ſolent Tentoria, cū alligatis ad paxillos in terram depaſctos funibus diſtenduntur, atque hoc etiam paſcto firman- tur. Itaque הרקיע immenſum quoddam, ut ita dicam, πῆγμα, ideòque σπένωμα non ineptè appelletur.* The ſenſe of which in brief is nothing but this, *That the Seventy tranſlate רקיע σπένωμα, that is, Firmamentum, becauſe the Heavens are ſpread out like a well-ſaſtned and firmly-pitched Tent.* And I add alſo, that they are ſo ſtiſly ſtretched, that they will ſtrongly bear againſt the weight of the Upper waters; ſo that they are not able to break them down, and therewith to drown the world. Which conceit, as it is eaſy and agreeable with the Fancy of the people, ſo it is ſo far from doing them any hurt, that it will make them more ſenſible of the Divine Power and Providence, who thus by main force keeps off a Sea of water that hangs over their heads, which they diſcern through the transparent Firmament, (for it looks blue as other Seas do) and would ruſh at once upon them, and drown them, did not the Power of God, and the ſtrength of the Firmament, hold it off.

Sect. 5.

Verſ. 7. See what hath been already ſaid upon the ſixth verſe. I will only here add, That the nearneſs of theſe Upper waters makes them ſtill the more formidable, and ſo they are greater ſpurs to devotion: For as they are brought ſo near as to touch the Earth at the bottom, ſo outward Senſe ſtill being Judge, they are to be within a ſmall diſtance of the Clouds at the top. And that theſe Upper waters are no higher than ſo, it is manifeſt from other paſſages in Scripture, that place the habitation of God but amongſt the Clouds, who yet is called the moſt High, *Pſalm 104. 3. Deut. 33. 26. Nahum 1. 3. Pſalm 68. 4.* But of this I have treated ſo fully in my *Introduction*, that I hold it needleſs to add any thing more.

Verſ. 8. I cannot ſay properly that God ſaw it was good. In the whole ſtory of the Three firſt Chapters, it is evident, that God is repreſented in the perſon of a Man, ſpeaking with a mouth, and ſeeing with eyes.

eyes. Hence it is that, the *Firmament* being of it self *invisible*, *Moses* omits the saying, that *God saw it was good*: For the nature of the Eye is only to see things visible.

Some say, God made *Hell* the second day, and that that is the reason it was not recorded, that *he saw it was good*. But if he did not approve of it as good, why did he make it? However, that can be none of the *Literal* sense, and so impertinent to this present *Cabbala*.

Vers. 10. And I may now properly say, &c. See what hath been said already upon verse the eighth.

Vers. 11. Whence you may easily discern, &c. This Observation is *Philo* the Jew's, which you may read at large in his *περὶ Κοσμοποιίας*. And it was very fit for *Moses*, who in his Law, which he received from God, does so much insist upon *Temporal* Blessings, and eating of the good things of the Land, as a reward of their obedience, to lay down such Principles as should beget a firm belief of the absolute power of God over Nature; That he could give them rain and fruitful seasons, and a plentiful year when he pleased; whereas he could cause the Earth to bring forth without rain, or any thing else to further her Births, as he did at the first Creation. The Meditation whereof might well cause such an holy resolution as that in the Prophet *Habakkuk*, *Although the fig-tree shall not blossom, neither fruit* Chap. 3. 17. *be in the Vines, the labour of the Olive fail, and the fields yield no meat; yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.* But that prudent and pious caution of *Moses* against Idolatry, how requisite it was, is plain, if we consider that the power of the Sun is so manifest, and his operation so sensible upon the Earth for the production of things below, especially of Plants, that he hath generally drawn aside the rude and simple Heathens to idolize him for a God: And their nimble Oracles have snatched away the sacred Name of the God of *Israel*, the true God, to bestow upon him, calling him *Jao*, *Saturnal. lib.* which is *Jehovah*; as is plain from that *Clarian* Oracle in *Macrobius*. 1. cap. 18.

Φεῖξο τὸν πάντων ὕπατον θεὸν ἑμμεν' Ἰαῶ,
Χείμαλι μὲν τ' Αἰδῶ, Δία δ' εἰαροῦ ἀρχομένοιο,
Ἡέλιον δ' ἑρῶς, μελοπῶρε δ' ἄβρην Ἰαῶ.

Which I have translated thus in my Poems:

That Heavenly Power which *Iao* hight,
The high'st of all the Gods thou may'st declare,
In Spring nam'd *Zeus*, in Summer *Helios* bright,
In Autumn call'd *Jao*, *Aides* in brumal night.

These names do plainly denote the Sun,
In Spring call'd *Zeus*, from life or kindly heat;
In Winter, 'cause the day's so quickly done,
He *Aides* hight, he is not long in sight;
In Summer, 'cause he strongly doth us smite
With his hot darts, then *Helios* we him name,
From *Eloim* or *Eloah* so hight;
In Autumn *Jao*, *Jehovah* is the same:
So is the word depriv'd by an uncertain fame.

This

This Oracle *Cornelius Labeo* interprets of *Bacchus*, which is the same with the *Sun*, who is the God of the Vintage, and is here described according to the four Quarters of the year.

And so *Virgil*, Heathen-like, attributes to the *Sun* and *Moon*, under the name of *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, that great blessing of Corn and Grain.

————— *Vestro si numine Tellus*
Chaoniam pingui glandem mutavit arista.

If by your providence the Earth has born,
For course *Chaonian* Acorns, full-ear'd Corn.

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Vers. 15. *In the hollow roof*, &c. Though the ceruleous upper Sea seems so near us, as I have already signified, yet the Lights of Heaven seem something on this side it, as white will stand off drawn upon a darker colour; as you may see in the describing solid Figures on a blue slate, they will more easily rise to your eye, than black upon white: so that the people may very well, consulting with their sight, imagine the *Firmament* to be betwixt the Lights of Heaven and the upper Waters, or that blue Sea they look upon, not on this side, nor properly betwixt the Lights or Stars.

Vers. 16. *Two great Lights*, &c. This is in counter-distinction to the Stars, which indeed seem much less to our sight than the *Sun* or *Moon*; whenas notwithstanding many Stars, according to Astronomers computation, are bigger than the Sun, all far bigger than the Moon. So that it is plain, the Scripture speaks sometimes according to the appearance of things to our sight, not according to their absolute affections and properties. And he that will not here yield this for a truth, is, I think, justly to be suspected of more Ignorance than Religion, and of more Superstition than Reason.

For their smallness, &c. The Stars indeed seem very small to our sight, and therefore *Moses* seems to cast them in by the by, complying therein with the ignorance of the unlearned. But *Astronomers*, who have made it their business to understand their magnitudes; they that make the most frugal computation concerning the bigger Stars, pronounce them no less than sixty eight times bigger than the Earth, others much more.

Vers. 18. *To be peculiar garnishings*. See *vers.* 14.

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Verf. 20. Fish and Fowl. I suppose the mention of the *Fowl* is made here with the *Fish*, by reason that the greatest and more eminent sorts of that kind of creature most of all frequent the waters; as Swans, Geese, Ducks, Herons, and the like.

Verf. 27. In his own shape. It was the opinion of the *Anthropomorphites*, That God had all the parts of a Man, and that we are in this sense made according to his Image: Which, though it be an opinion in it self, if not rightly understood, vain and ridiculous; yet theirs seem little better to me that imagine God a *Finite* Being, and take care to place him out of the stink of this terrestrial Globe, that he may sit *καθὰς ἐν καθάρῳ χώρῳ*, and so confine him to Heaven, as *Aristotle* seems to do, if he be the Author of that Book, *De Mundo*: For it is a contradiction to the very *Idea* of God to be *Finite*, and consequently to have *Figure* or *Parts*. But it is so difficult a thing for the rude multitude to venture at a Notion of a Being *Immaterial* and *Infinite*, that it seems their advantage to conceive of God as of some all-powerful Person, that can do whatever he pleaseth, can make Heavens and Earths, and bestow his blessings in what measure and manner he lists; and (what is chief of all) if need be, can personally appear to them, can chide them, and rebuke them, and, if they be obstinate, do horrible vengeance upon them. This, I say, will more strongly strike the inward Sense and Imagination of the vulgar, than *Omnipotency* placed in a *Thin, Subtile, Invisible, Immaterial* Being, of which they can have no perception at all, nor any tolerable conceit.

Wherefore it being requisite for the ignorant, to be permitted to have some *Finite* and *Figurate* apprehension of God, what can be more fit than the *Shape* of a Man, in the highest excellencies that it is capable of, for *Beauty, Strength, and Bigness*? And the Prophet *Esay* Chap. 40. 22. seems to speak of God after this Notion, *God sits upon the Circle of the Earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as Grasshoppers*; intimating, that men to God bear as little proportion as Grasshoppers to a man when he sits on the grass amongst them. And now there being this necessity of permitting the people some such like apprehensions as this concerning God, (and it is true Prudence and pious Policy to comply with their weakness for their good) there were the most strict injunctions laid upon them against *Idolatry*, and worshiping of Images that might be.

But if any one will say, this was the next way to bring them into *Idolatry*, to let them entertain a conceit of God as in *Humane* shape; I say, it is not any more than by acknowledging Man to be God, as our Religion does, in *Christ*. Nay, I add moreover, that *Christ* is the true *Deus Figuratus*: and for his sake was it the more easily permitted unto the *Jews* to think of God in the shape of a Man.

And that there ought to be such a thing as *Christ*, that is, *God in Humane shape*, I think it most reasonable, that he may apparently visit the Earth, and to their very outward senses confound the *Atheist* and *misbeliever* at the last day. As he witnesseth of himself, *The John 5. 22. Father judges none, but he hath given all Judgment unto the Son*: And that *No man can see the Father but as he is united unto the Son*. For the *Eternal God* is *Immaterial* and *Invisible* to our outward Senses; but he hath

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But if any one will say, this was the next way to bring them into *Idolatry*, to let them entertain a conceit of God as in Humane shape; I say, it is not any more than by acknowledging Man to be God, as our Religion does, in Christ. Nay, I add moreover, that Christ is the true *Deus Figuratus*: and for his sake was it the more easily permitted unto the *Jews* to think of God in the shape of a Man.

And that there ought to be such a thing as *Christ*, that is, *God in Humane shape*, I think it most reasonable, that he may apparently visit the Earth, and to their very outward senses confound the Atheist and misbeliever at the last day. As he witnesseth of himself, *The Father judges none, but he hath given all Judgment unto the Son*: And that *No man can see the Father but as he is united unto the Son*. For the Chap. 6. 46. Eternal God is *Immaterial* and *Invisible* to our outward Senses; but he hath

hath thought good to treat with us, both in mercy and judgment, by a *Mediator* and *Vice-gerent*, that partakes of our nature as well as his own. Wherefore it is not at all absurd for *Moses* to suffer the *Jews* to conceive of God as in a corporeal and humane shape, since all men shall be judged by God in that shape at the last day.

He made Females as well as Males. That Story in *Plato* his *Symposion*, how men and women grew together at first till God cut them asunder, is a very probable argument, that the Philosopher had seen or heard something of this *Mosaical* History. But that it was his opinion it was so, I see no probability at all: For the story is told by that ridiculous Comedian *Aristophanes*, with whom I conceive he is in some sort quit, for abusing his good old Friend and Tutor *Socrates*, whom he brought in upon the stage ἀποκατῆντα, treading the Air in a basket, to make him a laughing-stock to all *Athens*.

The Text is indeed capable of such a sense; but there being no reason to put that sense upon it, neither being a thing so accommodate to the capacity and conceit of the vulgar, I thought it not fit to admit it, no not so much as into this *Literal Cabbala*.

Vers. 29. Frugiferous. *Castellio* translates it so, *Herbas frugiferas*, which must be such like Herbs as I have named, *Strawberries, Wheat, Rice*, and the like.

CHAP. II.

7. The notation of *וָאֵל* answerable to the breathing of *Adam's* Soul into his nostrils. 8. The exact situation of *Paradise*. That *Gihon* is part of *Euphrates*; *Pison*, *Phasis*, or *Phasi-tygris*. That the *Midianites* are called *Æthiopians*. That *Paradise* was seated about *Mesopotamia*, argued by six Reasons. That it was more particularly seated where now *Apamia* stands in *Ptolemy's* Maps. 18. The Prudence of *Moses* in the commendation of *Matrimony*. 19. Why *Adam* is not recorded to have given names to the *Fishes*. 24. *Abraham Ben Ezra's* conceit of the names of *Adam* and *Eve* as they are called *אִישׁ* and *אִשָּׁה*. 25. *Moses* his wife *Anthypophora* concerning the natural shame of nakedness.

IN the four first verses all is so clear and plain, that there is no need of any further Explication or Defence, saving that you may take notice, that in the second verse, where I write, *Within six days*, the *Seventies' Translation* will warrant it, who render it τῇ ἑκτῇ, on the sixth day.

Vers. 5. See what hath been said on the eleventh verse of the first Chapter.

Vers. 6. A mighty Torrent of Water. For the *Seventy* render *נָחַל*, πηγή, Fons. *Aquila*, ἐκφυγμός, Eruptio. And the ordinary Eruption of Springs out of the ground may be a popular assurance, that that Water that covered the face of the Earth, first broke out from hence, but was after driven into one place by the power of God, that there might be dry Land; and is imply'd here to be so very dry, that
the

the Omnipotence of God might be the more manifest, in making of *Adam* out of this dry Dust.

But this scope might be more compendiously reached, though *אֶרֶץ* were rendred *Vapour*; (as most do render it) if the Negative in the foregoing Verse might be repeated *אֶרֶץ לֹא-נִיבָה*, as R. Schadiah reads it, *Nec quisquam erat qui coleret terram, nec vapor ascendeat*, &c. To which sense R. D. K. gives his suffrage right willingly. See P. Fagius upon the place.

Verse 7. *The Dust*. The Hebrew word signifies so, and I make no mention of any moistning of it with water; for God is here set out acting according to his absolute Power and Omnipotency: And it is as easy to make men of dry dust as hard stones; and yet God is able even of stones to raise up Children unto Abraham. Matth. 3. 9.

Blew into the nostrils. Breathing is so palpable an effect of life, that the ancient rude Greeks also gave the Soul its name from that operation, calling it *ψυχή* from *ψύχω* to breath or to blow.

Verse 8. *Eastward of Judea*. For so Interpreters expound *Eastward* in Scripture, in reference to *Judea*.

To prevent any further trouble in making good the sense I have put upon the following verses concerning *Paradise*, I shall here at once set down what I find most probable concerning the situation thereof, out of *Vatablus*, and *Cornelius à Lapide*, adding also somewhat out of *Dionysius* the Geographical Poet. In general therefore we are led by the four Rivers to the right situation of *Paradise*. And *Gihon*, saith *Vatablus*, est tractus inferior *Euphratis* illabens in sinum *Persicum*, is a lower tract or stream of *Euphrates* that slides into the *Persian Gulph*. *Pison* is *Phasis* or *Phasi-tigris*, that runs through *Havilah*, a region near *Persis*; so that *Pison* is a branch of *Tigris*, as *Gihon* is of *Euphrates*: Thus *Vatablus*. And that *Gihon* may have his *Æthiopia*, *Cornelius à Lapide* notes, that the *Madianites*, and others near the *Persian Gulph*, are called *Æthiopians*; and therefore he concludes first at large, that *Paradise* was seated about *Mesopotamia* and *Armenia*, from these Reasons following.

First, Because these Regions are called *Eastern* in Scripture, (which, as I have said, is to be understood always in reference to *Judea*) according to the rule of Expositors. And the Lord is said to have planted this Garden of *Paradise* *Eastward*.

Secondly, Because Man being cast out of *Paradise*, these Regions were inhabited first, both before the Flood, (for *Cain* is said to inhabit *Eden*, Gen. 4. 16.) and also after the Flood, as being nearer *Paradise*, and more fertile, Gen. 8. 4. also 11. 2.

Thirdly, *Paradise* was in *Eden*, but *Eden* was near *Haran*; Ezek. 27. 23. *Haran*, and *Canneh*, and *Eden*: but *Haran* was about *Mesopotamia*, being a City of *Parthia*, where *Crassus* was slain; Authors call it *Charra*.

Fourthly, *Paradise* is where *Euphrates* and *Tigris* are. And these are in *Mesopotamia* and *Armenia*; They denominate *Mesopotamia*, it lying betwixt them.

Ὅσον δ' Εὐφράτη καὶ Τίγριδι ἐνδοδι γαῖα,
 Τὴν δὲ Περιχτίονες μέσσην ποταμῶν ἐπέπυσιν.

That is,

*The land 'twixt Tigris and Euphrates stream,
 All this Mesopotamia they name.*

Fifthly, Because these Regions are most fruitful and pleasant. And that *Adam* was made not far from thence, is not improbable from the excellency of that place, as well for the goodliness of the men that it breeds, as the fertility of the soil.

Τοίη δὲ καίνης ἀροσισ πῖλσι, ἐν μὲν αἴξιν
 Ποίην, ἐν δὲ νομάς εὐανθέας, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν
 Φύτλην, καλλίστην τε καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ὁμοίω.

That is,

*So excellent is that Soil for Herbage green,
 For flowry Meads, and such fair goodly Men,
 As if the off-spring of the Gods th' had been.*

As the same Geographer writes.

Sixthly, and lastly, There is yet a further probability alledged, that *Paradise* was about *Mesopotamia*, that Countrey being not far distant from *Judea*. For it is the Tradition of the Fathers, that *Adam*, when he was ejected out of *Paradise*, having travelled over some parts of the world, came at last to *Judea*, and there dy'd; and was buried in a Mount, which his posterity, because the head of the first Man was laid there, called *Mount Calvary*, where *Christ* was crucified for the expiation of the sin of *Adam*, the first transgressor. If the story be not true, it is pity but it should be, it hath so venerable assertors as *Cyprian*, *Athanasius*, *Basil*, *Origen*, and others of the Fathers, as *Cornelius* affirms.

But now for the more exact situation of *Paradise*, the same Author ventures to place it at the very meeting of *Tigris* and *Euphrates*, where the City of *Apamia* now stands in *Ptolemy's* Maps, eighty degrees *Longitude*, and some thirty four degrees and thirty scruples *Latitude*.

Thus have we, according to the *Letter*, found *Paradise* which *Adam* lost; but if we find no better one in the *Philosophick* and *Moral Cabbala*, we shall but have our labour for our travel.

Vers. 9. That stood planted in the midst of the Garden. For in this verse the *Tree of Life* is planted in the midst of the Garden, and in the third Chapter the third verse, the *Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil* is placed there also.

For the Lord God had so ordained. Expositors seem not to suspect any hurt in the *Tree* it self, but that the fruit thereof was naturally good, only God interdicted it to try the goodness of *Adam*. So that this Law that prohibited *Adam* the eating of the fruit, was merely *Thetical* or *Positive*, not *Indispensable* and *Natural*.

Vers. 10. From thence it was parted. This is the cause that *Paradise* is conceived to have been situated where *Apamia* stands, as I have above intimated.

Vers.

Vers. 11 Phasis. See verse 8.

Chaulateans. The affinity of name is apparent betwixt *Havilah* and *Chaulateans*, whom *Strabo* places in *Arabia* near *Mesopotamia*.

Vers. 13. Arabian Ethiopia. See verse 8.

Vers. 17. See verse 9.

Vers. 18. High commendations of Matrimony. *Moses* plainly recommends to the *Jews* the use of *Matrimony*, and does after a manner encourage them to that condition; which he does like a right Law-giver and Father of the people. For in the multitude of the people is the King's honour; but in the want of people is the destruction of the Prince, as *Solomon* speaks, *Prov. 14*. Besides, there was no small Policy in religiously commending that to them, that most would be carried fast enough to on their own accords. For those Laws are best liked that suit with the pleasure of the people, and they will have the better conceit of the Law-giver for it.

Vers. 19. These brought he unto Adam, viz. the Beasts and Fowls; but there is no mention of the *Fishes*, they being not fitted to journey in the same Element. It had been ove-harsh and affected to have either brought the *Fishes* from the Sea, or to have carried *Adam* to the Shore, to appoint names to all the *Fishes* flocking thither to him. But after he might have opportunity to give them names, as they came occasionally to his view.

Vers. 20. See verse 18.

Vers. 21. Fell into a dream. For the Seventy have *ἐπέβαλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐκστασιν ἐν τῷ τῶν Ἀδὰμ*, God cast *Adam* into an *Ecstasy*; and in that *ecstasy* he might very well see what God did all the while he slept.

Vers. 23. See verse 21, and 24.

Vers. 24. So strict and sacred a Tye, &c. That's the scope of the Story: To beget a very fast and indissoluble affection betwixt man and wife, that they should look upon one another as one and the same person. And in this has *Moses* wisely provided for the happiness of his people, in instilling such a principle into them, as is the root of all Oeconomical order, delight, and contentment; while the husband looks upon his wife as on himself in the Feminine gender, and she on her husband as on her self in the Masculine. For Grammarians can discern no other difference than so betwixt *איש* and *אשה*, *Vir* and *Virrissa*. But *R. Abraham Ben Ezra* has found a mystery in these names more than Grammatical. For in *איש* and *אשה*, says he, is the contracted name of *Jehovah* contained, viz. *יה*, for there is *י* and *ה*. So long therefore as the married couple live in God's fear and mutual love, God is with them as well as in their names: But if they cast God off by disobedience, and make not good what they owe one to the other, then is their condition what their names denotate to them, the name of God being taken out, viz. *יש* and *אש*; the fire of discord and contention here, and the eternal fire of Hell hereafter. This is the conceit of that pious and witty *Rabbi*.

Vers. 25. And were not ashamed. *Matrimony* and the knowledge of women being so effectually recommended unto the *Jews* in the foregoing story, the wisdom of *Moses* did foresee that it would be obvious for the people to think with themselves, how so good and com-

mendable a thing should have so much shame and diffidency hovering about it. For there is a general bashfulness in men and women in these Matters, and they ever desire to transact these affairs in secret out of the sight of others. Wherefore *Moses*, to satisfy their curiosity, continues his History further, and gives the reason of this shame in the following Chapter.

CHAP. III.

1. *How much it saves the credit of our first Parents, that the Serpent was found the prime Author of the Transgression. That, according to St. Basil, all the living creatures of Paradise could speak: undeniable reasons that the Serpent could, according to the Literal Cabbala.*
9. *The opinion of the Anthropomorphites true, according to the Literal Cabbala.*
14. *That the Serpent went upright before the Fall, was the opinion of St. Basil.*
16. *A story of the easy delivery of a certain poor woman of Liguria.*
19. *That the general calamities that lie upon mankind, came by the transgression of a Positive Law, how well accommodate it is to the scope of Moses.*
23. *That Paradise was not the whole Earth.*
24. *The Apparitions in Paradise called by Theodoret Μορμολύχεια.*

IN this third Chapter there are causes laid down of some of the most notable and most concerning accidents in Nature: As of the hard travail and toil upon the sons of men, to get themselves a livelihood; Of the Antipathy betwixt Men and Serpents; Of the incumbrance of the ground with troublesome weeds; Of the shame of Veneriness; Of the pangs of child-bearing; and of Death it self. Of all these, *Moses* his wisdom held fit to give an account accommodately to the capacity of the people. For these fall into that grand Question in Philosophy, πότεν τὰ κακά; whence sprung up Evil; which has exercised the wits of all Ages to this very day. And every fool is able to make the Question, but few men so wise as to be either able to give, or fit to receive a sufficient Answer to it, according to the depth of the matter it self.

But it was very necessary for *Moses* to hold on in his History, and to communicate to them those plain and intelligible Causes of the Evils that ever lay before their eyes; he having so fully asserted God the Creator of Heaven and Earth, and contriver of all things that we see: Adding also that the Laws that he propounded to them, were delivered to him from God, and that all prosperity and happiness would accompany them, if they observed the same; That they should eat the good things of the Land, and live a long and healthful age.

Now it was easie for the people, though they were but rude and newly taken from making Bricks for *Pharaoh* in *Aegypt*, to think thus with themselves; If God made all things, how is it that they are no better than they are? Why do our wives bring forth their children with pain? Why are we obnoxious to be stung with Serpents? Why may not God give us an endless life, as well as a long life? and the like. To which *Moses* in general answers, (to the great advantage of

of the people, and for the faster binding them to the *Laws* he delivered to them from God,) That it was *Disobedience to God's will*, that brought all this mischief into the world; which is most certainly true. But by what particular circumstances it is set out, you may here read in this third Chapter.

Vers. 1. The Serpent also. It had been too harsh and boisterous, and too grossly redounding to the dishonour of our first Parents *Adam* and *Eve*, if they had immediately done violence to so express a command of God, and shown themselves professed rebels against him: And their posterity would have been scarce able to have remembered them without curfings and bitterness, for being so bold and apert Authors of so much misery to them. But so it came to pass, that it was not of themselves, but by the subtilty of the *Serpent*, that they were deceived into disobedience, being overshoot by his false suggestions. So that their mistake may be looked upon with pardon and pity, and our selves are fairly admonished to take heed that we forfeit not the rest.

But the power of Speech. I cannot be so large in my belief as *St. Basil*, who affirms, That all living creatures in Paradise could speak, and understand one another. But, according to the *Literal Cabbala*, I think it is manifest, that the *Serpent* could; and that it was not the *Devil* in the *Serpent*, as some Interpreters would have it. For, why should the *Serpent* be cursed for the *Devil's* sake? And beside, the whole business is attributed to the cunning and subtilty of the *Serpent*, as doing it by the power of his own nature. Therefore this were to confound two *Cabbala's* into one, to talk thus of the *Serpent* and the *Devil* at once.

Not eat of any of the Trees. So *Chrysostom*, *Rupertus*, and *St. Augustine*; as if the cunning *Serpent* had made use of that damnable Maxim, *Calumniare fortiter, aliquid adharebit*: So at first he lays his charge high against God, as if he would debar them of necessary food, and starve them, that at last he might gain so much, at least that he did unnecessarily abridge them of what made mightily for their pleasure and perfection.

Vers. 4. See verse 1.

Vers. 7. And the eyes of them both were opened. Some gather from hence, that *Adam* and *Eve* were blind till they tasted of the forbidden fruit; Which is so foolish a gloss, that none but a blind man could ever have stumbled upon it: For the greatest pleasure of Paradise had been lost, if they had wanted their sight. Therefore, as gross as it is, that can be no part of any *Literal Cabbala*, it having nothing at all of probability in it: It is not λόγος πιδανός.

Vers. 9. God's walking in the Garden, his calling after *Adam*, his pronouncing the doom upon him, his wife, and the *Serpent*, and sundry passages before, do again and again inculcate the opinion of the *Anthropomorphites*, that God has an humane shape; which I have already acknowledged to be the meaning of the *Literal Cabbala*.

Vers. 13. Here the first Original of Mischief is resolved into the *Serpent*, whereby *Adam* and *Eve's* credits are something saved, and the root of misery to mankind is plainly discovered.

Vers. 14. Creep upon thy belly. It is plain according to the Letter,

that the *Serpent* went upright; which is the opinion also of *St. Basil*, else his doom signifies nothing, if he crept upon his belly before.

Vers. 15. Perpetual Antipathy. See verse 1.

*Bibliotheca
Histor. lib. 4.
pag. 227.*

Vers. 16. Her sorrows and pangs in child-bearing. See verse 1. But these pains are much increased to Women by their luxury and rotten delicateness, that weakens Nature, and enfeebles the Spirits, so that they can endure nothing, whenas those that are used to hardship and labour scape better. There is a notorious instance of it in a woman of *Liguria*, who (as *Diodorus Siculus* writes) being hard at work in the field, was overtaken with that other labour. But she went but aside a while, and disburthening her self, with a quick dispatch, laid her child as gainly as she could, in some fresh leaves and grass, and came immediately again to her task, and would not have desisted from her work, but that he that hired her, in commiseration to the infant, paid her the whole day's wages to be shut of her: As if Providence had absolved her from the curse of *Eve*, she voluntarily undergoing so much of *Adam's*, which was sweating in the field.

Vers. 18. See verse 1.

Vers. 19. Observe the great Wisdom of *Moses*; The Statutes and Ordinances which he deliver'd unto the people, they being most of them not *φύσει*, but *θεσει*, not natural and intrinsically good, but positive and dispensable in themselves; here according to this History, all those grand evils of toil and labour upon a barren ground, of pains in child-bed, and of death it self, are imputed to the transgression of a Law that was but merely Positive: whereby the Law-giver does handsomely engage the people with all care and diligence, to observe all the ceremonies and ordinances he gave them from God; the whole posterity of *Adam* finding the mischief of the breaking but that one Positive Law in Paradise, the eating of the fruit of such a Tree that was forbidden: Whenas otherwise Positive Laws of themselves would have been very subject to be slighted and neglected.

Vers. 20. Called his wife Eve. *חַוָּה* signifies life.

Vers. 21. The use of which God taught. The two great comforts and necessities of life are Food and Clothing. Wherefore it was fit to record this passage also, to endear the peoples minds to God, and increase their devotion and thankfulness to him, who was so particularly and circumstantially the Author of those great supports of life.

Vers. 23. Forth from the Garden of Eden. That shews plainly that Paradise was not the whole Earth, as some would have it: For he was brought into Paradise by God, and now he is driven out again; but he was not driven out of the world.

Vers. 24. Haunted with Spirits. This phrase is very significant of the nature of the thing it is to express, and fitly sets out the condition of Paradise, when *Adam* was driven out of it, and could no more return thither, by reason of those Spirits that had visibly taken Possession of the way thereunto, and of the place. Nor am I alone in this Exposition, *Theodoret* and *Procopius* bearing me company, who call these Apparitions at the entrance of Paradise *μεμολύνηται*, and *Specetra terribili formâ*. And I think that this may very well go for the Literal sense of this verse, the Existence of Spirits and Apparitions being acknowledged in all Nations, be they never so rude or slow-witted.

T H E

T H E D E F E N C E O F T H E Philosophick Cabbala.

C H A P. I.

1. *Why Heaven and Light are both made Symbols of the same thing, viz. The World of Life. That ברא אלהים intimate a Trinity. That ראשית is a Title of the Eternal Wisdom, the Son of God, who is called also קדם, 'Αρχὴ and 'Ανατολή, and Λόγος, as well in Philo as the New Testament. That רוח אלהים is the Holy Ghost.* 2. *The fit agreement of Plato's Triad with the Trinity of the present Cabbala.* 5. *The Pythagorick names or nature of a Monad, or Unite, applied to the First day's work.* 6. *What are the Upper waters: and that Souls that descend εἰς γέεναν, are the Naiades, or water-Nymphs in Porphyrius.* 8. *That Matter of it self is unmoveable. R. Bechai his notation of שני very happily explained out of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. That Universal Matter is the Second day's Creation, fully made good by the names and property of the number Two.* 13. *The nature of the Third day's work set off by the number Three.* 16. *That the most learned do agree, that the Creation was perfected at once. The notation of כיכב strangely agreeing with the most notorious Conclusions of the Cartesian Philosophy.* 19. *That the Corporeal world was universally erected into Form and Motion on the Fourth day, is most notably confirmed by the Titles and Property of the number Four. The true meaning of the Pythagorick Oath, wherein they swore by him that taught them the mystery of the Tetractys. That the Tetractys was a Symbol of the whole Philosophick Cabbala, that lay couched under the Text of Moses.* 20. *Why Fish and Fowl were created in the same day.* 23. *Why living creatures were said to be made in the Fifth and Sixth days.* 31. *And why the whole Creation was comprehended within the number Six.*



Have plainly and faithfully set forth the meaning of Moses his Text, according to the *Literal Cabbala*, and made his incomparable Policy and pious Prudence manifest to all the world. For whether he had this History of *Adam* and *Eve*, and of the *Creation*, immediately from God on the Mount, or whether it was a very ancient Tradition long before in the *Eastern* parts, as some *Rabbins* would have it, but approv'd of by God in the Mount; *Moses* certainly could not have begun

begun his *Pentateuch* with any thing more proper and more material to his scope and purpose than this. And it is nothing but the ignorance of the *Atheist* that can make him look upon it as contemptible, it being in it self as highly removed above contempt, as true Prudence and Stayedness is above Madness and Folly.

And yet I confess, I think there is still a greater depth and richness of Wisdom in it, than has been hitherto opened in the *Literal Cabbala*; and such as shall represent *Moses* as profoundly seen in *Philosophy* and *divine Morality*, as he is in *Politicks*: And against which the *Atheist* shall have nothing at all to alledge, unless ignorance and confidence furnish his brain with impertinent Arguments.

For he shall not hear *Moses* in this *Philosophick Cabbala* either tasking God to his *Six days* labour, or bounding the world at the clouds, or making the Moon bigger than the Stars, or numbring days without Suns, or bringing in a Serpent talking with a Woman, or any such like passages, which the *Atheists* misunderstanding and perverseness make them take offence at: But they shall find him more large and more free than any, and laying down such Conclusions as the *Naturalists* and *Theosophers* in all Ages have looked upon as the choicest and most precious. Such, I say, are those in the *Philosophick Cabbala* you have read; and I am now come to defend it, and make it good, that it is indeed the meaning of *Moses* his Text. And one great Key for the understanding of it in this first Chapter, will be those *Pythagorical Mysteries of Numbers*, as I have intimated already in my *Preface*.

Sect. 4.

Verf. 1. I mean the same Thing by both. And there is good reason there should be meant the same thing by both. For, besides that those actual conspicuous Lights are in Heaven, *viz.* the Sun and Stars; Heaven, or the the *Aethereal Matter* has in it all over the Principles of Light, which are the round Particles, and that very fine and subtile Matter that lies in the intervals of the round Particles. He that is but a little acquainted with the *French Philosophy*, understands the business plainly. And in the expounding of *Moses*, I think I may lay down this for a safe Principle, That there is no considerable Truth in Nature or Divinity that *Moses* was ignorant of; and so if it be found agreeable to his Text, I may very well attribute it to him. At least the *Divine Wisdom* wherewith *Moses* was inspired, prevents all the inventions of Men.

De Civit. lib.
11. cap. 9.

But now that I understand this *Heaven* and *Earth* in the First verse, as things distinct from *Heaven* and *Earth* afterwards mentioned, I am not alone in it, but have the authority of *Philo*, who expounds not this *Heaven* and *Earth* of the visible and tangible *Heaven* and *Earth*, which are mentioned in the Second and Third day, but of an *Heaven* and *Earth* quite different from them: As also the suffrage of *St. Augustine*, who understands likewise by *Heaven* and *Light* one and the same thing, to wit, the *Angels*; and by *Earth*, the first Matter: which is something like the sense of this present *Cabbala*, * only for his *Physical Matter*, we set down a *Metaphysical* one, and that other belonging most properly to the Second day; and for *Angels* we have *The World of Life*, which comprehends not *Angels* only, but all Substantial Forms and Spirits whatever. And

And that *Heaven* or *Light* should be Symbols of *The World of Life* or *Form*, it is no wonder: For you may find a sufficient reason in the *Cabbala* it self, at the fifth verse of this present Chapter, and *Plotinus* assimilates *Form* to *Light*, ὁ δὲ λόγος φῶς, for *Form* is *Light*.

And lastly, in the second verse of this same Chapter, there be plain Reasons laid down, why the mere *Possibility* of the outward Creation is called the *Earth*, according to the description of the *Earth* in the second verse of the first Chapter of *Moses* his Text: unto which you may further add, that as the *Earth* is looked upon as the *Basis* of the World, so the *Possibility* of the outward Creation is, in some sense, the *Basis* thereof.

The Tri-une Godhead. The Hebrew words כְּרֵא אֱלֹהִים do handsomely intimate a plurality and singularity, the *Noun* being in the *Plural*, the *Verb* in the *Singular* Number. Whence I conceive there may be very well here included the *Mystery* of the *Trinity* and *Unity* of the Godhead, or τὸ θεῖον. And *Vatablus* himself, though he shuffles with his Grammatical Notions here, yet he does apertly acknowledge Three Persons in one God, at the twenty sixth verse of this Chapter. And that this was the Philosophick *Cabbala* of *Moses*, and the Learned and Pious of the *Jews*, it is no small argument, because the Notion of the *Trinity* is so much insisted upon by the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans*, whom all acknowledge (and I think I shall make it more plain than ever) to have got their Philosophy from *Moses*.

By his *Eternal Wisdom*. *Ambrose*, *Basil*, and *Origen* interpret *In Principio*, to be as much as *In Filio*; and *Colossians* the first, there the Apostle speaking of the Son of God, he saith, that he is the *First-born* of every Creature; and that by him were all things created that are in *Heaven*, and that are in *Earth*; and that he is before all things, and by him all things consist. This is the *Wisdom* of God, or the *Idea* according to which he framed all things: And therefore must be before all things the *Beginning* of the Creatures of God. And very answerable to this of the Apostle, are thole two Attributes *Philo* gives to the same subject, calling him πρωτόγονον θεῶν λόγον, *The First-born Word* of God, or *The First-born Form* of God, and ἀρχὴ the *Beginning*. He calls him also simply λόγος, which is, *The Word*, *Form*, *Reason*, or *Wisdom*. And one of the *Chaldee Paraphrasts* also interprets *In Principio*, *In Sapientia*. And this agrees exceedingly well with that of *Solomon*, יהוה קנני ראשית דרכו, *The Lord possessed me*, ראשית דרכו, *Principium vite sue*, that is, *operum suorum*, as *Vatablus* expounds it, and the Text makes it good; מקעלי כחן, Prov. 8. 22. קרם, *Oriens operum suorum ab antiquo*; *The Sun-rise* of his Works of old. For there is no necessity of making of ראשית and קרם, *Adverbs*, they are *Substantives*. And here *Wisdom* is called ראשית and קרם the *Principle* and *Morning* of the Works of God, not by way of diminution, but as supposing the *East* and the *Morning* to be the womb of *Light*, from whence springs all *Light* and *Form*, and *Form* is *Light*, as I told you before out of *Plotinus*.

And this Notion of קרם sutes well with that passage in *Trismegist*, In his *Képe* where *Hermes* speaks thus; Ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς ἀναβολῆς γενομένης, τοῖς πάντα ἐλάτυσιν κόσμῳ. ὁφθαλμοῖς τῇ τῆς ἀναβολῆς θεωρήσας, &c. where ἀναβολή, which is the same with קרם, must signify the *Divine Intellect*, the *bright Morning-Star*, the *Wisdom* of God: To which *Wisdom*, called in the eighth of the

Pro-

Proverbs, ראשית and קרם, the *Beginning* and *Morning* of his Works, is ascrib'd the *Creation* of the world by *Solomon*, as you may there see at large. I will only add, that what the *Hebrew* Text here in *Genesis* calls ראשית, the *Chaldee* calls קרמין, which is all one with קרם. Wherefore ראשית is the *Essential Wisdom* of God, not an *habit* or *property*, but a *Substance* that is *Wisdom*. For true *Wisdom* is *Substance*, ἡ ἀληθινὴ σοφία ἔσθ' αὖτε ἡ ἀληθινὴ ἔσθ' αὖτε ἡ ἀληθινὴ σοφία. it is the same that *Plotinus* speaks. Whence he is called in the *Apocalyps*, ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ᾔων καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, which is but a *Periphrasis* of *Jehovah*, *Essence*, or ἔσθ' αὖτε, * which name יהוה contains the future, present, and time past in it, in י' add ה, as *Zanchius* observes. This is the second *Hypostasis* in the *Holy Trinity*, the *Logos*, which was in the beginning of the world with God. All things were made by him, * and without him was nothing made that was made, *John* I.

First created this. I cannot impute it to any reason at all, but to the slowness of *Fancy*, and heavy unwieldiness of *Melancholy*, or the load of *Blood* and *Flesh*, that makes men imagine that *Creation* is incomperible even to God himself; whenas I think I have no less than demonstrated in my *Antidote against Atheism*, That it is impossible but God should have the power of *Creation*, or else he would not be God. But because our *Will* and *Mind* can create no *Substance* distinct from our selves, we foolishly conceit, measuring the *Power* of God by our own, that he cannot create any *Substance* distinct from himself: Which is but a weak *Conclusion*, fallen from our own dulness and inadvertency.

Vers. 2. Solitude and Emptiness. The very word signifies so in the Original, as *Vatablus* will tell you. Which being *abstract terms*, (as the *Schools* call them) do very fittingly agree with the *Notion* we have put upon this *Symbolical Earth*, affirming it to be no real actual Subject, either spiritual or corporeal, that may be said to be *void* and *empty*; but to be *Vacuity* and *Emptiness* it self, only joined with a capacity of being something. It is, as I have often intimated, the *Ens Potentiale* of the whole outward *Creation*.

But the *Spirit* of God. Not a great *Wind*, but the *Holy Ghost*. This is the *Interpretation* general of the *Fathers*. And it is a sign that it is according to the true *Mosaical Cabbala*, it being so consonant to *Plato's* School, which School I suspect now has more of that *Cabbala* than the *Jews* themselves have at this day.

Having hovered a while. The word in the Original is מרחפה, which signifies a hovering or brooding over a thing, as a *Bird* does over her nest, or on her young ones. Hence it is not unlikely is *Aristophanes* his *Egge*.

τίκτε πρώτιστον ὑπὸ νύξ μελανόπτερος ὦν.

To this SENSE,

Under the wind below, in darksome shade,
There the black-winged Night her first *Egge* laid.

And this manner of *brooding* thus is an *Embleme* of dearest affection; and who knows, but that from this Text the *Poets* took occasion of feigning that ancient *Cupid*, the *Father* of all the *Gods*, the *Creator* of all

all things, and *Maker* of Mankind? For so he is described by *Hesiod* and *Orpheus*, and here in this place of *Aristophanes*, from whence I took the fore-cited verse.

Simmius Rhodius describes this ancient *Love* in verses which represent a pair of wings. I will not say according to this conceit of *Aristophanes* his *Egge*, which they should brood and hatch. But the longest Quill of one of them writes thus,

Διῶσέ με τὸν γᾶς τε βαθυτέρῃ ἀνακτῇ, ἀκμονίδαν τᾶν ἄλλων ἰδράσαντα.

To this SENSE.

*I am the King of the deep-bosom'd Earth,
My strength gave to the Sea both bounds and birth.*

This *Spirit of God* then, or *Divine Love*, which was from everlasting, will prove the Third divine *Hypostasis*. The first was אלהים, which signifies *Strength*, and a word rather common to the whole *Trinity*. But *Jehovah*, as the *Rabbins* observe, is a name of God, as he is merciful and gracious, which may be answerable to *Plato* his Τεταδόν but that name is also communicated to *Christ*, as we have already acknowledged. The second is חכמה, which is *Wisdom*, as has been prov'd out of the *Proverbs*, and answers to the *Platonical* Νῆς. The third we have now light upon, which must be *Love*, and it has a lucky coincidence also with the third *Hypostasis* in the *Platonick Triad*, Λογὴ, whom *Plotinus* calls δευτέρῃ Ἀποδίτῃ, the *Celestial Venus*. And to this after a more immediate manner is the *Creation* of the world ascribed by that *Philosopher*, as also by *Plato*; as here in *Moses*, the *Spirit of God* is said to lie close brooding upon the humid Matter, for the actual Production of this outward world.

Ennead. 3.
lib. 6. also
Ennead. 4.
lib. 4. cap. 9.

Vers. 3. Exist independently of Corporeal Matter. That which exists first, it is plain, is independent of what follows; and *Philo* makes all *Immaterial Beings* to be created in the first day: Whence the Souls of Men are removed far from all fear of fate and mortality, which is the grand Tenent of *Plato's* School.

Vers. 5. Matter merely Metaphysical. See *Hyle* in my *Interpretation* general at the end of my *Poems*; where you will find that I have settled the same Notion I make use of here, though I had no design then of expounding *Moses*.

Monad or Unite. The fitness of the number to the nature of every day's work you shall observe to be wonderful. Whence we may well conclude, that it was ordered so on purpose, and that in all probability, *Pythagoras* was acquainted with this *Cabbala*: And that that was the reason the *Pythagoreans* made such a deal of doe with *Numbers*, putting other conceits upon them than any other *Arithmeticians* do: and that therefore if such *Theorems* as the *Pythagoreans* held, be found suitable and compliable with *Moses* his Text, it is a shrewd presumption that that is the right *Philosophick Cabbala* thereof.

Philo makes the First day spent in the *Creation* of *Immaterial* and *Spiritual Beings*, of the *Intellectual World*, taking it in a large sense, or the *Mundus Vita*, as *Ficinus* calls it, *The World of Life and Forms*. And the

Nicomach.
Gerasen. in
Phot. Biblio-
theca.

the Pythagoreans call an *Unite* Εἶδος, *Form*; and Ζωή, *Life*. * They call it also Ζανός πύργος, or the *Tower of Jupiter*, giving also the same name to a *Point* or *Centre*, by which they understand the *Vital formative Centre of things*, the *Rationes Seminales*: and they call an *Unite* also λόγος σπερματικός, which is *Seminal Form*. But a very short and sufficient account of *Philo's* pronouncing, that *Spiritual Substances* are the *First day's work* is, That as an *Unite* is *indivisible* in *Numbers*, so is the nature of *Spirits indivisible*; you cannot make two of one of them, as you may make of one piece of *Corporeal Matter* two, by actual division or severing them one piece from another. Wherefore * what was truly and properly created the first day, was *Immaterial*, *Indivisible*, and *Independent* of the *Matter*, from the highest *Angel* to the meanest *Seminal Form*.

And for the *Potentiality* of the outward *Creation*, sith it is not so properly any real *Being*, it can breed no difficulty; but whatever it is, it is referrable fitly enough to *Incorporeal* things, it being no *Object* of *Sense*, but of *Intellect*, and being also *impassible* and *undiminishable*, and so in a sort *indivisible*. For the *Power* of *God* being *undiminishable*, the *Possibility* of the *Creature* must be also *undiminishable*, it being an adequate *Consequence* of his *Power*. Wherefore this *Po-*

Nicomach.
Gerasen. A-
rithmet. The-
olog. in Phot.
Bibl. n. 187.

tentiality being ever *One*, it is rightly referred to the *First day*. * And in respect of this the *Pythagoreans* call an *Unite*, ὕλη, as well as the *Binary*, as also ἀλαμπία, and σκοτωδία. which names plainly glance at the dark *Potentiality* of things, set out by *Moses* in the *First day's Creation*.

†Concerning
the producti-
on of this
Corporeal
Matter, see
Plotinus, En-
nead. 4. lib. 3.
cap 9. See al-
so my Trea-
tise of Immor-
tal. Book. 3.
ch. 16. sect. 8.

Vers. 6. * Created an immense deal, &c. He † creates now *Corporeal Matter*, (as before *The World of Life*) out of nothing. Which *Universal Matter* may well be called רקיע, for *extension* is very proper to *Corporeal Matter*. *Castellio* translates it *Liquidum*, and this *Universal Matter* is most-what *fluid* still all over the world, but at first it was *fluid* universally.

Betwixt the *aforesaid fluid Possibility*, &c. But here it may be you'll enquire, how this *Corporeal Matter* shall be conceived to be betwixt the *waters above* and these *underneath*. For what can be the *waters above*? *Maimonides* requires no such continued *Analogy* in the hidden sense of *Scripture*, as you may see in his *Preface* to his *More Nevochim*. But I need not fly to that general refuge. For methinks that the *Seminal Forms* that descend through the *Matter*, and so reach the *Possibility* of the parts of the outward *Creation*, and make them spring up into act, are not unlike the drops of rain that descend through the *Heaven* or *Air*, and make the *Earth* fruitful. Besides, the *Seminal Forms* of things lie round, as I may so speak, and contracted at first, but spread when they bring any part of the *Possibility* of the outward *Creation* into act, as drops of rain spread when they are fallen to the ground. So that the *Analogy* is palpable enough, though it may seem too elaborate and curious. We may add to all this concerning the *Naiades*, or *Water-Nymphs*, that the *Ancients* understood by them, τὰς εἰς γένεσιν κατέστας ψυχὰς κοινὰς ἀνδρῶν, *All manner of Souls that descend into the Matter and Generation*. Wherefore for the *watry Powers*, (as *Porphyrius* also calls these *Nymphs*) it is not at all harsh to conceive, that they

they may be here indigitated by the name of the *Upper Waters*. See *Porphyrus* in his *De Antro Nympharum*.

According to which sense is that expreffion also in *Synesius's Hymns*; *Hymn. 3.*

Λιβὰς ἱερὰν
κέχυμαι καὶ γὰρ
παγὰ με δίδα
*ὄθεν ἐξεχύθη
φουὰς ἀλῆτις.

An Heavenly drop I fell
Spilt on this lowly ground!
Thy Flitting Vagabond
Restore unto that Well
Whence first she did redound.

Which shews plainly enough that there is that which may be called *Water* above the material Heavens.

Demetrius also in *Plutarch* makes the Souls involved in generation to be so many *Water-Nymphs*. And it is not a mere Metaphor, but aims also at a Physical truth, namely, at the moisture of the Vehicles of such Souls, or Spiritual Powers as are engaged in Generation. Wherefore all those Immaterial Beings, whether that *Universal Spirit of Nature*, or the Souls of Men and Brutes, as are endued or invested with such a genital moisture in their framing of any visible fabric out of Matter here below, (into which they descended by virtue of the vital adhesion of this humidity) are more than Metaphorically called *Water*, as the Angels and other Spirits created the First day, are more than Symbolically called *Heaven* and *Light*, as I have noted in its due place.

And upon account of this genital moisture that these Spiritual Effences are involved in when they frame any Terrestrial Contexture, I conceive that excellent Platonist *Virgil*, makes that Description of the task or exercise of the *Water-Nymphs* in the River *Peneus*.

*Cyrenen circum Milesia vellera Nymphæ
Carpebant hyali saturo fucata colore.
Inter quas curam Clymene narrabat inanem
Vulcani, Martisque dolos & dulcia furta;
Atque Chao densos Divûm numerabat amores;
Carminè quo capte fusis dum mollia pensa
Devolvunt, &c.*

By which passages certainly that knowing Poet understands nothing else but this; namely, That the spinning and weaving of the first contexture of things, is in a certain primordial or genital moisture, in which these Spiritual Powers the *Water-Nymphs* work; whom therefore he brings in teasing, and spinning, and singing of Love-songs, and the hidden and stolen Veneries of the Gods, (that is, of those parts of the celestial Creation that descend εἰς γένεσιν) under the waters of the River *Peneus*.

To conclude therefore, it is very easie and fit, that as the Angels and the Souls of Men unsunk into generation, and also all those Spiritual Beings created in the first Day, are, in reference to their inmost Vehicles, called *Heaven* and *Light*; so likewise to conceive that all Souls as they descend εἰς γένεσιν, and all Spiritual Powers as they apply to Terrestrial Formation, in which this genital Moisture is required, are in like analogy called the *Upper Waters* in this second Day's work,

as Man in respect of his outward Body was called * *Adam*, that is to say, *Earth*.

Vers. 7. What mischief straying Souls. The frequent complaints that that noble Spirit in *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists* makes against the incumbrances and disadvantages of the *Body*, make this *Cabbala* very probable. And it is something like our Divines fancying *Hell* to be created this day.

Vers. 8. Actuated and agitated. This is consonant to *Plato's* School, who makes the *Matter* unmoveable of it self; which is most reasonable. For if it were of its own nature moveable, nothing for a moment would hold together, but dissolve it self into infinitely little Particles; whence it is manifest, that there must be something besides the *Matter*, either to bind it or to move it: So that the Creation of *Immaterial Beings* is in that respect also necessary.

Rightly called Heaven. I mean אֶשׁ . For this Agitation of the *Matter* brought it to *Des-Cartes* his second Principle, which is the true *Aether*, or rather אֶשׁ . For it is liquid as *Water*, and yet has in it the fierce Principle of *Fire*, which is the first Element and most subtile of all. The thing is at first sight understood by *Cartesians*, who will easily admit of that Notation of the *Rabbins* in the word אֶשׁ , as being from אֵש *Fire* and מַיִם *Water*. For so *R. Bechai*, *The Heavens*, says he, were created from the beginning, and are called אֶשׁ , because they are אֵש and מַיִם , *Fire* and *Water*; which no Philosophy makes good so well as the *Cartesian*. For the round Particles, like *Water*, (though they be not of the same Figure) flake the fierceness of the first Principle, which is the purest *Fire*. And yet this *Fire* in some measure always lies within the Triangular Intervals of the round Particles, as that Philosophy declares at large.

And the Binary. How fitly again doth the number agree with the nature of the work of this day, which is the Creation of *Corporeal Matter*? And the *Pythagoreans* call the number *Two*, ὕλη , *Matter*. *Simplicius* upon *Aristotle's* *Physicks*, speaking of the *Pythagoreans*, $\text{Εἰκότως ἐν μὲν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐλεγον, ὡς ὁρίζον ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀπαράβησιν καὶ περατὴν. Δύο δὲ τὴν ὕλην, ὡς ἀόριστον, καὶ ὄγκον καὶ διαίρεσιν αἰτίαν.}$ They might well, says he, call *One*, *Form*, as defining and terminating to certain shape and property, whatever it takes hold of: And *Two* they might very well call *Matter*, it being undeterminate, and the cause of Bigness and Divisibility. And they have very copiously heaped upon the number *Two* such appellations as are most proper to *Corporeal Matter*, as Ἀσχετὸν , Ἀβείον , Ἀπειρόν , *Unfigured*, *Undetermined*, *Unlimited*. For such is *Matter* of it self, till *Form* take hold of it. It is called also ῥέα , from the fluidity of the *Matter*; Ἀσειά , Ἀσειά , because it affords substance to the *Heavens* and *Stars*; Νεῖκος , Μόρος , Θάνατος , *Contention*, *Fate*, and *Death*; for these are the consequences of the *Soul's* being joined with *Corporeal Matter*; Κίνησις , Γένεσις , Φύσις , Διαίρεσις , *Motion*, *Generation*, and *Division*, which are Properties plainly appertaining to *Bodies*. They call this number also ὑπομονή , because it is the ὑποκείμενον , the Subject that endures and undergoes all the changes and alterations the active Forms put upon it. Wherefore it is plain, that the *Pythagoreans* understood *Corporeal Matter* by the number *Two*, which no man can deny but that it is a very fit Symbole of *Division*, that eminent Property of *Matter*. But

But we might cast in a further reason of the \square being created the second day: for the *Celestial Matter* does consist of two plainly distinguishable parts, to wit, the *First Element*, and the *Second*, or the *Materia subtilissima*, and the round *Particles*, as I have already intimated out of *Des-Cartes* his Philosophy.

Verf. 9. It is referred to the following day. You are to understand, that these *Six numbers* or *days* do not signify any order of time, but the nature of the things that were said to be made in them. But for any thing in *Moses* his *Philosophick Cabbala*, all might be made at once, or in such periods of time as is most suitable to the nature of the things themselves. What is said upon this ninth verse, will be better understood, and with more full satisfaction, when we come to the fourth day's work.

Verf. 13. And the Ternary denotes. In this third day were the *Waters* commanded into one place, the *Earth* adorned with all manner of *Plants*, *Paradise* and all the pleasure and plenty of it created, wherein the *Serpent* beguiled *Eve*, and so forth. What can therefore be more likely, than that the *Pythagoreans* use their *Numbers* as certain remembrancers of the particular passages of this History of the Creation; whenas they call the number *Three*, $\tau\acute{\rho}\iota\tau\omega\nu$ and $\delta\alpha\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\chi\theta$, i. e. *Nicomach. Gerasen. Arithmet. Theolog. lib. 1.* *Triton*, and *Lord of the Sea*; which is in reference to God's commanding the *Water* into one place, and making thereof a *Sea*? They call also the *Ternary*, $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\iota\mu\alpha\lambda\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, and $\delta\tau\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$. The former intimates the plenty of *Paradise*, the latter relates to the *Serpent* there. But now besides this we shall find the *Ternary* very significant of the nature of this day's work. For, first, the *Earth* consists of the *third Element* in the *Cartesian* Philosophy, (for the truth of that Philosophy will force it self in whether I will or no;) and then again there are three grand parts of this *third Element* necessary to make an *Earth* habitable, the *dry Land*, the *Sea*, (whence are *Springs* and *Rivers*) and the *Air*; and lastly, there are in *Vegetables*, which is the main work of this day, three eminent properties, according to *Aristotle*, viz. *Nutrition*, *Accretion*, *Generation*; and also if you consider their duration, there be these three Cardinal points of it, *Ortus*, *Acme*, *Interitus*. You may cast in also that *Minerals*, which belong to this day, as well as *Plants*, that both *Plants* and they, and in general all *Terrestrial Bodies*, have the three *Chymical Principles* in them, *Sal*, *Sulphur*, and *Mercury*. And finally, which is of no small consequence, that the motion of the *Earth* is triple; namely, that upon its *Axis*, that of the *Centre* round about the *Sun*, and that which arises from the inclination of the *Axis*, and its site parallel to it self, whereby is described that *oblique Circle* on the *Earth*, which we call the *Ecliptick*.

Verf. 16. Such as is the *Earth* we live upon. As the *Matter* of the *Universe* came out in the second day, so the contriving of this *Matter* into *Suns* and *Planets* is contained in this fourth day, the *Earth* her self not excepted, though according to the *Letter* she is made in the first day, and as she is the *Nurse* of *Plants*, said to be uncovered in the third; yet as she is the receptacle of light, and shines with borrowed rays like the *Moon*, and other *Planets*, she may well be referred to this Fourth day's Creation.

as Man in respect of his outward Body was called * *Adam*, that is to say, *Earth*.

Verf. 7. What mischief straying Souls. The frequent complaints that that noble Spirit in *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists* makes against the incumbrances and disadvantages of the *Body*, make this *Cabbala* very probable. And it is something like our Divines fancying *Hell* to be created this day.

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Rightly called Heaven. I mean שמים . For this Agitation of the *Matter* brought it to *Des-Cartes* his second Principle, which is the true *Aether*, or rather שמים . For it is liquid as *Water*, and yet has in it the fierce Principle of *Fire*, which is the first Element and most subtile of all. The thing is at first sight understood by *Cartesians*, who will easily admit of that Notation of the *Rabbins* in the word שמים , as being from שן *Fire* and מים *Water*. For so *R. Bechai*, *The Heavens*, says he, were created from the beginning, and are called שמים , because they are שן and מים , *Fire and Water*; which no Philosophy makes good so well as the *Cartesian*. For the round Particles, like *Water*, (though they be not of the same Figure) flake the fierceness of the first Principle, which is the purest *Fire*. And yet this *Fire* in some measure always lies within the Triangular Intervals of the round Particles, as that Philosophy declares at large.

And the Binary. How fitly again doth the number agree with the nature of the work of this day, which is the Creation of *Corporeal Matter*? And the *Pythagoreans* call the number *Two*, δύο , *Matter*. *Simplicius* upon *Aristotle's* *Physicks*, speaking of the *Pythagoreans*, $\text{Εἰκότως ἐν μὲν τῷ δίδωμι λέγουσι, ὡς ὁρίζον ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν καὶ περὶ αὐτήν. δύο δὲ τὴν ὕλην, ὡς ἀόριστον, καὶ ὅπου καὶ διαίρειται αἰτίαν.}$ They might well, says he, call *One*, *Form*, as defining and terminating to certain shape and property, whatever it takes hold of: And *Two* they might very well call *Matter*, it being undeterminate, and the cause of Bigness and Divisibility. And they have very copiously heaped upon the number *Two* such appellations as are most proper to *Corporeal Matter*, as Ἀσχεδῆς , Ἀόριστος , Ἀπειρος , *Unfigured, Undetermined, Unlimited*. For such is *Matter* of it self, till *Form* take hold of it. It is called also Ρεία , from the fluidity of the *Matter*; Ἀσεία , Ἀσεία , because it affords substance to the *Heavens* and *Stars*; Νεῖκος , Μόρος , Θάνατος , *Contention, Fate, and Death*; for these are the consequences of the *Soul's* being joined with *Corporeal Matter*; Κίνησις , Γένεσις , Φύσις , Διαίρεσις , *Motion, Generation, and Division*, which are Properties plainly appertaining to *Bodies*. They call this number also ὑποκείμενον , because it is the Subject that endures and undergoes all the changes and alterations the active Forms put upon it. Wherefore it is plain, that the *Pythagoreans* understood *Corporeal Matter* by the number *Two*, which no man can deny but that it is a very fit Symbole of *Division*, that eminent Property of *Matter*. But

But we might cast in a further reason of the \square being created the second day: for the *Celestial Matter* does consist of two plainly distinguishable parts, to wit, the *First Element*, and the *Second*, or the *Materia subtilissima*, and the *round Particles*, as I have already intimated out of *Des-Cartes* his Philosophy.

Verf. 9. It is referred to the following day. You are to understand, that these *Six numbers* or *days* do not signify any order of time, but the nature of the things that were said to be made in them. But for any thing in *Moses* his *Philosophick Cabbala*, all might be made at once, or in such periods of time as is most suitable to the nature of the things themselves. What is said upon this ninth verse, will be better understood, and with more full satisfaction, when we come to the fourth day's work.

Verf. 13. And the Ternary denotes. In this third day were the *Waters* commanded into one place, the *Earth* adorned with all manner of *Plants*, *Paradise* and all the pleasure and plenty of it created, wherein the *Serpent* beguiled *Eve*, and so forth. What can therefore be more likely, than that the *Pythagoreans* use their *Numbers* as certain remembrancers of the particular passages of this History of the Creation; whenas they call the number *Three*, $\tau\acute{\rho}\iota\tau\omega\nu$ and $\delta\alpha\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\chi\theta$, i. e. *Nicomach. Gerafen. Arithmet. Theolog. lib. 1.* *Triton*, and *Lord of the Sea*; which is in reference to God's commanding the *Water* into one place, and making thereof a *Sea*? They call also the *Ternary*, $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\iota\mu\alpha\lambda\delta\epsilon\lambda\alpha\varsigma$, and $\delta\acute{\rho}\iota\omega\nu$. The former intimates the plenty of *Paradise*, the latter relates to the *Serpent* there. But now besides this we shall find the *Ternary* very significant of the nature of this day's work. For, first, the *Earth* consists of the *third Element* in the *Cartesian* Philosophy, (for the truth of that Philosophy will force it self in whether I will or no;) and then again there are three grand parts of this *third Element* necessary to make an *Earth* habitable, the *dry Land*, the *Sea*, (whence are *Springs* and *Rivers*) and the *Air*; and lastly, there are in *Vegetables*, which is the main work of this day, three eminent properties, according to *Aristotle*, viz. *Nutrition*, *Accretion*, *Generation*; and also if you consider their duration, there be these three Cardinal points of it, *Ortus*, *Acme*, *Interitus*. You may cast in also that *Minerals*, which belong to this day, as well as *Plants*, that both *Plants* and they, and in general all *Terrestrial Bodies*, have the three *Chymical* Principles in them, *Sal*, *Sulphur*, and *Mercury*. And finally, which is of no small consequence, that the motion of the *Earth* is triple; namely, that upon its *Axis*, that of the *Centre* round about the *Sun*, and that which arises from the inclination of the *Axis*, and its site parallel to it self, whereby is described that *oblique Circle* on the *Earth*, which we call the *Ecliptick*.

Verf. 16. Such as is the *Earth* we live upon. As the *Matter* of the *Universe* came out in the second day, so the contriving of this *Matter* into *Suns* and *Planets* is contained in this fourth day, the *Earth* her self not excepted, though according to the *Letter* she is made in the first day, and as she is the *Nurse* of *Plants*, said to be uncovered in the third; yet as she is the receptacle of light, and shines with borrowed rays like the *Moon*, and other *Planets*, she may well be referred to this Fourth day's Creation.

Nor will this at all seem bold or harsh, if we consider that the most learned have already agreed, that all the whole Creation was made at once. As for example, the most rational of all the Jewish Doctors, R. Moses Egyptius, Philo Judeus, Procopius Gazeus, Cardinal Cajetane, St. Augustine, and the Schools of Hillel and Samai, as Manasseh Ben Israel writes. So that that leisurely order of Days is thus quite taken away, and all the scruples that may rise from that Hypothesis.

De Creatione,
Problem. 1.

Wherefore I say, the Earth, as one of the primary Planets, was created this fourth day. And I translate הכוכבים, Primary Planets. Primary, because of ה emphatical; and Planets, because the very notation of their name implies their nature: כוכב is plainly from כו, *Ustio*, or burning, and כב extinction; Nouns made from כוה and ככה, as חו and אב from היה and אבה, according to unexceptionable Analogy. * And the Earth, as also the rest of the Planets, their nature is such, as if they had once been burning and shining Suns, but their light and heat being extinguished, they afterwards became opaque Planets. This conclusion seems here plainly to be contained in Moses, but is at large demonstrated in Des-Cartes his Philosophy. Nor is this Notation of כוכב enervated by alledging, that the word is ordinarily used to signify the fixed Stars, as well as the Planets: For I do not deny but that, in a vulgar Notion it may be competent to them also. For the fixed Stars, according to the imagination of the rude people, may be said to be lighted up, and extinguished so often as they appear and disappear; for they measure all by obvious sense and fancy, and may well look upon them as so many Candles set up by divine Providence in the Night, but by Day frugally put out, to prevent wasting. And I remember Theodoret, in his *περὶ πηγμάτων*, has so glibly swallowed down the Notion, that he uses it as a special argument of Providence, that they can burn thus with their heads downwards, and not presently swell out and be extinguished, as our ordinary Candles are. Wherefore the word כוכב, may very well be attributed to all the Stars, as well Fixed as Planets; but to the Fixed only upon vulgar seeming grounds; to the Planets upon true and natural. And we may be sure that that is that which Moses would aim at, and lay stress upon in his Philosophick Cabbala.

Wherefore in brief, ה Emphatical in הכוכבים contains a double Emphasis, intimating those true כוכבים, or Planets, and then the most eminent amongst those truly so termed. Nor is it at all strange, that so abstruse Conclusions of Philosophy should be lodged in this Mosaisical Text: For, as I have elsewhere intimated, Moses has been beforehand with Cartesius. The ancient Patriarchs having had wit, and by reason of their long lives, leisure enough to invent as curious and subtle Theorems in Philosophy, as any of their posterity could hit upon, besides what they might have had by Tradition from Adam. And if we find the Earth a Planet, it must be acknowledged forthwith that it runs about the Sun; which is pure Pythagorism again, and a shrewd presumption that he was taught that mystery by this Mosaisical Cabbala. But that the Earth is a Planet, besides the Notation we have already insisted upon, the necessity of being created in this fourth day amongst the other Planets, is a further argument. For there

there is no mention of its Creation in any day else, according to this Philosophick Cabbala.

Verf. 17. Inhabitants of the World. The Hebrew is עַרְהָרֵץ. And I have made bold to interpret עַרְהָרֵץ, not of this one Individual Earth, but of the whole Species; and therefore I render it, *the World* at large. As הָאָדָם, in the twenty seventh of this Chapter, is not an Individual Man, but Mankind in general. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς δόκτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἄδ' αὖμ εἶναι φυσιολογεῖ Μωϋσῆς πλ' οὐδ' τῆς τῶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως, *Origen. contr. Cels. l. 4.* Which is an excellent Key for the opening the whole Mystery of the Creation. And so ver. 16. הַמְאֹר הַגָּדוֹל, viz. הַמְאֹר הַגָּדוֹל and הַמְאֹר הַקָּטָן, are interpreted after the same manner, rendring them *the greater sort of Lights, and the lesser sort of Lights.* * So that no Grammatical violence is done to the Text of *Moses* all this time.

Verf. 19. And the number denotes. This fourth day's Creation is the contrivance of Matter into *Suns* and *Planets*, or into *Suns, Moons, and Earths.* For the *Æthereal Vortices* were then set a going, and the *Corporeal* world had got into an useful order and shape. And the ordering and framing of the *Corporeal* world may very well be said to be transacted into the number *Four*; *Four* being the first body in numbers an *Æquilateral Pyramid*, which Figure also is a right Symbole of *Light*, the rays entring the eye in a *Pyramidal* form. And *Lights* now are set up in all the vast Region of the *Æthereal Matter*, which is *Heaven.*

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And *Philo*, * who does much *Pythagorize* in his Exposition of *Moses*, In his *Cosmopæia Mosaica.* observes, That this number *Four* contains the most perfect proportions in Musical Symphonies, viz. *Diateffaron, Diapente, Diapason, and Disdiapason*: Τῆς μὲν δὲ διατετάρων ὁ ἀρχαῖος ὁπότεριτος, &c. For the proportion of *Diateffaron*, is as *Four* to *Three*; of *Diapente*, as *Three* to *Two*; of *Diapason*, as *Two* to *One*, or *Four* to *Two*; of *Disdiapason*, as *Four* to *One*.

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Nicomach.
Gerasen. A-
rith. Theolog.
lib. 2.

And for further eviction, we may yet add, that as *all numbers* are contained in *Four* virtually, (by *all numbers* is meant *Ten*; for when we come to *Ten*, we go back again) so the root and foundation of all the Corporeal Creation is laid in this *fourth* day's work, wherein *Suns*, *Earths*, and *Moons* are made, and the ever-whirling *Vortices*. For, as *Philo* observes, *Pythagorean*-like, *Ten* (which they call also κόσμος, ἑρμῆς, and πᾶσις, the *World*, *Heaven*, and *All-perfectness*) is made by the scattering of the parts of *Four*, thus, 1, 2, 3, 4. Put these together now, and they are *Ten*, πᾶσις, or τὸ πᾶν, the *Universe*. And this was such a Secret amongst *Pythagoras* his disciples, that it was a solemn Oath with them to swear by him that delivered to them the mystery of the *Tetractys*, *Tetrad*, or *number Four*.

Sext. Empi-
ric. adversus
Mathematic.
lib. 4.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἡμετέρα ψυχῇ ἐκδιδόντα τετρακτὺν,
Παγὰν αἰνάς φύσεως ῥίζωμα τ' ἔχουσαν.

By him that did to us disclose
The Tetrad mystery,
Where Natures Fount that ever flows,
And hidden root doth lie.

Thus they swore by *Pythagoras*, as is conceived, who taught them this mysterious tradition. And had it not been a right worshipful mystery, think you, indeed, and worthy of the solemnity of Religion, and of an Oath, to understand that 1, 2, 3, 4, make *Ten*; and that *Ten* is *All*? which rude mankind told first upon their fingers, and *Arithmeticians* discover it by calling them *Digits* at this very day.

There is no likelihood that so wise a man, as *Pythagoras* was, should lay any stress upon such trifles, or that his Scholars should be such fools as to be taken with them. But it is well known, that the *Pythagoreans* held the Motion of the Earth about the Sun, which is plainly implied, according to the *Philosophick Cabbala* of this *Fourth* day's work. So much of his Secrets got out to common knowledge and fame. But it is very highly probable, that he had the whole *Philosophick Cabbala* of the Creation opened to him by some knowing Priest or Philosopher (as we now call them) in the Oriental parts, that under this mystery of numbers, set out to him the choicest and most precious Conclusions in *Natural Philosophy*, interpreting, as I conceive, the Text of *Moses* in some such way as I have light upon, and making all those generous and ample Conclusions good by Demonstration and Reason. And so *Pythagoras* being well furnish'd with the knowledge of things, was willing to impart them to those whose piety and capacity was fit to receive them; not laying aside that outward form of *Numbers*, which they were first conveyed to himself in. But such *Arithmetical* nugacities as are ordinarily recorded for his, in dry Numbers, to have been the riches of the Wisdom of so famous a Philosopher, is a thing beyond all credit or probability.

Wherefore I conceive, that the choicest and most precious Treasures of knowledge being laid open in the *Cabbala* of the *Fourth* day, from thence it was that so much Solemnity and Religion was put upon that Number, which he called his *Tetractys*; which seems to have been

been of two kinds, the one, the *single number Four*; the * other, *Thirty* * Plutarch. de
six, made of the four first Masculine numbers, and the four first Femi-
nine, viz. of 1, 3, 5, 7. and of 2, 4, 6, 8. wherein you see, that the
former and more simple Tetractys is still included and made use of;
for Four here takes place again in the Assignment of the Masculine
and Feminine Numbers. Whence I further conceive, that under the
number of this more complex Tetrad, which contains also the other
in it, he taught his Disciples the mystery of the whole Creation, open-
ing to them the nature of all things, as well Spiritual as Corporeal.

Ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς τὸ τετρακτὺν ἔχει καὶ παθητικὸν, ὃ δ' αὖτις τὸ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀμεταβάτον. Διὸ δὲ μὲν θήλυνος ὀνομαζέσθαι, ὃ δ' ἀρρεῖν, as a certain Author writes; Anonym. in
Ptolem. Te-
trabibl. l. 1.
For an even Number carries along with it divisibility and passibility; but
an odd Number, indivisibility, impassibility, and activity: wherefore that is
called Feminine, this Masculine.

Wherefore the putting together of the four first Masculine Num-
bers to the four first Feminine, is the * joining of the Active and
Passive Principle together, matching the parts of the Matter with
congruous Forms from the World of Life. So that I conceive, the Te-
tractys was a Symbole of the whole System of Pythagoras his Philoso-
phy, which we may very justly suspect to be the same with the
Mosaical Cabbala. And the root of this Tetractys is Six, which again
hits upon Moses, and reminds us of the Six days work of the Creation.

Vers. 20. Fish and Fowl are made in the same day. And here Moses
does plainly play the Philosopher in putting them together; for there
is more affinity betwixt them than is easily discerned by the heedless
vulgar: for, besides that Fowls frequent the waters very much, many
kinds of them I mean, these Elements themselves of Air and Water,
for their thinness and liquidity, are very like one another. Besides,
the fins of Fishes, and the wings of Birds; the feathers of one, and the
scales of the other, are very Analogical. They are both also destitute
of Ureters, properly so call'd, of Dugges also, and of Milk, and are
Oviparous. Further, their motions are mainly alike, the Fishes as it
were flying in the Water, and the Fowls swimming in the Air, accord-
ing to that of the Poet concerning Dedalus, when he had made himself
wings,

Insuetum per iter gelidas enavit ad Arctos.

Cast in this also, that as some Fowls dive and swim under water, Euseb. Nie-
so some Fishes fly above the water in the air for a considerable space, remberg.
till their fins begin to be something stiff and dry. Hist. Natu-
ral. lib. 11.
cap. 35.

Vers. 23. And the Quinary denotes. Philo does not here omit that
obvious consideration of the Five senses in Animals. But it is a strange
coincidence if it was not intended, that living Creatures should be
said to be made in the Fifth and Sixth day, those Numbers, accord-
ing to the Pythagorical mystery, being so fitly significant of the nature
of them. For Five is acknowledged by them to be Male and Female,
consisting of Three and Two, the two first Masculine and Feminine num-
bers: It is also an Emblem of Generation; for the number Five drawn
into Five, brings about Five again, as you see in Five times Five, which
is Twenty Five. So an Eagle ingendring with an Eagle, brings forth
an

Nicomach.
Gerasen. A-
rithmet. The-
olog. lib. 2.
Plutarch. De
Ei apud Del-
phos.

an Eagle; and a Dolphin ingendring with a Dolphin, a Dolphin; and so in the rest. Whence the *Pythagoreans* call this number *Five*, *Cytherea*, that is, *Venus*, and $\rho\acute{\alpha}\mu\theta$, *Marriage*; and in *Birds* it is evident that they chuse their mates. Concerning the number *Six*, I shall speak in its proper place.

Verf. 26. That it is so free, so rational. That the Image of God consists in this rather than in the dominion over the creature, I take to be the right sense, and more *Philosophical*, the other more *Political*; and *Philo* interprets it after that manner we have made choice of, which is also more suitable to *Platonism* and *Pythagorism*, the best *Cabbala* that I know of *Moses* his Text.

Verf. 27. Male and Female. It is a wonder, says *Grotius*, to see how the Explications of the *Rabbins* upon this place and those passages in *Plato's Symposium*, agree one with another, which notwithstanding from whatsoever they proceeded, I make no question, says he, but they are false and vain: And I must confess, I am fully of the same opinion. But this strange agreement betwixt *Aristophanes* his Narration, in the forenamed *Symposium*, and the comments of the *Rabbins* upon this Text, is no small argument that *Plato* had some knowledge of *Moses*, which may well add the greater authority and credit to this our *Cabbala*. But it was the wisdom of *Plato* to own the true *Cabbala* himself; but such unwarrantable Fancies as might rise from the Text, to cast upon such a ridiculous shallow companion as *Aristophanes*; it was good enough for him to utter in that *Clubb of Wits*, that *Philosophick Symposium* of *Plato*.

Verf. 28. They lorded it. The *Seventy* have it $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$, which is to domineer with an high hand, *Matth. 20*.

Clem. Alex-
andrin. Stro-
mat. lib. 6.

Verf. 31. And the Senary denotes. The *Senary*, or the number *Six*, has a double reference, the one to this particular day's work, the other to the whole Creation. For the particular day's work, it is the Creation of sundry sorts of *Land-Animals*, divided into *Male* and *Female*. For *Two* into *Three* is *Six*. The conceit is *Philo's*; and hence the *Pythagoreans* called this number, $\rho\acute{\alpha}\mu\theta$, *Matrimony*, as *Clemens* also observes, adding moreover, that they did it in reference to the Creation of the World, set down by *Moses*. This number also, in the same sort that the number *Five*, is a fit Emblem of *Procreation*. For *Six* drawn into *Six*, makes *Thirty Six*. The conceit is *Plutarch's*, in his *De Ei apud Delphos*, though he speaks of it in an inferior kind of Generation: But methinks it is most proper to *Animals*. Here is something also that respects *Man* particularly, the choicest result of this *Sixth* day's labour. The number of the brutish Nature was *Five*, according to *Philo*; but there is an *Unite* superadded in *Man*, *Reason* reaching out to the knowledge of a God. And this *Unite* added to the former *Five*, makes *Six*.

Nicomach.
Gerasen. A-
rithmet. The-
olog. lib. 2.

But now for the reference that *Six* bears to the whole Creation, that the *Pythagoreans* did conceive it was significant thereof, appears by the Titles they have given it. For they call it, $\Delta\iota\alpha\theta\epsilon\tau\omega\varsigma \tau\epsilon \pi\alpha\upsilon\delta\epsilon$, $\alpha\kappa\mu\omega\nu$, $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\theta$, *The articulate and compleat efformation of the Universe, the Anvil, and the World*. I suppose they call it *the Anvil* from that indefatigable shaping out of new Forms and Figures upon the Matter of the

the Universe, by virtue of the Active Principle that ever busies it self every where. But how the *Senary* should Emblemize the World, you shall understand thus: The World is *self-compleat*, filled and perfected by its own parts; so is the *Senarius*, which has no denominated part but a *Sixth*, *Third*, and *Second*, viz. 1, 2, 3. which put together make *Six*; and *Euclide* defines a perfect number from this property, *Τὸ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὅ τοις ἰαυτῷ μέρεσιν ἴσθ' ὧν*, A perfect Number is that which is equal to its parts. Wherefore this number sets out the perfection of the World, and you know God in the close of all saw, that all that he made was very good. Then again the World is *Ἀπὸ τῆς ὁῦλης*, *Mas* and *Femina*, that is, it consists of an *Active* and *Passive* Principle, the one brought down into the other from the *World of Life*; and the *Senary* is made by the drawing of the first *Masculine* Number into the first *Feminine*, for *Three* into *Two* is *Six*.

Element. Geom.
metr. lib. 7.
defin. 22.

Clem. Alex-
andr. Stro-
mat. lib. 6.
Nicomach.
Gerasen. A-
rithmet. The-
log. lib. 2.

Thus you see continuedly, That the property of the number sets off the nature of the work of every day, according to those mysteries that the *Pythagoreans* have observed in them; and besides this, That the Numbers have ordinarily got Names answerable to each day's work; which, as I have often intimated, is a very high probability, that the *Pythagoreans* had a *Cabbala* referring to *Moses* his Text, and the History of the Creation. And *Philo*, though not in so punctual a way, has offered at the opening of the mind of *Moses* by this Key. But I hope I have made it so plain, that it will not hereafter be scrupled, but that this is the genuine way of interpreting the *Philosophick* meaning of the *Mosaical* Text in this first Chapter of *Genesis*.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. I. Vers. 1.

PRO hac Materia Physica nos Metaphysicam ponimus, &c. Ità sanè facimus in *Cabbala* ipsa; in *Appendice* verò *Defensionis*, Cap. 9. *Physicam* quendam *Hylem* hìc etiam intelligi posse, & fusè & solidè, ni fallor, demonstravimus.

Quod Nomen *יהיה* tempus futurum, præsens ac præteritum, &c. Hoc est, Divina Essentia totum rerum seriem ac seculorum ordinem à principio ad finem in se continet.

Et absque eo factum est nihil quod factum sit, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο ἔδὲ ἐν, ὃ γέγονεν. Quidam ad ἔδὲ ἐν, plenam periodum ponunt, & ὃ γέγονεν cum Ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶν ἦν conjungunt. Sed temerè meo quidem iudicio. Neque enim *ἀποφασολογία* est ὃ γέγονεν, sed vehementior affirmatio sine Logo nihil omninò creatum fuisse: ac si sic scriptum esset, χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο ἔδὲ ἐν ὅτι ἐν ὃ γέγονεν. Deinde ὃ γέγονε distinctionis gratiâ addi potest, ut certius intelligatur quid per ἐγένετο significetur, nempe quòd talia indigentur quæ initium habuerint, quod apertius indicatur per γέγονε, quod præteriti temporis significationem habet, cùm ἐγένετο ἀορίστως significet, & eodem ferè sensu sumi posset, quo ἦν in καὶ δέ ἐν καὶ ὁ λόγος. Eo igitur sensu ἐγένετο & γέγονεν hìc sumenda innuitur, quo τὸ γενόμενον in Dicto

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 olog. lib. 2. chuse their mates. Concerning the number *Six*, I shall speak in its
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Vers. 26. *That it is so free, so rational.* That the Image of God consists in this rather than in the dominion over the creature, I take to be the right sense, and more Philosophical, the other more Political; and Philo interprets it after that manner we have made choice of, which is also more suitable to Platonism and Pythagorism, the best Cabbala that I know of Moses his Text.

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Vers. 28. *They lorded it.* The Seventy have it $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\lambda\delta\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$, which is to domineer with an high hand, Matth. 20.

Vers. 31. *And the Senary denotes.* The Senary, or the number Six, has a double reference, the one to this particular day's work, the other to the whole Creation. For the particular day's work, it is the Creation of fundry sorts of Land-Animals, divided into Male and Female. For Two into Three is Six. The conceit is Philo's; and hence the Pythagoreans called this number, $\rho\acute{\alpha}\mu\theta$, *Matrimony*, as Clemens also observes, adding moreover, that they did it in reference to the Creation of the World, set down by Moses. This number also, in the same sort that the number Five, is a fit Emblem of Procreation. For Six drawn into Six, makes Thirty Six. The conceit is Plutarch's, in his *De Ei apud Delphos*, though he speaks of it in an inferior kind of Generation: But methinks it is most proper to Animals. Here is something also that respects Man particularly, the choicest result of this Sixth day's labour. The number of the brutish Nature was Five, according to Philo; but there is an Unite superadded in Man, Reason reaching out to the knowledge of a God. And this Unite added to the former Five, makes Six.

But now for the reference that Six bears to the whole Creation, that the Pythagoreans did conceive it was significant thereof, appears by the Titles they have given it. For they call it, $\Delta\iota\alpha\phi\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \tau\epsilon\ \pi\alpha\upsilon\lambda\delta\varsigma$, $\alpha\kappa\mu\omega\nu$, $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\theta$, The articulate and compleat efformation of the Universe, the Anvil, and the World. I suppose they call it the Anvil from that indefatigable shaping out of new Forms and Figures upon the Matter of the

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Element. Geom.
metr. lib. 7.
defin. 22.

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Thus you see continuedly, That the property of the number sets off the nature of the work of every day, according to those mysteries that the *Pythagoreans* have observed in them; and besides this, That the Numbers have ordinarily got Names answerable to each day's work; which, as I have often intimated, is a very high probability, that the *Pythagoreans* had a *Cabbala* referring to *Moses* his Text, and the History of the Creation. And *Philo*, though not in so punctual a way, has offered at the opening of the mind of *Moses* by this Key. But I hope I have made it so plain, that it will not hereafter be scrupled, but that this is the genuine way of interpreting the *Philosophick* meaning of the *Mosaical* Text in this first Chapter of *Genesis*.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. I. Vers. 1.

PRO hac Materia Physica nos Metaphysicam ponimus, &c. Ità sanè facimus in Cabbala ipsa; in Appendice verò Defensionis, Cap. 9. Physicam quandam Hylem hinc etiam intelligi posse, & fusè & solidè, ni fallor, demonstravimus.

Quod Nomen יהוה tempus futurum, præsens ac præteritum, &c. Hoc est, Divina Essentia totum rerum seriem ac seculorum ordinem à principio ad finem in se continet.

Et absque eo factum est nihil quod factum sit, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο ὃ δὲ ἐν, ὃ γέγονεν. Quidam ad ὃ δὲ ἐν, plenam periodum ponunt, & ὃ γέγονεν cum Ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶν ἦν conjungunt. Sed temerè meo quidem iudicio. Neque enim ἀεὶ ἀλογία est ὃ γέγονεν, sed vehementior affirmatio sine Logo nihil omnino creatum fuisse: ac si sic scriptum esset, χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο ὃ δὲ ἐν ὅτι ἐν ὃ γέγονεν. Deinde ὃ γέγονε distinctionis gratiâ addi potest, ut certius intelligatur quid per ἐγένετο significetur, nempe quòd talia indigentur quæ initium habuerint, quod apertius indicatur per γέγονε, quod præteriti temporis significationem habet, cum ἐγένετο ἀορίστως significet, & eodem ferè sensu sumi posset, quo ἦν in καὶ δέ ἐστιν καὶ ὁ λόγος. Eo igitur sensu ἐγένετο & γέγονεν hinc sumenda innuitur, quo τὸ γενόμενον in Dicto

Physic. lib. 1. cap. 3. Dicto illo *Melissi* apud *Aristotelem*, Εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἅπαν, καὶ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον οὐκ ἔχει. Ubi τὸ γενόμενον, & τὸ ἀρχὴν ἔχον, idem sonare videntur. Quæ verò necessaria sunt & æterna, cùm de eis dici non posset, ὅτι γέγονεν, ut quæ principium non habeant, non inscitè nec temerè adjectum est ὅ γέγονεν, ut distinctus perinde atque plenus hujus loci sensus intelligatur, nempe de omnibus γενόμενοις absolutissimè verum esse, quòd nihil omnino ἐγένετο, quin ab ipso sit factum, quò *Logos* verus Deus Creator agnosci possit, & ut talis eoli.

Verùm ὅ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶν ἦν, sententia admodum dura est aut falsa. Omne enim factum à *Logo*, non est Vita, cùm *Materia* non sit. Et ut ζῶν pro ζῶν poneretur vel ζωοποιηθὲν, durior est locutio. Et qualis ζῶν hîc subindicetur apparet ex verbis proximè sequentibus, quòd hæc ζῶν sit lux Hominum. Unde palàm est ζῶν hanc talem esse ζῶν à cujus influxu homines illuminentur, quæ proinde omnino est Spiritus sanctus. Id quod longè credibilius est, quàm Ideas Divinas per ζῶν significari. Quippe quòd iste sensus Narrationem magis aridam & Scholasticam redderet, eandemque nihilominus mancam relinqueret omissâ mentione Spiritûs S. tertiæ Hypostaseos Divinæ Trinitatis. Quibus omnibus adde, Græcos codices magis probatæ Authoritatis omnes, quod notat *Calvinus*, in vulgari lectione consentire.

Vers. 5. Apellant etiam Ζανὸς πύργον. Equidem fateor me hîc in animo habuisse Apellationem Ζανὸς πύργον, deorsum ad Rationales feminales significandas attrahere; at verò nunc postquam intellexerim Numeros Pythagoricos ad Mercaviam perinde atque ad Berebith spectare, longè altius quid sonare existimo, nec ad ullam Creaturam spectare, sed ad τὸ ἐν Platoniorum, & ob eam causam inter Nomina Unitatis recenseri. Qua de re vide Tabulam Sephirotharum Pythagoricam.

Quicquid verè ac propriè primo die creatum est, immateriale, &c. Nisi Hylem quandam Physicam cum *Augustino* tunc creari velimus: qua de re vide Appendicem Defensionis Cab. Philos. cap. 9.

Atque ex hac ratione Pythagorei Unitatem perinde atque Binarium ὕλην appellant. Quinimo vide annon Unitas Hyle vocari posset, eò quòd *Materia* ex Physicis Monadibus consistat.

Vers. 6. Immensam realis corporeæque Materiæ creavit copiam, &c. De productione hujus corporeæ Materiæ vide *Plotinum* Ennead. 4. lib. 3. cap. 9. & Tractatum meum De Animæ Immortalitate, lib. 3. cap. 16. sect. 8.

Adam, quod Terram sonat. Immò verè appertè pulvis appellatur, Genes. cap. 2. v. 7. Formavit igitur Dominus Deus Hominem כוֹהָאָדָם, pulverem è Terra.

Vers. 16. Et certè Terra uti & reliqui Planeta tali naturâ sunt ac si aliquando ardentes splendentisque fuissent Soles. Hîc equidem omittere non possim quin notem quanta cum scævitate atque invidentia mecum egerit S. A. qui in Exam. Gener. Cabbala meæ Philosophicæ, Disput. 3. sect. 2. p. 156. ita de me scribit. Itaque qui credunt terram aliquando fuisse sidus, qui Cartesii Potuisse vertunt in Debuisset, si Deus Mundum paulatim oriri voluerit, immò ita ortum esse audacter scribunt, atque Historiam Moisaicam fidiculis subjiciunt, prout D. Morus facit, à modestia ejusdem Cartesii & veritate procul videntur, majori temeritate, discedere. Quanta cum

cum incuria & supinitate, ne dicam, malevolentia, in scriptis meis versatus sit S. A. vel ex hoc loco satis intelligere est. Quippe qui de me planè contrà atque ipse sententiam explico, pronunciat. Non dico enim Terram Planetasque olim Soles fuisse, sed eorum naturam talem esse ac si olim fuissent Soles. Quod & ipse *Cartesius* apertè affirmat, pari, siqua sit, temeritate. Ego verò cum paulo suprà cum veteribus affirmàssem, omnia simul creata fuisse, Terram pariter atque Solem Stellasque, planè repugnat ut adeò audacter asseram Terram aliquando fuisse *sidus*. Cæterum ut non soli *Samueli Andreae* sed omnibus in posterum, (sive *semel* Mundus creatus sit sive paulatim & *successivè*) liberiora scriptorum meorum loca cavillandi ansam præripiam, quinque illas Regulas, quas in *Apologia* descripsi, earumque rationes, quibus præcipuus Scopus Methodusque scriptorum meorum certius intelligatur, huc transcribam. Quibus præfixus est hic Titulus,

Quomodo quis in Rationali hoc ac Philosophico seculo se gerere debeat ad lucrificiendos retinendosve homines in fide Christiana.

REGULA I.

¹ *Summa cum diligentia sibi cavere debet nè quicquam neget, quòd is quem convincere velit cum clara ac solida ratione, meritò tenere videatur & allegare.* ² *Et præsertim religioni habere debet id negare tanquam Christianæ Fidei repugnans.* ³ *Nisi planè ac reverà infallibilibus sacræ Scripturæ Oraculis contrarietur.*

Ratio primæ partis hujus Regulæ pretenda est à periculo nè faciat ut ipse contemptibilis appareat ac superstitiosus *Idiota*, sicque seipsum reddat Provinciæ, quam susceperit, planè inutilem; quippe quum *Antagonista* statim concludurus sit, non quidem judicium esse, sed casum, ignorantiam, aut educationis vim quæ faciat ut Religioni, quam profitetur, adhæreat.

Ratio secundæ partis est, nè Religionem ipsam in discrimen adducat, & contemptum, ac si infallibilis Dei dictamen non esset sed fallibilium aliquorum miserèque hallucinantium hominum qui rerum naturam ignorarent, & tamen nihilominus opportunitate oblatâ, in officium se insinuaverint Legislatorum & Prophetarum, quemadmodum fecit *Mahometes*. Hâc viâ equidem, fateor, seipsum quis commodè vindicare posset à contumelia & suspicione nè vir videatur rationis haud satis compos, dum ultrò agnoscit cum *Antagonista* Religionem suam sibi ipsi videri Rationi minùs consentaneam: Verum enimvero Religionem interim Opponentis derisui & contemptui exponit, facitque ut Christianitas non magis quidem commendabilis sit quàm vilissima quælibet Impostura cui id honoris unquam contigerit, ut Religionis Titulo adornaretur.

Denique superadditur, Nisi planè ac reverà infallibilibus Divini verbi Oraculis contrarietur. Nam proculdubio talis ratio quæ illis reverà repugnet, utcunque primo aspectu solida videatur, si examinetur stirpitùs & excutiat, non est vera Ratio, ut nec istæ Scripturæ Interpretationes veræ, quæ veræ repugnent Rationi.

Quam-

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Quomodo quis in Rationali hoc ac Philosophico seculo se gerere debeat ad lucrificandos retinendosve homines in fide Christiana.

REGULA I.

¹ *Summa cum diligentia sibi cavere debet nè quicquam neget, quòd is quem convincere velit cum clara ac solida ratione, meritò tenere videatur & allegare.* ² *Et præsertim religioni habere debet id negare tanquam Christianæ Fidei repugnans.* ³ *Nisi planè ac reverà infallibilibus sacræ Scripturæ Oraculis contrarietur.*

Ratio primæ partis hujus Regulæ pretenda est à periculo nè faciat ut ipse contemptibilis appareat ac superstitiosus *Idiota*, sicque seipsum reddat Provinciæ, quam susceperit, planè inutilem; quippe quum *Antagonista* statim conclusurus sit, non quidem judicium esse, sed casum, ignorantiam, aut educationis vim quæ faciat ut Religioni, quam profitetur, adhæreat.

Ratio secundæ partis est, nè Religionem ipsam in discrimen adducat, & contemptum, ac si infallibilis Dei dictamen non esset sed fallibilium aliquorum miseræque hallucinantium hominum qui rerum naturam ignorarent, & tamen nihilominus opportunitate oblatâ, in officium se insinuaverint Legislatorum & Prophetarum, quemadmodum fecit *Mahometes*. Hâc viâ equidem, fateor, seipsum quis commodè vindicare posset à contumelia & suspicione nè vir videatur rationis haud satis compos, dum ultrò agnoscit cum *Antagonista* Religionem suam sibi ipsi videri Rationi minùs consentaneam: Verùm enimvero Religionem interim Opponentis derisui & contemptui exponit, facitque ut Christianitas non magis quidem commendabilis sit quàm vilissima quælibet Impostura cui id honoris unquam contigerit, ut Religionis Titulo adornaretur.

Denique superadditur, Nisi planè ac reverà infallibilibus Divini verbi Oraculis contrarietur. Nam proculdubio talis ratio quæ illis reverà repugnet, utcunque primo aspectu solida videatur, si examinetur stirpitùs & excutiat, non est vera Ratio, ut nec istæ Scripturæ Interpretationes veræ, quæ veræ repugnent Rationi.

Quam-

Quamobrem ex primæ hujus Regulæ sequela, Is qui cum perito Philosopho agere velit, Motum Telluris debet non negare, quippe quod dogma sit adeo solidum & rationi consentaneum nec reverà sacræ Scripturæ repugnans. Etenim quod Terra motu Diurno, Annuoque circa Solem movetur, naturali Rationi nimis quam manifestum esse, apparere potest ex eis quæ scripsi in Epistola ad V. C. sect. 7. Quod verò Scripturis non repugnat, id quidem à tot viris eruditis probatum & confirmatum est, ut omnino sat sit eorum operæ meminisse. Quinimò nec tuto potest negare Terram Planetam esse; Illa enim necessaria consequentia est motus illius circa Solem, quemadmodum fit in aliis Planetis. Lumen etiam reflectit sicut Luna, transitque per Zodiacum, sicut faciunt alii Planetæ. Nec Scriptura usquam negat Planetam esse, non certè magis quam moveri circa Solem. Quocirca hæc aliæque consimiles conclusiones quum tam fortiter in humanam Rationem speculationesque Philosophicas se insinuant, valde inconsultum esset & Religioni Christianæ oppidò quam incommodum, si quis easdem affirmaret Christianæ fidei sacrosanctisque Dei oraculis repugnare, atque sic efficeret, ut Vulgares & Idioticæ hominum opiniones super his rebus pro indispensabilibus Christianæ fidei Articulis habeantur. Nam quantum detrimentum dogmata à Philosophia abhorrentia Religioni afferant, manifestum est in *Mahometismo*. Ubi fabula de Luna per *Mahometis* manicam egrediente, & de Sole in fonte pernoctante, deque Stellis tot montes magnitudine omnino æquantibus & e Cælo per catenas suspensis, cum id genus aliis, facit planè ut omnes homines intelligentes illam Religionem tanquam merè humanam considerent, nequaquam verò Divinitus institutam.

Quamobrem, quod dixi, magno præjudicio futurum esset fidei Christianæ, si quis suprà dictas conclusiones assereret ei repugnare, nisi reverà ipsi Scripturæ repugnarent, quæ hisce de rebus omnino filet, cum Objectum Historiæ Creationis, *Mundus Philosophorum* non sit, sed *Mundus Plebeiorum*. Qui est *comprehensio Mundi* non *ultrà*, nec alio quidem modo quam qui sensui & imaginationi rudis vulgi congruat. Ac proinde *φανόμωνα* enarrat sive *εμφανόμενα* Universi, secundum sensibiles istas Ideas quæ visus organo imprimuntur; Cælum cæruleum, Nubes, Solem, Stellisque ad eandem ferè a Terra distantiam collocans, eisdemque æstimans magnitudinibus quibus oculo nostro apparent. Quemadmodum demonstrari potest ex ipso Textu, vers. 6. Ubi Firmamentum sive Cælum (nam idem esse illuc affirmatur) dicitur esse inter Aquas superiores & inferiores, & in eum finem creari ut eas disterneret. Quare & situs & officium Firmamenti planè ostendunt, illud non nisi ad aquas superiores, i. e. ad Nubes extendi, quemadmodum censent *Rupertus*, *Eugubinus*, *Pererius*, *Gregorius de Valentia*, *Augustinus*, *Castellio*, *Calvinus*, *Vatablus*, & *Drusius*, *Grotius* etiam eò vergere videtur, & *David* denique *Hebraeus*, cognominatus *Camius*, acriter contendit *רקיע* propriè significare *Aerem*. Cæterum intra hoc *רקיע* (quod ordinariè redditur Firmamentum) Stellæ, Luna atque Sol siti sunt, vers. 14, 15, 16, 17. eisque describuntur magnitudinibus quibus intra hunc ambitum sensibiles eorum Ideæ nobis apparent.

Integra igitur illius Mundi comprehensio qui *Historicè* in *Genesi* descriptus est, Semiperipheriâ circumscribitur super Axem Terræ ad utrumque polum, paulo supra Nubes productum delineatâ & in plenum

num circuitum circumactâ. Hæc Semiperipheria sic circumducta *Sphericum* describit *Mundi Plebeiorum*, qui *Mosaica Historia* de Creatione perinde *subjectum* est, atque futuræ finalis *Conflagrationis* (quemadmodum Cl. *Medus* cum iudicio definivit) in adventu Christi, die novissimo.

Fabricatio igitur sive *Creatio Cæli* atque *Terræ* vera *Epocha* est *Historica* sive *Chronologica* totius *Historiæ Bibliorum*, cum *Philosophica Cabbala* nullis temporis discerniculis distinguatur limiteturve, sed naturam solummodo partium illustret *Universæ Creationis Dei*. Hæc verò ipse temporis ordo notatur, diésque sex, totidem diurnis *Terræ* circumvolutionibus, quantuscunque earum sit ambitus, facile possunt distingui, totaque *Creatio* realis esse rerum productionumve *Phænomenon Naturæ Historiæ*. Et quantum ad ea quæ miraculosa videntur & extra *Naturæ* cursum, rationi nequaquam repugnat, si concludas revera facta fuisse à Deo & in perpetua *Symbola* ponderosissimarum veritatum destinata. Quemadmodum fit in multis aliis miraculosis *Providentiæ* eventis in reliqua *Historia veteris Testamenti*, quæ sunt perennes *Figuræ* sive *Typi* summorum maximèque stupendorum *Mysteriorum Regni Dei*; ut miraculosus ille *Israelitarum* transitus per *Mare rubrum*, & similia.

Adeò ut ipsa *Litera Historiæ* vera sit, quanquam cum debitis accommodationibus, aptisque ad vulgi captum demissionibus facta sit illius enarratio. Exempli causâ. Verum est, Deum formavisse *Adamum* è pulvere *Terræ*, ut *Plastæ* fingunt homines luteos, quemadmodum loquitur *Cornelius à Lapidè*. Sed hunc pulverem addito opimo liquore (inquit *Tertullianus*) in argillam prius coagulavit. Et inspirationem etiam in faciem narésve illius intelligunt *Metaphoricè*, ut quædam intelligi solent etiam in communi *Historia*. Quæ quidem *Metaphoræ* maximè accommodantur ad captum populi. Adeò ut nè minima quidem digladiatio sit *Historicam Cabbalam* inter atque *Philosophicam*.

Verum etiam est *Adamum* conjectum fuisse in soporem, Deumque costam è latere ejus tulisse, formâssèque in mulierem. *Sapientia* porrò atque loquela *Serpentis*, res veræ sunt, quemadmodum *S. Ephrem*, *S. Basilius* atque *Iosephus*, & cum ratione quidem, intelligunt & appertè declarant. Postremò, Deum *Tunicas pelliceas Adamo* atque *Eve* fecisse, flammantèsque *Cherubinos* ante Introitum *Paradisi* collocâsse, ista etiam sunt *Historicè vera*. Quanquam nihil interim impedit quo minùs horum omnium *Historia Symbolica* etiam esse possit, sive *Hieroglyphica*.

Cæterùm tametsi quis apud seipsum de *Historica* symbolorum veritate satis persuasus esse possit, dubito tamen an debeat illius certitudinem in singulis partibus apud homines qui ingenio magis *Philosophico* sint, præfidentiùs affirmare. Idque eò magis moneo, propterea quòd sobrii admodum, multique ac probati nominis *Scriptores* quædam loca asserunt esse *Parabolica*. Quemadmodum facit *Cajetanus* de *Serpente*, per quem *Diabolum* intelligit intus *Eve* tales rationes suggerentem quæ ipsam illecturæ essent ad peccandum. *Cyrillus* etiam & *Eugubinus* intelligunt de *Diabolo* talem formam sibi assumente. *Tertullianus* per gladium flammantem & *Cherubinos*, *Zonam* intelligit *Torridam*.

ridam. Et *Cajetanus* rursus Historiam de costa *Adami* parabolam facit, asseritque *Adamum* & *Evam* eodem temporis momento fuisse creatos. *Adamumque* Animalibus ad eum accidentibus nomina imposuisse in Visione tantum intellectuali. Quamobrem valde inconsultum esset, cum & melioris notæ Christiani, & *Philo* etiam aliique *Judei* multa loca horum capitum Parabolica faciant, si quis affirmatè apud Philosophum contendere vellet, omnia reverà esse Historica, quicquid interim apud seipsum super hac re crediderit statueritve. Verum hæc excursio est, non adèò fortean necessaria, quanquam naturali scopo hujus primæ Regulæ satis homogenea.

REGULA II.

Admissis semel Conclusionibus Antagonistæ tanquam Rationi consentaneis, per occasionem debet ostendere quomodo nulla Christianæ Fidei pars, ulla in re, damnum inde accipiat.

Ratio Regulæ hæc est: Quia aliàs, fundamenta conclusionésve Philosophici sui *Antagonistæ* admittendo tanquam rationi consentaneas, credibilitatem alicujus articuli Fidei Christianæ in discrimen adducere posset, eumque, quem convertere adnititur, in priori Infidelitate obdurare. Equidem fateor, ex hujus Regulæ observatione, facile fieri posse, ut quædam tanquam admissa & approbata in scriptis meis occurrant, (quæ Philosophi facillimè generalissimèque approbant) in eum solum finem ut occasionem arriperem ostendendi nullum detrimentum periculumve ulli Principio nostræ Religionis indè imminere, quamvis ista vera esse admitteremus. Quod facit ut in nonnullis locis ineffigiatum, inorganizatumve vehiculum Animæ æthereum admittere videar. Qua de re hic non est dicendi locus.

REGULA III.

Quòd ipsa talia Principia Conclusionésve Philosophicas eligere debet, quæ, cum nullam cum Scripturis repugnantiam habeant, sint etiam in se maxime extra omnem cavillationem posita, facillimèque omnium teneri & demonstrari possint, & cum Attributis Divinis & Phenomenis Providentiæ conciliari; quæque denique aut anticipaturæ sint maximas Objectiones quas Atheus contra Existentiæ Dei aut Immortalitatem Animæ præmiùmque vitæ futura excogitare potest, aut eisdem saltem satisfacturæ.

Si hæc non sit Regula quam sincerus prudensque Christianus sibi præscribere debet in rebus Philosophicis, ipsi integrum est contrarium sibi asciscere. Quod tamen primo intuitu adèò absurdum est, ut satis sit vel leviter illud subindicasse. Quòd si quis dicat, eum rebus Philosophicis se omnino immiscere non oportere, idque nè tum quidem cum operam dat conversioni aut confirmationi eorum qui ingenio sint Philosophico, non solum immanis ex se esset barbaraque Assertio, sed cum contumelia Majorum conjuncta, qui *Universitates* fundârunt Legésque nobis ac Statuta conscripserunt quibus decretum est ut diligenter in Philosophiæ studiis versemur, idque in ordine ad ipsam Theologiam. Quamobrem hæc tertia Regula nequaquam negari potest valde rationi consentanea esse & reverà indispensabilis.

Si

Si hanc igitur Regulam secutus, præcipua aliquot *Cartesianismi* & *Platonismi* dogmata elegerim, equidem me veniam saltem mereri haud temerè censeo. Nam inscitam illam ejiciendo *Aristotelicorum* opinionem, qui Formas substantiales è *potentia Materiae* educunt, admittendoque & asserendo cum *Cartesio* *Mundi naturalis* Materiam, quantum ad illius substantiam, ubique esse homogeneam (quod & satis evidenter demonstravi in Epistola ad V.C. *sect.* 6.) rationes habemus omnium quæ concipi possunt maximè demonstravit quibus inferri possit *Existentia Dei*, substantialisque Animæ *Immaterialitas* & *Separabilitas* à corpore, quemadmodum notavi in literis ad D. *Claudium Clerfelier*. Immenfitas etiam illa Universi, quam illius Philosophia supponit, magis consentanea est sacris Dei Attributis, Potentiæ utique ejus ac Bonitati, magisque Divinam Majestatem condecet; sive Mundum consideremus tanquam *Effectum* tam *omnipotentis Cause*, sive tanquam *Templum* tam *gloriose Divinitatis*. Nam antiqui Philosophi Univerſum hoc tanquam unum augustum Dei Templum spectitarunt: Cujus Templum *Hierosolymitanum* figura esset, quemadmodum *Grotius* notavit in *Baruchum*. O Israel quàm magna est domus Dei, quàm amplius est locus possessionis illius! Magnus, ut qui finem non habeat; altus, ut qui careat *Mensurâ*: Quod ad admirationem usque verum est de *Mundo Philosophorum*. Neque certè hoc *Baruchi* cum Historia Creationis in *Genesi* quicquam digladiatur, cujus Objectum supra monui *Mundum* potius esse *Plebeiorum* quàm *Mundum Philosophorum*, quippe quæ *Mundum* sensibilem superiorum Aquarum sive Nubium distantia limitat.

Hanc tertiam Regulam porro secutus, *Praeexistentiam* etiam *Animæ* scriptis meis inserui, ipsam admittens tanquam dogma rationi admodum consentaneum, ejusque utilitatem in *Tractatu de Animæ Immortalitate*, lib. 2. cap. 2. satis copiosè declaravi. Atque meo quidem judicio, intra modestiæ limites quispiam se continens opinionem hanc tanquam consentaneam jure potest asserere; omnesque ipse objectiones in quas mihi incidere contigit in ipsam contortas, partim in supra dicto *Tractatu* partim in *Præfatione Generali* *Scriptorum Philosophicorum Collectioni* præfixa, facili negotio dilui. Sola verò *Rationalitas* illius dogmatis est quam tueor, non autem illius *Veritas*, quemadmodum intelligere est ex dicta *Præfatione*. Hoc verò ad præsentem Regulam minùs pertinet.

REGULA IV.

Et si necessarium non sit, admodum tamen optabile esse ut supra dicta Principia Philosophica quæ elegerit, non solum nullam cum Divinis Oraculis repugnantiam habeant, sed ut aliquam insuper ab eisdem mutuentur Auctoritatem & approbationem, ut quæ aut perpetuo tenore alicubi sub Litera sive Historia arcanè abscondatur, tanquam magis internus mysticusque illius sensus, aut breviusculis aliquibus stricturis in ipsa Litera non obscure subinde indigentur.

Ratio est, Quia, præterquam quòd nobiliorum illarum veritatum Philosophicarum detectio in Scripturis, Religionem asserit vindicatque à vili Ignorantiæ imputatione in Philosophia rerumque Natura,

ridam. Et *Cajetanus* rursus Historiam de costa *Adami* parabolam facit, asseritque *Adamum* & *Evam* eodem temporis momento fuisse creatos. *Adamumque* Animalibus ad eum accidentibus nomina imposuisse in Visione tantum intellectuali. Quamobrem valde inconsultum esset, cum & melioris notæ Christiani, & *Philo* etiam alique *Judei* multa loca horum capitum Parabolica faciant, si quis affirmatè apud Philosophum contendere vellet, omnia reverà esse Historica, quicquid interim apud seipsum super hac re crediderit statueritve. Verum hæc excursio est, non adedò fortean necessaria, quanquam naturali scopo hujus primæ Regulæ satîs homogenea.

R E G U L A II.

Admissis semel Conclusionibus Antagonistæ tanquam Rationi consentaneis, per occasionem debet ostendere quomodo nulla Christianæ Fidei pars, ulla in re, damnum inde accipiat.

Ratio Regulæ hæc est: Quia aliàs, fundamenta conclusionésve Philosophici sui *Antagonistæ* admittendo tanquam rationi consentaneas, credibilitatem alicujus articuli Fidei Christianæ in discrimen adducere posset, eumque, quem convertere adnititur, in priori Infidelitate obdurare. Equidem fateor, ex hujus Regulæ observatione, facillè fieri posse, ut quædam tanquam admissa & approbata in scriptis meis occurrant, (quæ Philosophi facillimè generalissimèque approbant) in eum solum finem ut occasionem arriperem ostendendi nullum detrimentum periculùmve ulli Principio nostræ Religionis indè imminere, quamvis ista vera esse admitteremus. Quod facit ut in nonnullis locis ineffigiatum, inorganizatùmve vehiculum Animæ æthereum admittere videar. Qua de re hic non est dicendi locus.

R E G U L A III.

Quòd ipsa talia Principia Conclusionésve Philosophicas eligere debet, quæ, cum nullam cum Scripturis repugnantiam habeant, sint etiam in se maxime extra omnem cavillationem posita, facillimèque omnium teneri & demonstrari possint, & cum Attributis Divinis & Phenomenis Providentiæ conciliari; quæque denique aut anticipaturæ sint maximas Objectiones quas Atheus contra Existentiæ Dei aut Immortalitatem Animæ præmiùmque vitæ futura excogitare potest, aut eisdem saltem satisfactura.

Si hæc non sit Regula quam sincerus prudensque Christianus sibi præscribere debet in rebus Philosophicis, ipsi integrum est contrarium sibi asciscere. Quod tamen primo intuitu adedò absurdum est, ut satis sit vel leviter illud subindicasse. Quòd si quis dicat, eum rebus Philosophicis se omnino immiscere non oportere, idque nè tum quidem cum operam dat conversioni aut confirmationi eorum qui ingenio sint Philosophico, non solum immanis ex se esset barbaraque Assertio, sed cum contumelia Majorum conjuncta, qui *Universitates* fundârunt Legésque nobis ac Statuta conscripserunt quibus decretum est ut diligenter in Philosophiæ studiis versemur, idque in ordine ad ipsam Theologiam. Quamobrem hæc tertia Regula nequaquam negari potest valde rationi consentanea esse & reverà indispensabilis.

Si

Si hanc igitur Regulam secutus, præcipua aliquot *Cartesianismi* & *Platonismi* dogmata elegerim, equidem me veniam saltem mereri haud temerè cenſeo. Nam inſcitam illam ejiciendo *Aristotelicorum* opinionem, qui Formas ſubſtantiales è *potentia Materiae* educunt, admittendòque & aſſerendo cum *Carteſio* *Mundi naturalis* Materiam, quantum ad illius ſubſtantiam, ubique eſſe homogeneam (quod & ſatis evidenter demonſtravi in *Epiftola ad V.C. ſect. 6.*) rationes habemus omnium quæ concipi poſſunt maximè demonſtravitas quibus inferri poſſit *Exiſtentia Dei*, ſubſtantialiſque Animæ *Immaterialitas* & *Separabilitas* à corpore, quemadmodum notavi in literis ad *D. Claudium Clerſelier*. Immenſitas etiam illa Univerſi, quam illius Philoſophia ſupponit, magis conſentanea eſt ſacris Dei Attributis, Potentiæ utique ejus ac Bonitati, magiſque Divinam Majeſtatem condecet; ſive Mundum conſideremus tanquam *Eſſectum* tam *omnipotentis Cauſæ*, ſive tanquam *Templum* tam *glorioſe Divinitatis*. Nam antiqui Philoſophi Univerſum hoc tanquam unum auguſtum Dei Templum ſpectitârunt: Cujus Templum *Hieroſolymitanum* figura eſſet, quemadmodum *Grotius* notavit in *Barucham*. O *Israel* quàm magna eſt domus Dei, quàm amplius eſt locus poſſeſſionis illius! Magnus, ut qui finem non habeat; altus, ut qui careat *Meſſurâ*: Quod ad admirationem uſque verum eſt de *Mundo Philoſophorum*. Neque certè hoc *Baruchi* cum *Historia Creationis* in *Genefi* quicquam digladiatur, cujus Objectum ſupra monui *Mundum* potiùs eſſe *Plebeiorum* quàm *Mundum Philoſophorum*, quippe quæ Mundum ſenſibilem ſuperiorum Aquarum ſive Nubium diſtantiâ limitat.

Hanc tertiam Regulam porrò ſecutus, *Præexiſtentiam* etiam *Animæ* ſcriptis meis inferui, ipſam admittens tanquam dogma rationi admodum conſentaneum, ejùſque utilitatem in *Tractatu de Animæ Immortalitate*, lib. 2. cap. 2. ſatis copioſè declaravi. Atque meo quidem judicio, intra modèſtiæ limites quiſpiam ſe continens opinionem hanc tanquam conſentaneam jure poteſt aſſerere; omnesque ipſe objectiones in quas mihi incidere contigit in ipſam contortas, partim in ſuprà dicto *Tractatu* partim in *Præfatione Generali* *Scriptorum Philoſophicorum Collectioni* præfixa, ſacili negotio dilui. Sola verò *Rationalitas* illius dogmatis eſt quam tueor, non autem illius *Veritas*, quemadmodum intelligere eſt ex dicta *Præfatione*. Hoc verò ad præſentem Regulam minùs pertinet.

REGULA IV.

*Etſi neceſſarium non ſit, admodum tamen optabile eſſe ut ſuprà dicta Principia Philoſophica quæ elegerit, non ſolùm nullam cum Divinis Oraculis repugnantiam habeant, ſed ut aliquam inſuper ab eiſdem mutuentur Authoritatem & approbationem, ut quæ aut perpetuo tenore alicubi ſub Litera ſive *Historia* arcanè abſcondatur, tanquam magis internus myſticùſque illius ſenſus, aut breviusculis aliquibus ſtricturis in ipſa Litera non obſcurè ſubinde indigentur.*

Ratio eſt, Quia, præterquam quòd nobiliorum illarum veritatum Philoſophicarum detectio in *Scripturis*, Religionem aſſerit vindicatque à vili Ignorantiæ imputatione in *Philoſophia rerùmque Natura*,

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(quemadmodum alibi monuimus) insigniores istos præterea liberæ Rationis ac Philosophiæ fructus tuetur, contra vulgarem suspensionem Impietatis & Irreligionis. Cujus rei exemplum speciale esse potest, illud *Baruchi* suprâ memoratum, quod stupendæ Universi Immenfitati mirificè favet & suffulcit. Tali utique qualis est, juxta principia *Cartesii*, computumque Astronomorum, Copernicanorum præsertim, qui orbitam Annui motûs Telluris punctum tantummodo faciunt cum distantia nos inter atque Stellas comparatam. Formatio etiam totius meæ *Cabbalæ Philosophicæ* ad hanc quartam Regulam pertinet, suamque illinc ducit originem. Quod verò conjecturam nominaverim, referendum est ad quintam & ultimam.

REGULA V.

Quanquam Theoremata Philosophica tam ea quæ ipse elegerit quàm quæ admiserit in Antagonista, solida sint in se & rationi consentanea, nec reverà cum verbo Divino repugnantia; par tamen esse tum propter Vulgi captum, tum propter usitatiores aliquas Expositorum, Scriptorumque Theologicorum Opiniones non ultra hæc Theoremata admittere aut asserere quàm ut Rationi consentanea; de absoluta verò illorum Realitate ac Veritate magis cautè & custoditè se gerere, quàm ut quicquam illic statuat asseratve.

Ratio hujus Regulæ est, Quòd omnia facienda sunt ad ædificationem. Quemadmodum proculdubio omnia illa fiunt quæ ad hanc Christianæ prudentiæ Regulam attemperantur. Hic enim omnium Mortalium rebus benignè prospicitur in eorum bonum.

Etenim eo usque gratificatur hæc Regula eis qui Ingenio magis Rationali sunt & Philosophico, ut concedat ipsis, admissio quidem, omnia illa Theoremata Philosophica, quæ ad eò citra omnem controversiam eis Rationi consentanea videantur, realiter esse vera, nihil tamen necesse est ut id illi sit obstaculo quo minùs Religioni nostræ fidem habeant, quandoquidem nihil esse in istis Theorematis conceditur quod ipsi repugnat, quinimò ipsam Scripturam, aliquibus in locis, illis favere videri.

Vulgi porrò captui gratificatur, in eo quòd permittitur ipsis assuetorum suorum conceptuum & opinionum fruitio, talium scilicet quæ mediocribus ingenii ipsorum dotibus maximè convenient; nec Mentis ipsorum nervi plus justo intenduntur & quasi torquentur excutiendo, aut adnitendo ad ea quæ extra ictum ipsorum sita sunt, nec contemptui se habitos reperiendo contristantur aut falsæ absurdæve opinionis incusatos, quippe cujus contraria affirmatur solummodo tanquam sententia quæ apud Philosophos rationi magis consentanea videatur, non autem tanquam veritas quæ tanti sit momenti ut conscientia cujusquam urgeatur ad eam seriò amplectendam.

Et postremò, Pax & Autoritas Ecclesiæ facta tecta conservatur, quæ nec infringenda nec minuenda est per nimis præidentem quantumvis certæ compertæque veritatis professionem, nisi planè requiratur à nobis, per evidens aliquod Scripturæ Testimonium, ut eam profiteamur.

Quæ

Quæ prudentiæ Methodus, meo quidem judicio, si meminerimus, quantum inter homines interfit, vel potius quàm immensum, quoad animi dotes, necessarium quodammodo erit ut adhibeatur, ut nemo scandalizetur in Religione, quò salus ipsius in discrimen veniat per Fidei naufragium; Cùm via, inquam, illa laudabilis, oralis Traditionis jam exoleverit, difficile erit quicquam invenire magis aptum dignumve quod in locum illius succedat, quàm sit hæc Methodus à nobis proposita.

Juxta cujus præscriptum *Cabbalam Philosophicam* ejusque *Defensionem* scripsi, sed *Conjecturam* simul nuncupavi, assensum suspendens, planèque me abstinens ab assertione veritatis illius in ipso Titulo perinde atque in ejus Præfatione, ut utilitas ad eos redundet, quibus nullâ aliâ ratione satisfieri posset, idque sine offensione reliquorum. Quinimò ut nè minimum impenderet cuivis damni aut periculi, non tantùm in *Præfatione* ad *Cabbalam*, sed etiam in illa ad Immortalitatem Animæ, assensum expresse suspendi ab omni re quæ ullo modo videri possit dissona aut repugnans cum communi pervulgatâque dogmatum Religionis nostræ intelligentia. Denique in Præfatione Generali ad Scriptorum Philosophicorum Collectionem tanquam Principium semel pono, Nullius Conscientiam obligari ad professionem illarum Philosophicarum speculationum licèt ipsi videantur vel certitudinis Mathematicæ contra voluntatem ac beneplacitum Superiorum. Et speciatim de *Cabbala Philosophica* illic declaro, me aptitudinem tantùm præstare & applicabilitatem istorum Theorematum sive *Cartesianorum* sive *Platoniorum* (ut *Præexistentiæ Animæ* & *motûs Telluris* circa Solem, &c.) ad *Textum Mosaicum*; quantum verò ad veritatem ipsorum Theorematum, apud meipsum me porro deliberare assensumque suspendere.

Tam accuratè ad hanc quintam ultimamque Regulam nostra scribendi ratio composita erat, tamque exquisitè ad eam attemperata: Idque non solum post fœlicem suæ Majestatis reditum, Ecclesiâque restitutam, sed eis etiam temporibus, in quibus (postquam excessus libertatis & perniciosus illius ad Atheismum & Profanationem abusus, me istos grandia ingredientiæ Gigantes Cœlumque ipsum ad pugnam superbè provocantes, propriis suis armis, prout illi venditant, liberâ utique Ratione ac Philosophiâ, adoriri coegissent) mihi integrum erat, magis præsidenter dogmaticèque scribere quàm prudentia mea ac modestia unquam esset acceptatura.

Quamobrem, cùm ipsum Institutum meum tam indispensabile tantique momenti officium in se contineat, quàm sit magis rationalium ac Philosophicorum hujus Nationis Geniorum ad Christianam fidem lucrifactio eorundemve in ea retentio, cùmque Methodus procedendi in hac re tanta cum cautione adhibita esset & moderatione, idque in istiusmodi temporibus in quibus nihil præter internam animi legem me coercere valuerit ab exiliendo extra oleas; spero quicquid in hoc genere & in hunc finem præstiterim, gratiam & acceptionem apud omnes homines candidos & ingenuos in perpetuum reperturum.

Adeò usque ut nè de ipso S. A. quidem penitus desperem quin sententiam mutaturus sit, & de maledictis & contumeliis, quas contra me tanquam impium ac profanum hominem & deliriis insuper & insomniis indulgentem temerè effutivit, pœnitentiam acturus, tandemque apud

se staturus, dum quis Philosophiæ & Theologiæ Professore paulò magnificentius agere gestit, eum nequaquam interim oportere exuere Christianum.

Vers. 17. *Adeò ut nulla violentia Grammatica, &c. Vide Hugonum Grotium, Apocalypf. cap. 13. v. 15. ubi viginti ferè exempla consimilis significationis hujus Articuli ה, & Græci ε, producit.*

Vers. 19. *Qui in exponendo Mose multum Pythagorissat, &c. Profana igitur, inquit S. A. est hæc exponendi ratio quæ Pythagoram Mosis Interpretem constituit. Quod admodum perversè ac protervè dictum est: Cùm Pythagoram à Mose ejusve successoribus tum rerum tum Numerorum Mysteria accepisse, cum communi Antiquitatis voce, apertè profitear. Singulari igitur Dei Providentiæ debetur quòd quædam Cabbalæ Mosaicæ fragmenta, quæ Judei perdidissent, in Schola Pythagorica fuerint conservata.*

Est Activorum & Passivorum Principiorum conjunctio. Descriptionem hujus conjunctionis vide apud Plotinum, Ennead. 5. lib. 1. cap. 2. & Ennead. 4. lib. 3. cap. 10.

CHAP. II.

3. *The number Seven a fit Symbole of the Sabbath, or Rest of God. 7. Of Adam's rising out of the ground, as other creatures did. 11. That Pison is from פיש or פוש, and denotes Prudence. The mystical meaning of Havilah. 13. That Gihon is the same that Nilus, Sihor, or Siris, and that Pison is Ganges. The Justice of the Æthiopians. That Gihon is from גיח, and denotes that Vertue. 14. As Hiddekel denotes Fortitude. 17. That those Expressions of the Soul's sleep, and death in the Body, so frequent amongst the Platonists, were borrowed from the Mosaicall Cabbala. 19. Fallen Angels assimilated to the Beasts of the field. The meaning of those Platonical phrases, πλεσσομεν, πλεσσομεν, ἡ ψυχή πλεσσομεν, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πλεσσομεν, and the like. That Θεοὶ in Platonism is the same that אלהים in Moses, that signifies Angels as well as God. 22. That there are three Principles in Man, according to Plato's School, Νῦς, Ψυχὴ, εἰδωλον Ψυχῆς, and that this last is Eve.*

IN this second Chapter, Moses, having spoke of the Sabbath, returns to a more particular Declaration of the Creation of Adam, which is referrable to the Sixth day's work: Then he falls upon that mysterious story of Paradise, which runs out to in the next Chapter.

Vers. 3. *And the number declares the Nature. The Hebdomad, or Septenary, is a fit Symbole of God, as he is considered having finished these Six days Creation. For then, as this Cabbala intimates, he creates nothing further. And therefore his condition is then very fitly set out by the number Seven. All number within the Decad are cast into three ranks, as * Philo observes. Οἱ μὲν γενῶσιν, ἔ γενώμενοι. οἱ δὲ γενῶντες μὲν, ἔ γενῶσι δέ. οἱ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ γενῶσι καὶ γενῶντες. Some beget, but are not begotten; others are begotten, but do not beget; the last both beget and are begotten. The number Seven is only excepted, that is, neither be-*

* In his *Cosmopæia* Mosaic.

begotten nor begets any number, which is a perfect Emblem of God celebrating this *Sabbath*: For he now creates nothing of anew, as himself is uncreatable. So that the *creating and infusing of Souls*, as occasion should offer, is quite contrary to this *Mosaical Cabbala*. But the *Cabbala* is very consonant to it self, which declares, that all Souls were created at once in the First day, and will in these following Chapters declare also the manner of their falling into the Body.

Vers. 4. Productions of the Heavens. The Original hath it תולדות השמים. Here the *Suns and Planets* are plainly said to be generated by the *Heavens*, or *Æthereal Matter*, which is again wonderfully consonant to the *Cartesian Philosophy*; but after what manner *Planets and Stars* are thus generated, * you may see there at large. It cannot but be acknowledged that there was a fathomless depth of Wisdom in *Moses*, whose skill in Philosophy thus plainly prevents the subtlest and most capacious reaches of all the wits of the world that ever wrote after him.

Take upon me to define. That no set time is understood by the *Six days Creation*, hath been witnessed already out of approved Authors; and the present *Cabbala* plainly confirms it, shewing that the mystery of numbers is meant, not the order or succession of days.

Vers. 6. Like dewy showers of Rain. *Vatablus* plainly interprets the place of *Rain*. But I conceive it better interpreted of something Analogical to the common *Rain* that now descends upon the *Earth*, which is less oily a great deal, and not so full of vital vigour and principles of life.

Vers. 7. And man himself rose out of the Earth. That God should shape *Earth* with his own hands, like a *Statuary*, into the figure of a *Man*, and then blow breath into the nostrils of it, and so make it become alive, is not likely to be the *Philosophick Cabbala*, it being more palpably accommodated to vulgar conceit. But mention of *Rain*, immediately before the making of *Man*, may very well insinuate such preparations of the ground to have some causal concurrence for his production. And if it be at all credible that other living creatures rose out of the *Earth* in this manner, it is as likely that man did so likewise; for the same words are used to signify both: for the Text of *Moses*, ver. 19. says, *That out of the ground God formed every Beast of the Field, and every Fowl of the Air*, as it says in the seventh verse, *that he formed Man of the dust of the ground*. Whence *Euripides the Tragedian*, Eurip. Menalipp. See Didor. Sic. Bibliothec. Hist. lib. 1. (one that *Socrates* lov'd and respected much for his great knowledge and vertue, and would of his own accord be a Spectator of his Tragedies, whenas they could scarce force him to see other Plays, as *Ælian* writes) this *Euripides*, I say, pronouncing of the first generation of men and the rest of the living creatures, affirmed that they were born all after the same manner, and that they rose out of the *Earth*. Ælian. Var. Histor. lib. 2. cap. 13. And that *Euripides* was tinctured with the same doctrines that were in *Pythagoras* and *Plato's School*, both the friendship betwixt him and *Socrates*, as also the *ἠθικά*, or *Moral and Philosophick* sentences in his Tragedies, are no inconsiderable Arguments. And, as I have already intimated, the best *Philosophick Cabbala* of *Moses* that is, I suspect to be in their Philosophy, I mean of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*.

Vers.

Vers. 8. Where he had put the Man. For there is no *Praterpluperfect* Tense in the Hebrew; and therefore, as *Vatablus* observes, if the sense require, the *Praterperfect* Tense stands for it.

Wholly Aethereal. For that's the pure Heavenly and undefiled *Vehicle* of the Soul, according to *Platonism*.

Beams of the Divine Intellect. I have already more at large shewed how the Son of God, or the *Divine Intellect*, is set out by the similitude of the *Sun-rising* or *East*, which I may again here further confirm out of *Philo*, Τέτον μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτατον ὕδον ὁ τῶν ὄντων ἀνέτηκε πατὴρ, In his αἰὲν ζυγ-
χύσεως διαλέκτων. So that the placing of *Paradise* under the *Sun-rise*, signifies the condition of a Soul irrigated by the rays of the *Divine Intellect*, which she is most capable of in her *Aethereal Vehicle*. But that the Souls of men were from the beginning of the world, is the general opinion of the learned *Jews*, as well as of the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, and therefore a very warrantable *Hypothesis* in the *Philosophick Cabbala*. Nay, I may further add that it is the Opinion of *Origen*, that *Plato's* Διὸς κῆπος, *Jovis hortus*, is but an imitation of this History of *Paradise*; and that *Porus* his being deceiv'd by *Penia*, answers to *Adam* his being beguiled by the *Serpent*. See *Origen* against *Celsus*, lib. 4.

Vers. 9. The Essential Will of God. By the *Essential Will* of God, is understood the Will of God becoming Life and Essence to the Soul of Man; whereby is signified a more thorough union betwixt the Divine and humane nature, such as is in them that are firmly regenerated and radicated in what is good. *Philo* makes the *Tree of Life* to be ἐυσέβεια, that is, *Piety* or *Religion*; but the best Religion and Piety is to be of one will with God: See *John* 1. 12.

* In his Leg. *Vers. 10. The Four Cardinal Vertues.* It is * *Philo's* Exposition upon Allegor. lib. 1. the place; and then the River it self to be τὴν γενναίαν ἀγαθότητα, that general goodness distinguishable into these four heads of Vertue.

Vers. 11. Is Pison. From פֶּשֶׁת or פֹּשֵׁת, * to spread and diffuse it self, to multiply and abound. This is *Wisdom* or *Prudence*, called *Pison*, partly, because it diffuses it self into all our actions, and regulates the exercise of the other Three Vertues; and partly, because *Wisdom* and *Truth* fill and encrease, and spread out every day more than other. For *Truth* is very fruitful, and there are ever new occasions that add experience of things,

Γινέσθω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμεναι.

According to our *English Proverb*, *The older the wiser.*

In the Land of Havilah. From חוּר and אֵל or אֵלֶּה, *Deus indicavit*, God hath shown it.

Vers. 12. Pure Gold, &c. An easy Emblem of *tried Experience*, the mother of true *Wisdom* and *Prudence*. And the virtue of *Bdellium* is not improper for diseases that arise from *Phlegmatick laziness*; * and the very name and nature of the *Onyx* stone also points out the signification of it: Though there be no necessity, as I have told you already out of *Maimonides*, to give an account in this manner of every particular passage in an Allegory or Parable: wherefore if any man think me too curious, they may omit these expositions, and let them go for nought.

Vers.

Vers. 13. River is Gihon. According to the History or Letter, we have made *Pison*, *Phasis*, and *Gihon*, a branch of *Euphrates*. But the ancient Fathers, *Epiphanius*, *Augustine*, *Ambrose*, *Hieronymus*, *Theodoret*, *Damascen*, and several others, make *Pison*, *Ganges*; and *Gihon*, *Nilus*. And they have no contemptible arguments for it: For first, *Jerem. 2. 18.* *Sihor* is a River of *Aegypt*, which is not question'd to be any other than *Nilus*, and its *Etymon* seems to bewray the truth of it, from *שחור*, *denigrari*, from the muddy blackness of the River. And *Nilus* is notorious for this quality, and therefore has its denomination thence in the Greek, *quasi νεα ἰλὺς*, according to which is that of *Dionysius*,

Οὐ γὰρ τις ποταμῶν ἐναλίγκιος ἔπλετο Νεῖλῳ,
Οὐ τ' ἰλὺς βαλὲν, ἔτε χθονὸς ἔλκεν ἀέξιν.

That is,

*For ther's no River can compare with Nile,
For casting mud, and fattening the soil.*

But now to recite the very words of the Prophet, *What hast thou to do with the way of Egypt, to drink the waters of Sihor?* the Latine has it, *ut bibas aquam turbidam*; this is *Nilus*: * But the Seventy translate it, *πιεῖν ὕδωρ Γηὼν*, *To drink the water of Gihon*; which is the name of this very River of Paradise: And the *Abyssines* also even to this day call *Nilus* by the name of *Guion*. Add unto this, that *Gihon* runs in *Aethiopia*, which is from *Sihor* it is likely; and then the Greek termination makes it *Sioris*, after by contraction *Siris*.

Σῆις ὑπ' Αἰθιοπῶν κηλήσκετο, οἱ δ' Συλῶης
Ἐνναέτι σρεφδύνει μετ' ἄνομα Νεῖλον ἔδευσεν.

That is,

*The Aethiopian him Siris calls,
Syene Nilus, when by her he crawls.*

As the same Author writes in his Geographical Poems. And that *Pison* is *Ganges* has also its probabilities. *Ganges* being in *India*, a Countrey famous for Gold and precious Stones. Besides, the notation of the name agrees with the nature of the River, *Pison* being from *פוש* *multiplicare*; and there is no less a number than Ten, and those great Rivers, that exonerate themselves into *Ganges*: as there must be a conflux of *multifarious Experience* to fill up and compleat that vertue of *Wisdom* or *Prudence*. So that we shall see that the four Rivers of Paradise have got such names as are most advantageous and favourable to the mysterious sense of the story.

Wherefore, regardless here of all Geographical scrupulosities, we will say, that *Gihon* is *Nilus* or *Siris*, the River of the *Aethiopians*, that is, of the *Just*, and the Vertue is here determinately set off from the subject wherein it doth reside: For by the fame of the *Justice* and Innocency of the *Aethiopians*, we are assured which of the Cardinal Vertues is meant by *Gihon*. And the ancient fame of their Honesty and Uprightness was such, that *Homer* has made it their Epithet, calling them *ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας*, *The blameless Aethiopians*; adding further, that

that *Jupiter* used to banquet with them, he being so much taken with the integrity of their conversation. And *Dionysius* calls them, Θεοδίας Ἀιδιονῆας, *The divine or deiform Ethiopians*: and they were so styled διὰ δικαιοσύνην, *by reason of their Justice*, as *Eustathius* comments upon the place. * *Herodotus* also speaking of them, says, they are very goodly men, and much civiliz'd, and of a very long life, which is the Reward of Righteousness. So that by the place where *Gihon* runs, it is plainly signified to us what Cardinal Vertue is to be understood thereby.

Notation of the name thereof. The name *Gihon*, as you have seen, fairly incites us to acknowledge it a River of *Æthiopia*. The notation thereof does very suitably agree with the nature of *Justice*, for it is from גור, *erumpere*. And *Justice* is ἀλλοτρίον ἀγαθόν, *Bonum alienum*, as the Philosopher notes, not confined within a man's self, but *breaks out* rather upon others, bestowing upon every one what is their due.

Vers. 14. Is Hiddekel. The word is compounded, says *Vatablus*, from two words that signify *velox* and *rapidum*; and this vertue, like a *swift and rapid stream*, bears down all before it, as you have it in the *Cabbala*.

In his Leg.
Allegor. lib. 1.

And stoutly resists. *Philo* uses here the word ἀνίστασθαι, *to resist*, which he takes occasion for from the *Seventies* κατέναντι Ἀσσυρίων, which he interprets against the *Assyrians*. The Hebrew has it, *Eastward of Assyria*, and therefore *Assyria* * is situated Westward of it. Now the *West* is that quarter of the world where the Sun bidding us adieu, leaves us to darkness; whence ζέφυρος, the *West-wind*, in *Eustathius*, has its name from ζέφ and εἶρ, *the wind that blows from the dark Quarter*. *Assyria* therefore is that false state of * seeming *Happiness* and power of wickedness, which is called the *Kingdom of darkness*. And this is the most noble object of *Fortitude*, to destroy or resist the power of this kingdom within our selves. Which is the force and power of the suggestions of the *Body*, which may well be signified by the *Occident*, as well as the *Intellect* by the *Orient*; the *Evening* also in the foregoing chapter denoting the corporeal or Material Principle all along.

Perath. From פרה, *Fructificavit*.

Vers. 17. In process of time, &c. This is according to the mind of the *Pythagoreans* and *Origen*. And that *Pythagoras* had the favour of having the *Mosaical Cabbala* communicated to him by some knowing Priest of the *Jews*, or some holy man or other, I think I have continually in the former Chapter made it exceeding probable.

The Region of mortality and death. Nothing is more frequent with the *Platonists* than the calling of the *Body*, * a *Sepulchre*; and *this life* we live here upon Earth, either *sleep* or *death*. Which expressions are so suitable with this *Cabbala*, and the *Cabbala* with the Text of *Moses*, that mentions the *death* and *sleep* of *Adam*, that it is a shrewd presumption that these Phrases and Notions came first from thence. And *Philo* acknowledges that *Heraclitus*, that mysterious and abstruse Philosopher, (whom *Porphyrius* also has cited to the same purpose, in his *De antro Nympharum*) has even hit upon the very meaning that *Moses* intends in this *death* of *Adam*, in that famous saying of his, ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὴν δὲ ψυχὰν ἡμεῖς τὸν ἐκείνων βίον, *We live their death*, (to wit, of

of the Souls out of the body) *but we are dead to their Life.* And *Euripides*, that friend of *Socrates*, and fellow-traveller of *Plato's* in his *Tragedies*, speaks much to the same purpose :

Τὸ οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

Who knows whether to live, be not to die; and to die, to live? So that the Philosophick sense concerning *Adam's* death must be this; That he shall be *dead* to the *Æthereal* life he lived before, while he is restrained to the *Terrestrial*; and that whenas he might have lived for ever in the *Æthereal* Life, he shall in a shorter time assuredly die to the *Terrestrial*: That the sons of men cannot escape either the certainty or speed of death.

Vers. 18. Both good for himself, &c. For the words of the Text do not confine it to *Adam's* conveniency alone, but speak at large without any restraint, in this present verse. Wherefore there being a double convenience, it was more explicate to mention both in the *Cabbala*.

Vers. 19. Fallen and unfallen Angels. The *fallen Angels* are here assimilated to the *Beasts of the Field*; the *unfallen*, to the *Fowls of the Air*. How fitly the *fallen Spirits* are reckoned amongst the *Beasts of the Field*, you shall understand more fully in the following Chapter. In the mean time you may take notice that the *Platonists*, indeed *Plato* himself in his *Phædrus*, makes the Soul of Man, before it falls into this *Terrestrial* Region, a *winged Creature*: And that such phrases as these, *πτερόρρυσεν* and *πτερορυσῖν*, ἢ τὴν πτερῶν ἀποβολήν, and *ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα*, and the like, are proper expressions of that School. And *Plato* does very plainly define, what he means by these *wings of the Soul*, (and there is the same reason of all other *Spirits* whatsoever) after this manner, *Πέφυκεν ἡ πτερὰ δύναμις ὅτι ἐμβρυὲς ἄγειν ἄνω, μετακείζουσα τὸ τὴν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ.* That the nature of the wing of the Soul is such, as to be able to carry upward that which otherwise would slugg downwards, and to bear it aloft and place it there where we may have more sensible communion with God and his holy Angels. For so *Θεοὶ* in the plural number is most suitably translated in such passages as these, and most congruously to the thing it self, and the truth of Christianity. And it may well seem the less strange, that *Θεοὶ* should signify *Angels* in the Greek Philosophers, especially such as have been acquainted with *Moses*, whenas with him *אלהים* signifies so too, viz. *Angels* as well as God. Wherefore to conclude, The loss of that Principle that keeps us in this divine condition, is the *losing of our wings*; which fallen Angels have done, and therefore they may be very well assimilated to *Terrestrial Beasts*.

Vers. 20. A faculty of being united, &c. This vital aptitude in the Soul of being united with corporeal Matter being so essential to her and proper, the invigorating the exercise of that Faculty, cannot but be very grateful and acceptable to her, and a very considerable share of her happiness. Else what means the *Resurrection of the dead*, or *Bodies*, in the other world; which yet is an Article of the Christian Faith.

Vers.

Vers. 22. This new sense of his Vehicle. There be three Principles in Man according to the Platonists, Νῦς, Ψυχὴ, εἰδωλὸν Ψυχῆς. The first is Intellect, Spirit, or divine Light; the second, the Soul her self, which is Adam the Man, *Animus cujusque is est quisque*, the Soul of every Man that is the Man; the third is, the Image of the Soul, which is her vital Energy upon the Body, wherewith she does enliven it; and if that Life be in good tune and due vigour, it is a very grateful sense to the Soul, whether in this Body, or in a more thin Vehicle. This *Ficinus* makes our Eve. This is the Feminine Faculty in the Soul of Man, which awakes then easiliest into act, when the Soul to *Intellectuals* falls asleep.

* *Ethic. ad
Nicomach.
lib. 10. c. 7.*

Vers. 24. Over-tedious aspires. Τα ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα, is a vulgar Monition reprehended by *Aristotle* in his * *Ethicks*. But it is a great point of wisdom for all that, and mainly necessary, to know the true Laws and bounds of humane happiness, that the heat of Melancholy drive not men up beyond what is competible to humane nature, and the reach of all the Faculties thereof; as well as to beware, that the too savoury relish of the pleasures of the flesh, or *Animal Life*, keep them not down many thousand degrees below what they are capable of. But the man that truly fears God, will be delivered from them both. What I have spoken, is directed more properly to the Soul in the flesh, but may Analogically be understood of a Soul in any Vehicle, for they are peccable in them all.

Vers. 25. Stood naked before God. Adam was as truly clothed in Corporeity now as ever after; for the *Æther* is as true a Body as the *Earth*: But the meaning is, Adam had a sense of the divine Presence, very feelingly assured in his own mind, that his whole Being lay naked and bare before God; and that nothing could be hid from his sight, which pierced also to the very thoughts and inward frame of his Spirit. But yet though Adam stood thus naked before him, notwithstanding that he found no want of any covering to hide himself from that presentifick sense of him, nor indeed felt himself as naked in that notion of nakedness. For that sense of nakedness, and want of further covering and sheltring from the divine Presence, arose from his disobedience and rebellion against the commands of God, which as yet he had not fallen into.

*Noët. Attic.
lib. 19. cap. 6.*

Not at all ashamed. Shame is φόβος δίκαιος φόβος, the fear of just reprehension, as *Gellius* out of the Philosophers defines it. But Adam having not acted any thing yet at randome, after the swing of his own Will, he had done nothing that the divine Light would reprehend him for. He had not yet become obnoxious to any sentence from his own condemning Conscience; for he kept himself hitherto within the bounds of that divine Law written in his Soul, and had attempted nothing against the Will of God. So that there being no sin, there could not as yet be any shame in Adam.

S C H O L I A

In CAP. II. Vers. 4.

FUsius videre est apud Cartesium. Et certè quoad rationem generalem sic generari possunt *Stellæ* ac *Planetæ*, subtilissimis particulis in Vortice ad centrum vorticis labentibus, & *Macula* postea fieri possunt & *Incrustationes*, & quæ sequuntur. Hæc verò modo omninò *Cartesiano* fieri, hoc est, merè *Mechanico*, minimè verisimile esse abunde demonstravi in *Enchiridio Metaphysico*. Vide & *Appendicem Defens. Cap. Philosoph. Cap. 10. sect. 4.*

Vers. 11. Expandere, diffundere se & abundare, &c. Nihil potest esse istâ Etymologiâ significantius, præsertim si ad inspiratam referatur *Sapientiam*. Unde *Siracides* huic ad fluviorum inundationes allusioni paulò diutiùs immoratur, *Cap. 24. Qui quasi Pison omnia implet suâ Ecclesiast. sapientiâ, & ut Tigris novarum frugum temporibus effusus: Qui ut Eu- cap. 24. v. 35. phrates ingenium facundat, & velut Jordanes tempore Messis: Qui profert ut lucem disciplinam cognitionis, inundat sicut Geon vindemia tempore.*

Vers. 12. Ipsumque nomen ac natura Lapidis Onychini. Sic in *Visione Ezechielis: Oculi & Pedes Vitulini, Manus & Alæ conjunctæ, Scientiam nec otiosam nec inutilem indigitant.* Vide *Divinos Dialogos, Dialog. 5. Sect. 10. & Expositionem Mercavæ.*

Vers. 13. Septuaginta verò vertunt πέντε ἰσθμοὶ ἑνὸς. *Drusus in Jerem. 2. 18. Hieron. Pro Sichor nos turbidam interpretati sumus, quod verbum Hebraicum significat, pro quo communis editio habet Gehon. Ad sensum non malè. Siquidem Gehon de veterum sententia Nilus. Eusebius de locis, Geon, Fluvius qui apud Ægyptios Nilus vocatur. Augustinus De Genesi ad Lit. lib. 8. cap. 7. Geon, quippe ipse est, qui nunc dicitur Nilus. Idem Sihor, si credendum Interpretibus, &c.*

Herodotus etiam de ipsis scribens, &c. Vide *Herodotum lib. 3. Ubi in colloquio Regis Æthiopum cum Ichthyophagis ad eum à Cambyse missis hæc inter alia habentur, οὗτε ἑστὶν ἀνὴρ ὅς τι δίκαιος. Εἰ δὲ ἦν δίκαιος, ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπεθύμουντο χώρης ἄλλης ἢ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ.*

Vers. 14. Vel ad occidentem, ab hoc fluvio, sita est, sensu quidem Mystico, &c. In sensu enim Literali ac Geographico, jam dixi in *Cabbala Literali*, pergere ad Orientalem Plagam contra *Assyriam*.

Apparentis felicitatis. *אשר* enim *beatitudinem* significat, sed hîc veram significare non potest, sed tantum apparentem.

Vers. 17. Corpus appellare sepulchrum, &c. *Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν δισμεῖς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ φῶς, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτῇ σπύλαιον καὶ ἀντρον.* *Plotin. Ennead. 4. lib. 8. cap. 3. hoc est, Vinculum Animæ corpus est ac sepulchrum, Mundusque hic terrestris illi spelunca est atque antrum.*

C H A P. III.

1. *The Serpent* Ὁφίων's in Pherecydes Syrus. אִיִּים, שְׁעִירִים, אַחִים, and לִילִית, names of Spirits haunting Fields and desolate places. The right notation of שְׁרִים. 13. That Satan, upon his tempting Adam, was cast down lower towards the Earth, with all his Accomplices. 15. Plato's Prophecy of Christ. The reasonableness of Divine Providence in exalting Christ above the highest Angels. 20. That Adam's descension into his Terrestrial Body was a kind of Death. 22. How incongruous it is to the Divine Goodness, Sarcastically to insult over frail Man, fallen into Tragical misery. 24. That it is a great mercy of God that we are not immortal upon Earth. That δαίμων, ψυχή, and ἄγγελος, are all one.

THE first verse. *This old Serpent therefore.*

In Pherecydes Syrus, Pythagoras his Master, there is mention of one Ὁφίωνes, *Princeps mali*, as Grotius cites him on this place, which is a further argument of Pythagoras his being acquainted with this Mosaical Philosophy; and that, according to the Philosophick Cabbala, it was an evil Spirit, not a natural Serpent, that supplanted Adam, and brought such mischief upon mankind.

Chap. 13. 21. *The Beasts of the Field.* But now that these evil Spirits should be reckoned as *Beasts of the field*, besides what reason is given in the Cabbala it self, we may add further, that the haunt of these unclean spirits is in solitudes, and waste fields, and desolate places, as is evident in the Prophet Esay his description of the desolation of Babylon, where he saith, it shall be a place for the אִיִּים and שְׁעִירִים, the Fauni and Sylvani, as Castellio translates it, or ἐνοκένταυροι and δαίμονια, as the Seventy: And these Onocentauri in Hesychius are, δαίμόνων τι γένος κάθυλον καὶ σκοτεινὸν τῇ ἐμφανείᾳ; *A kind of Spirit that frequents the woods, and is of a dark colour.* There is mention made also by the Prophet (in the same description) of the שְׁעִירִים, אַחִים, and לִילִית, all which Expositors interpret of Spirits. For שְׁעִירִים are interpreted by the Seventy δαίμονια, by Castellio Satyri; אַחִים, Castellio renders Fauni, the Seventy ὤχαι, *Clamores, Strepitus*; Grotius suspects they wrote ὤχιμ. Out of both you may guess, that they were such a kind of Spirit as causes a noise and stir in those desolate places, according to that of Lucretius,

Lucret. de
naturarum,
lib. 4.

*Hæc loca capripedes Satyros Nymphasque tenere
Finitimi fingunt, & Faunos esse loquuntur;
Quorum noctivago strepitu ludoque jocanti
Affirmant vulgò taciturna silentia rumpi.*

To this SENSE.

*These are the places where the Nymphs do wonne,
The Fawns and Satyrs with their cloven feet,
Whose noise, and shouts, and laughter loud do run
Through the still Air, and wake the silent night.*

But the Poet seems to put it off with this conceit, that it is only the Shepherds that are merry with their Lasses. But no man can gloss upon

upon this Text after that manner: For the Prophet says, *No shepherd* Esay. 13. 20. *shall pitch his fold there, nor shall any man pass through it for ever.* The last strange creature in these direful solitudes is לילית, which Interpreters ordinarily translate *Lamia*, a *Witch*; and for mine own part, I give so much credit to sundry stories that I have read and heard, that I should rather interpret those noises in the *Night*, which *Lucretius* speaks of, to be the *Conventicles of Witches and Devils*, than the merriment of *Shepherds* and their *Shepherdesses*, re-ecchoed from rocks and hills, themselves in the mean time unseen in the midst of their musick and mirth. But the *Jews* understand by לילית, a *she-devil*, an enemy to women in child-bed; whence it is that they write on the walls of the room where the woman lies in, חוץ לילית אדם חוה, *Adam, Eve, out of doors Lilith*.

And what I have alledged already, I conceive, is Authority enough to countenance the sense of the *Cabbala*, that supposes *evil Spirits* to be reckoned among, or to be Analogical to the *Beasts of the field*.

But something may be added yet further, *Matth. 12. 43.* There our Saviour Christ plainly allows of this doctrine, that *evil Spirits* have their haunts in the wide fields and deserts, which *Grotius* observes to be the opinion of the *Jews*; and that שרים, *Dæmones*, have their name for that reason, from שרה, *Ager, the Field*; for if it were from שדר, it would be rather שרם than שרים, *Shiddim* than *Shedhim*, as Grammatical Analogy requires.

Vers. 2. And Adam answered him. Though the *Serpent* here be look'd upon as a distant person from *Adam*, and externally accosting him, yet it is not at all incongruous to make *Eve* merely an *Internal Faculty* of him. For as she is said to proceed from him, so she is said still to be *one with him*: which is wonderfully agreeable with the *Faculties of the Soul*; for though they be from the *Soul*, yet they are really *one with her*, as they that understand any thing in *Philosophy* will easily admit.

Vers. 5. Know all things. πάντες ἀνθρώποις ἔστι ἐπιθυμία ἐρευνᾶν φύσει, *All men have a natural desire of knowledge.* Metaphys. 1. 1. It is an *Aphorism in Aristotle*. And this desire is most strong in those whose *Spirits* are most thin and subtile. And therefore this bait could not but be much taking with *Adam* in his thinner Vehicle. But whatever is natural to the *Soul*, unless it be regulated and bounded with the divine Light, will prove her mischief and bane, whether in this lower state, or what state soever the *Soul* is placed in.

Vers. 7. Neither the covering of the Heavenly nature. For *Adam*, by the indulging to every careless suggestion, at last destroyed and spoiled the pure frame of his *Æthereal* or *Heavenly Vehicle*, and wrought himself into a dislike of the fordid ruins and distempered reliques of it; and in some measure awakening that lower *Plantal life*, which yet had not come near enough the *Terrestrial Matter*, and with which he was as yet unclothed, found himself naked of what he presaged would very fitly suit with him, and ease the trouble of his present condition. See *2 Cor. ch. 5. v. 1, 2, 3, 4.*

Verf. 8. That they hid themselves. They hate the Light, because their deeds are evil. This is true of all rebellious spirits, be they in what *Vehicle* they will.

Verf. 9. Pursued him. *Præstantiorem Animæ facultatem esse ducem hominis atque Dæmonem*; It is *Ficinus* his out of *Timæus*, viz. That the best Faculty that the Soul is any thing awaked to, is her guide and good Genius. But if we be rebellious to it, it is our *Dæmon* in the worst sense, and we are afraid of it, and cannot endure the sight of it.

Verf. 10. No power nor ornaments. For he found that though he could spoil and disorder his *Vehicle*, it was not in his power so easily to bring it into order again.

Verf. 12. It was the vigour and impetuosity. There is some kind of offer towards a real excuse in *Adam*; but it is manifest that he cannot clear himself from sin, because it was in his power to have regulated the motions of the *Life of his Vehicle*, according to the rule of the divine Light in him.

Verf. 13. What work has she made here? *Adam* touch'd in some sort with the conviction of the divine Light, bemoans that sad *Catastrophe*, which the vigorous life of the *Vehicle* had occasioned: But then he again excuses himself from the deceivableness of that Faculty, especially it being wrought upon by so cunning and powerful an *Affailant* as the old *Serpent* the *Devil*.

Imagination for ever. That is, לעילם, *eis tòn aiōna*.

The eternal God. It being a thing acknowledged, that God both speaks in a man, as in other *Intellectual* creatures, by his divine Light residing there, and that he also speaks in himself, concerning things or persons, which *Speeches* are nothing else but his *Decrees*: It is not at all harsh, in the reading of *Moses*, to understand the *speakings of God* according as the circumstances of the Matter naturally imply; nor to bring God in as a third Person, in corporeal and visible shape, unless there were an exigency that did extort it from us. For his inward word, whereby he either creates or decrees any thing that shall come to pass, as also that divine Light whereby he does instruct those Souls that receive him, Philosophy will easier admit of these for the *speakings of God*, than any audible articulate voice pronounced by him in humane shape, unless it were by *Christ* himself; for otherwise in all likelihood it is but a message by some Angel.

Verf. 14. The Prince of the rebellious Angels. For the mighty shall be mightily tormented; and the nature of the thing also implies it; because disgrace, adversity, and being trampled on, is far more painful and vexatious to those that have been in great place, than to those of a more inferior rank. From whence naturally this *Chieftain of the Devils*, as Mr. Mede calls him, will be struck more deeply with the curse, than any of the rest of his *Accomplices*.

In the higher parts of the Air, &c. This is very consonant to the opinion of the ancient Fathers, whether you understand it of *Satan* himself, or of the whole kingdom of those rebellious Spirits. And it is no more absurd, that for a time the bad went amongst the good in the *Æthereal* Region, than it is now that there are good Spirits amongst the bad in this lower Air. But after that villany *Satan* committed

mitted upon *Adam*, he was commanded * down lower, and the fear of the *Lord of Hosts* so changed his *Vehicle*, and flaked his fire, that he sunk towards the Earth, and at last was fain to lick the dust of the ground. See Mr. *Mede* in his Discourse upon 2 *Pet.* 2. 4.

Vers. 15. *Messias* should take a Body. That the Soul of the *Messias*, and all Souls else, did preexist, is the opinion of the *Jews*; and that admitted, there is no difficulty in the *Cabbala*. *Plato*, whether from this passage alone, or * whether it was that he was instructed out of other places also of the holy Writ, (if what † *Ficinus* writes is true) † *Marfil. Fin. cin. de vita Platon.* seems to have had some knowledge and presage of the coming of *Christ*; in that being ask'd, how long men should attend to his writings, he answered, till some more holy and divine Person appear in the world, whom all should follow.

Notoriously here upon Earth. As it came to pass in his casting out Devils, and silencing Oracles, or making them cry out,

*Οἱμοι ἦ τεῖρόδωv —————

Christ bruises the head of *Satan*, by destroying his kingdom and sovereignty, and by being so highly exalted above all Powers whatsoever. And it is a very great and precious mystery, That dear Compassion of our fellow-Creatures, and faithful and fast Obedience to the Will of God, (which were so eminently and transcendently in *Christ*) should be lifted above all Power and Knowledge whatsoever in those higher Orders of Angels. For none of them, that were as they should be, would take offence at it, but be glad of it. But those that were proud, or valued Power and Knowledge before Goodness and Obedience, it was but a just affront to them, and a fit rebuke of their Pride.

But now how does *Satan* bruise the heel of *Christ*? Thus, He falls upon the rear, the lowest part of those that profess Christianity; Hypocrites and ignorant Souls, such as he often makes *Witches* of; but the Church Triumphant is secure, and the sincere part of the Church Militant. So Mr. *Mede* upon the place.

Vers. 16. The Concomitance of pain and sorrow. And it is the common complaint of all Mortals, that they that speed the best have the experience of a vicissitude of Sorrow as well as Joy. And the very frame of our Bodies, as well as the accidents of Fortune, are such, that to indulge to Pleasure is but to lay the Seed of Sorrow or Sadness, by Diseases, Satiety, or Melancholy: Besides many spinosities and cutting passages that often happen unawares in the conversation of those, from whom we expect the greatest solace and content. To say nothing of the assaults of a man's own Mind, and pricking of Conscience, which ordinarily disturb those that follow after the pleasures of the Body. *Lucretius*, though an *Atheist*, will fully witness to the truth of all this, in his fourth book *De rerum Natura*, where you may read upon this Subject at large.

Vers. 18. Thorns and Thistles. *Moses* instances in one kind of life, Husbandry; but there is the same reason in all.

— Nil sine magno
Vita labore dedit mortalibus —

Life nothing gratis unto men doth give;
But with great labour and sad toil we live.

* In Phryxo
Traged.

Vers. 20. Euripides, the friend of Socrates, and a favourer of the Pythagorean Philosophy, writes somewhere in his * Tragedies, as I have already told you, to this sense; *Who knows*, says he, *whether to live, be to die; and whether, again, to die, be not to live?* Which question is very agreeable to this present Cabbala: for Adam is here as it were dying to that better world and condition of life he was in; and like as one here upon Earth on his death-bed prophesies many times, and professes what he presages concerning his own state to come, that he shall be with God; that he shall be in Heaven amongst the holy Angels and Saints departed, and the like: so Adam here utters his Apologetical Prophecy, that this change of his, and departure from this present state, though it may prove ill enough for himself, yet it has its use and convenience, and that it is better for the Universe; for he shall live upon Earth, and be a ruler there amongst the Terrestrial creatures, and help to order and govern that part of the world.

The Life of the Vehicle, EVE. For EVE signifies Life, that life which the Soul derives to what Vehicle or Body foever she actuates and possesses.

* Cornel. à
Lapide in
Gen. c. 3.

Vers. 21. Skin of Beasts. This Origen understands of Adam's being incorporated and cloath'd with humane flesh and skin. * *Ridiculum enim est dicere*, saith he, *quòd Deus fuerit Adami coriarius & pellium sutor.* And no man will much wonder at the confidence of this Pious and Learned Father, if he do but consider, that the *Præ-existency* of Souls before they come into the Body, is generally held by all the Learned of the Jews, and so in all likelihood was a part of this Philosophick Cabbala. And how fitly things fall in together, and agree with the very Text of Moses, let any man judge. Origen prefers the significancy of this passage before the Platonick *πτερόρρύσεις*. his words are remarkable, and worth the citing. Καὶ ὁ ἐκβαλλόμενος ὃ ἐν τῷ Παράδεισῳ ἀνδραπῶς καὶ τῆς γυναίκος, τὰς δερμάτινας ἡμφιεσμένους χιτῶνας (ὅς διὰ τὴν παρὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε τοῖς ἀμαρτήσασιν ὁ Θεός) ἀπὸ ῥήτων τινὰ καὶ μυσηίων ἔχων λόγον, ὑπὲρ τὸν, καὶ Πλάτωνα, τῆς Ψυχῆς πτερόρρύσεως καὶ δεῦρο φερόμενης, ὥς ἀνθρώπου τινὸς λαβηταί. i. e. *Man his being cast out of Paradise, together with his wife, and cloath'd with coats of skin, (which by reason of the transgression of men, God has made for those that have sinned) has a certain hidden and mystical meaning, above that Platonical one, of the Souls casting her wings, and falling headlong hither, till she lay hold of some body of a more gross consistency.* See Origen. cont. Cels. lib. 4. This is answerable to that in Cornelius, which I think he has out of Epiphanius.

Vers. 22. But play and sport. This I conceive a far better Decorum, than to make God Sarcastically to jeer at Adam, and triumph over him in so great and universal a mischief, as some make it, and destitute of any concomitant convenience; especially there being a principle

ciple in *Adam* that was so easily deceivable, which surely has something of the nature of an excuse in it. But to jear a man, that, through his own weakness, and the over-reaching subtilty of his adversary, has fallen into some dreadful and tragical evil and misery, is a thing so far from becoming God, that it utterly misbeseems any good man.

Vers. 24. He made sure he should not be immortal. For it is our advantage, as *Rupertus* upon the place hath observed out of *Plotinus*: *Misericordiae Dei fuisse, quod hominem fecerit mortalem, nè perpetuis cruciaretur hujus vitæ arumnis*; That it is the mercy of God that he made man mortal, that he might not always be tormented with the miseries and sorrows of this present life.

Passing through the condition of being re-invested with his fiery Vehicle. The following words explain the meaning of the Cabbala; it is according to the sense of that *Plato* amongst the Poets, (as *Severus* called him) *Virgil*, in the sixth Book of his *Aeneids*.

*Donec longa dies perfectò temporis orbe
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum, atque auræ simplicis ignem.*

To this SENSE.

*Till that long day at last be come about
That wasted has all filth and foul desire,
And leaves the Soul Æthereal throughout,
Bathing her senses in pure liquid Fire.*

Which we shall yet back very fittingly with the two last Golden Verses, as they are called, of the *Pythagoreans*, who add *Immortality* to this *Æthereal* condition:

Ἦν δ' ἀπολείψας σῶμα ἐς αἰθέρ' ἐλθόντες ἔλθης,
Ἐσσεαι ἀθάνατος θεὸς ἀμβροσίος, ἐκέτι θνητός.

*Rid of this body, if the Æther free
You reach, henceforth Immortal you shall be.*

The Greek has it, you shall be an *Immortal God*, which *Hierocles* interprets, you shall imitate the Deity in this, in becoming *Immortal*. And *Plutarch*, in his *Defect of Oracles*, drives on this *Apotheosis*, according to the order of the Elements, *Earth refined to Water, Water to Air, Air to Fire*: So man to become of a *Terrestrial Animal* one of the *Hero's*; of an *Hero*, a *Dæmon*, or good *Genius*; of a *Genius*, a *God*, which he calls μεταχθιν θεότητος, to partake of Divinity; which is no more than to become one of the אלהים, or *Immortal Angels*, who are *instar flammæ*, as the *Hebrew Doctors* declare in *Beresbith Rabbah*. They are, according to their *Vehicles*, a *versatile fire*, turning themselves *Proteus-like* into any shape. Which are the very words of *Maimonides* upon the place. R. Maimonid. More Nevoch. part. 1. cap. 49.

And *Philo Judæus*, Ἐστὶ δ' αἱ τὸν αἶρα ἁγίων ἀσωμάτων ἱερῶτατος χορός. In his *De consensu*. For there is, saith he, in the *Air* a most holy company of *unbodied Souls*: fusione lin- and guarum.

and presently he adjoins, Ἀγγέλους γὰρ τὰς ψυχὰς ταύτας εἶωθε καλεῖν ὁ θεωπηδὸς λόγος, and these Souls the Holy Writ uses to call Angels. And in another place, he speaking of the pure Souls, calls them, ἑπάρχουσιν τῷ πανηγυμένῳ, ὡς περὶ μεγάλης βασιλείας ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἀπορώσας πάντα καὶ ἀκούσας, i. e. The Officers of the Generalissimo of the World, that are as the Eyes and Ears of the great King, seeing and hearing all things: and then he adds, ταύτας, δαίμονας μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι, ὁ δὲ ἱεὺς λόγος ἀγγέλους εἶωθε καλεῖν. These, other Philosophers call the Genii, but the Scripture Angels. And in another place he says, Ψυχὴ, Δαίμων, Ἀγγέλῳ, that a Soul, Genius, and Angel, are three words that signify but one and the same thing. As Xenocrates also made Ψυχὴ and Δαίμων all one, adding that he was εὐδαίμων, happy, that had σπουδαίαν ψυχὴν, a vertuous Soul. Wherefore not to weary my Reader nor my self with overmuch Philology, we conclude, that the meaning of Moses in this last verse is this, That Adam is here condemned to a mortal, flitting and impermanent state, till he reach his Æthereal, or pure fiery Vehicle, and become, as our Saviour Christ speaks, ἱσάγγελῳ, as one of the Angels. This, I say, is the condition of mankind, according to the Philosophick Cabbala of Moses.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. III. Vers. 14.

JUSSUS est descendere inferiùs, &c. Dæmones è Cælo à Jove fuisse deturbatos dixit Pherecydes Syrus, quorum Princeps dictus sit Ophioneus, i. e. Serpentinus. Vide Cornelium à Lapide in locum.


Vers. 15. Sive quod ex aliis etiam sacra Scriptura locis, &c. Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromat. lib. 5. post dictum illud è Sapientia Salomonis, Ἀρωμὴν ἀπὸ ἡμῶν τὸν δίκαιον, ὅτι δὲ ἄχρηστος ἡμῖν ὄντι, Tollamus à nobis justum, quia nobis incommodus est, statim subjicit: Ὁ Πλάτων μονοτονὴν περφηλεύων τὴν σωτήριον οἰκονομίαν, ἐν πρῶτῳ δευτέρῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὡς φησιν. Οὕτω δὲ διακείμενός ἐστι δίκαιος, μαστιγωθείς, τρεβλώσει, δεθήσει, ἐκκοπήσει τὰ ὀφθαλμῶ, τελευτῶν, πάντα κατὰ παθὼν ἀνασκινδυλευθήσει. i. e. Plato propemodum propheticè prædicens Servatoris Oeconomiam, in secundo de Republica sic dicit: Qui autem sic est affectus justus, flagris cadetur, torquebitur, vincietur, Oculi ei effodientur, & postremò omnia mala perpeffus, in palum crucemve tolletur & suspendetur: ac si Platoni perpeffiones Messie innotuissent ex Esaia, cap. 53.

THE

A N
 APPENDIX
 TO THE
 DEFENCE
 OF THE
 Philosophick Cabbala.

C H A P. I.

1. *The strength of the Philosophick Cabbala, argued from the nature of the Truths therein contained.* 2. *The dignity of Pythagoras.* 3. *That he was acquainted with the Mosaick Philosophy.* 4. *Pythagoras his Miracles.* 5. *Of Plato, that he was acquainted with the Jewish Learning; and what miraculous of him.* 6. *Of Plotinus, his retorting of Olympius his Magical practice against him upon himself; his great esteem of Origen.* 7. *The folly of men in their adhering to some private judgment more than to Fathers, Churches, Workers of Miracles, and to Reason it self.* 8. *The Cartesian Philosophy a restauration of the Physick part of the Mosaick, and of Des-Cartes his being inspired.*

1.  ET us now take a general view of this whole Cabbala, and more summarily consider the strength thereof: which we may refer to these three heads, viz. *The nature of the Truths contained in it; The dignity of those Persons that have owned them in foregoing Ages; and lastly, The invalidity of the most considerable Objections that can be made against it.* As for the Truths themselves, First, They are such as may well become so holy and worthy a Person as Moses, if he would Philosophize; they being very precious and choice Truths, and very highly removed above the conceit of the vulgar, and so the more likely to have been delivered to him, or to Adam first, by God for a special mystery.

Secondly, They are such, that the more they are examined, the more irrefutable they will be found; no Hypothesis that was ever yet propounded to men, so exquisitely well agreeing with the Phenomena of Nature, the Attributes of God, the Passages of Providence, and the rational Faculties of our own Minds. Thirdly,

Thirdly, There is a continued suitableness and applicability to the Text of *Moses* all along, without any force or violence done to Grammar or Criticism.

Fourthly and lastly, There is a great usefulness, if not necessity, at least of some of them, they being such substantial Props of Religion, and so great encouragements to a sedulous purification of our Minds, and study of true Piety.

2. Now for the *dignity of the Persons*, * such as were *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and *Plotinus*, it will be argued from the constant fame of that high degree of Vertue and Righteousness and devout Love of the Deity that is every where acknowledged in them, besides whatsoever *miraculous* has happened to them, or been performed by them.

See *Iamblich.*
de vita Py-
thag. cap. 1.

And as for *Pythagoras*, if you consult his Life in *Iamblichus*, he was held in so great admiration by those in his time, that he was thought by some to be the son of *Apollo*, whom he begot of *Parthenis* his known mother: and of this opinion was *Epimenides*, *Eudoxus*, and *Xenocrates*. Which conceit *Iamblichus* does soberly and earnestly reject; but afterwards acknowledges, that his looks and speeches did so wonderfully carry away the minds of all that conversed with him, that they could not withhold from affirming, that he was θεῶν παῖς, the off-spring of God. Which is not to be taken in our strict Theological sense, but according to the mode of the ancient *Greeks*, who looked upon men heroically and eminently good and vertuous, to be *divine* Souls, and of a celestial extract. And *Aristotle* takes notice particularly of the *Lacedemonians*, that they termed such as were σφόδρα ἀγαθοί, very good, σείας ἀνδρες, i. e. θεῶν ἀνδρες, *divine men*. According to which sense he interprets that verse in *Homer* concerning *Hector*,

Ethic. Nico-
mach. lib. 7.
cap. 1.

— — — — — ἂν δὲ ἐφ' ἧς
'Ανδρὸς γε θνητῶ παῖς ἔμμεναι, ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

But to return to him of whom we were speaking before. This eminency of his acknowledged amongst the Heathen, will seem more credible, if we but consider the advantage of his conversation with the wisest men then upon Earth, to wit, the *Jewish Priests* and *Prophets*, who had their knowledge from God, as *Pythagoras* had from them. From whence I conceive that of *Iamblichus* to be true, which he writes concerning *Pythagoras* his Philosophy; That it is φιλοσοφία ἐκ θεῶν ἀποδοθεῖσα τὸ κατ' ἀρχαίς, a Philosophy that at first was delivered by God or his holy Angels.

3. But that *Pythagoras* was acquainted with the *Mosaical* or *Jewish* Philosophy, there is ample Testimony of it in Writers; as of *Aristobulus* an *Egyptian Jew* in *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and *Josephus* against *Appion*. * *St. Ambrose* adds, that he was a Jew himself. *Clemens* calls him τὸν ἐξ Ἑβραίων φιλόσοφον, the *Hebrew Philosopher*. I might cast hither the suffrages of *Justin Martyr*, *Johannes Philoponus*, *Theodoret*, *Hermippus* in *Origen* against *Celsus*, *Porphyrus*, and *Clemens* again, who writes, that it was a common fame that *Pythagoras* was a disciple of the Prophet *Ezekiel*. And though he gives no belief to the report, yet that Learned Antiquary Mr. *Selden*, seems inclinable enough to think it true, in his first Book *De Jure Naturali juxta Hebraeos*; where you may

may peruse more fully the citations of the forenamed Authors. Besides all these, *Iamblichus* also affirms that he lived at *Sidon*, his native Country, where he fell acquainted with the Prophets, and Successors of one *Mochus* the *Physiologer*, or Natural Philosopher. *Συνέβαλε τοῖς Μόχῳ τῷ φυσιολόγῳ προφήταις ἀπογόνους*. Which, as Mr. Selden judiciously conjectures, is to be read, *τοῖς Μωσείαις τῷ φυσιολόγῳ προφήταις ἀπογόνους*, with the Prophets that succeeded Moses the Philosopher. See also *Minucius Felix* in his *Octavius*. De vita Pythag. cap. 3.

Wherefore it is very plain, that *Pythagoras* had his Philosophy from *Moses*. And that Philosophy which to this very day is acknowledged to be his, we seeing that it is so fitly applicable to the Text all the way, what greater argument can there be desired to prove that it is the true *Philosophick Cabbala* thereof?

4. But there is yet another Argument to prove further the likelihood of his conversing with the Prophets, which will also further set out the dignity of his person; and that is the Miracles that are recorded of him. For it should seem *Pythagoras* was not only initiated into the *Mosaical Theory*, but had arrived also to the power of working Miracles, as *Moses*, and the succeeding Prophets did; and very strange Facts are recorded both in *Porphyrius* and *Iamblichus*: As that *Pythagoras*, when he was going over a River with several of his companions, (*Iamblichus* calls the River *Nessus*, *Porphyrius* *Caucasus*) that he speaking to the River, the River answered him again with an audible and clear voice, *χαῖρε, Πυθαγόρα*; *Salve, Pythagora*: That he shewed his thigh to *Abaris* the Priest, and that he affirm'd that it glistered like Gold, and thence pronounced that he was *Apollo*: That he was known to converse with his friends at *Metapontium* and *Tauromenium*, (the one a Town in *Italy*, the other in *Sicily*, and many days journey distant) in one and the same day. To these, and many others which I willingly omit, I shall only add, his Predictions of Earthquakes; or rather (because that may seem more natural) his present flaking of Plagues in Cities; his silencing of violent Winds and Tempests; his calming the rage of Seas and Rivers, and the like. Which skill *Empedocles*, *Epimenides*, and *Abaris*, having got from him, they grew so famous, that *Empedocles* was surnamed *Alexanemus*; *Epimenides*, *Cathartes*; and *Abaris*, *Aethrobates*; from the power they had in suppressing of storms and winds; in freeing of Cities from the Plague; and in walking aloft in the Air. Which skill enabled *Pythagoras* to visit his friends after that manner, at *Metapontium* and *Tauromenium*, in one and the same day. See Iamblich. de vita Pythag. cap. 28.

5. And now I have said thus much of *Pythagoras*, (and might say a great deal more) there will be the less need to insist upon *Plato* and *Plotinus*, their Philosophy being the same that *Pythagoras*'s was, and so alike applicable to *Moses* his Text. *Plato*'s exemplarity of life and vertue, together with his high knowledge in the more sacred mysteries of God, and the state of the Soul of man in this world, and that other, deservedly got to himself the title of *Divine*, ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων.

But as for Miracles, I know none he did; though something highly miraculous happened, if that same at *Athens* was true, that *Speusippus*, *Diogen. La.* *Clearchus*, and *Anaxilides*, report to have been concerning his birth; *err. in vita* *Platon.* which is, that *Aristo*, his reputed Father, when he would forcibly have

have had to do with *Perictione*, she being indeed exceeding fair and beautiful, fell short of his purpose, and surceasing from his attempt, that he saw *Apollo* in a Vision, and so abstained from meddling with his wife till she brought forth her son *Aristocles*, who after was called *Plato*. But that is far more credible which is reported concerning the commending of him to his Tutor *Socrates*, who the day before he came, dreamed that he had a young *Swan* in his lap, which, putting forth feathers apace, of a sudden flew up into the Air, and sung very sweetly. Wherefore the next day, when *Plato* was brought to him by his father, *πῆτον, εἰπεῖν, εἶναι τὸν ὄρνιν*, he presently said, *this is the bird*, and so willingly receiv'd him for his Pupil.

But for his acquaintance with the *Mosaical* Learning, as it is more credible in it self, so I have also better proof; as *Aristobulus* the Jew in *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *St. Ambrose*, *Hermippus* in *Josephus* against *Apion*, and lastly, *Numenius* the *Platonist*, who ingenuously confesses, *τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωσῆς Ἀττικίζων*; what is *Plato* but *Moses* in Greek? as I have elsewhere alledged. See also *Origen* against *Celsus*.

See Clem. A-
lexandrin.
Stromat. l. 1.

Orig. contra
Cels. lib. 6.

6. As for *Plotinus*, that which *Porphyrius* records of him falls little short of a *Miracle*, as being able, by the Majesty of his own Mind, as his enemy *Olympius* confessed, to retort that Magick upon him which he practised against *Plotinus*; and that, sedately sitting amongst his friends, he would tell them, *Now Olympius his body is gathered like a purse, and his limbs beat one against another*. And though he was not instructed by the Jewish Priests and Prophets, yet he was a familiar friend of that hearty and devout Christian, and Learned Father of the Church, *Origen*; whose authority I would also cast in, together with the whole consent of the Learned amongst the Jews. For there is nothing strange in the *Metaphysical* part of this *Cabbala*, but what they have constantly affirmed to be true.

7. But the unmannerly Superstition of many is such, that they will give more to an accustomed Opinion, which they have either taken up of themselves, or has been conveyed unto them by the confidence of some private Theologer, than to the Authority of either Fathers, Churches, Workers of Miracles, or, what is best of all, the most solid Reasons that can be propounded; which, if they were capable of, they could not take any offence at my admittance of the *Cartesian* Philosophy into this present *Cabbala*. * The Principles, and the more notorious Conclusions thereof, offering themselves so freely and unaffectedly, and so aptly and fittingly taking their place in the Text, that I know not how, with Judgment and Conscience, to keep them out.

8. For I cannot but surmise, That he has happily and unexpectedly light upon that which will prove a true Restauration of that part of the *Mosaical* Philosophy, which is ordinarily called *Natural*, and in which *Pythagoras* may be justly deemed to have had no small insight. Which, in all probability, he attained unto by his converse with the successors of that *Sidonian Mochus* abovementioned; which *Casaubon* conceives rather to be *Μόχων*, (for how easily *σ* is lost out of *χ*, any one may see) and suspects it to be a *Tyrian* Name, and that in his own tongue he was called *משה*, *Mosabe*, which is ordinarily *Moses*: which

which falls in again with Mr. Selden's opinion, and is a further confirmation of his conjecture. And what a kind of natural Philosophy this *Moschus* imparted to his followers, * *Vossius* has expressly noted out * In his De Historicis Grecis, lib. 3. Strab. lib. 16. of *Strabo*, who makes mention of one *Moschus* a *Sidonian*, who lived in the Ages before the *Trojan War*, and was the first Author of the *Atomick Philosophy*, or of that Philosophy that gives an account of the *Phænomena* from the figure and motion of the Particles. Whence there must be no small affinity betwixt this ancient *Moschical*, or rather *Mosaical* Physiology, and the *Cartesian* Philosophy, which has so often and so naturally born a part in this Philosophick Cabbala.

And that the *Natural Philosophy* of *Pythagoras* was *Atomical*, is further to be evinced from what we find in *Diogenes Laertius*, concerning *Democritus*. For what a noise his Atoms have made in the World, cannot be unknown to any. But as *Diogenes* writes out of *Thrasyllus*, *Democritus* was so great an Admirer and Imitator of *Pythagoras*, and seems so to have taken all that he has from him, that a man would think he had been his Scholar or Auditor, but that Chronology will not admit thereof. But though he was not a Disciple of *Pythagoras* himself, yet, as *Glaucus Rheginus* writes, he was a Hearer of the *Pythagoreans*; and *Apollodorus Cyzicenus* reports, that he had a very intimate familiarity with *Philolaus*. In the Catalogue of his Books also which he wrote, one was styled *Pythagoras*, and another *Tritogenia*, a mystical term amongst the *Pythagoreans*. And when *Plato* would have burnt *Democritus* his Writings, they were two *Pythagoreans*, *Amyclas* and *Clinias*, that dissuaded him from executing what he had designed, certainly out of an honest, though mistaken, zeal. Which things I think are a ground of an invincible suspicion, that the *Physical* part of *Pythagoras* his Philosophy is *Atomical*. And that he held the motion of the Earth, is already famous. The rest let us consider out of the *Dogmata* of *Democritus*, and see how all together suit with those of *Cartesius*.

Pythagoras must have also held, if *Democritus* had all his Philosophy from his Writings or Traditions, * That there are infinite Worlds, and that they are generable and corruptible, but that the Matter is unperishable. That there are infinite numbers of Atoms or Particles different in magnitude and figure; *οὐρανὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δινέμεσθαι*, and that they are moved in the Universe after the manner of Vortices. For that is the proper signification of *δίνω*, namely, *Vortex*. *Καὶ ἔτι πάντα συγκείμενα γεννᾶν πῦρ, ὕδωρ, αἴρα, γῆν* And that by the rotation of these Vortices of Particles, is generated Fire, πῦρ, which is the peculiar expression of the Sun with the *Pythagoreans*, (as I have noted in its due place) and then afterwards Earth, Water, Air: As is said more expressly, *τὸν τε ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἐκ τοιούτων δινῶν καὶ περιφερῶν ὀγκῶν συγκειῖσθαι*, That the Coalition and Composition of the Sun and Moon was the result of these δίναι, or ὀγκοί περιφερῆς, these immense and vastly-rolling Vortices. And lastly, *πάντα τε καὶ ἀνάγκην γενέσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας ἕως τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει* that is to say, * That all things are made not without a Mechanical Necessity, this Vortical Motion being the cause of the generation of all things. Which *Democritus* calls *Ἀνάγκη*. And it may be for this cause also the * *Pythagoreans* called the *Decad*, that is, the World, *Ἀνάγκη*.

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Which

Which last Assertions of *Democritus*, as they are very easy and natural in * such a sense as *Cartesius* has declared the nature of the *Vortices*, and the consequences thereof; so are they very false, idle, and insignificant, according to any other meaning.

Wherefore the *Cartesian* Philosophy being in a manner the same with that of *Democritus*; and that of *Democritus* the same with the Physiological part of *Pythagoras* his Philosophy; and *Pythagoras* his Philosophy, the same with the *Sidonian*; as also the *Sidonian*, with the *Mosaical*; it will necessarily follow, that the *Mosaical* Philosophy, in the Physiological part thereof, is the same with the *Cartesian*. And how fitly the *Cartesian* Philosophy suits with *Moses* his Text, I have again and again taken notice.

9. And that *Des-Cartes* may bear up in some likely Equipage with the forenamed noble and divine Spirits; though the unskilfulness in men commonly acknowledge more of Supernatural assistance in hot unsettled Fancies and perplexed Melancholy, than in the calm and distinct use of Reason; yet for mine own part, (but not without submission to better Judgments) I should look upon *Des-Cartes* as a man more truly inspired in the knowledge of Nature, than any that have professed themselves so these sixteen hundred years; and being even ravished with admiration of his transcendent *Mechanical* inventions, for the salving the *Phænomena* in the world, * I should not stick to compare him with *Bezaliel* and *Aholiab*, those skilful and cunning workers of the Tabernacle, who, as *Moses* testifies, were filled with the Spirit of God, and they were of an excellent understanding to find out all manner of curious works.

Nor is it any more argument that *Des-Cartes* was not inspired, because he did not say he was, than that others are inspired, because they say they are; which to me is no argument at all. But the suppression of what had so happened would argue much more sobriety and modesty; whenas the profession of it with sober men, would be suspected of some spice of Melancholy and distraction, especially in Natural Philosophy, where the grand pleasure is the evidence and exercise of Reason, not a bare belief, or, as in other cases, an ineffable sense of life, in respect whereof there is no true Christian but he is inspired.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. I. Sect. 2.

Exam. Gen.
ner. p. 6, 7, 8.

QUALES erant *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, &c. Triplici obice viam hæc nobis intercludere conatur *S. A.* quò minus hoc genere argumenti *Cabbala* nostra confirmetur. Objicit enim hæc tria præsertim *μεγδα*, quæ vocat, *αἰτήματα*, supponi tantum non probari: Primum est, *Vera esse omnia quæ in Historiarum monumentis de Platonis & Pythagoræ sapientia traduntur*; Alterum, *Platonem & Pythagoram ad Judæos usque penetrâsse, atque à Mose præcipua dogmata sua hausisse*, &c. Ter-

Tertium denique, nihil à Pythagora vel Platone quoad ista Myſteria dictum, ſcriptum aut factitatum fuiſſe, quin ex Judaica diſciplina provenerit. Quæ quidem agnoſco magna eſſe Poſtulata, ſed univerſa nobis haud ita neceſſaria, quibus Atheum convincamus. Quod verò maximè ſcopo noſtro accommodum eſt, minimè dubitatur apud viros doctos, ſed comuni quaſi calculo comprobatur, ipſo fatente viro doctiſſimo S. A. Quod intellectum volo de Poſtulado ſecundo. Quod ad tertium verò attinet, fatiſ eſt ſi inveniantur apud Pythagoricos ac Platonicos ſolida & ſublimia Philoſophemata quæ aptè congruèque Textui Moſaico applicari poſſunt, quanquam aliàs multis ſcatere nugis deprehendantur aliunde aſcitis, aut de proprio cerebro fictis. Præclaras tamen illas ſublimèſque veritates, quæ apud ipſos reperiuntur, cùm multa eos à Judæis didiciſſe conſtet, cùmque veritates illæ tam aptè Textui Moſaico convenient, ad Textum rurfus Moſaicum tanquam proprium Fontem optimo jure referimus. Immo verò qui ſic non faciunt, ſummâ mihi videntur & Moſen & Deum Moſis, Deique Eccleſiam tam Judaicam quàm Chriſtianam injuriâ afficere. Quod ad primum denique attinet, nihil neceſſe eſt, ut omnia quæ dicuntur de Pythagoræ Platonisſque ſapientia vera ſint, fat eſt ſi ea ſint vera quæ nos ad confirmandam Cabbalam adhibuimus.

Seçt. 3. S. Ambroſius Pythagoram ipſum fuiſſe Judæum. Id quod & ipſe S. A. ultrò fatetur. Hunc, inquit, ex populo Judæorum genus duxiſſe putat quidem Ambroſius, lib. 3. Epiſt. 20. & ait pleròſque ita arbitrari. Duo verò objicit Andreades. Primum, Mneſarchum annulorum ſculptorem ſeu cœlatorem dici illius fuiſſe patrem, cujus nomen pariter & opificium parum convenit Judæo. Quaſi verò Gente Judaicâ oriundî à Græcis nominibus ſemper abhorruerint; aut annulorum ſculptio, cum Judaica Religione, (cùm abunde Imaginum & ſculpturarum fuerint in Templo Salomonis,) neutiquam conſiſteret. Alterum eſt, Judæum fuiſſe conjectari, ex eo quòd circumciſus eſſet, Circumciſionem verò etiam aliis Gentibus competere. Sed reſpondeo; Cùm fateatur fuiſſe circumciſum & cum Judæis verſatum eſſe, neceſſariâque fuiſſe Pythagoræ circumciſionem, ut tanquam Proſelytus Juſtitie ad interiora eorum Myſteria admitteretur, equidem aut natum eſſe Judæum aut à Judæis fuiſſe circumciſum longè veriſimillimum eſt. Quanquam his triciſ minimè innititur noſtræ Expoſitionis viſ, ſed converſationi ipſius cum Judæis. Ipſeque Andreades haud dubitandum agnoſcit Pythagoram & Platonem in notitiam eorum, quæ apud Judæos Myſteria erant, veniſſe. Et quæ obſecro potiſſimum myſteria debent eſſe, in quorum notitiam Philoſophos veniſſe oportet, niſi Philoſophica?

Seçt. 7. Cujus principia inſigniorèſque Concluſiones, &c. Quod intelligendum eſt, prout ſuprà monui, in genere, non ſecundum præciſam illam rationem Mechanicam, quam affectat Carteſius.

Seçt. 8. Infinitos eſſe Mundos, &c. Hoc eſt, Numerum Mundorum indefinitum.

Omnia fieri ſecundum neceſſitatem, &c. Non autem Mechanicam ſed Phyſicam. Sic omnino antiquos Pythagoreos ſtatuiſſe cenſeo. Deſluxu verò temporis Phyſicam in Mechanicam apud illius Succeſſores degeneraſſe.

Quòd Pythagorei Decadem, i. e. Mundum, Ἀνάστην appellaverint. Ἀνάστην
 verò *Physicam* non *Mechanicam* eos intellexisse existimo, Spiritumque
 Naturæ eâ voce subindicâsse.

Tali sensu, quo Cartesius naturam Vorticum, &c. Non tamen præciso
 illo sensu Mechanico, sed in genere potius, prout paulò antè monui,
 qui tamen Solis posteaque Telluris ex Sole naturalem Generationem,
 nisi omnia simul facta sint, complectitur.

Seçt. 9. Non dubitem eum cum Bezaliel & Aholiab, &c. Quo autem
 sensu ego Cartesium cum Bezaliel & Aholiab comparaverim, in Præfati-
 one ad *Dialogos Divinos Anglicè* editos, fideliter explicatur. Ad hunc
 ferè modum: Nec debet ille Author sic intelligi in comparando Car-
 tesium cum Bezaliel & Aholiab, ac si reverà crediderit supernaturaliter
 inspiratum. Quâ enim fronte potest quisquam istum sensum hujus-
 modi altivolanti blandiloquentiæ sive urbanitati imponere, cum passim
 in scriptis suis apertè fervidèque Cartesium, ubi in rebus ullius momenti
 eum errâsse deprehendit, confutat perinde atque laudibus extollit ubi
 meretur? Quod manifesto indicio est, eum non tenuisse infallibiliter
 inspiratum. Et cum Bezaliel & Aholiab Dei Spiritu repleti dicuntur,
 vera illius dicti *Exegesis* esse potest, eos sapientiâ tantum cordis reple-
 tos esse ad omnia curiosa opera Mechanica perficienda, quemadmo-
 dum innuitur sub finem illius Capituli, specialem & extraordinarium
 habuisse Genium ad eas res obeundas, quod Dei donum erat in Natura.
 Ut taceam, unumquodque magnum in Natura ex Hebraico Idiomate,
 à Deo denominari solere. Ac proinde repleti Spiritu Dei in sapientia
 & intelligentia, &c. est magnam portionem sapientiæ & intelligentiæ in
 certis quibusdam rebus fortiri. Et Cartesius proculdubio haud me-
 diocri ingenio & sagacitate præditus erat ad excogitandas maximè
 probabiles causas materiales Phænomenon Universi, ad easque affabrè
 redigendas in maximè speciosam contexturam cujus res ipsa capax sit,
 ad Philosophiam Mechanicam constituendam.

Præterea, Juvenis equidem tunc eram cum ista scripsi, nec tamen
 ullâ invidiâ aut æmulatione madidus aut turgidus; sed promptissimâ
 animi proclivitate, quæ ab aliis præclare dicta factave essent amicissi-
 mè amplexus sum, lubentissimè ceu discipulum me eorum Authori-
 bus addicturus, quanquam interim in nullius Magistri verba juratu-
 rus. Cum verò omnes Rationes Atomicae & Mechanicae ante Cartesii
 Scripta mihi planè sorduerint, condonandum profectò mihi est, æta-
 tiq; meæ, si præ nimio amore & admiratione tam præstantis Ingenii
 ex inopinato cœlitus delapsi (nec tamen ut *θεός ἐκ μηχανῆς*, sed ut
 Homo planè Mechanicus) Mechanicæque Phænomenon Naturæ ra-
 tiones tam dextrè & plausibiliter aperientis, in illius Laudes majori
 æstu sublimioribusque Hyperbolis raptus viderer, quàm aliam ætatem
 aliâsq; occasiones deceret.

C H A P. II.

1. *An Enumeration of Objections against the Philosophick Cabbala.* 2. *The Objection from the Inadequateness of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Six days Creation, answered.* 3. *That Tetractys in the Pythagorick Oath, is neither the four Elements, nor Mens, Anima, Opinio, Corpus, nor yet the Tetragrammaton.* 4. *That the exquisite fitness of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Days of the Creation argues his Philosophy the same with the Mosaical.* 5. *That the Mystical use of Numbers through the whole Denary is Judaical as well as Pythagorical.* 6. *And that neither the Jews nor Pythagoreans confine themselves to Ten: Whence this Objection from Inadequateness is found very invalid.*

1. **A**ND thus we have briefly considered the nature of the Truths comprised in the *Philosophick Cabbala*, as also the quality of those Persons that have owned them in the foregoing Ages. Now for the *Objections*: These *Seven* certainly are the most considerable, if not the only Allegations that can be made against it: namely,

First, That as well the *Pythagorick Numbers* as *Names*, are inadequate * to the *Six days Creation*.

Secondly, That the *Pythagorick Philosophy* does not answer justly to the *Judaick Cabbala*, in the chief strokes thereof, the *Jewish Writers* making no mention of the *Motion of the Earth*.

Thirdly, That the Interpretation of the *First day's Creation* is *Heterogeneous* to all the rest, it alone being *Symbolical*. Where three additional *Queries* are also proposed concerning the *Metaphysical Hyle*, created on the *First Day*.

Fourthly, That the Order of the *Cabbala* is preposterous, in placing the *Earth* before the *Sun*.

Fifthly, That the works of the *Fifth and Sixth Day* are too vulgar and trivial to be the Matter of a *Philosophick Cabbala*.

Sixthly, That there is an unwarrantable *ὑπερβολή* committed in our Interpretation of *Paradise*, we supposing it planted before *Adam* was made out of the *Earth*.

Seventhly and lastly, That our Interpretation of the *Cherubim and flaming Sword* is harsh, in that we make that a means of *Adam's* regaining *Paradise* that seems to keep him out.

2. But to these I shall fully answer in order. And first to the first part of the *First*, which would insinuate, that, because the *Pythagoreans* continued their *Numeral Mysteries* through the whole *Denarius*, whenas yet notwithstanding the *Days of the Creation* are but *Six*, therefore the *Six days creation* are not at all concerned in the *Mystery of their Numbers*: To this I answer, That their continuing their *Mysteries of Numbers* through the whole *Denarius*, is no prejudice to our Cause. For whether we suppose the *Hieroglyphicks of Numbers* to have been in use before the *Cabbala of Moses*, and that the first Author thereof took so many of them as were for his turn; (as he that writes a sentence, takes no more letters of the Alphabet than serves his purpose) or whether the first Author of the *Cabbala* began

these *Numeral Hieroglyphicks*, and thereupon the *Mysteries of Numbers* were afterward enlarged to smaller designs: neither *Hypothesis* makes any thing against our Interpretation. For it will follow, because *Moses* made *Hieroglyphical* Notes of *Six* Numbers only, to be the remembrances of the natures of such and such *Phænomena* of the World, and therefore they that partake of that *Cabbala* shall never make use of their Phansy to enlarge these *Numeral* *Mysteries* and Resemblances to other Matters; no not when in process of time they had lost the first end and scope of these *Hieroglyphicks*, and through ignorance and oblivion knew not what was the primitive occasion of them?

Wherefore that these *Numeral* *Mysteries* were stretched further than the *Six* days Creation, can be no argument against the *Philosophick Cabbala*: especially if you consider, that these *Six* Numbers are so exquisitely significative of every day's work; and that there can be * no tolerable sense of the *Pythagorick Tetractys*, but by supposing it the *Hieroglyphick* of the *Fourth* Day's Creation, which is intended a compendious comprehension of, or engagement into the whole *Pythagorick Cabbala*. Whose Conclusions are so exceeding weighty and venerable, that they may seem worthy of that Religion of an *Oath* abovementioned; where, (as † *Marcius* plainly proves) *Pythagoras* is sworn by, or at least he that imparted the Tradition of the *Tetractys*.

3. Which if it were but the knowledge of the number of the *Four* Elements, *Fire, Water, Earth, and Air*; or of the similitude that *Mens, Anima, Opinio, Corpus*, bear to the *Four* first numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. (which yet is inept or dilute enough in all but the last, if we would severely examine things; and if it were exact, were but a trifle: as also the things themselves ranged together to make up the *Tetractys*, are but forcedly produced, as not being all of one nature, but some Substances, other Accidents) I say, these pretended *Mysteries* are of so petty consideration, that it is impossible that they should have conciliated so great veneration to the first Imparter of them, as that the *Myſta* should religiously swear by him in their serious Converse.

Nor yet can it be the swearing by the *Tetragrammaton*, or the name of *Jehovah*. For *Tetractys*, as well as *Tetras*, (which is promiscuously put for it, and likely had been the only Appellation but for the verse sake) does not signify a *Name of four letters*, but simply the Number *Four*. And that it is a *Number*, not a *Name*, all the rest of the Numbers of the *Pythagorick* Denary will bear witness, as also the constant Interpretation of Writers, as you may see in *Meursius*. † Besides that οὐ μὲν τὸν τετρακτὺν, is false Greek; and οὐ μὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν ἀφ' ἧς οὐσαν τετρακτὺν, false verse. So little reason is there to dream of any other Interpretation than what we have given; namely, that it is the swearing by him that imparted by way of *Tradition*, (for so ἀφ' ἧς οὐσα implies) so excellent a piece of Knowledge as is comprised in the interpretation of the *Fourth* day's Creation, of which the *Tetractys* was the Symbol, and necessary Remembrancer; it not being applicable to that Day in the most notorious property thereof, but as that day is conceiv'd to comprehend the Creation of all, as to the main strokes of the Universe, whereby is necessarily imply'd that the

Pla-

† See Selden
de Diis Syris
Syntagm. 2.
cap. 1.

Planets must be so many *Earths*, with the rest of those noble Conclusions of Philosophy that depend thereon. Which was the sense of *Pythagoras* his School, as plainly appears out of || *Aristotle*, in his *De Cælo*, *Cælo*; where he says, that the *Pythagoreans* assert that the *Fire*, that is, the *Sun*, is in the midst of the World, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἐν ᾗ ἄσπερον εἶναι, and that the *Earth* is one of the *Stars*: he means, *Planets*. And that they made the *Planets* also *Earths*, appears from what he adds, Ἐτι δὲ ἐναντίαν ἄλλην ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι γῆν, ἣν ἀντίχθονα ὄνομα καλέουσιν; Moreover they make another *Earth*, which they call *Antichthon*, opposite to this of ours. Which questionless was nothing else but our overthwart neighbour-Planet or *Earth*, the *Moon*. For so she is called by the Ancients, † *Terra Ætherea*, as in || *Plutarch*, γῆ ὀλυμπία, and this hither part of her Ἀντίχθων and Περσεφόνη, as the other ἡλύσιον πεδίον tract of time having sophisticated this most solid Philosophy with superstitious conceits. * But this is enough to discover *Pythagoras* his opinion concerning the *Planets*, that he looked upon them as so many *Earths*. † Macrob. in Somn. Scip. lib. 1. c. 11. || Plutarch. de facie in Orbe Luna.

The *Tetractys* therefore is put for the *Cabbala* of this *Fourth Day's* work, which being fully and methodically explained, and the *Mystæ* finding their natures so perfected, and their Minds so illuminated thereby, might well extort from them such a veneration as would religiously induce them to swear by the first Author thereof. As it is said that *Pythagoras* himself did use the form; And I could charitably believe of all the *Primitive Pythagoreans*, that they swore in the same sense that *Pythagoras* did; namely, by the First Communicator of so high and stupendous a piece of Wisdom; which (as I have noted out of *Iamblichus*) is said to be Θεοῦ δόσιον, delivered first from God himself: Which will make this Swearing of theirs irreprehensible and blameless. See Johan. Meurf. Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 6.

4. There being therefore this exquisite fitness and appositeness in the application of these *Pythagorick* Numbers, (though we make not use of them all) to the Six days work of the Creation, it is a Demonstration that *Pythagoras* his Philosophy was the same in a manner with the ancient *Cabbala* of the *Jews*, touching the frame of the World.

5. Besides, there are not so few numbers of the *Pythagorick* Denary employed in the present Mystery, as is pretended. For the number *Seven* I have demonstrated to be very significant of the *Seventh Day's* Rest. * And the number *Ten* emerges out of the *Tetractys*, as has been above noted. So that *Eight* Numbers of the *Denary* are plainly demonstrated to belong naturally to the *Judaick Cabbala*. And that the ancient wisdom of the *Jews* made a mysterious use of the number *Eight* in their Religion, to me seems very plain, in that *Circumcision* was appointed on the *eighth* day. Which number being the first Cube, is a fit *Hieroglyphick* of the Stability of that Covenant made with the *Jews* in *Circumcision*; and the *Pythagoreans* call the *Octonary* ἀσφάλεια, which signifies, that *Security* which is by *Covenant*. And but that I might seem oversollicitous in a matter not so considerable, I think it would not be hard to produce places of Holy Writ, whence the number || *Nine* may be justly thought not to be devoid of a *Mystical* meaning. So little pretense is there to pronounce, that the Symbolical use of the first *Ten* Numbers is only *Pythagorical*, and does not concern the *Judaick Cabbala*. † See also Philo Jud. Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ περπασι- δέματα συ- νόδου.

6. To

6. To all which you may add, That neither the *Pythagoreans* themselves, nor the holy *Pen-men*, confine the *Mystical* use of *Numbers* to the first *Ten*, but expatiate both of them into other more compound *Numbers*. From whence is further evidence how causeless and invalid that *Allegation* is against the truth of the *Philosophick Cabbala*, concluded from that admirable fitness and congruity of the *Numbers* that are the Symbols of each Day's Creation; namely, *That there are more mystical Numbers than those that are applied thereunto*: As if, when-as there are several *Mystical Numbers* that far exceed the number of Seven days, they should all be applied to these Seven; or that, because they are unapplicable, therefore those that are so manifestly applicable, were not rightly applied.

And thus I hope I have fully satisfied the first part of this first Objection concerning the *Numbers* themselves. Which, I think, if duly considered, are alone (by reason of their fitness, and the significancy of their natures and properties) sufficient to assure us of that part of the *Philosophick Cabbala*, which is comprised in the first chapter of *Genesis*: And in which there is also a Prelibation of those illustrious Truths, which are more fully and circumstantially delivered in the second and third. Which shews, that the whole Philosophy of *Pythagoras* is of one piece, and from one fountain, the ancient *Cabbala* of *Moses*.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. II. Sect. 1.

Exam. Gener. p. 120.

AD sex Dierum Creationem esse inadquatos. Id quod S. A. nobis expressim objicit. Nos nempe ex Numerorum aptitudine veritatem *Cabbalæ* concludere, non obstante quòd *Pythagoras* ipse ultra *Senarium* progressus sit, & Numeros, non veluti *Symbola Hieroglyphica* rerum creatarum, sed tanquam *Causas Exemplares* & *Principia Harmonica* rerum agnoverit. Duo autem heic obijciuntur, Primum est quòd *Pythagoras* ultra *Senarium* progressus sit, Numerosque usque ad *Decadem* produxerit, cum tamen sex tantum dies sint Creationis. Alterum, quòd Numeros non tanquam *Symbola Hieroglyphica*, sed tanquam causas rerum exemplares statuerit.

Atque equidem primam illam Objectionem alicujus esse momenti facile concederem, si nec *Septenarius* nec *Denarius* ad Creationem ullo modo referri possent. Nunc verò cum manifestâ aptitudine, ne dicam necessitate (quemadmodum in hac ipsa Defensionis Appendice demonstro) eò referantur; (Nam *Septenarius Sabbati* five Cessationis Dei ab operibus sex dierum Symbolum est, nec quarti Diei opus rectè intelligi potest nisi ad *Tetractyos* potentiam attendamus, quæ *Denarius* est & idoneum Universitatis rerum creatarum Symbolum, quippe omnes Numeros in se continens:) hinc palàm est, quàm proclive foret *Pythagoreis*, ipsique adeò *Pythagoræ* Numerorum Mysteria ad *Decadem* usque extendere, quamvis primitus Mysteria non suppetarent, quæ *Octonario* & *Novenario* applicarentur, saltem quæ ad Creationem pertinerent. Quomodo verò aliunde supplementa fieri possent hoc ipso in capite subindicavi.

Addam

Addam verò hæc porrò, quæ ad eruditissimum virum *Christianum Knorrium* scripsi de usu ac natura decem *Sephirotharum*, quippe quæ spero hanc difficultatem penitus sublaturâ, palamque factura satis causæ subesse etiam è Traditione *Judaica*, cur *Pythagoras* ultra Numerum *Senarium* progressus sit, utpote qui Mysteria non tantum *Bereſbith*, sed & *Mercava*, non solius *Physica*, sed & *Metaphysica Judaica* Arcana participaverit. Sic igitur ad virum doctissimum scripsi. Quantum ad me ego certè *Sephirothas* credo (sicut & tu vertis) *Numerationes* omninò significare, effèque nihil aliud quàm *Numeralia* quædam *Repositoria* maximorum Mysteriorum antiquæ *Cabbalæ Decadem* non excedentia, manuūque digitis decem, super quos res numerare solent, respondentia, *Denariū*que *Pythagoricum* hinc originem suam traxisse. Varias verò Notiones vel Nomina ad singulos Numeros relata fuisse; quemadmodum observare licet apud *Johannem Meursium* in *Denario suo Pythagorico*: Quanquam multa quidem illuc notota Nomina spuria sunt, Modi tamen referendorum satis amplum est exemplum.

Sephiroth verò, sive *Numerationes Cabbalisticas* duàm fuisse generum putò, *Physicas* & *Metaphysicas*. *Physicas* fuisse *Repositoria* Mysterii Creationis sive Mundi, aspectabilis præcipuè, subindicatis interim & invisibilibus ejus incorporeisque Principiis. Septem autem primæ *Sephiroth* huic rei maximè inserviebant, septem diebus, (sex primis Operæ, septimo Quietis) applicatæ; & sic quidem ut singuli Numeri imaginem quasi ferrent rerum quæ singulis diebus appropriantur, sicut fusè demonstravi in *Cabbala mea Philosophica*. Nec omnino hîc otiaur decima *Sephirah*, sive *Denarius* quatenus ad *Quaternarium* referri potest, tanquam illius Potentia. Tot è decem Numeris sive *Sephiroth*, Mundi aspectabilis Creationi illustrandæ inserviebant. Quantum verò ad *Numerationes Metaphysicas*, id maximè notatu dignum est, eas totum *Denarium* complecti & in duas partes dividi, tribus prioribus ipsi *Divinitati*, septem reliquis *Creationi Spirituali* & invisibili applicatis. Ità ut septem postremæ *Sephiroth* *Repositoria* sint & capsulæ quasi rerum omnium creaturarum *Spiritualium* & *Invisibilium*, (quemadmodum septem, vel magis præcisè, sex primæ, rerum corporearum & aspectabilium,) tres verò primæ, quod dixi, *Sacroſanctæ Trinitatis*, &c. Vide ipsam Epistolam Tabulis *Cabbalisticis* præfixam. Nimius enim essem si cætera huc transcriberem. Ex his facillè intelliget *S. A.* fuisse apud *Judeos* magni momenti Mysteria quæ totam Numerorum *Decadem* adimplerent, nec ullas lacunas relinquerent quò minùs *Pythagoras* Numeros suos Mysticos ad *Denarium* usque extenderet. Quippe cujus *Denarius* non ad *Bereſbith* tantum, sed ad *Mercava* Mysteria pertinere intelligitur. Neque enim dubito quin *Judeorum* decem *Sephiroth* & *Denarius Pythagoricus* ab eadem origine profluxerint.

Ac proinde meritò cessare debet *S. A.* urgere, Si *Pythagorici* in Exam. Ge-
sais Numerorum Mysteriis ad Historiam Creationis respexissent & Numeri ner. p. 117,
ipsis fuissent operis cujusque diei Symbola, tum substitissent in Senario.
Hic ipsis potius fuisset *Sexas* dictus quàm *Denarius*, utpote re ipsâ *Sexas*
seu Numerus omnia Creationis opera comprehendens. Nam ipsam *Cabbalam*
Philosophicam Numeros ad *Denarium* extendisse manifestum est, nec ad
solum opus *Bereſbith*, sed ad *Mercavam* etiam applicavisse. Ut omit-
tam quàm ridiculè expectetur à *S. A.* ut *Pythagorici* *Senarium* *Sexas*

vocarent, quasi ipsa prima numerorum nomina à *Pythagoricis* imposita fuissent. At verò quod tantundem valet, *Senarius* ab ipsis ἐπεμέλεια vocatur, quòd die sexto tota Creatio perfecta esset. Addòque *Tetractyn*, quæ speciali modo ad Creationem refertur, etiam *Decadem* in se potentiâ continere, & eo ipso quarti diei opus mirificè illustrare. Adeò omnia ex voto D. *Samueli Andreae* hîc succedunt.

Quantùm verò ad alteram Objectionem, Quòd *Pythagoras* Numeros non veluti *Symbola Hieroglyphica*, sed tanquam vera rerum Principia agnovit, equidem si verum id esset, haud mediocrem, fateor, vim haberet ad subvertendam nostram opinionem. Homo verò, qui ità solida alias Philosophiæ principia imbibere, eorùmque capax fuerit, ut idem eousque deliraret, ut ipsos Numeros non *Symbola* quidem, sed *elementa* ipsa ac principia rerum existimaret, tantâque cum reverentia ac sanctimonia tales Nugas ac Quisquilias discipulis communicaret, superstitiosâve quadam aut affectatitiâ gravitate & autoritate eorum fidei obtruderet, res adeò absona est & ab omni ratione aliena, ut apud neminem nisi vecordem admodum, summòve laborantem præjudicio ullam fidem possit obtinere.

Fateor equidem *Aristotelem*, ut erat paulò pugnacior & disputationibus addictior Philosophus, in libro decimo tertio & decimo quarto *Metaphysices*, (si tamen isti libri *Aristotelis* sunt, qua de re docti inter se dissentiunt) absurdam hanc *Pythagoreorum* opinionem prolixè confutare. Et *Alexandrum* apud *Laertium*, in *Commentariis Pythagoricis* notare, ex *Monade* Numeros, ex *numeris Puncta*, ex *punctis Lineas*, ex *lineis planas Figuras*, ex *planis solidas*, ex *solidis Figuris Corpora solida*, ut *Ignem*, *Aquam*, *Terram*, *Aerem constare*, &c. Sed enimvero, etiam ex aliis quas *Alexander* *Pythagoreis* ibidem ascribit, manifestum est etiam illius temporibus *Cabbalam Pythagoricam* corruptam esse. Et tamen quod censet *Vossius*, Hic est ille *Alexander Polyistor*, qui Olympiade CLXXIII, imperante, in *Ægypto*, *Ptolemæo Lathyro*, florebat. At verò si duo illi ultimi libri *Aristotelis* genuini sint, ducentis trecentisve antè annis corruptionem istam factam oportet, nisi quòd *Aristoteles* censeri possit ex incertâ tantùm famâ istas opiniones tanquam *Pythagoricas* accepisse, avidèque occasionem amplexum esse eas confutandi, cùm tamen *Pythagorei* ipsi eis temporibus eò vecordia nondum prorupissent. *Aristotelem* verò non rectè semper veterum Philosophorum sententias intellexisse, notissimum est. Famam autem illam incertam à Symbolico illo ortam esse apud *Pythagoreos* loquendi modo (quibus frequens in ore erat,

————— Ἀριθμῶ δὲ τὴν πᾶν ἐπέκειν)

in Epistola ad V.C. fati monuimus. Tantùm addo *Philoponum* nobiscum sentire hac in re, qui in *Metaphys.* lib. 1. sic scribit: *Pythagorei dum volunt sapientiam suam occultam facere cerdonibus, Symbolicè tradiderunt disciplinas, dicentes Unitatem Mentem, Binariam Animam, &c.* Ipseque S. A. merito τὸν Πυθαγόρειον Φίλωνα, *Philonem Pythagoreum* à *Clemente Alexandrino* vocari asserit, quòd Numerorum Mysteria ex Principiis *Pythagoricis* captat. Captat autem *Philo* tanquam *Symbola* rerum quibus repræsententur, non tanquam *Principia* ex quibus consistant. Et paulò post, Exam. General. pag. 8. idem S. A. de *Pythogora* ac *Platone*

tone differens, Erant hi, inquit, Philosophi Matheseos studio imprimis additi. Unde illud solenne eorum in Scholis monitum, εἰς ἀγεωμέτρην εἰσιτά. Non ergo mirum si quæ hauserant secretiora de Deo & ortu Universi, quæ εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀχλῶν ἀγνοίαν ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας, (uti Josephus ex mente Platonis loquitur, lib. 2. contra Appionem) Mathematicis Ænigmatis involuta discipulis suis voluerint tradere. Hæc ipse S. A. ultro profert. Addamque e libro primo contra Appionem, Pythagoram plerâque e fonte Judaico hausisse, attestante eodem Josepho, hisce verbis: Πυθαγόρας τοίνυν ὁ Σάμιος ἀρχαῖος ὢν, σοφία ᾗ καὶ τῇ περὶ τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ πάντων ὑπερλήμψας διενευσῆεν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ μόνον ἐργακῶς τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν διήλός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζηλώτης αὐτῶν ἐκ πλείους γεγεννημένος. Unde constat quàm serio studio Pythagoras Mosaica Mysteria imbiberit, & quàm capax eorundem fuerit, propter eximiam pietatem ac sapientiam, & quàm sedulus futurus eorum per Ænigmata Arithmetica celator nè quid in profanum vulgus emanaret, juxta ipsius S. A. sententiam. Quapropter apud ipsum S. A. manifestum esse debet Numeros Pythagoricos non Ideales causas, internave Principia fuisse rerum, sed earum tantum Symbola vel Similitudines.

Ex agnitis verò hisce Numerorum, cum rebus, Similitudinibus, factum est ut extranei, qui Pythagoreorum mentem perperam intellexerint, Similitudines has in Ideas rerum verterent, nec eo contenti primas Essentias facerent, cum nihil tamen ab essentiæ substantiæve natura magis distet quàm Numerus; quippe qui Notio tantum secunda est non res, ut norunt omnes qui vel primoribus labiis veram Logicæ notitiam degustaverint. Nec sanè diffiteor quin prolapsu temporis, per mutationes rerum ac vicissitudines, apud ipsos etiam Pythagoreos, qui tales nempe se putaverint, quemadmodum & apud Judæos, Cabbala Philosophica, quantum ad abstrusiora tum Bereshith, tum Mercava Mysteria penitus ferè perierit, quanquam & nomina decem Sephirotharum apud Judæos & appellationes decem Numerorum apud Pythagoreos etiamnum manerent, quorum tamen usum rationemque utrique perinde ignorabant. Unde factum est ut Judæi Sephirothas suas in Emanationes nescio quas Divinas, Pythagorei verò pari superstitione suos Numeros in Ideas primasve rerum omnium Causas exemplares & Essentias aut verterent ipsi, aut ab aliis per errorem sic versas lubenter amplecterentur & pro suis agnoscerent. Ac proinde cum occasio hujusmodi Nugamentorum tradendorum tam clarè pateat, & de eximia Numerorum eorundemque appellationum congruitate cum sex dierum Creationis Operibus in Cabbala nostra Philosophica (ut de usu Sephirotharum genuino in Catechismo Cabbalistico) satis constet, nec nisi temporis successu prima Cabbalæ puritas possit corrumpi, equidem admodum temerè à S. A. affirmatur, & contra suam ipsius sententiam suprâ allatam, Pythagoram ipsum, (nè dicam proximos illius successores) Numeros non veluti Symbola Hieroglyphica rerum creatarum, sed tanquam Causas exemplares & principia Harmonica rerum agnovisse.

SECT. 2. Nullus Tetractyos Pythagoricæ sensus tolerabilis esse potest, nisi, &c. Quæ S. A. contra hanc sententiam objicit, mihi notissima erant etiam tum cum Cabbalam meam Philosophicam scripsi: Plutarchum nempe Tetractyn, quæ in juramento illo Pythagorico occurrit, ad Mentem, Scientiam, Opinionem, & Sensum, quatuor illas Animæ facultates applicare; & tum ob hoc, tum etiam quòd universus Numerorum ambitus

Exam. Ge-
ner. p. 126.

ἡ μὲν δὲ quidem in *Decade*, καὶ δὲ δὲ ὅτι in *Tetrade* contineatur, summum *Pythagoreos* juramentum fecisse τὸν τελεγεῖον, apertè statuere; *Nicetam* ad quatuor elementa retulisse; *Plutarchum* rursus τετρακτὸν de Numero XXXVI, qui ex quatuor primis paribus imparibusque numeris componitur, intelligere; & *Seldenum* denique ad nomen *Tetragrammaton* יהוה referendum censere. Quæ quidem omnia Interpretamenta tanquam levia admodum pessimèque fundata datâ operâ partim neglexi, partim confutavi. Quippe quum duo priora præterquam quod nihil in se contineant majestatem solennitatemque Juramenti dignum, à veritate etiam valde sunt aliena, nec rectè *Quaternario* possunt applicari. Neque enim *Quaternarius* omnes Animæ facultates exhaurit. Præter *Sensum* enim, *Opinionem*, *Scientiam* & *Mentem* sive *Intellectum*, datur etiam *Phantasia* & *Memoria*. Nec ipse *Plutarchus* quomodo *Quaternarius* sensui applicandus sit, explicat. *Quinarius* ipsum aptius repræsentaret. Et ex duabus præmissis positis, *Opinio* perinde oritur atque *Scientia*. Adeò nulla causa est ut *Binarius* *Scientiam* potius repræsentet quàm *Opinionem*. Immo cum dubia res sit *Opinio*, *Binarius* magis idoneus est ad *opinionem* significandam, quippe quam dubitatio semper comitatur, quam significantissimo vocabulo Græci ἐνδοσαμὸν vocant. Hæc igitur *Quaternionis* significatio *Pseudo-Pythagoreorum* quorundam merum delirium est vanumque insomnium. Equidem fateor illam *Quaternarii* proprietatem quâ omnes Numeros καὶ δὲ δὲ in se contineat, à genuinis *Pythagoreis* agnitam & usurpatam, sed tanquam summi Mysterii *Symbolum*, quod in *Defensione Cabbale Philosophicæ* explico, nec hîc repeto. Istam verò nudam *Quaternarii* proprietatem nullo sensu *Symbolico* imbutam, occasionem dedisse sanctissimo huic *Pythagoreorum* Juramento, tam stolidam ac vesana opinio est ut risu potius & explosione excipienda sit, quàm seriò refutanda. Nemo nisi summâ laborete vecordiâ, adeò absurdè de tam inclytis Philosophis sentire potest.

Nec tamen minus absolum est, quod *Nicetas* vult, nempe ad quatuor elementa *Tetractyn* referri, quasi ex istis omnia fierent. Quod ut falsissimum est, ita quatuor Elementorum doctrina res adeò vilis atque obvia est, ut planè impossibile sit ut hæc solennitatem sanctitatemque Juramenti mereretur. Nec ipsi profectò Objectori multum arridet. Qui interim de prima tertiæque Explicatione paulò majorem spem se concipere profitetur. Qualis autem prima illa sit jam vidimus. Et pari quidem vanitate laborat ipsa tertia. Nam composita illa *Tetractys* ex quatuor primis paribus imparibusque numeris, qui conjuncti XXXVI efficiunt, res perinde trivialis est & frivola, atque illa simplex, si omni sensu *Symbolico* destituatur, parique intervallo apud tam sanctos scientesque Philosophos à Juramenti sanctitate distabit. Quis autem sensus illius *Symbolicus* sit, suprà dictâ *Defensione* explico, Lectorémque eò remitto.

Supereft tandem *Seldeni* nostratis explicatio, qui τετρακτὸν ad nomen *Tetragrammaton* referendum statuit; Quasi *Juramentum* esset per nomen *Jehovæ*. Atque hoc certè satis consistit apprimève convenit cum Juramenti sanctimonia; sed *Syntaxis Grammatica* (quemadmodum in ipso Textu jam satis apertè monui,) hanc interpretationem planè respuit. Vult enim *Seldenus* τὸν cum τετρακτὸν conjungi, quasi τετρακτὸς
idem

idem esset atque *Jehovah*, nempe nomen Dei, quod nè *Tetragrammaton* quidem est, sed *Jehovah* dicitur nomen Dei *Tetragrammaton*; i. e. Nomen Dei ex quatuor literis conflatum. Adeò ut demirer hominem, aliàs satis doctum, tam sœdè hac in re hallucinatum esse, & ἀσυνταξίαν hanc ex priscorum Mysteriis, qui Deorum sexus confundebant, quos ἀρρενοθήλεις dicebant, excusare voluisse. Neque enim *Tetractys* Dei magis nomen est quàm *Tetragrammaton*, sed numerum tantum literarum nominis illius, utraque indicant, nempe si *Tetractys* etiam ad יהוה referatur. Quam propter hanc ἀσυνταξίαν palàm est, eo sensu quo vult *Seldenus*, non referri.

Cùm verò τετρακτύς nihil aliud sonet quàm τέλες, & in usu apud *Pythagoreos* sit sub uno numero multas res, quarum ille *Symbolum* esse possit, abscondere, vel tanquam in Repositorio μνημονεύσιμῳ recondere, τετρακτύν etiam ad יהוה sic referri posse non abnuam, ut Juramentum intelligatur fieri per eum qui *Mysterium* τετρακτύς tradidit, continentis nempe fontem ac radicem æternæ vel perennis nunquàmve desinentis *Naturæ*, doctrinam scilicet de illo Fonte ac radice, qui primo loco & tanquam *Origo* maximè prima est יהוה literarum nominis *Tetrade* insignis. Cujus etiam *Triunitas* (cùm unum & tria faciunt quatuor, prout *Reuchlinus* notavit) in hac *Tetracty* recondi potest, idque admodum consonanter *Doctrinæ Pythagoricæ*, quippe qui *Triunitatem Divinitatis* tenuerunt. Præter autem hoc *Mysterium Tetragrammati* (cujus Nominis vi *Pythagoras* fortean aliquando miracula edidit) & *Divinæ Triunitatis* (quorum utriusque satis aptum est *Symbolum Tetractys*) cùm *symbolum* præterea perinde idoneum sit, quod universalem *Mundi Creationem* referat, *Spiritu Naturæ* pollentis rerumque generationes perpetuantis, die quarto descriptam, (quemadmodum fusè explicavimus in *Defensione Cabbalæ Philosophicæ* ejusque *Appendice*, nec opus est hîc repetere) minimè mirandum est etiam illius *Mysterii* esse *Repositorium*; ut nec omittam huc referri posse quatuor *Animalium* quatuorque apud *Ezechielem* *Rotarum Mysterium*, cui quidem pandendo *Philosophia Pythagorica* haud incommoda clavis est. Adeò ut sensus Juramenti, οὐ μὲν ἔ, &c. hic sit: Non per eum qui nobis tradidit *summatum* *Physicæ tum Metaphysicæ Judaicæ* *Mysteria* sub *Tetractyos* *Symbolo* recondita, hoc est, Non per *Jehovam*, quippe omnium primum *Traditorem*. Quod profectò Juramentum est sanctitate profundâque *Sectæ Pythagoricæ* sapientiâ nequaquam indignum.

Ex hac autem explicatione, quam ex *Seldeno* & *Reuchlino* vir doctus in medium protulit, quæque à me multis modis emendatior facta est & correctior, opinio nostra de *Pythagora*, quòd *Sapientiam* suam è fontibus *Judaicis* hauserit, mirificè corroboratur. Quam igitur explicationem, cum tam accommodam rebus nostris fore prævidisset, primæ tertiæque per invidiam, posthabuisse meritò censendus est noster *Antagonista*. Sed ea de re ipse viderit.

Interea loci non abs re fore puto eos *Philologos* aggredi, quorum meminit eruditus *Author Systematis Mundi Intellectualis*, qui Juramentum in *Disticho Pythagorico*, per *Tetractyn* sive *Tetragrammaton* fieri statuunt, hoc est, per *Jehovam*, nomine Dei pro Deo ipso posito, juxta illud *Rabbinorum* dictum יהוה שמו ושבו יהוה, Ipse nomen suum est suumque nomen ipse, ac si sensus istorum verborum,

Ναὶ μὲν τὸν ἀμετέραν ψυχῇ μεταδόντα τετρακτὺν
Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως

hic esset ; Per Tetragrammaton sive Jehovah qui communicavit *se- ipsum*, sive fontem æternæ Naturæ nostris Animabus, quippe secundum doctrinam *Pythagoricam* ex mente Divina carptis & delibatis. Ad Philologos igitur istos respondeo.

Primò, Tinnulum istud reciprocumque Rabbiorum dictum sensu Politico & forsan magis arcano mysticòque intelligendum, perperam heic & quasi obtorto, quod aiunt, collo ad tædissimum Solæcismum Grammaticum defendendum vel invitum trahi. Neque enim illud dictum Rabbinicum sensu Grammatico accipiendum est ad absonas excusandas ἀτυταξίας, sed ad significandum, ubi nomen Jehovah alicui personæ imponitur, non esse inane Nomen in Scriptura, sed rem ipsam subesse. Ut ubi Angelus fœderis & Dux Israelitarum Jehovah dicitur. Jehovah ipsum isti personæ subesse innuit ; ac reverà fuisse Christum Animamve Messia æterno Logo conjunctam, &c. Ut o-mittam *nomen* & *rem*, *vocari* & *esse* idem frequenter apud Hebræos significare, adeò ut ex communi isto Linguae Hebraicæ Idiotismo dictum illud Rabbinicum multis in locis exponi possit, quem tamen Idiotismum omnes Syntaxios leges irritas facere nemo sanus statuerit.

Deinde, quod & suprâ monui, nè Tetragrammaton quidem, multòque minùs Tetractys est *Nomen* Dei, sed *Jehovah*. Adeò ut demirari satis nequeam horum oscitantiam Philologorum, qui tam incondita & malè cohærentia Insomnia Orbi literato propinant, nec Tetractyn sive Τετρακτα perinde atque reliquos Numeros *Pythagoricos* Sym-bola esse permittunt (ut certè *Hierocles* eo loco ubi ait, Ἔστι δὲ διημεροῦς καὶ ὅλων καὶ αἰτία ἡ τετρας, θεὸς νοητός, &c. Symbolum pro re significata ponit) sed *propria nomina* volunt esse, immo res ipsas, quarum tantum Sym-bola sunt sive Repositoria μνημονευτικά. Cum luce profectò clarius sit Tetractyn non esse *nomen* Dei, sed Tetragrammati *Repositorium* duntaxat, uti & aliorum Mysteriorum quorum sit idoneum Sym-bolum. Ac proinde quomodo [ipse *Nomen* suum est suumque *Nomen* ipse] cum *Tetractys* nomen ipsius non sit nedum ipse Deus, crassum illum Solæcismum excusare possit, ego quidem nequaquam video.

Tertiò, Si [μεταδόντα] Essentiæ Divinæ animabus humanis communicationem, sive μεταδοσιν significare debuisset, vocabulum μεταδόντα non μεταδόντα adhibitum fuisset, cum usitatissima vocis μεταδόντα significatio ad doctrinam Mysteriorumve traditionem pertineat, quo sensu non ego solum sed alii plerique omnes hoc in loco accipiunt.

Quartò, Si μεταδόντα idem heic sonet atque μεταδόντα, & [Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως] ipsam Divinam Essentiam indigitet, nostris animabus, quippe ex Divina mente carptis & delibatis, communicatam, id quidem admodum durum Paradoxum est & Doctrinæ *Pythagoricæ* omnique sanæ Sapientiæ contrarium. Dum enim animos nostros ex mente Divina carptos esse ac delibatos supponit, Mentem Divinam supponit discerpibilem, ac proinde corpoream. Adeò ut Philologi isti, qui huic sententiæ favent, Philologiam multo plus pollere videantur, quàm solidâ ratione aut acumine Philosophico.

Quintò

Quinto denique, plena Formula Juramenti *Pythagorici* sic est :

Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμείψα ψυχᾷ παρδόντα τετρακτὴν
Πατρὶν ἀέναν φύσεως, ῥίζωματ' ἔχουσαν,

quemadmodum reperitur apud *Sextum Empiricum* passimque apud alios Scriptores, nec probabile est primitus plenum non fuisse Distichon ; (nisi monostichon solummodo fuerit) cujus igitur sensus hic foret secundum hos Philologos :

*Non per Tetractyn qui Anima nostra communicavit
Fontem aeternæ Naturæ, Radicemque habentem.*

Qui sensus planè mancus est & imperfectus, cùm plenus & natus sensus sit idemque noster :

*Non per eum qui animæ nostræ tradidit Tetractyn
Fontem perennis Naturæ Radicemque habentem.*

Hic sensus plenus est, concinnus & perspicuus. Alter verò præterquam quòd mancus, falsus est præterea. Neque enim Fons æternæ Naturæ, Deus utique ipse radicem habet unde pullulet, sed Radix ipsa est rerum quidem omnium.

Atque hæc breviter ad confutandam hanc absonam Opinionem dictorum Philologorum operæ pretium putabam afferre, cùm eruditissimus vir ad alia properans, eam proponere tantummodo contentus esset, confutationem verò illius ipsi visum sit prætermittere ; quippe quam forsàn vix dignam confutatione putavit ; præsertim si cum simplici nostra Juramenti *Pythagorici* Interpretatione conferatur. Ubi nihil coactum aut violentum, nihil durum aut distortum est, nullaque ullius Legis est aut Grammaticæ aut Philosophicæ violatio. Sed omnia & inter se & cum Historiarum fide sententiæque plerorumque omnium Philosophorum, aliorumque quidem Philologorum apprimè conveniunt. Quam Interpretationem nihil attinet hîc repetere, cùm tam planè jam pluribus uno locis descripserim.

Brevem hanc tantùm hîc adjiciam Distichi Paraphrasin. *Per eum qui nobis tradidit Tetractyn, Numerum nempe illum Symbolicum, habentem sive continentem in se, tanquam apto istiusmodi rerum Repositorio, Fontem ac Radicem perennis Naturæ.* Quibus Deus primo in loco innuitur (ad quem nomen Tetragrammaton יהוה spectat) tanquam primus omnium Fons ac Radix : Et Spiritus Naturæ cum Materia Mundana universa, in secundo, qui perennis Naturæ Radix secundaria est atque Fons, cujusque ope Generale Mundi Systema prout quarto die describitur in Cabbala Philosophica, constitutum est, rerumque ac Seculorum perennis facta successio. Per *Tetractyn* igitur non juratur, sed per eum qui *Tetractyos Cabbalam* tradidit, quem non nego fuisse ipsum *Jehovam*, per eumque primitus *Pythagoram* jurasse, licet supersticiosi *Pythagorei* postea meritò dici possint jurasse per *Pythagoram*. Id quod fecisse eos testantur *Iamblichus*, *Hierocles* alique. Et ad eum planè sensum, Juramentum *Hierocles* interpretatur, nempe tanquam, per *Pythagoram*, factum qui *Tetractyn* discipulis tradiderit.

Quod quidem Juramentum in *Aureis Carminibus*, dum in altero Versiculo mutilum conspicio, invictam ferè mihi suspicionem injicit, nè id

quidem quod superest illius versiculi, esse genuinum, sed totum versiculum spurium quoddam esse segnéque assumentum, explicationis causâ à recentioribus aliquibus *Pythagoreis* superadditum, sed priscam Juramenti formulam, (quod & suprâ obiter subindicavi,) *Monostichon* fuisse, & nunc affirmativè nunc negativè, in rebus maximè seriis, prompto hoc & expedito modo usurpatam.

Nxì μὰ τὸν }
vel } ἀμετέρα ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακλύν.
Οὐ μὰ τὸν }

Quæ quidem forma satîs plena est, alterâ que multò rotundior, clarior, atque etiam comprehendentiore, ut quæ in genere significat magna aliqua ac veneranda Mytheria in *Tetraëtyos* Cabbala sive Traditione contineri. Nec dubito quin sub eo Repositorio Symbolico Mytherium Creationis quarti diei, totiùsque adeo *Berebith*, & Mytherium quatuor Animalium & quatuor Rotarum totiùsque itidem *Mercava* recondita essent. Sed & alibi hæc plus semel monui, & tædet profectò res tam manifestas & perspicuas tam multis repetitionibus inculcare.

Exam. Gener. pag. 149. *Sect. 3.* Hoc verò sufficit ad resciscendam *Pythagoræ* opinionem, &c. Conqueritur heïc S. A. me *Pythagoreorum* opiniones Magistro suo *Pythagoræ* ascribere, cùm ex *Commentariis Pythagoricis* constet, referente *Alexandro* apud *Laertium*, *Pythagoram* non tenuisse motum *Telluris*, &c. Sed respondeo, ὑπομνήματα πυθαγορικά non significare illa ipsa συγγράμματα, quæ *Pythagoras* dicitur scripsisse, ista scilicet τεῖα βιβλία διαβόητα, quæ τὸ πυθαγόρειον δόγμα, ipsius *Pythagoræ* doctrinam, integrè sincerèque continebant, quos libros *Philolaus* solus evulgavit; sed quævis Monumenta quantumvis corrupta & depravata. Qualia proculdubio ista sunt quæ *Alexander* apud *Laertium* memorat. Quippe quæ *Solem* & *Lunam* (apud veros tamen *Pythagoreos* Ἀσλίχθονα nostram habitam) & reliqua sydera Deos faciunt, ex eo solo quòd calor in eis dominetur qui sit vitæ Author; Animamque definiunt Αἰθέρος ἀπόσπασμα, partem *Ætheris* avulsam; Hominumque cum Diis cognationem consistere ex eo quòd caloris sint participes. Quæ tam crassa & absurda sint & à *Pythagoræ* doctrina tam aliena, ut nihil esse possit suprâ. Nam & *Pythagoras* & *Plato* & *Aristoteles*, hi omnes testante *Plutarcho*, Ἀσώματιν ἢ ψυχὴν ὑποθέμεναι φύσει λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἑστὴν νοήσιν. Omnes incorpoream Animam statuunt, quippe substantiam intelligibilem & ex sua natura seipsam moventem. Adeo ut si hæc *Hypomnemata* adeò spuria & depravata motum *Terræ* omisissent, nihil profectò contrâ nos faceret. Verum enimverò dubito sanè an omiserint, Terramve in ipso Mundi centro defixerint.

Neque enim ista verba à S. A. allata satîs id probant. Ex illis autem consistere (nempe Igne, Aquâ, Terrâ, Aere) Mundum animatum, intelligibilem, rotundum, μέσσην περιέχοντα τὴν γῆν, καὶ αὐτὴν σφαιροειδῆ καὶ περιεκκυρόην. Nam μέσσην περιέχον τὴν γῆν potest quidem nihil ampliùs innuere quàm Terram à libero *Æthere* undique cingi, adeo ut in medio Mundi rectè dici possit jacere (quanquam non propriè in centro) contrâ ac *Plebeii* imaginantur qui basin partemve infimam Mundi putant. Eousque nec ultrâ forsan, ista verba satîs incerta collineant. Et in sequentibus περιεκκυρόμενην legendum sit an περιεκκινούμενην equidem dubito. Neque enim tanta est vocum dissimilitudo, quin per scribarum primitus

mitus indiligentiam five oscitantiam altera pro altera pingi posset, *πειοικυμένην* præsertim pro *πεικινυμένην* ob sensum ad captum vulgi magis accommodatum, qui à motu terræ tantopere abhorrent. Adde quod *πεικινυμένην* cum sequentibus melius videtur cohærere. Nam *πειοικυμένην* ita consentit cum opinione *Antipodum*, ut planè mutuò se inferant. Ac proinde si *πειοικυμένην* vera lectio esset, subiungendum esset, *εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἀντίποδας*, ut necessaria connexio horum duorum intelligatur. Jam verò cum legitur, *εἶναι δὲ*, diversitatem innuit non autem connexionem, & duas diversas easque eximias *Pythagoræ* opiniones denotat, nempe *Terram moveri* & *Antipodas dari*; quæ duo erant, pro istis quidem temporibus, insignia dogmata, magnique & excelsi Ingenii argumenta. *Πεικίνουσιν* autem hanc tam de annuo quàm de diurno Telluris motu intelligi posse ex modò dictis fati patet. Adeò ut hæc *Hypomnemata* quanquam nihil contra nos faciunt, quippe magna ex parte adeò adulterata, in hac re tamen pro nobis facere meritò censerì possint. Quippe quod nemo ferè ante hoc seculum an *Pythagoras* motum Telluris tenuerit, unquam dubitavit, cum adeò apud omnes celebratum sit pro dogmate *Pythagorico*. Dogma verò esse *Pythagoricum* eo sensu quo *Hypomnemata* hæc *Pythagorica* dicuntur, nempe *Pythagoricorum* dogmata continentia, nullum dubium esse potest, ac proinde aut *πεικινυμένην* legendum esse, aut fatendum misera rursus ac manca hæc *Alexandri Hypomnemata* esse dogmatum *Pythagoricorum* monumenta.

Sed enim ex hac ipsa *Pythagoræ* vita per *Laertium* scripta, clarè mihi constare videtur ipsius *Pythagoræ* fuisse dogma. Dicit enim disertis verbis *Diogenes*, Μέχει δὲ φιλολάου ἐκ ἧν τι γινώσκει πυθαγόρειον δόγμα. Οὗτο δὲ μόνον ἔξενεσκε τὰ διαβόητα τεῖα βιβλία. Quæ igitur dogmata divulgavit *Philolaus* erant planè dogmata *Pythagoræ*, quæ ad illius exemplum tanto studio adhuc celata erant. Atque ad hanc igitur rationem intelligendum est quod occurrit apud *Diogenem* in *Vita Philolai*. Ubi *Philolaus* primus dixisse fertur (non primus illud dogma invenisse) τὴν γῆν κινεῖσθαι καὶ κύκλον, edoctus proculdubio è libris istis qui genuina *Pythagoræ* dogmata continebant, ad quòsque emendos *Plato* ad *Dionem* scripsit, & ex quibus ipse *Plato* primùm diurnum Telluris motum, mox verò jam senex factus etiam annuum intellexit agnovitque, referente *Plutarcho* in *vita Numæ*. Nec dubito quin *Aristarchus* à *Pythagora Samio*, ipse etiam *Samius* idem dogma, quanquam fortè non immediatè, acceperit, cujus mentionem facit *Archimedes* in *Psammitæ*. Ὅτι δὲ (Ἀρίσταρχος ὁ Σάμιος) τὰ μὲν ἀπλανῆ καὶ ἄστρον καὶ τὸν ἄλιον μινεῖν ἀκίνητον, τὴν δὲ γῆν περιφέρειν καὶ τὸν ἄλιον καὶ κύκλου περιφέρειαν ὅς ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν δρόμων καίκεται. *Libertus* verò *Fromondus* in *Ant-Aristarcho* suo, eum proximè post *Pythagoram* ponit, immò dubitat annon sit ætate anteponeendus, sed temerè & absque omni ratione. Verba *Fromondi* hæc sunt, de Situ Solis in Mundi meditullio quam Jovis custodiam, Διὸς φυλακὴν *Pythagorici* apellitant, Qua in re, inquit, *Pythagoram secuti* *Aristarchus Samius* (nisi tamen hic *Pythagorâ vetustior fuit*) *Philolaus*, *Hicetas*, *Seleucus*, *Cleanthes Samius*, *Leucippus*, *Heraclides*, *Ecphantus*, immò *Plato jam senex ut narrat Theophrastus*, &c.

Et certè communi omnium consensu *Pythagorica* dogmata ad ipsum *Pythagoram* tanquam ipsorum Authorem five Traditorem referantur. Nam & illi qui apud *Plutarchum* *Numam Pythagoræ* auditorem

fuisse volunt, ex *Pythagoricorum* dogmatum similitudine id arguunt, & inter cætera ex situ Solis in medio Mundi à *Numa* perinde atque à *Pythagoreis* sic collocati. Nec uni *Philolao* attribuit motum Terræ
De Cælo. lib. 2. *Aristoteles* sed *Philosophis Italicis*, *Pythagoreis* dictis à *Pythagora* qui in ea *Italia* parte quæ *Græcia major* appellabatur, multum diuque habitabat, quique illis istud dogma tradiderat, & ob id ipsum potissimum apud *Aristotelem* *Pythagorei* appellati sunt. Neque protectò par est ut in mentione istius opinionis *Pythagorei* appellarentur, nisi eam opinionem *Pythagoras* tenuisset. Adeò ut perversi distortique ingenii hominem esse oporteat, purumque putum *Cavillatorem* qui rem tam perspicuam, communique omnium rationi consentaneam negaverit, animique nimium tardi ac timidi, nisi emendandum illum locum *Dio- genis* potius censuerit vertendumque *περιουκμένην* in *περικινημένην*, quàm dubitandum an ipse *Pythagoras* motum Telluris tenuerit: cum & ipse *Digenes Philolaum* dogmata *Pythagoræ* primum divulgasse ait, & primum simul dixisse (nempe foràs illud *Pythagoræ* Arcanum protulisse) Terram moveri circa Solem.

Sed quicquid de ea fit versione, palàm est fidem *Alexandri* in rebus *Pythagoricis* ferè esse nullam, quippe qui tam crassos *Epicureorum* aut *Stoicorum* errores ipsi *Pythagoræ* non dubitavit affingere; si quid tenuerit & non tenuerit *Pythagoras* ex *Alexandri* testimonio definiendum sit. *Plutarchus* verò qui *Pythagoræ* pariter atque *Platoni* & *Aristoteli*
De Placit. Philos. lib. 2. cap. 23. doctrinam de cursu Solis per *Zodiacum* tribuit, manifestum est quòd sensu *Astronomico* intelligendus sit, non *Physico*. Nam postremò addit, πάντα ὅ τὰυτὰ καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα δεικνυσιν, delineationem cursûs Solis sensibilem, sive quoad apparentiam, indigitans. *Platonem* verò Solem in medio Mundi reverà immotum manere, sensisse non solum *Plutarchum* ipsum referentem, sed & *Theophrastum* suprà audivimus.

Exam. Gener. pag. 121. Sect. 5. Numerus verò *Denarius* emergit ex *Tetracty*, &c. *Denarium* ex *Tetracty* emergere, quia 1, 2, 3, 4. sunt decem, id satis ineptum & dilutum esse nobis objicit S. A. Quoniam hâc ratione omnes Numeri possent ex Senario educi; additque porrò restare *Cabbalistæ* dicendum, cujus ergò operis *Denarius* Symbolum sit *Hieroglyphicum*. Ad quorum utrûmque breviter respondeo; Ad primum, istâc ratione non omnes quidem Numeros, sed numerum 21. solum educi posse è Senario; Numerum verò 21. omnes numeros complecti, sensu concinno & adæquato dici non posse. Ad alterum, *Denarium* ad Opera dierum omnia simul sumpta, quippe Universi omnia in se complectentis Symbolum, rectè referri. Ad quarti autem diei opus specialiter pertinere quatenus *Quaternarii* potentia est, qui ob id ipsum generalis *Mundani Systematis* est Symbolum perquam idoneum. Quarti enim diei opus non tam ad particulares Creaturas, cujusmodi sunt, Animalia & Plantæ & Maria, &c. quàm ad generale Mundi, quod vocatur, *Systema* attinet.

C H A P. III.

1. *The Invalidity of the Objection from the Inadequateness of the Pythagorick Names of Numbers, the reason of the accumulation of them being so easily discoverable.*
2. *That the genuine Pythagorick Names are discernible from the spurious, as the sincere Doctrines of Christianity are from after-Corruptions.*
3. *Ten more Names added that are significative of the nature of Mundus vitæ, in the First Day's Creation.*
4. *Ten others significative of the Metaphysical Hyle created on that day.*
5. *Ἀμῖζια and Σπῆς πᾶσι, how accurately significant of what is in this First Day's Creation.*
6. *A plain account of those Pythagorick Names of an Unite, that make nothing to the First Day's work.*
7. *Six more names of the Binary, significative of the Second Day's work, with an account of such as are impertinent thereto.*
8. *An account of the impertinent Names of the Ternary.*
9. *Of Θῆτις, Ἀγυῖα, and Κεῖταις. The fit significancy of Λοξίας, in reference to the Third Day's work.*
10. *The Notations of ארץ, שמש, and כוכב, how Philosophical they are, and how significant of the grand Physical Truths of the Pythagorick or Judaick Cabbala.*

1. **N**OW as for Answer to the second part of this First Objection, concerning the Names of the Numbers I make use of, viz. That though those I have produced be fit enough for my purpose, yet those I have concealed may be either impertinent and insignificant, or indeed inconsistent with those I have produced; for mine own part, I am not at all afraid to be called to so strict an account, and do not doubt but that I shall be gainer upon the whole Compute. For I foresee that the Issue will be this, That I shall have occasion to bring a greater number of Names to confirm the truth I aim at, than I have yet made use of; and find my self not unprepared to give a reason of their forging of those that make nothing to our Cabbala. For what I said of the finding of Mysteries in new Numbers, upon the occasion of having those that appertain to the Creation communicated unto them, the same I here repeat concerning the giving of new Names to those First Numbers, by phancying they will set out this or that in either *Morality, Nature, or Metaphysics.*

Which Impertinencies certainly would grow the fastest, as I said before, when the first scope and use of their Names were hid in Oblivion. For then having no *Cynosura* to guide them, they would be blown upon every small and trivial Resemblance that this or that Number might have with this or that Object, according as the air of their lightly-working Phansy carried them, and their desire of making the sapless Mysteries of Numbers to arise to some bulk of superstitious Knowledge. *Τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον ὑπὲρ ἐδίδεξεν* For they having once lost the measure of their trading thus in the names of Numbers, their Accumulations would be infinite.

2. But it has fared much-what in this matter, as it has with the sober Truths of Christian Religion, to which, though there have been

been added innumerable humane Inventions, yet amongst these there have been conserved the grand Truths of Christianity it self, discoverable by the Testimony of Holy Writ: so though there have been many *Impertinent Names* of the first *Seven Numbers*, invented by ignorant and superstitious *Pythagorists*; yet they have also retained the true and useful, which is likewise discoverable by the application of them to the Text of *Moses*, according either to the *Philosophick* sense, or external phrase thereof. As is eminently plain in the *First Day's* work. Where truly I think I shall find more Names pertinent to the work of that Day, than impertinent, notwithstanding that their Ignorance has accumulated so many.

3. For whereas there are near Fifty Names of a *Monad* or *Unite*, above half of them are not insignificant of the nature of those things that are comprized in the *First Day's* work. For to the Names pertinent to what we call there *Mundus vita*, (which comprehends all the *Immaterial Creation*) besides *Ζωή*, *Εἶδ*, * *Ζανὸς πύργ*, *Λόγ* *σπερματικῆς*, which we have noted already; you may add also, *Νῆς*, *Μορφῶ*, *Γενή*, *Οὐσία*, * *Ἀλῖον ἀληθείας*, * *Ἀπλῶν ᾧδῶν*, *Νῦν*, *Μνημοσύνη*, *Προμηθεύς*, *Ἀρρενόθηνος*.

* *Νῆς*, because all *Immaterial Beings* are νοητὰ, *Intelligible*, not *Sensible*. *Μορφῶ*, because they are such as give *Form* to the *Matter*. *Γενή*, because all *Generation* is chiefly from this Principle, and *Matter* can gender

† Plotin. *Ennead.* 3. lib. 6. cap. 19.

nothing of it self, (they are the words of † *Plotinus*. *Μόνον γὰρ τὸ εἶδ* *γόνιμον*, ἢ ὃ ἑτέρα φύσις ἀγον. Which was the reason, says he, why the Ancients brought in *Mercury*, τὸ τῆς γενέσεως ὄργανον αἰεὶ ἔχοντα πρὸς ἐργασίαν, τὸν γεννώμενον ὃ ἐν αἰδήσει δηλῶντες εἶναι τὸν νοητὸν λόγον.) *Οὐσία*, because *Immaterial Beings* are the truest Substance, according as the *Platonists* do rightly contend: And so * *Ἀλῖον ἀληθείας*, for the same reason. * *Ἀπλῶν ᾧδῶν*, to the same purpose that *εἶδ* and *μορφῶ*. * *Ἀπλῶν*, because *Immaterial Beings* are devoid of Composition. *Νῦν*, because Intellectual life is at once, *vices temporum nesciens, in uno semper quod adest consistens*

|| In *Somm. Scipion.* lib. 1. cap. 6.

ævo, || as *Macrobius* speaks. *Μνημοσύνη*, if it be not pedantically popp'd in as the name of the mother of the *Muses*, whose names are also scattered through the *Pythagorick Denary*, I should suspect the reason of that appellation to be, because the highest and deepest seat of *Memory* is in that in us which is *Immaterial*. *Προμηθεύς*, because the Soul invested with her igneous Spirits, *Prometheus*-like, enlivens this statue of clay the Body. And lastly, *Ἀρρενόθηνος*, because all the *Immaterial Orders* have radically in them that division of Faculties into *Masculine* and *Feminine*, as is expressed more at large concerning *Adam*.

4. And to that which is that fluid undeterminate Capacity of things, that dark *Abyss* which compendiously we may call the *Metaphysical Hyle*, or the *Possibility of Creatures in the Outward World*, besides what Names we have produced already, as * *Υλη*, * *Ἀλαμπία*, * *Σκόλωδία*, you may add also, *χά*, *Σύγχυσις*, *Σύγχεσις*, *Πρωτῆς*, *Πανδοχεύς*. All which denote the Confusion, Undeterminateness, and promiscuous Capacity of this *Metaphysical Hyle*, or mere Potentiality of the external Creature. But then for that dark *Abyss*, mentioned in the *First Day's* Creation, what is more significant thereof than these terms of *χάσμα*, *τάραρ*, *Στύξ*, *Βάραθρον*; which are so apposite to the Text, that nothing

thing can be more, and utterly unlikely to have been the Appellations of an *Unite*, unless in reference thereunto. Add to $\Sigma\tau\upsilon\chi$, also $\Lambda\acute{\iota}\theta\eta$, because when things are resolved into this *First Day's* state, they are overwhelmed with Oblivion; the Souls of Men and Angels being then in silence, and so thoroughly drenched in the Lake of *Lethe*, that they can never remember what is past.

5. There are yet two very significant Terms behind, $\text{'}\Lambda\mu\acute{\iota}\xi\iota\alpha$, and $\Sigma\tau\iota\phi\epsilon\delta\ \mu\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\Theta$, which exactly set out the condition of the *First day's* Creation. For those Immaterial Beings thus considered, that is to say, as not united with Matter, what is more significative of their state than $\Sigma\tau\iota\phi\epsilon\delta\ \mu\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\Theta$, arid and rigid Virginity; or then $\text{'}\Lambda\mu\acute{\iota}\xi\iota\alpha$, according to that phrase in *Hesiod*, $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\iota\ \mu\iota\gamma\chi\eta\eta\alpha\iota$; And besides, the *Unmixedness* of the *Active* and *Passive* Principle proper to this Day, is notoriously signify'd by the Name $\text{'}\Lambda\mu\acute{\iota}\xi\iota\alpha$, as you may see in the || *Cabbala* || *Philos. Cab-*
it self. So that to those seven apposite Names we contented our selves *bal. chap. 1.*
with before, we have gained at least twenty as apposite by this Ex-
amination. *ver. 5.*

6. But for those that make not for our turn, the account of them is very easy. For after the *Pythagoreans* had lost the knowledge of the true scope of giving Names to those Numbers, which was for Remembrances of the nature of those things which are said to be created in those several Days; they then excogitated Appellations without any aim, from any similitude whatsoever betwixt the Number and the things it might represent. As for example, * Because there is but *one* God, therefore they called an *Unite* $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, $\text{'}\text{Ζ}\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\varsigma$, $\text{'}\text{Ε}\upsilon\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha$, and it may be $\text{'}\text{Ε}\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$. And then in *Natural* things, * because there is but *one* Sun, therefore they called a *Monad* $\text{'}\text{Η}\lambda\iota\Theta$ $\text{'}\text{Π}\upsilon\epsilon\phi\lambda\iota\Theta$, and $\text{'}\text{Α}\pi\acute{o}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu$; * and because $\text{'}\text{Α}\pi\acute{o}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu$, therefore $\text{'}\text{Λ}\acute{o}\gamma\iota\Theta$. And in *Morals*, because Love and Good-will consist in a kind of Unity of affections, they call an *Unite* $\Phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\Theta$, $\Phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$, $\text{'}\text{Ε}\rho\omega\varsigma$, $\text{'}\text{Ο}\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$. And because there is Unity in *Artificial* Order, they call it $\text{'}\text{Τ}\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\omega\nu\iota\alpha\varsigma$, $\text{'}\text{Ν}\alpha\upsilon\varsigma$, $\text{'}\text{Α}\rho\mu\alpha$. * And why they should call it $\text{'}\text{Α}\tau\lambda\alpha\varsigma$ and $\text{'}\text{Α}\xi\omega\nu$, I cannot better imagine, than because the Poles that are said to bear up the world, on which it hangs and turns, are two Points, that is, two fixt *Unites*. But why they call it $\text{'}\text{Ι}\sigma\omicron\nu$, $\text{'}\text{Μ}\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omicron\nu$, $\text{'}\text{Μ}\acute{\epsilon}\tau\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, is very plain. $\text{'}\text{Ι}\sigma\omicron\nu$, because those things that are equal, have *one* quantity: $\text{'}\text{Μ}\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omicron\nu$ and $\text{'}\text{Μ}\acute{\epsilon}\tau\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, because that which is exactly in the middle, or exquisitely moderate, is but *One*. But what an insipid and unsatisfactory Arguteness there is in such Conceptions as these, and how unworthy of so profound a Philosopher as *Pythagoras*, to whom the * Senate of *Rome* erected a Statue, as to the wisest man of all *Greece*, let any one judge.

* Plin. Hist.
Natural. l. 34.
cap. 6.

7. As for the Names of the *Binary*, I have already reckoned up above a dozen, that are very significant of the nature of the work of the *Second Day*. To those whereof that signify most dismally you may add further, $\text{'}\text{Τ}\acute{o}\lambda\mu\alpha$, $\text{'}\text{Τ}\lambda\eta\mu\omicron\sigma\omega\eta$, $\text{'}\text{Δ}\acute{\upsilon}\eta$, $\text{'}\text{Δ}\iota\chi\omicron\sigma\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, $\text{'}\text{Ε}\rho\iota\varsigma$, $\text{'}\text{Α}\gamma\upsilon\omicron\iota\alpha$. To $\text{'}\text{Ρ}\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$ also would be referred (saying that it seems but a rash and superstitious heaping up *Synonyma's* by the latter unskilful *Pythagorists*) $\text{'}\text{Δ}\iota\upsilon\delta\upsilon\mu\acute{\eta}\eta$, $\text{'}\text{Δ}\iota\omicron\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\rho$, $\text{'}\text{Φ}\rho\upsilon\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, $\text{'}\text{Ε}\sigma\acute{\omega}$. By all which terms is meant nothing else but *Cybele* or *Vesta*, but how * *Unpythagorically*, any one may discern that has but taken notice that *Vesta* is the *Sun* in true *Pythagorism*.

* See Chap.
6. sect. 6.

The

The rest of the Appellations are such senseless fooleries, that it is tedious to recite them; but yet I will give you more than a taste of them, that you may see with what pitiful trifles the *Pseudo-Pythagorists* entertained themselves when they had lost the true meaning of their *Cabbala*. For as before it was a fine thing with them to call the *Monad* by the name of Ἀπόλλων, or the *Sun*; so now for no better reason, I think, than that they did so, they will call the *Binary* Ἄρτεμις, Ἰσις, Δήμητρα, Ἑλδουσία, Δικλύννα, Ἥρα, all which may signify no more than the *Moon*, which is the *Second* great light in Heaven. So because any Agreement or kind Affection supposes *two* Parties, they call the *Binary* πηγὴ τῆς συμφωνίας, Ἑσπέρη, Ἀρμονία, Ἀφροδίτη, Διώνη, Κυδέρεια, Κοινωνία, and γάμος. where γάμος, and as many words else as sound that way, is very forcedly and unskilfully thrust in. Because the conjunction of the two *Unites* in the *Binary*, is either the conjunction of two *Masculines*, as some would have the *Unite* to be, (and then certainly no *Pythagoreans*, unless the successors of that * *Pythagoras* that Nero was married to, will call the *Binary* γάμος) or else it is the conjunction of two *Hermaphrodites*, which is as ridiculous. For || *Macrobius* declares, according to the sense of the Ancients, that an *Unite* is *Viro-fœmina*. *Unum autem, quod μονάς, id est, Unitas, dicitur, & Mas idem & Fœmina est, par idem atque impar, ipse non numerus, sed fons & origo numerorum.* Of which * *Aristotle* also affirms the like. τὸ δ' ἐν δὴ τῇ ἀμφοτέρωθεν εἶναι τέτων, καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον εἶναι καὶ πεπλημένον τὸν δ' ἀριθμὸν ἐν τῷ ἐνός. Which discovers their folly in calling the *Ternary* also γάμος. For it is the marriage of a Female with an *Hermaphrodite*, and of a number with what is not a number. *Jungentur jam gryphes equis.* So plain is it that the Appellation of Ἀφροδίτη and γάμος are the peculiar Titles of the *Quinary* and *Senary*, as they have a special congruity also to the *Fifth* and *Sixth* day's work. But let us not be so strict, but admit an *Unite* to be rather *Masculine*; the *Binary* will be still excluded from the Title of γάμος, and the *Ternary's* Title admitted but with difficulty, as Male and Female amongst Plants, which more exquisitely fits the nature of the *Third* day's work.

Furthermore, Because the *Binary* is made by adding an *Unite* to an *Unite*, it is called Αὔξησης, Σύνθεσις, Ἐπίθεσις. And because Dijudication implies a *Duality* in the Object, it is called Διάκρισις. And for that Opinion has a vergency *two* ways at once, it is styled Δόξα * and Demonstration *two* main parts, the Premises and Conclusion, it is termed Ἐπιστήμη. And lastly, because *two* is divided into *two* equal parts, it is named Δίκη. Such petty speculations did the pretended *Pythagorists* fall into, when they once had lost the sight of that Mark that the Mystery of Numbers aimed at in the *Binary*.

8. Let us dip also a little further into the *Ternary*, where we shall bring up the like slight stuff. The most tolerable are those names of *Moral* consideration, * as Μῆτις, Εὐβουλία, Φρόνησις, with which the *Ternary* is adorned; because he that would advise well, must cast his eye upon things *past*, *present*, and *to come*. * Also Φιλία, Εἰρήνη, Ὁμόνοια, the union of parties being made by some *Third* thing or person. * It is also called Εὐσέβεια, I suppose from the frequent use of the number *Three* in Religious Rites. The terms Τρίταμος and πρῶτον πλάτος are of *Mathe-*

* See Tacit.
Annal. lib. 15.
sect. 37.
|| In Somn.
Scipion. lib. 1.
cap. 6.

* Metaphys.
l. 1. c. 5.

Mathematical consideration, as are Δίσταμ and πρῶτον μῦθος in the *Binary*; but have no greater plot upon us in either place, than to advertise us, that the *Binary* is representative of two *Mathematical* Points, and of the first and shortest Line; the *Ternary* of three Points, and of the first and simplest Figure, which is the *Triangle*. Notions certainly whereby the Mind of man is gayly edified, and deliciously fed: and yet what follows is more vile and trivial. For the *Ternary* is called Κεβρία, because *Saturn* had three Sons, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*; and Αἰδάς, because *Pluto* was the third: Λατώ and Ἑλέτα, because *Latona* was the Mother of *Hecata*, who had three Titles, *Luna*, *Diana*, and *Proserpina*: Χαρίτια, because there are three Graces, *Aglaia*, *Thalia*, *Euphrosyne*: Διοσκοεία, from the three *Dioscouri*, *Trittopatreus*, *Ebuleus*, *Dionysius*: Φοργία and Γοργονία, because *Phorcus* was the Father of the *Gorgons*, which were three, *Medusa*, *Sthenio*, *Euryale*. Of such pitiful trash was the *Ternary* made the Repository by the *Pseudo-Pythagorists*, who knew not the ancient *Cabbala*.

9. Who also finding Θαλασσοῦχος upon record in the Titles of the *Ternary*, put in Θέτις, and Ἀγυιόπεζα, I believe it should be Ἀργυρόπεζα, which is an Epithet of *Thetis* in *Homer*; and *Ovid* takes notice of the beauty of *Thetis* feet in that Pentameter,

Et Thetidis quales vix reor esse pedes.

They added also Ναέτις and Κερατις, I think aiming at the same sense. Nor can they have any sense at all but in reference to the *Third* day's work, where there was made distinction of *Land* and *Sea*, and consequentially of *Rivers*.

But though there has been so much trash hitherto, yet there is one Name behind that will compensate our pains of raking in this dunghil: And that is Λοξίας, which, considering the weightiness of its signification, and its easy reference to the oblique Motion of the Earth, (upon which depends the garnishing thereof with Plants and Flowers) add that * *Pythagoras* is said to have first observed the obliquity of this Motion, I can willingly admit to be an ancient and authentic Title of the *Ternary*.

Plutarch. de
Placit. Phi-
los. lib. 2.
cap. 12.

10. And it will not be unseasonable to take notice, that the very || Notation of the word ארץ countenances our conjecture, it being derived, as the ancient *Hebrews* have observed, from רוץ, currere; certainly by reason of her constant course about the Sun, not because the Heavens run about her. Which we may be the better assured of, if we consider also the Notation of שמש, which is most likely to be from שם isdai, or sneiζιν, (as the *Seventy* often render it) and שם ארץ as the *Pythagoreans* ordinarily call the Sun τὸ πῦρ, as you may see in * *Aristotle*, Ἐπὶ μὲν δὲ τὸ μέγεθος πῦρ εἶναι φασιν, and || *Plutarch*, Κατὰ μέτρον τὸ κόσμος πῦρ ἰδρύμεται νομίζουσι, καὶ τὰτο ἔστιν ἡ ἀλλοῦσι. So that his οὐκ ἰδρύμενον πῦρ, *Fixt Fire*, does exactly answer to שמש that has the same signification, as all the *Suns* are acknowledged to be *Stella Fixa*.

|| See Paulus
Fagius upon
the Text.

* Ce Cælo,
lib. 2. cap. 13.
|| In Vita
Numæ.

And in that this *fixt Fire* is called by the *Pythagoreans*, Ἑστία, is a further discovery from whence they had their Notion, namely, from the *Hebrews*, who call *Fire* שם, and the *Chaldees* אש, which is in a manner the very word Ἑστία or *Vesta*. Nor was it needful to retain the

the whole word **שמש**, **אש** in 'Esiā having, by its transplantation into the Greek Tongue, got a strong affinity with ἥλιος, the same with **שם** in Hebrew; so that it alone bears fully the same sense that **שמש**: and the best Words are but the *Remembrancers* of the nature of Things.

But none such Philosophical ones as these of **ארץ** and **שמש**, I may add also **כוכב**, the easy and genuine Notations of them, setting out the hidden natures of the things they belong to, with that exact *opposition* they have one to another: that of **ארץ**, implying the *Earth's* Motion; that of **שמש**, implying the *Sun's* fixedness; that of **כוכב**, implying the Extinction of Light or Fire in all the *Planets*; that of **שמש**, implying the innate Light and Heat in all the *Suns* or *fixed Stars*. The wonderful Congruity of the Philosophical Notations, of which three words (to say nothing of **שמים**) cannot but gain further belief both to the Notations themselves, and also to the truth of the Physical part of the *Cabbala*. Nor is **שמים** of less Philosophical consideration, though it were to be admitted to be from **שמה** *excelsum esse*, and not from **אש** and **מים**. For then its being of the dual number, would insinuate the same thing as before, namely, the *Cartesian* Elements, or parts that Heaven does consist of, according as is observed in other words that denote things consisting of two parts, as **משפתיים**, **כיריים**, **אבניים**, and the like: and also the two kinds of Heaven, the one created the first day, the other on the second: As also **מים** likewise does denote two kinds of Water, that from the Clouds, and that in the Sea, Rivers, and Wells; but in a more Philosophical sense, the Waters *visible* and *invisible*; and then the *Invisible*, *Stygian* or *Celestial*, meaning by *Celestial*, that part of the *Mundus vite* that descends εἰς γένεσιν.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. III. Sect. 3.

ZΑνδρὲς πύργῳ. Σανδρὲς πύργον ad *Mercavam* potius referendum esse quàm ad *Berebith*, supra monui. Primæque *Sephira* nomen esse autumo, atque hîc sub Unitate poni tanquam ἡ Ἐνὲς, & ἡ Ἀγαθὴ *Platonici* sive *Pythagorici* nomen.

Nῆς, quia omnia *Entia Immaterialia*, &c. Vide etiam annon & hæc Appellatio ad primam *Sephiram* referri possit. Quanquam enim prima *Sephirah* secundum proprium characterem ἡ Ἀγαθὴ sit vel τὸ Ἐν, omnes tamen *Hypostases* sive tres primæ *Sephira* מוחות appellantur, i. e. *Mentes*, (interpretante *Rittangelio*) in *Cabbala Judaica*. Et certè ut ἡ Ἀγαθὴ sive τὸ Ἐν, mens sit latiori quodam sensu, rationi omnino est consentaneum.

Ἀπλὴν παρδείγμα, &c. Equidem hoc nomen, quatenus ad *Mercavam* refertur, primæ *Sephira*, sive ἡ Ἀγαθὴ *Pythagorico* admodum est congruens. Hoc est enim primum maximèque simplex *Paradigma* ac *Mensura Veritatis* ac *Perfectionis rerum omnium*.

Sect.

Sect. 6. *Quia non nisi unus est Deus, ideo ab ipsis Unitas dicitur appellata est, &c.* Cum verò Denarius Pythagoricus ad Mercavam perinde pertineat atque ad Bereshith, quidni hîc dicitur tali sensu accipiat, quali accipitur Johan. 1. ita ut sit prima Hypostasis ut Logos secunda, ita ut propriis quodam sensu Deus vocetur, nempe, Deus Pater?

Quoniam non est nisi unus Sol, idcirco Monadem appellabant ἥλιον, &c. At verò respiciendo ad Mercavam, considerandum est annon Sol, nomen Symbolicum esse possit Ταραθῆ Platonici, & eo ipso sensu dici Δις φυλακή, vel potius Ζαὸς πύργῳ. quod Mysterium cum Aristoteles non rectè intelligeret, putavit Pythagoreos Solem ipsum Δις φυλακὴν appellasse. Ταραθῆν verò esse quasi summam Divinitatis speculam, & in maximè infinitum prospectum extensam atque diffusam apud Platonicos confessissimum est.

Et Ἀπόλλωνα, & quia Ἀπόλλωνα ex consequenti Λόγον, &c. At verò si ad Mercavam hæc referrentur, Ἀπόλλων planè ad τὸ Ἐν referri posset, si-ve ad primam Sephiram, atque hic Ἀπόλλων non tantum Λόγῳ dici, sed & Pater τῷ λόγῳ unde non solum omnia vera Oracula, sed omnis omnino Veritas proficiscitur. Apollinem verò Unitatem ab α & πολλὸς Saturnal. l. i. cap. 17. significare, Author est Macrobius.

Cur autem ab ipsis Ἀτλας & Ἀξων appelletur, &c. Si Mercavam respiciant ista nomina, ratio haud ita difficilis est inventu. Primum enim Fundamentum ac Basis rerum omnium est ipsum Ταραθῆν. hic est ille Atlas qui sustentat omnia. Cum verò hoc Ταραθῆν immobile ipsum sit, ut Axis in Sphæra circumvoluta; omnia tamen circa ipsum moventur choreasque agunt, sedulo investigantia exultimque subinde lætantia, ob percepta beneficia ac voluptates, quæ ab hoc immobili Bono emanant. Vide Psychathanasian, lib. 3. Cant. 3. Enneastich. 11, 12, 13, 14. Ubi Ταραθῆ comparisonem cum immobili Sole fusiùs prosequimur. Axis verò cum linea supponatur quoad latitudinem indivisibilis, Unitatem & Simplicitem Ταραθῆ porro videtur indigitare. Qui sunt speciales characteres primæ Sephiræ.

Sect. 7. *Et quod Demonstratio duas partes habet præmissas & Conclusionem, vocatur Ἐπισήμη.* Equidem fateor hanc nimis laxam ac dilutam Rationem. Nec meliorem tamen tunc excogitare licebat, cum nondum observâssem Denarium Pythagoricum ad Mercavam etiam posse referri. Nunc verò mihi satis manifestum est, Ἐπισήμην secundæ Sephiræ respondere חכמה appellatæ. Cum & Æterna Dei Sapientia Ἐπισήμη vocetur apud Baruchum. Μετὰ τὸτο ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ὄφθη. Ea postea, nempe Ἐπισήμη, in terra visa est atque inter homines versata. In quem verum, Ego non dubito, inquit Vatablus, quin Christum filium Dei in carne revelatum intelligat. Is enim est æterna Dei sapientia (vox autem in textu est Ἐπισήμη Scientia) per quam omnia creata sunt, quæ postea carne induta cum hominibus est conversata, ab eisque visa & tractata, 1 Johan. 1. 1. Cap. 3.

Sect. 8. *Ut Μῆτις, Εὐδελία, Φρόνησις, &c.* Φρόνησιν hîc principalem esse vocem censeo, duasque alteras tanquam nomina cognata adjectas esse, respondere vero Φρόνησιν tertiæ Sephiræ בינה vocatæ, quæ significat Intelligentiam; quam & ipsa Φρόνησις significat, affectumque & amorem præterea in se involvit, ut φρονεῖν τὰ τῷ θεῷ, quod peculiare hujus ter-

tia *Sephira* donum est sive Charisma, quæ respondet τῇ Διὰ ψυχῆ Platoniorum, & τῇ ζωῇ τῇ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ apud Johannem, sive Spiritui Sancto.

Item Φιλία Εἰρήνη, Ὁμόνοια, &c. Hæc si ad *Mercavam* referantur, manifestum est fructus esse Spiritus sancti, sive *Sephira* tertiæ, בִּינָה appellatæ.

Appellatur etiam Εὐσέβεια. Si tres primas *Sephiras* respiciamus, quæ *Divinae Triunitatis* sunt Repositoria, admodum profectò probabile est Ternarium Εὐσέβειαν dici, propter σεβασιν istam, propter peculiarem illam venerationem atque adorationem sacrosanctæ *Trinitati* debitam; quippe quòd τὸ θεῖον, æternum illud ac immutabile meritòque adorabile Objectum, illis tribus Hypostasibus omnino clauditur. Reliqua sunt Creaturæ, quibus Divinam illam Adorationem neūtiqum fas est communicare.

Sect. 9. Pythagoram dici primùm hujus motus obliquitatem observasse, &c. Verba *Plutarchi* sunt πρῶτος ἀπεννηκέναι λέγει τὴν λόξωσιν τῷ ζωδιακῷ κύκλῳ. Ubi λόξωσις hæc plane *Loxia* Ternarii Numeri Nominis respondet. Circulus verò *Zodiacus*, sive illius *Ecliptica*, inclinantis Terræ motu annuo revera describitur.

Exam. Gener. p. 130.

Sect. 10. Derivatur à קרן &c. Quæ in hunc locum objicit S. A. hæc sunt: Quod originem, inquit ille, & Etymologiam vocis קרן spectat nemo istam admittet facile, qui Grammaticam Hebræam vel à limine salutarit. Resp. Quî igitur factum, ut *Paulus Fagius*, vir pius & doctissimus Scripturæ Interpres, istam Etymologiam admiserit? Num ille à limine tantum Hebræam Grammaticam salutavit? Immò linguæ Hebraicæ ex eruditissimis illius Expositionibus peritissimum fuisse satis constat. Sed pergit *Andreades*: Nam ut de punctis taceam & forma Nominis Segolati, quæ derivatis à verbo quiescente mediâ radicali planè non quadrat, τὸ ἄ quoque esse Heemanticum in ejusmodi vocibus adeò ab usu linguæ abhorret, ut in unico exemplo irregulari nempe אסור quod 2 Reg. 4. 2. legitur & à סור derivari solet, R. Salomon Jarchi tamen putet ἄ esse radicale. Ad partem posteriorem primò respondebo. Quid mihi objicis unum Salomonem Jarchi contra Buxtorfium, contra Martinium, acerrimum illum in lingua Hebraica Criticum, immò contra communem omnium Hebraicorum Lexicographorum, Grammaticorum Criticorumque sententiam? Certissimum igitur est ἄ Heemanticum esse posse in ejusmodi vocibus quæ deriventur à verbis mediâ radicali quiescentibus, ut in אסור. ארץ. Vide etiam annon insuper in אכן. Quæ vox tametsi ex longo usu adverbiascere planè jam videatur, probabile tamen est olim fuisse nomen à כון, & rem firmam, stabilitam, certamve significasse; ut אמן nunc adverbiascit, nunc nominis rationem habet, hoc est, nunc [verè], nunc veritatem significat: Et sic quidem אכן, quod nunc [certè] redditur, rem certam olim significasse non est dissimile veri. Sed en quartum tandem exemplum è mea penuria tenuique vocum Hebraicarum peritia, quam mihi exprobrat *Andreades*, nec aliàs certè immeritò. ררך האתרים via exploratorum, Num. 21. 1. Illic אתר à חור, exploratorem significat. Quamobrem ἄ Heemanticum esse in nominibus à verbo mediâ radicali quiescente, non est adeò inusitatum, nec uno tantum exemplo suffultum.

Ad

Ad priorem verò partem quæ innuit, si ארץ à רוץ derivatum sit, ut אסוך à סוך, ארוץ scribi oporteret, non ארץ. Sed respondeo nec אבון à בון, nec אתור à תור, sed אבן & אתר scribi. Quidni esse possit laxitas quædam aut authentica Anomalia in istiusmodi vocum terminatione? Quidni longo usu, cum ארוץ in principio scriptum esset, postea in אריץ, tandem in ארץ posset contrahi? quippe quum vox illa æquè frequenter linguis hominum atque res ipsa pedibus attrita sit. Adeo ut forma Nominis Segolati, quanquam non secundum Analogiam, per accidens tamen locum in hac voce habere posset.

Quæ cum ita sint, judicet quivis æquus rerum æstimator, quænam Etymologia probabilior sit, Hebraica an Arabica, à רוץ *currere*, an ab ארץ radice Arabica, significante, humilem & depressum esse. Nam Hebraicam esse illam radicem è Psalm. 68. 32. & Jerem. 49 19. reperiri, ex observatione *Altingii*, insomnium est *Andreadæ*, enormèque commentum, cum nulla vola aut vestigium istiusmodi radice illis in locis observandum sit, sed tantum radice רוץ. Voces enim sunt אריץ aut תריץ in utroque loco, & omnes Interpretes eum sensum sequuntur.

Cum verò illa Radix *Arabica* sit aut nulla, dispiciendum est, utrum consultius sit rationem nominis *Hebraici* è proximo, nempe, è fonte *Hebraico* petere, an ad *Arabiam* usque eam petitum pervagari; talemve quæ sit rudis ac plebeia, an talem, quæ magis Philosophica sit, linguamque primævam ac Divinam, quâ & ipsum *Adamum*, qui rebus nomina primitus imposuit, usum plerique omnes autumant, magis concederet. Nam concesso quod sit ejusmodi radix Arabica ארץ, quæ significet humilem vel depressum esse (meam enim linguæ *Arabice* imperitiâ lubens profiteor) non statim sequitur istam vocem ארץ primitus fuisse radicem Hebraicam. Fieri enim potest ut post puritatem linguæ *Hebraicæ* corruptam aut perditam & in varias dialectos degeneres mutatam, *Arabes* tale verbum à nomine Hebraico ארץ, quippe multa ab Hebræis mutuati, effingerent, verbum è nomine formantes (quod aliquo modo etiam fit apud ipsos Hebræos qui עפר pulveravit, è עפר pulvis efformârunt.) Vel fortè fortunâ accidere potuit, ut extaret vox purè *Arabica* quæ cum *Hebraica* voce אר & sono & aliquâ sensûs cognatione conveniat, cum neutra tamen ab altera derivetur: Ut nec vox nostra Anglicana *Jackdaw* ab Hebraica יחרו, nec illa à nostra deducitur, cum tamen sonus idem planè sit & satis aperta sensûs cognatio. Quippe quod Monedulæ simul vel gregatim solent volare, & constrepere. Propter quem strepitum vox Anglicana *Coile*, qui strepitus est tumultuarius à Græca κολοιδε monedula, à quibusdam derivata censetur. Atque heic quidem, sensus iterum perinde atque sonus satis cognati sunt. Levem tamen hominem esse oportet ac ferè fatuum qui aut vocem *Coile*, à κολοιδε, aut *Jackdaw* à יחרו derivari censuerit, aut vice versâ. Sexcenta istiusmodi accidunt in fusa illa vocabulorum cujusque Linguæ copia. Et instar miraculi foret si aliter contingeret.

Etiam vox Anglicana *Hard*, nec sono nec sensûs cognatione multum abludit ab Ebraica ארץ *Terra*, cum terra omnium elementorum sit durissimum. Et propius adhuc accedit vox Latina *Aridus*, quæ extrito u fit *Arids*, i. e. ארץ, quod optimè convenit cum natura Ter-

ræ, quæ sicca vel arida est. Immò vero, Genes. 1. 10. legimus, Deum Solum ficcum ארץ appellavisse. Adeóne tamen stolidus quisquam est ut ארץ à Latina voce *Aridus* derivandum existimet? Quo jure igitur quis concludere potest ארץ terram ab Arabica radice ארץ, (humilem esse) deduci, cum res fortuita planè sit, ut sit ea, in diversis Linguis, vocum aliquot in sono sensûque cognatio? Cum igitur è proximo fonte *Hebraico* tam eximia sit Nominis ארץ ratio sive Notatio, nè violemus, obsecro, linguæ *Hebraicæ* sacro-sanctitatem, è longinquo rationes accersendo peregrinas, abjectas & pueriles, cum domesticæ præstò sint, idque adeò solidæ, verèque Philosophicæ, Linguæque *Hebraicæ* sanctitate nequaquam indignæ.

CHAP. IV.

1. *Four Names more of the Tetrad that are Pertinent.* 2. *An Account of those that are Impertinent.* 3. *That such Trifles, either Numeral or Nominal, could not win that reverence from Pythagoras, as to induce him to swear by the first Imparter of the Tetractys.* 4. ΓάμΘ a Name proper to the Quinary and Senary, and how the Binary and Ternary came by that Title. 5. Two more Pertinent names of the Quinary, with an account of the Impertinent ones. 6. That if the nature of Numbers, and not of Things, had been intended by the Tetractys, the Pentad had rather merited the Religion of an Oath. 7. The Impertinent Names of the Senary. 8. Names thereof referrable to ΓάμΘ and ΚόσμοΘ. 9. Six other Names of the Senary most fitly interpretable from the Text of Moses. 10. Eight Names of the Septenary referring to the same Text. 11. Of the Impertinent Names of the Septenary, and why that Number is called Pallas, and why Apollo ἐβδομαγενής.

1. **W**E come now to the *Quaternary*, of which, besides what we have noted already, there are four more Titles not altogether inept or insignificant, as Ἑξάρμα, φύσις, Αἰόλα, ΚλειδῶχΘ τῆς φύσεως, *Ἑξάρμα, because the distinct and articulate fitting out the parts of the Universe was on the *Fourth Day*. φύσις, as denoting the Universal comprehension of Nature. Αἰόλα, as intimating the variety of Objects in the Universe discoverable by the Lights of Heaven, which are the *Fourth Day's* work, and which are themselves a most eminent part of that variety: whence is αἰόλα Νύξ in *Sophocles*, by reason of her being so variegated with Stars. And lastly, the *Tetractys* is called ΚλειδῶχΘ τῆς φύσεως, because the expounding the *Fourth day's* work is indeed the *Key* of the choicest secrets of *Nature*; or rather an *Inlet* to the truest and most concerning knowledge of *Universal Nature*, as well *Metaphysical* as *Physical*. Whence the *Tetrad* is not only said to be φυσικῶν σπερμαμάτων πηγή, but (if I mistake not *Photius* his meaning) *πολύθεΘ also, or rather πάνθεΘ, being full of *Immaterial Beings* every where, *Demons*, or *Angels*, or call them what you will; but the *Greeks* called them ordinarily θεοί.

2. But

2. But as these Names that have been here and elsewhere produced are *pertinent* to the purpose, so there are those that be as *impertinent*. For I find the ignorance of Posterity to have abused the *Tetrad*, as religiously as it was admired by the knowing *Pythagoreans*, to be a Receptacle of superstitious and useles toys. As for example: Because *Mercury* was born on the fourth day of the month, it was called Ἑρμῆς, Μαυάδης, ΣῶνΘ. as also because *Hercules* was then born, ^{Nicomach. Gerasen. Arithmet. Theolog. lib. 1.} Ἡρακλῆς, Ἀλκιμοτάτη, ἘπανδρΘ, Ἀρρενυργὺς, ἈθηνῶνΘ. Because *Bacchus* was twice born, and the *Tetrad* generated of two, (for two into two is Four,) therefore the *Tetrad* is called ΔιόνυσΘ, Βασιλεὺς, Διμάτωρ, ΘηλύμορΘ, and also ΔιόσκορΘ, it may be in reference both to *Hercules* and *Bacchus*. And lastly, because Fire has a Pyramidal form, and Four makes the πρῶτον σῶμα, which is a Pyramid, one Unite laid on the other three, (from which form of an heap it is also called Σείπας) they style the *Tetrad* Ἡρακλῆς.

3. But what pitiful trading would there have been for *Pythagoras*, if these be the riches of that *Tetractys* which he had so great esteem for, that he swore religiously by him, that was the first Imparter of it? Will this answer that big report made by || *Plutarch*, Ἡ δὲ τετρακτὺς μέγισθ' ἦν ἔρεθ, ὡς τετραλλήν, καὶ κόσμῳ ἀνόμεσαι. (He speaks ^{In his de Iside & Osiride.} there of the compound *Tetractys*, but the Oath was indifferent to both.) The *Tetractys* so called, was a grand Oath, as is famed, and was named κόσμῳ, The World. And certainly it was that clear and pleasant prospect into the Order and Nature of the Systeme of the World, arising out of the conjunction of the *Active* and *Passive* Principle, * and then running out to all Objects, as well *Metaphysical* as *Physical*, which were declared in the opening of the Fourth day's Creation; this, I say, certainly was that *Tetractys* which is called κόσμῳ, or the Universe, (that is, the *Cabbala* of the genuine and satisfactory knowledge thereof,) by the first communicator of which Mystery, both *Pythagoras* himself and the succeeding *Pythagoreans* so religiously swore. But those other Toys and Niceties that are merely *Numeral*, it is utterly incredible, that the imparting of them should ever extort any considerable esteem at all from so wise a man as *Pythagoras* was voted by all men.

4. Concerning the Titles of the *Quinary*, those that we have already taken notice of, are the most renowned in Authors, as you may see in the copious citations of || *Meursius*, and so apposite to the work of the day, that nothing can be more. As for the *Binary* and *Ternary's* being called Ἀρεθῶτη and τρίμΘ, as they are not so applicable to the days, nor competible to the nature of those numbers, as I have * above demonstrated; so they fall proportionably short in testimony of the Ancients, and certainly were the Additions of some idle and dry Pretenders to *Pythagorism* in after-Ages: as was also the adventuring to call the *Quinary* Ἀνδραγωγία, * when Ἀρρενῶθης had been more proper, if they had known the first scope of these Names. ^{* Chap. 3. sect. 7.}

5. To those few titles of the *Quinary* which we have produced, there may be two added more, I think, not impertinent; the one φύσις, as it signifies τὰ αἰδοῦα; the other, ἀρεθῶτης ἐλαχίστη τῆς ζώτηςΘ, al-

cluding to the Five senses, which the *Pythagoreans* would easily acknowledge the meanest and most evanid part of that life that is perceptive.

* But there are several other Names of the *Quinary* impertinent, I must confess, to the Fifth day's work, though it may not altogether be impertinent to take notice of them, that no fraud may be suspected in concealing them. They are designed for the Notes of either *Physical* or *Metaphysical* observation. The *Physical* discover how little Authentick they are, in running upon a supposition that is so *Unpythagorical*; namely, that there are four Elements, which compages the motion of the Earth naturally breaks a-pieces. But yet upon this *Aristotelean* conceit, that there are four, they will have the *Æther* a Fifth, and from thence call the *Quinary* Νέμεσις, as distributing the World into these Five Orders, Earth, Water, Air, Fire, *Æther*. And in reference to this Fifth call the *Quinary* Παλλὰς, and Ἀζύξ, as being a virgin-Element, and not mingling with the generations of things here below: also Ἀμύθητον, because it is the Region of Immortality; and Ἀκρεῶτις, because flesh and blood cannot inhabit there; and Ἀτάλαντον, because the Bodies of the Inhabitants are æquilibriumous to the Region, and do not sink by any ponderosity; and lastly, Ζανὸς πύργον, because though Jupiter fills all things, yet his highest dwelling is the *Æther*: Which yet is again very *Unpythagorically* spoken, for Ζανὸς πύργον is the Sun, not the *Æther*, when Physically interpreted, the same that Διὸς

|| De Cælo, φυλακὴ in || Aristotle.

lib. 2. cap. 13.

* See chap. 5.

sect. 2. where

the Decad is

called δεκάς.

As for the *Mathematical* Names, Δίκησις, * Ἀμίδεον, Διδυμαία, Καρδιότης, Κυκλιῶχος, ἄξων ἐδραία, all these six have but the intimation of this one sorry business, that Five divides Ten into two equal parts, as the Diameter does a Circle, as Justice decides equally, and as the Heart is in the midst of the body. Admirable profound Notions! The names that follow are more considerable; as namely, Ἀνικία, Ὀρδιᾶτις, Δίκη, Πέννοια. All which refer to Five, as it is the *Hypotenusa* of the first *Orthogonal* Triangle, that has its sides including the right Angle, rational: For it is called Ὀρδιᾶτις, as subtending the right Angle; Ἀνικία, as whose power is insuperable by the powers of both the sides; Δίκη, as equalizing its power to the powers of both the sides; || τὸ γὰρ ἴσον δίχασιον and lastly, πέννοια, because there is such a Project and Contrivance in bringing the same thing about so exactly by means that seemed so different, and so unlikely to produce the same effect.

|| Arist. Ethic.

lib. 5. cap. 6.

|| Diogen. La-

ert. in Vita

Pythagoræ.

6. For this invention in Geometry, *Pythagoras* is said to have || sacrificed an Hecatomb to the Muses; and this in Numbers, which might haply be mother to that in Geometry, does so far surpass the mere Numeral Mysteries of the *Tetractys*, that if the *Tetractys* had no further reach than those dry Niceties, *Pythagoras* his Scholars would surely have chosen rather to have sworn by him as the teacher of the *Pentad*, than of the *Tetrad*. So well ascertained are we from every side, that it was not the nature and mystery of Numbers, but of Things, that was comprehended in the *Pythagorick Tetractys*.

7. Of the Titles that belong to the *Senary*, the most dry and impertinent are Ἀμφιτρίτη, Ἀγχιδίκη, and Μεσδδύς: the *Senary* being called || Ἀμφιτρίτη, ὡς ἀμφὶς ἐαυτῆς δύο παρέχουσα τετάδας and Ἀγχιδίκη, as being the

|| Johan. Me-

urs. Denar.

Pythag. c. 8.

the next Number to the *Quinary* called Δίκα. and lastly, || Μεσδδύς, as || Clem. Alex. being equidistant from 10. and 2. Six exceeding two as much as ten *Strom. lib. 6.* does six.

Those of Physical consideration are Διχενία and ἡμισυ παντός, they both referring to the Signs of the Zodiack. The first both to those six in the Night, and those other six in the Day; (For six ever rise by Night, and six by Day.) The latter to the Division of the World into two Halfs, (by the cutting of the Horizon,) six Signs perpetually adhering to either Half thereof.

Those that refer to Pagan Superstition are Ἑξαπτελέτης, Τελοδίτης, Τείμορφος, which all have reference to *Trivia*, as being born on the sixth day of the month.

8. As for those Names of Ἀφροδίτη, Ζυγία, Φιλίωσις, Φιλητοσία, Ζυγίτης, Nicomach. Γαμηλία, they are all referrable to Γάμος, which we have already taken *Gerasen. Arithmet. Theolog. lib. 2.* notice of in our Defence of the *Cabbala*. To which you may also refer Ἀδέσσεις, the Spinner on of Life from the birth. * Το κόσμος also you may refer Ἀλήθεια, Ἀρμονία, and Πανάρχεια. the two former, as respecting God's general approbation of all that he had made as consonant to his *Mind* and *Will*; and the last, as implying a Perfection and Self-sufficiency in the World to subsist by virtue of those powers and parts God had framed it of.

9. The Titles that follow are more particular, and cannot well be made sense of, most of them, without reference to *Moses's* text. Such are Ἀρχή, Ἀνδρουργία, Εἶδος εἶδus, Ψυχοποιός, Τῆς ζωτικῆς ἕξεως ἐμποιητική, and Ὑγία. For why should Six be called Ἀρχή, but that *Adam's* Dominion over the Creature is mentioned in the Sixth Day? Ἀνδρουργία also answers *verbatim* to *Male and Female created he them*. And what sense can there be that Six is called Εἶδος εἶδus, but that *Adam* on the Sixth Day was created in the image of the likeness of God? Let us make man in our Image after our likeness. Whence || Clemens and * *Philo* also call him εἰκὼν εἰκόνος. And why should it be called Ψυχοποιός and Τῆς ζωτικῆς ἕξεως ποιητική, but that the Creation of man was on the Sixth Day, and so described by *Moses*, as that *Adam* being but a statue of Earth, an Image of clay at first, God breathed into him the breath of life, καὶ ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζωσαν; And haply in this respect also the *Senary* may be called Εἶδος εἶδus, the Soul being the very Form of that Form or Image of Earth that God had made. And lastly, it is extremely probable that Ὑγία refers also to the sound constitution *Adam* was made in, Health being before Diseases, according to that Song in *Maximus Tyrius*,

Ὑγία πρεσβύτα μακρόων, &c.

And sutable to that in the Book of Wisdom, For God created all things *Wisd. i. 14.* that they might have their being, and the Generations of the World were healthful, &c. Thus plain is it from these Instances that *Pythagoras* his Mysteries of Numbers had relation to *Moses* his Text.

10. As for the *Septenary*, we produced no names of it, which Omission we will now supply. For some of them seem very apposite and naturally referrable to the *Mosaick* Doctrine. As Ὀυλομέλεια, Τελεσφόρος, Ἀδέσσεια, Τύχη. For the *Septenary* may well be called Ὀυλομέλεια

μείλια and Τελεσφόρῳ, because it is said that on the *Seventh* Day God ended his work, all things being then *entire* and *perfect*. It is also truly called 'Αδείσεια, ἡ δὲ τῷ μὴ δρᾶν, à non agendo, because God rested on the *Seventh* Day from all his work. Or if 'Αδείσεια signify the same that Νέμεσις, the sense will be, that God sitting still and creating nothing any further, yet there is such a law of things in the very Creation it self, that what by *Free Agents*, and what by *Natural*, no man shall escape Punishment; which is intimated by 'Αδείσεια, deriving the word ἡ δὲ τῷ μὴ διδράσκων, à non fugiendo. * Τύχη also has some affinity with this Notion, it being a result from God's resting on the *Seventh* Day.

But there are also other Names, as Σεπλῆς, Φυλακίτις, Κωρῆς, 'Ονειρῶ. The first of which is rather a *Pythagorick* Notation of the number 'Επλῆς, than a new Name, and signifies, *Cultus Septenarii*, from σέβειν or σεβάσειν, which answers to, God blessed the *Seventh* Day, and sanctified it. And from God's so strictly commanding the people φυλάττειν τὸ σάββατον, it is not improbable the *Septenary* may be called Φυλακίτις: or else from φύλακες, *Vigiles*, Watchmen or || *Angels*, * into whose Hands the Government of the World is committed in this Sabbatism of God. And lastly, it is called Κωρῆς, καὶ ἑξοχήν, the *Seventh* day being so sanctified a season or opportunity cut out of the whole Sum of time, to employ our thoughts on the best things, and meditate on the Wisdom of God. Which kind of celebrating this holy Rest and Repose if they called 'Ονειρῶ, it is because such divine Speculations are most clear when there is the strictest ligation of the Senses of the Body, analogical to that in *Sleep*. But it is more likely to refer particularly to *Joseph's* explication of *Pharaoh's* Dreams of the *Seven* Kine, and of the *Seven* ears of Corn, the History of that Nation, whose Philosophy was so sacred to them, not seeming unworthy of their memory.

II. As for those Names of 'Αυδῆ and Φωνή, the reason is very trivial, from the Seven Vowels in the Greek Alphabet. Κείσις respects the Critical Days in diseases; and Κέρας Ἀμαλθείας is attributed to the *Septenary*, in which the *Universe* is said to be perfected, in such a sense as it was to the *Ternary*, in respect of the fulness and well-furnishedness of the Earth.

The other Appellations are such as belong to either *Pallas* or *Apollo*, both of which signify the same thing, that is to say, *Wisdom*: And I cannot assure any one that *Apollo's* being called ἐβδομαγενής, and the *Septenary Pallas*, had not its true and primeval occasion from this *Cabbala* of *Moses*; the divinest Wisdom owing its original to Rest and Vacancy from worldly Employments, from which God commands his people to cease on the *Seventh* day. So that the more we consider those Names of the *Pythagorick* Numbers that can answer to the Days of the Creation, the greater fitness we find in them, and applicability to *Moses* his Text.

S C H O L I A

In CAP. IV. Sect. I.

Eξάρμα, Quia distincta & articulata adaptatio, &c. Vel si ab ἑξάρμα deducatur, Ratio nominis est ab attollendo suspendendoque in sublimi varia Cœli Luminaria.

Πολύθεος etiam vel potius Πάνθεος, &c. At verò hæc Nomina ad Mercaviam præcipuè referri posse censeo, quæ in Explicatione quatuor Animalium de Ordinibus Angelicis tractat, Angelos verò apud Græcos θεοὶ nominari notius est quàm ut opus sit monere. Quarta etiam Sephirah amplitudinem regni Dei denotat, quod θεῶν, id est Angelorum præcipua multitudo est, quò minùs mirandum sit Quaternarium πολύθεον appellari.

Sect. 3. Excurrens dein ad omnia Objecta tam Metaphysica quàm Physica, &c. Hoc aliquo modo verum esset quamvis Tetraëtyos Explicatio ad Bereshith omnino restringeretur. Nunc verò cùm ad Mercaviam etiam extendatur, sive Visionem quatuor Animalium ac quatuor Rotarum, ad ipsùmque adeò Tetragrammaton, non potest quin modo locupletissimo sit verum.

Sect. 4. Cùm Ἀρρενόβηλος vox futura fuisset magis propria, &c. Quinto enim die bruta tantùm Animalia creata sunt, sexto verò etiam Homines, de quibus voces ἀνὴρ & γυνή rectius usurpantur.

Sect. 5. Sunt verò alia multa Quinariii nomina satis absona, fateor, & à quinta diei opere aliena, &c. At verò haud ita aliena sunt omnia, à quinta Sephira, quæ Geburah dicitur, significatque robur ac fortitudinem. Satis enim cognata videntur huic Sephiræ, Pallas, Ἀζυξ, Ἀκρεῶτις, Ζανὸς πύργος, Δίκησις, Καρδιᾶτις, Ἀνικία, Ὀρβιᾶτις, Δίκη, Πέννοια. Pallas quidem, quippe Dea bellicosa, quin & eadem Sapientia Dea, quò rectè igitur refertur Πέννοια. Nam vis consilii expers mole ruit suâ, ut monet alicubi Horatius. Sed justam oportet esse perinde atque providam, quò Δίκη & Δίκησις referri possunt. Immo verò Fortitudo verâque Animofitas in ipsa fundatur Justitia. Fugiant impii nemine persequente, Justī autem instar leunculi confidunt. Quò etiam spectant Καρδιᾶτις & Ὀρβιᾶτις. Rectitudo enim Animi cor corroborat, Divinamque quandam ingenerat vim atque fortitudinem, planèque invictam, quò spectant Ἀνικία, Ζανὸς πύργος, Ἀκρεῶτις, Ἀζυξ. Et certè ex illa voce Ζανὸς πύργος, innuitur vim esse summè Divinam: Est enim Ζανὸς πύργος prima Sephirah, illiusque mentio hîc fit tanquam primi fontis hujus invictæ virtutis, quæ Ἀνικία dicitur. Hæc est fides illa invincibilis in primo Bono, de qua Proclus sic Philosophatur: Δεῖ δὲ τὴν θεῖαν πίστιν ἐνοεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμον ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἑρμῇ τελείως ἰδρυθεῖσαν. Et paulo post, Εἰς τὴν εἰς τὸν ἑρμῆ ἀσφαλὲς ἥδη ὄντων ἀπάντων. Quod Pythagorei πύργον, Proclus ὄρμεν vocat, Turris verò ac portus utraque firmitudinem & securitatem denotant. Virtutem autem hanc Divinam esse porrò significatur per appellationem Ἀκρεῶτις, nempe vim esse eximiè Spiritualem. Ægyptii homines sunt & non Deus, & Equi eorum caro sunt & non spiritus. Quò etiam referri potest istud Apostoli, Nam arma militie nostræ non carnalia sunt, sed potentia Deo, &c. Ἀζυξ verò & Ἀκρεῶτις, optime conveniunt,

Prov. 28. 1.

Theol. Platonic. lib. 1.

25.

Esaï. 31. 3.

2 Cor. 10. 4.

veniunt, dum innuunt vim hanc Divinam ac cœlestem, cum *Virginitate*, hoc est, cum summa animi corporisque puritate esse conjunctam.

Sect. 8. *Ad Κόσμον etiam referenda sunt, &c.* Κόσμος optimè convenit cum sexta *Sephira* תפארת, quæ ut Κόσμος, *Ornatum* significat, possuntque utraque denotare pulchram εὐταξίαν, quò sensu Ἀρμονία & Πανάρκεια, haud ineptè etiam ad sextam *Sephiram* referri queant.

Sect. 10. Τύχη etiam aliquam cognationem habet, &c. Quo autem sensu ad *Sephiram septimam* referri possit, in *Tabula Sephirotharum Pythagorica* notavimus.

Quorum in manus Mundi Regimen, &c. Quomodo verò hoc intelligendum de eorum Regimine, Deique Sabbatismo, in *Defensione* suprâ explicavimus.

C H A P. V.

1. *The trivial Names of the Denary.* 2. *Nine significant Names of the Denary relating to the Universe, or the Fourth Day's work.* 3. *Aaron's Vestments an Emblem of the Universe;* 4. *And an Indication of the Divinity of Christ.* 5. *Three more names Ἡλιος, Φάνης, and Σφαῖρα, and in what regard given to the Denary.* 6. *The Decad, or rather the Tetractys, called κλειδῶχος, because the mystery of the Creation is chiefly locked up in the Fourth day.* 7. *As also because of its punctual and express significancy of the nature of that Day's creation.* 8. *Why it was called κλειδῶχος τῆς φύσεως.* 9. *Why the Decad or Denary called κλειδῶχος.* 10. *And why Πίσσις with a fuller inference of the true ground why the Tetractys was mentioned in the Pythagorick Oath, rather than the Pentad, or any other Number.*

|| Johan.

Meurs. Denar. cap. 12.

1. **W**E are not at all concerned in the *Octonary* and *Novenary*, they having no reference to any of the Days of the Creation. But the *Denary* adhereth so close to the *Quaternary*, in that it is the Power thereof, that it would be a culpable Omission if I should not bring into View all its Titles. The aptness and significancy of Κόσμος, Οὐρανός, Παντέλεια, and τὸ πᾶν, I have already observed. Of the remaining, the least to the purpose are, || Πρῶτος τετραγωνισμός, Μνημοσύνη, Μνήμη. It is called Πρῶτος τετραγωνισμός, or the *first Quadrature*, only because it is made of the four first Numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. It is adorned with the Title of Μνημοσύνη, because she is the Mother of the nine Muses; and these shallow *Pseudo-Pythagorists*, it seems, thought it a fine thing to bestow one of the daughters on every one of the other nine numbers of the *Denary*; but they have placed the Mother as well in the Rear as the Van: so fickle are they in these worthless fooleries. I need not note that Μνήμη was added as a synonymon of Μνημοσύνη.

2. But the rest of the Titles of the *Denary* or *Decad*, are not such trash; but reflect, as the *Decad* ought to do, which is the power of the *Tetrad*, upon the *Fourth Day's* Creation, which was the articulating the *Universe* into form and shape and right order. And therefore as this Number *Ten* (according as I noted before) was called

Κόσμος

κόσμος for the *comprehensiveness* of the Title; so, I conceive, congen-
 erous to this are those names of Εἰμαρμένη, Οὐρανία, Αἰών, Κεῖται, Ἀνάγκη,
 Ἀτλας, Ἀκάμας Πάμωχος, Θεός, (from which last the *Quinary* also is called
 Ἀμίδει) these all of them being of a *comprehensive* signification. For
 Εἰμαρμένη and Ἀνάγκη intimate that law of Fatality and Necessity in
 the order of the Universe; and Οὐρανία, that heavenly Musick or Har-
 mony of that Order; if it was not cast in vainly as one of the nine
 Muses, to fill up. Αἰών, Κεῖται, Ἀτλας, Ἀκάμας, denote the permanency
 and stable durancy of the world, that there is no fear that of its
 own nature it will ever fail. According to which sense are those ex-
 pressions in the *Pythagorick Oath*, Πηγὴ ρίζωμα τὰ ἀενάα φύσεως. Αἶνα
 φυσικῶς plainly answering to Αἰών, which is as much as αἰὲν ὄν.
 and Κεῖται, Ἀτλας, Ἀκάμας, to Ρίζωμα and Πηγὴ. For these Four,
 namely, *The Spirit of Nature, Suns, Planets, and Vortices*, are rightly
 said to be all what those Names express. And the Congruity is ex-
 act, in that, as the *Tetrad* and *Decad* are really the same *Tetractys*, so
 their names also be of the same importance, and point at the same
 things. And lastly, Θεός, and Πάμωχος, (if Πάμωχος be ὁ κύριος, as *Hesychius*
 renders it) found to the same tune, and are most fitly under-
 stood from that *Tetrastich* of the *Sibyl*,

|| See also
 chap. 1. sect.
 8. sect. 7.
 and chap. 8.

Εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ ὁ εὖν, (σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῆσι νόησον)
 Οὐρανὸν ἐνδεδυμαι, περικέκλημαι ὃ δέλασται,
 Ταῦτα δέ μοι στήγυα ποδῶν περὶ σῶμα κέχυθ',
 Ἀνὴρ δ' ἦδ' ἄστρον με χερσὶ περικέδρομε πάντη.

* According to which sense is also that in || *Plotinus*, Θεὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πᾶν || *Ennead. 2.*
 τῆς χειρὸς ψυχῆς σωμαειδυμένης, τὸ ὃ λοιπὸν δαίμων μέγας, καὶ τὰ παθητὰ ἐν αὐτῷ δαι-
 μόνια. So evident is it that all those Names respect the *whole Uni-*
verse in all the Lineaments thereof.

3. But there is something so sacred in those *Sibylline* verses, that I
 cannot let them pass without further Observation. Which, though it
 may seem somewhat digressive, is not altogether impertinent to our
 present purpose. For I do not question but the *Sibyl* in this descri-
 ption alludes to the Sacerdotal Vestments of *Aaron*, whom *Philo*
 makes a Type or Figure of the only-begotten Son of God, whom he
 calls ὁ πρωτόγονος θεῶν, and τὸν θεῶν λόγον, and || makes him the eternal
 high Priest of this vast Temple the Universe, styles him εἰκόνα τοῦ ὄντος,
 the Image of *Jehovah*, and the Maker of the World. Λόγος δὲ εἶναι εἰκὼν
 θεῶν δι' ὃ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο. And yet in a complex sense he makes
 the || Universe also the Son of God. For after a particular description
 of the meaning of the Vestments of *Aaron*, and his Priestly Orna-
 ments, where he will have the two precious stones on his shoulders
 to signify the two Hemispheres (each of them having six names of
 the Tribes, as the Hemispheres six Signs apiece so divided by the
 cutting of the Horizon;) the twelve stones in the Breast-Plate, to
 signify the twelve Signs in the Zodiack, and their being ranged into
 four Ternaries, to denote the four Seasons of the Year; his blue Robe
 to emblemize the Air; the Flower-work at the hem thereof, the
 Earth; Ποσειδών the Pomegranates (in allusion to εἰὼς ῥυο) the Water;
 and the || Bells, the harmonious mixture of Water and Earth for gene-
 ration:

|| See *Phil.*
Jud. De Som-
niis.

|| See *Phil.*
De Monar-
chia.

|| In his *De*
vita Mosis.

|| In his *De Monarchia*.

ration : he finally adds this reason of the Attire, || Ὅπως ἐν ταῖς ἱερευσίαις συλλειτουργῇ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ, *That the whole World might supplicate together with the high Priest.* To which he immediately subjoins, For it is most fit for him that supplicates the Father, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπαγγέσθαι ὡς θεογονίαν, καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος, as if the Universe were the Son of God. Which saying is unsound, unless he, whom he elsewhere calls παρὰ λόγον θεῶν, and the *Divine Logos*, be taken in to make the conception entire.

* Pomegranates.

Phil. de vita Moysis.

For thus will it appear, that the *Divine Logos* is the true high Priest indeed, * whose Induments are (according to those verses of the *Sibyl*) all the parts of the Universe; and that *Aaron* was but a Figure of Him; and that Εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ ὁ εὐὺς, * answers to the sculpture of the four letters in the golden plate upon the forefront of *Aaron's* mitre, which *Philo* says, was ὄνομα τῷ ὅλῳ, upon which the *Sibyl's* ὁ εὐὺς reflects, and whereby was understood *Jehovah Filius*: that ἐξενδὺν ἐν δέδυμαι refers to his blue Robe; which is not the *Air*, but so much of the *Heaven* as lies betwixt the Sun and any Planet or Earth in the same *Vortex*; as those * ποταμοὶ are not the *Water*, but the whole *Globe of Earth and Water*, which is every where at the lowest parts or hem of this blue Garment of the eternal *Aaron*. Which Pomegranates fitly represent the *Seminal fulness* of the Earth, the mother of all things: and in that they are many, they intimate the plurality of *Earths* or *Planets* in their respective *Vortices*. Nor does the scarlet interwoven in the Ephod and Breast-plate signify the Element of Fire, as *Philo* would insinuate; but the contexture of scarlet and purple with gold and white silk, of which the Ephod and Breast-plate did consist, denotes the vehement *Heat* and refulgent *Light* of the Sun; which is the *Pythagoreans* τὸ πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ ἰδρυμένον, as the Ephod and Breast-plate have their place in the middle of the Body, which is the Region of the Heart, the Sun of the lesser world. And lastly, the *Tunica Ocellata*, or *Stole of Eye-work*, as I may so call it, that reached farther than the blue Robe, (even as far as could be) it is apparent that it denoted the Starry Heaven; the Stars being fitly compared to Eyes, * as *Plato* has elegantly compared them in that known Distich of his,

Ἀστὲρες ὡσαυτὰς ἀστὴρ ἐμὸς, &c.

Exod. 28. 34.

|| Phil. de Monarchia.

|| Macrob. Somn. Scipion. lib. 2. cap. 1.

And though ταῖα in the *Sibyl* be called σπέρμα ποδῶν, yet in that it is said ὡς σῶμα κεκρύδαι, it implies the loose flowing of it, as of those Pomegranates at the hem of the Sacerdotal Robe. Nor can the Air be said περιελαμῖν πάντα (which certainly is here as much πανταχῇ) and that so jointly with the *Chorus* of the Planets; but it must imply the mobility and plurality of *Earths*, which therefore gives light to the former verse. But that there is a golden Bell and a Pomegranate, no better sense can be made than what *Philo* has given in || another place; Τῶν δ' ἀρμονίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν καὶ συνέχισιν ὅτι τὸν κόσμον μερῶν οἱ κώδωνες ἐμφαίνουσιν, *The Bells import the Harmony, Symphony, and Consonancy of the parts of the Universe.* For which reason the *Pythagoreans* called the *Tetractys* Ἀρμονία. And that ridiculous fame of || *Pythagoras* his Musick of the Sphears, was questionless nothing but the misreflected Echo of the sound of these golden Bells hanging on *Aaron's* Robe. For *Pythagoras* held no Sphears at all, but speaking the

the mystical language of the Jewish Philosophy, was misunderstood; as he was also in the mystery of Numbers, the world conceiting generally of him, that he made them the Principles of all things; whereas he understood them only as the Symbols of things. But || Aristotle ^{Metaphys. lib. 13. c. 3, 4, 5, 6.} encounters the opinion as seriously held by him; but with as good sport to the intelligent By-standers, as if they should see one fiercely run his lance against a suit of Armour, mistaking it for a man of War. But this only by the bye: we will return to the business in hand.

4. That πᾶς ὁ κόσμος συλλειτουργῇ, which I above cited out of Philo, is to be understood complexly, taking in also the *Eternal Logos*, is plain out of a parallel place, where Philo again, describing the Sacerdotal Vestments, speaks as before; Τῶτον τὸν τρόπον ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς διακοσμηθεὶς εἰλεῖτο, ὡς τὰς ἱερουργίας, ἵν' ᾔσκηται τὰς εὐχὰς ποιησόμενος, σωσιτέρως πᾶς ὁ κόσμος αὐτοῦ· wherein yet in the conclusion he does expressly comprehend τὸν τὸ σῶμα σῶντα καὶ διοικῶντα λόγον· and immediately adds, For it is necessary for him that would supplicate the father of the World, ἀκλήτως χρῆσθαι, ^{Phil. de vita Mos.} τελειοτάτῳ τῷ ἀρετῷ ὑπὸ, ὡς τε ἀμνηστὴν ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ χρηρίας ἀφρονειῶν ἀγαθῶν. Whence it is no wonder that the *Decad*, which is the symbol of the Universe, is by the *Pythagoreans* called Θεός· which is the present and more particular scope I aimed at.

But that which is most admirable to consider is, with what exquisite reason the *Eternal Logos*, which was the Framer of the World, and is, as it were, invested in his own work, is supposed the true *High Priest*, according to this Type of *Aaron*. For who so fit and effectual Intercessor with the Father, for the faults and offences of the World, as he that made it, and in whose breast is contained the Platform thereof; who understands so thoroughly the necessity of the occurrence, sometime of such things or passages as are not so holy as were desirable, and can, out of the perfect Knowledge of the nature of things, distinctly plead the unavoidableness of sundry ill emergencies from that || *Impossibility* and *Incommensurability* that is inexpug- ^{See chap. 8. sect. 7, 8.} nably lodged up in the perverse and unreclaimable *Hyle*?

Besides, presenting himself in his Sacerdotal vestments, which is the *Compages* and harmonious fitting of all the parts of the Universe, he does thereby also in a special manner plead for the particular miscarriages in some few; whereas the rest of the parts of the Creation are so healthful and lovely, that those that are out of frame, are no more than the passing of a discord into good Musick, which makes the next Note come off more sweetly. As if he should alledge to his Father, that, taking one thing with another, and considering under one view, all the Ends and Periods of things, all are in a sort allowable and good, and that those parts that seem most dark and dismal, it is the prerogative of the *Sovereign Goodness* to bring light out of them, and that to whom much is forgiven, his love will be also much.

Such an high Priest as this, I doubt not but *Aaron* did typifie in his Sacerdotal Habiliments. Which is a special confirmation of the Divinity of our blessed Saviour. This is our God, and there shall none other be accounted of in comparison of him. He hath found out all the ways of ^{Baruch 32 v. 35, 36, 37.}

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Know.

Knowledge, and has given it to Jacob his servant, and Israel his beloved. Afterward did he shew himself upon Earth, and conversed with men: Preludiously in the Cloud and in the Bush; but fully and compleatly in his being incarnate of the blessed Virgin. And Aaron also bore the figure of both his natures: of his Divine nature, in his Priestly vestments, which could signify no clothing but that of God; of his humane nature, in his own person, Aaron being but a mere man.

And yet because he was to sustain the person of him that was truly God, the Lord Jesus, there were some * injunctions, or rather Privileges put upon him, which supposed him in a manner elevated above the nature of man. Upon consideration whereof, Philo breaks out into such expressions as are most significative of the condition of Christ the Θεάνθρωπος, and true high Priest, as can be uttered. || Βέλεῖτο ὁ νόμος τὸν ἀρχιερέα μείζοντα μεμειοῦσθαι φύσεως ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἐχέοντα περισσόντα τῆς θείας, μετέειον, εἰ δὲ πάληδὲς λέγειν, ἀμφοῖν· ἵνα διὰ μέσου πνέας ἀνθρώποι μὴ ἰλάσκωνται θεόν, θεὸς δὲ τὰς χάριτας ἀνθρώποις καταδιακόνῃ πρὸς χάριτος ὀρίγῃ καὶ χρηγῇ· that is to say, The Law will have the high Priest to partake of a nature greater than humane, approaching nearer to the Divine, or (to speak exactly) to be the Confine of both; that men might propitiate God by a Mediatour partaking of both natures; and God, by using his Ministry, may reach forth the supplies of his Grace unto men. So clearly is the Divinity of Christ prefigured in the Law of Moses.

* See Levit.
1. v. 10, 11,
12.

|| Phil. de
Monarch.

Which weighty Considerations may make this seeming Digression more pardonable. * For it is not a mere Digression, but an Exposition of what I had alledged for the proof of the meaning of Θεός, one of the Names of the Decad, that respect the integral or more Universal Lineaments of the World.

5. But ἡλιος, and φάνης, and Σεῶρα, may very well more particularly glance at the Lights made on the Fourth day; which are not without the whirling of the round Vortices, which are insinuated by Σεῶρα. And lastly, κλαδῆχος, (which was also the name of the Tetrad) κλαδῆχος and πίσις, I conceive that they all of them respect rather the Tradition of the Tetractys, or the Opening the Mystery of the Creation, by the unfolding the properties of that Number, applicable to the Fourth Day's work, as it is conceived to be the more general Delineation of the Universe, than that they were meant of the things themselves, said to be created on the Fourth Day. But that the Fourth Day is comprehensive of the whole Creation; those names of the Decad, (which is the immediate power of the Tetrad) do plainly import, they all of them in a manner tending that way, and are drily and ridiculously imposed upon the Number without such reference. For why should the Decad be called ἡλιος, φάνης, Εἰμαρμένη, Ἀνάγκη, Αἰών, &c. but that it refers to the Law and Order of the Universe, and the furnishing of it with Suns and Planets? And though the Decad, it being in the Comprehension of all simple Numbers, may be a Symbol of the Universe, and upon that account be called, Οὐρανός, Κόσμος, Τὸ πᾶν, Πανέλευσις, and also Σεῶρα, and by reason of the ἀνακύκλωσις, the Revolution in numbring from Ten to Ten again, and so in infinitum, as is obvious to observe: yet if there were no further drift, or more serious reference to something else, the mere

mere assimilation of this number *Ten* to the *World* or a *Sphere* were a very juiceless and trivial thing.

6. In brief therefore, the *Cabbala* of the *Decad* or *Tetractys*, for they are all one, as * *Athenagoras* has observed, is called $\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\chi\theta$, or *Key-bearer*, First, because it was the Exposition of that part of the *Mosaick* Creation, which was the *closest locked up*. For although that upon the mere granting a Philosophick sense of the Text, and that the *First* day's Creation is only of *Immaterial* Beings, (as the *Monad* naturally implies) it will necessarily follow, that the *Earth* is not said to be created at all, unless it can find Place in the *Fourth* day: and that moreover the Text does universally pronounce of the Lights that were made, That they were to be *for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years*; which is very hardly good sense, taken distributively, because these ends and offices will be coincident in some; nor can be taken by way of enumeration of offices, or properties belonging to every one of the Lights of Heaven, unless there be Planets or Earths about all the Suns, which we usually call *Fix'd stars*: Yet these things are so faintly and obscurely insinuated, and that distributive sense, though more harsh and inept, is so far possible, that the work of the *Fourth* day, unless we be admonished to the contrary by some knowing *Mystagogus*, will, notwithstanding all this, seem only a particular Creation of the Lights of Heaven as such, and in such a sense as is vulgarly conceited. And therefore, for want of such an expressness in the meaning of this Day's Creation, as is in the others, the Mystery thereof may well be looked upon as sealed and locked up from vulgar Sight, and thereby the most concerning things in the whole *Cabbala*. Whence also the *Cabbala* of the *Tetractys*, or the traditional Explication of the *Fourth* day's work, must be acknowledged to be rightly styled $\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\chi\theta$, as being the *Key-bearer* or *Opener* of the most concealed Mysteries of the Creation.

7. And then, secondly, The *Tetractys* in reference to the nature of the number it self, and the property thereof, (though it be but a toy, and such as *Lucian* might justly deride, if there were no further usefulness in it) may well be called $\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\chi\theta$, in that it is so elegantly and expressly significative of the *Cabbala* of the *Fourth* day's Creation. And indeed the Analogy here betwixt the Sign, and the thing signified, is admirable: For as the *Fourth* day's Creation in external shew, is but part of the Creation allotted to the *Fourth* day, as other parts to other days; but in a more recondite meaning, is indeed the fashioning and ordering the whole *Universe*, framing of it into *Suns*, *Planets*, or *Vortices*; so the *Tetractys*, or *Four*, the Symbol hereof, is at first view but one certain number, part of the *Decad*, but in the hidden power comprehended therein is the whole *Decad*, 1, 2, 3, 4. put together, making up *Ten*.

To which you may add, That as the Work of the *Fourth* day seems at first view to be only the *making of Lights*, whose rays are receiv'd in *Pyramidal* form; whenas it was indeed the *framing of the World*, and contriving it into so many round *Vortices*; so the *Tetrad* or *Tetractys*, in its apert nature, is only the *First Pyramid*, (for *Four* is so in numbers) but in its more abstruse Power is a *Sphere*, as was noted * above.

And lastly, As the *Fourth* day's Creation seems only to respect the visible and material World, according to the external sense, but does necessarily imply an Immaterial Principle, ordering the matter into that frame of things: so the *Tetrad* is only *Feminine* in its open or exteriour nature; but in its parts whereby it grows into a *Decad* is both *Masculine* and *Feminine*, as well 1 as 3 (as *Zaratas* would have it) being *Masculine*, and 2 and 4 *Feminine*: As in the more compound *Tetractys* 36 there are four *Masculine* numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, and four *Feminine*, 2, 4, 6, 8. Which, as in the former consideration, intimates the necessity of conjoining the *Active* and *Passive* Principle in the *Fourth* day's work, that is, in the Fabrick of the *Universe*. But in that the composition of these parts fall into *thirty six*, which is a *circular* Number in an easier sense than *Ten*, there may be intimated thereby, that the whole Six days Creation is comprised together in the *Fourth*, and that the framing of the World is by *circumgyration* of the *Aethereal Matter* into repeated *Vortices*. But this compound *Tetractys* belongs not to this present inquisition. The Analogy betwixt the Simple *Tetrad*, and the *Fourth Day's* Creation, in the Philosophick sense, is so exquisitely express, that I think it is apparent by this time, why it has gained the Title of $\kappa\lambda\eta\delta\epsilon\chi\theta$ amongst the *Pythagoreans*, its very property so fitly opening the right meaning of the Work of the *Fourth Day*.

|| Plutarch. de
Iside & Osiride.

8. And that it was called $\kappa\lambda\eta\delta\epsilon\chi\theta$ τῆς φύσεως, implies also, * that it was intended chiefly and more immediately for an universal *Natural Cabbala*, the grand Theorems of *Nature* being comprised there, as *Metaphysical* Theorems in the *First Day's* Work, and in the two following Chapters. Out of which considerations, the reason is evident of all those Names given to the *Denarius*, which signify the *Universal Law* or *Compages* of *Nature*, which must be cast upon the *Fourth Day*, there being no *Tenth Day* of Creation for them to be cast upon. And *Ten* is the *Tetractys* as well as the *Tetrad* it self. || As *Thirty Six* is called the *Tetractys*, as well as the *Four* first *masculine* Numbers, and four first *feminine*, out of which it results.

|| See Johan.
Meurs. Denar.
Pythag. c. 12.

9. That the *Decad* should be also called || $\kappa\lambda\eta\delta\epsilon\chi\theta$, the reason is very easy and natural, if referred to the *Fourth Day's Cabbala*. For taking hold of that root or stock, as I may call it, we have also hold of the branches. For the *Cabbala* of the *Tetractys* will naturally shoot out into the consideration of the first, second, third, and of the fifth, sixth, and seventh Days; the nature of the World not being rightly understood, without reaching into them also, which are as it were the $\kappa\lambda\acute{\alpha}\delta\delta\iota$, the Sprigs or Branches on this side and that side of the *Cabbala* of the *Fourth Day*.

10. And for that third and last Name, $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$, it is a further argument, that the Names of the *Decad* refer to the *Fourth Day*: it intimating, that the *Decad* is also that very *Tetractys*, by whose Inventer and Communicator *Pythagoras* and his Followers were said to swear, in that the *Decad* is called $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$, as well as the *Tetractys* $\circ\rho\kappa\theta$, and $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is that assurance which is given by Oath. For $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\delta\alpha\pi\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ is as much as *to swear*, in the phrase of the *Greek Language*. So strangely and easily do things come about every where, and naturally fall in together

gether to one joint confirmation of the truth of the *Philosophick Cabbala*; and so manifest is it what special reason *Pythagoras* had to mention the *Tetrad*, rather than the *Pentad*, or any other number, in that form of swearing by Him that first imparted the *Cabbala*. For if the Mystery had ended in the numbers themselves, and had not been the Symbols and Repositories of some real knowledge of things *Natural* or *Divine*, the *Pentad* had deserved that celebrity of an Oath, better than the *Tetraëty*s, as I was || above intimating.

|| Chap. 4.
sect. 6.

To conclude therefore in general concerning the *Pythagorick* Names of Numbers, I dare appeal to any one, if I have not got an hundred times more ground than I have lost, by being called to this strict account; and if there has not been made a large accession of very pertinent Names to those I had before produced; as also a plain discovery how those came in amongst the *Pythagorick* Titles, that are nothing pertinent to our present *Cabbala*. Which so punctual account cannot but give ample satisfaction to all such as know when to be satisfied.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. V. Sect. 2.

AD quem sensum etiam collineat illud apud Plotinum, &c. Plotini verò sensus paulò crassior mihi videtur, quàm ut ferri possit à Christiano quoquam verò Philosopho. Neque enim *Mundus Dei corpus* est, sed *indumentum tantum*. Rectius igitur tutiusque *Sibylla* sacras Scripturas imitata loquitur, quàm *Plotinus*, quæ Deum vestiri quasi facit Mundo corporeo, non autem cum eo vitaliter uniri. Id officii relinquitur *Spiritui Naturæ*, qui Deus non est, sed Creatura, nempe *ὁ ἀντιστοιχῶν τοῦ παντός* Universi. Et quanquam *οὐρανὸς* & *παῖς* apud *Pythagoreos* *Denarii* sint Appellationes, ac proinde ad *Universum* quæ *Universum* pertineant; nihil tamen necesse est ut primævi *Pythagorei* *Universum* tanquam *Dei corpus* considerarent, sed tantum ut *Indumentum*. Sacerdotes verò Paganici id apprimè volebant, ut magis solida subesset causa colendi omnes partes Universi, tanquam membra Divini Corporis, ut Pontificii Panem colunt, tanquam vivum corpus Christi.

Sect. 3. *Cujus Indumenta sunt*, &c. Cum tamen concinna sit ac solida, in hoc capite, nostra de Vestimentis *Aaronicis* Philosophatio, equidem operæ pretium duxi, quò Lector majori cum voluptate ac facilitate, quæ hîc scripsi, intelligat, effigiem *Aaronis* cum omnibus Vestimentis Sacerdotalibus conspiciendam || in hoc loco apponere, ut uno quasi intuitu venustatem concinnitatemque notionum nostrarum percipiat. Est igitur *AAA* Tunica sive Stola ocellata, *B* Pallium Hyacinthinum, à quo Tintinnabula & Malo granata dependent, *C* Ephod sive Superhumeralis, & *I* Pectorale sive Rationale; *E* Cidaris vel Tiara, & *F* Lamina aurea coronalis, in qua Tetragrammati Inscriptio est.

|| Vide paginam sequentem.



Sculpturae respondere quatuor Literarum, &c. Et Sibylla & Philo sic videntur loqui ac si solum Tetragrammaton יהוה insculptum esset Laminæ aureæ. Tota verò Inscriptio apud Mosén sic est, קדש ליהוה, quod est, vertente Vatablo, *Sanctitas ipsi Jehovah.* Quod planè indicat, quàm sanctam sustineret personam Aaron, nempe ipsam Personam Jehovah Filii sive Christi, Personæ ex Aeterno Logo humanæque Anima ac corpore conflata. Quam Interpretationem nostram, & Sibylla & Philo confirmant.

Et denique Tunica sive Stola ocellata, &c. De opere hujus Stola ocellato sic scribit Arias Montanus: Hoc autem ut singulare nec arcanâ significatione carens in hac prima veste annotatu visum est dignissimum. Quod quidem Arcanum nos cum bono Deo e tenebris foeliciter eruisse, nullus dubito, rectèque hanc vestem interpretatos esse de Cælo Stellato. Quæ quàm naturalis aptaque sit Interpretatio, illinc etiam intelligere est, quòd Mythologi Argi oculos de Stellis Cœli, ipsùmque Argum de Cælo interpretantur.

Quemadmodum & Plato in notissimo isto Disticho, &c. Totum Distichon sic est:

Ἀστὲρας εἰσαδρεῖς Ἀστὴρ ἐμὸς εἶδε γαυδῶμεν
Οὐρανὸς, ὡς πολλοῖς ὀμμασιν εἰς σε βλέπω.

*Astra intueris, Aster mi, utinam ego essem
Cælum, ut te multis vicissim oculis intuear.*

In hac igitur comparatione Stellarum cum oculis, ipse etiam Plato cum Mythologis consentit.

Seçt. 4. Neque enim simplex Digressio est, &c. Adde porro si Digressio fuisset, admodum tamen utilem fore, præter confirmationem Divinitatis Christi, ad probandum insuper Motum Telluris revera partem fuisse Cabbalæ Philosophicæ Mosaicæ. Vestes enim Aaronis Systemati Mundano Pythagorico mirum in modum congruunt quadrântque.

Seçt. 6. Sicuti Athenagoras observavit, &c. Μίγυς μὲν ἀριθμὸς ὁ δέκα καὶ τὸς Πυθαγορικὸς ὁ πεντακτὺς τε ὦν, &c. Athenag. Apolog. pro Christianis.

Seçt. 8. Quòd destinatus sit præcipuè in universalem Cabbalam naturalem, &c. Equidem huc potissimùm spectare Tetractyn censeo, ob mirabilem proprietatis aptitudinem, quo quarti Diei Cabbala & aperiatur, & conservetur, perditave recuperetur; sed non dubito interim quin ad Mercavam præterea referri possit, quatuórque Rotas & Animalia, qua de re fati diximus suprâ.

CHAP. VI.

1. The second Objection, from the Unsuitableness of the Pythagorick Philosophy to the Judaick Cabbala, which makes no mention of the Motion of the Earth; with the first Answer thereto.
2. A second Answer, wherein is shown how easy, if not necessary, it was, that the Motion of the Earth should be lost out of the Judaick Cabbala.
3. But that there is notwithstanding that in the Jewish Cabbala which will necessarily infer the

the Motion of the Earth. 4. *That the Ancient Wise men of the Jews did hold the Motion of the Earth, as appears from Pythagoras his having drawn his doctrine from that Fountain.* 5. *That Numa Pompilius was descended from the Jews.* 6. *That the Temple he built to Vesta, is a Demonstration he held the Earth's Motion.*

1. **T**HE Second Objection against our *Cabbala* is that taken from the Maimedness of that Doctrine, which I pretend to be *Judaical* or *Mosaical*, which should consist of these two main parts, *The Motion of the Earth*, with those things that are involved therein, and *the Praeexistence of the Soul*; the former whereof, say they, is not to be met withal in the *Jewish Writings*. To which I answer,

First, That it is on this side the Generosity of my Design, merely to apply to *Moses* his Text such Truths as remain amongst the Writings of the *Jews*, and may be supposed Reliques of the ancient *Cabbala*; but that the high scope I drove at was, by the Method I have taken, to recover to their cognoscence that noble part of their *Cabbala*, which was lost, and yet which *Pythagoras* once had from their fore-fathers, as is abundantly testified by the suffrages of Historians. And truly this *Physical* part of the *Cabbala* which I have applied, fits so well, and sticks so close to *Moses* his Text, not only as to the things themselves, but also by virtue of the consideration of the Names and Properties of the *Pythagorick* Numbers, that, by this Artifice, as by cramps of Iron, both parts of the *Cabbala* are held so firmly together in one, that it is made apparent to any indifferent eye, that the whole *Cabbala* is of one structure and piece, and belongs all to the Text of *Moses*.

2. And then again, in the second place, I demand what is the *Physical* part of the *Jewish Cabbala*, if this be not; (for they will not deny but that *Moses* does Philosophize in this first Chapter of *Genesis*) or what so great and so true Theorems can they apply, as I have applied to his Text? If they will answer, there were indeed such, and fitly applicable; but they are lost: I say, in that the *Physical* part was lost, it is a shrewd presumption, even from thence; that this is it which we have recovered, no *Cabbala* being so likely to be lost as this, it being a harder thing to communicate to one the *Pythagorick system of the World*, than the *Praeexistence of the Soul*; as appears, in that it was a piece of Philosophy too big for the Capacity of || *Aristotle* himself, who, though he could name the opinion, and refer it to the *Pythagoreans*; yet he could not close with it. For the prejudice of Sense is great against it; and then the Philosophick and Mathematical preparations, more voluminous by far than what is requisite for the receiving of the doctrine of the Soul's *Praeexistence*. Whence it is, * that though *Platonism* be derived from *Pythagorism*, yet it has left out the Theory of the *Earth's Motion*; nay, the *Pythagoreans* themselves had in time lost it, as it appears in * *Timaeus Locrus*, *Apollonius Tyaneus*, and in some of the Titles the *Pythagoreans* have given to their Numbers.

|| *De Caelo*, l. 2.
cap. 13. *Metaphysic.* l. 1.
cap. 6.

And

And yet fewer *Jews* would have been found capable of receiving this part of the *Cabbala*, than *Pagans*; it being necessary for them that they be furnished, not only with what preparations were required in the other, * but also with a special hardiness of enduring to see the *Cortex* of the *Mosaick* letter, as it were, to break in pieces, to render up this recondite kernel for them to feed upon: whenas they might be taught the *Præexistence of the Soul*, with little or no violence to the outward Letter of *Moses*, that is to say, to the Literal Sense of it. Wherefore in that the *Motion of the Earth* has been lost, and appears not in the remains of the Jewish *Cabbala*, this can be no argument against its having once been part thereof.

3. But thirdly, Though the *structure* of this Theorem be lost amongst them; yet the foundation is not, which is a fair evidence, that the Edifice once stood there. And this foundation is to be seen, not only in their language it self, which I have || noted above, but * Chap. 3. also in their Writings, as that in *Gemara*, *Non orbes, sed in cælo liquido moveri sidera, vetustissima Hebraorum sententia est, ut † nos docet Gemara* † See Grot. in Decalog. *ad initium Geneseos*. But those most Ancient of the *Hebrews*, unless they were very short-witted, as certainly the nearer successors to *Moses* were not, but excellent Philosophers; *Moses* himself, without all question, being such, * they could not possibly hold the *Heavens* liquid, but withal might hold the *Motion of the Earth*; nor they, nor *Pythagoras*, hold the *Earth's* motion, without holding the *Æthereal Vortices*, as I have plainly demonstrated in my || Letter to V. C.

4. And fourthly and lastly, That they did expressly hold the *motion of the Earth*, is, in my apprehension, sufficiently evinced already, by what I have produced to prove, that * *Pythagoras* was either a *Jew* himself, or at least received his Doctrine from the *Jews*. Of which truth, the *Præexistence of the Soul*, and the *Triunity in the Godhead*, which *Pythagoras* taught, are no obscure indications. * For it is plain out of the Books of *Jetsirah*, that the *Jews* hold the *Triunity of the Godhead*, as well as the *Soul's Præexistence*. Wherefore, in all likelihood, he drew his || *Physical Philosophy* from the same fountain from which he did his *Metaphysical*. But this *Physiological* part of the *Cabbala* being neither so useful nor obligatory, as to matters of Religion, nor so easily received nor grasped, by reason of the vast excursions in that Theory, or if grasped, hard to be held by any long succession of men; (whose minds are most engaged in their personal interest, whether in reference to this world, or that which is to come;) it is no wonder, as I have already noted, that time wore it off, or let it sink and lost it, there being so few that were found fit, or that thought themselves concerned to receive it.

5. But nevertheless, (which is the main thing I intended to answer in this last place) though the same of this part of the *Cabbala* be in a manner extinct amongst the *Jews*; yet that it was once the hidden Doctrine of the learned of that Nation, seems to me sufficiently credible from what *Plutarch* writes of *Numa Pompilius*. For his so strictly prohibiting the use of Images in Divine worship, is very apparently *Mosaical*. As also that Principle of his, * οὐ καλῶς φορεῖται τὰ ἀνόρρητα ἐν ἀψύχοις γέφυμασιν, That inanimate Books are no fit bearers of secret

secret Mysteries, shews, that he was taught *Cabbalistically* by oral Tradition : and it is a thing confessed, that there was a secret Tradition of more recondite learning amongst the *Jews*.

And *Numa's* Instructor is said to be not a *Græcian*, but βαρβαρος τις σελήων Πυθαγόρεω, some *Barbarian* greater and better than *Pythagoras* himself; and where, I pray you, was such an one to be found, unless descended from the *Jews*? But another fame, I must confess, there is, that he was taught by *Pythagoras*; but not by him of *Samos*, for he was some Ages after; but by one *Pythagoras*, who was a *Lacedemonian*, as *Numa* himself was. * For the *Sabines* were a Colony of the *La-*

|| In vita Nu- cedemonians, as || *Plutarch* affirms.

m.c.

1 Macc. 12.

21.

Jos. Antiquit.

Judaic. lib.

13. cap. 14.

And to come home to the point, * the *Lacedemonians* themselves were descended from the *Jews*, as appears from the first Book of *Maccabees*, and from *Josephus*. For *Areus*, King of the *Lacedemonians*, in his Letter to *Onias* the High-Priest, doth expressly affirm, that it was found in writing, That the *Lacedemonians* and *Jews* were Brethren; and that they were of the Stock of *Abraham*. And the Letter of *Jonathan* the High-Priest, acknowledges the Kindred; and that they found it so in their Records; and adds further, that they remember the *Lacedemonians* in their Sacrifices and in their Prayers, as it becometh brethren.

6. Well, be it so then, will you say, and it seems exceeding probable from all these circumstances, that *Numa* was both descended from the *Jews*, and imbued with the Jewish Religion and learning? What's this to the purpose? or how does it prove the Motion of the Earth, once to have been part of the *Judaical* Tradition or *Cabbala*? Only thus much; That *Numa* did so religiously resent the truth of the Theorem, that knowing there was no such august Temple of God as the Universe it self, and that to all the Inhabitants thereof it cannot but appear round from every prospect, and that in the midst there must be an ever-shining Fire, I mean a Sun; in Imitation hereof he built a round Temple, which was called the Temple of *Vesta*, concerning which *Plutarch* speaks very plainly and apertly; * Νουμάς δ' λέγει καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἑσίας ἱερὸν ἐγκύκλιον περιβαλεῖν τὸ ἀσέβητον πνεῖ οὐρανόν, συμμυμένον ἔν τῳ οἰκῷ τῆς γῆς ὡς Ἑσίας ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σύμπαντον κόσμον, ὃ μέσον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ πῦρ ἰδρυμένον νομίζουσιν, καὶ τὸτο Ἑσίαν καλεῖσθαι καὶ Μονάδα. Τὴν δ' γῆν ἔτε ἀκίνητον, ἔτε ἐν μέσῳ τῆς περιφορᾶς ἔσαν, ἀλλὰ κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ πῦρ αἰορουμένην, ἔτε ἥν τιμιωτάτων ἔτε τῶν πρώτων τῶ κόσμου μορίων ὑπάρχειν. That *Numa* is reported to have built a round Temple of *Vesta*, for the Custody of a Fire in the midst thereof that was never to go out: not intimating herein the figure of the Earth, as if she was the *Vesta*, but of the Universe; in the midst whereof the *Pythagoreans* placed the Fire, and called it *Vesta* or *Monas*, and reckoned the Earth neither immoveable, nor in the midst of the Mundane Compass; but that it is carried about the Fire or Sun, and is none of the first and chief Elements of the World. What can be more plain than these Testimonies? But I leave it to every man's judgment to infer what measure of confidence he thinks good.

Plutarch. in
vita Nume.

S C H O L I A

In CAP. VI. Sect. 2.

QUamvis Platonismus à Pythagorismo derivatus sit, Theorema tamen de Motu Telluris omiserit. Post citationem è Cyrillo Alexandrino, quâ Platonem perinde ac Pythagoram in Ægypto commoratum esse probat S. A. qualisque esset Moses illiusque doctrina didicisse; rogat hęc ut expediam, quid factum fuerit, quod, cum Pythagoras & Plato, pariter Philosophiam Mosaicam in Ægypto degustarint, Plato tamen motum Terræ haud agnoverit. Unde insinuare vult motum Terræ nullam esse Philosophiæ Mosaicæ partem, alioquin enim Platonem eam fuisse amplexurum. Ut omittam verò Annorum amplius ducentorum fuisse intervallum Pythagoram inter & Platonem, manifestum est ingenium Platonis rebus Metaphysicis addictius fuisse quàm Physicis; indeque factum ut istud de motu Terræ Theorema aut omnino neglexerit aut tardius admiserit, Motum intelligo præsertim annuum. Nam tametsi *Timæus* Locrus etiam diurnum Telluris motum omisisse videatur, Plato tamen in suo *Timæo* eum innuere videtur istis verbis. τὴν δὲ τερφὸν ἡμετέραν, εἰλημένην ὃ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένην, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νοκτὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμνησθήσεται. hoc est, Jam verò Terram altricem nostram, circa axem per Universum extensum circumvolutam Diei & Noctis effectricem custodemque fecit Deus. Quid istis vocibus aptius Terræ circumvolutioni circa axem quadrare potest? Proclum agnosco Platonium quidem sed haud usque adeo peritum Philosophum pro εἰλημένην legere ἰλλομένην quam vocem interpretatur per σφιγσμένην & συνεχμένην, dicitque Terram περὶ τὸν ἀξονα παντὸς συνέχεσθαι καὶ συσφιγέσθαι, circa axem Universi contineri & constringi. Hæc verò Procli interpretatio non tam bellè convenit voci δημιουργὸν, Solem enim potius diceret Diei Noctisque opificem quàm Terram, nisi Terra motu diurno circa Axem moveretur, atque sic Diei & Noctis vicissitudinem efficeret. Et verò εἰλημένην veram & antiquam fuisse lectionem, constare potest ex Cicerone, *Academ. Quest. lib. 4.* ubi hæc habentur. Nicetas Syracusanus, ut ait Theophrastus, Cælum, Solem, Lunam, Stellæ, supra denique omnia stare censet, neque præter Terram rem ullam in Mundo moveri, quæ cum circa axem se summâ celeritate convertat & torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quæ, si, stante Terrâ, Cælum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in *Timæo* dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulò obscurius. Quod tamen non paulò obscurius sed nimis quàm obscurè diceretur, nisi εἰλημένην legatur, non ἰλλομένην. Nicetam autem illum Syracusanum de motu diurno intelligendum esse palam est, cum & Lunam stare dicat, quod verum esse non potest nisi quantum ad motum ejus diurnum. Neque præter Terram rem ullam in Mundo moveri. Motu nempe diurno, ut magis adæquatè cum hac Platonis opinione in *Timæo* conveniat, qui motum Terræ duntaxat diurnum ibi tradit. Paulatim verò totam doctrinam Mosaicam sive Pythagoricam imbibit & approbavit, referente, in Numa, Plutarcho, eum jam senem eadem cum Pythagoricis de Terra sensisse, & alio loco eam posuisse, medium verò domicilium alteri cuidam attribuisse præcellentiori, Soli nimirum. Qui locus citatur ab ipso S. A. Tam parum

Exam. Gen. p. 128.

reliquum est dubii de *Platonis* opinione circa motum *Terræ*, quamquam illius successores brevi istam doctrinam, quippe qui rebus *Metaphysicis* omnino addicti fuerunt, passi sunt intercidere. De quibus potissimum, quæ scripsi hîc intelligi volo, sed & aliquantulum etiam perstringi, ipsius *Platonis*, circa hoc Theorema, tarditatem.

Quemadmodum constat apud *Timeum Locrum*, &c. Verba sunt. *τὰ δ' ἐν μέσῳ ἰδρυμένα ἔστι στεῖν, ὅς τε ἔσπρας καὶ ἡμέρας γίνεθ'*, *Tim. Locr. de Anima Mundi*.

Exam. General. p. 129, 130.

Sed speciali præterea animi robore, quo sustinere possent *Mosaicum* videre *Literæ Corticem* quasi diffringi, &c. *Corticem Literæ Mosaicæ* hîc intelligo exteriorem, sensum utique maximè obviū vulgique captui accommodatum. Posse verò alium etiam *Literæ* subesse sensum magis reconditum ac *Mysticum*, nemo nisi qui perquam protervo sit ingenio & contra communem Patrum ferè omnium sententiā contumax potest negare. Cortex verò exterior confringi potest & interior detegi citra omnem vim *Literæ Mosaicæ* factam, quo minùs integra maneat & incolumis. Nullùsque sensus bonus haberi, debet qui *Literam* in ullo Apice grammatico ausit violare. Quam legem in mea Interpretatione me observasse contra inurbanas cavillas & convitia *S. A.* acriter contendendo. Nec vel minimam speciem prophanitatis habere si quis sensum *Mysticum* aliquando præferat *Literali*, ut *Nucleum Putamini*. Tota enim *Lex Mosaica* quasi *Putamen* est, si cum *Christianitatis Nucleo* conferatur.

Exam. General. p. 130.

Seçt. 3. *Impossibile erat ut Cælos liquidos tenerent quin eo ipso eos oporteret, &c.* *S. A.* aut perperam intellexit aut datâ operâ corripit hunc locum ut videri posset habere quod opponeret. Nam pro-[eos oporteret] *they mought*, ille vertit, [possent,] quasi scripsissem, *they might*, non autem *they mought*. Longè verò distant & sensu & origine *might* & *mought*, cùm *might* à *may* quod posse, *mought* verò à *must*, quod oportere significat, deducendum sit. Ille verò tanquam si scripsissem, *they might*, [motum *Terræ* possent tenere] sic insurgit: Quod verò ex *Grotio* producit nil planè ad rem facit, quia à posse ad esse non valet consequentia. Crediderunt antiqui *Hebræi* sidera in cælo liquido moveri, adeoque potuerunt etiam motum *Terræ* credere. Si arbitrari sunt hanc unquam fuisse sidus, omnino fatendum est. Sed istud posse nil ponit in esse. Credunt *Ætherem fluidum* *Tycho* quoque & alii, qui tamen istam *Terræ delationem* non agnoscunt. Quàm facunda & copiosa rest est Ignorantia! Si mentem meam rectè intellexisset, hujus objectionis maxima ex parte fecisset compendium. Non arguo à posse ad esse, sed à necesse esse ad esse, quanquam fateor à necessitate *Hypothetica*, nempe si quis admittere velit, sapientes *Hebræorum*, (quod abunde credibile est) ingenio fuisse haud ità stupido ac obeso. Hoc enim qui concesserit perinde atque tenuisse cælos esse liquidos, statim videbit motum *Terræ* eos pariter tenuisse, quemadmodum intelligere est ex eis quæ scripsimus in *Epistola ad V. C.* Seçt. 7. Quò Lectorem brevitatis causâ remitto. Quod verò ad *Tychonem* attinet, longè equidem abest, ut hominem existimem obeso ingenio, sed prudenti & callido, & animo fortean superstitionibus irerito. Instar monstri verò est eum rem *Astronomicam* eò deduxisse, ut *Saturnus*, *Jupiter* & *Mars*, *Venus* item & *Mercurius* circa *Solem* moveri intelligerentur, & tamen interim ut *Terra* quiesceret, cùm nec illi

illi circa Solem moveri possint, nisi cœlestis Materiæ circumductu. Sed ad locum suprà dictæ Epistolæ Lectorem remitto. Quem si satis perpenderit, spero mihi facile assensurum, veteres *Hebræorum* sapientes, cum cœlos liquidos tenuerint, incredibile planè esse eosdem motum *Telluris* non simul tenuisse.

Seçt. 4. *Pythagoram aut Judæum ipsum fuisse aut saltem doctrinam suam accepisse à Judæis, &c.* Præterire hîc non possum quàm egregium prævaricatorem se præstiterit *S. A.* dum rationes solidas hoc Paragrapho contentas sic conatur pervertere. *Num enim sequitur, ait ille, Pythagoras Philosophiam suam, h. e. saniora quæ de Deo & rebus Divinis tradidit, hausit à Judæis, uti antiqui Scriptores testantur, Ergo omne Pythagoricum dogma est Judaicum, & contrà? Hausit quædam Metaphysica, ergo totam Metaphysicam, cui nihil de suo addidit, ergo & Physicam. Accepit Physica nonnulla, ergo totam Physicam eodem modo. Denique dogma de motu terræ ob hanc vel istam causam facile deperdi potuit, ubi adfuit, ergo adfuit. Quis ita ratiocinatur, &c.* Exam. Gener. p. 131.

— — — Nemo, herculè nemo,

Perf.

nisi juvenis Philosophiæ professor idémque Doctor Theologiæ *S. A.* qui Histrionem ludicrum Mimúmve mavult agere quàm serium solidorum argumentorum examinatore contra ac in Titulo libri sui videtur professus. Vis meæ argumentationis in hoc quarto Paragrapho breviter hæc est. Metaphysica saltem quædam à *Judæis* hausit *Pythagoras*, (fatente ipso *S. A.* testimoniis antiquorum convicto) ergo ea ipsa præsertim quæ *Textui Mosaico*, tam pulchrè convenire deprehendimus. Quis enim nisi planè vecors qui ulla hausisse concesserit, quin ista hausisse lubentissimè sit agniturus? Deinde cum sapientissimus omnium Philosophantium perinde atque Religioni addictissimus habitus sit *Pythagoras*, testante *Josepho*, incredibile est opportunitatem nactus ex consuetudine cum *Judæis* de rebus *Physicis* etiam sciscitandi, ut eam negligeret, nec selectiora saltem quæque Theoremata *Physica* veteris *Cabbala* à *Judæis* hauriret, cum & vir pius esset & egregii acuminis, adeò ut in ipso nullum esset obstaculum sive impedimentum. Si verò ulla istiusmodi selectiora Theoremata *Physica* à *Judæis* acceperit, quàm absurdæ ac ridiculæ scrupulositatis est dubitare an ea acceperit, quæ maxime præclara sunt *Divinæque* traditione maxime digna; inter quæ excellit *verum Mundi Systema*, quod motum *Terræ* circa Solem necessariò complectitur; &, quod caput rei est, quanquam inopinato quidem, firmo tamen certoque artificio, *Textui Mosaico* facillimè applicatur, arctissimèque adhæret; || Quemadmodum in Explicatione quarti Diei fusè demonstravimus. Denique Philosophicus Theologicusque hic *Mimus* est non ego, qui sic argumentatur: Dogma hoc de motu *Terræ* certas quasdam causas deperdi potuit ubi adfuit, ergo adfuit. Ego enim objectioni tantummodo per anticipationem occurro, non novo utor argumento. Et postquam firmissimis argumentis doctrinam de motu terræ apud *Judæos Pythagoræ* temporibus viguisse demonstrâssem, causas aperio cur istud dogma apud *Judæos* postea interciderit, nè quis suspicetur istam opinionem nunquam extitisse apud *Judæos*, qui jam non extat. Quid autem hoc est nisi objectionem anticipare, non autem novum adhibere argumentum, quo probem, quod satis probatum erat antea? || Vid. 3. Cap. 5. sect. 7, 8.

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Exam. Gener. &c.
p. 132.

Manifestum enim est ex libro Jetzirah Judæos Triunitatem Divinitatis, Fateor, heic inquit S. A. si ad hoc mysterium quævis Triunitas sufficit, Judæos Cabbalistas & Pythagoram hanc quoque credere. TERNARIUS enim istis & huic MYSTICUS est. Sed si Triunitas, (quâ voce me dicit uti) trium Personarum in una Essentia intelligitur, ab istis æquè negatur hodièdum ac huic incognita fuit. An Cabbalista & Pythagoras Trinitatis Mysterium eodem planè modo intellexerint, quo nunc dierum Scholastici, nihil refert quantum ad vim nostræ argumentationis. Si Pythagoras pariter ac Judæi Cabbalista Triunitatem Divini Numinis tenuerint, satis magnum indicium est, quandoquidem Pythagoras versatus est cum Judæis, eum ab ipsis, hoc quale quale sit Mysterium hausisse. Qui unicus est argumenti mei scopus. Attamen profectò ea ipsa quæ extant in libro Jetzirah, quæque hîc profert ipse S. A. de Trinitate, doctrinam innuunt Christianæ valdè confimilem. Nam כתר seu Corona, חכמה Sapièntia, & בינה Intelligentia, appellantur נ מוחות tres Mentes, vel Medullæ seu Cerebella, & dicuntur uniri בנקורה in Centro uno. Quàm parùm, obsecro, hoc (rectè intellectum & Symbolico Cortice exutum) à Christiano Trinitatis Mysterio abest? Noli enim מוחות cerebella aut medullas interpretari, (quod insulsum esset sic intelligere) sed Mentes, & tres Personas habemus. Ecquid enim intelligere potest nec tamen esse Persona? Tres igitur personas habemus in Divino Numine. Sed unam Essentiam requirimus. Noli centrum unum quo uniuntur hæc tres Mentes, Mathematicè intelligere, sed Symbolice & Metaphysicè, & unam statim Essentiam deteges, cùm Centrum summæ & maximè indivisibilis unionis unitatisve sit Symbolum. Distinctæ igitur Mentes quæ sic uniuntur unam unitissimam faciunt Essentiam, summæve simplicitate Essentiali unam, nè S. A. Essentiæ unitatem deesse conqueratur. Sed unico Teste nitor eoque dubio. Quàm minimè dubii sensûs sit hic Testis jam vidimus, & quanquam unicus sit, apud Judæos tamen magni æstimatur. Sed addo porrò aliis in libris occurrere mentionem Sephirotharum, & tribus primis Divinitatem ascribi, reliquas descendere ad Creaturas; de quibus rebus cùm alibi mihi dicendum sit, in præsens quicquam superaddere supersederem, nisi me abstinere nequeam quin quæ apud eruditissimum veri Systematis Mundi Intellectualis Authorem de Trinitate Samothracica occurrunt huc accumulem. Bella enim sunt & quæ Doctrinæ Cabbalisticæ antiquitatem mirificè suffulciunt. Neque enim dubitandum est, quin decem Sephirotharum Mysterium simul cum Divini Numinis Triunitate olim esset propagatum. Breviter igitur rem sic accipe: In Templo Capitolino tria facella fuere sub uno tecto contenta, in quibus collocata sunt Simulachra, in facello ad dextram, Minervæ simulachrum, in facello ad sinistram, Junonis, in medio autem Jovis. Trinitatem hanc Capitolinam, Divinarum Hypostaseon Trinitatem significare, præeunte hac in re G. J. Vossio, eruditissimus Author dubitat affirmare. Nec id quidem temerè cùm tria hæc Capitolina Numina dicuntur primitus in Italiam ex Phrygia per Trojanos vecta, prius verò in Phrygiam ex Samothrace per Dardanum, idque octingentis ferè annis post Noachi Diluvium, referente Eusebio. Hos tres Deos, (quippe per quos penitus spiramus animique rationem possidemus, ut vult Macrobius, vel quòd Dii sunt, qui sunt intrinsecus atque in intimis penetralibus Cœli, ut vult apud Arnobium Varro) Latini Penates

tes appellârunt, *Samothraces* verò καθεύς, quam vocem *Varro*, *Divos* potes, i. e. Deos potentes interpretatur. Quæ vox *Cabiri* cum eadem plane sit quæ Hebraica כבירי justam dat suspicandi occasionem, inquit eruditissimus Author, antiquam Traditionem trium Divinarum Hypostaseon (quam, ait, apud Græcos, *Orpheum*, *Pythagoram* & *Platonem* certissimum est tenuisse, & fortean *Ægyptios* & *Persas*) suam Originem ab Hebræis duxisse. Et certè prima Hypostasis *Jupiter*, (qui in medio intelligi potest non aliter collocatus quam *Kether* in Tabulis Cabbalisticis, hoc est cum quadam Superioritate) sive *Jovis* Pater, est planè *Jehovah* Pater. Ut verò *Jehovah* Filius in sacris Scripturis *Sapientia* dicitur & secunda *Sephirah* הַבְּמָה, ità secunda Hypostasis hîc dicitur *Minerva* ex *Jovis* Cerebro nata. Qui *Divinus* igitur est *Logos*, (quem *Platonici* Νῆν appellunt) sive æterna *Sapientia*. Ipsèque *Varro* *Minervam* eam esse statuit in qua *Idea* & *exempla rerum* essent; quod optimè convenit *Divino Logo*, utpote in quo *Rationes* *Ideæque* rerum omnium continentur. *Juno* verè, quippe *Amor* & *Delicium Jovis*, etiam secundum *Vossium* haud incommodè respondet *Divino Spiritui*. Et ἡ ἑστὴ Græcè, quæ est *Juno*, quemadmodum alibi moneo, dicitur ubi ἑστὴ, qui character peculiaris est apud Christianos, *Spiritus sancti*. Uxor autem dicitur *Jovis*, quòd innumeram ex ea *Vitarum* *Animarumque* tum hominum tum *Deorum*, hoc est *Angelorum*, genuerit prolem. Quam ob causam etiam tertia *Sephirah* dicitur בִּנְיָהּ quasi בִּנְיָהּ אֵלֶיךָ ædificavit (perinde atque אֵלֶיךָ intellexit) unde & בִּנְיָהּ filius. Et totus quidem *Mundus* apud *Ægyptios* & *Platonicos*, *Filius Dei* dicitur, ut qui immediatus partus est *Junonis* sive tertiæ Hypostasis. Unde & meritò dicitur *Jovis* Uxor, rectèque בִּנְיָהּ etiam ad בִּנְיָהּ alludere censetur.

Et quod ad Unitatem hujus Trinitatis *Samothracia* attinet, nisi *Juno* & *Jupiter* unum quid essent *Essentiâ*, non autem separati, *Deus* non esset ἀρρενὸς θεός, (*Minerva* enim nisi *Grammaticè* nihil θεογονία sonat, ut nec הַבְּמָה apud *Cabbalistas* quæ *Pater* dicitur ut בִּנְיָהּ *Mater*) contrà ac tenuerunt omnes *Myfici Theologi* & eorum quidem sensu omnes debent tenere. Quippe quum hoc ἀρρενὸς θεός Symbolum tantum sit *Divinæ* virtutis omnia ex se procreantis, quo sensu *Juno* *Mundi* genitrix, rectè perhibetur *scæmina* seu *Uxor Jovis*. Quamobrem *Jupiter* nullam habere potest *Junonem* ipsi non ὁμείσιον, alioqui non esset ἀρρενὸς θεός, contrà ac *Orphica* statuit *Theologia*.

Id certè majoris difficultatis est, *Orphicam* hanc sive *Thraciam* conciliare cum *Samothracia*, *Cabbalæ* Hebraica. *Trinitas* enim *Orphica* non est *Jupiter*, *Minerva*, *Juno*, sed *Phanes*, *Uranus*, & *Cronus*, qui *Pater* est *Jovis*. Sed ut breviter hunc nodum solvam, Primò notandum est *Phaneta* hunc, *Parmenidis* essen εἷς ὅν, quod Hebraicè sonaret, *Jehovah*, hoc est, *Jovis* vel *Jupiter*. Quæ Hypostasis *Parmenidea* dicitur τὸ πᾶν, ὅτι πάντα διακεκρυμμένως ἐμφαίνει ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, utl monet *Simplicius*. Unde manifestum est *Jehovam* Patrem apud *Orpheum* significantissimo vocabulo appellari *Phaneta*.

Porro, cum nec secundam nec tertiam Hypostasim ἐμφαίνειν, hoc est, edere valeret, nisi easdem in se aliquo modo haberet, itaque duas alteras Hypostasies in se censetur aliquo modo continere, i. e. συνηρημένως & ἡνωμένως, ut idem loquitur *Simplicius*: non per modum plurium Hypostaseon, sed virtute potius ac potestate. *Phanes* igitur prima Hyposta-

sis est, ipseque *Jehovah* Pater qui dicitur & *Uranus* & *Cronus*. Quemadmodum in Tabula secunda Cabbalistica, secunda tertiæque *Sephirah* in prima *Sephirah* continentur ἡνωμένως, quanquam postea exhibentur διακεκριμένως. Neutra autem Trinitas nec *Orphica* nec *Cabbalistica* sic exhibita, Trinitas est sed simplex Hypostasis, *Kether* nempe Cabbalistica, *Phanes* Orphicus, *Platonicum* Τ'αγαθὸν & τὸ ἐν *Parmenideum*. quod & τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αἰτιον appellat *Simplicius*. Ex quo & Νῆς Δημιουργὸς emergit, Πρωτόγονος Θεὸς apud *Orpheum*, ac secunda proinde Hypostasis, qui & Δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς tum ab *Orpheo* tum à *Platone* celebratur, ut refert *Proclus*.

Unde tandem fati liquet Theologiam *Thracicam* cum *Samothracica* sive *Hebraica* optimè consistere. Cum enim *Phanes*, *Uranus* & *Cronus* eadem Hypostasis sit, ὁ Δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς, *Jupiter* Opifex, planè filius est *Croni* sive *Saturni*, quemadmodum vulgò celebratur; cùmque hic Δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς propriè sit, Νῆς rectè respondet *Minerva* in Trinitate *Samothracica*, & τῇ הכמה secundæ *Sephiræ* in *Cabbala* Judaica. Utque *Kether* Summitas est in ista Triade Judaica, ità Κεῖνός haud ineptè existimari potest τὸ ἀκρον τῆς νῆς, quod & alibi moneo.

Ut summatim igitur dicam, Prima Hypostasis, qui est *Jupiter* sive *Jehovah* Pater, *Phanes* dicitur quatenus πάντα ἀφ' ἐαυτοῦ ἐκφαίνει, juxta Magicum illud sive Chaldaicum Oraculum.

Εἰςὶ πάντα πνεῦς ἐνδὲς ἐκγεαῶτα.

Omnia ab uno Igne producta sunt. Dicitur verò *Uranus* quatenus ipse est hic Ignis. *Uranus* enim Ignem significat ab ὕλη, cùm reliqua pars vocis terminatio tantum sit nec quicquam significet. Qui quidem Ignis sive *Uranus* tanquam prior naturâ rectè respondet Νόῳ sive Λόγῳ secundæ Hypostasi, ut Ignis, Luci. ὁ δὲ λόγος φῶς, inquit *Plotinus*. Denique Κεῖνός dicitur vel tanquam ἀκρον τῆς νῆς (tota enim Trinitas est unum τὸ θεῖον) quasi ἀκρόνοτος dictus esset, vel tanquam quippiam existens ὑπὲρ τῆς νῆς, vel ἐπέκεινα τῆς νῆς, ut *Pfellus* loquitur. Πλὴν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ τῆς αἰσθητοῦς ἐπέκεινα. Κρείων δὲ παντὸς καὶ νοῦ καὶ ῥύματος. Cujus sanus sensus esse potest, Primum Principium nullâ Intellectuali Ideâ attingi posse, sed tantummodo Vitali. Atque ob hanc rationem *Saturnus* rectè dicitur à Ἥρας, latuit, quod nulli Intellectuali Ideæ sive notioni *Cronus* hic sive *Saturnus* expositus sit, sed tantum Vitali sive Δυνάμει ἀγαθοειδεῖ. Ac proinde respondet hic *Cronus* sive *Saturnus* tertiæ Hypostasi, τῇ ἐν λόγῳ ζωῇ, ut *Johannes* loquitur, vel τῇ θεῖᾳ ψυχῇ, ut *Platonici*. Τῇ Ἥρᾳ, *Junoni* tertiæ *Samothracicæ* Trinitatis Hypostasi, Amori ac Delicio *Jovis*, cui Spiritum S. vitæ fontem *J. Vossius* comparat, ut qui τὸ ἀγοδοειδὲς τῆς ψυχῆς in animabus purificatis excitat, quò profundum hoc & absconditum Bonum suo modulo attingant. Quodsi Κεῖνον ad Κρόνον alludere malles, tum est ille simplicissimus & simul coexistens Αἰὼν qui necessariò in primo Principio continetur, cujusque, ἡ θεῖα ψυχὴ (sive *Juno* uxor *Jovis*) in Mundi partu Tempus peperit Imaginem. Tam parùm infirmat *Orphica* sive *Thracica* Trinitas *Samothracica* sive *Capitolina* Trinitatis concinnitatem ac fidem.

Et certè æquum est cum *Cabiri Samothraces* & antiquiores sint & ab *Hebraica* Origine ducti, ut ad eorum legem Trias *Orphica* expendatur, & non vice versâ. Majorque forsân quibusdam videbitur congruentia si Φάων, Οὐρανός, & Κρόνος idem prorsus habeantur quod Τ'αγαθόν, Νῆς sive

Λόγος,

Λύγθ, & Ψυχά. ita ut Ταλαδν, δάνης vocetur, ut qui πάντα ἀπ' ἐαυτοῦ ἐκφαίνει. Λύγθ verò 'Ουγενός, ut qui sit τὸ πρῶτον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκφανόμενον, primum ex eo elucens, quatenus ab אור Lux deduci possit perinde atque ab אהרן Ignis. 'Ο δ' Λύγθ φθ, ut supra monui. Et Ψυχά denique κένθ, ut quæ Mundi genetrix sit, & simul cum Mundo, Temporis & evolutionis Seculorum. Atque sic exactè respondebit Orphica Trinitas Samothracica; Phanes, Uranus & Cronus, Jovi, Minervæ & Junoni. Atque equidem probabile est Trinitatis Orphica Nomine pro more Symbolorum Cabbalisticorum, quæ res plures sæpe sub uno Titulo condunt, utrumque Mysterium in se continere. Vide *Verum Systema Mundi Intellectualis*, lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 27. & sect. 17. Et *Macrobius Saturnalis*, lib. 3. cap. 4.

Sect. 5. Οὐ καλῶς φορεῖται τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, &c. Hæc S. A. Numæ me tribuere *Exam. Gener.* ait tanquam Principium, cum Plutarchi sint, rationem suo iudicio red- *P. 134.* dentis cur Numæ voluerit libros suos secum sepeliri. Sed obsecro te, mi Andreæ, quomodo rationem facti Numæ reddere potuit Plutarchus, nisi ipse Numæ eam rationem sectatus esset? Ipsaque fuisset Numæ opinio? Quam & Pythagoreorum fuisse statim subdit Plutarchus, innuens illorum perinde fuisse atque ipsius Numæ. Quod autem libros scriptos haberet Numæ, cum sententia illius de orali Traditione minimè pugnat, cum oralis illa Traditio monumenta scripta non excludat, sed tantum nè Mysteria in vulgus emanent, præcavet. Et sapientes Judæorum modernos etiam nunc curare, ut scripta secretioris Cabbalæ secum sepeliantur, à fide digno Authore accepi.

Numæque Pompilii præceptor dicitur, non Græcus quidem, &c. In hunc *Exam. Gener.* locum S. A. admodum oscitanter sic animadvertit. Quod enim ille *P. 135.* Plutarchum tradere putabat, id is negat haud obscure, vel saltem ceu dubium recenset, uti totus contextus arguit. Egone verò hinc Plutarchum affirmare aio præstantiorem aliquem Pythagorâ Numæ fuisse præceptorem? Quinimò tantum in genere sic dici innuo. Minimèque omnium sine causa dictum esse satis patet, cum Pythagoram Samium præceptorem ejus fuisse impossibile sit. Nec omnino negat Plutarchus talem Barbarum ei præceptorem esse potuisse, putà Judæum. Et si Pythagoram illum Spartiaten ei fuisse præceptorem concederetur, ad originem rursus Judæicam res tandem reduceretur.

Nam Sabini colonia erant Lacedæmoniorum prout Plutarchus affirmat. Non affirmat Plutarchus, inquit S. A. Sabinos (unde Numæ oriundus) coloniam esse Lacedæmoniorum, sed narrat Sabinos id velle ac jactare. Σαβίνοι δ', inquit, βέλονται Λακεδαιμονίων ἐαυτοὺς ἀπείκους εἶναι. Quasi verò βέλονται, [jactant] significet, non autem [volunt] i. e. statuunt μετὰ βελήν, post maturam deliberationem examinationemve determinant ac pronunciant. Ità & βέλονται & Latinam vocem Velle sæpissimè significare notissimum est. Et in hoc ipso loco sic significare planè constat ex eis quæ occurrunt apud Plutarchum in vita Romuli. Ubi de Sabinis sic scribit. Οἱ δ' Σαβίνοι πολλοὶ μὲν ἦσαν καὶ πολεμικοὶ, κώμας δ' ὥκυν ἀτειχίστους ὡς θεοῦ κλοναὶ αὐτοῖς μέγα φρονεῖν καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποίκους εἶναι. Hinc apertè affirmat ipse Plutarchus Sabinos coloniam esse Lacedæmoniorum.

Ipsi Lacedæmonii à Judæis erant oriundi, &c. Ad quæ S. A. Fuerunt, inquit, isti & Judæi συγγενεῖς, sed ἐκ γένους Ἀβραάμ, ex stirpe Abrahami, ut in libro Macab. legitur, vel ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας Ἀβραάμ οἰκιστῶν ex domo Abrahami, uti Josephus Antiquit. lib. 12. cap. 15. Quis verò hinc colligat Lacedæmonios

fuisse Judæos, &c. Nemo quidem quod ex Tribus *Judæ* oriundi sint, quod *Judæi* propriè appellentur, sed quod in genere ex nobili stirpe *Judæorum* sint prognati, quorum pater erat *Abrahamus*. Quod satis nostro proposito quadrat, cum ex suprâ dictis abundè constet *Abrahamum* eandem quam *Moses* habuisse *Cabbalam*, & vi illius Divinitus traditæ Sapientiæ Polytheismum & Idololatriam penitus subvertisse. Sed addo porro ex ista generaliori cognatione occasionem datam fuisse quâ consuetudinem haberent cum *Judæis* propriè sic dictis, quemadmodum constat ex literis *Arei Lacedæmoniorum* Regis & *Jonathanis* Pontificis *Judæorum*. Quod verò insuper urget *S. A.* *Quis hinc propagatam cum genere Abrahami disciplinam inferat quin liceat pari fide omnium Mortalium religionem ad Instituta Noachi revocare*, inscitè id profectò imperitèque objicitur. Neque enim par est utrobique ratio. Annon is qui sic argumentaretur; Illud institutum quod apud solos *Noachi* posteros reperitur, est Institutum *Noachicum* quod ipse *Noachus* tradidit; sed hoc vel illud Institutum apud solos *Noachi* posteros reperitur, Ergo, &c. Annon ille, inquam, qui sic argumentaretur, omnibus se deridendum propinaret? Quippe quod *Noachi* posteri totum humanum genus post Diluvium complectuntur. Si quis verò sic ratiocinaretur; Illud dogma quod apud solos *Abrahami* posteros aut apud eos qui illud ab ipsis acceperint reperitur, est dogma *Abrahamicum*; Sed dogma de motu Terræ apud solos *Abrahami* posteros aut apud eos qui ab ipsis illud acceperint reperitur, Ergo dogma est *Abrahamicum*; Genuinum primo aspectu solidumque appareret argumentum, nullòque modo ridiculum aut distortum. Neque enim vis nostri argumenti in eo consistit, quod universum cum genere *Abrahami* disciplina illius propagata esset, sed quod quædam dogmata apud *Abrahami* posteros solos eòsve saltem qui ea ab illius posteris acceperint reperiuntur, ac proinde ad *Abrahami Cabbalam* debent referri. Qua de re mox plura.

SECT. 6. *Νῦμας ὃς λέγει ὅτι τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἱερὸν, &c.* In hunc locum *S. A.* hæc objicit, *Plutarchi* inquit, *verba sunt, λέγει, aiunt, ferunt. Quis autem ignorat multa ferri quo nudâ conjecturâ nituntur?* Perquam frigide profectò ac jejune; præsertim hoc in loco, ubi ipsius rei natura communi famæ consentit, ut *Plutarchi* calculum omittam. Templi forma talis, Ignis in medio ita situs, tantæque Religione à Vestalibus custoditus nè extingueretur, ac si paris momenti esset atque Solis in medio Mundo extinctioni præcautio, omniâque ita planè concinnata tanquam si datâ operâ systema Mundi *Pythagoricum*, Templum hoc ritusque imitarentur, & communis insuper addita fama illud ipsum *Numa* institutum fuisse; & tamen hæsitat dubitatque *S. A.* an ita prorsus se res habeat. At quid ita obsecro? Nempe quod idem *Plutarchus* 18 Quæst. Roman. hanc dat causam cur *Numa* à Januario novum Annum auspicatus sit, quia tum Sol progrediendi fine facto revertitur, & ad nos cursum reflectit, &c. quasi hîc assereret *Plutarchus Numam* Solem non Terram moveri censuisse. Cum tamen *Plutarchus* heic tantum intendat causam reddere innovationis *Numæ* circa Anni initium, quæ perinde valet, sive Sol seu Terra moveatur, atque hinc communi loquendi formâ usus est non *Pythagoricâ* verève *Philosophicâ*.

Sed & ipsum *Andreaden* tandem hujusmodi cavillationum pudet, conceditque *Numam* motum Terræ credidisse; sed cætera quæ afferimus, eundem

eundem nequaquam religione *Judaicâ* imbutum, nedum fuisse *Judeum* evincere. Simulachra è Templis eliminâsse præter *Plutarchum* Doctores etiam Christianos, *Clementem Alexandrinum*, *Eusebium*, *Cyrillum*, & *Clementem* saltem id eum fecisse ἐν τῇ Μωσαϊκῇ ἀφελιδίᾳ affirmare concedit, nec tamen fidem ei adhibet *Andreades*, quippe *Clemente* (quem ni- Pag. 88.
hilominus alibi non *Hieronimi tantum* iudicio sed aliorum quoque omnium eruditissimum, in cujus libris nihil indoctum, nihil non ex media Philosophia depromptum, asserit) longè longèque nasutior. Sed & explicitam rationem profert suæ incredulitatis, *Numam scilicet non eliminâsse omnia simulachra*, sed vetuisse ἀνθρωποειδῆ καὶ ζωόμορφον εἰκόνα θεῷ νομιζέειν, ea tantum submovisse quæ Imaginem Dei referre prætenderent, populumque ad cultum pellicerent *Idololatricum*. Quod magis exactè *Judaicum* est, cum & aliquas Imagines ipsi *Judei* in Templo tolerarent.

Cæterum ad hanc Religionis castitatem pervenisse *Pompilium* vult ex solo lumine Naturæ, neque enim quicquam majus præstitisse, quam quod in cultu sui *Mithræ* præstiterunt *Persæ* qui ab Imaginibus in sacris abstinerunt. Immo perpetuum istum Ignem Vestæ sacrum cum *Persarum* Igne sacro & æterno convenire, cui Πυρρα erant dicata. Multum autem heic falli videtur vir eruditus *S. A.* dum adeò extenuat factum *Numæ* qui tam castam Religionem, aliis circumcirca gentibus *Idololatriæ* crassoque Imaginum cultui deditis, instituit. Quod nunquam fecisset, nisi Divinæ alicujus Traditionis autoritate fuisset suffultus. Quam a *Persis* accepisse perquam ridiculum est augurari, quippe quorum *Mithras* nihil aliud nisi Sol visibilis erat, cui dicata erant πυρρα. Ignisque tanquam illius Imago ab eis cultus. Ignis verò *Vestalis* à *Pompilio* institutus cum Templo rotundo, Symbolum duntaxat erat *Universi* cum Sole in medio posito (quod augustius illud Dei Templum est.) Deus verò *Numæ Pompilii*, non Sol ut *Persis*, sed Deus verus & invisibilis, Mundi Solisque Creator. Hinc nulla in Templo *Numæ* Imago Dei, visibilis, quippe cum ipse invisibilis sit; sed Templum tantum artificiosum visibile, augusti illius Templi visibilis in medio Ignem etiam habentis, nempe Solem, haud inconcinnum imitamentum.

Atque hinc verum esse sensum Templi *Numæ*, Libri cum ipso sepulti & postea effossi & combusti egregiè profectò arguunt. Nam *Physicas* August. De Civitat. Dei, lib. 7. c. 35. sacrorum causas eos continuasse apud *Augustinum* subinnuit *Varro*. Rationes igitur Rotunditatis Templi sitisque Ignis inextincti in medio eos complexos esse verisimilimum est. Quam meam conjecturam abunde postea confirmabunt quæ apud *Plinium* occurrunt, *Histor. Natural.* lib. 13. cap. 13. Illi enim *Cassius Hemina* apertè dicit eos libros doctrinam Philosophiamque *Pythagoricam* continuasse, & ob id ipsum jussu *Q. Petilii* tum Prætoris combustos esse. Idemque ferè affirmat *C. Piso Censorinus*, nisi quòd innuit libros partim legem *Pontificalem* partim Philosophiam *Pythagoricam* complexos, nempe Philosophiam *Pythagoricam* similem. *Pythagoras* enim *Samius Numæ* plus centum annis junior erat. Antias denique libros qui legem *Pontificalem* Latine, qui Theoremata *Philosophica* continebant Græcè scriptos tradit. Ex quibus haud temerè quis collegerit *Philosophica* Theoremata *Pythagorica* fuisse, i. e. Philosophiæ *Pythagoricæ* tunc sic dictæ conformia, quæ necessariò motum *Terræ* complectebantur, quippe Theoremata fuisse *Physica* ex *Varrone* apud *Augustinum* docemur. Dein, Eadem *Pythagorica* Theoremata Græcè, quanquam

quam ante *Pythagoræ* tempora, scripta fuisse. Et ob hæc denique ipsa Theoremata Libros *Numæ* fuisse combustos. Hæc itaque Antiquitatis monumenta non solum evincunt Templum *Numæ*, Mundani Systematis *Pythagorici* Symbolum fuisse, sed istud Mundi Systema cognitum fuisse ante tempora *Pythagoræ*. Inventum autem fuisse *Numæ* minimè est credibile, sed à *Græcis* eum accepisse, cum *Græcè* scripta essent ea Theoremata. Porro causam genuinam nobis indicant, cur jussu *Q. Petilii* ob hæc Theoremata Libri *Numæ* combusti essent, nempe quod vera illa & antiqua Physiologia ab *Abrahamo* olim & accepta & tradita, universam Idololatriam falsaque Numina Gentium uno quasi ictu, quemadmodum supra monuimus, è medio tolleret. Cum igitur post tot annos à *Numæ Pompilii* morte elapsos *Romanorum* Religio in multiplices Idololatrias degenerasset, cumque Physiologia *Pompiliana*, istas omnes, semel detecta, everfura esset, libros *Numæ* tanquam profanos & impios & Religioni *Romanorum* perniciosos comburi jusserunt, nè universus superstitionis status ruinas ageret, cum ingenti damno Sacerdotum, nec mediocri forsan Reipublicæ periculo.

Græcum denique aliquem ab *Abrahamo* oriundum, cum Physiologia illa *Abrahamica* *Græcè* scripta esset in libris *Numæ*, illi Præceptorum fuisse verisimillimum est. *Græcos* autem *Lacedæmonios* fuisse notissimum est, ut & *Pythagoram* quendam *Lacedæmonium* *Numæ* coætaneum cum *Numæ* consuetudinem habuisse & consilia communicasse, ipsumque adeo *Numam*, quippe *Sabinum* fuisse etiam *Lacedæmonium*, *Lacedæmonios* verò ipsos *Abrahamo* esse oriundos supra notavimus. Unde minimè mirum Physiologiam *Abrahamicam* in libris *Numæ* reperiri, filii utique *Abrahami*, dogmaque proinde de motu Telluris esse *Judaicum*, quod oportebat demonstrare. Vel breviter sic: Systema Mundi *Pythagoricum* vulgò dictum, arctissimâ congruitate, ut in *Cabbalæ Philosophicæ* Defensione probavimus, Textui *Mosaico* convenit. Idemque Systema nusquam apud ullos, nisi qui aut cum *Judeis* versati sint, aut qui eorum discipuli essent qui cum eis sint versati, ut *Pythagoras Samius* & *Pythagorici*, aut cum *Judeis* aliquâ cognatione conjuncti fuerint, ut *Pythagoras Spartiates* aliive *Lacedæmonii* ipsèque adeo *Numa*, hætenus repertum est; ergo dogma illud aliud esse non potest quàm *Judaicum*, parsque antiquæ *Abrahamicæ* sive *Mosaicæ Cabbalæ*. Ecquid esse potest magis luculentum ullius controversæ veritatis indicium?

Et tamen haud mediocre robur hisce addit Vestimentorum *Aaronicorum* consideratio, quæ cum significantissimum sint Mundani Systematis *Pythagorici* symbolum, perspicuum simul indicium sunt dogma hoc fuisse primitus *Judaicum*. Vestimentorum Interpretationem nihil opus est hic repetere. Adjiciam tantum supra dictis, etiam colores *Pallii* & *Stolæ occellatæ* cum hoc Mundi Systemate mirificè convenire. Pallium enim quod Planetarum est sive Terrarum in *Æthere* delatarum Regio, coloris est *Hyacinthini*, è rubro nempe in cæruleum vergentis vel vice versâ. Ubi *rubedo* vim igneam caloris Solis propter suam proximitatem, quæ hisce terris ad fructus maturandos, crassaque corpora Terrestrium Animalium vivificanda, necessaria est, subindicat. Cum verò sit Atmosphaera caliginosa in omnibus hisce Planetis sive Terris, (ut Noctium Umbrarumve vicissitudines ac Nubium taceam) adeo ut Lux pura adeo ac perpetua esse non possit, additur tinctura cærulea admixta,

tan-

tanquam ad nigredinem tenebrasque aliquantum accedens, quibus duobus coloribus Lux cœlestis pura ac candida mitisque ac placida, minui paululum intelligatur Incolis Terrarum, & quasi aut efferari subinde aut obscurari. *Stola* verò *ocellata* quæ ultra hanc Regionem Planetarum quaquaversum extenditur, *candida* est perinde atque *ocellata*, hoc est, *purâ* consistens *luce*, cum ubique multò remotior sit à Sole, nec *Igni torrido*, nec *vaporibus umbrisve obscura*.

————— Ἀλλὰ μάλ' αἶθρη
πεπλάτῃ ἀννέταλ' λευκὴ δ' ἀναδεδρομένη αἴγλη.

Albus candidusve splendor totas illas Regiones percurrit. Quod cum stola hac ocellata candida optimè convenit.

————— Semp̄erque innubilus Æther
Integit, & largè diffuso lumine ridet;

quemadmodum & canit *Lucretius* Græcum illum Poetam imitatus.

C H A P. VII.

1. *The Third Objection taken from the Heterogeneousness of the Exposition of the First Day's Creation to all the rest, it alone being Symbolical.*
2. *The Answer to the Objection.* 3. *That the Description of the Earth, in the First Day, intimates a Symbolical sense thereof; And how there is the same Idea in vulgar phancies of Light or Day and of Heaven.*
4. *That Heaven in the First Day signifies the Immaterial Orders of Beings, expressly proved out of Origen.* 5. *The same farther confirmed out of Parmenides the disciple of Diochates the Pythagorean, whom it is probable to have been acquainted with the Text of Moses.* 6. *That the Jewish Rabbins also give their suffrage thereto.* 7. *Testimony of Scripture, that the Creation of Angels and of the Souls of men is signified by the Light created in the First day.* 8. *That Heaven and Light understood of the Mundus Vitæ do not signify merely Symbolically.* 9. *A further consideration evincing the same Conclusion.* 10. *That whether Heaven and Light signify Symbolically or no, the First Day's work will not be so heterogeneous to the rest, an Evening and Morning being fetched from thence to every Day's Creation.* 11. *That the Metaphysical Hyle in the First day's creation, is not called Earth merely Symbolically, a thing not hard to prove, but needless.*

1. **T**HE Third Objection is against our Exposition of the First Day's work. For they urge, that it is very *Heterogeneal*, and strangely different from the Interpretations of all the rest of the Days, where the things mentioned are not *Symbolical*, but are properly what they are said to be: But *Heaven*, and *Earth*, and *Light*, are not so in the First Day's Creation, but the *Symbols* of something else. Which makes the *Cabbala* go off but harshly, it seeming not all of one piece.

2. But

2. But I answer; The Question is not whether the Interpretation may seem harsh to a nice and squeamish Phancy, but whether it be true: which I think I have produced no mean proofs for already, and must further remind you how many there be that, interpreting the story of *Adam* and *Eve* in *Paradise* literally, do notwithstanding not think it harsh to expound that of the Serpent *symbolically*. But there was also a necessity of speaking of the Creation of *Immaterial* Beings in a *Symbolical* way, *Moses* having a design not to mention any thing hard or subtle in the mere letter of the Text, as is acknowledged by all Interpreters. Neither could there be a *Philosophical* as well as a *Literal Cabbala* without taking this liberty; which ought to be freely granted, no uncertainty or obscurity arising therefrom, by reason of the *Cabbala* of *Numbers* belonging to the *Six Day's* Creation. For that trite Aphorism of the *Pythagoreans*,

——— Ἄριθμὸς ὃς τε πάντ' ἐπέσιξε,

is here fully verified, and was, I suspect, chiefly understood at first of the *Six Days* Works, *That all things were like to, and bore a resemblance of the Number to which they referred*. Whence we may be assured, that *Immateriality* was the work of the *First Day*, a *Monad* or *Unite* being so express a signification of the nature thereof.

|| See *Vatablus* upon the place.

Theodotion also renders it *Emptiness*, and *Nothing*.

3. And that the *Earth* might not break that sense of the *Cabbala*, the description is such as does very naturally favour the *Philosophical* meaning, the Text calling it || *Vacuity*, or *Emptiness* it self, as I have already noted. Nor is it at all harsh, that *Heaven* and *Light* are made *Symbols* of the same thing, not only for those Reasons I have already alledged, which verge more near upon Philosophy, (of which the chiefest is, that *Heaven* or *Aether* is the very body of *Light*, or *Light* it self when duly moved) but also from that notion or Phantasm that naturally arises from the Letter it self, according to the vulgar apprehension of things, who certainly have the same *Idea* in the mind of that *illuminated Concave* which is *Heaven*, that they have of *Day* distinct from the Sun. And there was no visible *Concave* at first but that of *Day*, there being neither Moon nor Stars to enlighten the Night.

|| *Histor. lib. 1. cap. 131.*
* *De lingua Latin. lib. 4.*

And that this conceit of ours is sound, appears further in that *Jupiter* and *Diespiter* are the self-same *Numen* amongst the Heathen. And yet *Jupiter*, that is, *Jovis Pater*, Father *Jovis*, is the convex *Heaven*. Τὸν πάλαι κύκλον τῷ ἑρᾷ Δία καλέουσιν, || *Herodotus* speaks it of the *Persians*. And *Dies Pater*, that is, Father *Dies*, (for, as * *Varro* has interpreted it, it is in the Nominative Case, as in *Marspiter*, *Neptunuspater*, *Januspater*) what can it be but this *illuminated Concavity* or *Convexity*, which is called *Day*, a distinct *Numen* amongst the Heathen, as well as *Night*, who made the notorious *Phanomena* of Nature so many Deities; and *Macrobius* expressly, *Cretenses* Δία ἡμέραν, vocant & *Jovem Salii*, in carmine, *Lucetium*? whence *Dijovis* in all likelihood is the same that *Diespiter*. But we will not dwell upon these toys. It was sufficient to have noted, that *Ὀυρανός* and *Ἡμέρα* are all one in the Heathen Theology with *Zeus*, and therefore all one with one another. It is now more material to consider, that without any light at all there can be no discernment of any thing; and that therefore *Heaven* must be vulgarly

ly conceived under the notion of this *luminous Concavity*, which for the lightfomness thereof, is called *Day*; and for its height and hollownes, (for *Cælum* is as much as *κοῖλον* *hollow*) is termed *Heaven*, and that they are one joint Object, especially in the First Day's Creation; *Heaven* being no where discoverable but in this newly-created *Day*, whole joint appearances made up but one and the same *Luminous Concave*, as I intimated before.

Whence the literal sence of the *First Day's* work, as it is the Symbole or Representation of the Philosophical, is very easy and natural, if you take it thus; namely, That first it is summarily said, *God created Heaven*, (that is, this *Luminous Concave*) and the *Earth*. But this *Earth* was nothing but *Emptiness* and *Vanity*, and *Darkness* was on the face of the *Abyss*, &c. describing thus, First, the condition of the *Earth* more punctually, which is the first part of this *Day's* Creation; but then after that, coming to the other part, he tells us how *God* commanded the *Light* to be made, that is, this *luminous Concave*, *Heaven*, (for they are in *Idea* really the same, as I have said, and therefore the words *Light* and *Heaven* by *Synonyma's* here) and how he called this *Light*, or *Cælum* *luminosum*, *Day*, &c. Which structure and sence of things considered, it cannot but take away all scruple and conceit of any harshness, in making *Heaven* and *Light* symbols of the same thing; namely, of that which the *Platonists* call *Mundus vitæ*, or the *World of Life*, and *Form*.

Nor can it be objected, that this *Literal* sence is incoherent with the *Literal Cabbala* we have framed already, where the *Heaven* is made on the *Second* day, and therefore cannot be literally made in the *First*. For I mean here by the *Literal* sence, not that continued popular sence or *Literal Cabbala*; for that is not supposed the Basis of the Philosophical; (For these three distinct *Cabbala's* have no intended either agreement or disagreement one with another, as having no mutual reference at all, but grow out of the *Letter*, which is common to all three, as three several sorts of Flowers out of one bed of Earth in a Garden.) But by the *Literal* sence here, I understand such a sence as may be made out of the letter qualified and prepared by a skilful hand, for a fit and unforced exhibiting any part of either the *Literal*, peculiarly so called, or else of the *Philosophical* or *Moral Cabbala*; whether this preparation be made by Grammar and Criticism, or else by *Pahntasmatical* or real and true Notion. For the *Letter*, as I said, is common to all three *Cabbala's*, but is to be prepared and fitted in each, not a sence congruous to the series of things in either of the other two; but of those things in one and the same *Cabbala*. Which is a Principle that no man, that well considers, but must acknowledge both rational and necessary.

4. But now, that we have given the right sence of the first Day's Creation in our Philosophical Cabbala, besides what we have produced already, appears further out of || *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Origen*, who, || *Strom. lib. 3.* comparing the *Second* Day's work with the *First*, write thus; *Καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μοναδικῇ συνίστησις ἑξαγὼν ἀδελφόν, καὶ γὰρ ἀγίαν, καὶ φῶς νοητόν· ἐν δὲ τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ τῇ αὐτῇ τῇ ἑξαγὼν ἑξαγὼν διμυρῶν.* Which interpretation || *Origen* follows exactly, || *Homil. in Cap. 1. Genesios.* *Cum antea, saith he, Deus Cælum fecisset, nunc firmamentum facit, id est,*

est, corporeum cælum. Fecit enim cælum prius, de quo dicit, Cælum mihi sedes est. And a little after; Cum enim ea quæ facturus erat Deus ex spiritu constarent & corpore, ista de causa in principio & ante omnia cælum dicitur factum, id est, omnis Spiritualis substantia, super quam velut in throno quodam & sede Deus requiescit. This therefore is that *Mundus vite* which is the highest Throne of God. * Which the *Pythagoreans* also call Ζαῖος πύργος, the Tower of Jupiter, it being his highest habitation, and is also termed his Δημιουργικὴ οὐρα, the external framing of the World, in all the parts of it, being immediately or instrumentally performed by it, as the *Fœtus* is in the womb.

5. According to which sense is that of *Parmenides*, That there are but two Principles, πῦρ καὶ γῆ, which in *Hebrew* would be אור וארץ *Lux* & *Terra*, or (which I have shewn to be the same,) Cælum & Terra; and adds further, Καὶ τὴν μὲν δημιουργικὴν τὰς ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ὄντων, καὶ τὴν ὑπαρχομένην τὸ θεμελιώδες καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, I leave to the ingenious to unriddle from שמים and ארץ, which is ארץ, Heaven and Earth. And for that Riddle which || *Laertius* adds further, * Γένεσιν τε ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρώτων γινώσκειν, αὐτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχοντα τὸ θεμελιώδες καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, I leave to the ingenious to unriddle from שמים and ארץ, and the *Hebraism* of the || article ה' which I have noted, and then to judge in how right a scent of things we have been in the pursuit of the meaning of the *Physical* part of the *Philosophick Cabbala*, and whether *Pythagoras* did not understand things the same way. For this *Parmenides* was a *Pythagorean*, as being an Intimate of one *Dioclates*, a follower of *Pythagoras*: Which *Dioclates*, as *Sotion* writes, was indeed poor, but a singularly-honest and good man; for which reason *Parmenides* adhered so close to him for his society while he lived, and had so great an honour for him, that he built an Ἡρώον, or Chapel, to him when he was dead.

All which Circumstances may justly make a man suspect, that this *Dioclates* was acquainted with the *Jewish Learning*, and the very letter of *Moses*, (as || *Pherecydes Syrus* is also said to have gotten τὰ φοινίκων ἀποκρυφὰ βιβλία, that is, the secret Books of the * *Phenicians* or *Hebrews*) or, if you will, with the *Literal* and *Philosophical Cabbala*. From whence *Parmenides* might take occasion of making that Distribution of Philosophy into such as is accurately and intellectually true, and such as is according to the Appearance of things to the Vulgar. * Διωτὴν τε εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν, καὶ κατὰ δόξαν. The latter of which, were it not in some such respects as I have intimated, would not have been taken notice of by *Parmenides*, for any piece of wisdom or philosophy at all. And that δόξα will signify external Appearance, is plain, in that || *Epicurus* divides that which appears ab extra, into ἐνέργεια and δόξα, and *Democritus* in *Laertius* has defined, ἀρχαὶ εἶναι τῶν ὁλων ἀτίμους καὶ κενόν· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα νομίζονται, δοξάζονται· that is as much as to say, φαίνονται, to be φαινόμενα, or external appearances.

To this πῦρ καὶ γῆ of *Parmenides*, exactly answers that couple of Principles amongst the *Pythagoreans*, φῶς καὶ σκοτός, which plainly point at the *Light*

|| In vita
Parmenidis.

|| Upon vers.
17. chap. 1.
Cabbal. Philo-
soph.

|| See Hesych.
Illustr. in Phe-
recydes.

|| Sext. Em-
piric. advers.
Mathem. i. 7.

Light and Darkneß in the beginning of *Genesis*; the *Pythagoreans* rendering אור *φῶς*, *Parmenides*, πῦρ; and the one calling the *Hyle* ἡ, the other σκότος, but both reflecting on the Text, where *Hyle* is denoted by both those characters. And that *Parmenides* meant not this sensible Earth, is plain out of || *Aristotle*, who says, that *Parmenides* ranked his first Principle *Fire*, αἴτιον δὲ πᾶσι, δάτερον δὲ αἴτιον δὲ μὴ δὲ, such as *Plotinus* describes *Hyle* to be: and *Theodotion* renders תהו ובהו *ἀέρας* καὶ ὕδωρ. But I have run out too far, let us return to *Origen*. || *Metaphys.*
lib. 1. cap. 5.

6. Consonant to that Interpretation of *Origen*, is that general Doctrine of the Jewish Rabbins, *Solium gloriae Dei creatum esse ante creationem Mundi*, as you may see in || *Maimonides*. But that that which is the Throne of God should be called *Heaven*, is no wonder, nothing being more ordinary than the placing of his Throne there. Wherefore, according to the general consent of the Rabbins, there was an *Heaven* made before the Creation of the outward World. And when, I pray you, then should it be made, if not in the first day? or what can be his throne that is said to sit upon the Cherubims, but the Angelical Orders? And that the *Cabbalists* expound the Creation of Heaven to be the Creation of Angels, || *Menasseh Ben Israel* assures us, and alledges the *Targum* upon *Job*, and *Moses Aegyptius* to the same purpose. || *More Ne-
voch. part. 2.
cap. 26.*
|| *De Creat.*
Probl. 25.
sect. 5.

7. But not only *Origen*, *Alexandrinus*, and the Jewish Writers, put in their suffrage for our Interpretation, but, if I be not mistaken, the very Scripture it self; nay I may say, God himself personally in the Scripture. *Job* 38. *Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the Earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. When the Morning-Stars sang together, and all the Sons of God shouted for Joy?* Where what is meant by the *Morning-Stars*, he must be blind that cannot discern from the following *Exegesis*; namely, the *Sons of God*, which is as much as the *Angels*; who are called *Morning-Stars* Symbolically, and in allusion to the *First Day's* Creation, namely, the creation of *Light*, which was the *Morning of the World*, and the Birth of *Spiritual* and *Angelical* Beings. And therefore again, ver. 19, 21. concerning this *First Day's* creation of *Light*, he asketh *Job* another like question; *Where is the way where Light dwelleth? and as for darkneß, where is the place thereof?* alluding certainly to the *Light* and *Darkneß* mentioned in the *First Day*. For thereupon he demands further, *Know'st thou that thou wast then generated or made, and that the number of thy Days is great?* So the learned of the Jews read it, and do, out of this Text, confidently conclude their *Præexistence of Souls*. Which if they do rightly, no question but their Creation is involved in the creation of *Light* in the *First Day's* Work. From these Testimonies I think it is plain enough, that by the Creation of *Heaven* or *Light*, is understood, as *Origen* has ventured to affirm, the Creation of all *Spiritual* Substances.

8. But further, to come nearer to the Objection, I do not conceive it necessary to acknowledge, that *Heaven* and *Light* do signify merely Symbolically, but that the things created the *First* day may be called most truly and properly by those Names, though they were first given to the Material *Heaven* and Visible *Light*: as the words *Spiritus*, *Anima*, and *Ψυχή*, were terms first given to that which is material, meaning thereby a *wast of Air*, *Wind*, or *Breath*; but now signify, and that

E e e e

pro-

|| See *Psycho-*
zoia Cant. 1.
Stanz. 41, 42,
43, 44, 45,
46, 47.

|| *Immortal.*
Book 1. ch. 5,
and 6.

properly and truly, the first of them any *Immaterial substance*, the two latter the *Soul of man*, which is Spiritual and Immaterial. And so it may be with *Heaven* and *Light*, that which is conceived of Heaven, belonging more truly and eminently to the *Mundus Vita*, than to the Material Heaven it self. || For the generations of sublunary things, their Fates and Periods, that vital Influence, and the Measurings of time, I do not doubt but all are more truly, more primarily and properly attributed to the *World of Life*, in which are all the *Seminal Forms* of things, than they are to the corporeal Heaven; and do hugely suspect, though I will not affirm, that the *Lights* of Heaven themselves would not be what they seem to us, let the *Matter* be never so subtile and soundly agitated, were they not actuated also by the *Spirit of Nature*, and became in some sort *Vital* thereby: insomuch that I conceive *Spirit* to be a further illumination of *Light* it self, as when the Soul acts in the eye. Besides, * concerning the promanation and intermixture of the Rays of *Light*, that which is said thereof, is more eminently and perfectly true in the nature of every *particular* spirit, (as I have || elsewhere shown at large) than in *Light* it self. That apprehension also, that *Heaven* is the highest part of the Creation, is not severely and Philosophically true in the material Heaven, it being every where, and the Earth it self a Planet: but it is irrefragably true of this *Heaven* that was created the *First* day; which is also the *inaccessible Light* where he dwells, unto whom the eye of no mortal can reach.

9. Besides all which, There being such a constant and necessary union betwixt the *Aethereal* or *Heavenly Matter*, and the *Mundus Vita* in all the parts thereof wherever they act, in this regard also it is plain, that the terming the First day's work *Heaven* and *Light* is not merely *Symbolical*, but reaches the very nature and property of the things, according as *Virgil* does seriously philosophize in those expressions touching the Souls of men,

Æneid. l. 6.

*Ignæus est ollis vigor, & cælestis origo
Seminibus; quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.*

Whereby he would insinuate, that there is an *igneous, luminous*, or *Aethereal Vehicle* always intimately adhering to the Soul, though it be much flaked and damped with the gross and crude moisture of the Body, during this Earthly Peregrination.

10. And lastly, whether we phansy *Heaven* or *Light* to signify symbolically or no, there will not be that *Heterogeneity* and Difference from other Days Creations, as is conceited; this lightsome Heaven or heavenly Light, being symbolically called the *Morning* of each Day's Creation, as the Material part, or *Passive Principle*, is styl'd the *Evening*. Which *Morning* is always a parcel of that *full Day* which was first created, and is castigated and mitigated by its conjunction with the *dark Matter* into a moderate *Matutine Splendour*, as those several parts of the Matter thus and thus modified, answering to the several Capacities of that *dark Emptiness* and *Vacuity* (which was the *Midnight* opposite to that *full Day*) being raised to an *actual Materiality*, may go
for

for the Evening-Twilight of every Day's Creation : the Possibility of this *external* and *material* Creation, being the *μεσότης* betwixt the *Mundus vite* or *Full day*, and that *Metaphysical Hyle* or *Midnight*, so soon as once its parts have but *material existence*, or exist as to their Matter; as the Dusk of the Evening is the *μεσότης* betwixt Day and Night.

II. And now if we would be so toyishly, or rather tediously curious, we might also go about to prove, that the *Earth* mentioned in the *First* day's Creation, which is nothing but that *Metaphysical Hyle*, ought not to be thought to be so much symbolically as truly and properly so called, * the most peculiar Attributes of the *Earth* being only true in it. For the *Earth* strictly and philosophically considered, is neither the lowest of the Creation, nor immoveable; but this *Metaphysical Earth* is both, as is manifest at first sight, it being the lowest degree and shadow of Being; and * not only immoveable, but undiminishable and unimpairable, as I have already noted. But this is a subject not worth the polishing, the main work of the *First* day being the creating of *Heaven* or *Light*; and the description of the *Earth* there being such as does easily assure the *Philosophick* sense to any that are not over-scrupulous; of which more in the following Chapter: and lastly, it being a matter of no such great consequence, whether *Earth* and *Heaven* and *Light* signify Symbolically or no; seeing that let their signification be what it will, it is, in such sort as I have described, carried down to the work of every day, whereby the whole piece becomes sufficiently homogeneous.

S C H O L I A

In C A P. VII. Sect. 4.

QUEM & Pythagorei etiam Ζανός πύργον, &c. Nempe quando Ζανός πύργος *Monadis* appellatio, ad *Berebith* refertur; quando autem refertur ad *Mercaviam*, τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τετραδὸν significat, primam Triadis *Platonice* Hypostasin.

Sect. 5. Quod tam accuratè respondet Textui Mosaico, ut difficile sit dubitare, &c. Vide duo sequentia Capita, & particularim Caput nonum, Sect. 9.

Γίγνεται τε ἀνθρώπων ὅς τις πρῶτον γενέσθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, &c. Multa quidem in hunc locum objicit vir ingeniosus Philosophiæque *Cartesiane* fati addictus T. B. quæ cum is haud parvam vim habere existimet ad enervandum præclarum hoc *Parmenidis* testimonium, in medium proferam omnia, singulisque ut proposuero statim respondebo.

Primò igitur objicit, Opinionem hanc nusquam nisi hîc apud *Laertium* attribui. Respondeo verò tam planè tamen id fieri & cum ejusmodi circumstantiis, Quòd *Intimus* scilicet fuerit *Diachata* Pythagorei, cui & *Heroon* extruxit defuncto, quòdque duo *Principia* posuerit πῦρ καὶ γῆν, quæ certò Symbolicè intelligenda sunt & ad Textum *Mosaicum* referenda, ut vel hoc singulare Testimonium instar omnium esse possit. Præterea minime mirandum esse, Testimonium hoc nusquam reperiri præter-

quam apud *Laertium* solum, cùm is solus sit apud quem *Vitam Parmenidis* scriptam nunc habemus. Et qui opiniones illius obiter memorant eas ferè tantùm tangunt quæ ad prima illius principia attinent, ut *Aristotelis*; *Plutarchus* verò quanquam res *Physicas* etiam particulares tractasse ait, ut *Terram, Cælum, Solem, Lunam, Stellæ, hominum ortum*, hoc tantùm in genere narrat, particulares modos ac rationes ea tractandi omittens. *Platonis* autem *Parmenides* licet satis prolixus sit, totus tamen est, si rectè memini, *Metaphysicus* aut *Logicus*. Porro si vitam illius ab aliis scriptam haberemus, hocque ejus dogma apud ipsos omissum, non magis probaret illius dogma non fuisse, quàm *Platonem motum Terræ* non tenuisse aut *Divini Numinis Triunitatem*, quod *Laertius* in *Vita Platonis* ea omiserit. Immò verò maximè consentaneum est paucos futuros fuisse qui hoc dogma memoriæ traderent, ut quod tam enorme videretur & tam celebri Philosopho indignum, atque hanc ob causam passuros fuisse intercidere tanquam figmentum aliquod perperam illi attributum. Cùm verò hoc dogma tam plenè hîc & tam firmis suffultum adminiculis nobis occurrat, imbecillum profectò argumentum est quod ab illius omissione apud alios deducitur. Tempus enim Fluvii instar, sicut alicubi ait sapientissimus *Verulamius*, stramina & sarmenta arida secum defert, lapides verò & metalla, (aurum sit licet & argentum) hoc est maximè solida quæque facile patitur subsidere.

Secundò objicit, Si *Parmenides* hanc opinionem tenuit, quòd eum oporteret *Motum Telluris* etiam tenere, Quem tamen non tenuit. Ad quod respondeo, Intimam illius Amicitiam cum *Diochete Pythagoreo* vel solam, admodum probabile efficere, eum *Motum Telluris* tenuisse. Et certè sine ulla magna libertate mihi assumpta emendandi exemplaria, cur non ipse Textus apud *Laertium*, Πρωτῶν ἢ ἑτῶν ἢ γῆν ἀπεφάνηται σφαλερὴν καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κείσθαι, sic corrigi potest? ponendo κινεῖσθαι pro κείσθαι, facile intercidentibus ἢ in literis, & omissione earum haud ità facile observatâ, cùm sensus adhuc integer esset & vulgari Intellectui magis accommodus. Adeò ut motus *Terræ* diurnus saltem, sic agnoscendus sit factâ hac emendatione. Quâ sensus reverà multo solidior fit ac credibilior. Quomodo enim dici potuit *Parmenides* præter rotunditatem *Terræ* primus declarasse eam ἐν μέσῳ κείσθαι, id quod tam vulgare & triviale est ut lippis notum sit & tonforibus? Omnino imperfectus sensus est, si *Parmenidem* celebrem illum Philosophum respiciamus, nisi legatur ἐν μέσῳ κινεῖσθαι. Primùm verò detexisse terram figurâ esse sphericâ & motui accommodâ, & dein reverà motu saltem diurno circa axem suum in medio Mundi moveri, doctrina est *Parmenide* digna. Et si laxetur paululùm sensus τῆς ἐν μέσῳ, (quod & ipse T. B. fieri posse admittit, nisi ipse posuisset obicem) Motus annuus etiam addi possit, & *Terra* adhuc esse quasi in medio *Vorticis*, cùm tota illius orbita puncti instar sit cum toto Vortice comparata. Sed, quod dixi, huic laxationi hîc obicem ponere conatur per citationem quandam ex *Plutarcho*, unde ait manifestò constare *Parmenidem* *Terram* censuisse in centro Mundi libratam, quod tamen nihil facit contra motum illius diurnum, sed

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cap. 15.

διὰ τοῦτο μόνον κενεῖσθαι, μὴ κινεῖσθαι δέ. Quorum verborum hic videtur sensus genuinus, *Parmenides & Democritus ex eo quòd Terra undique equaliter instans, incumbens vel compressa in equilibrio maneat, idcirco concutitur solum* (nempe in Terræ-motibus) *non movetur è loco.* Fateor ἀρεῶσαν legi in meo exemplari. Verum sive per *Divinatoriam* quandam oscitantiam, sive datâ operâ T. B. ἀρεῶσαν verterit in ἐρεῶσαν, videtur sanè prababilior lectio, magisque consentire cum sententia *Democriti*, cap. 13. memoratâ. Ubi dicit, Κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν πλάζεσθαι τὴν γῆν διὰ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ κρυφὰ, πυκνωθεῖσαν ὃ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ βαρυνθεῖσαν κατασῆναι. id est, *Vagari Terram in Principio, ob parvitatem & levitatem, tempore constipatam & consolidatam in debito loco sibi.* Quòd verò fixetur in centro Universi repugnat aliis *Democriti* opinionibus, qui Materiam Universi infinitam credebatur, ac proinde Terram in centro illius fixam credere non potuit. Præterea eum Terram aliter immobilem credidisse quàm ipsi *Cartesiani* eam credunt, non est verisimile, quippe quòd *Pythagoreus* planè fuit *Democritus*, & à *Pythagora* adeò videtur omnia accepisse, in Opere suo *Æquivoco*, quemadmodum refert apud *Laertium Thrasyllus*, ut nisi temporum ratio obstaret illius auditor censeretur posset. *Pythagoreorum* verò quempiam audivisse *Glaucus Rheginus* affirmat, & *Apollodorus Cyzicenus Philolao* in amicitiam venisse notissimo illi motus Telluris assertori. Et *Leucippum* sanè (quem quidem & *Democritum* tanquam duos geminos germanosve Philosophus per omnia consimiles & consentientes perinde ac coætaneos simul ubique ferè nominat *Aristoteles*) τὴν γῆν ὀχεῖσθαι καὶ μέσον δινομένην affirmasse ipse memorat *Laertius*, immò *Democritum* *Leucippi* fuisse auditorem. Ex quibus abunde constare potest nos genuinum loci illius, apud *Plutarchum*, sensum reddidisse, aut *Plutarchum* ipsum, ut est homo haud ità accuratus in tradendis veterum Philosophorum opinionibus, hac in re falsum esse. Tantillum momentum habet iste locus ad probandum *Parmenidem* Telluris motum annum non tenuisse.

Tertiò, urget, Homines dici non posse ἐξ ἡλίου ex Sole materialiter generatos, quia Sol antè definit esse Sol quàm ista fieri possit generatio. Ecquidem hæc Objectio haud exigui momenti foret, si omnis Materia in generatione immediata esset sive proxima, nulla remota. Hac verò ratione nulla corpora dici possent generari aut constitui ex quatuor Elementis, quoniam antequam corpus Animalis putà aut Arboris ex ipsis constitui possit, desinunt esse ista Elementa. Nec pullus dici posset gigni ex crystallino illo liquore quem notavit *Harvæus*, quia definit talis esse liquor, priusquam convertatur in carnem, cartilagine & ossa. Sensus proculdubio, idèmq; admodum facilis ac naturalis istorum verborum γένεσιν τε ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γένεσθαι, hic est: *Generationem Hominum quantum ad materiam ex qua geniti sint, ex aliquo primùm Sole, tanquam ex materia magis remota, factum esse, sed ex Sole hoc in Astrum frigidum sive Terram Planetamve converso, tanquam ex materia magis immediata.* Unde statim sequitur, idque admodum cohærenter, *Solem verò esse calidum & frigidum.* Ut nemo miretur homines genitos ex Sole, non immediate quidem sed mediatè. Quæ tamen distinctio hîc subticetur ad maiorem movendam admirationem, ut sit instar *Ænigmatis* legenti aut audienti. Quòd autem τὸ θερμὸν & τὸ ψυχρὸν, non autem θερμὸν & ψυχρὸν legitur, id quidem fieri potuit per imperitiam quorundam sciolorum, qui cùm observassent τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν apud

quam apud *Laertium* solum, cùm is solus sit apud quem *Vitam Parmenidis* scriptam nunc habemus. Et qui opiniones illius obiter memorant eas ferè tantùm tangunt quæ ad prima illius principia attinent, ut *Aristotelis*; *Plutarchus* verò quanquam res *Physicas* etiam particulares tractasse ait, ut *Terram, Cælum, Solem, Lunam, Stellas, hominum ortum*, hoc tantùm in genere narrat, particulares modos ac rationes ea tractandi omittens. *Platonis* autem *Parmenides* licet satis prolixus sit, totus tamen est, si rectè memini, *Metaphysicus* aut *Logicus*. Porro si vitam illius ab aliis scriptam haberemus, hocque ejus dogma apud ipsos omissum, non magis probaret illius dogma non fuisse, quàm *Platonem motum Terræ* non tenuisse aut *Divini Numinis Triunitatem*, quòd *Laertius* in *Vita Platonis* ea omiserit. Immò verò maximè consentaneum est paucos futuros fuisse qui hoc dogma memoriæ traderent, ut quod tam enorme videretur & tam celebri Philosopho indignum, atque hanc ob causam passuros fuisse intercidere tanquam figmentum aliquod perperam illi attributum. Cùm verò hoc dogma tam plenè hìc & tam firmis suffultum adminiculis nobis occurrat, imbecillum profectò argumentum est quod ab illius omissione apud alios deducitur. Tempus enim Fluvii instar, sicut alicubi ait sapientissimus *Verulamius*, stramina & sarmenta arida secum desert, lapides verò & metalla, (aurum sit licet & argentum) hoc est maximè solida quæque facile patitur subsidere.

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cap. 15. *θεν ἴσον ἐπετάσαν* (sic enim legit T. B. bisque repetit) *μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσορροπίας*,
διὰ

διὰ τὸ μόνον κεδάινεται, μὴ κινεῖται δέ. Quorum verborum hic videtur sensus genuinus, *Parmenides & Democritus ex eo quod Terra undique equaliter instans, incumbens vel compressa in equilibrio maneat, idcirco concutitur solum* (nempe in Terræ-motibus) *non movetur è loco.* Fateor ἀρεῶσαν legi in meo exemplari. Verum si per *Divinatoriam* quandam oscitantiam, siue datâ operâ T. B. ἀρεῶσαν verterit in ἐρεῶσαν, videtur sanè prababilior lectio, magisque consentire cum sententia *Democriti*, cap. 13. memoratâ. Ubi dicit, Κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν πλάζεσθαι τὴν γῆν διὰ τὰ μικρότητα καὶ κρυφότητα, πυκνωθεῖσαν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ βαρυνθεῖσαν κατασῆναι. id est, *Vagari Terram in Principio, ob parvitatem & levitatem, tempore constipatam & consolidatam in debito loco sisti.* Quod verò fixetur in centro Universi repugnat aliis *Democriti* opinionibus, qui Materiam Universi infinitam credebant, ac proinde Terram in centro illius fixam credere non potuit. Præterea eum Terram aliter immobilem credidisse quàm ipsi *Cartesiani* eam credunt, non est verisimile, quippe quod *Pythagoreus* planè fuit *Democritus*, & à *Pythagora* adeò videtur omnia accepisse, in Opere suo *Æquivoco*, quemadmodum refert apud *Laertium Thrasyllus*, ut nisi temporum ratio obstaret illius auditor censeretur posset. *Pythagoreorum* verò quempiam audivisse *Glaucus Rheginus* affirmat, & *Apollodorus Cyzicenus Philolao* in amicitiam venisse notissimo illi motus Telluris assertori. Et *Leucippum* sanè (quem quidem & *Democritum* tanquam duos geminos germanosve Philosophus per omnia consimiles & consentientes perinde ac coætaneos simul ubique ferè nominat *Aristoteles*) τὴν γῆν ὀχεῖσθαι καὶ μέσον δινομένην affirmasse ipse memorat *Laertius*, immò *Democritum* *Leucippi* fuisse auditorem. Ex quibus abunde constare potest nos genuinum loci illius, apud *Plutarchum*, sensum reddidisse, aut *Plutarchum* ipsum, ut est homo haud ità accuratus in tradendis veterum Philosophorum opinionibus, hac in re falsum esse. Tantillum momentum habet iste locus ad probandum *Parmenidem* Telluris motum annum non tenuisse.

Tertiò, urget, Homines dici non posse ἐξ ἡλίου ex Sole materialiter generatos, quia Sol antè definit esse Sol quàm ista fieri possit generatio. Ecquidem hæc Objectio haud exigui momenti foret, si omnis Materia in generatione immediata esset siue proxima, nulla remota. Hac verò ratione nulla corpora dici possent generari aut constitui ex quatuor Elementis, quoniam antequam corpus Animalis putà aut Arboris ex ipsis constitui possit, desinunt esse ista Elementa. Nec pullus dici posset gigni ex crySTALLINO illo liquore quem notavit *Harvæus*, quia definit talis esse liquor, priusquam convertatur in carnem, cartilagineas & ossa. Sensus proculdubio, idemque admodum facilis ac naturalis istorum verborum γένεσιν τε ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γένεσθαι, hic est: *Generationem Hominum quantum ad materiam ex qua geniti sint, ex aliquo primùm Sole, tanquam ex materia magis remota, factum esse, sed ex Sole hoc in Astrum frigidum siue Terram Planetamve converso, tanquam ex materia magis immediata.* Unde statim sequitur, idque admodum cohærenter, *Solem verò esse calidum & frigidum.* Ut nemo miretur homines genitos ex Sole, non immediate quidem sed mediatè. Quæ tamen distinctio hîc subticetur ad maiorem movendam admirationem, ut sit instar *Ænigmatis* legenti aut audienti. Quòd autem τὸ θερμὸν & τὸ ψυχρὸν, non autem θερμὸν & ψυχρὸν legitur, id quidem fieri potuit per imperitiam quorundam sciorum, qui cùm observassent τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν apud

quosdam antiquos Authores pro Principiis *Parmenidis* haberi (quamquam & id falsam interpretationem potius habendum sit duorum ejus Principiorum, quæ πῦρ καὶ γῆν appellat, quam ipsissima illa Principia) articulos istos vocabulis præfixerunt. Verum autem sensum restituerunt omnes Interpretes reddendo, αὐτὸν τε ὑπάρχειν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, ipsūque (nempe Solem) *calidum esse & frigidum*, non *illud calidum & illud frigidum*. Cæterum τὸ λαμπρὸν & τὸ σκοτεινόν, cum *Plutarcho* adversus *Coloten*, duo illa *Parmenidis* principia agnosco, quibus *Pythagoreorum* illa Principia duo respondent, φῶς καὶ σκότος. & ad *Lucem Tenebrasque Mosaicis* in Creatione alludere censeo. Τὸ θερμὸν verò καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν Interpretamentum esse posse solummodo, illudque falsum existimo, *Aristotelis* aliorumve, quasi *Parmenidis* πῦρ καὶ γῆν ea subindicarent, cum posterior nihil aliud quam *materiam primam* apud *Mosen* descriptam, prius, *Principium Activum* atque Incorporeum significant, quemadmodum alibi moneo. Veruntamen, si cui adeò volupe est, haud ita à ratione alienum esset, si lectionem in Textu tanquam primitus sic scriptam retineremus, nempe τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, modò eo sensu accipiat, quo *Plutarchus* de *Primo Frigido* disputat, quod & τὸ ψυχρὸν subinde vocat, disquiratque an τὸ ψυχρὸν πρὸς τὸ θερμὸν opponatur ὡς εἰς αὐτὸ πρὸς εἰς αὐτὸν, an verò ὡς πάθος πρὸς πάθος, & an sit aliquod τὸ ψυχρὸν sic, ut *Ignis* est τὸ θερμὸν. Tandemque concluditur, Terram istud τὸ ψυχρὸν esse. Quo quidem sensu si hæc verba apud *Laertium* sumantur, equidem non nego quin fieri possit, ut sit vera lectio & Philosophiæ *Parmenideæ* satis consentanea, quæ faciliè admittet, Terram, i. e. Globum quemlibet *Terraqueum* cum *Atmosphæra* (nam & *Pythagorei*, apud *Laertium*, Aerem, ψυχρὸν αἰθέρα appellant) esse τὸ ψυχρὸν, ut *Solem* quemlibet τὸ θερμὸν. Cùmque istiusmodi Globus *Terraqueus* nihil aliud sit, juxta illius sententiam, quam *Sol extinctus* ac frigidus, Solem aliâ atque aliâ conditione, esse & τὸ ψυχρὸν & τὸ θερμὸν, Philosophia *Parmenideæ* faciliè statuet secundum ipsissima verba Textus αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, hoc est, quemlibet Solem esse τὸ θερμὸν & τὸ ψυχρὸν, prout *candens* sit aut *extinctus*.

Quartò, Sed ad ulteriorem difficultatem urget ex sequentibus verbis apud *Laertium*, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα συνεσθάναι. Quòd ex his nempe, ἐκ τῶν θερμῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχρῶν omnia consistunt. Quòd igitur necessariò intelligendum est de duobus istis Principiis quæ πῦρ καὶ γῆν à *Parmenide*, & ab Interpretibus saltem τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν appellantur. Quæ cum omnium rerum totiùsve Mundi Principia sint, non possunt esse *Soles lucentes & extincti*, sive *Soles calidi & frigidi*. Verùm respondeo respiciendum esse ad partem Textus præcedentem, γένεσιν τε ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γένεσθαι, atque tunc ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα συνεσθάναι exponendum esse cum relatione ad γένεσιν ἀνθρώπων (prout illi supponunt qui ἐξ ἡλίου pro ἐξ ἡλίου legi volunt) quo innuitur particularia, saltémque sublunaria γυνήματα esse intelligenda, (nempe istiusmodi omnia γυνήματα ἐξ ἡλίου θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν, ex materia scilicet *extincti Solis* in terram jam mutati, factique *frigidi*, & ex materia *Solis* adhuc *lucentis* calidique & effluvia subtilissima ex se perpetuò emittentis, sicut *Cartesius* describit, ex altera tanquam materia magis remota, altera proxima consistere) non autem universum mundum totamve illius compagem sic genitam esse. Quæ ἐν πρῶτῳ καὶ γῆν, nisi Symbolicè intelligantur, componi non potest, aut generari. Hoc, inquam, modo faciliè intelligitur ut omnia sublunaria & particularia γυνήματα ex Materia ca-
lidi

lidi alicujus *Solis* atque *frigidi* possint constare. Ut omittam Ellipticam esse posse locutionem, idemque significari ac si dixisset, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα γινέσθαι καὶ συνίστασθαι. Ità ut ἐξ duplicem vim habeat, & suam propriam, & τὴν ὑποκείμενην, vel ὑποκείμενην, adeò ut *Sol calidus* sive *lucens* Efficientis causæ rationem habere intelligatur perinde ac *Materialis*. Tam parum difficultatis habet hæc Objectio.

Quintò, Ac proinde quintam addit, quæ primo quidem aspectu plausibilis videtur, Facilem scilicet esse Textûs correctionem si scribatur ἐξ ἰλίου pro ἐξ ἡλίου. Sic enim τὸ θερμὸν & τὸ ψυχρὸν sive πῦρ & γῆ *Parmenidis* simul conjuncta hanc ἰλὺν constituent, materiam utique proximam ex qua Homines aliæque Animalia oriantur. Præterea cùm *Parmenides* discipulus esset *Xenophanis* & *Xenophanes Archelai*, cùmque *Archelai* opinio esset, γεννᾶσθαι τὰ ζῷα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ἰλὺν παρὰ πλεονασμὸν γάλακτι οἶον τροφὴν ἀνείσης, ἔγωγε δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν, in *Vita Archelai* per *Laertium* scripta. Et paulo antè, Ἐλεγε δὲ δύο αἰτίας εἶναι γένεσως θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, καὶ τὰ ζῷα ὑποκείμενα ἰλίου γεννηθῆναι. Hæc pulchriorem speciem argumento superinducunt, quòd scribendum sit ἐξ ἰλίου non autem ex ἡλίου, quippe quum *Parmenides* Magistri *Xenophanis* omnino vestigiis insistat, discipuli utique *Archelai*. Sed enimvero, hoc argumentum quod primo aspectu tam bellam præ se speciem fert, si penitiùs inspiciamus, omnium reperietur infirmissimum, talèque quod reliqua sit infirmaturum. Etenim quamquam *Parmenides* discipulus erat *Xenophanis*, *Laertius* tamen apertè asserit eum *Xenophanem* non fuisse sectatum, sed *Pythagoreis* se adjunxisse, quorum Philosophiæ hæc lectio ἐξ ἡλίου est magis consentanea, quemadmodum ex *Cabbala* mea *Philosophica* apparet. Et tametsi ἐξ ἰλίου facile scribitur pro ἐξ ἡλίου, notandum tamen est voces istas unà tantum literâ convenire, ut taceam generis differentiam, pessimâque syntaxi ἰλίου cum αὐτὸν conjungi; & sensu Philosophico perinde absongo, cum πῦρ καὶ γῆ, illorumve Interpretamento, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, quæ universalis Principia sunt ex quibus *Parmenides* res omnes consistere statuit, etiam *Cælum*, *Terram*, *Solem*, &c. Quomodo igitur illa possunt esse ἰλίου, quæ ad summum non est nisi Materia proxima generationis & nutritionis Animalium ex Terra ortorum juxta illa dicta *Archelai*? Præterea *Aristoteles* de *Parmenide* refert, quòd suam γῆν considerârit tanquam τὸ μὴ ὂν, Quod *Pythagoreorum* σκοπεῖ respondet, prout πῦρ ejus, illorum φασὶν cunctâque cum Symbolico sive Cabbalistico sensu Textûs *Mosaici* mirificè conveniunt, Genes. cap. 1. v. 2. quemadmodum in locis pluribus ostendi. Ut verò γῆ sensu literali sit τὸ μὴ ὂν, adeò ab omni sensu ac ratione abhorret, ut certi esse possimus *Parmenidem* altiore aliquem sensum intendisse, quàm ingeniosus hic Objector lubenter velit admittere. Sed fruatur quisque sensu suo.

Sextò & ultimò, Ut videri verò possit, nullam non movisse lapidem quò Interpretationem nostram eludat, & tam præclarum pro antiquitate Philosophiæ Cabbalisticæ obscuret Testimonium, tandem urget editionem *Baziliensem* in qua ἐξ ἰλίου legitur; Et *Aldobrandinum* in commentariis & margine translationis legisse, è limo. Quibus postremò addit judicium *Menagii*. Eò igitur tandem res redit, ut perpendenda sint etiam pondera editionum & autoritatum. Quamobrem contexam primò, brevissimam editionum *Diogenis Laertii* Historiam. Prima itaque illius *Diogenis Laertii* editio facta est per *Ambrosium Monachum*, qui *Græcorum* carminum translationem omisit. Se-

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possit huic lectioni, nisi quòd non patiatut ut *Cartesius* profundius in rerum naturalium notitiam penetrâsse videatur quàm aut *Moses* aut quisquam veterum Philosophorum. Hinc illa sollicitudo T. B. viri aliàs eruditi & ingeniosi, pro lectione ista ab aliis ferè omnibus reprobata.

Phœnicum sive *Hebræorum* libros, &c. *Judeam* enim ad *Palestinam*, *Samaritam* & *Galileam* ad *Phœniciam* apud Historicos pertinere, ait *Step.* Vide etiam *Ortel.* Geogr. sacr. Tab. 1.

Δεσύν τε εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν, &c. Contra nostram hujus loci interpretationem objicit rursus vir ingeniosus T. B. *Parmenidem* nempe sic intelligere non posse duplicem Philosophiam sive Sapientiam, unam *Symbolicam* quæ constituatur secundum opinionem vulgi illiusve captui accommodetur, quam ego *Literalem* Cabbalam appello; Alteram secundum Veritatem verèque Philosophicam & accuratissimæ rationi consentaneam: sed eum intelligere tantummodo Rerum veritatem & earum apparentiam sensui, τὸ δοξαστὸν & τὸ ἐπισημονοκὸν, τὸ αἰσθητὸν & τὸ νοητὸν. Quippe quòd huc planè faciant ista carmina etiam in hoc ipso loco à *Laertio* adducta, quòdque hanc ipsam opinionem *Sextus Empiricus* contra Mathematicos, lib. 7. p. 156. fusiùs explicat, ipsèque adeò *Plato*, nempe *Rationi* & *Intellectui*, non sensibus fidendum esse. Hæc ille, & fatìs profectò appositè. Ad quæ respondeo, hanc ipsam fuisse *Parmenidis* sententiam omniumque aliorum qui *Symbolicam* ac *Philosophicam* Cabbalam acceperint, me neutiquam dubitare; ac proinde cùm *Parmenides* duplicem hanc Philosophiam sive sapientiam agnovisset, alteram nempe *Symbolicam* & ad captum vulgi sensuumque æstimationem concinnatam, alteram ad veritatem notionisque Intellectus infallibiles, alteriusque supra alteram præcellentiam animadvertisset, minimè mirandum est & ipsum in Scriptis suis & Veritatis & Opinionis vulgi mentionem facere alteramque alteri præferre, & alios ut *Platonem* & *Empiricum* sic sensisse *Parmenidem* posteris tradidisse, non quidem ad explicandam illam sententiam Διτλήν τε εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν, &c. quæ duplicem Cabbalam respicit, quemadmodum insinuare vult vir lepidus T. B. sed ad memorandum simpliciter, Monitum fuisse *Parmenidis*, Cavendum esse à sensuum fallaciis solique rationi fidendum. Quod fatìs quidem cum nostra illius sententiæ Διτλήν τε εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν, &c. interpretatione consentit, nullo verò modo eidem refragatur. Sed ut simplex Vulgi opinio *Philosophia* appelletur minimè consentaneum est, quamvis *Symbolica* Cabbala cognitio sic dici possit, tanquam pars quædam veteris Sapientiæ. Et *Duplicem* hanc Cabbalam hìc intelligi valdè verisimile est, cùm paulò suprà mentio facta sit duorum Principiorum, ut ego quidem sentio, *Mosaicorum*, quæ *Parmenides* πῶρ καὶ γῆν appellat, & deinde *Solis calidi* & *frigidi*, quos ad Cabbalam *Mosaicam* pertinere in Cabbala nostra *Philosophica* fatìs demonstravimus.

Seçt. 8. Si radiorum Lucis promanationem consideremus & intermixturam, id quod de ea dicitur magis eminenter perfectèque, &c. Quæ quidem ratio haud parvi momenti esse debet apud eos qui istam notionem Spiritus quam in Tractatu De Anima Immortalitate descripsimus, amplectuntur, quod ferè faciunt *Platonici*; quæ verò propria mea sit hac in re opinio, in Scholiis illìc subditis declaravi.

Seçt. 11. Quippe de qua maximè peculiaria Terræ Attributa solummodo sunt vera, &c. Exclamat heic *Andreades*, Aperta contradictio est, Esse ista Terræ Exam. Gener. pecu- p. 138.

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possit huic lectioni, nisi quod non patiat ut *Cartesius* profundius in rerum naturalium notitiam penetrâsse videatur quàm aut *Moses* aut quisquam veterum Philosophorum. Hinc illa sollicitudo T. B. viri aliàs eruditi & ingeniosi, pro lectione ista ab aliis ferè omnibus reprobata.

Phœnicum sive *Hebraeorum* libros, &c. *Judeam* enim ad *Palestinam*, *Samariam* & *Galileam* ad *Phœniciam* apud Historicos pertinere, ait *Step.* Vide etiam *Ortel.* Geogr. sacr. Tab. 1.

Δεσύν τε εἶναι ἡ φιλοσοφία, τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν, &c. Contra nostram hujus loci interpretationem objicit rursus vir ingeniosus T. B. *Parmenidem* nempe sic intelligere non posse duplicem Philosophiam sive Sapientiam, unam *Symbolicam* quæ constituitur secundum opinionem vulgi illiusve captui accommodetur, quam ego *Literalem* Cabbalam appello; Alteram secundum Veritatem verèque Philosophicam & accuratissimæ rationi consentaneam: sed eum intelligere tantummodo Rerum veritatem & earum apparentiam sensui, τὸ δοξαστὸν & τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, τὸ αἰσθητὸν & τὸ νοητὸν. Quippe quod huc planè faciant ista carmina etiam in hoc ipso loco à *Laertio* adducta, quodque hanc ipsam opinionem *Sextus Empiricus* contra Mathematicos, lib. 7. p. 156. fusiùs explicat, ipsèque adeò *Plato*, nempe *Rationi* & *Intellectui*, non sensibus fidendum esse. Hæc ille, & satis profectò appositè. Ad quæ respondeo, hanc ipsam fuisse *Parmenidis* sententiam omniumque aliorum qui *Symbolicam* ac *Philosophicam* Cabbalam acceperint, me neutiquam dubitare; ac proinde cùm *Parmenides* duplicem hanc Philosophiam sive sapientiam agnovisset, alteram nempe *Symbolicam* & ad captum vulgi sensuumque æstimationem concinnatam, alteram ad veritatem notionisque Intellectus infallibiles, alteriusque supra alteram præcellentiam animadvertisset, minimè mirandum est & ipsum in Scriptis suis & Veritatis & Opinionis vulgi mentionem facere alteramque alteri præferre, & alios ut *Platonem* & *Empiricum* sic sensisse *Parmenidem* posteris tradidisse, non quidem ad explicandam illam sententiam Διτλήν τε εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν, &c. quæ duplicem Cabbalam respicit, quemadmodum insinuare vult vir lepidus T. B. sed ad memorandum simpliciter, Monitum fuisse *Parmenidis*, Cavendum esse à sensuum fallaciis solique rationi fidendum. Quod satis quidem cum nostra illius sententiæ Διτλήν τε εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν, &c. interpretatione consentit, nullo verò modo eidem refragatur. Sed ut simplex Vulgi opinio *Philosophia* appelletur minimè consentaneum est, quamvis *Symbolica* Cabbala cognitio sic dici possit, tanquam pars quædam veteris Sapientiæ. Et *Duplicem* hanc Cabbalam hîc intelligi valdè verisimile est, cùm paulò suprâ mentio facta sit duorum Principiorum, ut ego quidem sentio, *Mosaicorum*, quæ *Parmenides* πῶρ καὶ γῆν appellat, & deinde *Solis calidi* & *frigidi*, quos ad Cabbalam *Mosaicam* pertinere in Cabbala nostra *Philosophica* satis demonstravimus.

Seçt. 8. Si radiorum Lucis promanationem consideremus & intermixturam, id quod de ea dicitur magis eminenter perfectèque, &c. Quæ quidem ratio haud parvi momenti esse debet apud eos qui istam notionem Spiritus quam in Tractatu De Animæ Immortalitate descripsimus, amplectuntur, quod ferè faciunt *Platonici*; quæ verò propria mea sit hac in re opinio, in Scholiis illîc subditis declaravi.

Seçt. 11. Quippe de qua maximè peculiaris Terræ Attributa solummodo sunt vera, &c. Exclamat hæc *Andreades*, Aperta contradictio est, Esse ista Terræ Exam. Gener. pecu- p. 138.

peculiaribus Attributa, & tamen eidem haud convenire. Respondeo autem nullam esse contradictionem, Attributa quæ vulgò tanquam peculiaribus Terræ attribuuntur, alii alicui rei potiori jure posse attribui. Nec opus putabam, id me velle, subindicare, neque enim credidi unquam fore ut scripta mea in manus inciderent tam captiosi Cavillatoris.

Nec immobilis tantum sed quæ nec minui potest, &c. Notabilis rursus *contradictio*, ait S. A. Quippe quòd suprà dixeram in ipsa Cabbala, de hac ipsa Materia quòd fuerit *instabilis, fluida & ex sed ad instar aquæ indeterminabilis.* Sed respondeo; Tota illa Instabilitas & Fluiditas resolvitur tandem in decantatam illam Materiæ ἀοείστατον. Non igitur majorem habet instabilitatem quàm ista Ἀοείστατος requirit quæ tantum *Metaphorica* est, cujusque *Fluiditas* ista est *Symbolum*, innuitque solummodo ab alio determinationem. Cum autem hæc Indifferentia sive Indeterminabilitas sit ἰσορρομία quædam, *stabilitatem* Terræ in eo ipso etiam quodammodo imitatur, quo aliâ ratione considerari potest ut instabilis sive mobilis. Sed manifestum est, quicquid sit hæc *Materia Metaphysica*, in sua notione quatenus talis, idem quid esse & immutabile ac immobile. *Physicam* verò *Materiam* solummodo *mobilem* esse. Sed subtiliores hæc similitudines tanquam tricas me considerare, ipse in hoc loco professus sum.

C H A P. VIII.

1. That Hyle or first Matter is mere Possibility of Being, according to Aristotle.
2. That the same is but Empty Space or Capacity of Body, according to Plato and Plotinus; and how fitly the Description of Hyle in them, agrees with Moses his Terra innanis & vacua.
3. What in Plotinus his description answers to Abyss, Darkness, and Waters in Moses.
4. That Plotinus seems to make Hyle a mere Non-Entity.
5. But that his more express Opinion is, that it is the Potentiality of Corporeal Beings, and Entity in reversion.
6. How this Hyle may be said to be created.
7. Why Moses would take notice of so lank and evanid a business as this Hyle seems to be, in his Six Days Creation.
8. That Impossibility is involved in the notion of the Mosaic Hyle, with a special reason why the Pythagoreans might call the Decad Ἀνάγκη.

1. **B**UT now for those Three additional Quæres touching this *Metaphysical Hyle*; The first of them is concerning the Name thereof, why I would adventure to give so substantial a name as *Hyle*, which is as much as to say, *Matter*, to that which I acknowledge to have no Being but a *Metaphysical* one, and that such a *Metaphysical* one as is not truly any Being, but a mere Capacity thereof. But I answer, That I have rather surnamed the *Hyle* of the Ancients *Metaphysical*, than transplanted the name of *Hyle* to a mere *Metaphysical* Entity. For so far as I can find, they usually allow their *Hyle* no more Entity than I have allotted to it in my description thereof; namely, That it is the Capacity only of the existence of the Corporeal or Sensible World, but it self is neither Substance, nor any thing else actually.

λέγω δὲ ὕλην ἢ χωρὶς αὐτὴν μὴτε πρὸς, μὴτε πρὸς, μὴτε ἄλλο μὴδὲν λέγω ὅτι ὡς εἶπαι τὸν ὄν.

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It is *Aristotle's* Definition of *Matter* in his * *Metaphysicks*. And again * *Lib. 6. cap.* not far after, τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸτόθεν ἢ ἐν ἐνδεσφύλλῳ, *The possibility of 3, & 7. being and not being, that is the Hyle or Matter in every thing.*

2. And *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, casting things into Three ranks, makes one kind to be τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος εἶδος, which is intelligible, ingenerable and incorruptible, invisible and immoveable: The second kind is what has some resemblance of this, and bears the same name with it, but is sensible, corruptible, and moveable: The third he makes τὸ τῆς χώρας, *Place or Space*, (*Plutarch* interprets it δίδασμα) φθορὰν καὶ ἀσθενήματα, εἶδεν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν παύσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναδυσίας ἀπὸν, λογισμῷ πρὶν νόθον μόγις πισίν. This is his description of *Matter*, as both *Plutarch* and also *Plotinus* supposes. But it is a very suspicious business that he means no more than *empty Space* by it; which he calls χώρα, and which is very hard to conceive what it is, but makes it also the seat and foundation of all generable things, and accordingly || *Plotinus* calls it ὑποβάδεια. || *Ennead. 6. lib. 1. cap. 8.* Which answers exactly to *Terra inanis* & *vacua* in *Moses*, *Subtilty* and *Emptiness* being thus comprised in one.

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CHAP. VIII.

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περόδον, ὡς ἔδρα ἀποθεμένη. In which words he compares the *Matter* to a fixed seat against which the *Forms* do as it were hit, but do not sink in, so that he will have the *Matter* to remain as before, unchanged and unmoveable. Accordingly as he also expresses himself in the eleventh Chapter, That the *Matter* has neither more nor less by the access or recess of *Forms*, μέν γ' ὅ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὤ. Which word μέν γ' he often uses in setting out the steddiness and immutableness of the *Matter*, in that sense that *Plato* uses it, speaking of the stability of the *Earth*, μέν γ' ἔστι ἐν θεῶν οἰκῇ μέν. So that these flitting *Forms* and *Matter* are as the Generations of men and the *Earth*, *One generation goeth, and another cometh, but the Earth standeth fast for ever.*

3. That also suits very well with the third Appellation of the *Mosaick Hyle*, (namely, *Abyss*) which *Plotinus* has in his * second *Ennead*. Τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐκείνου ἢ ὕλη, διὸ δὲ σκοτεινὴ πᾶσα, That the Profundity of every thing (he calls it the τὸ ἕχαπιν || elsewhere) is the *Matter*; and therefore is ever dark. Which *Darkness* is a fourth Property of the *Mosaick Matter*, and on which *Plotinus* insists pretty copiously in this * second *Ennead*, and contends we can have no other notion of it, it being αἶον ὁφθαλμῷ τὸ σκότος, as *Darkness* is to the *Eye*: and that the *Soul* can no otherwise see it ἢ ὡς ἀχρημοσυνὴν δὲ ὡς ἀχεστὴν καὶ ὡς ἀλαμπές. And a little after, Τῷ τοῦ νοῦ ἀμυδρῶς ἀμυδρὸν, καὶ σκοτεινῶς σκοτεινόν, καὶ νοεῖ ἢ νοῦσα, as a man sees darkness. And lastly, that he may not seem not to have touched, at least, every part of the *Mosaick* description of the *First Matter*, what *Moses* may mean by the mobility of the *Waters*, *Plotinus* has expressed by τὸ ἀόριστον, or ἡ ἀοριστία, the *Indefiniteness* or *Undeterminateness* of *Matter*.

4. And truly I think what we have produced hitherto bids fair for a proof, that he means no substantialler a Being by *Matter* than what may well be called *Metaphysical*. But he speaks broader, and yet more compendiously, in his || third *Ennead*, where (as * *Clemens* also says *Plato* styles the *Matter*) he calls it τὸ ἀληθινῶς μὴ ὂν, That which is truly *Non-Entity*: and a little after further describing it, ἢ τὸ ὂν ἐν φαντασίᾳ ἢ ὂν ὄν, Whose *Entity* being but in imagination is no Being; And in chapter the thirteenth, he declares, That if *Matter* would keep her self what she is, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ μόνον οὐδ' ὄντων ἀδεκπν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ π μίμημα αὐτῶν, καὶ τέτε ἀμοιρον εἰς οἰκείωσιν εἶναι, she must necessarily be unreceptive of all *Entities*: nay, if there be but the least shadow of them, she must not share therein, that she may conserve to her self her own property.

5. But the *Philosopher* is so severe in such expressions, that he seems to strip *Matter* more naked than she really ought to be. But he is more moderate in others, where he will permit her to be the *Possibility* of the outward and sensible World, and only argues her to be no *Entity*, because she is only this *Possibility*. As in *Ennead* the * sixth, Εἰ γὰρ δυναμὶς ἐστὶν ὁ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν, ἐδ' αὖ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν, For if that be only *Potentiality* which is to come, and that which is to come no *Essence* or *Substance*; *Matter*, which is but *Potentiality*, is no *Substance* or *Essence*. And in *Ennead* the || second, he will allow *Matter* to be *Essence* in *Reversion*. Τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ μόνον τὸ μέλλον ἐπαγγελλλόμενον, The *Being* of *Matter* is only an expected or promised *Being*, or, as I said, a *Being* in reversion. And toward the end of the Chapter he concludes, Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα ἀπεβέκηκός τῷ ἀληθῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἔχη τὸ εἶναι. And in the close of all,

Εἴπερ

Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ ἀνάλαθεον τὴν ὕλην πρεῖν, ὕλην αὐτὴν δεῖ πρεῖν, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως λέγειν αὐτὴν εἶναι μόνον ἵνα ᾗ ὃ ἐστίν. The sense of both which sentences is but this, That the *Essence* of *Matter* excludes real *Existence*, and consists only in *Capacity* or *Possibility* of *Being*. Whence it is manifest, That this *Platonical Hyle* which I have applied to the *First Day's* Creation, may rightly be called *Metaphysical*, or, if you will, that which has but the most evanid *Metaphysical* Entity be called *Hyle*, which was the thing aimed at.

6. But now there is a more dangerous Quære that emerges out of the Answer to the former; namely, * How this mere *Capacity* or *Possibility* of corporeal and sensible Beings can be said to be created. For this *Possibility* and *Capacity* seems to be of it self, and to need no Creation. * But I answer, That *Creation* is nothing else but an *Emanation* of the Creature from God, as || *Aquinas* has determined; and I say, that this || *Aquinas* in *Possibility* and *Capacity* of things, is the utmost *Projection* or *Emanation* ^{1. qu. 45.} from the *Divine* Existence, and would not be without Him. For if He were not, every thing else would be impossible to be. Therefore this *Possibility* depending on Him, and being not a mere nothing according to the *Metaphysicians*, who allow *Ens in potentia* to be truly *Ens*, as well as *Ens actu*, it is rightly said to be created by Him. And if *Creation* be *ex nihilo*, this is much more eminently so than any, that which is below it being the most absolute *Non-ens* that is conceivable; which is, as I said, *Impossibility*, which would be the state of all things, were there not a God.

7. The third and last Quære is, why *Moses* should take notice of so lank and evanid a business as this mere *Possibility* of the external Creation. For what good is there to consider, that the *Possibility* of an House or Statue is before the *Masons* and *Statuaries* making of them? But I answer, The reason is not the same, there being an infinite difference betwixt the whole Universe and an House or Statue, and betwixt God and a *Mason* or *Statuary*. And therefore in such vast things as God and the Universe, every minute consideration will be great: and we see that humane understanding has ever thought it so. For mens minds have been much puzzled and plunged in the diving down to the lowest and last ground of all things, which they call *Hyle*, and have commonly defined it such as I have described it, a mere *Potentiality*.

Besides, is that a contemptible Notion or Speculation, to consider that the very *Possibility* of other Beings is from God; and that it is impossible for any thing to be without Him? For as it is an Aphorism most true, so it is also very closely connex with Piety and Religion; and such a Philosophy we are to expect from so holy a man as *Moses*.

And lastly, when we say, This *Hyle* is the *Potentiality* or *Capacity* of things, it involves also in it *Impossibility*, as being a finite *Capacity* or *Possibility*. And therefore from hence there will be a necessary sequel of such things as are accounted evil in the World. For such a *Capacity* or *Possibility* as is but finite, dwells next door to *Necessity*, the Mother of Mischief, as is intimated in the *Pythagorick* verses, though upon another occasion.

πρόσθεν, ὡς ἔδρα ἀποθεμένη. In which words he compares the *Matter* to a fixed seat against which the *Forms* do as it were hit, but do not sink in, so that he will have the *Matter* to remain as before, unchanged and unmoveable. Accordingly as he also expresses himself in the eleventh Chapter, That the *Matter* has neither more nor less by the access or recess of *Forms*, μέν γ' ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὤ. Which word μέν γ' he often uses in setting out the steddiness and immutableness of the *Matter*, in that sense that *Plato* uses it, speaking of the stability of the *Earth*, μέν γ' ἐστὶ ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνη. So that these fitting *Forms* and *Matter* are as the Generations of men and the *Earth*, One generation goeth, and another cometh, but the *Earth* standeth fast for ever.

3. That also suits very well with the third Appellation of the *Mosaick Hyle*, (namely, *Abyss*) which *Plotinus* has in his * second *Ennead*. Τὸ γ' βάθος ἐκάστω ἢ ὕλῃ, διὸ γ' σκοτεινὴ πᾶσα, That the Profundity of every thing (he calls it the τὸ ἕχαπν || elsewhere) is the *Matter*; and therefore is ever dark. Which *Darkness* is a fourth Property of the *Mosaick Matter*, and on which *Plotinus* insists pretty copiously in this * second *Ennead*, and contends we can have no other notion of it, it being οἷον ὁφθαλμῷ τὸ σκότος, as *Darkness* is to the *Eye*: and that the *Soul* can no otherwise see it ἢ ὡς ἀχρηστων γ' ὡς ἀχρηστων καὶ ὡς ἀλαμπής. And a little after, Τῷ τοῦ νοῦ ἀμυδρῶς ἀμυδρὸν, καὶ σκοτεινῶς σκοτεινόν, καὶ νοῦ ἢ νοῦσα, as a man sees darkness. And lastly, that he may not seem not to have touched, at least, every part of the *Mosaick* description of the *First Matter*, what *Moses* may mean by the mobility of the *Waters*, *Plotinus* has expressed by τὸ ἀόριστον, or ἡ ἀορισία, the *Indefiniteness* or *Undeterminateness* of *Matter*.

4. And truly I think what we have produced hitherto bids fair for a proof, that he means no substantialler a Being by *Matter* than what may well be called *Metaphysical*. But he speaks broader, and yet more compendiously, in his || third *Ennead*, where (as * *Clemens* also says *Plato* styles the *Matter*) he calls it τὸ ἀληθινῶς μὴ ὂν, That which is truly *Non-Entity*: and a little after further describing it, ἢ τὸ ὂν ἐν φαντάσει ἢ ὂν ὄν, Whose *Entity* being but in imagination is no Being; And in chapter the thirteenth, he declares, That if *Matter* would keep her self what she is, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ μόνον τῶν ὄντων ἀδεκν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ π μίμημα αὐτῶν, καὶ τέτε ἀμοιρον εἰς οἰκείωσιν εἶναι, she must necessarily be unreceptive of all *Entities*: nay, if there be but the least shadow of them, she must not share therein, that she may conserve to her self her own property.

5. But the *Philosopher* is so severe in such expressions, that he seems to strip *Matter* more naked than she really ought to be. But he is more moderate in others, where he will permit her to be the *Possibility* of the outward and sensible *World*, and only argues her to be no *Entity*, because she is only this *Possibility*. As in *Ennead* the * sixth, Εἰ γ' ὁ δυνάμεις ἐστὶν ὁ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐκείνο γ' μὴ ἐστὶ, ἐδ' αὖ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ, For if that be only *Potentiality* which is to come, and that which is to come no *Essence* or *Substance*; *Matter*, which is but *Potentiality*, is no *Substance* or *Essence*. And in *Ennead* the || second, he will allow *Matter* to be *Essence* in *Reversion*. Τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ μόνον τὸ μέλλον ἐπαγγελόμενον, The *Being* of *Matter* is only an expected or promised *Being*, or, as I said, a *Being* in reversion. And toward the end of the Chapter he concludes, Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἐνεργεῖα μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα ἀβεβηκὸς τῶ ἀληθῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἔχη τὸ εἶναι. And in the close of all,

Εἴπερ

Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ ἀνάσθαι τὴν ὕλην πρῶτον, ὕλην αὐτὴν δεῖ πρῶτον, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως λέγειν αὐτὴν εἶναι μόνον ἵνα ᾗ ὃ ἐστίν. The sense of both which sentences is but this, That the *Essence* of *Matter* excludes real *Existence*, and consists only in *Capacity* or *Possibility* of *Being*. Whence it is manifest, That this *Platonical Hyle* which I have applied to the *First Day's* Creation, may rightly be called *Metaphysical*, or, if you will, that which has but the most evanid *Metaphysical* Entity be called *Hyle*, which was the thing aimed at.

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Διῶαμις γὰρ ἀνάγκης ἐγξῦδι ναίει.

Plutarch. de
Anima Pro-
creatione.

Nor can I make any allowable sense of Plato's Ἀνάγκη πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμα-
χῶσα καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσα, of his *Necessity that does refractorily and untamedly resist
and oppose God*, but this *Impossibility* of the Creation. But in that he
calls it ἀτακτον ψυχὴν καὶ κακοποιόν, and ψυχὴν ἐναντίαν καὶ ἀντίπαλον τῇ ἀγαθουργῷ, is
either a ranting piece of Rhetorick, or rather Poetry, or else a gross
mistake of *Moses* his Text (for that he was acquainted with it, I have
intimated before) he interpreting עוֹלָהּ אֵלֶּיךָ in such a sense as the
Literal Cabbala has expressed it, which he conceived to be the effect of
this ψυχὴ ἀτακτὸς καὶ κακοποιὸς which he imagined.

Ennead. 1.
Lib. 8. cap. 7.

* See Psycho-
zoia Cant. 1.
Stanz. 9, 44.
45.

8. But the face of the *First Matter* in *Moses* is horrid and dismal
enough, without any such freakish conceits fetch'd from the misun-
derstanding of the *Literal Cabbala*, to make it bewray its own guilt
and accessoriness to those evils that happen in the World. And being
no other than such as has been hitherto described out of *Plotinus*,
Plotinus himself does notwithstanding lamentably complain of the
mischiefs arising out of it, in his περὶ τοῦ πῶτα, καὶ πῶθεν τὰ κακά, where he
defines this *Hyle* to be κακὴ οὐσία, and τὸ πρῶτον κακόν, *The Essence of Evil*,
and the *First or Original Evil*; and giving a reason of what evil there
is in the World, he writes thus, μεμιγμένη γὰρ ἐν δὴ ἡ τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ φύσις ἐκ τε
νοῦ καὶ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ὅσα θεῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἦεν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχαίας φύσεως τῆς
* οὐλῆς λεγομένης. *That the world is mixt of Intellect and Necessity, and that
those things that come from God are good; but the Evils are from that antique
Nature which is called Hyle.* But it is, I must confess, pretty humour-
somely spoken of him to call this *Hyle antique*, unless it be merely in
reference to particular shows in the World: For the World it self is
as *antique* as this *Hyle*, according to his own doctrine elsewhere. As

|| Lib. 9. c. 12.

* Ennead. 3.
Lib. 2. cap. 3.

in his fifth || *Ennead*, where he makes the Universe a *necessary Emanation*
of God, and the *natural Image* of the *Eternal Intellect*: and thence in-
fers, Πᾶσα δὲ φύσις εἰκὼν ἐστὶν οὖσαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρχέτυπου μένει. And in * another place,
Ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ὁ Κόσμος, καὶ ἐκ ἐκ λογισμῷ χρυσόμορφος, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἀμείνονος χρυσώσης
καὶ φύσιν ὁμοίον ἑαυτῇ. And in the foregoing chapter to this Citation, he
says the very same thing, Γέρονε δὲ ὁ Κόσμος ἐκ λογισμῷ τῷ δεῖν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δὲ φύσεως
φύσεως ἀνάγκη, *That the World was not made by consultation and reason that
it ought to be so, but by the immediate Necessity of the emanation of an
After-nature.* Which Conclusions of *Plotinus* if they be true, I should
think this as eminent a reason as any, why the *Pythagoreans* called the
Decad, which is their Symbol of the Universe, Ἀνάγκη, that is, *Necessity*.

But I the more willingly made this excursion, because it makes for
the more easy understanding of what I was going to add for the fur-
ther proving, that *Plotinus* makes *Hyle* the Root of all evils. In the
|| Lib. 8. c. 7. first || *Ennead*, as before, Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑ μόνον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη τῇ ἐκβάσει, τῇ παρ'
αὐτὸ ὑποστάσει, ἢ, εἰ ἔτι περὶ ἐθέλει λέγειν, τῇ αἰεὶ ὑποβάσει καὶ ἀποστάσει, τὸ ἔχαλον, καὶ μεθ' ὃ ἐκ
ἧν ἔτι γενέσθαι ὁ ποιῶν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ κακόν. ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τὸ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἔχα-
λον. τὸ δὲ ἢ ὕλη μνησθὲν ἐπ' ἔχουσα αὐτῇ, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνάγκη τῷ κακῷ. For since that the
*Sovereign Goodness is not alone, it must needs be that, by an Egression, or
gradual Subsidency, or Descent, or Distance from it, the Extreme, and
after which it was impossible there should be any thing, that this must be the
Evil. And of necessity there is something after the First, so that there must
be*

be an Extreme. And this is Hyle or Matter, having nothing of the First, and this is the Necessity of Evil; namely, so far forth as this Hyle has nothing of the First, nor is capable thereof. Which is as much as to say, that the *Impossibility* or *Incommensurability* in the lowest creation of things, (and such is this Corporeal World) is this *Ἀνάγκη*, this *Necessity of Evil*. That there would be an *Impossibility* of all things, if there were no God, but there is now an *Impossibility* or *Incommensurability* in these lower things, notwithstanding that there is one: as it is impossible that the edge of a Knife and the back should be alike strong.

Which considerations of this *Metaphysical Hyle* are not so trivial; nay, are rather so weighty, that they may very well be thought worthy of *Moses* his distinct taking notice of them in that squallid and horrid hew he sets out this *Hyle* or *First Matter*, in the First Day's Creation, and for these reasons, his having made it part of the First Day's work. For it is such a truth as deserves a serious Meditation; nor can it misbecome a Philosopher to speculate the First grounds of those effects, for which all-foreseeing Providence has so expressly fitted the generality of mankind, in furnishing them for the reception of such odd and cross occurrences with those high and histrionical Passions of *Laughter* and *Weeping*. So plain is it, that our making this *Metaphysical Hyle* to be signified by the *void and formless Earth*, enveloped with waters and darkness, is a sound and unexceptionable Interpretation.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. VIII. Sect. 6.

Quomodo mera hæc Capacitas sive Possibilitas rerum corporearum ac sensibilem dici possit creari, &c. Non solum quod non videatur indigere Creatione, sed etiam (id quod non temerè videtur submonere S. A.) quod eo ipso fieret *Ens reale*, nec esset mera *Capacitas* sive *Possibilitas*. Sed enimvero nisi quis datâ operâ captandis cavillandi occasionibus invigilet, paulò laxiore significatione verborum [*Creatio & Ens*] admittâ, hæc difficultas facile solvi possit. Omni gradui nempe ad *Entitatem Entis* nomen indulgendo, & omni *Efficientia*, quæ facit ut *Ens*, (quàm minutissimo gradu fuerit, gradusve ad *Entitatem*, id est, quale quale fuerit *Ens Gradusve*) ex nihilo existat, nomen indulgendo *Creationis*. *Possibilitas* enim hæc sive *Capacitas* propius accedit ad *Entitatem* quàm *Impossibilitas*; ut ipse *Andreades* etiam contendit *Ens in potentia* propius accedere ad *Entitatem* quàm *Ens possibile*. Cum verò sit aliqua *Efficientia* atque vis, quâ quid propius ad *realem Entitatem* accedit quàm alia multa, si ex nulla præjacenti materia id efficit, cur illud [*efficere*] [*creare*] dici non patiar haud satè intelligo, quanquam illa *Creatio* minutior sit & obscurior perinde atque id quod dicitur creari. Adeò ut lubens profitear litigium hîc de vocibus esse potius quàm de rebus ipsis.

Exam. Gener.
p. 139.

Exam. Gener.
p. 139, 140.

Sed respondeo Creationem nihil aliud esse quàm Emanationem Creaturae à Deo, &c. Creationem hinc *Materiae Metaphysicae* ita me exponere ait *Andreades*, ut hinc necessario sequatur eandem *Materiam* immò ipsum *Mundum Deo coeternum* esse. Objicit enim quod occurrit Sect. 8. Nam *Mundus ipse aequè antiquus est atque hanc Hyle secundum suam ipsius doctrinam alibi traditam.* Quæ verò ego illic de *Plotino* loquor, ille intelligit, (idque admodum protervè ac iniquè) de meipso. Cum nè *Materiam* quidem *Metaphysicam* præsentem instantemque ab æterno extitisse, nedum *Mundum ipsum* statuo. Sed, quæ est illius confidentia, sic me sentire, ex ipsa Creationis definitione, quam amplector, demonstrare se posse profitetur. Hucque arripit quod reperitur in *Tractatu meo de Animæ Immortalitate*, lib. 1. cap. 6. Axiom. 17. *Effectum emanativum coexistit ipsi substantiæ ejus quod causa illius dicitur. Indèque rectè me inferre dicit, Si tale effectum unquam est, semper esse debet, vel saltem tamdiu quàm substantia ista existit.* Ego verò vel ultrò concedo *Axiomatis* istius sensum limitandum esse, & ad causas creatas emanativas restringendum. Nam in ea sola Regione versabatur mens mea quando istud *Axioma* scripsi, Lectorisque candidi est Titulum respicere qui Causas emanativas creatas solas spectabat, dum ego ista meditabar. In causa verò prima increata ubi Effectum tam infinitis gradibus subsidit infra Causam, ipse Defectus & Incapacitas Effecti emanatorii sibi obstaculo esse potest quo minùs ab æterno coexistat suæ Causæ. Qua de re fusiùs egi in *Enchiridio Metaphysico*, nec opus est plura hinc addere. Hoc tamen obiter moneo, tantum abesse, ut ego accensendus sim illius *Materiaris* quos toties crepat & *Hermogenistis*, ut Possibilitatem hanc *Creaturae futuram* tantum ab æterno non instantem præsentemve fuisse statuum ante tempus Creationis. Quod unum Responsum satis est ad difflandas omnes illius cavillas & argutias circa hoc argumentum. Ad reliquas illius in hunc Paragraphum *Tricas Scholasticas* ac *Nugacitates* conniveo & fileo. Neque enim mihi vacat cum tam juvenili tamque parum urbano *Theologiæ & Philosophiæ* Professore aut ludere aut rixari. Puer quivis decennis satis clarè perspiciet nullam subesse impietatem illi Effato; *Si Deus non esset, omnia forent in statu Impossibilitatis.* Nec ad *Atheismum* viam pandere, *Omnia necessario ab Illo solo existere profiteri.* Et denique, Utrum consultiùs sit ad *Incompossibilitatem* Creationis ea mala quæ in Mundo occurrunt, an ad voluntatem Creatoris referre, penès quemvis, qui cæco non sit malignoque ingenio, judicium esto.

CHAP. IX.

1. *A new Supposition concerning Hyle, as if it were an actual material Substance, and how applicable Moses his description is thereunto.*
2. *How it can be referred to the First Day's Creation, of which an Unite is the character.*
3. *How it will be found to be the Inferiour Waters in the Philosophical sense.*
4. *What coagulated the Monadical consistence of this Physical Hyle, into a capacity of becoming Æther or the Second Day's work.*
5. *That the supposition of this Physical Hyle is very passable, if of Monadical consistence; otherwise intolerable.*

1. But

1. **B**UT if it will be an ease to any man's mind to have a more plump and perceptible Object couched under this name *Hyle*, the Text peradventure is not altogether incapable of it. For suppose we should make this *Hyle* real and actual Matter, consisting of those perfect *Parvitudes* (which I have || elsewhere described) actually divided one from another, and equally charged with so much motion, or thereabout, as is now conserved in the World; the attributes of that *Hyle* described in *Moses* will agree very well thereto. || *Immortal.*
Book i. ch. 6.
also *Pref.*
sect. 3.

For first, it will be *ἰδέα* and * *ὑποβάθρα*, a ground and seat for Forms: * *Plotin. Ennead. 6. lib. 1. cap. 28.* and, being thus a Sustentacle or Foundation, be fitly represented by the term *Earth*. As also it will be such a *βάθος* or *Profundity*, as the name *Abyss* may well reflect upon, it being the *deepest* or *lowest* of the real Creation. Then for *Vacuity* and *Emptiness* this *Hyle* is utterly empty of all sensible Forms, (and we suppose it as yet not join'd with any Substantial ones) and is not so much as *thin* or *thick* to the touch, because not perceptible at all, and is truly that *τὸ μετ' ἀναίματος ἀπὸν* which || *Plato* ventured at, it being indeed tangible in it self, but not || *Chap. 8. sect. 2.* so to the touch of man or Angel, by reason of the infinite subtilty of the consistency thereof. And must needs be therefore as a *void Solitude* and *empty Space*, a mere *Vacuum* as to the search of any created sense; which roving up and down, could find no crassitude any where but what these perfect *Parvitudes* have, which are so infinitely subtle, that no Touch can perceive them, so that all will seem as absolutely *empty* and *void*.

And thirdly, this *wast Solitude* will be as *dark* as Pitch, insomuch that if the Sun were where it is now, and the rest of the *Vortex* were of this consistency of *Matter* I describe, it would be as black as Midnight, as I could easily demonstrate.

And lastly, for the *Fluidity* or *Waterishness* of it, it is infinitely more *Water*, that is to say, more *fluid* than Water it self; and if *Thales* his opinion had any truth in it, it must be found here. But || *Aristotle* || *Metaphysic. lib. 1. cap. 3.* seems to make this the Philosophy of far ancients Sages; Such, saith he, as made *Oceanus* and *Tethys* the fathers of Generation, *τῆς γενέσεως πατέρες*, (for so he speaks) and taught that *Water*, namely, *Styx*, was the Oath of the Gods. *Τιμώτατον δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ἔρεθ' ὃ τιμώτατον ἔστιν.* And certainly such a *Water* as this *Hyle* is, which I have described, which the Sun cannot so enlighten as to be seen through it, or any light from the Sun, must be a *Stygian* water indeed: and it is here observable, that the *Pythagoreans* called the *Monad*, *Styx*. So fitly does the nature of this *Physical Hyle* thus described, agree with those Attributes in *Moses* his Text.

2. But how will you be able, will you say, to make it sute with the character of the Day; namely, with an *Unite* or *Monad*, and so carry things down into the *Second Day's* work, so as you do in your *Metaphysical Hyle*, which you make the *Waters under the Firmament*, and that *Firmament* the vastly-extended matter, which is properly *divisible*, and therefore denoted by the *Binary*, and being framed into an *Aethereal* consistency, is called *Heaven*, which environs every *Earth*, as

lying next to the *Physical* waters thereof, which are every where to be gathered together into one place, &c?

Chap. 8.
sect. 2.

* *Ennead.* 2.
lib. 4. cap. 8.

I must confess, that the nature of the *Physical* Matter being *divisible*, and the *Binary* so express a note thereof, and the *Metaphysical* *ἐν π καὶ ἀπλῶν καὶ ἀσώματων*, as * *Plotinus* has described it, I could not withhold but conclude, that the *Metaphysical Hyle* belonged to the *First* day, and the *Physical* to the *Second*. Which is a very sober and safe Interpretation, as appears from what has been said. But I shall hold on, and try how tolerable the other will prove.

I say therefore, That this *Physical Hyle*, as I have described it, is also *ἐν π καὶ ἀπλῶν καὶ ἀσώματων*, in a very considerable sense. It is *one* and *simple*, that is to say, exactly *uniform* every where, and *indivisible* into any parts that are of a *different* nature; whereas the *Firmament* in the *Second* Day is distinguishable into the *First* and *Second* Element. And then again, as to any sense it is as good as *incorporeal*, being only *ἀπλὸν μετ' ἀναμεικσίας*, as *Plato* has phrased it to our hands, and therefore may well be ranged amongst incorporeal Beings. But besides, it consisting of actual *perfect Parvities*, and of nothing else, which are so many *Physical Monads*, and utterly *indivisible* in themselves, as the incorporeal Beings created the *First* day are, but separable, as they likewise are, one from another, it may unforcedly be referred to the *First* day's work.

3. But now as touching the *Waters under the Firmament*; This *Physical Hyle* thus considered with all that *ἀόρισία*, and *fluid Undeterminateness* of the Possibility of corporeal Creatures which is necessarily inherent in it, will be fitly and expressly enough those *inferior Waters*. And the *השמים* or *הרקיע*, the *Firmament* or *Heaven*, will be an Order of Being betwixt this *Physical Hyle*, (wherein is comprised the above said Possibility of things and *Indeterminateness*) and those *Immaterial Beings* that descend *εἰς γένεσιν*, and are noted by the name of *Superiour Waters*, or *Waters above the Firmament*. For this thin *Primordial Water*, consisting of mere *Physical Monads*, was before the *Firmament*, and filled all. Out of this, and in order next above it, was the *Heaven* or *Firmament*, or, as the *Greeks* call it, *Æther*; and next above this *Æther*, and which was created before it, is that part of the *World of Life* that descends into *generation*. This is the Order of things; and it is easily intelligible, you will say, that the *Æther* is a *middle Term* betwixt those two *Extremes*, the *Physical Hyle* and the *World of Life*.

4. But you will farther demand how this *Primordial Water*, this *Hyle*, consisting of mere *Physical Monads*, should ever coagulate or cruddle into that consistency of the *Æther*, which is made up of the *globular* particles, and of that thinner Element, but both much grosser than the first consistency of the Matter? But to this I have nothing to answer, but that that which, in the efformation of Animals, coagulates the first humid Matter there into such organized consistency of several degrees of crassitude as was fit to produce those two Elements of which the *Æther* does consist: and that though the *World* be a *Machina*; yet the *Mechanick* or *Artificer* is not *Matter*, but some other Principle in the *World of Life*.

Where-

Wherefore the *Monadical* consistency of the *Matter* being lost in the production of the *Aether*, and it expressly falling also into two distinct principles, which *Cartesius* has judiciously taken notice of, the Creation of this *Aether*, or *Heaven*, does naturally come under the character of the *Binary*, and is fittingly placed in the *Second Day*.

Nor is it needful to add how all things will now go on orderly as before, and how this *Aether* will environ the *Physical* or *Sensible* waters that cover the Earths, in which joint the *Literal* and *Philosophical Cabbala* easily fall in together, as they do in the *Fifth* and *Sixth Day's* Creation. Nor does it belong to this place to consider, how after the *Stygian* Darkness of these *Primordial Waters*, the *Matter* being coagulated, as was abovesaid, and set upon *Vortical Motion*, *Light* dawned out in infinite parts of the World, and the whole Heavens at last glistered bright with innumerable Suns or Stars, this speculation appertaining altogether to the *Fourth Day's* Work.

5. In the interim, it is plain that this new Interpretation is very passable: and though the Authority of *Plotinus*, and the *Platonists*, bear strong toward the first, whose suffrage may justly seem the more considerable, they being of the succession in the *Philosophick Cabbala*; yet that venerable Father of the Church, *St. Austine*, favours this second; and *Plato* himself calling *Matter* ἐναργεῖον ὃ μὴ ἔσται, seems to insinuate, that it is more than *Metaphysical*; as also *Plutarch* his affirming, that both *Plato* and *Aristotle* make the *Matter* σωματικὴν. But if this *Physical Hyle* be not conceived to have been of a *Monadical* consistence at first, this Interpretation which, upon that *Hypothesis*, is so plausible, or rather unexceptionable, will without it be found intolerable. For this *Hyle* will then be necessarily devolved to the *Binary*, or else the *Pythagorick* Numbers will signify nothing at all. But admitting it to have been of such a consistence at first, all things will follow smoothly and easily, and either Exposition prove fit and rational to any indifferent judgment; * but which to prefer, I leave to the liberty of the peruser. And yet I cannot abstain from casting in thus much in the behalf of this latter, That *Generation* is out of that which is more liquid than what is generated; and that there is nothing more liquid than the Heavens, unless this *Primordial Water* of *Monadical* consistence, this ancient *Styx*, the solemn Oath of the Gods, as you heard out of *Aristotle*.

S C H O L I A

In CAP. IX. Sect. 5.

UTRA verò alteri præferenda sit, Lectoris arbitrio determinandum permitto, &c. Heic ovare videtur *Andreades* & de me *Triumphum* affectare, quasi omnino fluctuarem nesciremque ipse quid tandem statuerem, sed undique constrictus difficultatibus & absurditatibus rem quasi in medio relinquere vellem. Sed enimvero fingit difficultates & angustias quas mihi optat, cum reverà nimis amplum potius sit spacium, duarumque valde

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P. 141.

valde concinnarum consentanearumque opinionum mihi detur optio, quam & Lectori humaniter offero. Quinimò utramque illi permittitur amplecti. Neque enim insolens est apud *Cabbalistas* sub uno *Symbolo* plures *Notiones* recondere, nec ulla est necessitas ut altera alteram excludat. Quodsi alterutra tantum retinenda esset, ut ingenuè fatear quod sentio, & à fluctuationis labe omni ac suspicione apud *S. A.* me liberem, *Materia Physica* isti *Hyle Metaphysicae*, meo quidem judicio est præferenda. Sed pro more *Cabbalistico* utramque rectius retinendam censeo, & idem *Symbolo Mosaico*, *Numeroque Pythagorico* subijciendam.

CHAP. X.

1. *The Fourth Objection, taken from the preposterous placing the Suns in the Fourth Day, and the Earths in the Third.* 2. *The Answers; First, That the inflexible Order of those Six mystical Numbers of the Creation was intended only as a Repository for memory and concealment, not for a book of accurately-digested Method.* 3. *Secondly, That the Method is not so reprehensible as is pretended, the Earth rightly following the Æther (which is the Second day's work) as the immediate effect thereof;* 4. *As does the garnishing of the Earth also, (as the first assured effect of the conjunction of the Active Principle with the Æther in the Second Day) but rightly precedes the Fourth day's work, as the End or Object thereof.* 5. *That it was not needful, nor it may be possible, that one and the same series of Text should bear a threefold sense with the same exactness of order in things belonging to each of them.*

1. **T**HE Fourth Objection is, That the Order of those things comprised in the Six day's creation, according to the Philosophick *Cabbala*, is harsh and preposterous; the work of the Fourth day being more naturally to be placed in the Third, Suns being before Planets, and Planets before there can be Earths to be garnished with Rivers, Plants, and Flowers. And therefore, according to the Priority of Nature, the Creation of *Suns* and *Planets* should have been placed before the garnishing of the *Earth* with Sea, Rivers, and Plants.

2. But I answer, That the Objection is made upon this mistake, as if the external *Cortex* of the Text of *Moses* in the order of the Six days Creation, were a Covering of limber silk, not a Cabinet made of hard Materials, and so figured and framed, that every part cannot be alike capable of receiving of every thing into it. Wherefore the rule of placing things must be the Cabinet it self, not our desire or phancy that would place them. Just so the case stands in this *mystical Repository* made up of the six first Numbers, whose natures are *immutable* and *inflexible*, and their order not to be *transposed* or *inverted*. And therefore those noble Truths of Philosophy that are to be couched or concealed under them, are to be laid in such as are *most significative* of them, and in *such order* as the Numbers themselves stand. From whence it was necessary that the garnishing of the Earth should precede the adorning of the Universe with Suns and Planets, because the

Num-

Number *Three* precedes the Number *Four* ; and these were the *fittest Numeral Boxes*, as I may so speak, for the receiving those great Truths hid in the Third and Fourth Day's Creation into this mysterious Cabinet ; which is only the *Repository of Memory*, and *mystical concealment*, not a Book of natural and accurately-digested Method ; but yet not the less serviceable for the occasional imparting these Mysteries to them that were thought worthy of them : which could not be without fuller Converse, wherein all things would be orderly and methodically unfolded.

3. And this Answer I hold so substantial, that I account it superfluous to add any thing more, though I might also contend that the order of the things themselves is not so unnatural as is pretended. * For the *Second* day's work is the *Æther* or *Heaven*, which consists of the *first* and *second* Element of *Des-Cartes*, whose *third* Element, which yet is the effect of the *first*, is all that of which the Earths consist. In what a natural order therefore does the consideration of the *Earth* succeed that of the *Firmament* or *Heaven* as the effect thereof, and so take place in the *Third* Day ? For though, by reason of some circumstance, as, namely, of the gathering together of the subtiler part of the *Æther*, by the recession of the *Vortex* into the form of a Sun, the Earth may be look'd upon as the Third from the *Æther* in order of production, and for this cause the *Ternary* be fitly called *Τριτογενεια* in *Pythagoras* his School ; yet it is also really an immediate product of that subtile principle in the *Æther*, and which is as much *Æther* as the other Principle therein. Wherefore the placing the *Earth* immediately after the *Æther* is, in this respect, according to natural Order, and may pass for tolerable Method.

4. The Garnishing also thereof with Land and Sea, Trees, Grass, and Flowers, is the first assured effect of that *Active Principle* united with Matter, mentioned in the *Second* Day's work. So that the *Earth*, with its vegetative Garnishings, does orderly enough succeed the Making of the *Heaven* or *Æther*, * but needs not be said to be created the *Third* day, because an *Earth* and *Primary Planet* being all one, it is comprised in the Creation of the Fourth. Wherefore the *Earths* with their Furniture succeed the *Second* Day's creation, as an *Effect* thereof ; but precede the *Fourth* Day's Creation, as being an *Object* of those things that are there said to be created. For the Sun, Moon, and Stars, are made to shine upon the Earth, and send down their influences thereon, for the seasonable resuscitations of the Seminal Powers of Plants and Herbs. So that the *Earth* seems to be the *Finis Cui* of the Creation of the *Luminaries* of Heaven as *Luminaries*, and therefore, according to the *Priority of Nature*, rightly enough precedes, whether as the *Final Cause* or *Object* of their Influence : As both the *Furniture* of the *Earths* and the *Luminaries* of Heaven precede in order, as *Objects* of the Senses of Man, and other Animals that are said to be created on the *Fifth* and *Sixth* days.

And thus the Order of the whole *Six* days Creation in the Philosophical sense is natural enough and Logically coherent, though not every where under the notion of *Causality*, nor this *Causality* every where that of the *Efficient*.

5. And

5. And it had been a needless Miracle, and it may be impossible, to contrive one and the same Text to answer in accurate Order to the popular Appearances of things, to the severity of Philosophick Truth, and the Moral Allegory at once. With all which this Text of *Moses* is charged, and does to admiration make good the design as to all considerable intents and purposes: but an exact concatenation of the Series of things throughout is more than ought to be expected, no such Accuracy being industriously intended, but only that the Order of Numbers according to their *significancy* should be a *Repository* of Notes and Remembrances; but the management of the *Cabbala* it self, (that is, of the ancient Philosophy of the Jews) left to the skill of the *Mystagogus*, when he was consulted, who would not fail to declare all things in a due and natural Method.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. X. Sect. 3.

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P. 143.

NAM *secundi diei opus est Æther sive Cælum quod ex primo secundoque elemento Cartesii consistit, &c.* Quod S. A. hinc objicit, non magis profectò est momenti. Dicit enim me præter Cartesii mentem asserere Cælum ex primo & secundo Elemento componi cum ex secundo tantum constet. Ego verò per Cælum intelligo Ætherem. Ætherem verò ex globulis & Materia subtilissima constare nemo qui vel primoribus labiis Philosophiam Cartesianam delibaverit unquam inficiabitur. Intervalla enim illa triangularia inter globulos satis magnam Materiæ subtilissimæ partem necessariò retinent, cum vacuum nusquam in rerum universitate reperiatur. Et ex hac mixtura reverà fit *αιθήρ*, sive *אֵתֶר*, id est, Liquidum quoddam igneum, quemadmodum alibi notamus.

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P. 142.

Sect. 4. Sed nihil opus est ut dicatur creari die tertio, quoniam Terra & Planeta primarius unum idemque sunt, & quarti proinde diei creatione comprehenditur. Quid ad hæc S. A. Quis hanc impiam, ait, audaciam ferat, Mose in faciem contradicere ut tua commenta stabilias? cum is distinctionem & ornatum Terræ ad diem tertium referat, ad quartum nihilominus revocare tantum quia primarius Planeta videtur? &c. Mitte contumelias & maledicta, bone Andreæ! & rem seriò placidèque mecum perpende. Philosophiam tuam imploro, ut qui Philosophiæ Professor es, si non Terra est Planeta primarius, perinde atque Luna, secundarius. Theologiæ verò peritiam, cum sis Theologiæ Doctor, si non plerique omnes sanioris judicii Interpretes, Luthero Calvinòque non exceptis, per Terram, confusam aliquam inanemque ac vacuum molem intelligunt, quam tanquam Materiam primam, ex qua Mundus formandus esset, sed à Deo creatam, considerant? Quis igitur non doleat tam præcipientem in Juvene Theologo cavillandi ac maledicendi pruriginem, qui nè eis quidem, quæ tam solido innituntur fundamento, parcere noverit, eaque non solum ut falsa sed impia proculcare ausus sit & execrari? Quæ tamen non modò vera sed necessaria sunt mentique Mosaica apprimè consentanea. Terra enim, supposito quòd ea, quæ in principio me-

memoratur, Materia Mundana sit adhuc confusa & informis, *nullo die creatur* quatenus Terra, *ornatur* tamen *die tertio*; quatenus verò *Planeta primarius* necessariò *Die quarto* creatur, inter reliqua Luminaria. Quis igitur magis *Mosi* in faciem contradicit, isne qui *Terram*, quamvis *Planeta* sit, *die quarto* creatam negat, immò verò ullo die creatam; an ille qui aliquo die creatam affirmat, & eo ipso insuper *Die quo Moses*? Unde *Impietas* perinde ac *Falsitas* in ipsum *Andreaden* meritò retorquetur. Qui cum *Terram Materiam* quidem *Physicam*, licet non *Metaphysicam* significare concedit perinde ac *Cælum Lucemve, Spiritus Angelosve*, eo ipso *Mosi* in faciem contradicit, nullum diem *Terræ creationi* relinquens, nedum quem ipse *Moses*, putà quartum. Tertium enim *Moses* non *Creationi Telluris* assignat, sed illius ornatui. Aded ut *Andreade* in *Mosen* temeritas multiplici audaciæ cortice incrustetur, dum *Cabbalas* imperitè confundit & *Philosophicam* miscet cum *Literali*. Creari verò Luminaria *die quarto* quid secundum *Cabbalam Philosophicam* significet, satis in ipsa *Cabbala* explicavi, Numeris naturam rerum creaturarum non temporis ordinem significantibus. Quod optimè convenit cum Dicto illo apud *Lutherum* in *Genes. cap. 1.* *Hilarius & Augustinus quasi duo maxima Ecclesiæ Lumina sentiunt Mundum creatum subito & simul, non successivè per sex dies.* Quomodo autem sensus *Creationis Literalis & Historicus* verus etiam sit, in *Apologia* satis diligenter aperui.

C H A P. XI.

1. *The Fifth Objection answered, concerning the pretended Trivialness of the Fifth Day's Work: 2. As also of the work of the Sixth day. 3. An Answer to the Sixth Objection, against that τσεολογία implied in our Interpretation of Paradise; First, in reference to Grammar and Criticism: 4. Secondly, in reference to the nature of things themselves. 5. An Answer to the last Objection, made against the interpreting the Cherubim and Flaming Sword to be a state that Adam must pass through, or into, before he can become immortal. 6. That there was a necessity of so punctually and continuedly fitting a Philosophical sense to Moses his Text, because of the Interruption of the Tradition of the Mosaick Philosophy.*

1. **A**S for the pretended *Trivialness* of the *Fifth* and *Sixth* Days work; I think it is apparent from what we have noted on the *Fifth* Day, that *Moses* his ranging of *Fish* and *Fowl* together, is a consideration not *vulgar* and *trivial*, but *Philosophical*. * And his *Distinctly* allotting them a *Morning* and *Evening*, that is, an *Active* and *Passive* principle, is the pointing at a Truth very weighty, and useful for the giving a timely stop to that dangerous mistake of making mere *Matter* capable of sense and cogitation; which would be a great prejudice to the belief of the Existence of humane Souls themselves.

2. And for the *Sixth* day's work, there is yet less reason for such a Detraction. For, first, he is *Philosophically* judicious in * reckoning *Man* amongst the *Mediterraneous Animals*; because the conformation of their

their inward parts especially, is nearer one another than to either that of *Birds* or *Fishes*: And the external similitude of *Mankind* with *Apes* (whose *species* are many) is so near also, and goes off so by degrees to those that are more thoroughly *Quadrupedal*, that it is evident that men and they are held together naturally in one subordinate rank and *Series*. And then again, that is of very great moment, there being this nearness and affinity in outward and inward conformation of parts betwixt *Men* and *Beasts*, especially some kind of *Apes*, so distinctly and expressly to declare, that *Man* notwithstanding is of a condition *highly raised* above them, and of a nature *plainly Divine*, being, in respect of his Soul, the Image and Likeness of God; and (which is remarkable) not less such for her actuating this Terrestrial body as God does the World: as is insinuated in the *Cabbala* it self, and is so weighty a Philosophical truth, that it is not fit for every man's consideration.

Nor is the mention of their multiplication, which refers to the contrivance of the genital Organs in all Creatures, both in the *Fifth* and *Sixth* day, as also of the provision of food, low and trivial, but noble speculations, and the grand pledges of a Divine Providence. So widely are they mistaken, that think thus meanly of what is mentioned in the *Fifth* and *Sixth* days Creation.

Gen. 2. 8.

3. The Sixth Objection is against our going back into our Exposition of the eighth verse of the second chapter, and fetching things higher than from the Efformation of *Adam* out of the ground; whenas, according to the order of the Narration, *after Adam* was made, God planted him a Garden to solace himself in, &c. But I answer, that I have done no violence to *Grammar* at all, in this my Exposition that seems thus preposterous. For *Vatablus* himself reads it, *Plantaverat autem Deus, &c.* And I only adjoin, & *posuerat illic hominem quem formavit*, for his & *posuit quem formaverat*: For the *Preterimperfect*, *Preterperfect*, and *Preterpluperfect Tenses*, are expressed all alike in the *Hebrew*. And that I have in the *Cabbala* interferred *postea*, [which *afterward* he formed into a terrestrial Animal] both the mention immediately preceding of that kind of Efformation, and the propriety of the word *וַיַּעַשׂ* warrants me to it. For this *Terrestrial* efformation of *Adam*, was after the planting of *Paradise*, according to the wiser sort of them that understand the Text only literally, who acknowledge that *Paradise* was made on the *Third* Day, when God caused the Trees to germinate out of the Earth. And therefore it is not harsh to take the same liberty in our *Philosophick Cabbala*.

4. But now if we respect the *things themselves*, and the strict *Philosophical* sense of them, the order of the Narration, according to our Exposition, is admirably natural and easy: This History of *Paradise*, and *Adam's* fall from that Happiness, being immediately subjoined to the repetition of his *Terrestrial Efformation*, as containing the cause and reason why so noble a Creature as *Man* should ever appear in this *Terrestrial* body, whereby he is ranked amongst Brutes. It insinuates therefore, that it was not so at first with him, but that God had placed him in a more Heavenly condition, and that by the temptation of the Devil, he fell from that state, and sinking by degrees, was at
last

last, absorpt into *Terrestrial* generation, and was clad in the *skins of Beasts*.

And there are of the *Jews* that interpret this very *Paradise* of a state before the *World* was created, reckoning it amongst the *seven things* that were created before the *World*. From whence it does plainly follow, that if *Adam* was placed in this *Paradise*, he was before he appeared in an *Earthly Body*. Which is expressly the Opinion of the *Jews*, as appears from what || *Menasseh Ben Israel* cites out of *Ge-* || *De Creat.*
maria Hagaiga: In cælo Empyreo esse domicilia vitæ, & pacis, & animarum *Probl. 15.*
justorum & Spirituum, atque etiam animarum istarum quæ in Mundum *sect. 5.*
ventura sunt. And out of *Beresbith Rabba* he saith, That the wise men of his Nation interpret that of the *Psalms*, *Post & ante me formasti*, of *Psal. 139. 4.*
the creating *Adam*, that is, mankind, *first* in the *First* day, and after in the *Sixth*.

Adam was therefore created amongst the *Angelical Orders*, part of the *First Day's* Creation, when God made *Heaven* or *Light*. All which Intellectual Orders of Beings then created are called *Heaven* and *Light*, because, as I have intimated * before, their first and immedi- • *Chap. 7.*
ate vestment or vehicle is *lucid* or *æthereal*, in which they stood *Proba-* *sect. 8.*
tioners. And it would be no less than a Demonstration that this was their first state, if, after the discussion of the darkness of the *Chaos*, speaking *Physically*, all the *World* was either light or diaphanous, I mean either *Suns* or *Æther*; as it would naturally be, if the Original of all *Planets* were the *Incrustation* of Stars or *Suns*. But this is an Excursion so wild, or so wide, that I am awakened, as it were with a fright, out of this *Reverie* or *Dream*.

5. The seventh and last Objection is against our interpreting the *Cherubim* and *flaming Sword*, (in the close of our *Cabbala*) to be a State that *Adam*, or *Terrestrial Mankind*, is to enter into, before they can be repossessed of the *celestial Paradise*, and become capable of *Eternal Life*; whenas the Text seems to import, that the *Cherubim* and *flaming Sword* are not to let in, but to keep *Adam* out of *Paradise*.

But to this I answer, That after God had driven *Adam* out of *Eden* to till the ground, *אשר לקח טעם*, from whence the terrestrial *Adam* is taken, or, if you will, was taken, according as was mentioned before, (for the Argument of the Narration was the *Terrestrial Adam*, what he had been, and how he came to fall) after, I say, that *Adam* was turned out of *Paradise*, and that he became *Terrestrial* and *Mortal*, God (according to the Text) is only said to place *Cherubims* and a *flaming sword* to keep the way of the *Tree of Life*. Which does not imply an utter prohibition of all passage but through this *Fiery Guard*. And it is as proper for a Porter or Guard, to let in, as to keep out. So little incongruity is there in the sense we have given in that respect.

And that these *Fiery flaming Cherubims* are an Hieroglyphick of a certain State that the *Terrestrial* man must pass into, before he can come to the enjoyment of a blessed Immortality, this is no private conceit of mine, but has the suffrage of no less than Five several Interpreters on the place; namely, *St. Ambrose*, *Origen*, *Lactantius*, *Basil*, and *Rupertus*, as *Cornelius à Lapide* affirms: who says, it is the joint Opinion of them all, grounded upon this Text, to wit, That there

is a Fire set before the entrance into Heaven, which all Souls must pass, St. Peter and St. Paul not excepted, that they may be tried and purged thereby, if there be any impurity in them. So warrantable is it to make these *Fiery Cherubims* an Emblem of some state or condition of the Soul, that must fit it for the tasting of the *Fruit* of the Tree of Immortality. But the phancying of this to be the passing through an *external* Flame, or Fire, I must confess I think has too much of the *Μυθώδης* and *Παυδαειώδης* in it, to be admitted for the sense of the *Philosophick Cabbala*.

Wherefore I interpreted it of the *Fiery* or *Æthereal Vehicle*, or of the condition of the *flaming Cherubims*; namely, That we cannot attain to the state of Immortality before we pass into this order of Beings, and become like unto them.

Whereas therefore it is said, that these *Flaming Cherubims* keep the way to the Tree of Life, being placed before the Garden of *Eden*, it is but in such a sense as when *Hesiod* says,

Τῆς δ' ἀστῆς ἰσπῶτα θεοὶ ἐμμεγίστην ἔμμεν,

That God has made Labour the porter of the Gate of Vertue; and in such as *Virgil* places Grief, and Care, and Sickneß, and Old Age, at the entrance of *Orcus*,

*Vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci
Luctus & ultrices posuere cubilia Curae, &c.*

Of which certainly there is no other sense in either place, than that by being *laborious* a man shall attain unto *Vertue*, and no otherwise; and that by being overcharged with *Care*, *Grief*, *Sickneß*, or *Old age*, a man shall be sent packing into the state of the dead. So *Spencer*, to omit several other instances in him, in making those two grave personages, *Humilta* and *Ignaro*, the one the Porter of the House of Holiness, the other of the Castle of *Duess*, can understand nothing else thereby but this, That he that would enter into the House of Holiness, must be like *Humilta*, an humble man; and he that can conscientiously pass into the communialty of the imposturous *Duess*, must be a very *Ignaro*.

In like manner, the sense of the placing these *flaming Cherubims* before Paradise and the gate to the Tree of Life, is only that they may be for an Hieroglyphical Representation, to shew what a one a man must be, or what state or condition he must partake of, or pass into, before he can arrive to a blessed Immortality; namely, that he must recover his *fiery Vehicles*, be made *Angelical*, ἁγίωσις, and enter as it were into the order and condition of the *Celestial Angels*. Which I think is so easie and unexceptionable a sense, that nothing can be more.

Unless peradventure it may seem still easier, if we superadd also, That the being assimilated to these *Cherubick Orders*, is not without considerable Colluctation and Conflict, the Soul not being able to approach the *Angelical* nature in her inward advances but with pain and agony. (Who shall dwell with devouring fire? who shall dwell with everlasting

lasting burnings? He that walketh righteously, he shall dwell on high, &c.) Which Colluctation, or, if you will, Digladiation, may be represented by the *flaming sword turning every way*: As if the meaning were, That he that would recover the capacity of eating of the fruit of the Tree of Life, must first undergo the combat with the *fiery Angelical* nature, through which state he is to pass before he can come to be made partaker of life and immortality. For that *external Things* and *Persons* are the *Symbols* and *Hieroglyphicks* of *internal Dispensations* in Holy Scripture, is so trite and obvious, that I need not take notice thereof.

6. I have by this time, I hope, made all smooth and plain in my *Philosophical Cabbala*, and taken away every imaginable scruple concerning the fitness and concinnity of things, and clearness of those grounds I go on, and have so expressly and articulately in every punctilio fitted a Philosophical sense to the Letter of the Text, that I must confess I do not hold it probable, that either *Pythagoras* or any one else had so particular and minute an account of the *Cabbala* thereof from any *Jewish Priest* or *Prophet*, supposing they had any at all, as my self have given. Not that I am so vain as to imagine with my self, that I have a certainer knowledge of the meaning of the *Mosaical Text* in this *Philosophical* way than they had; but because it was not needful for them to insist upon so curiously fitting a sense to every clause thereof as I have done: they being able to perswade their inquisitive *Mysta* upon the faith of a continued Tradition, that this or that was the *Philosophical* meaning of *Moses*; whereas this Tradition being interrupted so many Ages, I was necessitated to find a rational account or meaning of every thing, lest the probability of truth should be doubted in all.

Which if any one think too great a curiosity, as it may be it is, (and yet why should a man conceit he has found any thing fit that was not intended by that Wisdom that prevents all thoughts?) he may content himself with those more plain and general strokes of the *Cabbala*, not expecting to find every passage of the Text concerned in such a *Philosophical* sense: For thus the whole Contexture will be as an *Apple of Gold with pictures of Silver*, as I have already noted out of *Maimonides*. But if I have fitted a *Philosophical* sense to every clause with that unexceptionableness, that he can hardly refrain his assent, I hope he has no cause to complain, that the *Cabbalist* has put into his hand a *Ball of pure and continued Gold*.

SCHOLIA.

In CAP. XI. Sect. I.

Quodque eis Mane & Vesperam, hoc est, Activum & Passivum Principium, &c. Nihilne, hic, inquit S. A. inter opera quinta diei reperire Exam. Gener. potuit Cabbalista observatione dignum præter istam fictitiâ de Principio? 145, 146. Activo & Passivo Speculationem, quæ tamen secundum ipsum omnibus diebus communis est? Annon saltem Cetos magnos nominatim in Textu sacro

& ab ipso quoque in Cabbala Philosophica expressos ceu argumentum eximii operis potuit allegare? Verum de opinionibus suis Platonice tantum sollicitus erat. Hæc ille. Respondeo verò, Nihilne præter istud Principium Activum & Passivum memoro, cum proximè præcedenti lineâ Avium Pisciumque conjunctionem sub opere ejusdem diei tanquam considerationis Philosophicæ noto? Sed non æquo animo fert *Andreades* quod *Cetos* istos *magnos* prætereo, quales describere, fateor, potuerim, si libuisset, ex *Dionysio Afro*, *Erythreum* mare frequentantes,

Ἀμφὶ δὲ πάντῃ
κῆτεα θῖνες ἔχουσιν Ἐρυθραίου βότα πόντου,
οὐρεσὶν ἡλιεατοῖσιν ἐοικότα

En tibi *Cetos*, *Andreade*, *montium* instar, si magnitudinem admiraris,
Et paulò post,

Πολλάκι δ' αὖ καὶ ἦν αὐτῆς ἀνδραγαθὸς ἥδον
κεῖνα κατὰ βράχους τετρατά

En *monstra* totam Navem cum vectoribus uno haustu absorbentia, si adeò volupe sit *Andreade* res magnas ac monstrosas contemplari. Quantum cum hoc juvene Philosopho (si & nobis paululum cum eo juvenari liceat) officiosus quispiam iniret gratiam, qui eum per oppidum circumduceret, non ad vivendos Leones & Urso, cum ad hanc quintam diem non pertineant, sed aves maximas quasque, ut Avem *Emeu*, *Struthiocamelum*; & Imaginationem saltem interea reficeret *Historiola* de Ave *Ruch* quæ Elephantum dicitur è Terræ-matris gremio unguibus eripere posse & volando in sublime auferre. Quantæ huic oblectationi forent hæc tam ampla Spectacula? Potest tamen interim pro opulenta suæ Philologiæ copia, memorare si velit quis fuerit è Patribus aut Philosophis qui dixit Deum maximum esse in minimis, nostramque magnorum istorum Cetorum præteritionem sic excusare; vel quod propius ad rem accedit, recordari apud seipsum nos in *Cabbala Philosophica* non *Literali* versari. Philosophum verò non decere nudam rerum naturalium recensionem, sed eximium quid ad eas pertinens insuper notare. Quod & *Mosen* fecisse contendo eo quòd *Pisces* & *Aves* sub unum diem reduxit, propter naturarum affinitatem, animasque habere innuit à corporibus distinctas, nempe *Principio* gaudere *Matutino* perinde atque *Vespertino*. Quod magni momenti est contra *Atheos* & *Epituroes*, qui nè animam humanam à corpore distinctam agnoscunt. Quòd autem Speculationem de *Principio Activo* & *Passivo* fictitiam vocat, id profectò admodum temerè & imperitè facit, cum dogma illud in scriptis meis passim rationibus validis ac invictis demonstraverim. Esse scilicet in rebus omnibus creatis *Vespertinum* ac *Matutinum*, hoc est, *Materiale* & *Spirituale* Principium, earumque fabricam in Rationes merè Mechanicas nequaquam posse resolvi. Quòd verò insuper innuit *Platonicam* esse, dico eò esse probabilius quòd *Mosaica* sit, illiusque Textui consentanea.

Seçt. 2. In recensendo Hominem inter Animalia mediterranea, &c. Cum Exam. Gener. Monstris se congressurum fingit S. A. in hoc Paragrapho. Primum est, quòd
p. 146. Hominem inter Animalia mediterranea referam contra Scripturam & Cabbalam propriam, cum utraque Hominis creationem à productione Animalium di-

distinguant. Alterum, quòd errore gemino Imaginem Dei velim in animo relucere etiam quatenus corpus actuat. Nam & falsum est, ait ille, Deum esse Animam Mundi, & erroneum quoque Animam corpus informantem eo ipso Imaginem Dei referre. In primo autem monstro nihil monstrofi inesse palam est, quippe quòd nec contra Scripturam nec contra propriam Cabbalam arietat, utraque enim Operi sextæ diei tum Animalia cætera Mediterranea, tum Hominem accensent. Et appello tuos ipsius oculos, ni Andreade, videturne tibi homo Animal Mediterraneum an Avis Piscifve? Qualis est profectò (si Animal Mediterraneum non sit) nempe aut Ὀρνιθάνθρωπος aut Ἰχθυάνθρωπος. Vidēsne qualia monstra ipse alis, dum monstra meis scriptis immeritò affingis? Et quod ad alterum monstrum attinet, Noli tibi ab ipso metuere. Magnum quiddam est (& ipse magna admiraris ut qui Cetorum præteritionem tam inclementer ferebas) nequaquam autem monstrosum, si rectè rem accipias. Annon omnes ferè Philosophi Hominem tanquam Microcosmum, animumque humanum tanquam Microcosmi hujus (ut Deum Macrocosmi) moderatorem considerant? Nec tamen simpliciter quatenus corpus hoc actuat, dico Animum hominis Imaginem Dei referre, sed quatenus intellectuales suas ac Divinas operationes etiam dum corpus actuat, liberè exercet μὴ συμφερόν μὴδὲ συμπάδων τῇ σώματι, ut loquuntur Platonici, qui status erat illius Adami qui in Textu dicitur ad imaginem Dei creatus. Animi verò in corpus per scædas libidines immerfi illiusque Cupiditatibus dediti, Divinam hanc imaginem perdunt & in brutorum ferè censum ordinemve transeunt. Animus igitur hominis in eo statu creatus genuina erat Dei imago, quam Platonici εἰκόνα propriè vocant. In aliis verò animabus concedo, cum Platonici, Dei quædam quasi εἰδωλα sive ἰνδάλματα elucere. Dei verò Imaginem eas neutiquam referre certissimum est, ut nec Deum esse Animam Mundi, sed Animarum omnium Animam quemadmodum eum appellat Synesius in Hymnis, Ψυχῶν Ψυχὰς, φύσις αἰ φυσίων. Nec ipse Nature Spiritus sine eo vivere potest aut subsistere qui Anima Mundi aliquo sensu dici potest. Deus autem nequaquam sic potest dici, sed Creator illius quod Materiam Mundanam actuat.

CHAP. XII.

1. The Cabbalist's Apologie whereby he would clear himself of the imputation of either trifling Curiosity, 2. Rashness in divulging such hidden Mysteries, 3. Or of Inconstancy in judgment. 4. The main Aim of his Philosophick Cabbala. 5. The reason of placing it before the Moral.

I. **T**HUS much in Defence of my Philosophick Cabbala. It will not be unseasonable to subjoin something by way of Apology for the Cabbalist: For I find my self liable to no less than three several imputations, viz. of trifling Curiosity, of Rashness, and of Inconstancy of Judgment.

And as for the first, I know that men that are more severly Philosophical and rational will condemn me of too much curious pains in applying Natural and Metaphysical Truths to an uncertain and lubricous

Text or Letter; whenas they are better known, and more fitly convey'd by their proper proof and arguments, than by fancying they are aimed at in such obscure and Ænigmatical Writings.

But I answer, There is that fit and full congruity of the *Cabbala* with the Text, besides the backing of it with advantages from the History of the first rise of the *Pythagorical* or *Platonical* Philosophy, that it ought not to be deemed a fancy, but a very high probability, That there is such a *Cabbala* as this belonging to the *Mosaical Letter*: especially if you call but to mind how luckily the nature of *Numbers* sets off the work of every day, according to the sense of the *Cabbala*.

And then again, for mine own part, I account no pains either curious or tedious that tend to a common good; And I conceive no smaller a part of mankind concerned in my labours, than the whole Nation of the *Jews* and *Christendom*; to say nothing of the ingenious *Persian*, nor to despair of the *Turk*, though he be for the present no friend to Allegories.

Wherefore we have not placed our pains inconsiderately, having recommended so weighty and useful Truths in so religious a manner to so great a part of the world.

2. But for the imputation of *Rashness*, in making it my business to divulge those secrets or mysteries that *Moses* had so sedulously covered in his obscure Text; I say, it is the privilege of Christianity, the times now more than ever requiring it, to pull off the veil from *Moses* his face: And that though they be grand Truths that I have discovered, yet they are as useful as sublime, and cannot but highly gratify every good and holy man that can competently judge of them.

3. Lastly, for *Inconstancy of Judgment*, which men may suspect me of, having heretofore declared the Scripture does not teach men Philosophy; I say, the change of a man's judgment for the better is no part of Inconstancy, but a Vertue; nay, part of that Vertue which is Constancy, it being the constant purpose of a good man to embrace that which is best and truest; whenas to persist in what we find false, is nothing but perverseness and pride. And it will prove no small argument for the truth of this present *Cabbala*, in that the evidence thereof has fetch'd me out of my former opinion wherein I seemed engaged.

But to say the truth, I am not at all inconsistent with my self; for I am still of opinion, That the Letter of the Scripture teaches not any precept of Philosophy concerning which there can be any controversy amongst men. * And when you venture beyond the *Literal* sense, you are not taught by the Scripture; but what you have learned some other way, you apply thereto. And they ought to be no trash, nor trivial *Notions*, nor confutable by Reason or more solid Principles of Philosophy, that a man should dare to cast upon so sacred a Text; but such as one is well assured will bear the strictest examination, and that lead to the more full knowledge of God, and do more clearly fit the *Phænomena* of Nature and external Providence to his most precious Attributes, and tend to the furthering of the holy Life, which I do again profess is the sole end of the Scripture. And he that

that ventures beyond the *Letter* without that guide will soon be bewilder'd, and lose himself in his own fancies.

4. Wherefore if this *Philosophick Cabbala* of mine, amongst those many other advantages I have recited, had not this also added unto it, the aim of advancing the *divine Life* in the world, I should look upon it as both false and unprofitable, and should have rested satisfied with the *Moral Cabbala*. For the *divine Life* is above all *Natural* and *Metaphysical* knowledge whatsoever. And that man is a perfect man that is truly righteous and prudent, whom I know I cannot but gratify with my *Moral Cabbala* that follows. But if any more zealous pretender to prudence and righteousness, wanting either leisure or ability to examine my *Philosophical Cabbala* to the bottom, shall notwithstanding either condemn or admire it; he has unbecomingly and indiscreetly ventured out of his own Sphere, and I cannot acquit him of *Injustice* or *Folly*.

5. Nor did I place my *Cabbala's* in this order, out of more affection and esteem of *Philosophy* than of *true holiness*, but have ranked them thus according to the order of Nature: the holy and divine Life being not at all, or else being lost in man, if it be not produc'd and conserv'd by a radicated acknowledgement of those grand Truths in the *Philosophick Cabbala*, viz. The existence of the *Eternal God*, and a certain expectation of more consummate happiness upon the dissolution of this mortal Body. For to pretend to Vertue and Holiness without reference to God, and a Life to come, is but to fall into a more dull and flat kind of *Stoicism*, or to be content to feed our Cattel on this side *Jordan*, in a more discreet and religious way of *Epicurism*, or at least of degenerate *Familism*.

S C H O L I A

In C A P. XII. Sect. 3.

ET quando quicquam audes ultra sensum literalem, ex Scriptura non doceris, sed quod aliunde edoctus es, &c. In hunc locum sic animadvertit S. A. Quod perinde est, ait ille, ac si scripsisset, Expositionem suam ex earum numero esse quæ sensum non eruunt ex Scripturis, sed in easdem inferunt. Quam temeritatem quomodo cum Hilarii notissimo monito de dictorum sententia expectanda potius ex dictis quam imponenda, & referenda magis quam asserenda (ut lib. 1. de Trinitate loquitur) conciliaturus sit ipse viderit. Respondeo verò, de hoc nostro Expositionis genere (est enim ut quando Oedipus quis *Ænigma* solvit, quod facere non potest nisi ex rebus præcognitis quas ad *Ænigma* applicet) inscite & intempestive hoc Hilarii monitum asserri. Quippe quum perinde hic se res habeat atque in exponendis Vaticiniis Danielis putà aut Apocalypseos, ubi necesse est Historiam aliunde accersitam Vaticiniis explicandis applicare, quam nisi prius noverit, Vaticiniis applicare non potest Interpretes. Quemadmodum igitur Vaticinia Apocalyptica non docent nos Historiam, sed verà aptaque Historiâ aliunde haustâ rectè illustrantur verèque exponuntur:

Exam. Gener.
P. 52.

ponuntur: ita *Bereſbith Moſaicum* cū ſtylo *Prophético Myſticōve* ſcriptum ſit, quanquam in *Litera*, *Philosophiam* non magis nos doceat, quam *Vaticinia Apocalyptica* *Historiam*; *Theorematis* tamen *Philosophicis*, ſublimibus pariter atque ſolidis, *Textuſque Moſaici* majeſtate dignis, illique aptè congruentibus, quanquam aliunde accerſitis, citra omnem errorem aut temeritatem poteſt explicari. Atque hoc quidem in loco ſatis opportunum fore ſpero, ſi eis quæ habet vir eruditus, (pag. 11.) respondeam: ubi, Ponamus, inquit, vera eſſe quæ à viro doctiſſimo in *Cabbala ſua* *Philosophica traduntur*; nullum dubium eſſe quin *Philosophi iſti ita ſenſerint*, à *Judæis eadem hauſerint* aquè ac *veterum nonnulli ab utriſque, quin quadrent ſapientie Moſis, Phænomenis Naturæ & Attributis Divinis*; annon ergo ſaltem ſenſus iſte quatenus ex primo *Capite Geneſeos hauritur, vel eidem potiùs infertur, in authoritatem Traditionis Judaicæ, & conſentientem Gentilium quorundam ſapientiam vel veterum quorundam opinionem penitus refunditur*? Reſp. Nequaquam, Tantum abeſt ut penitus in authoritatem *Traditionis Judaicæ ſapientiamve Gentilium*, opinionemve quorundam veterum refundatur, ut potiſſimum fundamentum in eo poſitum ſit, quòd tam ſublimis ſolidæque veritates & ad explicandam tuendamque *Divinam Providentiam* apprimè utiles, tam aptà tamque perpetuâ tum rerum tum numerorum cum *Textu Moſaico* congruitate convenient, quemadmodum certiffimæ notiſſimæque *Historiæ cum Vaticiniis*. Sicut verò in *Vaticiniis* interpretandis, quanquam ex certa facti notiſſima ad ſatis certum *Vaticinii ſenſum* pervenimus, (in *Vaticiniis* putà de adventu Chriſti;) ad majorem tamen ornatum, antiquiorum *Rabbinorum* interpretationes ante Chriſti adventum ad fidem apud *Judæos præſertim faciendam, adhibemus*; ita, tametſi ex firmitudine ac ſoliditate rerum, perſpicuæque tum rerum tum numerorum aptitudine, & *Quaternarii* præter cæteros (ut taceam Numerorum nomina) ſatis conſtare poteſt verum nos ſenſum *Myſticum Textuſ Moſaici* aperuiſſe; non exiguum tamen ornatum & plauſibilitatem addit conſtans illa apud veteres fama *Pythagoreos ſapientiam ſuam à Judæis accepiſſe, ipſoſque Judæos Myſticum Textuſ Moſaici ſenſum ſemper agnoviſſe, & ſimilia*. Et ſicut denique, ea præſertim *Vaticinia* quæ certis quibuſdam temporum rationibus ac ſynchroniſmis circumſcribuntur, non ſolùm certò intelliguntur ab Eventis, ſed aliquo modo, ſi opus eſſet, fidem facerent Eventis apud *Historicos* memoratis; ita ſanè non inficior, quin *Textus Moſaicus, Numeris* etiam iſtis *Myſticis* tam pulchrè limitatus, non ſolùm intelligatur ex maximè ſolidis maximèque utilibus veræ *Philosophiæ dogmatis*, qualia nos explicavimus, ſed eiſdem viciffim non exiguam dignitatem conciliet atque fidem. Tantum abeſt, quod dixi, ut penitus in *Authoritatem Traditionis Judaicæ ullorumve ſapientum*, ſed potiùs in mirabilem *Textuſ Moſaici* cum ſolidiſſimis quibuſque ac ſublimiſſimis *Philosophiæ Theorematis* congruitatem tota res refundatur, ut *Vaticiniorum* Interpretationes in accuratam congruitatem cum *Eventis*.

Atque hæc ad ſingula loca præcipua quæ impugnare conatus eſt *Samuel Andrea*, quæque ſi enervâſſet, noxam aliquam & damnum firmitudini *Cabbalæ* illaturus fuiſſet, respondenda cenſui. Quod reliquum eſt, & ad totam ferè *Cabbalam* ſpectat, minimi omnium eſt momenti, nempe quòd non unam Sectam unumve *Philosophum* per omnia ſæcula ſequor,

quor, in *Cabbala* concinnanda applicandâque Textui *Mosaico*, sed quasi τῆς αἰρέσεως ἐκλεκτικῆς Sectator, ex diversis Philosophis, Sectisve quæ mihi visum sit, seligo, è *Pythagora*, è *Judeis*, è *Cartesio*, &c. hoc est, quod præcipua quæque tanquam flores è singulis decerpo, quibus sacro Capiti *Mosis* coronam contexam. Quis verò rerum satis gnarus & ingenuus hoc mihi vitio verterit, modò veritates istæ satis dignæ sint *Scripturae majestate*, & tum inter se tum Textui *Mosaico* consentiant? Quod quidem fieri abunde demonstravimus. Immo verò pleraque unius esse filii vel ab una Secta derivari, *Pythagorica* putâ. Cui tamen affinitatis gratiâ ac ornatûs alia magna nomina sæpius adjungo. Atque hæc ad omnia quæ illius momenti apud *S. A.* videri possunt, dicta sunt.

Reliquas leviores argumentorum vellicationes, Mimicæve cavillationes & falsæ & indecoræ convitia, nec *Philosophiæ* nec *Theologiæ* multoquæ minùs *Christianitatis* professore digna, tanquam Responso indigna prætereo. Neque tamen hoc celabo, tantam in nonnullis locis apud eum fuisse vim veritatis, ut multa quæ ad causam nostram non mediocriter faciant aut ultro concessa aut è veteribus recitata non dubitârit depromere. Qualia sunt,

Pag. 7. *Augustinum* cum *Ambrosio* asserere *Platonem* nostris literis per *Hieremiam* fuisse imbutum, ut illa posset docere & scribere quæ jure laudantur. *Lactantium* mirari *Pythagoram* & *Platonem* Religionem *Judeorum* amplexos non esse, quandoquidem utrique cum *Judeis* conversati sunt. Et constantem denique de Philosophorum *Gentilium* ad *Judeos* adventu traditionem fuisse.

Pag. 27. Magnum meæ *Cabbalæ* ab autoritate præstò esse præsidium, constare de *Platonis* ad *Judeos* adventu, referente *Cyrillo Alexandrino*. Immo *Augustinum* pænè assentiri illis qui credunt *Platonem* sacrorum Librorum non expertem fuisse. Favere meæ Expositioni totam *Cabbalistarum* Nationem, cum *Philone Originem*, *Basilium*, eundem *Augustinum*, & quotquot allegorias in Scripturis interpretandis sequuntur; &

Pag. 28. Apertè fatetur, cùm de *Litera Mosis* idem cum quibusdam magni nominis Ecclesiæ doctoribus sentiam, cum istis æquè controversiam ipsi intercidere atque mecum. Eximiâque ac satis laxam profectò *Augustini* sententiam profert, Confess. lib. 12. cap. 17. Dum quisque conatur id sentire in Scripturis sanctis, quod in eis sensit ille qui scripsit, quid mali est si hoc sentiat, quod tu Lux omnium veridicarum mentium ostendis verum esse, etiamsi hoc non sentit quod ille quem legit, cùm & ille verum nec tamen hoc senserit? &

Pag. 54. Extra Controversiam est multa quæ in *V. T.* potissimum narrantur, esse ἀλληγορέματα & aliorum respicere, seu habere sensum compositum ex *Hystoria* & *Typo*, prout illa docent quæ in *N. T.* explicata sunt. Porro,

Pag. 57. Ubi me reprehendit quòd multiplicem fingam sensum & *Cabbalam*, fatetur interm me habere quos sequar. Et inter illos *Johannem Picum Mirandulanum* magnum illud *Italiæ* lumen, qui ante duo secula septemplici sensu *Historiam Creationis* exposuit in *Heptaplo* suo, *Basilium* & *Augustinum* imitatus. *Augustinum* quadruplicem posuisse modum *Scripturæ V. T.* interpretandi, secundum *Historiam*, secundum *Etymologiam*, secundum *Analogiam*, secundum *Allegoriam*. Alios triplicem statuere *Scripturæ* sensum, *Literalem*, *Mysticum* & *Moralem*, quos

quos inter familiam ducere *Origenem*. Eumque sequi *Hieronymum*, qui sententiam suam confirmat ex Prov. 22. 20. *Tu autem scribe ea tripliciter.*

Pag. 63. In tribus prioribus Capitibus Geneseos, variam esse intertexturam Theosophicarum & Philosophicarum veritatum, plurima Theoremata Physica & Metaphysica eisdem verbis objici quæ primo aspectu ordinarium tantum & crassum sensum ferre videntur: Quantum ad hoc, de *Thesi* nullam ultrò concedit esse quæstionem, sed omnem controversiam in *Hypothesi* versari.

Pag. 67. Haud dubitandum esse *Pythagoram* & *Platonem* in notitiam eorum, quæ apud *Judeos* Mysteria erant, venisse.

Pag. 81. Admodum frequens esse ut in *Propheticis* & *Ænigmaticis* scriptis Mysteria sub *Numeris* occultentur. Et paulò post, Multa Veterum plurimos in istis *Numerorum Mysteriis* explicandis sibi indulgisse.

Pag. 82. Veteres non solum *Judeos* sed & *Christianos* Numerorum Mysteriis multum fuisse deditos, sed alios aliis cautiùs ea in re se gessisse.

Pag. 83, 84. *Philonem Judæum Alexandrie* in *Ægypto* natum, virum magna eruditione celebrem, magno apud *Christianos* in pretio, primum hac in re reliquis facem prætulisse. Eundemque à *Clemente Pythagoreum* vocari, ejusque libros cum laude ab *Eusebio* memorari.

Pag. 87. *Priscos Ecclesiæ Doctores Arithmetica Mystica* studio mirum in modum abreptos fuisse, & inter alios præsertim *Origenem* & *Clementem Alexandrinum*, utrumque autem *Philonis Judæi* cum laude meminisse.

Pag. 92. *Hieronymum* etiam & *Augustinum* magna illa Ecclesiæ Lumina Numerorum Mysteriis instituisse. Nec se quidem denique ait istud studium averfari, aut damnare istiusmodi Mysteriorum investigationem, parçè modò id sit atque coactè. Neque enim se ex illorum numero esse οἱ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς οἱ παῖδες τῆς μορμολύκειας, ἕως δὲ δῶσι τὴν ἑλληνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν πορεύμενοι μὴ ἀπαγγέλλειν αὐτὰς, quos *Clemens Alexandrinus* magnus Sapientiæ Gentilium admirator eo nomine corripit.

Quod equidem lubens fateor; non esse utique *Samuelem Andrea* talem, qui sibi à *Philosophia Græcanica* vel potius *Judaica*, tanquam à *Mormolyceo* metuat, sed qui se tanquam *Mormolyceum* sistat quo alii (ille magis alata scilicet Animæ & sublimes) ab ista *Philosophia*, tanquam Aves à bono Tritico absterreantur, dum illius *Instauratorem* tam foedis convitiis incessit, dum illi *Melancholici humoris* fictiones affingit, audaciæ & temeritatis crimen impingit, immò profanitatis subinde & impietatis, cum tamen venerandæ Antiquitatis vestigia ubique tam diligenter premit, nec ullam sibi assumit libertatem quæ non ei confirmata sit præstantissimorum Scriptorum exemplo & autoritate, eorum utique ipsorum quos ipse *Andreades* laudat: nec eas *Mysticæ Interpretationis* Leges limitésve excessit, quos ille ultrò cuivis Interpreti concedit.

Quam intempestivo igitur furore ac rabie in *Cabbalistam* involaverit, exemplo sit illa Contumelia quæ occurrit p. 127. Itaque profandam & intolerandam audaciam prodit quando aliquoties scribit (quod interim de sensu Textûs Philosophico omnino intelligit) *Mosen per sex Dies non successionem Temporis sed naturam rerum indicare, quasi Dies pro opere Diei poneretur.* Ubi tamen non tam *Cabbalistam*, uti nec in plerisque aliis quæ in *Expositione* illius carpit, quàm doctam ac venerandam Antiquitatem

ta:em sanctosque Ecclesie Patres, interque alios multos duo maxima illa Ecclesie Lumina, quemadmodum appellat *Lutherus, Hilarium & Augustinum*, qui omnia simul creata senserunt, per *Cabbalista* latera furiosè impetit confoditque.

Sed quid est quod non audeat multifariâ Lëctione & eruditione turgida & præservida Juventa? Quas dotes profectò juveni nostro Philosophiæ & Theologiæ Professori ac Doctori nequaquam invideo, quinimò animitus congratulor; Judicium solummodò sanum in eo desidero, & linguam bene moratam.

THE

THE DEFENCE OF THE

Moral Cabbala.

CHAP. I.

What is meant by Moral, explained out of Philo. 3. That the Light in the First day improv'd to the height, is Adam; in the Sixth, Christ, according to the Spirit. 4. In what sense we our selves may be said to do what God does in us. 5. Why ערב and בוקר are rendred Ignorance and Inquiry. 18. Plato's τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν βραχὺ καὶ δυν. The Pythagoreans ἀπλωσεν σεαυτὸν applied to the Fourth day's progress. 22. That Vertue is not an extirpation, but regulation of the Passions, according to the mind of the Pythagoreans. 24. Plotinus his τὸ διεισδέναι καὶ λεοντῶδες, applied to the Sixth day's progress. 26. What the Image of God is, plainly set down out of S. Paul and Plato. The divine Principle in us, ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἀνδραπῶτης, out of Plotinus. 28. The distinction of the Heavenly and Earthly Man, out of Philo. 31. The Imposture of still and fixed Melancholy, and that it is not the true divine Rest and precious Sabbath of the Soul. A compendious rehearsal of the whole Allegory of the Six days Creation.



*Leg. Allegor.
lib. 1.*

E are now come to the *Moral Cabbala*, which I do not call *Moral* in that low sense the generality of men understand *Morality*: For the process and growth, as likewise the failing and decay of the *divine Life*, is very intelligibly set forth in this present *Cabbala*. But I call it *Moral*, in counter-distinction to *Philosophical* or *Physical*; as *Philo* also uses this term *Moral* in divine matters. As when he speaks of God's breathing into *Adam* the breath of Life, *εἰς τὸ πρῶτον*, saith he, *ἐμπνέει φυσικῶς καὶ ἡθικῶς*, God breathes into Adam's face *Physically* and *Morally*: *Physically*, by placing there the Senses, viz. in the Head; *Morally*, by inspiring his Intellect with divine knowledge, which is the highest Faculty of the Soul, as the Head is the chiefest part of the Body. Where-

Wherefore by *Morality*, I understand here *divine Morality*, such as is ingendred in the Soul by the operation of the holy Spirit, that inward living Principle of all godliness and honesty. I shall be the more brief in the Defence of this *Cabbala*, it being of it self so plain and sensible to any that has the experience of the life I describe; but to them that have it not, nothing will make it plain or any thing at all probable.

Vers. 1. A Microcosm, or little World. Nothing is more ordinary or trivial, than to compare Man to the Universe, and make him a little compendious World of himself. Wherefore it was not hard to premise, that which may be so easily understood. And the Apostle supposes it, when he applies the Creation of *Light* here in this Chapter to the illumination of the Soul, as you shall hear hereafter.

Vers. 12. But that which is Animal or Natural operates first. According to that of the Apostle, *That which is Spiritual is not first, but that which is Animal or Natural; afterward that which is Spiritual.* *The first Man is of the Earth, earthy; the second Man is the Lord from Heaven.* But what this *earthy* condition is, is very lively set out by *Moses* in this first day's work. For here we have *Earth, Water, and Wind*, or one tumultuous dark *Chaos* and confusion of dirt and water, blown on heaps and waves; an unquiet night-storm, an unruly black tempest.

And it is observable, that it is not here said of this deformed Globe, *Let there be Earth; Let there be Water; Let there be Wind*: but all this is the *ὑποκείμενον*, The subject Matter, a thing made already, viz. The rude Soul of Man in this disorder that is described; sad Melancholy like the drown'd Earth lies at the bottom; whence Care, and Grief, and Discontent, torturous Suspicion, and horrid Fear, are washed up by the unquiet watry Desire, or irregular suggestions of the *Concupiscible*, wherein most eminently is seated base Lust and Sensuality; and above these is boisterous Wrath, and storming Revengefulness, foolhardy Confidence, and indefatigable Contention about vain objects. In short, whatever Passion and Distemper is in fallen Man, it may be referred to these Elements. But God leaves not his creature in this evil condition; but that all this disorder may be discovered, and so quelled in us, and avoided by us, he saith, *Let there be Light*, as you read in the following verse.

Vers. 3. The day-light appears. To this alludes St. Paul, when he says, *God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.* Where the Apostle seems to me to have struck through the whole Six days of this Spiritual Creation at once. The highest manifestation of that Light created in the First day, being the face of *Jesus Christ*, the Heavenly Adam, fully compleated in the Sixth day. Wherefore when it is said, *Let there be Light*, that Light is understood that enlightens every man that comes into the world, which is the *divine Intellect* as it is communicable to humane Souls. And the First day is the first appearance thereof, as yet weaker and too much disjoin'd from our affections; but at last it amounts to the true and plain Image and Character of the Lord from Heaven, Christ according to the Spirit.

Vers. 4. And God hath framed the Nature of Man so, that he cannot but say, &c. God working in second causes, there is nothing more ordinary than to ascribe that to him that is done by men, even then when the actions seem less competible to the Nature of God. Wherefore it cannot seem harsh, if in this *Moral Cabbala* we admit, that man does that by the power of God working in the Soul, that the Text says God does; as the approving of the Light as good, and the distinguishing betwixt Light and Darkneſs, and the like; which things, in the *Mystical* ſenſe, are competible both to God and Man. And we ſpeaking, in a *Moral* or *Mystical* ſenſe, of God acting in us, the nature of the thing requires that what he is ſaid to do there, we ſhould be underſtood alſo to do the ſame through his aſſiſtance.

For the Soul of man is not merely paſſive as a piece of wood or ſtone, but is forthwith made active by being acted upon: and therefore if God in us rules, we rule with him; if he contend againſt ſin in us, we alſo contend together with him againſt the ſame; if he ſee in us what is good or evil, we, *ipſo facto*, ſee by him; *In his light we ſee light*: and ſo in the reſt. Wherefore the ſuppoſition is very eaſy in this *Moral Cabbala*, to take the liberty, where either the ſenſe or more compendious expreſſion requires it, to attribute that to man, though not to man alone, which God alone does, when we recur to the *Literal* meaning of the Text. And this is but conſonant to the *Apoſtle*, *I live, and yet not I*. For if the life of God or Chriſt was in him, ſurely he did live, or elſe what did that life there? Only he did not proudly attribute that life to himſelf, as his own, but acknowledged it to be from God.

Vers. 5. As betwixt the Natural Day and Night. It is very frequent with the Apoſtles to ſet out by Day and Night, the *Spiritual* and *Natural* condition of man. As in ſuch phraſes as *1 Cor. 15. 44.* *The night is paſt, the day is at hand: Walk as children of the light.* And elſewhere, *1 Theſſ. 5. 8.* *Let us who are of the day; and in the ſame place, You are all the ſons of light, and ſons of the day. We are not of the night, nor of darkneſs.* But this is too obvious to inſiſt upon.

And thus Ignorance and Inquiry. The Soul of man is never quiet, but in perpetual ſearch till ſhe has found out her own Happineſs, which is the *Heavenly Adam, Chriſt, the Image of God*; into which Image and likeneſs when we are thoroughly awakened, we are fully ſatisfied therewith: till then we are in Ignorance and Confuſion, as the Hebrew word עִרְבָּה does fitly ſignify. This Ignorance, Confuſion, and Diſſatisfaction, puts us upon ſeeking, according to that meaſure of the Morning *Pſal. 14. 6.* *light that hath already viſited us.* And בֹּקֶר is from בָּקַר, to ſeek, to conſider, and inquire. This is the Generation of thoſe that ſeek thy face, O Jacob, that is, the face of Jeſus Chriſt, the reſult of the Sixth day's work, as I have intimated before.

Vers. 6. Of ſavoury and affectionate diſcernment. Wherefore he will *Prov. 9. 17.* not aſſent to Solomon's whore, who ſays, *Stolen water is ſweet*; but will rather uſe the words of the Samaritan woman to Chriſt, when he had told her of thoſe waters of the Spirit, though ſhe did not perfectly reach his meaning, *Sir, give me this water, that I thirſt not, neither come hither to draw.* For who would ſeek to ſatisfy himſelf with the toilſome

some pleasures of the World, when he may quench his Desires with the delicious Draughts of that true, and yet easy-flowing, *Nectar* of the Spirit of God?

Vers. 10. To compare to the Earth. Origen compares this condition to the *Earth* for *Fruitfulness*; but I thought it not impertinent to take notice of the *steadiness* of the *Earth* also. But the condition of the *ungodly* is like the *raging waves* of the *Sea*; or, as the Prophet speaks, *The wicked are as the troubled Sea that cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt.*

Vers. 11. He is a fruitful field. This Interpretation is Origen's, as I intimated before.

Vers. 14. According to the difference of these lights. What this difference is, you will understand out of the sixteenth and eighteenth verses.

Vers. 18. To this one single, but vigorous and effectual, Light. For indeed a true and sincere sense of this one comprehends all. For all the Law is fulfilled in one Word; to wit, in this, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and all thy soul, and thy neighbour as thy self*; and, to do so to others, as we our selves would be done to. Wherefore for men to make nothing of this Royal Law of Christ, and yet to pretend to be more accurate Indagators into matters of Religion, and more affectionate Lovers of Piety than ordinary, is either to be abominably hypocritical, or grossly ignorant in the most precious and necessary parts of Christianity; and they walk by *Star-light* and *Moon-light*, not under the clear and warm enlivening rays of the *Sun of Righteousness*.

It is an excellent saying of Plato's, in an Epistle of his to *Dionysius*, *Τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν βεῆχῃ κείσθαι*, That Truth lies in a little room: and assuredly that which is best and most precious does; whereas the folly of every man notwithstanding so misguides him, that his toil and study is but to adorn himself after the mode of the most ridiculous Fellow in all the *Græcian* Army, *Thersites*, of whom the Poet gives this testimony, that he was,

— ἀκοσμά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς,

That he had a rabble of disordered Notions, and fruitless Observations; but that neither he, nor any body else, could make either head or foot of them, nor himself became either more wise or more honest by having them.

That Precept of the *Pythagoreans*, *Ἀπλῶς σεαυτὸν*, Simplify your self, Reduce your self to One, how wise, how holy, how true is it? What a sure Foundation is it of life, liberty, and easy sagacity, in things belonging to Virtue, Religion, and Justice? I think no man is born naturally so stupid, but that he will keep close to this single Light of divine Love, in due time; nay, in a short time he will be no more to seek what is to be done in the carriage of his Life to God or man, than an unblemished Eye will be at a loss to distinguish colours. But if he forsake this One Light, he will necessarily be benighted, and his mind distracted with a multitude of needless and uncomfortable scrupulosities, and faint and ineffectual Notions, and every

James 2. 8.

body will be ready to take him up for a *night-wanderer*, and to chastise him for being out of his way; and after, it may be, as friendly offer himself a guide to another path that will prove as little to the purpose, unless he bring him into this *Via Regia*, or Νόμος βασιλικός, as St. James calls it, this *Royal Law* of the sincere Love of God, and a man's neighbour.

Vers. 26. That is, that the Concupiscible in man. That the Waters are an Emblem of this Concupiscible, Venus her being born of the Sea does intimate; which were not so much to the purpose, did not Natural Philosophy and Experience certify, that Concupiscence is lodged in moisture. Whence is that of Heraclitus, Ψνὴ ψυχῆ σοφωτάτη, (in Porphyrius his *De antro Nympharum*) i. e. *Anima sicca sapientissima*. And without all question the inordinate use of the Concupiscible does mightily besot the Soul, and makes her very incapable of divine Sense and Knowledge. And yet to endeavour after an utter insensibility of the pleasures of the body, is as groundless and unwarrantable. But concerning this, I shall speak more fully on the 22 and 31 verses of this Chapter.

Vers. 21. Winged Ejaculations. Whether Mental or Vocal, they are not unfitly resembled to Fowls, according to that of Homer,

— πτεὰ πτερόντα μενοινῶν.

And if Vocal words have wings, the inward Desires of the Soul may well be said to have wings also, they being the words of the Mind, as the other are of the Mouth, and fly further for the most part, and get sooner to Heaven than the other.

Note also, that Origen likewise makes a difference here betwixt the Fish and the Fowl, and makes the Fowl to be good cogitations, the Fish evil. But I account them rather both indifferent, and to be regulated, not extirpated, by the Mystical Adam, Christ, the Image of God in Man. And these strong Heats and Ejaculations are the effects of Melancholy, wherein the divine Principle in man, when it actuates it, works very fiercely and sharply, and is a great waster of the delightful moisture of the Concupiscible, and weakens much the pleasures of the Body, to the great advantage of the Mind, if it be done with discretion and due moderation; otherwise if this Passion be overmuch indulged to, it may lead to Hecticks, Phrensies, and Distractions.

The contrivance of the Text mentioning only such Fowls as frequent the waters, naturally points to this sense we have given it; but if our imagination strike out further to other winged creatures, as the Fowls of the Mountains, and sundry sorts of Birds, they may also have their proper meanings, and are a part of those Animal Figurations that are to be subdued and regulated by the Mystical Adam, the Spirit of Christ in us.

Vers. 22. Might have something to order. But if you take away all the Passions from the Soul, the Mind of man will be as a General without an Army, or an Army without an Enemy. The Pythagoreans define Righteousness, εἰρήνη τῆς ἑλᾶς ψυχᾶς μετ' εὐρυθμίας, The peace of the whole Soul, the parts thereof being in good tune or harmony; according

to

to that other Definition of theirs, describing Righteousness to be *ἁρμονία πρὸς ἀλόγον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ποτὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον*, That it is the Harmony or Agreement of the Irrational parts of the Soul with the Rational. But quite to take away all the Passions of the Mind, instead of composing them to the right rule of Reason and the divine Light, is as if a man should cut away all the strings of an Instrument, instead of tuning it.

Vers. 24. And makes the Irascible fruitful. Religious devotions, help'd on by Melancholy, dry the Body very much, and heat it, and make it very subject to wrath: which, if it be placed upon holy matters, men call it Zeal; but if it be inordinate and hypocritical, the Apostle will teach us to call it bitter Zeal. This more fierce and fiery affection in man is Plotinus his *τὸ θειώδες καὶ λεοντώδες*, the Lion-like nature in *Ennead. 1. 1.* us, which if Adam keep in subjection, there is no hurt in it, but good. And it is evident in the Gospel, that our Saviour Christ was one while deeply impassioned with Sorrow, another while very strongly carried away with Zeal and Anger, as you may observe in the stories of his raising up Lazarus, and whipping the Money-changers out of the Temple. And this is no Imperfection, but rather a Perfection; the divine Life, when it has reached the Passions and Body of a man, becoming thereby more palpable, full, and sensible. But all the danger is of being impotently passionate; and whenas the Body is carried away by its own distemper, or by the hypocrisy of the Mind, notwithstanding to imagine or pretend that it is the Impulse of the divine Spirit. This is too frequent a mistake, God knows, but such as was impossible to happen in our Saviour; and therefore the Passions of his Mind were rather Perfections than Imperfections, as they are to all them that are close and sincere followers of him, especially when they have reached the Sixth day's progress.

Vers. 26. By the name of his own Image. What this Image of God is, || Plato, who was acquainted with these Mosaical Writings, as the ho- || In his Thea- ly Fathers of the Church so generally have told us, plainly expresses *tetus.* in these words; *Ὁμοίωσις θ', ὅστις καὶ δίκαιον γενέσθαι καὶ ἁγνός ἐστι*, To be like unto God, is to be Just, and Holy, and Wise. Like that of the Apostle to the Colossians; And have put on the new Man, which is renewed in Knowledge, after the Image of him that created him: and that more full passage in the fourth of the Ephesians, And that you put on the new Man, which after God is created in Righteousness and true Holiness. There are all the three members of that divine Image, Knowledge, Righteousness, and Holiness, which are mentioned in that foregoing description of Plato's, as if Plato had been pre-instructed by men of the same Spirit with the Apostle. Chap. 3. 105

The true and perfect Man. Plotinus calls that divine Principle in us, *Ennead. 1. 1.* τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἄνθρωπον, the true Man. The rest is the brutish Nature, the *cap. 1.* τὸ λεοντώδες καὶ θειώδες, as I said before.

But has full Power. Wherefore if this Definition of the Image or Likeness of God, which Plato has made, does not involve this Power in it in the word *δίκαιον*, according to the Description of Justice by the Pythagoreans above recited, (which implies, that the rational and divine part of the soul has the Passions at its Command) I should add to *καὶ ἁγνότητος* this one word more, *καὶ δυνάμει*, that the Description

may run thus; to be like unto God, is to be Holy and Just, together with Wisdom and Power. But I rather think, that this Power is comprehended in Holiness and Justice: For unless we have arrived to that Power as to be able constantly to act according to these Vertues, * we are rather well-willers to Holiness and Righteousness, than properly and formally righteous and holy.

¶ In his de
Plantat. Noe,
lib. 2. and
elsewhere.

Vers. 27. In his little World. They are the words of Philo, *Περὶ τῆς μικροῦ κόσμου, τὴν ἀνθρώπου, * μέγαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸν κόσμον εἶναι*, That Man is a little World, and that the World is one great Man; which Analogy is supposed, as I said at first, in the Moral Cabbala of this present Chapter; and Origen, upon this Chapter, calls Man, *Minorem Mundum*, a Microcosm.

Leg. Allegor.
lib. 1.

Vers. 28. The Heavenly Adam, Christ. Philo makes mention of the Heavenly and Earthly man, in these words; *Δύο ἀνθρώπων γένος ὁ μὲν οὐρανίου, ὁ δὲ γαίῃ*. Man is of two sorts, the one Heavenly, the other Earthly. And St. Paul calls Christ the Heavenly Adam, and Philo's

Leg. Allegor.
lib. 1.

Heavenly Adam is *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγενῆς*, Created after the Image of God, as St. Paul, in the forecited places to the Colossians and Ephesians, also speaks concerning Christ.

John 4. 34.

Vers. 29. The Heavenly Adam to feed upon, fulfilling the Will of God. As Christ professes of himself, *It is my meat and drink to do the will of him that sent me*.

Vers. 30. Nor is the Animal Life quite to be starved. For a good man is merciful to his beast. See Origen upon the place.

Vers. 31. Approves all things which God hath created in us to be very good. Not only the divine Principle, but also the Fishes, Beasts, and Birds. *Vult enim Deus ut insignis ista Dei factura, Homo, non solum immaculatus sit ab his, sed & dominetur eis*: For it is the Will of God, saith Origen, not only that we should be free from any soil of these, (which would be more certainly effected if we were utterly rid of them, and they quite extirpated out of our nature) but that we should rule over them, without being any thing at all blemished or discomposed by them. And for mine own part, I do not understand how that the Kingdom of Heaven, which is to be within us, can be any Kingdom at all, if there be no Subjects at all there to be ruled over, and to obey. Wherefore the Passions of the Body are not to be quite extinguished, but regulated, that there may be the greater plenitude of life in the whole man.

And those that endeavour after so still, so silent, and demure a condition of Mind, that they would have the sense of nothing there but peace and rest, striving to make their whole nature desolate of all *Animal Figurations* whatsoever, what do they effect but a clear Day shining upon a barren Heath, that feeds neither Cow nor Horse? neither Sheep nor Shepherd is to be seen there, but only a vast, silent Solitude, and one uniform parchedness and vacuity. And yet while a man fancies himself thus wholly divine, he is not aware how he is even then held down by his *Animal Nature*; and that it is nothing but the stillness and fixedness of *Melancholy* that thus abuses him, and, instead of the true Divine Principle, would take the Government to it self, and in this usurped Tyranny, cruelly destroy all the

the rest of the *Animal Figurations*: But the true Divine Life would destroy nothing that is in Nature, but only regulate things, and order them for the more full and sincere enjoyment of man; reproaching nothing but sinfulness and enormity, entitling *Sanguine* and *Choler* to as much Vertue and Religion as either *Phlegm* or *Melancholy*. For the Divine Life, as it is to take into it self the humane nature in general, so it is not abhorrent from any of the complexions thereof. But the squabbles in the world are ordinarily not about true Piety and Vertue, but which of the Complexions, or what Humour shall ascend the Throne, and sit there instead of Christ himself. But I will not expatiate too much upon one Theme; I shall rather take a short view of the whole Allegory of the Chapter.

In the *First* day there is *Earth, Water, and Wind*, over which, and through which, there is nothing but disconsolate darkness and tumultuous agitation; the Winds ruffling up the Waters into mighty waves, the waves washing up the mire and dirt into the Water; all becoming but a rude heap of confusion and desolation. This is the state of the *vũs xõũds*, or *Earthly Adam*, as *Philo* calls him, till God command the Light to shine out of Darkness, offering him a guide to a better condition.

In the *Second* day is the *Firmament* created, dividing the *upper* and the *lower* Waters, that it may feel the strong impulses, or taste the different relishes of either. Thus is the Will of man touch'd from above and beneath, and this is the day wherein is *sat before him Life and Death, Good and Evil*, and he may put out his hand and take his choice.

In the *Third* day is the Earth uncovered of the Waters, for the planting of the fruit-bearing trees. *By their fruits you shall know them*, Marth. 7. 20. saith our Saviour, that is, by their works.

In the *Fourth* day there appears a more full accession of Divine Light, and the Sun of Righteousness warms the Soul with a sincere love both of God and man.

In the *Fifth* day, that this light of Righteousness, and bright Eye of divine Reason, may not brandish its rays in the empty field, where there is nothing either to subdue or guide and order; God sends out whole shoals of *Fishes* in the Waters, and numerous flights of *Fowls* in the Air, beside part of the *Sixth* day's work, wherein all kind of *Beasts* are created.

In these are decyphered the sundry Suggestions and Cogitations of the Mind, sprung from these lower Elements of the Humane nature, *viz. Earth and Water, Flesh and Blood*; all these man beholds in the Light of the Sun of Righteousness; discovers what they are, knows what to call them, can rule over them, and is not wrought to be over-ruled by them. This is *Adam*, the *Master-piece of God's Creation*, and Lord of all the creatures, framed after the Image of God, *Christ according to the Spirit*, under whose Feet is subdued the whole *Animal Life*, with its sundry Motions, Forms, and Shapes. He will call every thing by its proper name, and set every creature in its proper place: *The vile Person shall be no longer called liberal, nor the churl bountiful. Wo be unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that call* Esay 32. 5. Esay 5. 20.
light

light darkness, and the darkness light. He will not call bitter Passion, holy Zeal; nor plausible, meretricious Courtesie, Friendship; nor a false, soft abhorrency from punishing the ill-deserving, Pity; nor Cruelty, Justice; nor Revenge, Magnanimity; nor Unfaithfulness, Policy; nor Verbosity, either Wisdom or Piety. But I have run myself into the second Chapter before I am aware.

In this first, *Adam* is said only to have dominion over all the living creatures, and to feed upon the fruit of the Plants. And what is *Pride* but a mighty Mountainous *Whale*; *Lust*, a *Goat*; the *Lion*, *Eagle*, and *Bear*, wilful *Dominion*; *Craft*, a *Fox*; and worldly *Toil*, an *Ox*? Over these, and a thousand more, is the rule of *Man*, I mean of *Adam*, the *Image of God*. But his Meat and Drink is to do the will of his Maker; this is the fruit he feeds upon.

Behold therefore, O Man, what thou art, and whereunto thou art called, even to be a mighty Prince amongst the creatures of God, and to bear Rule in that Province he has assigned thee, to discern the Motions of thine own heart, and to be Lord over the suggestions of thine own natural spirit: Not to listen to the counsel of the flesh, nor conspire with the Serpent against thy Creator; but to keep thy heart free and faithful to thy God: so mayst thou, with innocency and unblameableness, see all the Motions of Life, and bear rule with God over the whole Creation committed to thee. This shall be thy Paradise and harmless sport on Earth, till God shall transplant thee to an higher condition of Happiness in Heaven.

SCHOLIA

In CAP. I. Vers. 26.

Affectatores potius sumus Sanctitatis & Justitiæ, quam revera & propriè justī atque sanctī. Justitia enim & Sanctitas Virtutes sunt; Virtus verò Intellectualis vis Animæ & quâ faciliè prosequitur, ac proinde constanter quòd absolute & simpliciter optimum est. Hoc ni fiat, Virtus propriè non est, sed dispositio potius ad virtutem, vel ἀρὴν ἡμετέραν, semiperfecta Virtus, quemadmodum appellat Theages Pythagoreus. Vide *Enchiridium Ethicum*, lib. 1. cap. 3. sect. 1, 3.

Vers. 27. Μέγαν ὃ ἀνθρώπου τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, &c. Hoc autem fieri non potest, nisi συναριθμημένης τῆς θείας ψυχῆς, ut loquitur Plotinus, quo & *Mundum Deum* rectè appellari posse vult innuere. Ego verò *Mundum* nec *Hominem* nec *Deum* rectè nominari posse contendo, sed *Zoophyton* potius quoddam ingens, ex *Materia Mundana* & *Spiritu Nature* compositum. Spiritus enim *Nature* quamvis Rationibus Seminalibus abunde affluat, omni tamen *Ratione Intellectuali* atque liberâ penitus destituitur. Unde manifestum est magnum *Hominem* à *Philone* non rectè appellari, multoque minùs, à *Plotino*, *Deum*.

C H A P. II.

The full sense of that Ἀπειθία that keeps men from coming into the true Sabbath. 4. The great necessity of distinguishing the innocent motions of Nature from the Suggestions of Sin. 5. That the growth of a true Christian indeed doth not adequately depend upon the lips of the Priest. 7. The meaning of, This is he that comes by Water and Blood. 8. The meaning of, Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand. The Seventh thousand years, the great Sabbatism of the Church of God. That there will be then frequent Converse betwixt Men and Angels. 9. The Tree of Life, how fitly in the Mystical sense said to be in the midst of the Garden. 17. A twofold death contracted by Adam's disobedience. The Masculine and Feminine Faculties in man, what they are? Actuating a Body an Essential operation of the Soul; and the reason of that so joyful appearance of Eve to the Humane Nature.

TO the Fifth verse there is nothing but a recapitulation of what went before in the first Chapter; and therefore wants no further proof than what has already been alledged out of St. Paul, and Origen, and other Writers. Only there is mention of a Sabbath in the Second verse of this Chapter, of which there were no words before. And this is that Sabbatism or Rest, that the Author to the Hebrews exhorts them to strive to enter into through faith and obedience. For those that were faint-hearted, and unbelieving, and pretended that the children of Anak, the off-spring of the Giants, would be too hard for them; they could not enter into the promised Land, wherein they were to set up their rest, under the conduct of Joshua, a Type of Jesus. And the same Author, in the same place, makes mention of this very Sabbath that ensued the accomplishment of the Creation, concluding thus; *There remaineth therefore a Sabbatism or Rest* Hebr. 4.
to the people of God: For he that has entred into his Rest, he also has ceased Hebr. 4. 9³
10, 11.
from his own works, as God did from his. Let us labour therefore to enter into that Rest, lest any man fall after that example of disobedience and unbelief. For the Greek word Ἀπειθία may well include both Senses, viz. Disobedience, or the not doing the Will of God according to that measure of Power and Knowledge he has already given us; and Unbelief, that the divine Life and Spirit in us is not able to subdue the whole Creation of the little World under us, that is, all the Animal Motions and Figurations, be they Lions, Bears, Goats, Whales, be they what they will be, as well as to cast out the children of Anak before the Israelites, as it is in that other Type of Christ, and of his Kingdom in the Souls of Men.

Verf. 4. The Generations of the Animal Life when God created them. For these are as truly the works of God as the Divine Life it self, though they are nothing comparable unto it. Nay, indeed, they are but an heap of confusion without it. Wherefore the great accomplishment is to have these in due order and subjection unto the Spirit or Heavenly Life in us, which is Christ: and that you may have a more particular apprehension of these generations of the Animal Life,

Life, I shall give you a Catalogue of some of them, though confusedly, so as they come first to my memory.

Such therefore are *Anger, Zeal, Indignation, Sorrow, Derision, Mirth, Gravity, Open-heartedness, Reservedness, Stoutness, Flexibility, Boldness, Fearfulness, Mildness, Tartness, Candour, Suspicion, Peremptoriness, Despondency, Triumph, or Gloriation*: All the *Propensions* to the exercise of Strength, or activity of Body; as *Running, Leaping, Swimming, Wrestling, Fasting, Coursing*, or the like: Besides all the *Courtly Preambles, necessary Concomitants, and delightful Consequences of Marriage*, which spring up from the Love of Women, and the Pleasure of Children. To say nothing of those Enjoyments that arise from correspondent affections, and mere natural friendship betwixt man and man, or fuller companies of acquaintance: their *Friendly Feastings, Sportings, * Musick, and Dancings*. All these, and many more that I am not at leisure to reckon up, be but the genuine pullulations of the *Animal Life*, and in themselves they have neither good nor hurt in them. Nay, indeed, to speak more truly and impartially, they are good, according to the Approbation of him that made them; but they become bad only to them that are bad, and act either without measure, or for unwarrantable ends, or with undue circumstances; otherwise they are very good in their kind, they being regulated and moderated by the divine Principle in us.

And I think it is of great moment for men to take notice of this Truth, for these three reasons: First, because the bounds of Sin, and of the innocent Motions of Nature, being not plainly and apertly set out and defined, men counting the several *Animal Figurations* and natural Motions for *Sins*, they heap to themselves such a task, to wit, the quite extirpating that which it were neither good, nor it may be possible, utterly to extirpate, that they seem in truth hereby to insinuate, that it is impossible to enter into that *Rest* or *Sabbath* of the people of God. Wherefore promiscuously sheltering themselves under this confused cloud of sins and infirmities, where they aggravate all, so as if every thing were in the same measure sinful; if they be but zealous and punctual in some, they account it passing well, and an high testimony of their sanctimony. And their hypocrisy will be sure to pitch upon that which is least of all to the purpose; that is, a man will spend his zeal in the behalf of some natural Temper he himself is of, and against the opposite Complexion. But for the indispensable dictates of the divine Light, he will be sure to neglect them, as being more hard to perform, though of more concernment both for himself and the common good. But if it were more plainly defined what is Sin, and what is not Sin, a man might with more heart and courage, fight against his enemy, he appearing not so numerous and formidable; and he would have the less opportunity for perverse excuses and hypocritical tergiversations.

The second reason is, That men may not think better of themselves than they are, for their abhorrency from those things that have no hurt in them; nor think worse of others than they deserve, when they do but such things as are approvable by God and the divine Light. And this is of very great moment for the maintaining of Christian Love and Union amongst men.

The

The third and last is, That they may observe the madness and hypocrisy of the world, whose religious contestations or secret censures are commonly but the conflict and antipathy of the opposite *Figurations of the Animal Life*, who, like the wild beasts, without a Master to keep good quarter amongst them, are very eagerly set to devour one another. But by this shall every man know whether it be Complexion or Religion that reigns in him, if he love God with all his Heart, and all his soul, and his neighbour as himself; and can give a sufficient reason for all his actions and opinions from that *Eternal Light*, the *Love of God* shed abroad in his heart: If not, 'tis but a faction of the *Animal Life*, fed up and fostered by either natural Temper or Custom; and he is far from being arrived to the Kingdom of Christ, and entering into that true Rest of the people of God.

Vers. 5. Where there is no external Doctrine. Pulpits, and Preachings, and external ordinances, there is no such noise of them amongst the holy Patriarchs, whose lives *Moses* describes; and therefore I conceive this sense I have here given the Text, more genuine and warrantable. But besides, *Moses* unveil'd being Christianity it self, the manner of the growth of the true Christian is here prefigured. That he is || rather taught of God than of Men, he having the Spirit of Life in him, and needs no man to teach him: For he has the *Unction* in himself, which will teach him all things necessary to Life and Godliness. * Which *Unction* notwithstanding does never slight external helps to the holy Ordinances of Christ, as I have abundantly proved in its due place.

1 Cor. 3. 6.

1 John 2. 27.

* See *Mystery of Godliness*, Book 8. ch. 12. Book 10. ch. 12. sect.

8. 9.

Vers. 6. Which is Repentance from dead works. In this verse *נחל* in the *Philosophick Cabbala* signified a Vapour, but here I translate it a Fountain of Water, which I am warranted to do by the *Seventy*, who render it *נחל* but that Water is an Emblem of Repentance, it is so obvious that I need say nothing of it: *John's* baptizing with Water to Repentance, is frequently repeated in the Gospels.

Vers. 7. And breaths into him the Spirit of Life. In allusion to this passage of *Moses* in all likelihood is that of the *Psalmist*, Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me: O give me understanding, and I shall live; as if, like Adam, he were but a Statue of Earth, till God breathed into him the Spirit of Life and Holiness.

Psalm 119.

Of the Water and of the Spirit. The Water and the Spirit are the two extremes; the first and the last that makes up the Creation of the Spiritual Adam, or Christ, compleated in us, and includes the middle, which is Blood. First therefore is Repentance from what we delighted in before: then the killing of that evil and corrupt Life in us, which is resisting to blood, as the Apostle speaks. And the 1 Epistle of John, Whatever is born of God, overcomes the world: Who is he that overcomes the world, but he that believes that Jesus Christ (the divine Light and Life in us) is the Son of God; and therefore indued with power from on high to overcome all sin and wickedness in us? This is he that comes by Water and Blood, by Repentance and perseverance till the death of the body of sin; not by Repentance only and dislike of our former life, but by the mortification also of it. Then the Spirit

Heb. 12. 4.

1 John 5. 4.

of

of Truth is awakened in us, and will bear witness of whatever is right and true. And according to this manner of testimony is it to be understood especially, That no man can say, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, but by the Spirit of God, as the Apostle elsewhere affirms. This is the Heavenly Adam, which is true Light and Glory to all them that have attained to the mystical resurrection of the dead, and into whom God hath breathed the breath of Life, without which we have no right knowledge nor sense of God at all. *Ἦν δὲ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ὁ ἐκείνός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ διδοῦσα, καὶ μὴ ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτῆς καὶ δύναμις;* They are the words of Philo upon the place. For how should the Soul of man, says he, know God, if he did not inspire her, and take hold of her by his power? *Verf. 8. To the Kingdom of Heaven.* And the end of the doctrine of John, which was Repentance, was for this purpose, that men might arrive to that comfortable condition here described; and therefore it was a motive for them to repent. For though sorrow endure for a night, yet joy will come in the morning. For the new Jerusalem is to be built, and God is to pitch his Tabernacle amongst men; and to rule by his Spirit here upon Earth; which, if I would venture upon an Historical Cabbala of Moses, I should presage would happen in the Seventh thousand years, according to the Chronology of Scripture; when the world will be so spiritualiz'd, that the work of Salvation shall be finished, and the great Sabbath and Festival shall be then celebrated in the height: A thousand years are but as one day, saith the Apostle Peter; and therefore the Seventh thousand years may well be the Seventh day. Wherefore in the end of the Sixth thousand years the Kingdoms of the Earth will be the second Adam's, the Lord Christ's, as Adam in the Sixth day was created the Lord of the world and all the creatures therein; and this conquest of his will bring in the Seventh day of rest, and peace, and joy, upon the face of the whole Earth. Which presage will seem more credible, when I shall have unfolded unto you, out of Philo Judæus, the mystery of the number Seven: but before I fall upon that, let me a little prepare your belief, by shewing the truth of the same thing in another Figure.

Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahaleel, Jared, they died, not enjoying the richness of God's goodness in their bodies. But Enoch, who was the Seventh from Adam, was taken up alive into Heaven, and seems to enjoy that great bliss in the body. The world then in the Seventh Chiliad will be assumed up into God, snatch'd up by his Spirit, inacted by his Power. The Jerusalem that comes down from Heaven will then, in a most glorious and eminent manner, flourish upon the Earth. God will, as I said, pitch his Tabernacle amongst men. And for God to be in us, and with us, is as much as for us to be lifted up into God.

But to come now to the mystery of the Septenary, or number Seven; it is of two kinds: the one is *ἡ ἐν τῷ δέκαδ ἑβδόμας*, the other *ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἑπτά*. The Septenary within the Decad is merely seven unites; the other is a Seventh Number, beginning at an Unite, and holding on in a continued Geometrical Proportion, till you have gone through Seven Proportional Terms. * For the Seventh Term there is this Septenary of the second kind, whose nature || Philo fully expresses in these words; *Αἱ δὲ ἑπτὰ ἐστὶν ἑβδόμας*.

1 John 4. 13.
14, 15.
1 Cor. 12. 3.

In his Leg.
Allegor. lib. 1.

Revel. 21. 3.

Revel. 21. 2.

|| In his Cos-
mogonia Mo-
saic.

μονάδ' ὅ συνιδέμεν ἐν διπλασίῳ ἢ τετρασίῳ ἢ συνόλῳ ἀναλογῶν, ἑβδόμη ἀει-
 γὰς κύβ' τε καὶ τετραγώνος ἐστίν, ἀμφότερα εἶδη περιέχων τῆς τε ἀσώματου καὶ σωματικῆς
 οὐσίας· τῆς μὲν ἀσώματου καὶ τὴν ἐπίπεδον ἢν ἀπολεῖται τετράγωνοι, τῆς δὲ σωματικῆς καὶ
 τὴν ἐτέραν, ἢν ἀπολεῖται κύβοι. To this sense: For always beginning from an
 Unite, and holding on in double, or triple, or what proportion you will, the
 seventh number of this rank is both Square and Cube, comprehending both
 kinds, as well the Corporeal as Incorporeal Substance: the Incorporeal,
 according to the Superficies which the Squares exhibit; but the Corporeal,
 according to the solid dimensions which are set out by the Cubes.

As for example, 64, or 729, these are Numbers that arise after
 this manner; each of them are a Seventh from an Unite, the one a-
 rising from double Proportion, the other from triple; and if the
 Proportion were Quadruple, Quintuple, or any else, there is the same
 reason, some other Seventh Number would arise which would prove
 of the same nature with these, they would prove both Cubes and
 Squares, that is, Corporeal and Incorporeal: For such is sixty four, either
 made by multiplying four Cubically; for four times four times four is
 again sixty four, but then it is a Cube. And so seven hundred twenty
 nine is made either by Squaring of twenty seven, or Cubically multiply-
 ing of Nine, for either way will seven hundred twenty nine be made;
 and so is both Cube and Square, Corporeal and Incorporeal. Whereby
 is intimated, that the World shall not be reduced in the Seventh day
 to a mere Spiritual consistence, to an Incorporeal condition, but that
 there shall be a co-habitation of the Spirit with Flesh in a Mystical or
 Moral sense, and that God will pitch his Tent amongst us. Then
 shall be settled everlasting Righteousness, and rooted in the Earth, so
 long as mankind shall inhabit upon the face thereof.

And this Truth of the Reign of Righteousness in this Seventh thousand
 years, is still more clearly set out to us in the Septenary within Ten,
 τῇ ἐξῆς δεκάδ' ἐξ ἑβδόμης, as Philo calls it, the naked number Seven.
 For the parts it consists of, and * into which it is the most equally
 divisible, or rather only divisible as into different numbers, are 3 and
 4, which put together make 7. And these parts be the sides of the
 first Orthogonion in Numbers, the very sides that include the right
 angle thereof. And the Orthogonion what a foundation it is of Trigo-
 nometry, and of measuring the altitudes, latitudes, and longitudes of
 things, every body knows that knows any thing at all in Mathematicks.
 And this prefigures the Uprightness of that holy Generation, who will
 stand and walk κατ' ὀρθάς, inclining neither this way nor that way,
 but they will approve themselves of an upright and sincere heart.
 And by this Spirit of Righteousness will these Saints be enabled to
 find out the depth, and breadth, and height of the Wisdom and Good-
 ness of God, as somewhere the Apostle himself phraseth it.

But then again, in the second place, this Three and Four comprehend
 also the conjunction of the Corporeal and Incorporeal nature; Three
 being the first Superficies, and Four the first Body: and in the Seventh
 thousand years I do verily conceive, that there will be so great Union
 betwixt God and Man, that they shall not only partake of his Spirit,
 but that the Inhabitants of the Aethereal Region will openly converse
 with these of the Terrestrial; and such frequent conversation and or-

dinary visits of our cordial friends of that other world, will take away all the toil of life, and the fear of death amongst men, they being very cheerful and pleasant here in the body, and being well assured they shall be better when they are out of it: For Heaven and Earth shall then shake hands together, or become as one house; and to die, shall be accounted but to ascend into an higher room. And though this dispensation for the present be but very sparingly set a-foot, yet I suppose there may some few have a glimpse of it; concerning whom accomplish'd Posterity may haply utter something answerable to that of our Saviour's concerning *Abraham*, who tasted of Christianity before Christ himself was come in the Flesh; *Abraham saw my day, and rejoiced at it.* And without all question, that plenitude of happiness that has been reserved for future times, the presage and presentation of it, has, in all ages, been a very great Joy and triumph to all holy men and Prophets.

The Morning Light of the Sun of Righteousness. This is very suitable to the Text, *Paradise* being said to be placed *Eastward* in *Eden*, Rev. 22. 16. and our Saviour *Christ* to be the *bright Morning-Star*, and the *Light that lightens every one that comes into the world*; though too many are disobedient to the dictates of this Light, that so early visits them in their minds and consciences; but they that follow it, it is their peace and happiness in the conclusion.

Vers. 9. Which is a sincere Obedience to the Will of God. The *Tree of Life* is very rightly said to be in the *midst of the Garden*, that is, in the midst of the Soul of man; and this is the *Will or Desire of man*, which is the most inward of all the Faculties of his Soul, and is as it were the *λογος σπρυματικής*, or *vital Center* of the rest, from whence they stream or grow. That therefore is the *Tree of Life*, if it be touch'd truly with the divine Life, and a man be heartily obedient to the Will of God. For the whole Image of divine Perfection will grow from hence, and receive nourishment, strength, and continuance from it. But if this *Will and Desire* be broke off from God, and become actuated by the creature, or be a *Self-will* and a *spirit of disobedience*, it breeds most deadly fruit, which kills the divine Life in us, and puts man into a necessity of dying to that disorder and corruption he has thus contracted.

Whatever others would insinuate to the contrary. For there is nothing so safe, if a man be heartily sincere, as not to be led by the nose by others: For we see the sad event of it in *Eve's* listening to the outward suggestions of the *Serpent*.

In his Leg. Allegor. lib. 1. *Vers. 10. The four Cardinal Vertues.* It is the Exposition of *Philo.* Till verse 17, there is no need of adding any thing more than what has already been said in the Defence of the *Philosophick Cabbala*.

Vers. 17. Dead to all Righteousness and Truth. The mortality that *Adam* contracted by his *Disobedience* in the Moral or Mystical sense is twofold; *The one*, a death to righteousness, and it is the sense of *Philo* upon the place, *ὅ ὃ ψυχῆς θάνατος, ἀρετῆς μὲν φθορά ἐστίν, κακίας ὃ ἀνάληψις,* *The death of the Soul is the extinction of Vertue in her, and the resurrection of Vice:* and he adds, that this must be the death here meant, it being a real punishment indeed to forfeit the life of Vertue. *The other*
mor-

mortality is a necessity of dying to unrighteousness, if he ever would be happy. Both these notions of *Death* are more frequent in St. Paul's Epistles, than that I need to give any other instance.

His more noble and Masculine Faculties. What the *Masculine* part in man is, || *Philo* plainly declares in these words, Ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀνδρὲς μὲν || In his Confession, λόγον ἔχει ὁ νῦν, γυναικὲς δ' ἡ αἰσθησις, *In us, saith he, the Man is the Intellect, the Woman the Sense of the Body.* Whence you will easily understand, that the *Masculine Faculties* are those that are more *Spiritual* and *Intellectual*.

Vers. 18. That the whole *Humane Nature* may be accomplished with the *Divine*. Which is agreeable to that pious ejaculation of the Apostle, 1 *Thess.* 5. And the God of Peace sanctify you wholly, or thoroughly; and I pray God your whole Spirit, Soul, and Body, may be kept blameless, ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ, by the presence or abode of Jesus Christ, the divine Life or heavenly Adam in you. This is the most easy and natural sense of * that place of Scripture mystically understood, as it will appear to any man, whose mind is as much set on Holiness as hard Theories. And it is very agreeable to the *Mystical* sense of the second Psalm, where the Kingdom of Christ reaches to the utmost ends of the Earth, that is, as far as Soul and Life can animate, so that our very flesh and body is brought under the Scepter of Christ's Kingdom.

Vers. 19. The Figurations of the Animal Life. That the Motions of the Mind, as they are suggested from the Animal Life of the Body, are set forth by Fishes, Beasts, and Birds, I have already made good from the authority of Origen.

Vers. 20. In a capacity of taking delight in them. For Melancholy had so depraved the complexion of his Body, that there was no grateful sense of any thing that belong'd to nature, and the life of the Vehicle.

Vers. 22. The greatest part of that Paradise a man is capable of upon Earth. This is a Truth of Sense and Experience, and is no more to be proved by Reason, than that White is White, or Black is Black.

Vers. 23. Essential operation of the Soul. The very nature of the Soul, as it is a Soul, is an aptitude of informing or actuating a Body; but that it should be always an organiz'd Body, it is but Aristotle's saying of it, he does not prove it. But for mine own part, I am very prone to think that the Soul is never destitute of some Vehicle or other, though Plotinus be of another mind, and conceives that the Soul at the height is join'd with God and nothing else, nakedly lodged in his arms. And I am the more bold to dissent from him in this exaltation of the soul, I being so secure, in my own conceit, of that other suspected extravagancy of his, in the debasement of them, that at last they become so drowsy and senseless, that they grow up out of the ground in that dull function of life, the efformation of Trees and Plants. And I am not alone in this liberty of dissenting from Plotinus; For besides my own conceit this way, (for I must confess I have no demonstrative reasons against his opinion) I am emboldened by the example of || Ficinus, who is no small admirer of the forenamed Author.

That which I was about to say is this; The informing or actuating of a Body, being so indispensable and Essential an act of the Soul, the

See *Immortal. of the Soul*, Book 3. ch. 1. sect. 2.

Comment. in Plotin. Ennead. 2. lib 8. cap. 8. and elsewhere.

temper and condition of the Body that it thus actuates, cannot but be of mighty consequence unto the Soul that is conscious of the plight thereof, and reaps the joy of it, or sorrow, by an universal touch and inward sense springing up into her cognoscence and animadversion. And we may easily imagine of what moment the *health* and good plight of the *Body* is to the *Mind* that lodges there, if we do but consider the condition of *Plants*, whose bodies we cannot but conceive in a more grateful temper, while they flourish and are sweet and pleasing to the eye, than when they are withered by age or drought, or born down to the Earth by immoderate storms of rain. And so it is with the body of man, (where there is a Soul to take notice of its condition) far better when it is in health by moderation in diet and exercise, than when it is either parched up by superstitious melancholy, or flocked and drowned in sensuality and intemperance; for they are both abaters of the joys of life, and lessen that plenitude of happiness that man is capable of by his Mystical *Eve*, the woman that God has given every one to delight himself with.

Vers. 24. So far forth as they are incompatible with the health of the body. This is an undeniable truth, else how could that hold good that the
 1 Tim. 4. 8. *Apostle speaks, That Godliness is profitable for all things, having the promise of this world, and that which is to come; whereas without the health of the Body, there is nothing at all to be enjoy'd in this present world? And certainly God doth not tie us to the Law of Angels or superiour Creatures, but to precepts suitable to the nature of man.*

Obedience to the Precepts of that superiour Light. For if the *Life of the Body* grow upon us so as to extinguish or hinder the sense of divine things, of our dependence on God, and of the joyful hope of the life to come; it is then become disorderly, and is to be castigated and kept down, that it pull not us down into an aversion from all Piety, and sink us into an utter oblivion of God and the divine Life.

Vers. 25. Without any shame or blushing. See what has been said upon the *Philosophick Cabbala*.

SCHOLIA.

In CAP. II. Vers. 4.

Concentibus musicis ac choreis. Sunt è severioribus Theologis qui Choreas omninò illicitas putant. Et facile concedo, res in se licitas multis propter naturæ suæ pravitatem illicitas evadere. Hæc igitur ingenium suum, animique propensiones quisque explorare debet, & sic se gerere ut nec sibi noxam nec proximo scandalum pariat. Ut verò nemo ferè est, ex elegantiori saltem hominum genere, quin licet rem commodam arbitretur saltationem, à saltando tamen absterget, nisi in loco commodo, nollétque in conclavi non bene emundato pulverem circa se aliósque excitare; ità certè debet quisque vir bonus antè perpendere an domum suam, hoc est, suum corpus satis expurgatum

gatum habeat ab omnibus sordibus, nec excitaturus sit pulverem in domicilio suo luteo & pulvere, liberiori hoc ludicrorum genere. Quod si suspicetur fore, consultius erit abstinere, donec corpus ab his sordibus ac pulvere, aut anima ab hoc corpore pulveris liberata fuerit.

Vers. 8. Nam septimus Terminus illic est septenarius, &c. ἑβδομῶς αἰθρῆς appellatur apud Philonem. Sed ipsa Unitas hic pro Numero aestimatur: Septimúsque ab unitate intelligitur inclusivè, ità ut unitas tanquam primus Terminus comprehendatur.

In quas maximè equaliter est divisibilis, &c. Quanquam enim septem in duo & quinque dividere etiam licet, manifestum tamen est Divisionem multò esse inæqualiorem.

Vers. 18. Hujus loci Scriptura mysticè intellecti, &c. h. e. in sensu Morali. Quodsi interpreteris sensu magis Physico sive Philosophico, tunc ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ idem significabit quod εἰς τὴν παρουσίαν, prout Beza, Grotius, & alii plerique omnes exponunt. An verò Grotius genuinum hujus loci sensum reddiderit dum ὁλόκληρον ad cuncta tria referri vult, ad Spiritum, Animam & Corpus, meritò potest dubitari. Videtur enim appreciatio paulò alienior, ut corpus terrenum, postquam Terræ commissum sit, ἀμείπτως inculpatum & immaculatum conservetur in adventum Domini. Videndum igitur annon minùs coactus foret sensus in [ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα] ὁλόκληρον restringere ad πνεῦμα, & per Spiritum integrum totum intelligere, debitis suis partibus constantem, (utì & Grotius agnoscit exponi posse) totum verò hunc Spiritum esse hominem Spiritualem, quem τὸ ἕσθαι ἄνθρωπον, Apostolus 2 Cor. 4. appellat: atque heic innuit duabus partibus constare, καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι, & animâ & corpore, nempe corpore tenui & spirituali. Platonici nunc τὸ λεπτὸν ὄχημα, nunc τὸ αὔλον σῶμα, nunc tenue vehiculum, nunc corpus immateriale vocant. Ut hæc quidem sine macula & culpa conserventur usque ad adventum Domini, satis apposita est appreciatio. Corpus verò terrenum ante Resurrectionem, putrescere in sepulchro & putrescere notissimum est, ut minùs rectè de eo intelligi possit oratio. Corpus verò Terrenum vivum, in [ἀγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὁλοτελεῖς, sanctificet vos totos] includi faciliè concedo, quò minùs necessarium sit in reliqua parte versùs intelligi, sed corpus potius αὔλον Platoniorum.

CHAP. III.

A story of a dispute betwixt a Prelate and a Black-Smith, concerning Adam's eating of the Apple. What is meant by the subtilty or deceit of the Serpent. That Religion wrought to its due height is a very cheerful state; and it is only the halting and hypocrisy of men that generally have put so soure and sad a vizard upon it. 5, 6. That worldly Wisdom, not Philosophy, is perstringed in the Mystery of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil. 10. The meaning of Adam's flying after he found himself naked. 20. Adam, the Earthly-minded Man, according to Philo. 21. What is meant by God's cloathing Adam and Eve with hairy Coats, in the Mystical sense. 33. Παράδεισος τρυφῆς, or the Paradise of Luxury. That History in Scripture is wrote very concisely, and there-

fore admits of modest and judicious Supplements for clearing the sense.
24. What is meant by the Cherubim and flaming Sword. Plato's definition of Philosophy, μελέτε θανάτου. A more large description of dying to Sin, and of the life of Righteousness. That Christian Religion, even as it refers to the external Person of Christ, is upon no pretence to be annull'd till the Conflagration of the world.

IN this Third Chapter is the sad Catastrophe of the Story, the Fall of Adam, and the Original of all that misery and calamity that hath befallen mankind since the beginning of the World. Of so horrid consequence was it; that our Mother Eve could no better suppress her longing, but, upon the easy perswasion of the Serpent, ate the forbidden Fruit; as a famous Prelate in France once very tragically insisted upon the point to his attentive Auditory.

See Jo. Bodin. Mag. Demonoman. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 123, 124, 125.

But it should seem, a certain Smith in the Church, as Bodinus relates, when he had heard from this venerable Preacher, that Universal Mankind, saving a small hand of Christians, were irrevocably laps'd into eternal damnation by Adam's eating of an Apple, and he having the boldness to argue the matter with the Prelate, and receiving no satisfaction from his managing the Literal sense of the Text, (and his skill, it would seem, went no further,) the Smith at last broke out into these words, *Tam multas rixas pro re tantilla ineptè excitari*; as if he should have said in plain English, *What a deal of doe has there been about the eating of an Apple?* Which blasphemous saying, as Bodinus writes, had no sooner come to the ears of the Court of France, but it became a Proverb amongst the Courtiers. So dangerous a thing is an ignorant and indiscreet Preacher, and a bold, immodest Auditor. Bodinus in the same place does profess it is his Judgment, that the unskilful insisting of our Divines upon the Literal sense of Moses, has bred * many hundred thousand of Atheists. For which reason, I hope that men that are not very ignorant and humourous, but sincere lovers of God and the divine Truth, will receive these my Cabbala's with more favour and acceptance, especially this Moral one, it being not of too big a sense to stop the mouth of any honest, free, inquisitive Christian. But whatever it is, we shall further endeavour to make it good in the several passages thereof.

In his Confessio Moisaic.

Verf. 1. Inordinate desire of pleasure. It is Philo's, τὸν ὄφιν ἡδονῆς εἶναι σύμβολον, *That the Serpent is a Symbole or representation of Pleasure*; which he compares to that creature for three reasons.

First, because a Serpent is an Animal without feet, and crawls along on the Earth upon his belly.

Secondly, because it is said to feed upon the dust of the Earth.

Thirdly, because it has poisonous teeth, that kill those that it bites. And so he assimilates Pleasure to it, being a base affection, and bearing it self upon the belly, the seat of lust and intemperance, feeding on earthly things, μὴ σιτευμένη ὅτι ἐξάντων τροφῶν ἣν ἐρέγχει τοῖς φιλοθεάμοις διὰ λόγου καὶ δογματῶν σοφία, *but never nourishing her self with that heavenly food which Wisdom offers to the Contemplative by her precepts and discourses.*

Philon. Confessio Moisaic.

It is much that Philo should take * no notice of that which is particularly set down in the Text, the subtilty of the Serpent, which methinks

thinks is notorious in *Pleasure*, it looking so smoothly and innocently on it, and insinuating it self very easily into the minds of men upon that consideration, and so deceiving them; whereas other Passions cannot so slyly surprise us, they bidding open war to the quiet and happiness of man's life, as that judicious Poet *Spencer* has well observed in his *Legend of Sir Guyon, or Temperance*.

*A harder lesson to learn continence
In joyous pleasure than in grievous pain:
For sweetness doth allure the weaker sense
So strongly, that uneathes it can refrain
From that which feeble Nature covets fain;
But grief and wrath that be our enemies,
And foes of life, she better can restrain:
Yet Vertue vaunts in both her Victories,
And Guyon in them all shews goodly Masteries.*

In his *Faery
Queen*, Book
2. cant. 6.

What a rigid and severe thing, &c. This is the conceit of such as are either utter strangers to Religion, or have not yet arrived to that comfortable result of it that may be expected. For God takes no delight in the perpetual rack of those Souls he came to redeem, but came to redeem us from that pain and torture which the love of our selves, and our untamed lusts, and pride of spirit, makes us obnoxious to; which men being loth to part with, and not having the heart to let them be struck to the very quick, and pulled up by the roots, the work not accomplished according to the full mind and purpose of God, there are still the seeds of perpetual anxiety, sadness, and inevitable pain. For to be dead, is easement; but to be still dying, is pain: and it is most ordinarily but the due punishment of halting and hypocrisy. And mens spirits being long sowed thus and made sad, their profession and behaviour is such, that they fright all inexperienced young men from any tolerable compliance in matters of Religion, thinking that when they are once engaged there, they are condemned *ad Fodinas* for ever, and that they can never emerge out of this work and drudgery in those dark Caverns, till they die there like the poor *Americans*, enslaved and over-wrought by the merciless *Spaniard*.

But verily if we have but the patience to be laid low enough, the same hand that depressed us will exalt us above all hope and expectation. For if we be sufficiently baptized into the Death of Christ, we shall assuredly be made partakers of his Resurrection to Life, and that glorious liberty of the Sons of God, according as it is written, *If the Son make you free, then are you free indeed*; free from Sin, and secure from the power of any Temptation. But if *Mortification* has not had its perfect work, too mature a return of the sweetness of the *Animal Life* may prove like the Countryman's cherishing the Snake by the fire-side, which he had, as he thought, taken up dead in the Snow; it will move, and hiss, and bite, and sting. The strong prefaces of the manifold corporal delights and satisfactions of the flesh, may grow so big and boisterous in the mind, that the Soul may deem

John 8. 36.

deem her self too freightly girt up, and begin to listen to such whispers of the *Serpent* as this, *What a rigid and severe thing is this business of Religion, &c?* and account her self, if she be not free to every thing, that she is as good as free to nothing.

Vers. 2, 3. But the Womanish part in Adam. 'Tis but one and the same Soul in man, entertaining a dialogue with her self that is set out by these Three parts, the *Serpent*, *Adam*, and the *Woman*. And here the Soul recollecting her self, cannot but confess that Religion denies her no honest nor fitting pleasure that is not hazardous to her greater happiness, and bethinks her self in what peril she is of losing the divine Life and due sense of God, if she venture thus promiscuously to follow her own will, and not measure all her actions and purposes by the divine Light that for the present is at hand to direct her.

Vers. 4. But the Serpent, &c. The sense of this verse is, that the eager desire of *Pleasure* had wrought it self so far into the sweetness of the *Animal Life*, that it clouded the man's judgment, and made him fondly hope, that the being so freely alive to his own Will was no prejudice to the Will of the Spirit, and the life of God which was in him; whenas yet notwithstanding the Apostle expressly writes, *What fellowship is there betwixt righteousness and unrighteousness? what communion betwixt light and darkness? what agreement betwixt Christ and Belial?* And he elsewhere tells us, *That Christ gave himself for his Church, that he might so thoroughly purge it, and sanctify it, that it should have neither spot nor wrinkle; but that it should be holy and unblameable,* a true Virgin-Bride clothed with his divine Life and Glory. And those men that are so willing to halt betwixt two, the *Flesh* and the *Spirit*, and have house-room enough to entertain them both, (as if there could be any friendship and communion betwixt them) let them seriously consider whether this opinion be not the same that *deceived Adam* was of, and let them suspect the same sad event, and acknowledge it to arise from the self-same Principle, the inordinate desire of pleasing their own wills, without the allowance of the divine Light, and consulting with the Will of God.

2 Cor. 6. 14.

Ephes. 5. 27.

Vers. 5. Skill and Experience in things. And some men make it no sin, but warrantable knowledge, to know the world, and account others fools that are ignorant of that wicked mystery. For man would be no Slave or Idiot, but know his own liberty, and gain experience, as he pretends, by the making use of it.

But that the accurate exercise of *Reason* in the knowledge of God's marvellous works in *Nature*, or those innocent delightful Conclusions in *Geometry* and *Arithmetick*, and the like, and these parts of Knowledge should be perstringed by *Moses* in this History, it seems to me not to have the least probability in it; for there are so very few in the world, whose minds are carried any thing seriously to such Objects, that it had not been worth the taking notice of. And then again, it is plain that the miscarriage is from the affectation of such kind of Knowledge as the *Woman*, the *flowring life of the Body*, occasioned *Adam* to transgress in. Wherefore it is the fulfilling of the various desires of the flesh, not an high aspire after Intellectual Contemplations; for they respect the *Masculine Faculties*, not the *Feminine*, that made way to the transgression. Where-

Wherefore, I say, the *Wisdom* that the *Serpent* here promised was not *Natural Philosophy* or *Mathematicks*, or any of those innocuous and noble accomplishments of the Understanding of man, but it was the *Knowledge of the world*, and the *Wisdom of the flesh*. For the *Life of the Body* is full of desires and presages of satisfaction in the obtaining of this or the other external thing, whether it be in *Honour*, *Riches*, or *Pleasure*; and if they shake off the divine Guide within them, they will have it by hook or by crook. And this *worldly Wisdom* is so plausible in the world, and so sweetly relished by the mere natural man, that it were temptation enough for a Novice, if it were but to be esteemed *Wise*, to adventure upon such things as would initiate him therein.

Vers. 6. But the Wisdom of the flesh. The Apostle calls it *σοφία σαρκός*. Rom. 8: 7. Which *wisdom of the flesh*, he saith, is *enmity with God*. But the free and cautious use of *Reason*, the *Knowledge of the fabrick of the world*, and the course of *Natural causes*, to understand the *Rudiments of Geometry*, and the *Principles of Mechanicks*, and the like; what man, that is not a *Fool* or a *Fanatick*, will ever assert that God bears any enmity to these things? For again, these kinds of *Contemplations* are not so properly the *Knowledge of Good and Evil*, as of *Truth and Falshood*; the *Knowledge of Good and Evil* referring to that experience we gather up in *Moral or Political encounters*.

But those men that from this Text of Scripture would perstringe *Philosophy*, and an honest and generous Enquiry into the true knowledge of God in Nature, I suspect them partly of *ignorance*, and partly of a *fly and partial kind of countenancing of those pleasures that Beasts have as well as Men*, and I think in as high a degree, especially *Baboons and Satyrs*, and such like lecherous *Animals*. And I fear there are no men so subject to such mis-interpretations of Scripture as the boldest *Religionists* and *Mock-Prophets*, who are very full of heat and spirits, and have their *Imagination* too often infected with the fumes of those lower parts, the full sense and pleasure whereof they prefer before all the subtle delights of *Reason* and generous *Contemplation*. *Enthusiasm: Triumphat. sect. 21, 22.*

But leaving these *Sanguine-inspired Seers* to the sweet deception and gullery of their own corrupted Fancy, let us listen and keep close to him that can neither deceive nor be deceived, I mean *Christ* and his holy Apostles; and now in particular, let us consider that grave and pious Monition of St. Peter, Beloved, *I beseech you, as Strangers and Pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts that war against the Soul*. Wherein this holy man, instructed of God, plainly intimates that the Soul in this world is as a traveller in a strange Country, and that she is journeying on to a condition more suitable to her than this in the Body. Whence it follows, that the tender patronizing of those pleasures that are mortal, and die with the Body, is a badge of a poor, base, degenerate Mind, and unacquainted with her own nature and dignity. *1 Pet. 2. 11.*

Vers. 7. How naked now he was, and bare of all strength and power to divine and holy things. This was *Adam's* mistake, that he thought he could serve two Masters, *The Will of God*, and, *The dictates of the flesh*. But thus he became estranged to the divine Life and Power, which will not dwell in a body that is subject unto sin; For the holy Spirit of discipline *Wisdom 1. 5. will*

will fly deceit, and remove from thoughts that are without understanding, (viz. such as are suggested and pursued at randome) and will not abide when unrighteousness cometh in.

Vers. 8. Could not endure the presence of it. For the divine Light now was only a convincer of his miscarriages, but administred nothing of the divine Love and power, as it does to them that are obedient and sincere followers of its Precepts; and therefore Adam could no more endure the presence of it, than sore eyes the Sun or Candle-light.

Vers. 9. Persisted and came up closer to him. This divine Light is God, as he is manifested in the Conscience of man, but his Love and Power are not fit to be communicated to Adam in this dissolute and disobedient condition he is in, but merely Conviction, to bring him to repentance. And after the hurry of his inordinate pleasures and passion, when he was for a time left in the fuds, as they call it, this light of Conscience did more strictly and particularly sift and examine him, and he might well wonder with himself, that he found himself so much afraid to commune with his own Heart.

Vers. 10. Ingenuosly confessed. For he presently found out the reason why he was thus estranged from the divine Light, because he found himself naked of that power and good affection he had in divine things before; having lost those by promiscuously following the wild suggestions of his own inordinate will, as you see in the following verse. Wherefore he had no mind to be convinced of any obligation to such things as he felt in himself no power left to perform, nor any inclination unto.

Vers. 11. The sad event upon his disobedience. Adam's Conscience resolved all this confusion of mind into his disobedience, and following his own will, without any rule or guidance from the will of God.

Vers. 12. His rational Faculties, and said. Like that in the Comedian,

Homo sum, humani nihil à me alienum puto.

And so commonly men reason themselves into an allowance of sin, by pretending humane infirmities or natural frailties.

Vers. 13. That he kept his Feminine faculties in no better order. That is, the foolish and mischievous Sophistry amongst men, whereby they impose upon themselves, that because such and such things may be done, and that they are but the suggestions of nature, which is the work of God in the world, that therefore they may do them, how and in what measure they please. But here the divine Light does not chastise Adam for the exercise of his Feminine faculties, but that in the exercise of them they were not regulated by an higher and more holy Rule, and that he kept them in no more subjection unto the Masculine.

To which he had nothing to say, but, &c. The meaning is, that Adam's temptations were very strong, and so accommodate to the vigorous life of the body, that as he thought, he could not resist. But the will of man assisted by God, as Adam was, if it be sincere, what can it not do?

Vers.

Vers. 14. Then the divine Light began to chastise the Serpent. From this 14th verse to the 20th there seems to be a description of the Conscience of a man, plainly convincing him of all the ugliness and inconveniencies of those sinful courses he is engaged in, with some hints also of the advantages of the *Better life*, if he be converted to it, which is like a present flame kindled in his mind for a time: but the true love of the divine Life and the power of Grace being not also communicated unto his Soul, and his Body being unpurg'd of the filth it has contracted by former evil courses, this flame is presently extinct, and all those monitions and representations of what so nearly concerned him are drowned in oblivion, and he presently settles to his old ill ways again.

That it crept basely upon the belly. See what has been said out of *Philo* upon verse 1.

Vers. 15. But might I once descend so far. This the *divine Light* might be very well said to speak in *Adam*. For his Conscience might well remind him how grateful a sense of the *harmless joys of the Body* he had in his state of obedience and sincerity: and if the *divine Light* had wrought it self into a more full and universal possession of all his Faculties, the regulated *joys of the Body*, which had been the offspring of the woman, had so far exceeded the tumultuous pleasures of inordinate desires, that they would, like the Sun-beams playing upon a fire, extinguish the heat thereof, as is already said in this 15th verse.

Verse 16. So that the kindly Joy of the health of the Body shall be much depraved. The *divine Light* in the Conscience of *Adam* might very well say all this, he having had already a good taste of it in all likelihood, having found himself after inordinate satiating his furious desires of pleasure, in a dull, languid, nauseating condition, though new recruits spurred him up to new follies. For the *Moral Cabbala* does not suppose it was one single mistaken act that brought *Adam* to this confusion of mind, but disobedience at large, and leading a Life unguided by the Light and Law of God.

Earthly-minded Adam. *Philo* calls him *τὸν γῆινον νῦν*, the *earthly mind*, pag. 332.

Vers. 17, 18, 19. Adam's Conscience was so awakened by the *divine Light* and *Reason*, and *Experience* so instructed him for the present, that he could easily read his own doom, if he persisted in these courses of disobedience, that he should be prick'd and vex'd in his wild rangings after inordinate pleasure all the while the *Earthly mind* was his light and guide. But after all this conviction, what way *Adam* would settle in, did not God visit him with an higher pitch of superadvenient Grace that would convey *Faith*, *Power*, and *Affection* unto him, you see in the verse immediately following.

Vers. 20. Adam was not sufficiently. For mere conviction of Light disjoin'd from *Faith*, *Power*, and *Affection*, may indeed disturb the Mind, and confound it; but is not able of it self to compose it and settle it to good, in men that have contracted a custom of evil.

Called her, My Life. So soon as this reproof and castigation of the *divine Light* manifested in *Adam's* Conscience was over, he forthwith falls

falls into the same sense of things, and pursues the same resolutions that he had in design before; and very feelingly concludes with himself, that be that as true as it will that his Conscience dictated unto him, yet nothing can be more true than this, *That the Joy of his Body was a necessary solace of Life, and therefore he would set up his happiness in the improvement thereof.* And so adhering in his affection to it, counted it *his very life*, and that there was no living at all without it.

|| In his *Quis*
rerum divi-
narum heres.

They are almost the words of || *Philo*, speaking of the sense of the Body, in which was this corporeal Joy; *Ἦν ὁ ὁ γέννησθαι νῆς, ὅνομα Ἀδάμ, ἰδὼν διαπλαθεῖσαν, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θάνατον, ζῶν ἐκείνῳ ἀνόμεσεν, i. e. which corporeal sense the earthly mind in man, properly therefore called Adam, when he saw efformed, though it was really the death of the man, yet he called it his Life.* This is *Philo's* Exposition of this present verse.

Psal. 35. 26.
& 109. 29.

Vers. 21. Put hairy Coats. The *Philosophick Cabbala* and the Text have a marvellous fit and easy congruency in this place. And this *Moral* sense will not seem hard, if you consider such phrases as these in Scripture; *But as for his enemies, let them be clothed with shame*; and elsewhere, *Let them be clothed with rebuke and dishonour*, besides other places to that purpose. And to cloth men according to their conditions and quality, what is more ordinary, or more fit and natural? As those that are *Fools*, they ordinarily cloth them in a *Fool's coat*. And so *Adam's* will and affection being carried so resolvedly to the *brutish* life, it is not incongruous to conceive that the *divine Light* judging them *very Brutes*, the reproach she gives them is set out in this passage of *clothing them with the skins of beasts*.

The meaning therefore of this Verse is, that the *divine Light* in the Conscience of *Adam* had another bout with him, and that *Adam* was convinced that he should grow a kind of a *Brute* by the courses he meant to follow. And indeed he was content so to be, as a man may well conceive, the pleasure of sin having so weakened all the power of that higher life in him, that there was little or nothing, especially for the present, able to carry him at all upwards towards Heaven and Holiness.

And of a truth, vile *Epicurism* and *Sensuality* will make the Soul of man so degenerate and blind, that he will not only be content to slide into *Brutish* immorality, but please himself in this very opinion, that he is a real *Brute* already, an *Ape*, *Satyre*, or *Baboon*; and that the best of men are no better, saving that civilizing of them and industrious education have made them appear in a more refined shape, and long inculcated Precepts have been mistaken for *connate Principles of Honesty and Natural Knowledge*; otherwise there be no indispensable grounds of *Religion* and *Vertue*, but what have happened by *over-ruling Custom*. Which things, I dare say, are as easily confutable, as any Conclusion in *Mathematicks* is demonstrable. But as many as are thus sottish, let them enjoy their own wildness and ignorance; it is sufficient for a good man, that he is conscious unto himself that he is more nobly descended, better bred and born, and more skilfully taught by the purged Faculties of his own Mind.

Vers.

Vers. 22. Design'd the contrary. The mercy of the Almighty is such to poor man, that his weak and dark spirit cannot be always so resolvedly wicked as he is contented to be; wherefore it is a sound surmise of desperate men, that do all the violence they can to the remainders of that Light and Principle of Religion and Honesty left in them, hoping thereby to come to rest and tranquillity of mind, by laying dead, or quite obliterating all the Rules of Godliness and Morality out of their Souls. For it is not in their power so to do, nor have they any reason to promise themselves they are hereby secure from the pangs of Conscience. For some passages of Providence or other may so awaken them, that they shall be forced to acknowledge their error and rebellion with inexpressible bitterness and confusion of spirit: And the longer they have run wrong, the more tedious journey they have to return back.

Wherefore it is more safe to close with that life betimes, that when it is attained to, neither deserves nor is obnoxious to any *change* or *death*; I mean, when we have arrived to the due measure of it. For this is the natural accomplishment of the Soul, all else but rust and dirt that lies upon it.

Vers. 23. Out of this Paradise of Luxury. The *English Translation* takes no notice of any more Paradises than one, calling it always the *Garden of Eden*. But the *Seventy*, more favourable to our *Moral Cabbala*, that which they call a *Garden in Eden* at first, they after name *ἡδυστοῦ τρυφῆς*, which may signify, *the Garden of Luxury*. But whether there be any force at all in this or no, that Supplement I have made in the foregoing verse will make good the sense of our *Cabbala*. And in the very Letter and History of the Scripture, if a man take notice, he must of necessity make a supply of something or other to pass to what follows with due cohesion and clearness of sense.

So in the very next Chapter, where God dooms *Cain* to be a Vagabond, and he cries out, that *every man that meets him will kill him*, according to the concise story of the Text, there was none but *Adam* and *Eve* in the world to meet him; and yet there is a mark set upon him by God, as if there had been several people in the world into whose hands he might fall, and lose his life by them. And then again at *vers. 17. Cain* had no sooner got into the *Land of Nod*, but he has a wife and a child by her, and he is forthwith said to build a City; whenas there is no mention of any but himself, his wife, and his child, to be Artificers; but any ingenious Reader will easily make to himself fitting supplements, ever supposing due distances of time, and right preparations to all that is said to be acted. And so in the story of *Samson*, where he is said to take three hundred Foxes, it may be rationally supposed that Country was full of such creatures; that he had a competency of time, a sufficient number to help him, and the like. That the History of Scripture is very concise, no body can deny; and therefore where easy, natural, and agreeable supplements will clear the sense, I conceive it is very warrantable to suppose some such supplies, and for a Paraphrast judiciously to interweave them.

But now that *Paradise* at first should signify a state of *divine pleasure*, and afterward of *sensual voluptuousness*, it is no more harsh than that *Adam* one while is the *Spiritual* or *Intellectual Man*, another while the *Earthly* and *Carnal*. For one and the same *Natural* thing may be a *Symbol* of contrary *Spiritual Mysteries*. So a *Lion* and a *Serpent* are figures of *Christ*, as well as of the *Devil*: and therefore it is not so hard to admit that this *Garden of Eden* may emblemize, while *Adam* is discours'd of as innocent and obedient to God, the *delights of the Spirit*; but after his forsaking God, the *pleasures of the flesh*; and consequently, that the fruit of the *Tree of Life* in the one, may be *perseverance and establishment in the divine Life*; in the other, a *settlement and fixedness in the brutish and sensual*.

Vers. 24. The manly faculties of Reason and Conscience. These I conceive may be understood by the *Cherubim* and *flaming Sword*. For the *Cherubim* bear the Image of a *Man*, and *Reason* is a cutting, dividing thing, like a *Sword*, the *Stoicks* call it *τὸ διαπρίλα λόγον*, *dividing and distinguishing Reason*. For *Reason* is nothing but a distinct discernment of the *Idea's* of things, whereby the *Mind* is able to sever what will not suit, and lay together what will. But if any body will like better of *Philo's* interpretation here of the *Cherubim* and *flaming Sword*, who makes the *Cherubim* to signify the *Goodness and Power of God*; the *flaming Sword*, *τὸ θεῖον λόγον*, the *effectual and operative Wisdom or Word of God*; it does not at all clash with what we have already set down. For my self also suppose, that God, by his Son, the *Eternal Word*, works upon the *Reason and Conscience* of man: For that *Word* is *living and powerful, sharper than any two-edged Sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is the discerners of the thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight; but all things are naked and open unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do.*

Heb. 4. 12,
13.

That he could not set up his rest for ever. Assuredly a man's heart is not so in his own hand, that he can do himself all the mischief he is contented to do. For we are more God's than our own, and his *Goodness and Power* has dominion over us. And therefore let not a man vainly fancy, that by violently running into all enormity of life, and extinguishing all the *Principles of Piety and Vertue* in him, that he shall be able thus to hide himself from God, and never to be reminded of him again for ever. For though a man may happen thus to forget God for a time, yet he can never forget us, sith all things lie open to his sight. And the power of his *ever-living Word* will easily cut through all that thickness and darkness which we shrowd our selves in, and wound us so as to make us look back with shame and sorrow at a time that we least thought of.

But that our pain may be the less, and our happiness commence the sooner, it will be our wisdom to comply with the *divine Light* betimes; for the sooner we begin, the work is the easier, and will be the more timely dispatch'd through the power of God working in us. But this I must confess (and I think my self bound to bear witness to so true and useful a mystery wrapt up in this *Mosaical* covering,) That there is no other passage nor return into happiness than by death.

Pla-

Plato also, that had been acquainted with these Holy writings, has defined *Philosophy* *Μελέτη θανάτου*, *The meditation of death*, viz. the dying to the lust of the flesh, and inordinate desires of the Body; which Purgatory if we had once passed through, there would soon spring up that *Morning Joy*, the Resurrection from the dead, and our arrival to everlasting life and glory. And there is no other way than this that is manifestable either by *Scripture*, *Reason*, or *Experience*.

But those that through the grace of God, and a vehement thirst after the divine Righteousness, have born the Cross till the perfect death of the body of sin, and make it their business to have no more sense nor relish of themselves, or their own particular persons, than if they were not at all, they being thus demolished as to themselves, and turned into a *Chaos*, or dark *Nothingness*, as I may so speak, they become thereby fitted for the *new Creation*.

And this *personal life* being thus destroyed, God calls unto them in the dead of the Night, when all things are silent about them, awakes them, and raises them up, and breathes into them the breath of everlasting life, and ever actuates them by his own Spirit, and takes all the humane Faculties unto himself, guiding or allowing all their operations, always holding up the spirit of man so that he will never sink into sin; and from henceforth death and sorrow is swallowed up for ever, for the sting of Death is Sin.

But whatever liberty and joy men take to themselves that is not founded in this new life, is false and frivolous, and will end but in sadness, bitterness, and intolerable thralldom. For the *Corporeal life* and *sense* will so deeply have sunk into the Soul, that it will be beyond all measure hard and painful to disentangle her.

But as many as have passed the *Death*, have arrived to that *Life* that abides for ever and ever.

And this *Life* is *pure and immaculate Love*, and this *Love* is God, as he is communicable unto man, and is the sole *Life* and *Essence* of *Vertue* truly so called; or rather, as all colours are but the reflexion of the Rays of the Sun, so all *Vertue* is but this One variously coloured and figured from the diversity of *Objects* and *Circumstances*. But when she plays with ease within her own pure and undisturbed *Light*, she is most lovely and amiable; and if she step out into zeal, Satyrical rebuke, and contestation, it is a condescend and debasement for the present; but the design is, a more enlarged exaltation of her own nature, and the getting more universal foot-hold in other persons, by dislodging her deformed enemy.

For the *divine Love* is the love of the *divine Beauty*, and that *Beauty* is the *divine Life* which would gladly insinuate it self, and become one with that particular Principle of *Natural life*, the Soul of man. And whatever man she has taken hold upon, and won him to her self, she does so actuate and guide, as that whatever he has, she gets the use of, and improves it to her own *Interest*, that is, the advancement of her self.

But she observing that her progress and speed is not so fast as she could wish, (that is, that mankind is not so fully and so generally happy by her as she could desire, and as they are capable of) she

raises in a man his Anger and Indignation against those things that are obstacles and impediments in her way, beating down by solid Reason such things as pretend to Reason, and such things as are neither the genuine off-spring of the humane faculties, nor the effects of her own union with them, discountenancing them, and deriding them as Monsters and Mongrel things, they being no accomplishment of the humane nature, nor any gift of the divine. She observing also, that mankind is very giddily busy to improve their Natural faculties without her, and promise themselves very rare effects of their art and industry, which if they could bring to pass, would be in the end but a scourge and plague to them, and make them more desperately bold, sensual, Atheistical, and wicked; (for no fire but that of God's Spirit in a man can clear up the true knowledge of himself unto us,) she therefore taketh courage (though she see her self slighted, or unknown) and deservedly magnifies her self above all the effects of Art and humane industry, and boldly tells the world what petty and poor things they are if compared unto her.

Nor doth she at all stick to pour out her Scorn and Derision unto the full upon those garish effects of fanatical Fancy, where *Melancholy* dictates strange and uncouth dreams, out of a dark hole, like the whispers of the Heathen Oracles. For it is not only an injury to her self, that such *Antick Phantasms* are preferred before the pure simplicity of her own beauty; but a great mischief to her darling, the Soul of man, that he should forsake those Faculties she has a mind to sanctify and to take into her self, and should give himself up to mere inconsiderate Imaginations and casual impresses, chusing them for his guide, because they are strongest, not truest, and he will not so much as examine them.

Such like as these and several other occasions there are that oftentimes figure the *divine life* in good men, and sharpen it into an high degree of Zeal and Anger. But whom in wrath she then wounds, she pities, as being an affectionate Lover of universal mankind, though an unreconcilable disliker of their vices.

I Have now gone through my *Threefold Cabbala*, which I hope all sincere and judicious Christians will entertain with unprejudic'd candour and kind acceptance. For as I have lively set out the mysteries of the holy and precious life of a Christian, even in the *Mosaical Letter*; so I have carefully and on purpose cleared and asserted the grand essential Principles of *Christianity* it self, as it is a *particular Religion*; avoiding that rock of scandal that some, who are taken for no small Lights of the *Christian* world, have cast before men, who attenuate all so into *Allegories*, that they leave the very Fundamentals of Religion suspected, especially themselves not vouchsafing to take notice, that there is any such thing as the *Person of Christ now existent*, much less that he is a *Mediatour with God for us*, or that he was a *sacrifice for sin* when he hung at *Jerusalem* upon the Cross, or that there shall be again any *appearance of him in the Heavens*, as it was promised by the two Angels to his Apostles that saw him ascend; or that there is any *life to come*, after the dissolution of the natural body,

though

though our Saviour says expressly, *That after the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are like the Angels of God.* Matth. 22. 30.

But to be so *spiritual* as to interpret this of a *mysterious* resurrection of a man in this life, is in effect to be so truly *carnal*, as to insinuate there is no such thing at all as the *Life to come*, and to add to *Sadducism*, *Epicurism* also, or worse, that is, a religious liberty of filling one anothers houses with Brats of the adulterous bed, under pretence that they are now risen to that state that they may without blame commit that which in other mortals is down-right *Adultery*. Such unlawful sporting with the *Letter* as this, is to me no sign of a *spiritual man*, but of one at least *indiscreet and light-minded*, more gross in my conceit than *Hymeneus* and *Philetus*, who yet affirmed that the resurrection was past, and so *allegoriz'd* away the faith of the people. See *Mystery of Godliness*, Book 6. chap. 17. sect. 3.

For mine own part, I cannot admire any man's *Fancies*, but only his *Reason*, *Modesty*, *Discretion*, and *Miracles*, the main thing being presupposed (which yet is the birth-right of the meanest Christian) *to be truly and sincerely Pious*. But if his *Imagination* grow rampant, and he aspire to appear some strange thing in the world, such as was never yet heard of; that man seems to me thereby plainly to bewray his own *Carnality* and *Ignorance*. For there are no better Truths than what are plainly set down in the Scripture already, and the best, the plainest of all. So that if any one will step out to be so venerable an *Instructor of the World*, that no man may appear to have said any thing like unto him, either in his own age or foregoing generations; verily I am so blunt a Fool as to make bold to pronounce, that I suspect the party not a little season'd with *spiritual Pride* and *Melancholy*: For, God be thanked, the *Gospel* is so plain a Rule of *Life* and *Belief* to the sincere and obedient Soul, that no man can add any thing to it.

But then for comparison of persons, what dotage is it for any man, because he can read the *common Alphabet of Honesty and a Pious life* in the History of the Old and New Testament, finely *allegorizing*, as is conceiv'd, those *external Transactions* to a *mysterious* application of what concerns the *inward man*; to either place himself, or for others to place him in the same level with *Jesus Christ the Son of God*, the *Saviour of men*, and *Prince of the highest Angelical Orders*, who rose out of the grave by the omnipotent hand of his Father, and was seen to ascend into Heaven by his Apostles that gazed upon him as he passed through the Clouds, and whom all true *Christians* expect visibly to appear there again, and revisit the world according to the promise? I say, it seems to me a very unreasonable thing, if not impious and blasphemous, to acknowledge any man whatsoever comparable to so *sacred a Person* as he every way approved himself, and was approved by a voice from Heaven, saying, *This is my beloved Son, hear him*. See *Mystery of Godliness*, Book 6. chap. 12.

If any man therefore having none of these Testimonies from above, nor being able to do any thing more than other men, shall be so unmannerly as to place himself in the same rank with *Christ the Son of God*, because he has got some fine fancies and phrases, and special and peculiar interpretations of Scripture, which he will have immediately suggested from the Spirit; I cannot forbear again to pro-

See *Mystery of Godliness*,
Book 6. ch.
13. sect. 7.

nounce, that this man is overtaken with an high degree of either *Pride* or *Madness*; and if he can persuade any others to look upon him as so *sacred a Prophet*, that it must be in them at least *Inadvertency* or *Ignorance*; nay, I think I shall not say amiss, if I attribute their mistake to a kind of *Pride* also. For *Pride* affects nothing more than *Singularity*; and therefore undervaluing the plain Simplicity of ordinary *Christianity*, such as at first sight is held forth in the Gospel of Christ, they think it no small privilege to have a Prophet of their own; especially they getting this advantage thereby, that they can very presently, as they fancy, censure and discern the Truth or Falshood of all that venture to speak out of the Rode of their own Sect; as if every body were bound to conn their lessons according to *their Book*. And it is a fine thing to become so accurately wise at so cheap a rate, and discover who is *Spiritual*, or who is the *Carnal*, or mere *Moral* man. This is indeed the folly of all Sects, and there is no way better that I know to be freed from such inveiglements, than by earnestly endeavouring after that which they all pretend to, and to become truly more holy and sincere than other men; for the *thoroughly-purified man* is certainly delivered from all these follies.

These things I could not forbear to speak in zeal to the honour of my *Saviour*, and the good and safety of his *Church*. For if men once get a trick to call the world *Christian*, where the *death of Christ on the Cross at Jerusalem is not acknowledged a sacrifice for sin*, nor *himself now in his humane Person a Mediatour with God the Father*, and the *Head of his Church Militant and Triumphant*; nor that there is *any Eternal Life nor Resurrection*, but that in the *Moral or Mystical sense*: assuredly this will prove the most dangerous way imaginable quite to take away that in time, which is most properly called *Christian Religion*, out of the world, and to leave merely the name thereof behind.

See *Mystery of Godliness*,
Book 6.
chap. 15.

But a Religion so manifestly established by God in a most miraculous manner, and being so perfect, that the wit of man cannot imagine any thing more compleat, and better fitted for winning souls to God: It can be nothing but giddiness or light-mindedness, to think that this Religion can be ever superannuated in the world, but that it shall last till *Christ's Corporeal appearance in the Clouds*. For there is no reason at all that the Holy Ghost should be thought to come in the flesh of some particular man, no more than God the Father did under the Law. For what can he tell us more or better than Christ has already told us, or what himself may tell us without any personal shape? And there is no Prophecy of any such thing, but only of that which is better; that Christ will procure for all those that are his faithful and obedient followers, the Spirit of Truth and Righteousness, and indue them with the divine Life; and that it shall so at length come to pass, that Justice, Peace, and Equity shall more universally and fully flourish in the world than ever yet they have done; and that Faith in God, and of the Life to come, shall be more vigorously sealed upon the hearts of men; and that there shall be a nearer union and conjunction betwixt the humane and divine nature in us than ever, and more frequent and sensible commerce betwixt the Inhabitants of the *Æthereal* and *Terrestrial* Region, according as I have already

ready declared concerning the *Seventh day* in this *Defence of the Moral Cabbala*.

But in the mean time, though that full *Sabbatism* be so far off, yet I doubt not but there have been and are very sweet and joyful *prælibations* of it in sundry persons, which quicken their hopes and desires of the compleatment thereof: and that of the holy Apostle, *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συσπείρεται καὶ συνωδίνει ἀχρὶ τοῦ νῦν*, is not less true now than in his own times. * But those that would abuse that Text to a Political sense and tumultuous mispractice, are the Birth of Vipers, not the revealed Sons of God. For *the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God*. Jam. 1. 20. *Nor are the weapons of our warfare carnal, but Spiritual*. Which may be 2 Cor. 10. 4. a safe key to the unlocking of the Mystery of all those Prophecies concerning the Reign of the Saints, and their Victories, which fanatical persons, and of a gross temper, so easily err in, to the great disturbance of the World. And I must confess that even learned men, and of a more polite judgment and peaceable Spirit, have been very prone to mistake in this point, the phrase of Scripture seeming literally to sound that way: which if I could believe to be the right sense thereof, I should not be able to read the Predictions without horreur and affrightment; there being greater reason to be impassion'd for miseries to come, than those that are long since passed, and for such as are some time to fall upon the Church of Christ, than for those that concern mere Pagans. *Pour out thy wrath upon the Heathen that have not known thee, and upon the Kingdoms that have not called upon thy name*, would be the more natural wish of every well-willer to Christendom in this case; amongst the number of whom I cannot but profess my self. Psal. 79. 6.

And therefore peceiving the order of things so demonstrable, that of necessity *the judgment of the little Horn, the destruction of the man of sin, the burning of the Whore of Babylon*, and the like, are yet to come, and also concern the Christian World; and that upon this destruction all the Kingdoms of the Earth are to be the Kingdoms of Christ and of his Saints: I am infinitely relieved and refreshed in my own spirit, in that I am sufficiently satisfied in my self, that this Destruction is not to be understood necessarily of any carnal warfare and effusion of blood, but of that warfare which is *not carnal*, as St. Paul speaks; and that the reign of the Saints will not be by the invasion of the rights of Princes upon the want of Saintship, but by the conversion of Prince and people every where into the condition of Saints; and that the burning of *Rome* by fire is no more meant by that Tragical Prediction in the Apocalyps, than the sacking of *Corinth* by St. Paul's weapons of warfare, which he boasts to be so mighty through God for pulling down of strong holds. Nay, I will add further, that it is not only not necessary that these Predictions should be understood in so gross a sense, but that there is far greater reason to conclude, that they are not so to be understood, whether we consider the things themselves that are predicted, or the phrases and prefigurations of them in the Prophecies. And it would make much for the peace and happiness of Christendom, if any able Pen were employ'd in a more particularly making out so concerning a Truth: Besides the gratifying

ing of the more ingenuous Spirits, whose understandings cannot be well at rest in any supposition that clashes with that demonstrable order of Visions, *Synchroneal* and successive, which Mr. Mede has so happily light upon, and out of the rode of which all Expositions are found so groundless and inept, so rack'd and confused; nor their hearts at ease, if those menaces and encouragements to revenge, wars and bloodshed, should be the real scope and meaning of these Apocalyptick visions, and should not be figuratively and spiritually to be understood: which undoubtedly is the chief and primary, if not the only, sense of them. An Hypothesis which once received would prevent all the ill use that might be made of these clear and wonderful Predictions, and would remove all occasion of prejudice and disgust of the most rational and coherent interpretations of them.

But out of my love of the Peace and Tranquillity of the Church, not to lull her asleep into a false security; It does not at all follow, That, because this storm of destruction is not literally meant against her, therefore she shall never fall into any such. For assuredly there may be such a constitution of things, as if the Church should fall thereinto, would certainly bring down divine vengeance, though God had never threatned it. As for example, If the Generality of the Guides of Christendom should be gross Idolaters, bold Nullers or Abrogators of the indispensable Laws of Christ, by their corrupt Institutes, and bloody and barbarous Persecutors, and Murderers of those that, out of conscience towards God, will not commit Idolatry with them, nor forsake the commands of Christ; and to arm and occrustate themselves in this devilish Apostasy, should secretly foment in their own breasts, and endeavour to convey unto others that hideous monster of Atheism and Infidelity; taking it for their deepest foundation, That all things are alike true in Religion, only they must have the wit to dictate what is most for the *power* and *profit* of the Priest, and make his Interest the measure of all, not the honour of God, nor Salvation of the people: I say, if they should lapse into such a dreadful Apostasy as this, it is unimaginable how Vengeance could be kept off from overtaking them at the long run, or what hope they could have to speed better than the *Jews*, those Murderers of the Prophets of old, of whom Christ declares, that for persecuting and killing his innocent servants, all the righteous blood shed upon Earth should come upon them, from the blood of *Zacharias* the Son of *Barachias*, whom they slew betwixt the Temple and the Altar. And what a sad vengeance it was that did at last overtake them, though they were the peculiar people of God, is overwell known, unless it were better considered.

Matth. 23. 35.

If any such thing should ever come to pass, which God avert, the very external *Cortex* then of the Prophetick Visions would *ex accidenti* seem Prophetical, and the contexture of Phrases and Prefigurations such, as if they were intended to be in some sort *δελφικὴ μάχη* a two-edged Sword, striking both ways, and so destroying them in the gross sense that had hardened themselves against the spiritual edge thereof, and would not suffer their foul abominations to be cut off, and that bloody and Idolatrous Beastliness that had ruled so long, to be slain there-

thereby. To as many as so modest a sense of this can seem intolerable, they cannot but seem to me either Atheistically sottish, and utterly unbelieving of any truth of either Prophecies or Providence, and to think that humane wit and force will carry all before it: or else they are in a sleepy self-condemned condition, and hate the light, because their deeds are evil; such as *say unto God, Depart from us, we desire not the Knowledge of thy ways*; or such as *give the Nazarites wine to drink, and command the Prophets, saying, Prophecy not*; that *say to the Seers, See not*; and to the Prophets, *Prophecy not unto us right things; speak unto us smooth things, prophecy deceits*.

But unless I would my self be a false and deceitful Interpreter of the Prophets, I cannot but profess, that I think *that more Eximious and Illustrious Kingdom of Christ upon Earth* is yet to come, and that it will in due time be accomplished one way or other, according as *Daniel* has predicted, *That the Kingdom, and Dominion, and the greatness of the Kingdom under the whole Heaven, shall be given to the people of the Saints of the most High*: Which is not yet come to pass, forasmuch as that *little Horn that speaks such great things* is not yet put to silence. Dan. 7. 27.

Which *little Horn* cannot be *Antiochus Epiphanes*, he plainly belonging to the *Leopard with Four Heads*, or to the *Goat with four horns*; Dan. 7. 6. which *Beasts* denote the Greek Kingdom, of which the great *Horn*, or *Alexander*, is accounted the *first King*, and the other four as his *successors*, (else how could he be *first*?) and *Antiochus* reckoned in the latter time of the Kingdom of the *Four Horns*: which further shews, that the successors of *Alexander's* successors belong all to that one kingdom that is styled *Greek*, and represented by the *entire bodies* of those *Beasts*, the *Leopard* and *He-goat*, the one with *four heads and four wings*, and the other with *four horns* after the breaking of that first great one. From whence it is necessary, that the * *Fourth beast* be the *Roman Empire*, according to what has been also the constant opinion of the Church and of the Fathers.

At the same Times and Events does *St. John* point with these of *Daniel*, in the blast of the *seventh Trumpet*. *And the seventh Angel sounded, and there were great voices in Heaven, saying, The Kingdoms of the World are become the Kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever*. Rev. 11. 15.

And lastly, the Apostle *Paul* also witnesseth, that *before Christ deliver up the Kingdom to his Father, he is to put down || all Rule, and all Authority and Power*; For he must reign till he have put all his enemies under his feet: The last enemy that shall be destroyed is *Death*, which (as I have already signified unto you) though he be now with the *King of Terrors*, will in that great *Festival and Sabbatism*, by reason of so sensible and palpable union betwixt the Heavenly and Earthly nature, be but a pleasant passage into an higher room, or, to use that more mysterious expression of the *Rabbins* concerning *Moses*, in whose Writings this *Sabbatism* is adumbrated, God will draw up a man's Soul to himself by an *Amorous kiss*; For such was the death of that holy man *Moses*, who is said to have died in *Moab*, על פי יהוה, in the kisses and embracements of God. 1 Cor. 15. 24, 25, 26. 1 Dan. 7. 14, 27. R. Maimon. More Nevoch. part. 3. c. 51.

This

This shall be the condition of the Church of Christ for many hundred years; till the Wheel of Providence driving on further, and the Stage of things drawing on to their last Period, men shall not only be freed from the fear and pain of death, but there shall be no capacity of dying at all. *For then shall the day of the Lord come, wherein the Heavens shall pass away with a noise, and the Elements melt with fervent heat, and the Earth with all the things in it shall be burnt up.* Thus Christ having done vengeance upon the obstinately wicked and disobedient, and fully triumphed over all his enemies, he will give up his Kingdom to his Father, whose *Vicegerent* hitherto he hath been in the affairs of both men and Angels. But till then, whosoever by pretending to be more Spiritual and Mystical than other Men, would smother those Essential Principles of the Christian Religion, that have reference to the *external Person of Christ*, let him phrase it as well as he will, or speak as magnificently of himself as he can, we are never to let go the plain and warrantable Faith of the Word for ungrounded fancies and fine sayings.

Wherefore let every man seek God apart, and search out the Truth in the holy Scripture, preparing himself for a right understanding thereof, by steadfastly and sincerely practising such things as are plainly and uncontrovertedly contained therein, and expect illumination according to the best communication thereof, that is, answerably to our own Faculties; otherwise if we bid all *Reason*, and *History*, and *Humane helps*, and *Acquisitions*, quite adieu, the world will never be rid of *Religious Lunacies* and *Fancies*.

S C H O L I A.

In CAP. III. Vers. o.

MULTA centena Atheorum millia pepererit. Idem Bodinus eodem ferè loco vel paulò post, de Porphyrio etiam sic scribit. Eodem errore Porphyrius in libris quos adversus Christianos scripsit, ex literali sensu illud exagitans quod de *Arbore scientiæ Boni & Mali*, & de *Arbore vitæ* in *Mose* legimus, innumeros homines à Religione vera avocavit propter ea *ἄνωμα* quæ nasci videantur ex *Literali sensu*. Quamobrem meritò quis heic mirari potest præposterum eorum hominum studium, qui pro unico passim sacræ Scripturæ sensu tam acriter contendunt. Quod tametsi apud quosdam, ex superstitiosa quadam simplicitate fieri potest, apud alios tamen verisimillimum est, quippe aut *Atheismum* aut *Infidelitatem* clam in sinu soventes, ex maligno Religionis contemptu fieri, cui vultum quàm deformatissimum distortissimùmque exoptant, ut eam liberiori diductiorique rictu derideant.

Vers. 1. *Philonem* illud notasse, &c. Quod tamen alibi facit *φειλιώνης* ὁ ὄφης πάντων θνητῶν, ὃς δὲ πάντων πανεργότατος ἦδονη, *Ferarum omnium sapientissimus est Serpens, omnium verò vaferrimum voluptas*, Leg. Allegor. lib. 3.

Vers. 24. *Qui verò Textu hoc ad sensum Politicum*, &c. Quin tamen sensus sit hujus Textus etiam Politicus, nullus dubito, quemadmodum &

& illius apud eundem *Paulum*, 1 Cor. 15. ubi de Christi *Politiâ* omnia sibi subjugante loquitur, *Deinde erit finis cum tradiderit regnum Deo ac Patri, quum aboleverit πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξουσιῶν ὧν ὀνυχίζω*, quæ postrema vox idem quod ייִן significare potest; quum aboleverit *omne Imperium & omnem Potestatem cum suis copiis sive exercitibus*. Postquam hæc facta fuerint, tandem eò deventum erit ut *ultimus hostis mors aboleatur*. Quæ victoria τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τῆς σαρκατικῆς ἡμῶν in se complectitur. Quæ postrema pars est hujus Paragraphi ad *Romanos*, respondetque *abolitioni mortis* illo loco ad *Corinthios* memoratæ. κτίσις verò significationem habet & *Physicam* & *Politicam*, ac perinde, ut locus requirit, exponi potest alterutro sensu vel utroque. Quodsi ἡ ἀποκαταστάσις τῆς κτίσεως & πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συναδίνῃ, etiam ad *Physicam* significationem extendantur, vide annon id innuere possint, omnia in hac Regione *Mortalitatis*, quæ sensu non carent, placidiori rerum sensu perfusum iri ac sæliciori, circa ea tempora quibus gloriosa libertas obtigerit Filiis Dei, nempe post Ἐκτίρωσιν. Vide *Grotium* in locum. Mixtum verò sensum esse posse in hoc loco ad *Romanos* & tum de rebus *Politicis* tum de *Physicis* agi, ille locus ad *Corinthios* satis confirmare potest.

Quartam Bestiam esse Imperium Romanum. Vide *Synopsin Prophetica* ubi quæstio hæc contra *Grotium* satis accurate copiosèque discutitur.

THE

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CHAP. I.

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